The Duran Podcast - Hotel Ukraine - You can never leave w/ Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris and Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: September 8, 2023

Hotel Ukraine - You can never leave w/ Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris and Glenn Diesen

Welcome to today's program. My name is Glenn Dyson. I'm a professor of political science and Russian foreign policy. With me is Alexander McCurice from the very popular Duran podcast. And the guest today is the excellent Alistair Kruk. Welcome, sir. Thank you very much. Pleasure to be with you. So, yeah, please correct me if I'm wrong, but your background includes, I think, almost 30 years. in MI6 with British intelligence, you've not only been a British diplomat, but you also have background from EU diplomacy as an advisor of Javier Solana, which was the highest representative of the EU's common foreign and security policy. And also, yeah, I guess from the top

enchilons of democracy, you also have a lot of experience with negotiations, de-escalation, and peace negotiations. So I guess if there's a lot of experience. one thing sorely missed in the past 18 months, it's really been diplomacy and de-escalation. So it's certainly great to have you on today. And I guess to address the problem of finding a political settlement to the Ukrainian war, we wanted to start by speaking about this article you recently published called Hotel Ukraine. Sure, you can check out any time, but you can never leave. Obviously, they referenced Eagles, Hotel California.

But you argued that all the participants in the Ukrainian war, be it Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the Europeans, have all to some extent boxed themselves in, as there's not really an exit out of this conflict. I was wondering if you can elaborate or explain. Yes. I mean, the purpose of Hotel California, which was themed to me at, because in all my experience in these sort of conflict, you know, you know, it's easy to get in, and everyone assumes getting out is just as easy. And so hence the sort of title, which is, you know, you're always welcome to come. We are always receiving you, however, in conflict, but, you know, you can never leave the hotel.

You will get away. And I think this is what I'm suggesting for both for the United States and, well, Europe is just an adjunct of the United States. But it's also the case even for Russia is not so easy to get out of this conflict either. But the main thing that I was trying to raise this is my experience of sort of negotiations I've done many cease-by negotiations and hostage negotiations as well at times on behalf of governments. And my experience of this is two things, is that the West tends to approach them a very literal, from a very, if you like, Western perspective of logic, of rationality.

disease, and they say to me, and I remember so often people would come and say, you know, but why don't they, you know, understand that violence is just not serving their courts? Why can't they just stop and, you know, come to terms with the other side and that it is just really so simple? So throughout the time when I was working in his negotiators coming in from Washington and would sit down and say, well, you're back in the envelope, you know, here's the five of points. Do we agree on this? Okay, it's done.

You know, and back on the plane back to Washington. And, you know, the point was that conflict actually changes psychology, the sight of people. The longer it goes on, the more it changes. It ratchez. rationalist. And this sort of very, if you like, rationalistic approach to confess, to know, here's a spectrum of part. At one end is this part, and that end is that part, let's split it here, and that's the solution. But it doesn't take account to, I mean, what I call consciousness or cycling. People, it may seem sensible, political.

and rational to come to the solution that is being proposed, but it may not be psychologically acceptable, even though it is, if you like, politically rational, so do. What who have experienced losses, loved ones, family, imprisonments, who've been abused, who have been treated badly over many years, become very, I mean, it's a different world. A different psyche, different world that they live in. And this is why I used to see these, you know, people used to think that they were extremists or Islamist radicals or something. In fact, many of them were just secular sort of medical students who were a suicide belt and

exploded. They just wanted to hurt the other side. So I think really, I mean, this article. was looking at two things. One is my experience that when it comes to negotiation, now at the moment the West is sort of in a binary system. On the one hand, it says, you know, okay, let's have a negotiation frozen conflict, we'll freeze the thing as it is, and we'll negotiate poor points of getting more territory so that we can put pressure and Russia will join frozen conflict, and then we can allow Ukraine to join NATO in New Corp.

We can build up the security guarantees, which are effectively sort of a re-nosed NATOization of Ukraine. And then the other one is really, okay, know that, well, let's just keep the war going. Maybe it will lower end, but let's keep the war going because the longer we, a trip Russia collapse and at the beginning. And my point is, they haven't even reached the sort of starting point for real negotiations from these positions. There's such sort of, you know, Western-style positions that are reached inside the Western

Beltway bubble, you know, of what we would like to offer Russia, that this will be what we will offer. And they do this, and I think you've made this point before, Alexander, so it's not new to you. I've heard it was very much my experience. They do this, and they don't have any real understanding of what's going on. They don't understand unless I come back to indicate how the psyche in Russia is changed by war. It's not just the rational perception, but the psyche has changed. Russians now really want, have a sort of impulse. They want to see, if you like, the regime in here.

They want to see it defeat on this. And this is, you know, you say it's not very rational, but that's the reality of negotiations in my experience that they can't, you know, they haven't done the home. They don't, and we have much worse situation because the West is stuck in this dilution about Russia being a state that is on the verge of collapse and it's weak. So they haven't really started to think about that or even to try to tell the list. What it is, Russia might accept. There is a hidden assumption behind all this, oh, whatever we are.

When we come to the conclusion, Macron and Charles say, oh, well, we'll say this to Putin, and then Putin will grab it with both hands and say, oh, thank you very much for your contribution. And I think, you know, I've often seen, I mean, this is particularly evident to me, sorry, I'll stop in a second, but I just wanted to make this clear. The second point is really that in doing hostage things. I mean, where you're not in a position to hold long conversations. You're doing it over radio or something like this with hostage takers who are ready to cut

the throats of the person they're holding and the things like that. You know, the governments that come to me often and said, can you open a channel to these people? This is basically what all, this is where we have with Europe. All they're saying is, let's open a channel with Russia. And I keep saying in these hostage negotiations, I keep trying, I can't imagine. But what are you going to say? You know, I thought what you're going to say, and what are you going to say when they say

no? I mean, you have to be a bit like chess player. You may not be as good as that, but you need to think, where are you going to go if it's not going to happen? And I set out in the article the principal reasons why it's not going to happen like that is because it's quite obvious that the ultra-nationalists and the neo-fascists. You see this, I mean, you know, Zelensky's ten-point plan, which calls for the capitulation of Russia, is a typical example when you don't have to negotiate with.

So those are the essential points. They don't really have and thought through how to negotiate. My experience, it may take them some time to think out how to negotiate. But in the meantime, you know, Russia has agency, Russia has horses. They don't even put into the equation the fact that, you know, Russia in the next weeks or may indeed change the whole paradigm of this conflict. And they haven't even thought about going into it as the first page, let alone thought about how to manage it if it's the paradigm.

I mean, there's a chronic lack of actually sort of understanding these things, and that's what I was trying to express this article. I have to say, I think it is an absolutely brilliant article, if I may just quickly say. I thought the point about Hotel California, Hotel Ukraine, is, well, it's very insightful because what has happened is that there's been this long discussion about Ukraine. It's gone for years, essentially since the Soviet Union broke up about what to do with Ukraine. and people in the West, governments in the West, have far too long, and still now,

they haven't really thought through the fact that this is a very complicated relationship between Ukraine and Russia. And one would have thought that before getting involved in a country like Ukraine, which has been a part of Russia, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union for 300 years, where there's all these enormously connected relationships between Russia and Ukraine, economic, social, familial. You would have thought that they would tread very carefully before going into Ukraine. They never did.

They went straight in. They took very strong declaratory positions. They still do. They still talk about supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes. That's become a kind of mantra that they're now endlessly repeating. And of course, that isn't really going to help you. If you find yourself in the kind of situation in which you are in now, where you're involved in an intractable conflict,

it's not working out as you expect. And it strikes me that you're absolutely right. They haven't really even started to think about what the Russian side is going to. is thinking, what it's going to do, how its own perspective is evolving. I just wanted to make quickly two points just before we come back. The first is that the rational solution that you're talking about to me is very similar to the Minsk agreement. Grant these people autonomy in those days.

I mean, it was always entirely about granting not just the whole of Don. not the whole of Donbash, these territories that were under the control of the people who were, who, you know, engage in those uprisings back in 2014, grant them autonomy, agree some kind of constitutional set up for Ukraine. Minsk made no reference to NATO, by the way, just to say, or no reference to the EU, nothing of that kind. and we're now perhaps thinking about returning to something like that, completely ignoring that a whole lot of things have happened since.

There's been a terrible wall, which is still ongoing, emotion has increased, investment on the Russian side has increased, going back to Minsk is not going to be, or anything like Minsk is simply not going to happen. And the second thing, which I also have to say, I was thinking about, again, when I was reading your article, was that it reminded me so much of what happened in Syria, and a place I know for thinking very well, in 2016. The Russians intervened in Syria, and there was these very complex negotiations between the Americans and the Russians that went on for about a year, and the Americans were putting

forward all kinds of proposals to the Russians, which never really really. addressed from a Russian point of view their primary concern, which is the stability of the government in Damascus. And the result was that the negotiations in the end fail. And the Russians just went ahead and supported asset. And in the end, basically, they sweat the board. And it seems that we are repeating in Ukraine something of the same mistake. We're not looking to address the concerns of the other side. We're talking all the time to ourselves. We are negotiating, in effect, with ourselves. We're not really thinking about what the other side is looking at. Yes, I think that it's so. I want to say because I think, you know, you'll have to look at it

at two levels. One is the sort of geosrategic, the geopolitical level, which is consuming the European intention completely treat Ukraine as a sort of separate as a single entity. And I suggest the Grin Bip, that they ought to think of it more like Ireland. Do you have the same problems? I mean, I was a very young, rather naive diplomat at that time. I remember, you know, we thought it was a good idea to put the two sides in a room together and tell them to sort it out, and then we sort it out. Of course, it was a complete failure, total failure,

in a way, convinced of the other side's agreement in capacity, shall we say. And the point is, you know, you start off with one side that has an understanding and interpretation of history. It has a vision of the future. it has a completely different cultural background. And on the other side, a completely incompatible vision of history and a vision of the future for Arna. And so long, if you like in Arna, to try and get to the point,

not of an agreement, but simply to the point where one side says, well, look, I don't agree with their history, I don't agree with their vision in the future, but I now accept they have a point, and they are authentic representatives of those people. And no one has understood this in terms of what is going on Ukraine. You have the same thing there, and you have on one side which we're supposed to endorse in fact, a form of ultra-nationalism. You know, I won't say much about this here.

I mean, it is one of those ultra-nationism. I've been dealt with ultra-nationalisms in the Middle East. I mean, that simply, I mean, I suppose if you like, some of the extreme Salafists are ultra-nationalists in the sense they see most of the world as apostates. I am not proper Muslims, and therefore it is their duty to kill them. But there is a very strong sense of the other. science, vision and history of the territory which they jointly share, but of wanting to rid completely of what they see is the foreign unacceptable alien implant into that country.

And because we've been alive so much, certainly through American intelligence services with one aspect of it, I think it makes it much more difficult for them. ready to come to an understanding of this problem. When Russia says it finally comes, when Macron and Schultz, I mean, they don't come. It has to be the United States. They don't care what in Moscow what Sholz and Macron say. I think actually they knew Macron is having less influence of Europe and Lithuania at these times.

But they don't, but they are never going to accept. a frozen conflict or a separation that leaves an ultra-nationalist, neo-fashish, which is predominant. There is a military on the other side, which is also getting fed up with what they see is, you know, nonsense from NATO, doctrines and how to operational strad of the head. So there is a, if you like, a great difficulty. The lens he is caught between the two. But you can see for that time being he cannot escape the far right. They effectively control. You saw, you see this in all his statements from his supporters and that 10-point piece of that.

So these, I mean, really, you know, are things that take a lot of time to get to the point where you can actually have a conversation about these. And I just think, you know, particularly in Washington at the moment, whereas sort of torn apart by political turmoil at home and differing views within their own sort of about how to deal with us, it's going to be very difficult to see. really a good idea. It may make political sense, but it doesn't make psychological sense. I thought that, yeah, well, the Ukrainian seems to have been at, with a bit of a dilemma, because on one hand, they recognize that this is a war of attrition, where they shouldn't exhaust their

manpower and their equipment. But at the same time, it looks like, yeah, they have to conquer new territories at any cost in order for, to continue sending weapons. So in this dilemma, it seems that Zelensky went with the territory and support from the West. But this, yes, you also pointed out in the article, it's not, hasn't been that popular, especially among Solutioni, who has been a bit critical of wasting all of these soldiers. So I am, I thought, yeah, that this... I think he'd be, I think he'd be, I think he'd be called a traitor by those hard right forces. If he tried to negotiate or do anything except keep open the national forces in Ukraine,

I'm not content with just getting the land back. I mean, they're hoping to bring Europe to the point at which it concurs with them that is necessary to destroy Russia. And this is not really ever sort of brought forward into how do we deal? with us. But until Zelensky moves, until Zelensky has another, if you like, influence on him, he is going to be very much caught by that. And for the time being, he's, for the time being, Zelensky seems to be, you know, trapped by all sides, by the military who doesn't want to go on with the war, because they're losing too many people, and then by the far

right who says you dare give up the war, and you're a traitor, and you'll face the consequences. So, I mean, is the United States capable of dealing with that internal political enough, how to resolve that internal process as a precursor to the beginning of some sort of political solution. And as a moment, I don't see that they even understand it's a problem. I mean, they just see it as, you know, that's how it is. We've always supported those people of the right and they're part of the government. And whatever Zelensky, whatever the government says, that's our policy and they decide what is the outcome of this war. But it's interesting that people seem to have forgotten about 2019 in the West because

Zelensky at one point, he did attempt to abide by by this Minsk Agreement. After he won the presidency, he actually went to the front line in Zolote, as the right-wing militias refused then to pull back their heavy weapons. And what was interesting is the whole encounter was caught on tape and went viral in Ukraine, in which he even pleaded that they would respect his authority. You know, he said, I'm not a loser. I'm a president of Ukraine. You know, you have to listen to me. But not only did they refuse to follow his orders. They even threatened his life. I mean, if you look at members of parliament, they threatened him. Dimitre Jaros, from the right sector, threatened his life.

Andri Bilezky as well also threatened him. What was interesting then is they weren't held accountable, they weren't arrested for threatening the president. Instead, we saw that he had to embrace the far right. Jaros, who had threatened his life, he became advisor to the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. You had Bieletsky only three weeks ago. Selensky posted on a photo with Bilezky and put it on the internet.

This is the same guy who, again, threatened Zelensky and said he would, Ukraine's goal was to lead the white race in a war against the Russians. And it's just, it seems that in 2019, the Americans might have been able to influence some of this by putting their full weight behind Zelensky. But these days, is it too late? Yeah, it's too late for that now, unless it was... I mean, I think there are two things that will change to this calculus problem, but you're right, but I mean, actually, if you look carefully, all his bodyguards, all Zelensky's bodyguards, are from the far right. He has no freedom.

I mean, no movement, everything he says, what he's doing is monitored by the far right, and they keep him under a careful, a careful watch. Two things change. may change to, I think, the paradigm. One is we may see turmoil within the Kiev sphere, that the military and the far right will engage in some sort of conflict, violent or whatever. Because I think the military are coming to the end, because the military understand, I think better than the Pentagon. You know, it's not just about weapons and money. I mean, you know, if you run out of the sort of experienced manpower, I mean, you know, you can be given more weapons and money,

but you just can't mount an effective military operation. And, you know, they know that they're running out of experienced men. I mean, they've run out of experienced men. They know that they don't have the weapons or the, um, uh, or the, um, uh, or the, um, uh, the missiles in order to change the war in a strategic way at all. And so I think they are very much at odds with the right position. No, it must continue until Russia breaks and Putin is gone. I mean, that hard line is very much opposed by the military.

So either we're going to see, I think, a breakup in Kiev and term and maybe a new government or a vacuum, who knows? No one knows. That's what I meant about is not easy for Russia. It means, I mean, all the reports that I hear, I think Alexander has made reference to, all the reports suggest that, I mean, Russia has been, first world, building out their logistics supplies, and then when that has been sorted, they've been building out the size of their armed forces. And they now have really seen a massive, shall we say, massive resource, military resource. They've been building up these law conscripts. The conscripts were there, but the conscripts are being put into a sort of contractual basis,

just as Barber was about to be. And so they have now a large force. I don't believe it will take that you remember that the Russia says, I think it was Putin very early on in the war and said, you know, you must understand we have the technical ability to bring Ukraine to a stop. I mean, Lomik. He meant by the progressive destruction, nutrition of logistics, capabilities, of electricity, of information to be passed on.

You know, it's still amazing to me that the Internet and all of those facilities are allowed to continue to work in the past of Ukraine. As you know, Russia is capable of cutting down, stopping the Internet and keeping their own an internet function at the same time to interfere with NATO's vaunted, you know, ISR, the satellite surveillance system. They can probably stop Starlink. They've tried it and seem to have succeeded in it, but they don't do this. Now I think at some point they may decide when the Ukrainian

forces of being sufficiently exhausted, they will do it. I don't think it needs necessarily, and I don't think it would put it to thousands dead as a result of their offensive. I think it would be a combination of, what was it, an embrace of Ukraine that actually brings it to the sort of paralysis, like a sort of python snake. sort of slowly winding around you and then squeeze it until

the breath goes out of you rather than a sort of necessarily a sort of you know what's a big arrows I mean this is speculation I mean

Russia is very making sure we don't know what they're going to do next and whatever it is of this price I'm sure Can I just ask you to think about a possibility, which is this, which is that the Russians as you're right, I mean, I'm hearing the same thing, that they're building up their forces, they're building up more aircraft, they're increasing the shell production,

they're conscripting more people, they're training more people, they're taking out contracts with more people, but they're still playing it exactly as he said in a very, very measured way. Could it be that the Russians are doing this precisely in all, to give more space for a possible negotiation, for somebody to come forward from the West with a proposal that they can work with, that they're in effect waiting for the West to see, you know, we're going to be, we're going to get ourselves ready in a few months. But until then, let's see whether the Americans, whether, let's see whether the Europeans will finally come to their senses and make a coherent.

proposal. Because again, this isn't not unlike the sort of thing that the Russians tend to do. At least that's my own experience. And would that mean, if that were the case, that perhaps there is still space for a negotiation? I was he suggested that this autumn might be the last real opportunity to do that. Well, you know, I've always said that from the Putin's perspective, this is primarily, again, I've come back to the term, but it's a psychological. It is primarily intended to force an exit by the West from their sort of position of exceptionism and their adoption. of a sort of hegemonic view of the world and to sort of push them out of that view. And we see aspects of, you know, we tend to be too much focused on the military, I think, because there's such good commentary from military people that we sort of look at it very much in a military way. But, you know, Putin is playing a very complicated game.

The diplomacy has been very adept at bringing China online and bringing India. The BRICS was an incredible geostrategic achievement. But ultimately, the aim is to get back to the position, as he said, more than the year ago in December, where he put down those two draft treaties. And the whole point is how to push, you know, the West to the point that it really does. Now, I know the French Farm Minister has just said some sort of West, but, you know, when they get a call from Washington, it'll change great enough. So I think he is very much concerned about that.

I think the second thing he's very much concerned about is what I can borrow from one else's expression, the fragile Americans, thank you. How do you sort of continue this squeeze on the West to bring about an exit from their delusions about themselves, their delusions and they're the best and the only power of the world? How do you push them out of that without actually allowing them to go to the point where they say, oh my God, you know, not. 9-11, Pearl Hop, and this is the real danger, and I agree with others that say this, because, I mean, it's quite clear the West doesn't have any game-changing weapons that will, you know, that Russia can't match on the field at all. Are they going to, at some point then, sort of say,

well, you know, because there are plenty of new cons in advocating it, well, you know, don't, you know, You know, Putin's bluffing on the nuclear score. It's all bluff. He doesn't really mean it. We'll just use a small nuclear image to him. Well, we'll turn it down. It won't be bigger than a big conventional weapon. Why not?

And you know, then he'll get the message and then he'll sit down and he'll, he will capitulate to us. And, you know, again, I think it's a reflection that the Americans don't, you know, don't look at themselves in America. They don't see how weak they really are. They still see themselves as the sort of, there may be sort of anxiety, but they still see themselves.

We are the biggest victory in the world. It's the most technically advanced. We have the best weaponry in the world. There's nothing to sort of compare it. Well, actually, all of that's changed. That whole strategic paradigm doesn't work anymore. They've been overtaken, technically, they've been overtaken in their military doctrine, they've been overtaken in the sense that, you know, their weapons actually haven't worked very well

on the ground. I mean, it's work, they, Russian weapons have objectively proved, effective in this conflict than the American ones. So they don't look at themselves very much, but I think this is the fact that they're not. point. So, Alexander, your question. No, this is what Putin's aim is to get to the point in which. But let's be clear about what the negotiation has to be about. It has to be with the United States. Forget Europe. It has to be with the United States. And it has to be about the relationship, an understanding that as, if you like, Eurasia and its security grows,

if you like the Eurasian security structure, we need a modus for Vendor with Western security structure. We can't go on with this sort of messy incrementalism of the West. We are building a huge security and trading structure. structure across Europe, how do we get to the point in which we can convert security structure and how to live with what are the Western needs and Western vital interest in security in the area? Now, so, Alexander, I agree with you. Eventually this is, you know, what Putin is aiming towards.

The only thing is, if you look at Washington, you don't see the slightest sort of the sort of sense that they even understand the problem, let alone have a proper answer to that. And it's not just Russia, Russia, and the others in the Brits, are a very secure structure. We see it evolving across the Middle East already. Look what's happening. We find that the Gulf states are joining with Iran in a Gulf. Naval Patrol protection policies and things like this are happening very very rapid It'll happen it'll unroll in the next period

But this is really what we have to be talking about is this some how will these two things And I don't think it's not just Ukraine is just one you know part of this It's a financial war. It's a cultural war It is a war of civilization and of course it's a military war one too in Ukraine, but the military one in the Ukraine is only is subordinate to, I think, Russia and China's bigger objective of trying to find some form of modus within between the Eurasian security needs and Western security needs. I think what you touch on is, it's been to some extent the challenge of Russia for the

past 30 years, which was at the end of the Cold War, to find a new format for Europe, which was not based on the same zero-sum logic of the Cold War, where, well, effectively, when NATO expands, it ends up being at expense of Russian security. But I guess what really changed was in 2014, with when we backed the coup in Ukraine, because until then, Russia had a very Western-centric foreign policy. Its objectives were largely defined by this. ambition to have a greater Europe, which would be absent of this zero-sum dynamic. But since 2014, again, this option is now gone. Now they're seeking this huge Eurasian integration, and it seems to some extent the challenge

becomes even greater, because now this huge Eurasian... Even greater. Yeah, this Eurasian... You know, in a sense, I think what you're saying about, you know, the Cold War and the talk about European security update, you know, that's passing. I mean, it's stale. I mean, you know, subject. I mean, you know, Sweden comes in or Finland or whatever, but, you know, there's nothing really

that's going to change this whole mega argument that is being, the proposition being put forward by Russia and China, and with the other brick states in that respect. And so, you know, it's got to be understanding the slightly broader perspective now. that this is, you know, not just Europe, it's Eurasia. And there is a security and the bricks will likely sort of converge and commingle in due course. But, you know, and that's part of it is the financial war. I mean, that's another aspect of it to push the West to understand. If they don't understand it in Ukraine, they're getting more pressure.

both in terms of they're getting pressure, in terms of de-dollarization and consequences of that, they're getting pressure in Syria now where they're being under Al-Qaeda, considerable forces that are pushing for their rule to leave Syria. I mean, that's a very dangerous aspect, because it could easily explode into something much wider, a regional war. So we're in very sort of uncertain territory and there is too much. I think really in some, there's too much fluidity in this. There's not enough. And, you know, I mean, I don't know that the White House has got the ability, you know,

they can't even sort of their intelligence, on you, Craig, let alone try to get it out, you know, what duration security needs and duration structures are going to mean, economically financially as well as in many fields on trade and on setting of standards for the next year of the globe. I mean at the moment, you know, America is engaged in an attempt to do what it did to, I think someone has made the point before, what it did to Japan. They're now doing it to China, albeit in a different way, adding everything list of national security interests, you can't trade with this, you can't do this, you can't do

that, more regulations, more tariffs. And the danger is that it's succeeding. I mean, you know, China for the moment is slowing. It's vitally important, I think, to the welfare of the United States as to Europe, that this should not happen and that they be allowed to reorientate in very careful years about how to restructure the Chinese economy for the future in a different way from the Western way. And that needs sort of strategic space to move, you know, trading space, not just security, but security and trade come together.

I mean, half, which I think has been little sort of noticed, I mean, half of the BRICS expansion was all about getting these pivots, these choke points on trade around the wasn't just about, you know, de-dollarization. It was a strategic, geopolitical look at the prospects of security for the whole of the Eurasian. the heartland, if you like to back to the kingdom, the heartland strategy. It's interesting. Because, I don't know, very interesting, because, I mean, when Americans talk about the conflict with Ukraine, and there was this extraordinary commentary by this new Republican politician, Vive Erasmuswamy, who's just emerged out of nowhere. But he was a good example of what I find is the general trend. You don't actually have people in Washington who are prepared to talk about a general, peaceful settlement of, you know, the entire global situation.

A ceasefire. Ramoswamy says, I want peace in Ukraine. I want to do this deal with the Russians so that I can detach the Russians from the Chinese and I can focus on pushing back hard on the Chinese. So it is essentially a conflict between those people in the United States who want to confront China and they're a large group. And another group who still want to confront Russia, who I suspect include to a certain extent the president himself, who is, let's be clear about this, somebody who's lived all his life through the Cold War, who's very Eurocentric in his own way, he tends to think

very much, it seems to me, along the lines that people thought in the 1970s when he first became a senator in the 1980s, when it was all about Europe. But that's what it's all about. It's all about either we go after the Russians or we go after the Chinese or some people who still want to go after both of them at the same time. But it's never about actually finding a long-term, sustainable, peaceful relationship with. with all of them. And this has become not just sterile, but ultimately very dangerous. Exactly, it is very dangerous. I mean, you know, again, this sort of beltway discussion has no real basis in reality.

Because as I go back to what I said at the outset, the war has seared the consciousness of Russia. There is no way that are coming back into the Western or the American sphere, at least for a generation. I mean, it has really shared them. It's not, and it's misunderstood. Who called Putin all these names and everything which they do, which is, you know, juvenile, and Russians regarded as juvenile.

But I mean, the point is how they have denigrated Russian. Russians and what it means to be Russian. Russia culture, Russia as a whole, Rishimia, the whole sort of sense, which, you know, I believe the West sees it as a sort of, you know, simply a mercantiless, the usual West with mercantilist view. But it's holistic. Or the culture, the economic, the sort of sense of the people as a whole. the spiritual side, the orthodoxy.

All of those is that sort of conflates into a single portion. And I think that is what, you know, they just refuse to accept. So the idea that they're going to break off Russia to fight China. I mean, it's just la-like stuff. It's just ridiculous. They're not going to do that. But what they are doing is driving China more and more with it only an expansion. and a major expansion, financial as well as security expansion, of the Eurasian landmacks,

is the only answer to the United States that is pulled in this direction, pulled in less, it is about this idea, that idea, and at a White House it doesn't seem to be able to decide which it was. Now, I think the only thing that will maybe shift this a little bit is, and I put it at the end, you know, you can argue it in different ways. It looks as if we might be moving towards an impeachment process, inquiring, not an impeachment per se, but an impeachment inquiry aimed at Biden. Now, inevitably, once the Congress gets dug into an impeachment inquiry, I mean, it's all going

be all the stuff about, you know, Ukraine is going to come out from the corruption. And there's plenty more to come out. I mean, we all remember what happens about those cryptocurrency, FTX or whatever it was, who was somehow circulating cryptocurrencies and then providing support back in Washington. I mean, there's a lot more to come out. I just think the DNC had a point we'll say, for God's sake, let's do something to move on from all of this sort of deep messiness, that is great messiness, not in a military sense, but in a sense of the nexus between, you know,

Biden and the United States and Ukraine, which is how we corrupt, and we all know how corrupt it is. But I don't think they'll want that washing parade washing come out to obviously during the lead-up to these, if we have elections, the 24. So I do think that, I don't know how, but I think this is going to either make a bigger sort of impact on the public which is going to push the Republicans, the uniparty, part of the Republicans, towards a sort of, the Republican towards a more view about continuing the war in Ukraine, or it's going to bring about some sort of bigger crisis in the United States as these things come up. It's unforeseeable, it's just, but all one can see is, I mean, it gets worse and worse

and worse the tensions in the United States, and there's no obvious sort of remedy to those, either. But it seems that some of the Republicans, definitely not all, probably not even the majority, they appear to feel that Ukrainian failure, that they could blame it on Biden

and again, pin it as a democratic failure or on the Democrat Party instead of being an American failure. But even if the support begin to diminish it within the United States, I was just curious, what

what would be the leeway in for Russia's bargaining position? I know my impression of some of the territorial issues, they would be willing to compromise. For example, the region of Saperrogy in Kerson, which is on the western side of the Dnieper. They might want to be willing to discuss changing the administrative borders, given that they don't actually hold these territories. But beyond this, what would be the scope of the bargaining? because as you pointed out, a cease... I think the skull of the balcony.

Sorry, because the... The skull of the balcony. Yeah. No, sorry, just because the... I missed your last sentence. Yeah, sorry. No, well, because the ceasefire doesn't seem to be as reasonable proposition, as you also pointed out in the article, it effectively just means that, you know, they would see that as the West simply rearming and, you know, fighting another day.

So, is the only acceptable thing for Russia then be regime change in Kiev, given that, well, they can't live with this current government. And, well, they would have to have some kind of reassurance that Ukraine would remain neutral and that Western weapons would stop flowing. Or is there no room for bargaining? Well, I think, I think, arguably, really, from opposition more or less capitulation. on the part of Kiev because of the factors that will have to go into it. I mean, the first, as I've said, and I keep going, there would have to be a change in the character and quality of governance in Kiev. It can't, you know, there's no point.

Russia simply not except any sort of possibility of re-arming or continue with the far right control and set the limits of policy in Kiev. So there would have to be a change in the quality, whatever that means, whatever you, I don't know what the Russians would say exactly about that, but there would have to be a change of that. Then there would have to be some sort of understanding that the Russians, I'm never going to leave the Dombats to be exposed again, as it has been from 2014 onwards, and being shelled regularly by the Ukrainian armed forces.

How do you address, I mean, these are the rail, this is where I go back to the island question, and you know, you've got two peoples living on one territory that have quite different cultural visions of the future in their past. How are you going to deal with that? And that is going to be, I think, probably, that the end result, however it comes about, perhaps from an implosion in Kiev, but will be the run of the NEPA. First of all, move to the NEPA and take the land to the Rheven NEPA. And then when it's got to the NEPA, I think it will pause.

And as you ask this question, I think they will not sort of try and go to the ultimate of us, but they may pause at the NEPA and say, well, West, have you got something to say that is constructive about how to deal with this? Because otherwise, we will need then a, if you like, a from the NEPA for the extent of the weapons you give to the Ukraine. or the Ukrainians still have. If they have, you know, 50-mile missiles, we'll have to go to 60 miles. If they have 60 miles, we'll go to 70. But we are not going to have Dombas, moonups, civilians, schools, civilian buildings, regularly bombarded by Ukrainian military equipment, even if, you know, effectively the Ukrainian state,

iterates itself in the evolved or down in the south and operates from there. We don't know what will be the outcome of us, but if it does that, then what, you know, what will be the Russians undoubtedly will lead to have some very clear understandings about the in-term situation of Ukraine, quite apart from understandings of the bigger geopolitical to your scratch each point. I mean, I have to say straight away, I cannot imagine that from a Russian point of view, a peace agreement is going to be possible,

which doesn't address the fundamental issue, not just of the security of Dombas, but at the security of Russia as a whole. And I think this is something that I think a lot of people in the West simply don't understand. We come back to those two treaties that the Russians proposed back in December 2021, and which, to all intents and purposes, the United States showed no interest in negotiating about the substance of those treaties. I absolutely think that the Russians,

if they get to the NEPA, will want to stop there. I don't think they want to go all the way to VOLV. I think they understand perfectly well that they would have lots of problems if they went to VALV. But I think what people in the West also need to understand is that if the Russians feel that their own security, the security not just of Donbass, but the whole of the Western Russia and beyond Western Russia, cannot be preserved unless they go further west still, beyond the NEPA, I think eventually they will do that. They've now shown repeatedly that when they say that they will take steps to ensure their security, that, you know, they're not bluffing. And I have to say, all this constant

commentary that you see that, well, you know, what the Russians are doing is a bluff, that, you know, all these things that the Russians are saying is, if it was a bluff, we wouldn't be where we are. And I didn't think there's any understanding of this in the West. And to the extent that there still is an understanding of this, I think that people in London especially, but also a lot of people in Washington would be viscerally opposed to it. And I sometimes worry that they would rather see a debacle, a military debacle, in Ukraine, any disaster there,

than come to that kind of sustainable solution with the Russians, which will, of course, freeze the front lines, if you like, the new Cold War lines further. and hardened them indefinitely and would make for a very, very bad security situation in Europe going forward into the far future. I agree absolutely, as I say to you, I mean, what I said once after going to the Nepal, you just need no farther. I mean, you know, that has to be an agreement, there'll be no artillery, or that if there is artillery, that it will be destroyed by the Russians. But you're quite

I mean, it goes back to the whole point, I mean, that where the security leads Russia. Now, where I think people are missing is two, the second part of this, and they don't grasp it. What was the first line of attack on Russia? It was financial. America launched its financial war and took it out, the banks out of Swift and sanctioned did and you had the French finance ministers think, oh, we are going to collapse the currency, we're going to collapse Russia.

And Europe was one of the greatest intelligence variants of the Sierra. I mean, they told the Europeans, it's easy, we will put the sanctions of Russia, and it will be collapsed. And, you know, in six months you'll be back to having cheap natural gas from Russia. And they'll be eating out of your hand and you can take what removal. materials of one. And they believed, and they made a grievous mistake, which has put in jeopardy, the economic future of Europeans. And I think that what people don't understand is that this is the other law that has been going on, the excessive weaponization of the dollar, what happened to Japan, what has happened

to Russia. And what is happening now as we speak to China. I mean, and the Chinese understand that it's not the same financial war that was unleashed on Russia, and the one

in Japan was quite different, it was an interest rate war, but they are having this rec cutting out key material. Actually, what it's likely to do in my view is actually drive us into a depression. Because, you know, if all these states stop functioning economically, if Russia, which is slowing now, is not because of a property speculative blue, they'll sort of better.

But it is slowing because it doesn't export as much. That's where employment is. That's where ordinary Chinese work is in manufacturing, not in, you know, speculative, you know, Goldman Sachs and discounts. It's not there. So this is, you know, as essential, existential to Chinese security. So Russia and Chinese security, you know, is involved in the sense of the financial war, as well as the wider security of, you know, they believe in the real economy. And they're trying to build out real corridors, real transport, real manufacturing across the Eurasia and Africa, and to leave Europe to Fester in its own, of its own major. So, I mean, I don't think this is, you know, we still haven't lost the big, the bigger strategy that is going on here, which is, you know, Russia and China facing the same problem.

India is worried about the same problem. All of these states, even Saudi Arabia and UAE worry about the same problem because in that sort of weaponization of the financial debt. So they're all coming together. And they are building out, secondly, a new cultural paradigm on terms of, you know, not only self-autonomy and of sovereignty as much as one can, but in the sense, and it's now suddenly taken off as a powerful anti-colonial movement, backlash in Africa. So, I mean, the thing that's got the mix to it.

And, you know, I'm sorry to say, you know, we talk about the closed mind of America, who was it, Bloom, or wrote the book about the American closed mind. Actually, the problem is in Europe and America, it's the corridor. They can't get out of this one corridor thinking that they've been in since the cold war. And they can't sort of move on from that and see it as a, you know, we can forget McKinna. This is a new addition of McKinnell that is taking change in credit. I think you're spot on with the reference to the assumption that we could get back to the deal with cheap Russian energy. because in the 90s and early 2000s, there was an impression that Russia, to some extent,

used its relationship with the East almost to increase its own market value in its path towards the West to become part of this greater Europe. But for me, it seems what the Russian, Chinese and others are working on is similar to what the United States itself did in the early 19th centuries, when they wanted to become less dependent on the Great Britain. Then they had the American system. Again, it had these three pillars. They wanted the manufacturing industry,

developed this transportation infrastructure, and of course the National Bank, these three pillars. And you see that this is kind of the foundation of, I think, what the Russians and Chinese are working on, as well as much of Eurasia. They want this first pillar of technological autonomy, these industries decoupled from the U.S. They want the second, which is trillions of dollars,

into this Belt and Road initiatives with new transportation corridors, not vulnerable to the U.S. And of course, third would be the financial aspect. We see this BRICS development bank, the SEO, trading in their own currency by de-dollarizing, reducing reliance on SWIFT. So as the economic system shifts, there's also an opportunity to reject the hegemonic world order, which is seen as being encapsulated by this rules-based international order, we call it, which is to a large extent a challenge of international law.

I think this is why the Ukraine crisis becomes so problematic because it's become a symptom of a wider challenge of, I guess, the entire world order, the geo-economic infrastructure. But again, this makes it more complex, doesn't it? But also, you know, what Brexit was about is also about neoliberalism and about, you know, the neoliberalism imposition through the West. control over the financial system that meant that countries couldn't produce what they wanted to do with their own crops and their own agriculture. They were forced into doing export products like sort of flats for Europe and strawberries of Europe and things like this in order to earn the for next to buy American grant. I mean, you know, neoliberalism structures, I mean, are part of this.

attempt. And I remember this debate, I don't know if you remember, between Zee and Putin, and Putin and Z said, you know, the problem was, and what caused, we weren't going to that, what caused Russia, the Soviet Union to collapse? And he said, you know, you lost a belief in your own ideas. And that was the consequence to admit you've done a wonderful job in actually both melding together elements of the market system with a state strategy, with giving it a strength, which we didn't do and it was a failure. And the net outcome of this really the discussion was, yes, I mean, the problem was, what happened was China understood In order to survive, it needed to be outside the Western financial structures.

And that unfortunately, Russia went the other way, dived into the Western structures. And that was what brought it down. And it was quite interesting, and Putin said, you're absolutely right. And the understanding that it was actually being within the financials here, not I'm talking about sanctions here, and not talking about sanctions here, and not talking about. about removing people and just talking about the Western hyper-financialized system, which what it does is over time it robed real economy that it employs people that gives them decent jobs and allows them to buy things in favor of financialized products instead. I mean, Friedrich Liss wrote all about this in the end of the 19th century.

And so, I mean, this is part of this great move, is to produce not just a new culture, but a new development model for the world that is a not a hyper-financialized neoliberal model. Because ultimately, as lists said, even in the 19th century, over-emphasis of consumption, you end up without the real. economy sufficiently to support your own population in work and earning. And of course, the interesting thing about List is that he was heavily influenced by what was happening in the United States at that time. And in a sense, you can see that List, who was very much the dominant economic thinker in late 19th century Russia, is now actually coming back, I understand. People are actually looking at him again. And if I can just talk about this, because of course, all that you said about the fact that the Russian financial system essentially became

the Western financial system, it became the Western branch of it. I had a very close friend, I have a very close friend, who is a Russian banker, and he was making exactly that very same point to me 15 years ago. And in fact, what? What we have steadily seen incrementally step by step is Russia moving away from this. So, I mean, one of the very first things that happened when Nubuilina took over the central bank, which people don't understand. People always think of Nubulina very much as an arch-liberal connected to the West. But what she actually did was she closed down lots and lots and lots of Russian banks,

and the Russian banking system today that's left. is almost entirely state controlled. In that respect, it's not very different in some respects from the Chinese. It's, again, a publicly owned banking system. There are still some private banks in Russia, as there are some private banks in China, but they are an insignificant part of the financial system. And you can see also that she took steps with the ruble. Firstly, she made it fully convertible, which was actually a blow at the oligarchic interests in Russia,

which wanted a ruble pegged to the dollar at a certain rate, because that was very convenient for them to convert money into dollars whenever they wanted. It was also the same with Western investors as well who were able to take money out of Russia at a high ruble exchange rate against the dollar. And she's lower, she prevented that. And then now steadily she has been introducing exchange controls and capital controls. And she's taking that further still. And I suspect that before very long, within the next five years, maybe sooner than that,

we're going to go into a system where the ruble will cease to be as simply convert. as it has been, especially with this new financial structure, the brick structure, being constructed, which will effectively mean that you can transfer money and funds around the world without having to make your currency convertible in the same way that it was. And again, if you go back to the 19th century, to the United States, you will find that an awful lot of that mirrors what the United States. States was doing then. So an industrial policy in Russia, aircraft construction, railway construction, high technology construction, all of those things, with a repatriated and in effect nationalized financial system geared once more towards internal economic development. But with the Russians, again, like the Chinese, operating it all within. a market system where prices are set by supply and demand and are not controlled directly

by some kind of central institution which fixes prices. But there is a convergence. This is the point I was going to say there is a convergence already and it's been happening for some time between the Chinese and the Russian economic models and it is not so different in both cases to what was happening in the United States in the 19th century, which was a topic, by the way, which decades ago I actually started. Yeah, and well, I quite agree. I mean, there are Putin said specifically to see you managed that much better than we have and we are for a new model now. So, I mean, that was an interesting discussion that came out why did the Soviet Union, um,

collapsed. But I mean, Friedrich Liss was more prominent in the German thing, but of course, Kanssegevitti, who was Prime Minister and is still Thoros Russia, and he was a close father of his and wrote books on similar lines. So it was embedded in the beginning from that earlier point, that earlier time. And I think, you know, that we are so at a point of influence, and I think, you know, that we are, so at a point of both economically and how all things are going, as well as with going through an inflection point in terms of geostrategie and more than that. I mean, I think there is, I keep coming back to this word, I can't sort of define it, but I think, you know, there is a change of consciousness taking place.

You know, because, you know, the Western system doesn't even believe consciousness exists, it's only within the mind, you know, neurons and so on. But, I mean, I think, you know, sometimes suddenly things shift. And again, you know, one can't necessarily explain it. I mean, take power, American power. You know, suddenly you have it. And then suddenly people look at you and are skeptical that you're being as powerful as they thought of you to be. And that's what it's facing.

I mean, across the world, through the West of the narrative, the Western sense of huge power. It's not accepted. It's not accepted. People's, you know. It's there, and it isn't. And it isn't now. Yeah, that's why I brought up the American system, because it was based on the Hamiltonian economics. And Friedrich Liszt as well, obviously built on this as well.

But what was interesting is the ideas of Friedrich Liszt were republished in Russia by Sergei Witte, in little pamphlets which were handed out. And they kind of followed this at the end of the 19th century. The problem was then you had the communism. And after that, you had the 90s where they had this liberal view, where pro-Western, only Western-centric liberal view. And you were right these days. They rediscovered Sergei Witte.

But, of course, in a Eurasian context. And they see the Chinese. and it's as if they're reading the same book of Hamilton and Witte and Friedrich Lists simply because the core of it was largely to extend economics as an anti-hegemonic instrument because the idea would be interdependence have to be measured by the symmetry of interdependence. You don't want to be more dependent on the adversary than they are on you. But a way to diversify this would be first strategic autonomy, me, but I mean to shift the symmetry of dependence, but also to diversify economic partnerships.

And I think this is where the West's opportunity is because in Russia's interest is really to diversify. It doesn't want to be too reliant on China only. I mean, China is the most important partner. It wouldn't go against China, but it doesn't want to put all this eggs in one basket. That's why it has to reach out to the Arab states, to India. But also, it would have ideally had the West as a partner as well, now that this is closed stuff. off, you know, there would be some interest in working and in the future, but it looks like the politics is getting, and of course, the military conflict now is getting in the way of this geo-economic rebalancing in which, again, both Russia and the Europeans especially would have

greater economic benefits of working together instead of avoiding excessive dependence on either America on one side or Asia on the other, but that's very different from saying that we can make the Chinese, now sorry, make the Russians abandon this greater Eurasian project and instead come back into the Western financial system because that's simply not going to happen, which is why it's a bit extraordinary to listen to this kind of politicians in the US these days, which actually suggests, you know, we'll promise to take the Russians in if they just turn their backs on China. They don't seem to appreciate the huge shifts which are happening. But, no, anyways, this is put a...

I mean, you know, the point you're making that I think is very clear and very right, you know, the structural contradictions in the Western financial systems have now been allowed to get so great that there's no easy solution, there's no solution. And then we will, first of all, have to go through some form. of financial crisis as a catharsis. And out of that catharsis, I will not be surprised if we go back to something of the 90-11 looking more about strategic.

I mean, even then it was quite clear that Adam Smith was overdoing the invisible hand and that individualism had its point that it could be taken too far. And I think much of the world is moving in that direction. and it will affect us, and we'll probably start. I mean, you even have a bit of this under amazingly Boris Johnson when he was talking about some sort of strategic plans for the economy we need

some sort of strategic plan. And it were just sort of elements. It wasn't, of course, a coherent one. I think the thing, clearly this model has not worked. of debt-wet consumption because it does result ultimately in an attenuated real economy. And fewer and fewer people getting appropriately paid jobs. I mean the jobs become fewer and they become of lesser quality. And eventually you have a major political and social crisis.

So I think we're probably not a traumatic experience. that. Can I just say one very last thing because I'm glad you brought up Boris Johnson, because of course, there is the issue, which is, of course, not perhaps important in terms of the world, but, you know, I live in Britain. I'm British. Alistair, you're British too. I think one country that is going to have to make some very serious and important decisions about its role is going to be Britain specifically. In fact, I think we're coming very close in Britain

to a second different type of end-of-empirate moment. And I have to say, I feel that one of the reasons for the extraordinary vehemence of British policy about Ukraine, it's over-commitment to support of Ukraine, is ultimately it's a, it's a, device for keeping the Americans still in Europe, still pushing this policy of, you know, using the Americans, keep them here, keep them in Europe. That makes us important.

That makes, because, you know, we're able that way to move along on America's coattails. Now, somehow rather, in one way or another, despite all the enormous problems of understanding and thinking that you spoke about in the United States, which I completely agree, the Americans are not so long now. They're going to go. They're not going to go completely, but they're not going to be this enormous power that they were,

either in the world or even in Europe itself. And this policy, which we've followed actually quite successfully in Britain ever since the Second World War, of remaining meaningful by being, you know, a long, you know, part of the American train, I think that's coming to its end. And we need to start thinking beyond that. We still need to start thinking beyond that in terms of how we structure our own economy and our own society, but also about how we conduct our foreign relations.

And not just about Europe, which is, of course, important, but also globally as well. And I think that is going to be a very traumatic and very difficult experience and one which are political class in Britain is completely unprepared for. Anyway, that's just by a little rant about this, if you like. I don't know what you think about that, Alistair.

No, I think I understand. I agree what you're suggesting. There is, you know, that investing in investing so heavily in the Ukraine project for the reasons you said. We've mortgaged our future, our economic future, Europe's economic future. And I think this is going to become much more apparent as the recession comes into being and these inflation continues to rise.

I mean, it's obvious here in Italy and I know that in Britain, I mean the social stresses and the political stresses from us, I mean they mortgage things without. With their decisions, they took on sanctioning Russia, thinking that they could live without Russian gas and that it would be fined by LNG at seven times the cost of the pipeline gas, and it wouldn't affect their economy. And I don't think they really thought any of this through.

And now look at us, we have, you know, we are in de-industrial life. And I mean, that's the one thing that sort of kept the 60% of the population is in the wrong income, the ones that couldn't have these inflated, exaggerated incomes, a big merchant bank or investment bank. I mean, quantity needed work and this isn't available. That's what they bet in order to try and keep on site with the United States. that bet is failed. What will be the political consequences? I can't foresee, but I will be the consequences for sure.

I mean, Europe has really put itself into... I mean, it's just mortgage our future. You always seem to finish off here on a pessimistic note, but any final comments, Alexander, before we... Well, it can also... I accept there's going to be a period of extreme term. in a very difficult period of turmoil. But I mean, I think we also need to understand,

and our leaders perhaps need to understand, that the system that we are trying to sustain is ultimately unsustainable. And once it's gone, if it's handled properly, if we come out of it in an intelligence way, it could actually be a liberating moment. We can start doing things, which we are preventing ourselves from doing, in a way that could actually enhance our prosperity and our security.

What it needs is imagination, but there is very little, and planning, and there's very little of either at the moment. You know, I know that when I make these points, it sounds very pessimistic, it sounds really quite bleak, very positive, because I have, I mean, this is a sort of subjective thing, of course, But I have the sense that the globe, the whole planet is moving through an inflection point. One of these great changes that happens once every 500 millennium, again, where consciousness of people's thinking suddenly begins to change.

We don't know the exact reasons for this, but somehow suddenly civilization and things starting in chat. I believe we're in that process, but first I just have to have. boost in a way that we have to go through a catharsis to get to the point where the green shoots of what's coming next really can become visible and that we can start to see which of the green shoots are the ones that are going to you know we need to attend to them we need to take care of we need to cover it at the moment those green shoots were simply erased behind the forces that don't want to see any green shoots in that, but it's going to come.

It's going to be sure. On that note, I want to thank you again, Alster Crook, for coming on. It's been a great pleasure. And thank you for sharing your insights. Also thanks to you, Alexander. And yeah. Well, can I just also add my own thanks to Alistair. It's been wonderful to have this discussion.

this discussion. Such an erudite discussion, if I can say, in covering so many, so many important topics.