The Duran Podcast - Hormuz Leverage Could Become Long Term Trap

Episode Date: August 8, 2026

Hormuz Leverage Could Become Long Term Trap

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation with the Strait of Hormuz. And we definitely have negotiations taking place. But the question is, who is negotiating? Is it Oman, Iran, and the United States, or is it Iran and Oman? Trump, the Trump administration, they make it out as if they are part of the negotiations and we're very close to a deal on the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is saying that no such thing has taken place. It is actually just bilateral negotiations between Oman and Iran.

And they are very close to an understanding as to how Hormuz will be managed going forward. And if you go by Iranian media, it is a process that the United States will not. like. So what is happening here? Well, I'm glad you've said this because this is what we're getting from the Iranians now. The Iranians are giving a completely different account of the progress of the negotiations. And I'm sorry to say this. I mean, I don't like to say this, but they have been consistently more correct about negotiations processes ever since this conflict began on the 28th of February. I mean, we've had long stretches

where the Americans have claimed that they're in direct contact with the Iranians. There'd be negotiations going on. It turned out there weren't negotiations going on. There's only been one actual proper meeting between the Iranians and the Americans, and that was the one that took place in Islamabad some months ago.

And that ended very, very quickly. There's been mediators, Pakistan, Qatar, and they've been sending messages backwards and forwards between the Iranians and the Americans. But as we discussed before, this isn't really even a proper mediation operation. It's more like a kind of courier service than anything else. And, well, through all of that, though, we did eventually get the memorandum of understanding, which was largely drafted, as far as I can by the Iranians and the Pakistanis, and which Trump signed off. We've discussed how the Americans signed it, but there was never any real possibility

that the Trump administration would follow through. What the Iranians are saying now is that this is what is actually happening. They are in negotiations with Amman. The negotiations are about the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. And the Iranians say that there will be only one channel. It will be managed jointly by the two literal states, Amman and Iran. There will be a discretionary fee for ships that pass through. There is no question or possibility.

of two separate channels, one on the north coast close to Iran and the other on the south coast, close to Oman. I mean, that was something we saw during the period of the memorandum of understanding. The Iranians have said that is unacceptable. There is only going to be one channel jointly administered by Oman and Iran. And this has nothing to do with the United States. It is a purely bilateral negotiation. The Americans are not part of it. And this is the crucial point. It's the killer point is this. They're saying that even if Iran and Oman come to a joint agreement about the future management of the Strait of Hormuz, this does not mean that the Strait of Hormuz is going to be reopened. That is an entirely separate issue. And that

depends on the resolution of the underlying conflict between Iran and the United States. So we might have, we probably will have, an announcement very soon of some sort of agreement in principle between Amman and Iran. But that does not mean that the Strait of Hormuz automatically is going to be reopened. And the United States will not support this. Absolutely. And in fact, I believe it was in the Wall Street Journal. There was a report that said that the United States and some of the Persian Gulf states, the UAE, perhaps Saudi Arabia, are strongly opposed to this whole agreement. Amman, I should say, has always been something of an outlier amongst the Arab Persian Gulf states. They don't really get on very well with the others. And they've always been more friendly to the Iranians and the Americans will absolutely not like the fact that the Iranians will have essentially control of the Strait of Hormuz and will be able to impose a fee and control shipping through

the Strait of Hormuz. So at the moment again, despite all the optimism that we're hearing, the statements for Trump and from Bessent and from others that all is soon going to be well, the Strait of Hormuz is going to be reopened, the shipping through the Strait of Hormuz will be able to start again. The fact that there will be several months, two months apparently of a temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. For the moment, I myself have difficulty understanding any of this, because unless the Iranians are telling us something that's completely different from what is really going on, which, of course, is possible, but not consistent with what we have seen before. Less is actually happening than meets the eye. And to repeat again, a point we've made many times on our programs,

it is difficult to understand why, given that Iran and the United States are in conflict with each other, the Iranians would want to relax control. of the Strait of Hormuz whilst they are in conflict with the Americans, given that keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed is what gives them leverage over the Americans. For the moment, it doesn't seem to me to make obvious sense for the Iranians to agree to this. Well, even if the Iranians agreed to something with Oman, and let's just say they opened up Hormuz. You still have the U.S. blockade of Iran. Well, that's, well.

So does the U.S. lift the blockade in order to allow oil to flow out of, out of the Strait of Hormuz? Does the U.S. select which tankers move out of Hormuz or which do not? Does Iran select which tankers move out of Hormuz and which do not? Well, to answer the last question first, if Iran is going to exercise, control over the Strait of Hormuz, then by definition, they would have a right to prevent tankers passing through the Strait of Hormose. They could say that a particular tanker must pay a fee, which, as I said, is discretionary, and which they are presumably entitled to set, though conceivably part of the deal with Iran might be that it sets out what the same

size and scale of the fees would be. But it would be for the Iranians ultimately to make the decision. So if what we're hearing from the Iranians is true, they will retain control of the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians are saying, coming now to the question of the sea blockade, that there is no possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being reopened whilst the American sea blockade remains in place. There are reports which claim that it's not going to be a fee, but it's going to be a fund that will be created between Iran and Oman. And it will be a voluntary fund, which will maintain Hormuz, of which the Gulf countries

and the Europeans will put money into this fund. Europe on the hook for Hormuz. Kind of makes sense, actually. It makes a great deal of sense. But anyway, what do you make of that? I don't want to explore the mechanics of this until we actually see what the agreement is if there's going to be an agreement. My own personal view is that at the end of the day of any fund that is set up of this kind is going to be controlled by the Iranians if these arrangements are sorted out. because the Iranians will be the people who are left in control.

So you can call it a fund instead of a fee. You don't want to call it a toll. That is absolutely not a language that apparently the Americans, the Europeans, the Persian Gulf states, even some people in Iran and the Chinese and all of those want to see used. But ultimately, the fact is that somehow in some way, people are going to have to pay. That's going to be the idea.

And voluntary. Well, you know, there are such things that are voluntary, but also compulsory. So I suspect this is going to be one of them. It's a possibility because the Trump administration has been saying that a fee is unacceptable. Yes, yes. So maybe the workaround is to create a fund

and for the United States to order their vassals in the Gulf and in Europe to put money into the fund. for which the vassal countries are going to have to do it. Of course. Right? And that way the Trump administration can say, you know, we're not, we don't have a fee in place. We're not putting money into Hormuz because Trump always says, you know, Hormuz is not important to us.

The Europeans need it. The Gulf countries need it, but the United States release that doesn't need it. So he can say that again. He can say we're not putting money into it. And he can present it maybe as some sort of a thing. temporary victory, or a pause at least, until the U.S. rearms, of which U.S. stockpiles, now we know, are very low and they do need some time to rearm. So maybe that could be a workaround. Of course, Iran and Oman, but specifically Iran has to go for this, has to accept

this. Absolutely. And I suspect that there will be opposition within Iran to accepting it, too. I mean, that's the other side of it. I mean, the Americans may not be happy with this deal. I suspect that there are people within Iran itself who are not going to be happy with this deal either. There is a very, very vocal, and I suspect quite powerful faction in Iran, which says that it's wrong for Iran

to engage in any negotiations with anyone at all, with the Americans, obviously, but also with the Persian government, states and even with Amman as well, that the right thing for Amman to do is to keep the Strait of Hormuz shut and wait for the Americans to cave. That that's the way to do it. And in fact, this particular faction, which is a faction, it is not the entirety of the Iranian leadership. What they want is to start hitting the United, they want to resume the war. They've actually written pieces.

I read them in which they say that the right thing for Iran to do is at precisely the moment when American inventories of weapons are at their lowest, this is not the moment to stop. It's the moment to continue attacking. Yeah, but the United States will attack. I mean, the U.S. is low on weapons, but it still has the capability to launch attacks. Of course he cares. Of course it. So, I mean, I understand what the hardliners, let's say, in Iran are.

are thinking. But that does run various risks of the United States, using, maybe even using weapons that have not been used so far and around. It is, I mean, I think it is a dangerous policy to the point of recklessness. And it also risks isolating Iran. I mean, the Chinese won't like that. Other countries in the world won't like that. I mean, even the country that is perhaps most sympathetic to Iran, which is Russia, would probably have difficulty supporting a stance of that sort. But anyway, the point is that there is a faction in Iran which is arguing in that way. It is not without influence. It has support inside Iran. And that is going to make negotiations very difficult. And it's going to

make it very difficult for the Iranians to make concessions, because those concessions then have to be negotiated within Iran itself. There's a factor that people perhaps don't understand so well in the West. On the other side of things, by dragging this out, you do give the U.S. the ability to rearm and restock, and then you're going to get another. strike into Iran, then there's going to be a pause, then the U.S. will rearm and restock. There'll be another strike, a pause, and it'll go on for months, if not years. So how does this resolve?

How do you resolve this, then? I mean, if you can't resolve it diplomatically, if the two sides are not talking, it's very, very risky for Iran to go on the offensive, at least in a way that will provoke the United States to use more devastating, more dangerous weapons that they have not used in this conflict to date. If you leave it as is, if you leave everything the way it is, Horbush closed and nothing's really going on, it then gives the United States the ability to drag this war out, which is definitely what it would like to do, what some forces in the U.S. Absolutely.

We want. That's the preference, is for this to be a long war where they can strike and get Iran over many months and many years until they do get some sort of a collapse. Absolutely. And of course, there's the issue of oil and oil reserves and all of that. And that is undoubtedly a major factor weighing on the president and his officials. Interest rates. We saw what happened with the yen. We did a program. All of that. All of that. But there is a faction within the United States that ultimately doesn't care about these things. They'll say that the United States can always discover workarounds. It is still an enormous

economy. It still has dollar primacy. It can always attract, you know, oil, the oil that it needs from wherever it is can be found. It can get oil from Venezuela. It can do this and can do that. It can even possibly make deals with the Russians under the table. For them, the priority is defeating Iran. So, and again, one should not completely discount these ideas. I mean, there would be major economic problems in the United States. There would be major political costs arising from those problems. But one should not say that the United States cannot absorb this kind of

blow. The Europeans, perhaps, cannot. We might have an economic crisis in Europe, but the sort of people in the United States that we're talking about is they're not going to be worried about rises in the cost of living in the United States and problems of the US economy are not going to be bothered by an economic crisis in Europe. I think that's the thing to work to understand. And yes, they will work towards rebuilding their stockpiles and they will be aiming for a long war. And of course, Iran itself is under severe economic pressure. I mean, the currency continues to weaken. There is also high inflation in Iran. People there are, you know, experiencing severe economic stress. if the United States is experiencing economic stress, so to an even greater degree is Iran,

though arguably Iran has greater capacity to absorb that stress. Here is what I think would be the right strategy for Iran to take. I think they're spending too much time talking to the Americans, too much time talking to the Amanis. What I think they ought to be doing is talking to their briefs partners. I've discussed this. We've discussed this in many programs. They should be talking to the Chinese and the Russians.

They should be expediting weapons deliveries from Russia and perhaps from China too, but definitely from Russia. They should be going to China, telling the Chinese that what we did before was a huge mistake, you know, making an economic deal with you and then making, giving all the contracts to Western companies. we unequivocally apologize. We were utter fools to do that. Get Chinese economic and financial help to stabilize the Iranian economy, which would not cost a huge amount of money, certainly not for China.

Stabilize the economy internally. Strengthen the economy militarily. And forget about Hormuz. I mean, Hormuz, closing Hormuz. I think, and this is something where I know many people push back, I think it is a long-term trap for Iran itself. I think many people think that this is Iran's magic key and its ultimate solution. Certainly, it puts enormous temporary pressure on the Trump administration and threatens

a global economic crisis. But does that. ultimately benefit Iran. And with every year that passes, and every month, every year that passes, greater workarounds are found. The global economy eventually adjusts, and Iran's leverage eventually will start to fade, even if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. The Iranians used to understand that very, very well before the 28th the first. February, which is why before the 28th of February, they did not work to close the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz gives you a temporary advantage, but it is only a temporary one.

Staking everything on keeping the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely closed, I think ultimately is a trap which isolates Iran and puts it in a weaker position. The better thing is to get the Iranian economy back on its feet, sort out trading links with Iran's BRICS partners, re-equip Iran with a stronger military, and then that will put Iran in a stronger position when the United States comes for it again, which it inevitably will. Oh, they better get moving, Iran. I don't see much activity happening between Iran, Russia, and Iran and China. I mean, there are some trips that Arachi has taken to China and to Russia. But he should be camping out there. I mean, he should be there every other week.

I mean, maybe there's stuff that's happening behind the scenes that we don't know about. Yes. Okay, that's understandable. But I've seen Arachi go to China just a couple of times into Russia a couple of times. over the past six months. He should be there every two, three weeks trying to hammer out deals. And I just want to say, I just want to stress what you said, long term, it is a trap. There's no doubt about it, long term, closing hormone is a trap because the global economy,

the situation, the oil economy will find workarounds. We talked about this in a video we recorded a week ago. Pipelines will be built, workarounds will be thought up and implemented, and the leverage will weaken over time. But it is a short-term to media term, a huge pressure point, and it does give Iran tremendous leverage, short-term, medium term. Absolutely. Which goes back to the U.S. strategy of dragging this out. Yeah. And Iran's strategy should be to try and figure this out quickly.

I mean, these are the two different strategies that are taking place there. And we should not underestimate. One more quick point. We should not underestimate the U.S.'s ability, which they have shown they can do, to manipulate the oil markets and the price of oil and even intervene when it comes to shocks that net oil importers are undergoing, as was the case with Japan. has shown that he will do whatever it takes to stabilize things. It should not be underestimated.

You are absolutely, you are absolutely right on all points. Iran is wasting too much time negotiating with Amman. This is my own personal view. Amman is a small weak country. Ultimately, it is not a negotiating partner for Iran. They can agree a few things on the Strait of Hormuz and the management of the Strait of Hormuz. But the Americans can come along. The other Persian Gulf states can come along.

And they say, look, we don't care what you've agreed with, Amman. This is what we want. And they can brush Amman aside. The Iranians have spent too much time altogether, ever since the collapse of the JCPOA, negotiating with the Americans. I mean, the whole memorandum of understanding, all of that. negotiating with the Americans with whom deals never stick? That's the lesson of the JCPOA. I mean, why they went through the whole business of the MOU,

when they should already know that you sign a deal with the United States, and the Americans will take it not as an actual package, but as a menu where they can pick whatever part of it. you know, they want and which suits them. They should be negotiating with countries like China and Russia where you make a deal and it sticks. It's honored. So you go for China, you do a big economic deal with them. I mean, it was there on the table. They had it actually. And then they messed it up and threw it away. They should come back, say, look, we're sorry we did. that. Now this time we've seen how foolish we were. We're members of Briggs now. Let's move forward

with this. You've seen how we've been attacked. We understand your concerns about the Strait of Hormuz. We guarantee that it will be reopened. Do a big economic deal with China, which can stabilize Iran's economy. Do a big economic, because Russia has economic tools it can use to help Iran to. It can supply gas, which Iran needs, apparently despite being potentially a major gas producer. It can provide other things, other technologies. Do an economic deal with Russia. They've already done economic deals, but they've been very slow up to now in working on them. I mean, there was lots of stories about how difficult it was to create railway links through the Caspian Sea

and the railway links between Russia and Iran were very difficult that would take ages to build. And yet we see that Iran, when it puts its mind to it, can build railways and has the ability to build things very, very fast. So I have to say it, that looks now more like excuses

not to move forward and do things to build strong, viable Caspian and Caucasus corridors. So move forward energetically with that and get those military deals. The fighter jets, the air defense system, which the Russians offered years ago and which the Iranians refused, all of those things. And as I said, these deals are with real partners, and they will stick. Iran has some reason to believe, good reason to believe that they would be on. Yeah, make the deal with Oman and just make it quick.

Right? Just, okay, come to some sort of agreement with Oman. The United States is not going to like it. We already know the outcome. Yeah. Even if the United States likes it, we still know the outcome. The U.S. is trying to buy time. Yes.

They're trying to string this whole process, this whole conflict, trying to string it out. string everybody along so that they can buy time and eventually get that opening to get the regime change in Iran. But Iran has to move quickly with bricks. I'm getting all kinds of Assad-Syria vibes with all of this. I have to say it. I really, really am. I know two different countries, two different situations. Syria didn't have a straight-of-ormuz. I understand all the arguments. But at the end of the day, Assad dragged his feet in getting deals. with China and getting deals with with Russia. He ignored the invitation to Kazan to the Brick Summit.

He opted for tighter and stronger cooperation with the Gulf countries, which are vassals to the United States. And over many years, he got isolated and then he got taken out once the opening presented itself. He also rejected, as we now learned, a Chinese offer to join the Belt and Road initiative. I remember when a big Chinese... He opted for the West. For the West, exactly.

The GCC countries, but the West, it's the West. Yes, exactly. He opted for it. Exactly. And the Iranians, despite everything, there seems to be a very powerful group of people in Iran who hanker after doing the same thing. And you're absolutely right. They open themselves up to the same problems.

This is not the Iranians. be compromising. I mean, you know, compromising over the Strait of Hormuz or any of these things, using the Strait of Hormuz to try to gain leverage over the Americans in order to agree a deal with the Americans is a fool's errand, because whatever deal you agree with the Americans is not going to be worth the ink. It's written on. Yeah, eventually you're going to have to have to work with.

China. You have to. With Russian bricks, eventually. So you better start yesterday. Now, exactly. Exactly. And you're absolutely right. Arachi has made a few sporadic trips to Russia. I think he's only made two to China since the start of this whole conflict, which is incredible, actually. It shouldn't just be Arachshi. You should have large numbers of Iranian officials, economic officials, military people, all of those people, they should be going regularly to both of these two capitals and they should be negotiating a deal now. That's what they ought to be doing. Any chance that the US tells China to not make a deal with Iran? Well, I think they did. I think Trump basically said that very thing to Xi Jinping back in March

and the Chinese position is very straightforward. China makes deals with whomever it chooses. That is their sovereign right. They've consistently said that about every country. I don't think they'd make an exception of Iran. All right. The main point with Hormous is what you said. Long term, absolutely.

It's a trap. Short term, medium term. It provides Iran with a great deal of leverage, but they have to sort this out short term to medium term. otherwise. Yes. This is going to head towards the same direction as Assad. Exactly.

Exactly. All right. We will leave it there at the durand.locos.com. We're on X-Rond Rumble. We're on telegram. We are also on substack. Go to the Durand shop, pick up some merch. There's a link of the description box down below.

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