The Duran Podcast - Historical narratives with political agendas - Geoffrey Roberts, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: January 8, 2024

Historical narratives with political agendas - Geoffrey Roberts, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Dyson. I'm joined by Alexander Mercurs from the Duran, and the guest today is Jeffrey Roberts, Emeritus Professor of History at the University of College Cork. It's great to see you both again. Likely. And Alexander.

So our topic today will be the use of history in politics, both authentic and misrepresentation, of course. I think a nice quote I always like is George Orwell in 1984 he wrote who controls the past, controls the future I think it's a good quote outlining the imperative

of using history for politics as well those who control and historical narrative often have the ability to also influence the present and the future however as we always see manipulating history also comes at a huge cause because it will undermine our ability to have a common understanding

of the past, to live in the same reality, and of course, we're also less able to draw the conclusions of history to inform the present. So I think that the use of history is especially important to understand the relations between the West and Russia, because often it seems we do live in two very different worlds, which can have its root in two different narratives of world history. So, yeah, I tend to see this as being very much front and center of tensions. For example, briefly, I would just say, to understand the conflict between the Western Russia, I often ask my students a very simple question, which everyone ideally would have the same answer to,

which is, when did the Cold War end, for example, because I often find that whenever people say, oh, it's 1989 when Bush and Gorbachev declared an end to the Cold War, and we reached an agreement the year after, you know, the Charter of Paris for New Europe, outlining inclusive European security architecture, without dividing lines. This is one historical narrative. Then the other one will be, other part of the class would say, no, no, it ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And from there on, you can already map out how history shapes the present. Because, again, obviously, if it was in 1989 through compromise and negotiations, then NATO expansion represent this enormous betrayal that would revive the Cold War, as argued by George Kennan. However, if NATO expansion ended in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,

well, then, you know, NATO expansion could represent the right of the victor, and, you know, Russia's resistance or complaints could be dismissed as a revisionist effort to, you know, undermine the post-Cold War system. So I think, yeah, these are important issues because we also have then addressed topics such as, you know, what's the path to peace? If it's 1991, it's through victory, if it's 1988, it's through diplomacy, So I think that this makes it very important to understand where the historical narrative of the other side comes from. This which is also why I keep pointing out it's very unfortunate that we seem to have trained the population to scream Russian propaganda every time they present a vision of history, which differs from what we have been served.

Anyways, as we will discuss today, I think also the proxy war we are now fighting in Ukraine. also has an important historical component to it, in which both sides lean on two different historical narratives. So in order to understand history and how it's used, well, this is why we invited the great Jeffrey Roberts, a leading historian on Russian and Soviet policies. So I thought we could start off by addressing Russia's historical narrative, if they're substantiated by facts, but also how they're used. and especially Putin, which most of his speeches and articles appears to lean heavily into history. And, yeah, I guess more recently, at least over the past two years, we see Putin being quite critical of Lenin, especially the transfer of Russian territories to the administrative borders of Ukraine within the...

Soviet Union, of course. So let's say, let's fact-check him, if you will, Putin's understanding of history. So yeah, let's just start off this as a point of departure. So Professor Roberts, how do you see this? What is Putin's argument about all critical arguments about Lenin? And how do you see this being substantiated by facts? okay well let me give by

making his point obvious point is that you know Putin has a passion for history yeah in terms of his like pastime reading he reads history and he reads literature and his kind of like speeches are full of kind of like historical references

and claims lessons he's learned learnt from from history he's really He's written two, published in the last couple of years, in fact, two major historical essays, one on, you know, this famous and now notorious essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, although at the time he gave it, it wasn't that notorious, because, you know,

40% of Ukrainians, it seems, actually agreed with him in July 19, July 2021. And then the other essay was an essay on the origins of the Second World War. And he's also made a number of other notable speeches, in which there's a very, very strong historical content, particularly on anniversary. Anniversary dates, anniversaries in relation to the Second World War. But I think there's another important way to make about Putin.

Okay, so he's a politician, and his history has presented in his essays and in his speeches, is a politicized history. In a sense, there has a politicized history. in a sense there has a political purpose in the present. You know, he doesn't like write history just for the sake of it, yeah? So there's always a, and, you know, the political purpose is transparent. It's obvious.

And he actually states it, you know, what he's actually saying in his essays or in his speeches. So there's no secret about it. There's no hidden kind of agenda. But at the same time, Putin is also very, very insistent on getting a, getting the record straight about the truth about a past. Putin is not a postmodernist, yeah? He believes, you know, and I think this is where his legal background comes into it. He believes in evidence. He believes the importance of getting the narrative straight. He believes there is like one truth. And he believes it should be a shared and common truth because, you know,

if you have these competing truths, then you have a situation of conflict. And of course, it's very much what we can see in relation to the Ukraine war. So Putin's, you know, defense and emphasis on, you know, of historical methodology, traditional historical methodology, I find, I find, I find, I find, I find quite, quite, quite, quite striking, yeah. Okay, no, okay, no, more direct response to your question. Yeah, so it's the other thing to say is, okay, he reads a lot of history, he's very interested, he has interesting things to say about history, these essays he wrote, as a historian,

and I was assessed as being pretty good, pretty good, pretty good essays. But Putin is not an original thinker. Yeah, he's not an original, you know, what you're reading those essays are some very, very common themes of what I would call post-Soviet historiography. That's to say, historiography, which has its roots in the Soviet period, but has also developed in the post-Sovic context when there's a lot more freedom of thought and, you know, there's no party line to adhere to and so on. But so, you know, he's interesting, but he's not, he's not, and obviously, it's obviously significant, but he's not, it's not original. That's the important. But there's one, one, one respecting which, I'm not say he's original,

but there's a kind of peculiarity of what he has to say about, about history of relation to Ukraine. It's his animus towards Lenin. Okay, so Putin is a conservative, now a conservative. he doesn't have a very good view of the Bolsheviks or of the Russian, the Bolshekid of the party. He sees that as be a disaster for Russia. He approves of the overr of desertum and democratic Russia in 1970,

but he disagrees with the Bolshek's seizure of power, which of course led to civil war and all kinds of other complications as well. So obviously there's an obvious political reason why he would have this animus towards Lenin. But he also has this particular thing about blaming Lenin for, at least to a certain extent, for the current set of problems in relation to Ukraine, which Putin sees historically as arising, at least in part, the fact that a lot of Russian lands and a lot of Russian peoples were included

as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the early 1920s. And then, like, subsequent to that, other bits of territory were added to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, right? And those like boundaries were the ones that remained in place in 1991 when the USSR collapsed. So, so Putin's always criticising the, you know, the Lennon's giveaway of Russian lands to the Ukrainians in the early 1920s. But he never actually explains why Lenin and the Baschiks did that. By the way, I don't think Lenin was particularly comparable in this respect. But he was the head of the government. Yeah, sure.

He takes responsibility. Putin never explains why. Lenny and the Boschiks did this. And actually, I had some good reasons for doing it, right? And one of the primary reasons was, was that in these Russian historical Russian lands, you know, Novorasir and Malarous and all that kind of thing like that, yeah, there were a lot of Ukrainians.

You know, they were ethnically mixed lands. Lots of Ukraine's. Ukrainian stories were claimed there were a majority of Ukrainians in these territories, which became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist. I'm not quite so convinced by the own, but certainly there was a lot of Ukrainians. And the further west you went, the more Ukrainians

that they were. There were. And the more people speaking Ukraine or speaking dialects of Russian rather than Russian. So there were good, like, ethno-linguistic reasons for actually including these territories into the Ukrainian Republic, Soviet Socialist Republic. But the other thing was, is that Bolsheviks wanted to create a strong socialist, Soviet Ukraine that would act be a strong counter to Ukrainian nationalism. which was still active within the boundaries, within the Soviet Union itself, but also had established himself a base in Galicia, eastern Galicia, Eastern Galicia, Western Ukraine broadly, which as a result of the Civil War and the Russo-Poish War

have become occupied by the Poles in 1920, in 1920. And the Ukrainian nationalists were using there as their base for their nationalist agitation and the Poles, actually. were encouraging them because they had this animal towards the Bolsheviks as well. So it is to create a strong political counter to Ukrainian nationalism. And then the third thing was, and I think this particularly applies to the reason why the Donbass was included in Ukraine, Donbats, which was very heavily Russian compared to other areas, which became part of Ukraine, because of Dunbos was an industrial area, the mines and so on.

And, of course, it was in the industrial areas, the urban areas, that that's where the Bolshevik political base was. So it was very much a political calculation there as well. And the other thing I kind of make about it, it didn't work out too badly. Until actually, until 2014, because after the Soviet collapse, because of the way Ukraine had been constructed historically, including by this transfer of Russian lands, historical Russian lands to the Ukrainian Republic by Lenin, there was a certain balance in Ukraine, yes? A balance between the Western and the Eastern orientation, between the Russian speakers and the Ukrainian speakers,

between the ultra-Ukrainian nationalists and other Ukrainians who weren't so nationalists and wanting to continue to have a good relationship with Russia. And that balance was from time, until it was overgrown, of course, by the Biden events, which led to Crimea's secession and then to the secession of the Dombas. And once you get to that situation, of course, the Ukrainian nationalist element, not just in Western Ukraine and Galicia, but also in central and southern Ukraine, becomes very, very predominant politically, and is able to pursue its, policy of trying to suppress the Donbass suppression, secession, but by force of arms.

And of course, that's where the whole crisis begins and it culminates. Well, and it's ongoing, of course, in this current world. So I think Putin's a little bit unfair on them and the Bolsheviks, yeah. But the interesting thing about that, though, is, okay, I'm sorry, I think he's unfair on Lenin, and I'm contesting the details of what he's saying. But it's interesting at the same time, Pouti is striving to have a long-term perspective of what's going on. He's striving to have a historical view. And he's striving for that historical view to inform his present-day understands and his present-day action. And that's all to the good, I think.

providing that the historical view you have is not distorted it's not misrepresenting it doesn't misrepresent things because as long as it's like you know

a good good history and in general I think Putin's perspective is recently good history but in this particular instance I'm not so sure yeah I mean this is a fundamental

point because of course you can have different historical perspectives of particular events. What becomes, I think, a bit concerning is when those perspectives, a particular perspective, one perspective, becomes a kind of state dogma. And, you know, I have been following a lot of Russian commentary recently about the war. And, of course, because Putin is the president of Russia, because what he's been writing about the origins, of today's Ukraine, the events of the 1920s, the decisions that were made then, the decisions that were made in the 1930s, because he's writing them, and because he's the president of Russia, and because he is the leader of Russia at a time of war, these views are being reproduced by

more and more people in Russia, and they are being taken straightforwardly as an unchallengable, incontrovertible truth. That this is a decision that was made by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. It's often explained as a particular animus that Lenin himself is supposed to have had against Russia, that he did this in order to weaken Russia itself. And you can find some of this appearing in some of the things, even that Putin sometimes hints at, and that essentially what is being done today is correcting the mistakes that Lenin made in the 1920s. And of course, that in turn has, and that translates into a new perspective about how Russia

should be developed from this point onwards, that it should become a much more consciously you know, conservative, orthodox national state, than it has historically been, which is, of course, can I quickly say, paradoxical, because Putin, at the same time as he's expressing all these views about what Lenin did in the 1920s, goes out of his way continuously to say that Russia is, in fact, a multinational,

multi-ethnic state. And he also speaks about Ukrainians and Russians as being branches of the same tree. Even he's now coming close to saying that they are connected people. So this is an example, I think, of where he's criticisms of Lenin. They're becoming very, very pointed. and they're becoming very widely repeated, are not only having an effect on the internal political debate in Russia, but they're doing so in ways which perhaps he himself might not ultimately approve.

Because the position, I think, is that the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are one people, not just, you know, they're part of one big Russian family, which kind of, historically is a narrative that begins to develop, I think it's in the latter part of the 17th century, when significant parts of what we now know as Ukraine become part of the Russian Empire, right? So this narrative of one people, yeah, common heritage and all that, going back to Kiev and Rus,

yes, the first Russian state and so on, is all part of a kind of like Azarist state and nation building, building project, yes? We are this one people. That's part of the foundation of our strength. And it's not just the Russians that form the core of the Russian multinational and Soviet,

non-Multination and post-Soviet national state. It's the Ukrainians and the Belarusians as well. Okay, then what happens is that in the 19th century in Ukraine, across Europe, of course, You get the development of nationalist movements, nationalist ideologies, nationalistist historians, right, who create a counter-narrative to the one-people narrative. And their narrative, I'm not sure it's two peoples, but certainly in their narrative is that the Ukrainians, those speaking Ukrainian in Galicia and so on, that there are a distinct and separate branch of the Eastern Southern Sotlandlandlandic family.

And, of course, that's the foundation of the claim for national independence for Ukraine. Now, in terms of Lenny, yeah, Lenin, I think Lenny didn't have any animus towards the Russians. No, he was Russian himself. I don't think he was proud of that. What he had in animus' force was great Russian national chauvinism, yeah? That's why he didn't like Russian. But also Lenin had no truck with Ukrainian nationalism, either, and even less so, did Stalin, very active in repressing Ukrainian nationalism over America.

over many decades. Okay, so, but the Soviets had this multinational policy, which basically encouraged cultural nationalism, but suppressed political nationalism. There was never any question of any, okay, the Ukraine like all the other republics had the right to secede, they had the sovereign right to succeed,

but there was never any question that actually been actualized, in practice, right? That, you know, politics was off the agenda. But there could be cultural nationalism, and the partially encourage it, facilitate. In Ukraine, they had, you know, Ukrainianization, yeah?

Spreading the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian speakers being put into key positions, Ukrainian actually being taught in Russian schools, as well as in Ukrainian, massive kind of like program of Ukrainianization, which, of course, has the effect historically, of forming the foundation for, you know, for Ukrainian nationalism as it re-emerges in the Second World War, in the first instance,

and then, of course, in the post-Sovic period. But, okay, but going back to this question about, okay, you were saying about Russian nationalists, their particular kind of view, which is to a certain extent articulated by Putin, about these historical Russian land, We need to reunify them. You know, they need to return to, you know, the greater Russian family.

They come part of Russia, Russia, basically. It's what I don't take into account is that, yeah, they were historical Russian lands. But in the meantime, a lot of things happened in Ukraine. You had to develop a separate Ukrainian culture and nationalism in the form of Glissia when it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And then also we had, you know, nearly 100 years. We've had, of, you know, of Ukraine, Ukraine being either a Soviet republic, social republic, or independent Ukraine.

And a lot of stuff has happened during that 100 year period, in particular, yeah. The language is spread. The culture is spent. Perceptions of difference have spent. It doesn't mean a certain light distancing by some sections of the Ukrainian population, large sections. increasingly large sections, from Russia. So your perspective on Russia's historical lands and territories

and how you relate to them, I think, has to take that reality into account. And what I would say is that at the present time, if you're talking about Russian speaking and pro-Russian areas of Ukraine, I would say that the territories, the provinces, the Oblos, which Russia has already incorporated, Crimea plus suburbia,

Ersan and Luganskin, Donis, those are the most pro-Russian, yeah, Russian-identified areas of Ukraine, right? And the further west you go, the less pro-Russian, less Russian-speak is the more Ukrainian, the more nationalist orientation is going to get. Now, okay, there may be good reasons

for expanding in that direction. military reasons, yeah. But I think there needs to be a bit of reality about what's going to be the consequences of that. And it's not going to be so easy to incorporate. I think that Russians can manage the incorporation of what they've already incorporated. But they go much beyond that.

I mean, apart from difficulties of actually capturing and occupying these territories and sustaining occupation, I think they're going to run into great difficulties It's about integrating them into the Russian Federation. And if you're not going to do that, a proper full integration, though I'm not sure you should be going there at all, at least in terms of direct territorial expansion.

And the other point I make is that, you know, one needs to take into account external perceptions of what's going on here, What might go on here? At the moment, Russia has quite a lot of allies, partners, supporters in the so-called global south. We understand the Russian position, understand why Putin's done what it's done. I think actually understand that why, you know, there's been this territory expansion into the Dombas and into, you know, the Black Sea coastlands.

And they're prepared to accept that as part of an, of a, of a, a, of a, a ditching. a peace deal at some kind. But the more Russia expands territory, the more annexations, if you can call it that, it carries out. I think the less understanding there's going to be for Russia's actions in the global South. And the more isolated Russian might find itself internationally.

And also that kind of expansion will, you know, I would say almost throw a lifeline for the credibility of the West and NATO and Ukrainian nationalism, because they'll be able to say, well, you know, you said that Putin's ambitions were limited, you know, security, defense, and they were just like, but look what's happened, you know, he's conquering the whole of Ukraine. He's claiming it's historical Russia, but actually that's not actually true.

So I'm kind of worried about how sometimes historical discourses, rhetoric, can actually build up a kind of momentum, which always becomes kind of unstoppable. I don't think Putin has taken across the Rubicon in that respect. I think he's, no, his position is restrained and keeping his options open. But certainly even his drift is in that direction that, you know, we need to, you know, reoccupy these territories, these peoples that were formerly part of Russia. Kevin Rusto is really the center it feels in terms of,

of the challenge, if you will, about creating a Ukrainian national identity, because, again, when Putin refers to Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians as one people, obviously, it's a reference to, you know, Kievan Rus from millennia ago. And, of course, I can understand the concerns for Ukrainian nationalists, what this means, because if you recognize this history that they were all part of Kiven Rus, then they fragmented into now what are three different nations, it's almost as if the natural condition would be for them to reunite. So again, this is what I often read from Ukrainian authors,

which is this would normalize empire, if you will. So they're very strict, strong against this. But again, then they have to find a way of using history to reject this whole notion that they are all part of Kievan Rus, that they're all, again, one, one people from this sense. And that's when you get this obsession often, I think, from Ukrainians, nationalists, where they insist that, you know,

they monopolize on Kivenruz that, you know, they are the real successors. So then they have to explain the Russians. Who are the Russians if they're not a common people from Kivnruz? And then they always return back to this idea that, you know, they're the successor of the Mongols. You know, they are this barbarians from the east. They're not even Europeans. They're Asians who came in.

You know, this is the, you have the barbarians at the gate. And then immediately you see the attempt to differentiate themselves from Russia becomes effectively a very anti-Russian, aggressive anti-Russian position, which can also be cultivated by others in the West, especially the United States, if they want to convert Ukraine into an anti-Russian front line. And I guess this is also why Putin also focus a lot on Kievan Rus, because it feels this is what the West is doing by trying to rehabilitate, if you will, the Bandera legacy. Exactly because of this Ukrainian nationalism, I think it was a good reason why the Ukrainian nationalists aligned themselves with Hitler in the Second World War in order to essentially rid themselves of this Russian legacy. But again, that's why I'm a little bit concerned now as well when I see the current policies,

because in the past I felt at least Europeans were a bit cautious about stoking some of the more dangerous historical narratives. For example, suggesting that Holodomor was deliberate genocide against the Ukrainians as opposed to being a famine, which also affected Russians and Kazakhis. and, you know, also Bandera, of course, making him a national hero to organize national identity around this is something that really, really furriates the Russians because now you don't have a distinctive Ukrainian national identity, now you have an anti-Russian one where they actually celebrate a Nazi collaborator.

And so when I see the EU Parliament, they're all yelling, you know, Slava Ukraini, which is a slogan of the OUN and the, the fascists, obviously, this is something in which the Russians see less and less ability to even have proper diplomacy anymore. So I was just wondering if you can speak of how you see this, yeah, the legacy of Kivenruss. Is it really important to understand the current tensions or is it more disappears in the background?

Is it more of the Second World War issues that pop up? Yeah, I agree with everything you just said there, Glenn. I'm not being wrong about this, but my understanding is that the one-people notion also originally included the Galician, yeah, the Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian-speaking sections of Ukraine. It wasn't just Ukraine. You speak Russian or no, it was. But that seems to have shifted. So what Putin's saying there, isn't it? He seems to be saying that, you know,

he seems to be writing off Western Ukraine, Elisier, Levov and all that, as being something other, no longer part of the Russian family. And he's happy for Poland and the West to do whatever they want, whatever they want with that. Now, I mean, that's, I find that worry.

For two reasons, one is, because it implies that the implication is he's not said this and he's kept his options that we're going to take all the rest certainly up to to Denepe and probably my implication

Kiev itself which will be an enormous undertaking very costly, damaging, dangerous, all this kind of things. So that kind of worries me. But the other thing it worries me is that it kind of like it kind of, yeah, by

excluding Western Ukraine in the way in which it does, and characterises to be wished out as being, you know, like Banderites and stuff like this, yes? It kind of plays into the hands of Ucrank, ultrant Ukrainian nationalism, doesn't it? And also into the hands of like, of Western altruists, who want to stoke up those kind of tensions and those kind of differences, right? And want to go along with this idea that, you know, on the other side,

to the Denepe anyway, that's the land of the barbarians of the Russians and the, you know, Western Ukraine, Glissia, you know, is naturally a part of the West. So it's a very, very, very, it's very, it's very very divisive kind of discourse that has grown up, which could have negative consequences. And as I say, I'm kind of concerned about how it kind of feeds into the ultra-nationalist Ukrainian narrative by itself. Because Putin is now actually straightforwardly. I mean, he's quoting,

there's a comment made by an MP of the Tsarist Duma that, you know, if you want to lose Ukraine, then annex Galizia. He's talking about Galizia increasingly as being this big mistake that Stalin made in 1939, bringing Galizia into the Soviet Union was a terrible mistake. It was taking territory away from Poland and Hungary and Romania.

And this is another, you know, on top of Lenin's mistakes in the 1920s of giving the Russian lands to Ukraine. The other great mistake was Stalin's decision in 1939 to advance into Galicia and to reincorporate it in the Soviet Union. And this isn't even, according to him, Ukrainian territory. anymore. I mean, his latest speech, the one that I think that he made of the defense ministry board, he actually said that he knows 100% that the people in this region want to join Poland again, which I think, I mean, I have seen no evidence for that claim at all, and he didn't provide any. But he is increasingly making this distinction between, you know, Galicia and the rest of Ukraine, and is implying that this has always

a terrible mistake and that it was warned about before the First World War and that Stalin went there and seized all these lands and again Stalin did this for some incomprehensible reason, known best to himself, which Putin never discusses. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Actually, Putin has a lot more time for Stalin than he does for Lenin because he sees he sees Stalin as, um, uh, a state builder, yes, and a unifier and a centraliser. So there is that. But yeah, you're right.

He does criticize Stalin in relation to the Soviet acquisition of Western Ukraine, from 1939 onwards. But as you say, it doesn't actually explain what went on there. Well, you know, for a start, okay, some of this territory, some of Western Ukraine was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. right other part of it are what parts of the the Russian Empire and what happened was

as a result of Poland's victory in the Rosso-Polish War 19, 1920 and the Treaty of Riga 1921 thing it was is that you know that the Bolsheiks were forced to concede Western Ukraine to Poland and also the same reply

to Western Belarusia as well okay so it was occupied by Poland, was known as Poland's eastern territories. The Poles, of course, thought they had a special historical claim for it, from their point of view, Levov or Libyv. I'm not sure, what do they quote?

Was a Polish city, and to a certain extent they were right. It was historically Polish city, but all the peasants living around here, the rest of the area were actually Ukrainians, not Poles, or they were Jewish. Yes, that was the other major nationality there. So let me come to the Nazis, the Nazi Soviet Pact, and there is this spheres of influence arrangement, August 39.

And then what people don't also know is that subsequent to the first spheres of influence arrangement, there was a second spheres of influence arrangement. In September, there was a friendship and boundary treaty, which basically fixed Soviet action. acquisitions in eastern Poland along the so-called Kurz-Kurz Online, Lord Kurson, British Foreign Secretary at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference, and he chaired a committee or a commission, which was looking into what should be the boundary between Russia and Poland, because Poland, of course, re-emerged as an independent state,

but what should be its boundary? And the frontier it came up with became known as to Kersenlight, which is supposedly the fairest ethno-graphical, division between Russian Poland. So when Stalin is acquiring, you know, Western Ukraine in 39, he's just like doing something that the Bolshev's always intended to it because they'd lost that territory to Poland by force, and also something that people in Ukraine, you know, in the Ukrainian Soviet Social Security, that's what they wanted to happen. They wanted that. There was huge popular enthusiasm for that re-communification process. And the same,

apply to Belarusia as well. So that's what happens, of course, later on, you know, the territory is lost to the Germans and so on. But throughout the Second World War, Stalin is insistent that that that 1939 border with Poland, which runs along, which ran along, more or less, not completely, there were some differences, the curse. And like, that would be the post-second World War front frontier between Poland and US. So from the start of point of it, it wasn't really about Ukraine. That was a done deal. Obviously, you know,

Ukraine was seen as being one entity. Okay, they spoke Ukrainian or more Ukrainian in eastern Ukraine than they did in East, but it was still seen as being a unified territory. You know, it was never an issue. So the whole thing about Ukraine's Western Frontiers, we now know it, wasn't about

what Ukraine's Western Frontiers was really. It was about the frontier between the USSR and Poland. That's what it was all about. So when Putin complains about the arbitrary mess with which modern Ukraine's borders are constructed, yeah, he kind of has a point. There is a certain arbitrary quality to it,

but not completely. I would say that the only really kind of like arbitrary decision in relation to Ukraine, Transparders was the one in 1954, the transfer by Christchof to the crime. That's all the rest of it. Actually, when you're looking at it in detail, it's quite organic and makes a lot of sense. And only in retrospect is it seemed to be arbitrary and administrative. That wasn't the way it was seen at the time.

I wanted to ask you, well, almost touched on it, which is the divisions we've had over the Second World War as well, because, of course, the Russians use history for politics, but it's also true of us in the West, of course. And I guess one thing that's really been standing out in the past few years, at least the past 10 years, if not 15, has been the efforts in the European Union to blame the Second World War on the pact between the Soviet Union and not the Germany. Molotov-Ribbentra pact. So that the argument being, well, was a, I guess, a way of suggesting that the Second World War

was really a conflict against the totalitarians in which instead of having the Soviet Union as, you know, the main actor who defeated Nazi Germany, I guess you would know better, but I think about 85% of the German casualties occurred on the East Front. So instead of having the Soviet Union in partnership with the West defeating Nazi Germany, there's been this effort to put the Nazi Germany and Soviet Union in one category, referring to totalitarianism in terms of linking them. But to that end, you see that the efforts to suggest that the Maltob Ribbon-Trop Act is what really triggered the Second World War,

is something, you know, went a little bit from the periphery, and now it's in the center to the extent that the European Union is pushing this very hard with its declarations that, you know, this is a time to remember the victims of total terrorism, essentially, and also blaming both of these countries for the war. I was just wondering, well, what are your, like, historical perspective on this? You know, was this in a vacuum or, you know, did other countries make deals with Hitler? How do you see the relevance of, well, what would be the different variables triggering the Second World War?

And what is the role of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Act? Well, of course, I've written many books and articles about all of these topics, Glenn. I could keep you here all afternoon or all night, forever and more, talking about these topics. But I'm not going to do that. But yeah, but it's the important point you're right, because, of course, it was that historical revisionism, yeah? Revising that, you know, the Second World War is not being an anti-fascist, anti-Nazi war, an anti-Hitler war,

but being a war against, you know, Soviet totalitarianism, was whereas Nazi totalitarianism, and sidelining and denying the role that the Soviet Union played and sacrifices in made in a victory of an army. Germany. I mean, it was that, the emergence of that historical revisionism in the 2000s, yes, particularly in the EU

context, that is what actually drew Putin into history and historical research and starting to really engage with it, engage with documents, facts, arguments, the literature and so on, right? So in 2009,

was that the 70th anniversary the outbreak of the world? I think I'm right. I'm going to say that. 70th, that anniversary. He was in Poland for those commemorations, right? And he made a very notable speech there. And he also published an article in Polish on the anniversary of the war. And he both the speech and the article, he pushed back against this historical revision quite explicitly. Yeah, he did.

And, you know, he contested the idea that, you know, the Second World War was triggered by the Nazi vote back. He said, no, it was true. If there was, it was, you know, okay, the Nazi Soviet plaque played a role in the outbreak of war, but what about the Munich Agreement, right? And he also pointed out that throughout the 1930s, the Soviet Union was striving for, you know,

collective security arrangements, particularly with Britain and France, to actually stop it. to, you know, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, to, tovert, to the, to, to, to, to, to, the, of course, he also points out that, um, um, when the Soviet Union does get involved in the world, it's the Soviet Union that actually, um, uh, bears the main brunt of the fighting on the, on the, on the, uh, on the, at the same time, at this, this, this, the anti-hila coalition, the was very, very important. And, you know, the Soviet Union, during war had it had, had a huge

support from its west. So he pushes back very strongly against this historical revisionism that's becoming more and more prevalent. But at the same time, it's quite a conciliatory speech and a conciliatory article. Because what he's saying is, look, you know, we can disagree about these things. As long as we can agree on some basic facts and context of the whole thing, we can have different kind of evaluations, right? But that shouldn't blind us to the main lesson of the war. And the main lesson of the war was that, you know, was not nine, it says this in the article,

I think it's not 1939 that we need to focus on so much. It's not that anniversary. The really important anniversary is in 1945, when we had this, we secured this common victory over Nazi Germany and we saved Europe and our world from, from from from from nazism that's what we ought to commemorate and celebrate and that should be the foundation of our relations and the other things in relation to how the second world war came about

who was to blame for this and it's a that's of that that that's of a secondary secondary character yeah so it's this hold it about the nazis i pact the war origins that's that's that's what engages Putin with history as an active participant in uh in the in the discussion now um and then 10 years later, he kind of like, the 18th anniversary, he gets involved again. And he makes many similar arguments. But it takes a much kind of like more stride, much more hardline view in 2019 and 2020. Dan, he did 10 years previously. And that's partly because for the previous 10 years, there have been what this historical

revisioners have been growing and growing and getting more, more of vociferous and actually that's a lot more nasty, right? So, and Soviet Union, Russia, Stalin, be demonised by these anti-Russopobic

kind of element. So it's not surprising that he puts a hard on line face. And from that, from that, those sets of interventions, then of course we get to the big essay that he publishes on the origins of the Second World War, but that's in 221.

And then also, you know, his historical interest then spread out into doing this art, this more broader historical article on the historical, on the unity of the Russian Ukrainian people. Yes, that whole debate is actually quite, it's quite question. Can I just make my general point about Putin's relationship to history and the role it plays in shaping his thinking and action. Okay, because you know,

I suppose I'll have I haven't got a copy to hand, I was going to say my latest book started his library, a dictator in his books, in fact, I'll go and get a copy when you're speaking, Alex Hunter. Obviously, that was a question that

I had to to deal with in relation to Stalin, because Stalin, of course, was an history buff as well, Probably more so than Putin. Maybe not. But anyway, that'd be a big history buff, but also a big literature butt.

A lot of things in common between Stalin and Putin as readers. And Stalin had lots of things to say about history, particularly Russian history, of course. So in that research, about, I'm like, well, how do I weigh the importance? How do I characterize importance? As I was saying, my latest book,

Stanley's Library, a dictator in his books. One of its major themes is Stalin's love of history and how history informed his outlook and his policies and action. So this is kind of like passion of history was something that the Putin shares with Stalin. So I actually, you know, what was Stalin's relationship to history, historical knowledge of what he got from reading history books how did that impact on his policies decisions uh and actions okay so and you can ask the same question in relation to Putin as well

and there was lots of people who um they did that they make they try to like read off directly from Putin's so supposed views about history and and read that into his action and decision so some people say, oh, Putin doesn't believe Ukraine's a real country, a real nation. So that's why it's okay for him to invite him. Or Putin, some people say, oh, Putin thinks the Soviet, you know, Russian Empire. Soviet empire was a good thing. So he wants to, you know, he wants to recruit it. You know, things like that.

Okay. So the conclusion I came to in relation to Stalin, and I think it applies to Putin, Two is that, you know, just talking about Putin, Putin's actions, decisions, policies don't actually come directly from history. Where the policies and actions come, they come from, he's reading history, I mean, they come from the present and his engagement with the present. What history does is it provides Putin with a context, yeah, and a way of, um, conceptualising his policies and actions. And we're presenting themselves, presenting those policies, both to himself and to outsiders, yeah?

Okay, but so it's a kind of history, you could say history function as kind of a rationalisation device, but it's the important point is it, it's a completely authentic rationalisation device. It's not just a post hoc rationalisation just to justify actions he's taken. It's a genuine set of beliefs, associate historical beliefs associated with action. But here's the thing, this is the really important thing. The historical view comes into its own when it comes to deform that action policy and decisions take.

How things are implemented in practice, right? and how the goals of action develop in the process of acting, right? Just let me give an example of that. Okay, so I think that Putin went to war, invaded Ukraine in February 22 because he saw Ukraine and NATO's build up of Ukraine as a strategic military threat, not necessarily an immediate one, but certainly one in the medium term. So it was a strategic calculation. That's what informs his invasion of Ukraine.

But now he goes about that invasion and his subsequent actions is very much shaped by his historical perspectives, right? And particularly, of course, his historical perspective about the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians as being one people. and the whole history of Russian-Ukraine and Russia. So there is this strategic decision, military operations, military expansion as war. But in political terms, Putin's annexation or occupation of Ukrainian territory takes the form of incorporation into the Russian Federation. So he's what I mean.

So his fundamental historical view about the nature of Russian. and Ukrainians and their relationship is really fundamental in informing, well, not form, but the content of his policy and his military goal. So that's the way I see a relationship between the role of history. It's not the reason for action, but it's crucial in shaping the character of that action. There is something about his articles. and not just his articles, but many of his speeches, which I'm going to say straight away, remind me a lot of legal briefs,

that he's made a decision. He's got to explain the decision. He's got to justify the decision. So he does what lawyers do is that he puts together the facts, the evidence that supports the decision and which defends it. And a lot of his articles, for me, actually have that defensive quality about them, that they are actually explaining his actions and defending them and in effect putting a case. And he does this actually very well. I think that

there's a lot about Putin, which we don't know. I think he's done a lot more legal work. This is my own personal view, than people understand. Because the way he constructs his arguments have so much of the lawyer about them. And lawyers can work with history. And there is an overlap between legal work and history, as I've seen myself many times. But of course, lawyers use history in a particular way. And I think that is to some extent what Putin does.

And of course, it doesn't, because it shapes his arguments, because it presents his case in a certain way. It shapes his case and it shapes his future decisions in exactly the way that you say. Well, that's interesting. I agree. I was just going to say, if you're building, if you're using history to build a case,

I got that impression in 2014 with his Crimean speech when they were unified or annexed, whatever language will they use. You know, he outlined the decision. And again, it felt like also he gave almost a warning then, because obviously, taking back Crimea, they could, you know, refer to the Treaty of Perislav from 1654. This was the 300-year anniversary in 1954 when Khrushchev handed it to Ukraine, at least administratively. And, you know, we recriticized this.

But what was interesting in the 2014 Crimean speech was he did mention the rest of the historical Russian lands from, you know, Odessa to Karkov when he essentially criticized the Bolsheviks. Like, who knows why they transferred this to Ukraine? You know, he said God will judge them. That was his words. But I see the same rhetoric coming back now. You know, these are historical Russian lands. And it seems almost to use your words, Alexander, he's building a legal case for suggesting, you know, we gave you these territories with Russian peoples, Russian speakers, with Russian culture.

And, you know, if your idea of a nation building or Ukrainian nationalism is anti-Russian to its core in terms of der Russifying the language, culture, traditions, you know, pushing all the statues into the river. If this is your nation building, then we will effectively suspend your sovereignty or this regions, and we will take them back because you, you know, you abuse to these territories we gave to you. It almost feels this is the direction they're taking it. And again, they might have done this anyways, you know, for security reasons or, you know, to protect the people, whatever. But either way, it seems, you know, history is being employed here to build a legal case for what's coming. next. It can't be a coincidence that all this historical reference are coming now at the time

when they see Ukraine appears to be on the verge of a collapse and the Russians are, you know, preparing a huge offensive. I completely, can I just quickly say before Jeff so speaks, which is that I want to make it very clear that when I say that Putin is to some extent acting, constructing a case like a lawyer does, I'm not suggesting. in any sense that he's not making good faith arguments. I have no doubt that he, when he says what he's saying, he generally believes in the strengths of his arguments. Again, I have, you know, I get that very clear sense from the way that he's doing it. But if you've practiced in courts

and seen the way advocates work in courts, you often, you often, you, you often, fight that the most effective and powerful and reasoned advocates are those who believe their case. And I think this is very much what Putin does. And of course, the more you research your case and the more you construct it, the more carefully you construct it, the more likely you are eventually to believe it yourself. Yeah, yes. Yeah, I agree 100%. That when Putin speaks, it's in good faith. Yeah, I don't, yeah. That's, yeah, that's what he really, he means what he says.

Of course, you know, why he says what he means changes over time. But that's, there's nothing exceptional about that. Yeah, and I agree with your point about the legal character of, in this case we're talking about speeches or indeed historical essays. but a lot of things that you might attribute to its legal character, of course, Putin, of course, was a law student, as everyone knows. He trained as a lawyer, at least as an undergraduate. I would characterize it as narrative history,

of constructing a narrative and an associated argument in a particular way. But then I would also make the argument that there are very significant, overlaps between law and history as disciplines. As academics, in fact, I wrote a paper. I'll send you to Alexander. You might be interested, which was called the philosophy of law and the philosophy of history, like making that comparison. But I think the other thing that strikes me, yeah, yeah,

so, you know, the careful construction, the evidence-based, logic-based, narrative construction of these speeches and of these, of these essays, is the point about their authorship. No, I'm sure that Putin has some research system. Obviously, he's given documents. Maybe there's an input from historians or his staff and maybe editing, maybe draft. You know, I don't know. But I'm absolutely convinced that this is about Putin's authorship of these essays and speeches.

There might have been other inputs on, but there very definitely is. He is the author of all these statements and arguments that he makes. Yeah, and in response to what you said, yeah, it would be very interesting, won't it, to see, you know, how this place are, you know, is, you know, is the history, so to speak, the historical rhetoric and discourse going to, you know, predominant, predominate over strategic calculation. and what are going to be the consequences of either way, whether strategic calculation predominates or whether history, historical discourse, you know, predominates.

And yeah, at the moment, you know, my worry is that history is going to win out. And there's going to be some very negative consequence now, which brings me to another point. I was thinking about starting off our conversation, but drawing your attention to, I haven't got a copy. I couldn't find my copy. But there was a book by a guy called David Reef, David Reef, R-I-E-E-W-E-E-W. He's an American journalist.

And he published a book in 2017 in praise of forgetting. And his basic argument is, you know, the damage that historical memory does because it's a distorted representation of the past, the damage that it does, you know, in the present in terms of, you know, sparky disputes, you know, intensifying conflict, leading polarisation of differences, all of that kind of thing. A lot of this stuff has been to do with clashing nationalisms,

which is, of course, of what we've got going on in Ukraine at the moment, to a sex with. And just make it hard to make it hard to be that it would be much better off if we forgot, if we didn't have this historical memory, or there was less, if we forgot history, if we just concentrated on our own time, where we were, our own present, yes? We're present to ourselves and present to our time,

and focus on that. Okay, so he published that book in 2017, and I was very, yeah, I was very taken by his argument then, but I'm even more taken by the argument now, because I think, you know, historical memory, okay, bad history, distorted history, polarized history, one side, we're having one to live it, has actually been very, very damaging in relation to the Ukraine war.

And we'd be much, you know, rather than true, and also history, actually, this is particularly true, I think, in relation to Western discussions about war, history becomes, you know, historical analogy or historical claims about whatever themes, become a substitute for actually thinking about what's actually going on now in front of us, and what might happen as a consequence of that.

And I think that's kind of what's happening in relation to this developing Russian discourse about, you know, reuniting historical Russia and its people's. It's the historical vision, you know, the striving action and things forward, rather than, you know, the reality that actually confronts Russia, the choices, our choices, actually,

that confront Russia in the present time and you know the cost of damages the dangers but i still have a certain degree of hope actually quite a large degree of hope that that Putin um um that the Putin will resist that temptation and actually there's an interesting um um another point about Putin history which i picked up on recently which i think fits into this bit of discussion which was when he was at the um the native summit in Bucharest in 2008 yeah remember the one of the world well, the Ukraine and Georgia were going to be admitted as members in due course, right? So he was there and he actually made a, you know, he made a speech at the conference.

Then it's actually quite a moderate, mild speech, very, very different from the speech he delivered in Munich, a year before, the Munich Security Conference speech, and he was very much trying to persuade his Western audience, the East audience, not to go down this part, that it was dangerous. It wasn't, you know, not just because, you know, Russia didn't like it because of all the other consequences might have flown it. That was interesting. I'd never actually read that speech or reports for it before. But also he did a press conference, one of his press conferences in Bucharest, right? And there was a question came out.

I can't know what exactly was. And he responded to the question by saying this. He said, oh, as you know, I'm very interested in history, particularly modern European history, right? and he said one of the people that interests me most is Bismarck. And one of the things I learned from Bismarck was it's not intentions that matter, it's capabilities. And that's my worry in relation to NATO expansion. It's not a matter of intentions. It's a matter of capabilities.

And that is what my concern is, yeah. So that was very interesting, very significant for another reason, going back to Stalin's library, Stalin was also very, very interested in Bismarck. Bismarck, yeah, was huge, Stalin had a huge interest in Bismarck. Bismarant, of course, was a realist, pragmatic, a state builder, a unifier or an attempted unifier, all kind of things which I think I would characterize Stalin's spirit, and also Putin as being, you know, be as well. So people have to like to think of both Stalin and Putin in terms of Machiavelli, Machiavellian terms, that kind of concept. But I think that's wrong. I think

it's wrong in the case of Stalin. And I think it's wrong in the case of Putin. If there is a historical figure which might help us try to understand what they've done and what they were doing in future, then Bismarck might be the person that we'll to focus on in that discussion. Maybe Bismarck would be also a good person to look back on in history because after the Cold War, when the United States and his partners were pitching the idea of unipolarity in which there's only one central power, the whole idea would be, you know, we're liberal democracies, we're going to be the only dominant force, but we're going to be good, we're a force for good because we're liberal democracies. So the way the Russians have countered this over and over again is, you know, when in the country assesses threats, it has to look at two components. You look at capabilities and intentions. What will they do with this capabilities? And again, intentions change, but the capabilities remain there.

So for them, it might, you know, whenever the West talks about missile defense, like, yeah, we're going to be able to intercept nuclear retaliatory capabilities, but we have no intentions of doing it. or we're going to expand NATO all along the Russian borders. However, we only have the best of intentions. So when you pitch unipolarity, it's always, yes, we're going to have max capabilities, but you have to trust our good intentions. So it seems quite sensible. If you want to counter the unipolar argument to refer to Bismarck, if you will, that we will look at capabilities and not your intentions.

Are you muted, both of you? Yeah, I'm sorry, I think there's another point to me from very dear Glenn, actually, which is that the Western intentions towards Russia have changed, and they've changed quite radically, yes? Much, much more hostile, yes, and ambitious, in theory anyway, than they were in 2008 when Putin was addressing them in Bucharest. Now, that change has come about for reasons which have to do with, the West and the choices that it made.

But also, you know, it's also come about in response to Putin's actions. You know, Putin's militarization of his diplomacy by invading Ukraine. So, you know, there is an element of like, you know, self-fulfilling, you know, prophecy involved here. because one of the rationalizations that Putin is made for, you know, taking this, what I call it, preventative war against Greta, because he said, you know, Western, you know, what they want to do, they want to break up Russia, they want to split Russia up, they want to destroy Russia as a great power. And I think there was a certain amount, there was, and there's a certain amount of truth in that. but nevertheless, Putin's own action, his own response to it, has actually made it even more true than it was in the past. Going back to what you said about Bismarck, very, very interesting,

I didn't know that he had that. He'd made that comment about Bismarck. Because the most interesting thing about Bismarck, to me, is that Bismarck always knew when to stop. he this is this is one I mean he didn't march on Vienna for example I mean he there's enormous pressure

you know when they won the battle against the Austrians to march on Vienna and he said no we are not going to march on Vienna this is going to be a huge mistake if we march on Vienna we're going to take on far more than we can and perhaps if he

remembers if he remembers his Bismarge maybe that will tell him when to stop in terms of Ukraine as well. Maybe just as Bismar realized that, you know, marching on Vienna was not a good idea. Maybe he realized that marching on Kiev or Odessa isn't such a good idea either. Just, just, just throwing that out. Because I am, I'll say this, I am frankly becoming concerned at some of the statements that are coming out of Moscow now. All kinds of officials at various levels are talking, increasing.

about in terms of total victory. And I don't think that they have worked through exactly what that means. Firstly, whether it is achievable at all. And if it is achievable, whether, in fact, it is actually going to work out in the end to anybody's benefit, including Russia's. I mean, I could see enormous economic problems. I can see huge problems with people in Ukraine as well. Perspective relationship between Russia and Europe going forward,

it would be even more damage than it is at the moment. And your point about perspective in the global South, I think he's absolutely right. Bismarck always knew how far to go and he stopped. And I wonder whether Putin will do the same. I think he, yes, I hope, I suspect. And actually, I think he does. I think he does know when to stop.

I think, you know, he's shown that, by the way, he's resisting this tremendous pressure, you know, he's under to commit himself explicitly to expansive territorial goals in relation to Ukraine. And, you know, I know, I did a piece on this myself about Putin's territorial ambitions. how far we go. And the thing that

where that piece started was when I was, you know, I was at the Valdai conference meeting in Sochi in October. So I was in the room for,

you know, Putin's famous annual press conference. It was an amazing experience and quite frankly, an amazing performance by, by Putin. But one of the things he said

was asked a question, a direct question, well, you know, in fact, or virtually a direct in your face question, are you going to take

Odessa, because Odessa after it was a Russian city. So are you going to take it? Put your money on the table on this one, right? And his response was, he said, it's not a matter of territory. It's a matter of security. And I would do whatever it's necessary for the purposes of Russian security, not just the security in a Russian state, but also the security of our compatriots in living in Ukraine. I think he's kind of like, and that, that, I think he's still holding up to that, to that, to that, to that, to that, to that position. And that gives me hope that, that, that, that, that, that, even if there is a, you know, a big time Ukrainian military collapse or even if there is it, that, that, that, that, that, that, that, that, that, that, that, the, actually actually has, has, all the way through the war, by the way, well, before the war for many, many years since 2014, but all the way through what, he has acted with, with restraint. And is, is he really going to. start behaving differently. I hope not. I think his caution is, or worries about, well, rhetorically box himself in,

because if he's promising to deliver Odessa now, he's tying his own hands in terms of future diplomacy. Because, again, I believe he's authentic in this argument, because the main concern of Russia would be, of course, that NATO would move into Ukraine and threaten its security. as well as, of course, oppressing the ethnic Russians in Ukraine. So, again, much like the Americans wouldn't want the Russian troops in Mexico. But I guess from their perspective, if they could negotiate a way of having Ukraine to be neutral,

such as they wanted before 2014 or, you know, the Minsk agreement, which, you know, they failed to have implemented up to 2022, then, you know, through that argument of Putin, then they would need Odessa. then it would simply, you know, because it wouldn't be a threat to Russia. So I think as the signals have moved forwards and, you know, the war seems to be coming to an end in the foreseeable future. And what is hearing from NATO is, listen, when this war is over, then we're going to let Ukraine in. If this rhetoric continues, then obviously there's no settlement afterwards. So I think that not promising to deliver Odessa now gives him the freedom to negotiate something of a neutral position for Ukraine.

However, if NATO doesn't give him neutrality for Ukraine, then he can't accept Odessa becoming NATO territory. So in that instance, I think he will take Odessa. But again, I think one of the problems I think of the Ukrainian side has been they locked themselves in. Zelensky effectively said it's illegal for me to negotiate with Russia. Well, you know, we're not going to stop until we have Crimea. If you set this, if you already set the objectives and you have left yourself with no room for maneuver, yeah, you bucked yourself in. So I think he, you know, if there will be any diplomacy or possibility of it later on, it's as good probably not to say things too certain because I heard that question in Valdai as well. But actually, the year before, when Waldao was in Moscow last year, sorry, that's two years from now, we just had New Year's Eve,

some journalists ask the same question. You know, he said, I want to visit Odessa next year. Will I require Russian or Ukrainian visa? And, you know, he gave a similar answer. You know, it's not territory. We have to wait and see. We want our security one way or the other. So I think, you know, that would be his logic behind it.

Yeah, I think, I think, at first time, say, everyone. has boxed themselves in. Ukrainians, the West. Everyone's boxed themselves in except Putin, yeah. But he can't get out of the situation on his own, yeah? It will require, you know, there be some significant movement on the Ukrainian side and on the Western side. And if that doesn't happen, then, you know, then I think, you know, the Russian nationalist dreams of, you know, of getting to a desk. and even capturing Kiev, Karkov, all of that, you know,

I think those dreams might be, you know, might be realised in some form. We'll see. I think that is a very important point because, of course, it's a point in some ways that, you know, we've been, I think all three of us have been making at various times that the absence of diplomacy is very dangerous. It is actually leading to outcomes which potentially are in nobody's interests and certainly not in the interests of anybody who cares or say they care for Ukraine itself. I think that's my last point on this.

I'll make a lot. Yeah, the big loser and all this. Okay. Whatever difficulties Russia might have, whatever path it chooses, whatever path it chooses, whatever like crisis, the outcome might. provoking the big liars of this is going to be Ukraine and the Ukrainian

that's going to be the greatest tragedy of this situation wherever the outcome. I know I couldn't agree more I think yeah, this is often we tend to

at least in the West ignore the the problems within Ukraine. Of course not only the Russian invasion and the horrible consequences that's had for Ukrainian people

but also the internal dynamic because again Ukraine was not at peace between 2014 and 22. And I guess, just my final comment, I guess, would be my concern a bit about the direction of the historical narratives we have in the West. Because after the Cold War, yes, with the objective of creating a Europe without Russia, I think we began to construct this historical narratives. For example, Russia was a cause of the Second World War, rather. than the one who defeated Hitler. You know, we said the Cold War ended through victory,

so not through a compromise in order to delegitimize the idea of having a unified or inclusive European security architecture. So of all these narratives, but they weren't really anti or that Russian or this hostile to its core. But I think that once we began to have this conflict over Ukraine, especially since 2014, I think we began to adapt a lot of the language of the nationalists in Ukraine. So now, you know, I see Western leaders more or less defending Bandera. It's like, oh, yeah, I soviet.

It's just, you know, well, are they really Nazis? You know, or as they said in Canada, you know, some Nazis, you know, they were just fighting for their country. So suddenly we're getting to change the narrative. But so Swedish, former Swedish prime minister, Schmidt, he went out in, Carl Smith, no, Carl Smith. No, sorry, forget his name. Anyways, he posted on Twitter a picture of, you know,

Ukrainian knights fighting orcs, which is, again, pitched back to this Kivendrus idea that, you know, these are the white Europeans fighting the Asiatic barbarians. And, you know, so we're starting to go into a very ugly territory in which we, I think the idea of supporting Ukrainian nationalist to create a Ukraine without Russia, the Russifying Ukraine. This fits within our vision of Europe without Russia. But nonetheless, I think the narratives we're embracing now, it's going a very ugly direction.

And of course, the Russians will see a way of countering this with narratives of their own, which might increasingly seem to delegitimize the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood altogether. If this is how we define Ukraine now as being an anti-Russian entity, you know, one where we, again, there was Americans who passed a resolution where they called the famine of Holodomor deliberate Russian genocide. I mean, this is incredible stuff which really fuels a lot of resentment now. If this is the path we're going down, I don't think Russia

can live next to such a Ukraine, and in which they, they would see the need to effectively dismantle, at least take much more territory and even regime change. So this is my greatest concern. I think, yes, both of you suggested. All the people are suggesting, you know, we're supporting Ukraine, we're supporting Ukraine. What we're really doing is, you know, pushing them down the river

and just setting a horrible, horrible future waiting for them. Anyways, any final comments before we round this off? Oh, okay. Well, then I'll just want to, yeah, thank you again, Professor Roberts for your time. Yeah, we hope to have you back again sometime.