The Duran Podcast - Germany economic decline & alternative futures - Maximilian Krah, Alexander Mercouris, Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: November 10, 2023

Germany economic decline & alternative futures - Maximilian Krah, Alexander Mercouris, Glenn Diesen

Welcome to today's program. My name is Glenn Dyson. With me is Alexander Mercuris from the excellent Duran. And the guest today is Maximilian Krah, a leader of German political party, alternative for Germany or IFD, and also a member of the European Parliament. Sorry, the correction will be alternative for Deutschland. But so today we're going to discuss. Germany's changing role in the world, but also this rise of IFD.

As Germany's position in the world appears to weaken, and as the name would suggest, alternative for Deutschland or IFD, is proposing an alternative, and it had a spectacular rise as well. So there's really a lot to unpack here, but I thought we could start with the German economy, because well, Germany has been an economic powerhouse for Europe, the locomotive, if you will, driving Europe forward. And I think some social and political problems could often be managed as long as the economy was thriving. But what appears now happening is, you know, Germany's economies going through a challenging period. And so I thought we could start off here, Mr. Kra. How do you see the main challenges?

and if not also opportunities for German industry and the wider economy. I mean, the established politicians, the government and the Christian Democrats, they drive a policy that will definitely lead to deindustrialization and recession. There are two main drivers of that. The first is the climate policy, and the second is their foreign policy. approach. The first thing is on climate because if you want to, Germany's model

of economy is to be the manufacturer of the Western world. So we don't have enough services. We don't have one real strong investment bank. We don't have accounting companies, but we have strong manufacturing

industry. And if you run a country which is based on manufactured industry, then you need cheap energy and if your biggest industry as the car as the automotive industry

you should not abolish engines in about 10 years. So climate policy as we do it as we drive it and manufacturing industry are incompatible.

So that's the first thing. You can't follow this very tough climate policy on the one hand and preserving your business model on the other hand. The second is, of course, foreign policy because Germany is producing big surpluses and it is exporting the manufactured products in the whole world. But the first thing is we allowed the US to destroy our North Stream pipelines, which destroys our energy production together with the climate policies, the both effects combined, are ruining our competitiveness,

in production costs and the U.S. and the left-wing liberal understanding of foreign policy drive us into economic wars with China, with Iran, with Russia, etc., etc. So when your business model is based on exporting goods and you start to sanction half the world, then this business model won't work anymore. So you see both together the climate policy and the foreign policy destroy the German business model and we don't have another one. So there is degrowth, which they call it, recession as I call it, de-industrialization and poverty ahead. Could I just ask? Because of course your party is called the alternative for Deutschland.

But in fact, it seems to me as somebody who was once interested in German history and was, took a great interest in it, that in fact, what you were advocating is the kind of foreign and economic policies in Germany, which were once upon a time very mainstream in Germany. Germany obviously focused on its industrial base. It was a country that was always careful to build up its trading links. its policies were always in many respects, sovereign-ist, independent. I would say that what you are seeking a return to is the traditional policy that made Germany, the economic powerhouse that Glenn is talking about.

And I find it very strange and to me very surprising, as somebody who goes to Germany quite often, who has a great, connection and bondness with the country, that this fact is not somehow understood. It's a traditional, a German-oriented policy based on German interests. I mean, of course, this model was very successful. It made us the European powerhouse. It made us a quite rich country, a peaceful global player. economics, a driver in technology.

But we have to be fair enough to say that this model had some illnesses in the years ago. Because, I mean, if we talk with each other, I guess no one of us has a technical device anymore which was

invented or made in Germany. We don't use a software which is invented in Germany. So we lost the leadership in technology centuries ago. We also have the problems that not enough young Germans study engineering or some technical subjects. We have too many in the humanities.

So you are right. We want to go back to the times when the German model still was successful. And we believe we can make it successful again. And we also believe that this model fits very well to what you couldn't call the Germanhood. but we have to accept that now we see that the model is collapsing because of the left liberal policy on climate and foreign policy. But the system was sick already decades ago. And it's not just that we have to repair what is destroyed in the last five or ten years. We have to refix it in a very fundamental way because we lost leadership and technology, of course.

This is entirely correct because, of course, if you look back to Germany historically, if you looked at the situation in Germany as it was, Germany was an absolute forefront of technologies. It was at the forefront of aerospace technology. It was at the forefront of rocket technology about people shouldn't talk too much about it. But it was, you know, it pioneered development of railways. it was a very advanced scientific technological bear moth. And one gets the sense that what has been happening over the last couple of decades, I'd say the last three decades especially, is a certain atrophy,

a lack of energy, a sort of complacency trying to set in. And can you tell us whether you think that is right and where the, that has come from because it seems to me that the traditional model, you can't say it was unsuccessful and not spurring innovation because Germany did produce a huge amount of innovation. So where was that lost? What happened that caused that change? And is it that change that happened in the economic system and in the social, system that's underpinned it, that also explains some of these very strange developments,

strange to me, developments in politics, the rise of, you know, climate things and things of that kind that we see in Germany, a sort of distancing itself from the sort of roots that Germany used to have and, you know, perhaps brought about by that atrophy. I mean in the first sense you have to understand that the German elite as we have it today does not want to be German anymore in the traditional sense so the defeat in 1945 was not just a military defeat it was also a moral catastrophe so people I mean there is a famous joke of five people sitting around and one says I'm

French, I'm Swedish, I'm Spanish, I'm Italian, and one says, I'm European, and everyone else says no Euro-German. So German elites, especially West German elites, East Germany is another issue, want to break out of Germanhood and German history. That is the first thing. The second is, we have a lack in leadership. I sometimes say the problem with leadership in Germany is that you not even have a German word after 1945. So we even don't teach leadership.

There is no chair for strategic studies in the German university. There is no real leadership program. So if you do want to learn leadership, then you should apply for a preferably angry. Saxon leadership program because Germans might teach quite well engineering, et cetera, et cetera, but when it comes to leadership abilities, they are weak. And the Germans lost a little bit this self-confidence in what they are able to. And the second is that the German elites wanted to change the country fundamentally. to create a new German.

So less German in a cultural and traditional sense in a more Western style. And this transformation went wrong whenever it was performed. So there is no successful transformation of something that was inherited from before the war and they wanted to change it. And everything they changed went wrong. We tried to change our university system.

And a hundred years ago, places like Heidelberg, Marburg, Guttenen sounded more or less the same like Harvard, Prince, Yale. We don't compete with Oxford and Cambridge. And that's over. I mean, if you can choose between Heidelberg and Harvard, you take Harvard. We will see whether this will last after the Vogue Revolution and the U.S. has finished, but still you would always vote Harvard over Heidelberg. You had not clearly made the same decision a hundred years ago. So we changed the university system.

We changed to the worst. The same in industry, we preserved our car industry until now the climate ideology came, but everything else we had to change. So we changed steel industry, coal mining, etc. Of course we had to change it because of development of market. market prices. But what we created instead never worked. The areas which used to be industrial strongholds today are shitholes. And that means that the Germany, the post-war Germany, inherited a lot from the pre-war Germany. And I take an example, the assets

the amount of assets in West Germany in 1945 after the war, after the distractions of the war, were more valuable, there were more assets, industrial assets, than in 1938. So the distractions of the war not even destroyed, the plus which was created between 38 and 45.

In East Germany, of course, the Russian took everything with the reparation. but that's another issue. So Germany inherited a lot of things from pre-war Germany, including the workforce, including the well-trained engineers, including the assets, and they created a Wirtchaftwunder,

an economic miracle, which is quite astonishing. But in the same time, they tried to escape from the old Germany. And the best thing you can judge it or you can see it is how they rebuild the destroyed, city centers. So the post-war elites did not rebuild the beautiful old European-style West German city centers, but they used the money they made in the Wirtchatswunder

to create completely ugly city centers. No one would have the idea to spend his vacations in German city centers because they are completely ugly. And they even destroyed quite well, not very much damage, buildings you could easily restore and create it expensive, ugly, horrible architecture. And you see that the old model, which was created in the 19th centuries and then was continued to use, was quite successful. But the will to break out of this old model and to create a new, more liberal, more Western, et cetera, et cetera, Germany has failed. And I would go so far to say that everything that was very successful in Postford Germany is somehow inherited from pre-war Germany.

And whenever we started to change it and to rebuild it, it became less successful. To be honest, we have to add that all intellectual property was even, the protection was given up in 1945. So this is the reparations we paid to the Western countries that all German patents that were in existence in

1945 were open from that time on. So we lost a lot of assets as well. But if you just take the material assets, the industrial assets, Germany started after 1945 from a very high level and

we lost the grip. We lost the belief in ourselves, we lost leadership, and we were so happy with the money we made, based on that what we inherited, that we forgot to reinvent ourselves and to do things that are smart in an economic sense. There's two people in Germany, sorry, I have much understanding of this, that, I mean, we're talking about deindustrialization in Germany. I mean, for me, the concept of de-industrialization in Germany is a profoundly shocking thing. I mean, we've had it in Britain, we've had it in other countries, but for it to reach Germany, Germany, for me, for many people around the world, our entire conception of it is that it is based around its great industries.

Do people in Germany feel that way? Do they understand that a process of de-industrialization is now actually? underway? Does this because people concern? It's not that clear because all the really important elites are not working in industry. The money Germany made in the 1950s and the following decades were spent into jobs in public service and in unproductive jobs in sectors which are not

combined with the manufacturing industry. And the next problem is that the lobby organizations of the manufacturing industries, they are silent because this is the problem with managers instead of owners. Those managers know that if they openly would argue that the current policy leads into deindustrialization and poverty, they would probably lose their jobs. there are two issues that I mean, you know, there is this dispute. Is politics downstream from culture or is politics downstream from law? And there is one law that the German industry conglomerates that their boards are nominated 50% by union representatives

and 50% by shareholder representatives. That means if you and you are board member, a CEO of a German company, you need the approval of union representatives. But union representatives are usually linked with the Social Democrat Party. So if you are openly criticised the current policy and say this policy will destroy German industry, you will never keep your job. so the legal structure of board dominations in Germany effectively brings managers to be silent on the destruction on their own companies and since managers just want to stay in job and then receive their bonuses and their pensions they are quiet so they even hail they say okay now we have a new time climate change is a reality

and we have completely to restructure our companies because that's the way that they can stay and job for the next five or ten years and then they have reached pension age and after them they don't care because they are not the shareholders. So the problem for our part is that we argue to say, for instance, the automotive industry, but automotive managers themselves tell us everything is fine with abolishing gasoline engines by 2035.

No, nothing is fine, but those managers are just fearing that they get fired when they speak out the truth. That's the problem. The problem is that the German elite does not care because for them is enough money. And so we have to address the middle class and the lower middle class that is already in a process of becoming poor and poor. So we are not the party of the bold and the beauty pool. We are the party of blue-collar workers. We are the party of the forgotten men and women in the country. I wanted to ask you another question about their industry,

because you mentioned before the access to energy. And yes, we all know cheap and reliable supply of energy is really the lifeblood of industries. So I was wondering how German society, society, businesses, as well as politicians are attempting to respond to the issue of energy because, as you mentioned, Germany seeking to cut itself off Russia as its main supplier. And you mentioned the United States' attack on the Nord Stream. What is the current discussion? Are there anyone calling for reviving the Nord Stream? Are they seeking to remove energy sanctions? Is there any plan going ahead?

Or what does the German debate look like? I mean, the EFD is calling for the rebuilding of North Stream, one and two. Former Chancellor Schroeder is calling for the reconstruction of North Stream. But I mean, everyone labels him as a gas prom lobby. so his word is not very influential anymore. But all the other parties deny. And this is for two reasons. It's for foreign policy and for climate policies.

Climate has reached the statutes of a religion. I call it the climate voodoo. They all follow this religion and they are willing to sacrifice for the religion. So they say, except the Greens, they are a little bit more honest, they say we can feed the German industry energy need by alternative energy sources like wind and solar. And they say it, and there are a lot of so-called experts in TV and establishment newspapers who say, yes, that's possible. I mean, we all know it's impossible. And since the industry has not the ability to speak out loudly that it's impossible because of the mechanism I told you, what they do is that they have foreign investments.

So the German industry is not investing anymore within the country. For I guess about 10 years, German industry has higher depreciation than reinvestment within Germany. So they go abroad. And it's unfairly enough that the United States are really begging and advertising German industry to invest in the U.S. with the reason that energy prices are much lower in the U.S. than in Germany. So they destroy our pipeline, forces to buy their fracking gas, LNG, and then they create high energy prices,

and then they come to the German companies in which they already. already are often shareholders by Black Rock, et cetera, et cetera, and they now come to the US. We offer you a cheap energy. And so the managers get more and more dependent from the US, even by this development. That said, the managerial elite is replying on the energy crisis by investments abroad and depreciating German assets and politics

is just talking about climate voodoo and some public subsidiaries for the energy prices for the industry which you can't continue forever

so it's just a measure for one or two years then either you have an inflation or you are run out of money so there is no strategic plan how to respond

And the Green Party, which is the intellectual leader of the establishment, openly says, okay, then we have degrowth. It's not necessary that every family has a vacation by plane every year. It's not necessary to eat meat and sausages every day. If you need proteins, there are also insects. You can eat your proteins from. You don't need your own house with a yard. you can have a little rented apartment that is cheaper and consumes less energy. And so on.

You don't need bananas. You can eat apples. So they preach a religion of sacrifice and degrowth. And they have their 15% believers. And then the establishment parties says, no, we are able to combine our climate voodut with keeping the country wealthy, which is impossible. So we are the only force that quite openly says you have to decide. Either you want to follow the climate voodoo or you want to keep the country wealthy.

This is a position which we, of course, hold against everyone else. So this is a little bit of tricky situation because everyone else tells you climate voodoo is unavailable, it's to choose. And either they say we can combine climate voodoo with wealth, or they openly say it's time to sacrifice the wealth. What seems extraordinary to an outsider like myself is the extent to which the Green Party, which polls, what is it, around 15% of the poll at the last election, less, significantly less than your party is polling now, for example.

example, seems to have acquired such an extraordinary ascendancy over policy in Germany, both economic policy and, of course, the economics minister is from the Green Party, and over foreign policy, which is also run by a member of that party. And I have to say, listening to what you've just been saying about how, you know, the Americans, the United States has been able to benefit in many ways, both from the policies that are implemented in Germany, the cutting off of the cheap energy and all of these things. It does somewhat seem to me as if the foreign policies and the climate policies

exactly align, but not perhaps in German interests, but in the interests of someone else. I mean, this is something I experience here in Brussels. EU officials truly believe in what they call a value-based feminist foreign policy. American diplomats use those verdicts, but they follow their own interests. So the problem is that sometimes, especially Germans, are too naive to understand that human rights may sound very good. very very have a good very good sound but that it's used as a tool for very brutal policy of national or group interest and when I speak that out and say look you talk about human rights but in fact you are the useful idiot of groups that benefit from that policy and they accuse me of being against human rights So as I mentioned earlier, Germany has no word for leadership.

That's the first thing. The second is that the old republic, until 1989, had not even an understanding of politics. They always mix politics with policy. Because politics in a very fundamental sense means that you take care on the collective survival of a nation. but the major decisions how to survive as a nation were done by the western powers they were determined by the cold war situation so interior politics in germany was limited to policy and even the major question of policy were transformed to judicial questions and decided by the constitutional court so a german

until 1989 had nothing to decide, at least nothing to decide of relevance. So we created a political class that is not able to decide something of relevance. They are not able to anticipate decisions. For them, indeed, everything is a moral. We take care of human rights worldwide. We don't ask what it costs. We follow the United States. Trump run the U.S.

They began to talk about strategic autonomy. When Biden came and said, America is back to lead the world, they were very happy because they know that they can't lead the world. But they believe that the America is the frontrunner of human rights and value-based foreign policy. They don't understand that it's a pure and naked policy of interest and that human rights is just a tool to push those. interest through the agenda.

This is indeed a problem with the political class we have. And because of that, they don't really understand what they are doing, at least in my perception. And the Greens now, they are the party of those people. They are the party of the children of the upper class. They are the party of those who never experience existential threats. and so if you don't experience existential threats you have a tendency to take a lot of time for abstract questions like feminist rights in the south of Sudan, etc., etc.

And now the socialists and the Christian Democrats, they don't have any idea of politics. The socialist idea was that the workers get their fair share on the wealth of the country. this job is done by the 1970s and the Christian Democrats' job was to make an amalgamization between the old Catholic milieu

and the Rhine which were against the national question in the 19th century with the culture comfort, the war on culture, Bismarck against the Catholic Church and to make a unity between them the liberals and the old conservatives that had survived World War II. So to bring the Catholic milieu into democracy, but this was done by the 1950s or 1960s.

So neither the socialist nor the Christian Democrats have any ideological idea any. And then the only ideological idea we have is this left liberal, vokeness, human rights-based thing of the Greens. And so when you were a young politician within the Christian Democrats or the socialists and you look for an idea, then you have to choice between the idea which is outdated since the 1960s or 70s or you have a very contemporary idea of the Vogue Greens. And that gives the Greens an intellectual lead within the whole political spectrum except the AFD because we don't follow this voceness. but the Greens have the intellectual power and this is stabilized by

the majority of journalists if only German journalists and the TV stations and the big newspapers would be allowed to vote the Greens would have I guess 60%. It is based by almost all professors in the humanities of German universities. It is based by all the major lobby organizations,

etc, etc. They all follow this this vote green left liberal ideas and you can quote Antonio Gramskey there is a cultural hegonomy of the Greens and this cultural hegonomy makes the difference and not the 15% they are now polling compared to the 23 we poll because we don't have access to university to lobby organization to board members

to the wealthy, to those informal power structures. I'll just very quickly say this. I mean, you brought up Bismarck. I mean, the idea for Bismarck of a country that does not pursue its interests would have been astonishing. I mean, every country should pursue its interests. The United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany too. And what you're basically saying is that the police,

political class in Germany doesn't believe that Germany should pursue its interests or the interests of its own people. Now, that is not a position, or so it seems to me, of defending human rights. It's a position which shows no understanding of, well, simple things like patriotism, concern for your own country, for its own welfare, and those kind of things. That's what I just quickly wanted to say. But look, they say it quite open. I mean, for them, what is your own country? What is your own people? They follow insofar Kant's idea of the universal state, the world state.

They believe that there is a world state, a world community, and that Germany is just one district of this world community, this world state. and that every person and every human in the world has the same set of rights, including the right to migrate. And everything they can do is to manage the migration, that it's work. But they will never accept a fundamental difference between, let's say, a person from Syria that enters German border and a German. they say now both are here, one is longer here, one has shortly arrived, but in general for them they have the same rights. Liberalism is blind for we and then. Current Western thinking cannot accept differences.

Every difference for them is discrimination. So when you are consequent in this liberal individualism, what they follow, then of Of course, there is no just like an us. There is only humanity and the individual. But for me, as a right winger, the music plays in between, family, nation. But concepts like family and nation are always excluded, because not everyone is part of my family and not everyone in the world is part of my nation. So I differentiate.

I say they belong to me. They have a higher claim. to be supported. I'm responsible for them in a higher level than I am responsible for somewhere who's somewhere who's not part of that collector. And by doing so, they blame me for being against human dignity, against human rights, and let's say against humanity. So there is the problem that they feel themselves as the managerial elite of a world state run by a set of universal understood rules, which are human rights defined by some NGOs. And they don't have any understanding and acceptance that different nations are different,

that there is a difference between the Saudi Arabian people and their rights and Germans. So they will not accept differences and any rights of collectives that are in between the individual and humanity as a whole. This is a very fundamental clash between the idea of a country and world state and a world order

that it's based on nations and on regions, on civilizations. And we are in midst of that split between the world state, the unipolar world based on

on what the West understands and defines by human rights and the understanding that you have different collectives in their territories that has the right to govern themselves according to their own rules and keeping alien powers out. I thought it was interesting now that AFDS obviously filling a vacuum and I think this when a government does not pursue its national interest, It obviously does create a vacuum.

But I noticed when the polling put AIFDA as the second most popular party in Germany, there was open discussions among both media and politicians that they should maybe ban the alternative for Deutsche which is an interesting approach to democracy, of course. But one of the accusations was that Aifte was too Russia friendly. If you look at the history of Germany, one would think that being friendly to Russia could be a source of stability in peace as opposed to being a negative aspect. So this is intended, I see, of course, as an insult. But I was wondering, how do you see the possibility of Germany moving forward in repairing relations with Russia?

And, well, in that context, how do you see this war, which has split now the Germans from the Russians, because this seems to be the key thorn in the side? First, they consider to abolish us because we keep on the idea that there is a German ethnicity. the big issue, what we debate is that they say part of the German nation is every German passholder. And we say, yes, that's true. Every German passholders has legally completely the same rights and duties, no problem with that. But we want that the community of the German pastholders is majorly, given by ethnic Germans. So ethnic Germans should remain the dominating group among the German citizens.

And they say if you do that, you distinguish between ethnic Germans and non-ethnic German citizens, and that distinction is incompatible with human dignity. this is the argument. I mean, it's hard to explain to someone who is outside Germany, but that's how they say. So if we say we want to have to keep the ethnic Germans, the majority within Germany, we accept that there are non-ethnic Germans having German passports.

Of course we do that. But that should be an exception. That should not be the majority. and it should not be the goal of the state to have a higher number of non-ethnic Germans. This is the reason. But now let's come to the war on Russia. I mean, I always say that

we don't know what will be the outcome of the war yet. So we can now we see a little bit clearer, but one outcome is very obvious that the loser of the war is Germany. Because, I mean, there are several reasons. The first is, of course, energy. We talked about North Stream. The second is the export market, which is important for a country like Germany.

But the third is also geopolitics. I mean, we all know the hardland theory. And for Germany, good relations with Russia always were very beneficial. I mean, we have a German state in the modern times, only because in 1812 the Prussians and the Russians in Taorogun agreed to fight against Napoleon together. Because of that deal, the German national movement could succeed and finally create the German nation state in 1878. Then this German empire became too quick to successful what led to erogency. So in 1819, William II did not prolong the treaty with Russia, the so-called assurance treaty,

the Rewkshershickroupershershurtr. And from giving up the good deal with Russia in 1840, to the defeat of 1918, it took less than 30 years. So historically, when you are in good terms with the Russians, then that is a quite positive position for Germans because they have space to develop. The Russians is a very gamalophile country. You know that Vladimir Putin used to work sometime in my hometown of Dresden. He speaks through in German.

His daughters attended at the German school. When he came to Dresden, when this was possible, he quite often said, no, we go home. Now we are going home to his wife. So there is a lot of connections, cultural connections, historic connections, between the Germans and the Russians. Both are powers of the land, not of the sea. both share their interest and their cultural influence in the heartland in the CEE countries. And this is very crucial for us, and AFD sees its own foreign policy

in the tradition of those geopolitical approaches, which are completely contrary to the Rheinbund. The Rheinbund was the German version of Napoleon Bonaparte. and there is a famous quote from the 1920s which says, imagine a Germany without Prussia and Saxony that would be a Rheinbund from Flandstburg to the Lake of Constance. And you can say that the Federal Republic of Germany,

the West German Republic, was much more a Rheinbund than a Bismarckian Germany. And after 1990s, the question arose, should the new reunited Germany continue to be a Rheinbund, or should it again try to follow the Bismarckian way? And for us, we want to follow the Bismarckian way. But for the West German elites, I would say they not even would understand what we are talking about, because for them, the Rheinbund idea, the Rheinbund Germany, is the only,

concept of politics they even know. If I tell them something about Reinhund and Bismarck, they could not even follow. And it is much worse. They don't even know what the term geopolitics mean. Less than a month ago, we had a debate in the European Parliament on the new geopolitical approach for Europe. And no one except me even. talked about geopolitics, about geo-determinism, about geography matters.

They all talked about value-based foreign policy and global policy, etc., etc. So you see, if we go back to history, we stand for this Bismarckian continental concept of being a power of the land, having good relations and peace with Russia knowing that the heartland is the key to the world of the future looking for partners on the continent German establishment does not understand that

has never heard about the heartland does not understand the concept of geo-determinism and that therefore don't understand what geopolitics mean and has a mindset that knows the Reinbund idea without knowing that there are alternatives. Hello?

Your audio. Sorry, I had the dog barking. I seem to remember reading somewhere a quote of Bismarx in which he said that the secret of success in politics is a good treaty with Russia. And again, I can very well understand why in Germany today,

given all that you've been saying to us, This is going to be a very, very resisted and opposed idea. But it's important to say that Bismarck based his policy on good relations with Russia. And that was how he succeeded in uniting Germany and moving Germany forward. Or so it seems to me. So what you say, again, makes sense to me, at least, from a German perspective. and is it ever discussed amongst Germans that to the extent that Germany is an industrial power still

and a trading power, Russia is its heartland. It's not just its heartland, it's its hinterland. It's the place where Germany can invest, build up, establish commercial economic links, forge synergies, which would be beneficial, to the Russians, but to the Germans as well. Is that ever understood or debated in Germany within the political class or even the economic leadership?

It is only discussed from us. It is discussed by former Chancellor Schroeder. The discussion is not allowed by the establishment because they only argue based on what they call values. They say Russia is a autocratic regime. which might be true. And we must become independent from a autocratic regime. That's it.

They don't ask for costs. They don't ask for perspective. It's just it's an autocratic regime. And then they appeal to the old fears which were cultivated in Germany since 1941 because there's an interesting continuity. already the Nazis, after they had to deal with the Russians to make a revision of the Westside Treaty, because that is what happened in 1939, they changed their propaganda and say the Russian are a threat to us, we have to preemptively strike against them, which is bullshit.

Then, after World War II, there were a lot of if people in West Germany who were affiliated with the Nazis. What was their excuse? Look, they said, we fought against Russian communism in World War II. We now do it again together with our new American friends. We were not wrong at all. And so there was a union between the old Nazis and the Western powers. So there is two or three generations of West Germans grew up with the story. Take care. The Russians want to come and Ivan comes to the Ryan with his tanks.

Interesting enough, the East Germans who had Ivan in their own towns are much smarter on those things. They say, we know the Ivan. It's not nice to have him here, but he's definitely not able to come to the Ryan. because probably not even their tanks are moving forward and they are drunk. So when we talk about those perspectives and those chances and opportunities Russia offers to Germany, then usually someone with a West German background comes and says, no, that's dangerous. The Russians, you can't trust them.

They want to conquer us. they will not stop in the Ukraine and then the next is that they say okay they are not a democracy and this is then the next argument and then there

is something which is a cultural they feel superior there is also something that people from the West usually feel superior towards something in the east usually a French will feel some superiority over a German.

But unfortunately, there are too many Germans who feels superior over the Russians. So you have three reasons on which you can appeal to destroy what is natural. The old story that Ivan wants to conquer Germany, which is cultivated since 1941, this argument of autocracy against democracy, and cultural superiority.

And those three arguments together are used against the AFD when we propose a closer cooperation with Russia because of course, all you said is true, this is what is natural. And since the public debate in Germany is very limited, it's very narrowed. So you can only openly say something between left and center. You can only discuss such issues and internet debates and podcasts and in alternative media.

And every established acting person, be it a politician from a non-AFD party, or be it an economic leader who would openly speak out what I say, would immediately label to be a Russian lobbyist, a Russian spy, a Putin agent, etc., etc. So it works very fine to prevent the Germans from doing what is good for them. I mentioned geopolitics and the heartland. And I can't help but to think about General Houseoffer. He wrote this paper almost 100 years ago in 1924. He was making the similar point that Germany has to diversify its partnerships because he looked at if Germany would only seek partnerships with maritime powers.

He was concerned that the Germans might become slaves, if you will, of the Americans and the British. So he also envisioned Germany to lean more east, so seeking a partnership with the Russians, the Chinese, as well as the Japanese. But again, this is the kind of, I guess, geopolitics, which no longer exists. But in terms of – I wanted to ask about – ending this conflict because I think one of the key problems was this conflict could have been ended in 2014 I guess quite easily or at least with greater East than today, but at least over the past two years the conflict has grown so bad that there seems to be a lack of solutions. But how do you see this conflict ending or what would be a possible settlement in order to move forward?

I mean, refers to the options Germany has, I mean, this is not only politics, it's also to whom feel we familiar. In 2024, to propose a stronger cooperation with Bolshevik Russia was probably a very strange idea. You don't want to be affiliated with the Bolshevik country, which burns down churches. again in the 1950s, you had the choice between America, which at that time was a ethnically, completely European country. And on the other hand, you had Joe Stalin. I mean, the choice is clear. But, I mean, by 2045, the majority of Americans will not have European ancestors.

America is moving away from Europe just by ethnicity. You cannot expect a descendant of an Indian or a Latino or an African to take care on European interests. But you could do that very well in 1955 when the Germans, after the Anglo-Saxons, were the second largest ethnic group among American citizens. So there is always the questions to whom feel we affiliated. And the times when Europeans felt united with the Americans are over in the moment when the majority of Americans is non-European. You cannot feel very affiliated with Camilla Harris. But the future of America is Camilla Harris and not Ronald Reagan.

Even if I hope that Donald Trump again will make it in 2024. But these are counterstrikes against Eddie. development, which is determined by demographics. So we should not only talk about geography matters. We also have to talk about that demographics matter. And that makes Russia again interesting because Russia has horrible demographics, but it will remain a European country by its ethnicity, at least by the majority. So when you go to St. Petersburg and then you go to London or you go to New York City,

and I ask you which is a European city then Petersburg will win and not London and not New York City but 50 years ago this was not that clear so we should also that keep in mind but now let's come

back to the war in Ukraine I truly believe that this war was provoked by America to divide the Germans and Western Europeans from the Russians and the Chinese of course the American Americans know the hardland theory.

That is their big advantage over Annalena Barbrook and all these figures that do German foreign policy. And because they know the hardland theory, they don't want to see the hardland moving away with a free trade zone that reaches from Lisbon to Vladivostok. And it was Angela Merkel who talked about a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok in 2015 after Crimea. was annexed by the Russians. So you see there was a direct threat that the heartland could become under non-American influence at all. And this is the deeper reason for that war, because this is the most stupid war we have seen in the last decades. It's a war that could have easily been avoided, but which should not get avoided because this is a war that is wished by people like Victoria Newland

and this gang in the State Department and by all the war mongers Lindsay, Graham, we all know them. So even in 2014, even in 2022, when it was clear how to end that war by the Minsk agreement, they prevented Ukraine from signing the treaty,

which was openly stated by Naftali Bennett, who is in my mind a trustworthy witness. So now they've pushed Ukraine into war. They use Ukrainian youth as their weapon. They fight until the lost Ukrainian. I like that quote, even it's a Russian invention. And they bring even brave Ukrainian nationalists to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the Christopher Street Day in Kiev,

which is a indeed brilliant move, give the devil his due, to bring the most right-wing soldiers, the most right-wing population, and that is what we have in the western parts of Ukraine, to destroy their own country, and to create an atmosphere that their children will become left liberals

and their grandchildren will become participants on the LGTBQ parade after the country is destroyed. This is indeed a brilliant move. And I'm so sorry that the brave Ukrainian people

do not understand that their elite in Kiev, which is not even Ukrainian-speaking, but Russian-speaking, has completely sold their own people to their own pockets and their own corruption. How will it end now?

I mean in the moment, America is not continuing to sponsor the Ukrainian state and the Salensky regime. This is what we have reached now. The European Union has to take the burden, but we don't have the money, thankfully. So without fresh money from the West, Ukraine cannot succeed. They cannot even survive. So we will now see whether the Russians are willing to close a deal quickly, or they say, you didn't want a deal in 2022.

You don't get the deal now. So the question now is, who is in the trap? In 2022, the Russians were in the trap of the West, because they had to invade Ukraine to prevent Ukraine become a native state and Russia would lose its backyard. Now the West is in the trap, because the West cannot give up Ukraine without the negotiated agreement. Because if the Russians would enter Kiev,

no one in the whole world would trust Western guarantees anymore. So are the Russians so desperate that they are now saving the West's facade by making a negotiated agreement? Or do the Russians say, we can continue the war for two or three years, but you can't? And then let's say, who is losing its credibility? I think the most likely way is that we will have a negotiation. agreement to terms that are favorable to the Russians, but will see a Ukrainian state remaining. And that means the Russians will keep what they have now. And the Ukrainians will accept Crimea. And the big question is whether the Russians demand Odessa. This is the question I hear.

the West cannot accept that Russia gets Odessa and Ukraine becomes a landlocked country. So probably you will have a deal that the current front line is the new border. Then you will grant the Ukrainians a lot of economic aid to stabilize the regime. And the Russians will ask for lifting some of the sanctions. This is, in my mind, the most likely outcome. But it's possible as well that the Russians say, if we don't get Odessa, we will continue to fight. And then the West has the decision whether it wants to continue supporting Ukraine

or the only Republicans and the House of Congress. I stopped that. Or whether we want to have this catastrophe for our credibility to have the next Kabul when the enemy is entering the capital. But once again, I think the Russians are desperate enough for peace again,

and we will see a border at the front line, a lifting of some of the sanctions, and the West will then give a lot of money to prevent the Ukrainian people to make a revolution against the corrupt elite in Kiev? Maximilian Khr, we have been speaking a long time and you've said amazing things. But I'm just going to finish off from my side with one particular observation,

which is that I want to push very much back against this comment that you see in Germany, apparently, from the elite, that the way to defend values, the whole idea about values, They've conflated it with democracy that if you don't, if Russia is an autocracy, we're a democracy, we must be open to the world. We will submerge our interests in everybody's interests. It reminds me of a program we did on this channel, Glenn Deeson and I, with Ratchel of Klaus, who was the former prime minister of the Czech Republic and president of the Czech Republic. And he took the absolutely diametric view. He said that in order to have democracy, proper democracy and proper law, proper system of law, which secures democracy, you have to do it within a strong state based on a people. And that is how you have real politics.

You have politics of left versus right, proper political parties, proper contested elections, People aren't pushed into agreeing with each other all the time and that you have proper dialogue. So proper dialogues, proper debates. And it seems to me that from everything that you've been saying, that is exactly what Germany lacks. The idea of banning political parties ought to be anathema in any functioning, real democracy. And when people talk about values, and at the same time, the same people start proposing prohibitions and bans, then you can see that something is severely wrong. And I think the observations that Bachelov-Claus was making are shown to be true. Maybe I put now, although I would left to agree fully, I put some water into the wine.

I indeed think that this is depending on the cultural tradition in which you are. I give you an example of Singapore. Singapore is autocratic as well, I would say. But the rule of law in Singapore is guaranteed. If you look at the World Judiciary Index, then Singapore and even Hong Kong are ranked better than France. I forgot Germany in Germany might be a little bit better. but you have higher chances to get a decent sentence in a Hong Kong or Singapore courtroom than in a French one.

And I would say that both Hong Kong and Singapore are limited democracies. So I would bring the position that the best political system is the one that fits best to your cultural set of rules and understandings within your civilization. So you need a system that works accordingly to your tradition, to your heritage, to the understanding of just and unjust in your country. And so I would not agree that we should take over. our European understanding of competition between political parties and individual liberty to the whole world, because I would argue that our system and the system that Klaus proposes would definitely fail if you would transform it to China.

But if you would transform the Chinese system to us would be horrible as well. So for Europe, we should find a system that fits to our heritage. And now we have the big problem that not only in Germany, but that Europeans in general, have a problematic understanding of their own heritage and history. This comes back from the rationalist philosophy in the 18th and 16th century. because the rationalist modern philosophy has the basic theory that everything prior to it was dark middle ages. And then the Enlightenment came and now since we are enlightened, we belong to the good side of the force, right? So many Europeans are not willing even to debate the negative parts of enlightenment and rationalist philosophy.

but we are now reached the end of Western modernity. We are already postmodern people. And I believe indeed in what Leos Strauss wrote and Alistair McIntyre, when you want to have a British philosopher, that we need to redevelop and to rediscover Blanche, Socrates and even terms of Aquinas, and that we need to understand that problems we are confronted in global politics now has much more to do with Emmanuel Kant than with Bismarck or even with the Middle Ages.

Insofar, I believe that we should rediscover what conservative thinkers wrote at the 19th century on the limits of liberalism and liberal theory, we should become familiar not only with Karl Schmidt, but also with Davila and with Kortez, and with all the writers of the counter-revolution. I'm in Mola Vandenberg and Germany, and we should be brave enough to go out of the prison that was built by the Enlightenment philosophy.

This would also give us the ability to talk to the non-Western religions. Because as long as we don't have a religion of our own, how do we want to understand and communicate with the Islam world? They will not accept us. So, Klaus is arguing based on the time he was very successful. He is promoting a very sympathetic, conservatively understood classical liberal approach. But this classical liberal approach had the core insight of the current vokeness and the current madness. And so I would say I love to hear what Klaus said because indeed it's much better than what we have today.

But I truly believe that for us, the demand on our self, is to think at a much deeper and broader way than within the limits of classical liberalism. When you spoke now, I was thinking about the Chinese civilizational initiative, when they effectively, to a large extent, rejected a lot of the universalism, which you find in a lot of liberal ideology in which they were making a similar argument that each civilization has to because there's different roots needs to follow its own path to modernity to reproduce his own culture and

yeah essentially a very vestalian idea i guess to reject universalism and uh instead have a cooperation between as in the chinese set of the between the diversity of civilizations That being said, I think, yeah, we have run out of time. So unless anyone have any final words. Hi, I'm Flew. I thank you very much. It's always a pleasure to talk in a political debate on more than on policy. So I think it was very good because we came very much to the ground. And I thank you very much.

It's also for me, it's always a big advantage because when we talk about such issues, we all become smarter and even I learn by the challenge you gave me through your questions. And so I wish you all good luck. And I hope that the thoughts we shared with each other will now inspire a lot of people to even rethink their own political prejudice and go into the adventure of becoming a more inspiring and more contemporary political observer themselves. Just wanted to say thank you very much for your generosity and time today and also for the insights you've given and I'm sure that this program will be very, very highly appreciated by those who watch it and I suspect there will be an awful lot of those.

Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Bye. Bye-bye.