The Duran Podcast - EU/UK demand Russia surrender w/ Ian Proud (Live)

Episode Date: April 29, 2025

EU/UK demand Russia surrender w/ Ian Proud (Live)

All right, we are live with Alexander McCurice in London, and we are joined once again on the Duran with Ian Proud. Great to have you with us. Once again, Ian, before we get started, where is the best place for people to follow your work? Please follow me on the peacemonger, which is my substack, why talk often in vain, it seems, at times, about the need to bring peace in Ukraine and other places.

And on my website, Proudoir. diplomat.com. I've got those links down below to the substack, to the website. I also have the link for Ian's X account as well. It puts out a lot of great posts on X. So before we get started, Ian, Alexander, let's just say a quick hello to everyone that is watching us on Odyssey, on Rockfin, on Rumble, on YouTube, and of course on our locals. Page, the durand. Dot locals.com. Great to have you with us and a quick shout out to our moderators as well zaryl in the house i believe i saw peter somewhere in there as well so uh those are our moderators thank you for everything that you do alexander ian let's talk about what is going on in uh with project uk with the uk and with the

e u and all of these peace plans and these ceasefire plans indeed let's do so no one better to discuss these with and with the peacemonger with Ian Proud. And can I actually push back a little about the point you made about this, that this is sometimes a very difficult thing. And it doesn't seem as if we're making any progress in getting this idea of a negotiated solution moving forward. Just go back to where we were this time last year, to the kind of rhetoric and the discussions that were happening then. We are in a completely different diplomatic. media universe now. There's clearly a great deal of exasperation and anger on the part of all sorts of people, that there's even talk about peace and peace settlements and negotiations and ceasefires and all those

sort of things. One gets the very strong impression that there's an awful lot of people who would rather that we were not talking about those things. But the fact is we are talking about these things. We're talking about these things all the time. And I'm sure that you are as, you know, familiar with the, you know, with the history of conflicts as I am. When a war begins, it's very, very difficult to end. Sometimes getting a negotiation underway, a serious negotiation underway to end it can be a protracted and complex issue. But the fact is, something has started. And, And we ought to be grateful for that. And it might come eventually to an end point.

The war might come to an end point. And the negotiation might reach some kind of agreement. And this churn that we're seeing up to now, in my opinion, is historical terms, not that unusual. So that's the first thing I wanted to say. Now, last week, we had two proposals for what looked like framework. proposals to move forward to discuss a way towards peace. One was an American proposal, which was presented as a take it or leave it proposal. I think we're all starting to have doubts about whether it really is a take it or leave it

proposal. But it did, it seems to me, show a certain shift in the American position. it begins to address some of the issues that might eventually lead us to a settlement. There was another proposal which came from Europe. There were overlaps between the two. But I have to say that the European proposal filled me with grave misgivings. It caused me very, very deep concern. It is inconceivable to my mind that that proposal could be accepted by the other side.

by the Russians at all. And I worry that the mere fact that proposals like that are still circulating is inevitably going to be noted in Moscow and is going to make them even more suspicious of the American proposals than they probably would anyway be and is likely to lead to a hardening of the Russian position. So that is my concern. That's the sort of topic I wanted to. discuss in this program today. But perhaps if you could just put forward your own thoughts first, and then we can perhaps delve a little bit more into the detail in the next 40, 45 minutes that we might have. Thanks, Alexander. I certainly agree with what you said at the top. There has been a massive change, not just really in terms of the tone and posture of talks since the war began,

but actually since 2014, for the first time the Americans have really embraced the idea of having dialogue with Russia, which in itself is a huge change. Now, of course, Europe is nowhere near close to catching up with that, but nevertheless that's had seismic implications for the speed and the momentum behind efforts to actually bring the war to close. That's the first thing. I completely agree with you on that point. On the plans, I think what has been interesting for me, and you noted this, was the sense that there has been some movement, albeit slightly, movement on the European and the Ukrainian side, you know, towards the facts on the ground, you know, in terms of the starting point for longer term peace process. The first is to accept

the line of control at the point of which the fighting stops as a basis for future talks. I mean, that is in itself a huge shift. It was only a few weeks ago that the kind of European Commission press representative were saying that, you know, Ukraine should push Russia out to its 1990. border as a requirement for sanctions to be lifted. That's first thing. Second, there's an acceptance that NATO is off the table. I think that is now kind of accepted, if not sort of wholeheartedly, including by the European side and I think also by the Ukrainian side.

You know, these are two kind of big deals. All of the rest, there's a lot of texture in the other kind of issues remaining, including some child Ukrainian Georgian and so on and so forth. The biggies, which I think you allude to, the sticking points from the Russian side, on the economic side, this idea that there should be absolutely no sanctions, move. Indeed, there should be harsher sanctions, you know, in the term of a peace, which is a completely ludicrous idea, and will only sort of emboldened, you know, President Putin to keep fighting. So that's a big one.

And the security guarantees, this idea that Ukraine should be militarised and have NATO light, sort of guarantees from basically NATO countries, that clearly also isn't going to, isn't going to kind of wash with Russia. But there has been movement. And I think actually, if I close here, you know, what Trump's, you know, this is my last gasp offer. I think that's just part of the, his manoeuvring. That's part of how he kind of does still making, sort of putting maximum pressure on the Ukrainian and Europeans in particularly to settle. And I think that's where we are, you know, right now. You think we, what, do you think we're going to see the Europeans move? further because at the moment they don't seem to be happy about the entire peace process at all.

And that makes the question why. Why is this enormous reluctance in Europe to resolve this crisis? Why is there all this debate all the time about carrying on somehow without the Americans, which anybody who looks at this situation objectively knows that is impossible? I mean, that is an absolute guarantee. of failure and of defeat eventually. So why do we get this rhetoric? Why not acknowledge properly that the Americans do want to see this war end?

And what we really need to do is accept the fact and get behind them. Is it because we're over-invested in the previous policy? Or is it, and I say this, frankly, is it because Fartan, many of our leaders seem to me to be living inside a historical novel of 1938, in which they all play particular roles in it, you know, taken from that novel and they can't just give all that up. I mean, what is the problem? Why are we so hostile to some kind of resolution of this conflict, which will stabilise the situation in Europe and deliver peace? and allow our economies perhaps to begin to recover from the many problems we have.

So I'm not sure about a novel, but I certainly think some are living in a fantasy land. That's clear. I think there are three things. You know, first, people are trying to position Trump as some sort of global sort of far-right aberration who will disappear in time and we just need to kind of weather that storm. I think it's totally deluded, quite frankly, because the world is shifting multipolar. even though I don't agree with Trump's trade policies, he's kind of in his own peculiar way embracing that.

That's the first thing. The second thing, and you alluded to this, is people who are invested in the war. And actually what that means is that to fail and to be seen to have failed, which is going to happen when the war comes to an end, European and actually Biden's US policy will be seen to have failed.

People need to reposition and repackage was being a completely wasteful project that has cost over a million lives through deaths and injury since the war began, prompting the rapid deindustrialisation of Europe with consequences for ordinary citizens. So people have to deal with that when war comes to an end.

We failed and you suffered, and that is a hard package. And the third thing, of course, is that then you have this disgruntled failed state in terms of Ukraine, that suddenly wants turbocharged access to European Union membership, which European members can't afford to give them, because they're spending their money now on the vehement of a strategic threat

that doesn't really exist. So, you know, it's a whole package of pain, quite frankly, for European leaders. But they just need to kind of, you know, swallow that, what is going to be an extremely bitter pill, which I believe will have domestic political vacations in countries like France and Germany in particular, also of course, Central Europe, for many years to come. Why this obsession was sending troops to Ukraine, which our Prime Minister in Britain has?

I mean, first of all, what is that supposed to achieve even? I mean, I'm still not clear what the objective is, what is exactly supposed to do? Is it a tripwire force? Is it a retraining force that it has been scaled down to? Is it a deterrent force, a deterrent force, which is more likely, I would have thought, to be provocative? Is it intended to complicate and wreck the negotiations? Is it an attempt to try and make Britain and France look more important and engaged in this process than they really are?

I mean, what is this? Why are we seeing this debate even happen? I get the sense that many people in the army, the British military especially, are frankly extremely skeptical about this idea altogether. You see all these articles appearing in all kinds of places, which look to me to reflect that concern. So why are we so focused on these things that can only complicate the course towards a negotiation, rather than putting all that aside. Surely what we ought to be doing is working in harness with the Americans, and constantly, you know, putting up our own proposals and acting, if you like, in sort of right angles to them.

Well, collectively there are 1.4 million troops at arms in Ukraine from both forces, you know, right now. The idea that 10,000, even 20,000, I don't think the UK could deliver up 20,000 troops, is going to make a difference. I think part of this is about sort of, you know, trying to confirm to ourselves in Britain that we really do still, we really are still a global strategic military power, which we are not. We've just sent half of our fleet. Literally four ships is almost half of our sea worthy fleet on an eight-month tour to the Indo-Pacific. You know, the idea that we're still this great military power is something that we cling to, using now to as like the 2.5% uplift in defence spending.

that that is completely ridiculous, but very much placed to domestic constituency in Britain right now, which kind of loves a good war, having pulled out of Afghanistan, which is our only real reason, only purpose for military engagement worldwide hitherto. And secondly, it's about gruntling Zelensky. It's about saying, well, we really are on your side,

and even though it's obviously unworkable, we'll pursue these hairbrained ideas, including some, you know, when it comes down to it, meaningless tripwire force, reassurance force, whatever you want to call it, a military force, which Russia will see as a NATO force and which will disincentifies Russia from seeing for peace. So, you know, but for both reasons, actually, it's just not a good idea. And actually, as part of that reckoning that I alluded to earlier, when our policy in Ukraine

fails and is seen to fail, you know, Britain needs to come to a reckoning with our military role in the world as a much reduced military power, despite an exorbitant increase in our country, our spending on defense. There was a very good article that you posted on your Substant blog about the fact that Zelensky gets invited to all these meetings. And of course, he comes with his own ideas. And frankly, it seemed to me, and exactly as you said somewhere, that this proposal that the Europeans put forward has Ukrainian fingerprints in lots of.

parts of it. I mean, there are lots of ideas there that you can see must be coming from the Ukrainians. Isn't it time when instead of encouraging the Ukrainians in the way that we seem to be doing, we had a frank and honest discussion with them and explained to them very clearly and very simply. the Americans have reached their limits. If they've reached their limits, we've reached ours. We've reached ours. We can't do more.

You've got a peace proposal from the Americans. What you need to be doing at this time is getting completely behind it, because that's really your only way forward now. I mean, I haven't seen that discussion take place, but isn't that what we should be doing? If our Prime Minister, if the French president, if the European Commission president were to say that to Zelensky,

he might pay attention. At the moment, he seems to think that we're saying one thing, the Americans explain something else that he can somehow maneuver and darken weed between the two and it can still move forward with whatever plan he has. Every time you see Zelensky on the TV now, he seems increasingly dictatorial with this kind of really violent hand movements and body language. I'm not sure if you've going to notice that. It's certainly glaring, you know, from my perspective.

Look, that conversation is the conversation we should have been having with Parashenko in 2015, actually. And we've avoided having with the Ukrainian since that time. And now what that conversation means is that we lied to you. We said we'd support you for as long as it takes. It took too long and now the Americans are leaving and actually we don't have the money, all the political constituencies just keep going, add in for an item.

I think that's a conversation that nobody wants to have, but they need to have actually. And I think the longer this goes on, the grave of the domestic political consequences for all of these countries. And actually the big missing piece in this conversation, everything that we've discussed until now is Russia. And one of the things that came out to the Steve Wichkhov meeting with President Putin last week

was Ushikov's statements that there were really productive discussions on the idea of bilateral Russia to Ukraine talks. Now, this will only be solved when the Russian and the Ukrainian sides get together. This ultimately isn't about what the Europeans, what their plan is. It isn't even about what Trump's plan is, although I'm completely. aligned with where he is on NATO membership and all those things. I'm completely aligned. This comes down to actually Russia and Ukraine talking to each other. And as we know, Zelensky has made that illegal.

So, you know, this is kind of the real crunch point now. At what point is Zelensky going to fold and say, well, actually, yes, we do need to talk directly to Russia. I maybe need to talk directly to Vladimir Putin. And what does that mean for him domestically in Ukraine itself? I mean, can I just say, I mean, yes, we lied to the Ukrainians before, but if we don't have that conversation, what it means is we're just going to continue lying to them. That is an even worse position. So, I mean, you know, there has to be a point where this has to stop. And I was actually going, I mean, you anticipated me because the Russians are now clearly saying this is the moment when we have to move beyond.

move beyond us talking to the Americans, we have to actually sit down and talk with the Ukrainians themselves. And I think the Americans are fully on board with this, by the way. That's absolutely my own impression. So why isn't that happening? I mean, what is the objection,

both from the Ukrainian side and from the European side? Why do we not want the Ukrainians and the Russians talk with each other. Because it seems to be, ceasefires, by the way, I mean, absolutely wonderful things. But the most logical way to agree a ceasefire is by the two parties that are actually fighting coming to the point when they agree between them. I mean, that's how ceasefires in most conflicts are negotiated. But what is this objection to direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine? Why are we insisting on a ceasefire before negotiating? even begin. Again, I don't think this is the usual pattern in conflicts. You meet, you talk,

you agree a ceasefire, you then move on and you discuss more substantive issues. Well, indeed, that was what happened in March 22, of course, as we all recall. And the Europeans have demonised the notion of having any direct dialogue with President Putin since 2015. I keep reiterating this point. This is not a new blockage, you know, that we face. What is different is that Trump has completely unblocked that and we're not ready to do that, you know, yet. Ultimately, the Ukrainians and the Russians under Turkish moderation were able together to come up with the framework for a longer-term peace process that kicked down the road issues around the states of Crimea at that time before Russia lay legal claim to the war blasts

and all the rest of it. They were capable of hammering out. you know, the framework of a longer term, a process that looked to the extent that it was fully acceptable to either side, workable for both sides at that time. And they need to get back to the hard yards of doing that, you know, once more, recognizing that actually the circumstances and the conditions on the Ukrainian side may be less favorable now, frankly, than they were in March 2022. And that's another reason why, for Zelensky, having made it illegal to talk to the Russians, you know, that's a difficult one for him to move on from because that's essentially political suicide. Now, you know, it's that honest conversation again, European leaders getting behind Trump saying, well, actually now we do need to get down to the business of actually sitting down with the Russians,

even if you and Putin don't actually meet directly to hammer out some sort of a deal, because that is the only way to end this, direct bilateral negotiations between the warring parties. Well, as I said, how wars generally end. What else can we do to get this process going? I mean, should we go public? Why don't we speak to the Russians ourselves? Just a few weeks ago, I remember that there was an argument at one of the endless meetings that have happened

between Sanchez, the Spanish Prime Minister and the other European leaders, about appointing a European representative to conduct dialogue directly with the Russians. I've not heard anything about that since. I've never heard of any appointment to such a person. Isn't that an obvious thing to do? Shouldn't we appoint someone? Shouldn't that person be going to Moscow, just as Wick Goff is going to Moscow, I mean, talking to the Russians. I mean, one of the obvious things I would have thought in negotiations. This is something that I should say I've

been involved in many negotiations. It's just the Russians who are advancing. I mean, what we need to do is to find a formula where they decide that it is to their advantage to stop. That means talking to them to find out what it is they want from us that might induce them to stop. It doesn't mean, you know, we accept it, but at least it provides us with an understanding of what they're thinking. Why don't we do that? Surely now that the Americans are talking to the Russians, we should be talking to the Russians also. Why doesn't David Lamy go to Moscow? I mean, just a suggestion. But if David Lamy can't go, maybe, as I said,

we appoint a European representative, maybe Mr. Sanchez. And he can go. Well, it was actually going to be Macon. Macon was the person who was nominated for that role. And actually, he was one of the only people who was talking to Putin. If you remember that terrible scene on the extremely long table, you know, in the incumbent. And that's absolutely right.

I mean, they should. But in any case, I think it's childish, this notion that only one European leader can be the one who talks to Putin. I mean, why can't they all? I mean, I know the Hungarian foreign minister has been to Moscow quite recently to talk for energy links and that sort of thing. We've demonised dialogue to such an extent that we're even talking about which European head of state or head of government should be the one who goes trembling and cowering to Moscow. to talk to the terrifying Vladimir Putin is quite ridiculous. We need that dialogue. But in terms of the specifics, maybe we do need a Minsk three.

Instead of being Germany and France and Ukraine and Russia, is the USA in France and Ukraine and Russia, with Russia and Ukraine doing the negotiations. And the Americans and the French, possibly the Chinese, they're to be there to moderate and support. Maybe that's the format, the back and forth the shuttle of who's going to go to Moscow, you know, today, oh, gosh, hadn't been for 10 years. I mean, it's quite ridiculous. You know, if there's going to be some sort of role for the Europeans to play,

you know, let's be clear about what it is. Let's actually have a format of dialogue that brings them in with the Americans and possibly with another, you know, Brick's, you know, third party with Russia and Ukraine. I think that might be a sensible way forward. I mean, it's, it's hardly mentioned ever, but the Chinese actually have a peace envoy. We're supposed to be brokering peace between Ukraine and Russia. His name is Lee Kwe. And he's visited both Kiev and Moscow many, many times. He gets on with the Russians. He doesn't get on so well, unsurprisingly, maybe, with the Ukrainians. But why don't we meet with him? Obviously, the Americans are their own issues with the Americans at the present time. But we are talking about China very often as a country

that has influence in Moscow, which it probably does. Why don't we actually get in touch with and speak to their peace envoy? I remember he was travelling around European capitals at one time, and they didn't seem to be keen to meet him at all, as I remember. Is it again this idea that, you know, China shouldn't really involve itself in European problems? Just asking. Yeah, well, as I said, I think we should involve China in a sort of peace dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, with the US and maybe with France or another kind of European country.

That makes complete sense. But I mean, the European states are so completely aligned with Ukraine that are unable to play an impartial mediating role, which is actually the role that Trump is now positioning the United States to play, which is a role that China has been trying to play without any success, unfortunately, for some months now. So it's whether Europe itself can play that mediating role. It simply cannot with people like Caii Callas, you know, by running the conform policy.

It can't with Ursula Bondiolian, you know, so that they're not the right people, in any case, unelected, you know, representatives. So, I mean, who's it going to be? And actually, are they going to do that in good faith, seeking a genuine mediatory role that looks to kind of bring the conflict to an end? That's the big question. That's something that Macron is, all this kind of pontification is kind of not really, getting to the heart of. He's not having been nominated into this

bizarre European role as their spokesperson. I've seen him do nothing frankly in this role since that time. Absolutely. I mean that that's what I was going to say. I mean I personally from what I've heard I mean the Russians aren't keen on Macron anyway I mean they've had many dealings with him but can I ask about something else because how united is Europe actually because you mentioned Peter Seyato, the Hungarian foreign minister who's been to Moscow.

Fetzo is going from Slovakia is going to Moscow for the 9th of May parade. But in some ways you could argue these are the perennial dissidents. But do you get the feeling, which I certainly do, that anyway, there is a fracture now starting

that more and more European countries are quietly becoming increasingly disillusioned and doubtful about this whole process. And the fact that there is this core group of Germany, France and Britain, of course, isn't in the EU, but through all intents and purposes on this issue, is part of the group who are running the policy. It's not going to be sustainable because other European countries beyond a certain point are going to start to push back and start to say this is, we have indeed reached our limits and we really do need peace and we can't continue with this any longer and that we could actually have a split in Europe if this stance is maintained for much longer.

Well, I think there's increasing disillusionment within Central Europe, but the European project itself. And actually you also see that in France and in Germany with the continued vise of the AFD even after the elections were recently concluded with a bizarre interference in Romania's elections with Austria kind of really kind of slowly more closely aligned with Central European states with even sort of place like Croatia you know and so on and actually Serbia the kind of the maneuvers it's going through about it's kind of frankly never ending they probably never will end you know

European accession process and all these things. People are starting to question, well, what is the point of the European project? It was an open sort of economic community that was intended to kind of break down barriers and create a sort of unified European community of peoples, not unelected institutions. But that doesn't seem to be the purpose that it's serving now. The purpose that it's serving now is increasing militarism and antagonistic relations with its biggest kind of nuclear-armed neighbor, which is Russia. So I think that that disillusionment is really about the European project itself,

you know, possibly less so about, you know, the Ukraine war where, you know, the blob consensus is still kind of remarkably durable. But we'll see in June when the sanctions come for, you know, a big rollover at the moment, the European sanctions against Russia. If there's any ceasefire that happens before then, you know, which will be the first European country to break banks on consensus and bring the sanctions house of cards crashing down because it'll only take one country to do that. If there is some ceasefire, if the US does offer sanctions relief, then you can be sure that FISA or something like

that will want to follow suit in some way. I mean this is one of the strangest things of all. The Americans are talking about sanctions relief And as you said at the start of the program, some people in Europe are talking about strengthening sanctions even further. I mean, how can one enforce European sanctions at the same time that the Americans are relaxing theirs? I mean, it makes absolutely no sense to me. I mean, surely the two, the one will undermine the other. If the Americans are relaxing or even lifting sanctions, we are not going to be able to enforce. sanctions that we impose by ourselves. All we will be doing is causing further problems for the

European economy, which at that point is going to start looking increasingly isolated. Also, it seems to me. Well, sanctions long ago past the point of diminishing marginal marginal returns, actually many years ago, arguably even before the war started. So I mean, the point is that having more sanctions will actually hurt Europe more than they hurt Russia, but we're so invested in sanctions as an end as a means rather than an end that actually that that point seems to be lost on European decision makers. You know, the idea that kind of the US can lift and Europe, Europe can stick is quite bizarre, but but the main point is that sanctions aren't working and actually sanctions, if they have a purpose, it's to incentivise Russian behaviour

and concessions, all sanctions have done of involved in Russia to act and imposing further sanctions or disincentifies any motivation for Russia to reach compromise on the battlefield at a time when they still have by some considerable margin, you know, the upper hand. Yeah.

On the question of the European fracture, I mean, you mentioned central Europe. Now, both Alex and I are from Sophehram. Southern Europe, if you like, from southeastern Europe, from the Greek world. But again, speaking about attitudes in Southern Europe, I'm going to just quickly say, in my opinion, they've always been much more skeptical about this whole policy towards Russia than you find in northern Europe. And I understand that in Italy, now the debate is moving much further. And it seems to me the Italian government is taking very tentative steps away.

from what might be called the European Consensus Just just to say Anyway, let's No, that is true And the Italians are always the most Duffish, sorry, the Italians are always the most

Dutch, one of the most Duffish, including with the Spanish, you know, back in 2014 when the sanctions were first imposed. You know, you and I both talked about Mateo Enzi, you know, seeing Matero Enzi in St Petersburg, the International Economic Forum in 2016 and, you know, the massive trade promotion effort that Italy put into that event after sanctions regime

would be in place for two years. But nevertheless, the European consensus still held. So I think the southern Europeans always had a more sort of carefree attitude sanctions, but will still trade with Russia. That doesn't mean that they would necessarily break consensus on sanctions, where I think actually the risk is much greater in such a Europe. Yeah. What about the Russians?

They are advancing. Why would they want a negotiated solution, especially given the fact that there is a great deal of mistrust in Russia of the whole diplomatic process as it has played out in the past? I mean, this is something I think people need to recognize in the West,

but, you know, there is that caution and that mistrust in Moscow. Of that, I've no doubt, which he's very, very strong. And you find it on all the usual telegram channels that we all read. It's clearly there. But why would the Russians want a negotiated end to the war? Put aside the humanitarian issue about the fact that they're losing lots of people, which no doubt does play a role. But they're winning.

they sense that sanctions have played out their most important effect. Why would they settle for less than they could? Why would they settle for less than an outright victory? What is the attraction for them in doing so? Well, I think Russia's core demands have always been clear, and the first of those obviously around making Ukraine a neutral country, removing its NATO aspirations, restoring rights for people with minority languages, including the Russian language, and that sort of thing, that the list of issues has got more complicated as the

war has dragged on for three years, including the foreblasts and so on. But I've always felt that actually if those key can a preconditions, those underlying causes that the Russians often talk about are addressed and they need to be addressed to the NATO issue and so on, then actually that would incentivise them to sort of settle, you know, wherever the fighting is when the gunfire, when the gunfire stops. There are issues around that about sanctions as well. You know, they would want to be sure that actually, you know, to incentivise them to stop, there would need to be some plan that sanctions be removed over time. The problem that we have today is that actually was saying, well, stop fighting and will impose even greater penalties on

you. And clearly that is never going to persuade the Russians to settle. that will only ever incentivize them to keep fighting. But I believe that actually, and Trump seems to have a much clearer focus on this, there needs to be a plan for sanctions removal. NATO has to be taken off the table, lots of other detailed things to be discussed. But if we address these core issues, first and foremost, I believe Russia would be willing to settle. Is that what the Russians mean when they talk about the root causes of the war, that they're talking about these core issues that have been there for,

them all the time. And what sort of guarantees would they seek that once those core issues are addressed, they're not going to be revisited again? Because, of course, we're talking about NATO membership. I mean, NATO membership for Ukraine was not something that Ukraine initially sought. Its constitution, its post-independence constitution spoke about Ukraine being a neutral country. The Russians always say that they were promised that NATO would not be extended and certainly they didn't, I think, in the early 90s, think that Ukraine would be brought into NATO. What guarantees would they be seeking that whatever we agreed now

would not be changed in the future? Or would it be the case that after the disaster we've just, experience that nobility in the West would have any appetite to revisit this whole issue by going back on what was agreed before. Just unscramble that a little, if I can ask. There's a lot of texture around, you know, how NATO confirms that it won't join, how Ukraine confirms that it won't join NATO at some point in the future. It can't clearly just be some verbal thing, maybe it's some sort of constitutional, you know, change in Ukraine. That would be extremely painful as we all know some assurance that well for as long as Trump's in power you know

Ukraine won't be able to join NATO I don't think as you suggest that's really going to cut it with President Putin he wants a cast iron guarantee the Russians always tend to be quite so legalistic they want treaty-based commitments and that sort of thing so I mean that you know how it happens what the nuances around that is going to take a lot of detailed work but it will require some I think firm sort of legally binding commitment that this won't happen in the future. That's my sense of what the Russians will ask of this, what that ultimately comes out and looking like remains to be seen. But I mean, my view on this continues to be that actually we're, you know, we should be thinking beyond the

purely military. Clearly, you know, NATO taking off the table is a big precondition, you know, from the Russian side. But there's the economic side too. If we are genuinely re-engaging, the opening to the borders, you know, with Russia and with Ukraine, and between Ukraine and with Russia over the much longer term, of course, then actually the conditions should not in the future arise that there would need to be a conflict in any case. I mean, I think that there's a risk in looking only too narrowly at the NATO question, which has to be addressed in some sort of legally binding treaty-based kind of form, but thinking of the bigger pictures, you know, what is the relationship that we want to have with Russia,

with Ukraine, with the wider Eurasia continent at a time when relations with the US from an economic and trade and investment perspective are in any case starting this out and we we see that it's in our collective interest to actually think within our neighbourhood i'm getting to finish with this question it's it's a big one because i know but i know you're becoming very interested in the in the briggs question and eurasia and all of this we are we are in a very difficult economic situation not just in britts but in europe in general and um if we can get this issue of nato and russia off the table. Not only perhaps can we start to address these pressing economic problems that we have, but is it not at least possible that, you know, once we re-establish a civilised dialogue with the Russians,

we might actually be able to work with them to improve our own economic situation. And of course, those too. Because well, you've been to Russia, you've worked there, you've been the embassy. Objectively, it seems to me they have a great deal to offer, not just natural gas,

but lots of other things, you know, lithium, whatever, whatever natural resources you want. Extremely smart workforce. Extremely smart work. Well, you go ahead and say. Yeah, I mean, sort of

great cultural heritage and all those, you know, an obvious kind of route into sort of trade into China that could be lower costs and shipping trade and that sort of thing in the future. I mean, so many economic benefits. To us, it's an absolute no-brainer, you know, that actually having a more open and embracing sort of economic trade and investment relationship with the country with, you know, these vast reserves of low-cost energy, you know, makes sense. Even as we go through some sort of unspecified kind of green net zero kind of transition, we're still going to need sort of a low energy for years to come.

Culturally, it makes sense to kind of open borders, which the whole European project was kind of grounded upon that, that idea of having this kind of common community in terms of this multipolar pivot towards greater trade, not just with China, but with Asia, you know, as a whole, I mean, Russia is the perfect bridge, you know, to help, you know, build those interconnectors between Europe and wider Asia. I mean, there are no economic reasons that actually we would want wholeheartedly to kind of embrace Russia more closely than we do now. And in any case, we did before. I mean, even, you know, when I was in Russia, you know, BP was the biggest Western investor in Russia through its 19.75 percent stake of Rosneft.

the time you know we were invested in the and it's hard to say it now but the Nord Stream 2 project through Shell I mean we had so we had so many kind of collaborations university to university collaboration was tremendous cultural collaboration kind of was really deep I mean we did so many good things you know together I think we need to kind of focus on that bigger picture you know what is the relationship that we want to have and actually manage the ups and downs which will happen, you know, it's a complicated, difficult relationship politically at times, rooted in mutual historical grievances and all those things that we know about very well, but we need to kind of focus on the big picture of, you know, we can have a better relationship with the Russia

if you really want to. It's really us that's kind of holding ourselves back. Ian Prout, thank you very much for coming to this program and discussing all of these things today. You just stay there a few minutes. If you could just stay there a few minutes, Alex will put some questions to you. All right. We have a few questions here for Ian Proud. From William, am I right that the talks will fizzle out until even the West Twigs Istanbul Plus was a cracking deal? Then they may try to accept it, only to find that four regions are now six or eight, as Adistovic warned. Yeah, I mean, I think that's a risk of that. I think the risk is fairly low. At the moment, high impact, low likelihood is what I would say right now. I think Trump is so

invested in getting his Nobel Prize and bringing the war to an end, that there's going to be increasing American pressure to settle. Istanbul won was a good deal. The deal even now may not be as good as it was then in March 2022, but I think pressure is going to go, including within Ukraine itself on Zelensky, for something to give Ryan. And at the moment, the Russians are making all the running on this.

From Bin Lind, UK seems to be falling apart. Can it be in a depression? Well, lots of people are depressed. I mean, I think economically, in some aspects, I think what Rachel Reeves and I'm politically independent, by the way, I don't support any of the major political parties. But, I mean, she's trying to do the impossible. She is actually trying to embrace closest of economic relations with China and with the EU and with the US at the same time that Trump is doing his kind of crazy tower wars.

If only she embraces that with greater Eurasian, with Russia in particular, that would be even even better. But I think actually there is a plan, but I think Ukraine war is getting in the way of us actually kind of driving forward and driving growth in our country. The soon as we end the war, then soon as we can get back to living on that. Sparky asks, Ian, before the dissolution of the USSR, wasn't Ukraine just a nominal country that still thought of itself as Russia? Isn't Ukraine's identity as separate from Russia a product of Western propaganda? Well, Ukraine was it so necessary within the Soviet Union, of course. Now, you can argue historically that was a confected ideal with kind of the Western Ukrainian Catholics

against kind of Russian majority, the people in the East, the Kuomian Tartas in the south and that sort of thing. But it was what it was. It was, you know, territorial, you know, within the Soviet Union, whether you could, frankly ask that about lots of countries, whether they really exist. But the borders are what they are, and you've got to deal with the facts on the ground. it tends to be my view on that. And those facts have obviously changed by war,

the sooner you can re-freeze the lines and get people coexisting the better. Sparky asks, Ian, isn't it best in the long term for Ukraine to go back to being Russia like it was before the revolution? Well, I don't really believe in rewriting history. I'm a diplomatial with what happens in here and now. No would be my answer to that.

I mean, Ukraine should be Ukraine, Russia should be Russia. ideally they should both over the much longer term seek ways to have much better relations than they do now and have done for the past kind of 12 years will be in my recommendation there's still lots of people in russia with ukrainian heritage lots of people still in ukraine with russian heritage i mean it shouldn't be an either or it should be a you know how can we get to a place where both countries can peacefully coexist trade move embrace freely and engage with each other as neighbors and, you know, brethren.

All right. One more question, Ian, if you have the time. From Josie S. Thank you, Alex Alexander and Ian Proud for your work. Question. The U.S., EU, and UK have all been active participants in this conflict since 2014, yet they still present themselves as neutral mediators and peacemakers. This is a complete lie.

Are Russia's leaders reminding them that they have been at war and that they are losing, Has it always been like this in the political leadership of the collective West? Short answer, yes. And Trump has changed the game. Trump has changed the game. You know, he said, well, actually, why should we directly engage with Russia? You know, we're also supporting Ukraine. I mean, that's been the little game changer here.

You know, the US in particular, but also the UK and to less extent, certainly in the early days, you know, the EU were very much kind of invested in the side. the Ukraine should be peeled away from Russian influence. And that gambit has catastrophically failed with the consequences that we see today. Thank goodness Trump was bringing some realism and sense to this. Let's hope he succeeds. Fantastic. Ian Proud.

Thank you so much for joining us. Once again, you can follow Ian's work on Substack, on X, on his website. I have all those links in the description box down below, and I will add them as a pinned comment as well when we wrap up. this live stream. Thank you, Ian, for joining us. I see you both again. All the best. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ian. Take care. Take care. All right.

Alexander, you there? Absolutely. All right. Let's answer the remaining questions. From Nikos, you know, I once thought that Trump didn't understand this conflict because the media have such a big influence on public perception. But increasingly, I think he is an idiot. He is losing constantly. Part one. regards to, that's what, I don't know if you want to comment on that, Alexander.

And then, and then, first of all, first of all, Donald Trump, first of all, Donald Trump is not an idiot. People always say this about him. I mean, I've had to deal with many idiots in my time. I can tell you absolutely not, absolutely Donald Trump is not only not an idiot. He is an extremely clever man in his own particular way. Now, what I think he is is also still, despite having been president before, very inexperienced in conducting negotiations of this kind. Remember, whenever he tried to conduct negotiations back during his first term, he was always prevented from doing so, basically. So it never really got off the ground. So I think he's bringing to this particular conflict, a diplomatic strategy based on what he used to do in commercial negotiations,

which doesn't really fit very well. But I think, this is my own view, over the last couple of days, he's finally arrived at that point, which we were discussing in the program with Ian Pram now, where he understands that the way forward now is for the Russians and the Ukrainians to get, and talk and for you for Zelensky to rescind his October 22nd decree and forget all about that and finally sit down and negotiate in other words we've gone past the point of first the ceasefire then the negotiations which was always putting the cart before the horse he now understands they have to be the negotiations first then out of the negotiations once you have the framework agreement

sorted out you have you get to the cease to to the ceasefire and that means that the Ukrainians must finally sit down and talk to the russians and of course they will do so from a vastly weaker position than they were back in april 2022 when they basically walked out of the talks Okay, Nico says, in regards to the North Korean troops, Constantine Roshkov, a.k.a.a.a. the real reporter, had a conversation about them with SS SB veteran Valerie Shiraev. Valerie said that North Koreans were brought in as a favor. They performed poorly, however, because they didn't follow the advice of the Russian generals and instead used old Soviet tactics. With that in mind, and since South Korea is weaker than ever, thanks to President Yun,

I don't understand why Russia announced their participation. Russia doesn't owe a thanks to Kim. I guess they did it as a show of force. Unfortunately, I am 100% convinced that Europe and the UK will use this as an excuse to bring their own troops into Ukraine. No, I don't think they will, actually. I don't think that's what's going to happen. I think that the whole idea of bringing troops into Ukraine

is gradually melting away. And the North Korean, the presence of the North Koreans, isn't going to make any difference, because the reason it is melting away is because the British and French militaries and the militaries right across Europe have told the political leaders, it is an absolute non-starter. You are sending our soldiers into a furnace and they're going to be roasted. That is what I think is killing that idea entirely. As to how well or badly the North Koreans did in Kusk, because that's the only place, by the way, where they fought. Well, you get completely diametrically opposite accounts from different Russian commentators.

I wasn't there. I haven't spoken to any North Koreans. We don't even know how many North Koreans that actually were. So I am not going to arbitrate and discuss this. Why did the Russians announce it? They announced it, I am absolutely sure, because Kim Jong-un. wanted it announced he wanted it confirmed why did the russians agree to have north koreans sent to russia at all i think the answer goes back to what happened in early 2023 when the south koreans disastrously and in the face of repeated warnings both on the russians and i now understand from China. And I've heard this now from some people in China, supplied half a million shells to the United States to facilitate the Ukrainian offensive of the summer of 2023. The Russians

were absolutely furious about that. And they went out of their way to make it clear to the South Koreans that there would be consequences. And they did that in the most public way imaginable by getting closer to the North Koreans and to Kim Jong-un. A stupid decision by South Korea and by the way, by the Biden administration, which has now had significant consequences. Banos says, put simply with Zelensky ruling out, Crimea and the four oblasts being accepted, and as part of peace deals,

what do they suggest to do with the overwhelming Russian, population in such one wonders. Indeed. I mean, this is going to be the absolute substance of negotiations, if they ever happen, which would go forward. I know the Russians are going to withdraw from any of these points, actually. I think the Russians, for the Russians, it is every bit as important as every other part of this process. if you read the interview that Lavrov gave to the Brazilian newspaper or global

and by the way, if you watch the interview Lavrov gave to I forget her name, on Face the Nation, yeah, on CBS. Alex, by the way, did a really good breakdown of that interview. If you follow those interviews, you see that the Russians are absolutely clear that this is going to be a central pass of any settlement. Without it, there isn't going to be peace.

Matthew says Britain wouldn't survive three days if the UK started a war with Russia. Same goes for France and Germany. NATO just doesn't have the military industrial production capability, nor does Britain. You're completely right. You are absolutely correct. So why do we go around pretending otherwise? why do we pretend that we can rearm and sort of keep this Russian threat at bay

when what we're doing is crippling our own economies and making ourselves look ridiculous to the world? Bin Lind says, great videos. Alex, love your humor. Nico says, can I ask what it takes to impeach a president? If Trump calls Europe a cancer and Ukraine a Nazi nation, a,k.a. the truth, will he suffer consequences? No, I don't think he would be impeached on something like that. I think there's actually quite a lot of people in the United States

who are coming round to that view also, by the way. The interesting thing is that Trump is coming in for a huge amount of criticism in the United States about many, many things, but not so much about his Ukraine policy. Even the Democrats who talk out against it do so, I get the sense, more because they feel they have to than because they really believe in it. I think America collectively understands

that this story is played out and they want to find a way through. I'm going to say this. If there's going to be an impeachment, I'll tell you where it will come. They will say that Trump has violated some of these legal decisions, which we do need to do a program about,

maybe with Robert Barnes, some of these legal decisions that all of these out-of-control judges all across the United States are making. And they will say that he violated his oath to uphold the Constitution and the law, and they will base the impeachment on that if an impeachment comes. It'll be based, in other words, on these domestic issues. William says Prince William was in a blue suit at the Pope's funeral, as were many others. Zelensky was the only one dressed like a car and mechanic, just saying.

You have you got it You're so absolutely correct I mean again I mean you know maybe call me old fashioned I mean when I attend funerals I go in a dark suit with a black time And I do not talk business there I mean I just

I am I'm not surprised But I'm still a little shocked That this sort of thing happens Nick Thank you for that super sticker Nico says the only weapon Ukraine and the EU have is terror in the media. Zelensky rejected the ceasefire.

He will conduct terrorism in Moscow on May 9th. The media will justify it. This is my greatest. Oh, absolutely. The Russians are already talking about the fact to prepare for some kind of incident on the 9th of May. Raphael says, is there a chance that there is Leonid Brezhnev in Russia now watching Putin playing around that will remove him like they did to Khrushchev? No. No, no, no, no. It's a completely different political system today. And I don't think there's any Brezhnev figure, you know, maneuvering to oust Putin. I mean, can I just say if you're familiar with the political situation in the Soviet Union in 1964, I mean, Brezhnev was actually already a very, very powerful political figure. And it visibly so, before Khrushchev. was removed. What people didn't realize was that the relationship between Khrushchev and

Brezhnev was breaking down. But Brezhnev was, you know, he was the president of the country for one thing. And he was seen as a powerful figure already. There's no one analogous to Brezhnev in Russia today. And the political structures are completely different. Putin is elected by the people. Cruz Jeff was appointed by a committee, the central committee of the Communist Party, and that committee could remove him, which is in 1964 what it did. Ms. Texas G. says, Alexander, could the announcement of NK troops and Kursk be more of a message directed at Japan and South Korea? Yeah, it is. That is exactly what it is, mostly South Korea. As I said, the Russians, I knew this before, but apparently, as a, as a, I've now learned.

The Russians were absolutely furious when South Korea facilitate. Didn't it facilitate made possible the summer 2023 offensive by violating its own laws by supplying half a million shells to Ukraine? Of course, they didn't do it directly. They pretended that they were lending the shells to the United States, which then, of course, promptly gave them to Ukraine, as the South Koreans knew perfectly well would happen. Sparky says, seems to me North Korea is on a short path to Brick's membership. Yeah?

Well, quite likely, actually. I mean, the only thing that stands in the way of them doing that, by the way, is their own ideology, Juche, which I don't pretend in any way to understand that I'm not an expert on, but I believe that it's all about self-reliance and all that. So it may be that there are ideological issues, but then I'm sure that they can find ways around that. By the way, just to say, I mean, whatever you may, think of the regime in North Korea, and I am not in any way a fan. Can I just make that clear? Kim Jong-un is clearly a clever man, and he knows how to play his cards well. I think people ought to be

aware of that going forward. He's played his cards with the Russians with great skill. William says, is Ian right to people as A about four regions becoming six, then eight? I feel there are far too many barriers to peace that won't be overcome before other areas have been captured. Once captured that's that. Ian is Ian was not being Blazor. He was being British, if I may say

so. I mean, he's a very British person and I think he was using the very typical British understatement. And on top of everything else, he obviously is somebody who is read in Russia, by the way. Russians are very well aware of him.

Doesn't want to start floating ideas and saying things that might make things more complicated than they are already. But I think he takes that possibility very seriously. As should everybody. The Russians have made this point themselves many times that first Ukraine had its entire territory and nobody challenged it. Then in 2014 it lost Crimea. Now it's going to lose Donbass and the land. And rich, if it goes on refusing to negotiate and make a genuine peace, just as Aristovic says, it will go on losing territory and losing population and losing all the economic assets that go with that territory. Ranov White Wolf says, what are Putin's motivations for shared values visa? I know several conservative Westerners who are happy in Russia.

Did you answer the question? Exactly. That's exactly it. Yeah, it's exactly it. Happy in Russia. Anon Kalarisian, thank for a super sticker. And final question from Sparky. President Trump is very smart, but the gaps in his knowledge leave him vulnerable to the evil, naive,

or incompetent people with whom he surrounds himself. I agree. I'm going to say something else. You know, everybody talks about, you know, Trump being a man of enormous, weaning self-confidence. I would say somewhat the opposite, actually. I think that he is very, very strong and self-confident

when he deals with politics and elections and things of that kind. In his conductive diplomacy, I think because he's so inexperienced in it, he is insecure. And that makes him listen sometimes to very bad counsel as he did with Bolton disastrously in his first term and as he's been doing with Kellogg

over the course of the Ukraine negotiations. All right. Final question from Sparky. Comment from Sparky, Kim Young-un and President Trump still have a mutual friend, Dennis Rodman. Indeed they do. Absolutely. And there is talk in America

that Trump wants to restart that negotiation over again. And so he should. Just me. Thank you for that super chat. And Chili Pepper says Russia is basically telling Ukraine either withdraw fully from the four regions or we take it from you. What do you expect Ukraine to do? Well, what they should do is sit down and talk now. They should sit down and talk now.

They don't need to agree a ceasefire. They should go and meet in Istanbul, in Minsk, in Riyadh, in Jeddah. they can have the Americans in the background. I think the Russians would prefer to deal with the Ukrainians by themselves, by the way, without the Americans there. But anyway, they can do whatever the format of the talks, they need to start negotiating with the Russians now. And they need to understand that they are in a very, very weak position indeed. Their battlefield situation is getting worse and worse. And the Americans have reached their limits.

and the Europeans have no limits because they have no capacities. They can't even talk about limits when they're not in any position to provide assistance by themselves. And that's where I think what the Ukrainians should do. Whether they will is a completely different question. Notice that Putin brought up this question of talks, direct talks between Russia and Ukraine at the meeting with Witkoff on Saturday. Americans, Trump, seem to be taking it up. We've had no move in that direction from Zelensky up to now. And the October 2020 decree prohibiting negotiations, he shows no sign of being prepared to receive.

Alex. Raphael says, if I were Modi, I would change my policy. Modi? Which policy? There's so many policies that Modi has. No. Yeah. I would change my policy.

Thank you for that. Rafael. Elza says, I'm sure Macron wanted to join the historic 15-minute talks at Peter's Dome and beat it a third chair to repeat the historic photo in Yalta in 19. I needed a third chair to repeat the historic photo in Yalta in 1945. That's so ridiculous. I agree with you, by the way. I mean, in Macron's fantasies, that probably is true.

But, I mean, you know, Roosevelt, Churchill had started Trump and Zeletsky and Macro. I mean, really, I mean, for Macro, I would have thought, if Macro had any degree of self-awareness, a photo like that, he would realize in a year's time would be an embarrassment. It would not be, I mean, it would certainly go into. history, but for all the wrong reasons. Mac Rock is, in my opinion, an absolutely hopeless leader. He imagines himself a genius, and he's really a fool.

Sparky says Dennis Rodman should be Trump's envoy to take some of the burden of Whitkoff. He'd do a better job than Kellogg, that's for sure. I would rather have Rodman than Kellogg. Jungle Jin says Hungary leaves the ICC after dead in Yahoo's visit. I think the ICC is on its last legs I think it's I think it's disintegrating I think it's made one mistake after another From Gio Stone

Gstone says how will the UK and EU tell citizens that soldiers sent to Ukraine were killed in action And they now are at war Will they do Will they do force conscription Well I think there would be massive opposition Within British society to such a move To say that straightforwardly.

As for having an honest conversation with ourselves, well, that is obviously also massively overdue. Don't expect to get it from Kirstam. And the final question from Klaus says, seriously, is there a possibility of an assassination on May 8th when Russia celebrates victory? So let's give that. They celebrated on May 9th, by the way. But yes, there is. May 8th is when in the West and in Ukraine now they're celebrated, but in Russia it's celebrated on the ninth of that.

Yeah. Jungle Jin says, is the ICJ also a dead duck? No. No. No. No. That is a much, much more powerful institution with a very, very much longer history and a very, very much more powerful jurisprudence behind it.

No comparison. All right. Thank you to Ian Proud for joining us on this. live stream. Thank you to everyone that watched us on Odyssey, on Rumble, Rockfin, YouTube, the durand.locals.com as well. Thank you to our moderators for helping us out. Chili Pepper says Russia has said the four regions is part of their territory. No country in the history has withdrawn from their own territory and handed over to the invading country. Russia is not leaving much room. I would also add to that. I think that, I think that,

people think that it will take the Russians longer to capture the whole territory of the four regions, then it probably will. Just saying. Ben Sparky says, I read Dennis Rodman's books years ago. He's more than just a great rebounder. I agree, Sparky. I completely agree. Yeah. Good point. All right. That is the live stream. That's it. We'll get some videos up. Indeed. Great program. Great questions. Thanks to everyone. take care everybody