The Duran Podcast - How will US political upheaval influence Ukraine; John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: July 26, 2024

How will US political upheaval influence Ukraine; John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone, my name is Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander McCurris and Professor John Meersheimer. Welcome, it's great to see the both of you again. The pleasure to be back, pleasure to be speaking to John. Yeah, it's a pleasure to be back and to be speaking to both of you for sure. So a lot has changed since the last time we spoke. I think we can safely say that the front lines in Ukraine are collapsing and Israel is certainly struggling in Gaza and the war is obviously also expanding. But I thought we could perhaps start with the United States.

Obviously, there's political crisis across the West, but I would argue that as the only real decisions are being made in Washington, it makes more sense to focus on the United States. So I guess my first question would be, what does all the upheaval and, well, we can call it reshuffling in the United States actually mean for its foreign policy? Indeed, what are the foreign policies of Kamala Harris? I expected to be a continuation of Biden.

I could be wrong. But given that Biden had a very central role in the Ukraine war ever since 2014, one could expect some changes. And also, what would the view? pick of Vance mean. Also, he's been quite outspoken, especially on the Ukrainian war. So, yeah, a bit wide or broad question, perhaps, but what is happening in America and how will that affect the world? I would just start off by saying that it's difficult to tell at this point what the consequences of having Kamala Harris as the presidential candidate will mean. She's not a person who said very much about foreign policy.

She's not a very experienced person. And it's just very hard to tell it this juncture how well she will do against Trump and Vance. Trump and Vance are a formidable duo. I don't think there's any question about that. But they have their liabilities, especially Trump. And you can make an argument that a Democrat would, the right message who can really campaign could beat Trump in Vance. But on the other hand, Kamala Harris has zero experience running as president. She was not good when she ran as a candidate

in the primaries in 2020. And she has not done a good job as vice president. There's just no question about that. She had very strained relations with the White House. And, the few things that she did for the administration, especially with regard to handling borders and immigration, she did not do very well. So this is not a person that one can just right off the bat have a lot of confidence in, in terms of her ability to run a contest against Trump over the next 15 weeks. But assuming that she runs a good campaign, the question is, what are her policy views. I think she's basically going to be more of Biden. I think that's doing part to the fact that she has never been an independent voice on foreign policy. Domestic politics has been her forte.

She'll be heavily dependent on her advisors, and her advisors will be basically from the same camp that Joe Biden's advisors are from. So I think on the Russian-Ukraine issue, which we focus a lot of attention on, I think there'll be no meaningful. change in terms of her views versus Biden's views. I think the situation that she is walking into is a fundamentally different one than the situation that Biden walked into when he became president in January 2021. As you said, Glenn, and as Alexander knows very well, the front is collapsing in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are in deep trouble, and she's going to inherit this problem over the next 15 weeks. And if she wins, she'll inherit this problem as vice president.

For Trump, completely different matter, because there's a problem. I invite in the region, which is the Middle East. Lots of people argue that she is softer somewhat than than Biden is with regard to dealing with the Israelis. But she's not going to want off the reservation on that issue and she'll be supportive of the Israelis over the long term as Biden has been. So I don't see much difference in Kamala Harris's foreign policy positions than in Joe Biden's foreign policy positions. I find that, I mean, I think I'm sure you're right. It is, though, a bit disappointing because with Biden basically withdrawing from the scene, one would have said, if one was looking at this from a distance, that this is a good moment, a good opportunity to start

distancing oneself and the United States from policies that are not succeeding. The war in Ukraine is going very badly. The conflict in the Middle East is going very badly from a American perspective as well. Netanyahu's coming to Washington, which is awkward to put it mildly. I noticed that that Kamala Harris is going to stay away from Congress when he's addressing it, which I think from her point of view is a wise move, actually. But this logically could be the moment to say, well, this was Biden's policies. They're not working very well. This is my opportunity as the new candidate for the Democratic Party.

to start coming up with new ideas and to suggesting alternative approaches, which might get the United States out of the whole, which it finds itself in, in both of these conflicts. And of course, that might also just possibly help Kamala Harris in this contest with Trump and Vance, who seem to be taking a much more skeptical approach, at least to the Ukraine conflict, which I think, well, I mustn't exaggerate, but I think it's probably a reasonably popular stance as well.

Continuity Biden doesn't seem to me a very successful line to take going into this election, just say. But Alexander, just think about it this way. This is a person, Kamala Harris, who has hardly any experience, foreign policy, has never had independent views. And all of a sudden, she's thrust into this contest where she's the presidential candidate from the Democratic Party, and she has only 15 weeks to wage to campaign. Even if she agreed with you, do you think she's in a position politically to execute the sort of policy switch that you describe, say to what you've just said.

But I just think if you look at the sort of context in which she's operating, she hasn't hardly any room for maneuver on the foreign policy front. I'm afraid you're probably right. But anyway, I just wanted to throw out the idea. As I said, Biden is leaving. He's leaving, I think, a terrible mess. one would have thought politically, it was wise to distance oneself from that mess, but I completely take your point. I mean, she doesn't appear to have the authority within the party or the experience or the authority, not just within the party, but within the political world generally to be able to take a different course.

But, you know, one might just propose it and hope for the best. That's all I can say. But two quick points, Alexander. One is that the Democrats, excuse me, the Democrats are spinning the year's lead article in the New York Times this morning about the Biden presidency on foreign policy front. And it tells a very positive story. Yeah. Right.

So it's important to understand that lots of people in the foreign policy establishment believe that Joe Biden has been a great success. The second point I'd make to you is, and this is a point that you made in your initial comments, it's the Republicans, in particular Trump and especially Vance, who are interested in fundamentally changing American foreign policy, both Russia and Ukraine. And I think the interesting question is what we do, if they get into, to the White House because they want to radically alter what has been Biden's foreign policy

on Ukraine. Well, given that it does look, at least from my perspective, more likely that Trump will take the presidency, I thought it's interesting what it signals the pick of ants, because when I was watching the Republican National Convention, well, first we had David Sachs giving an opening speech where he was stressing the point that this war was provoked. And then, of course, the picking vans I thought was quite interesting, given that he's been also very vocal about how this war can't be won and also why it's a war which is not in the interest of the United States.

And the need for something fundamentally different. So there seems to be a push towards well-hardening the idea that, you know, this, we have to end this war and making it effective. effectively a Republican platform. There was even an interesting headline by CNN in which they point out that given the likelihood of a Trump victory, Zelensky is already considering negotiations, which I thought was something he should use because even the prospect of him becoming president apparently is incentivizing peace negotiations.

Now, of course, these are just headlines, but nonetheless, it seems that the I guess they clearly signaled that a Trump presidency would move to end this war quickly. This is my main takeaway, I guess, from Vance. But again, to what extent is it actually possible? I keep hearing that Trump would like to end the war in 24 hours. I'm guessing it's going to put a deal to both the Ukrainians and the Russians. But if it doesn't go down on either side, of course he has a lot of pressure on he can put on the Ukrainians by simply cutting off the weaponry, but on Russia there's less influence unless the Russians

get what they want. And that obviously would have to be neutrality for Ukraine's concession and some concessions on the territories, even if the Russians don't get everything they want. So what is your expectation? Do you see anything different or any greater insights on the Trump presidency based on his pick? Well, I think your description of what Trump and Vance want is correct. And I'd be very curious to know what Alexander thinks about this because he follows what's going on on the battlefield so closely. But my view is that what happens between now and the end of January matters greatly.

In other words, if the Ukrainians lose on the battle, there's a collapse in, let's say some, but I think we will. agree it's a possibility. It's a serious possibility that the Ukrainians collapse. If Ukrainians collapse, Trump and Vance, assuming they win, they inherit a very different situation than one in which the Ukrainians managed to hang on and the war on February 1st, 2025, looks a lot like it does today. So I think events on the battlefield really matter. And by the the way, events on the battlefield matter for Kamala Harris, because Kamala Harris is running on Joe Biden's platform. And if we lose in Ukraine before the election, where the Ukrainians look like they're frumbling, this is actually much of them. I'm just curious what you think about that,

Alexander. I think that the Ukrainians will be able to hold together before the election. I don't think we're going to see a dramatic collapse before then, even though it's getting more difficult for them by the day, and their commander, General Searski, today, or rather yesterday, made statements which I think show how difficult the situation for them is becoming. But I think they'll just be able to hold it together until then. About January, I'm not so sure, to be frank. I think the situation is becoming much, much more difficult.

And the question is, what is the United States going to do as the situation deteriorates? Will there be an attempt to help the Ukrainians to stabilize the situation which might be very difficult and very dangerous? Or will there instead be a shift in gears and people starting to say maybe a time has come to negotiate and to talk? I still think, by the way, even if there is a Ukrainian military. collapse on the front lines between now and January. Ukraine remains a very big country. There's an awful lot beyond Donbass, beyond the NEPA, and I still think that the prevailing mood in Moscow is that they would prefer to negotiate a solution to the crisis, the longer-term crisis, than march all the way to the Western border.

I think there are divisions in Moscow about this, but I certainly think that Putin himself would still prefer to negotiate. I don't think he wants to take over the whole of Ukraine for the many reasons that we've talked about. And I still think also that he would welcome some kind of a return to a relationship of some kind with the United States if he could have it.

So even if there is a collapse in eastern Ukraine over the next few months, I think, surprising as it may be for some people, I think that a new administration, or indeed the current administration, if it's re-elected in some form, if it were to start making serious overtures to the Russians, would probably still find them willing to sit down and listen. what would come out of those negotiations, I don't know. I just would like to ask both you and Glenn, what you think Trump and Vance would be able to do if the Ukrainians basically hold on through January and where Trump and Vance get elected, you're willing to make the necessary concessions that the Russians demand to put an end to this war. Because the foreign policy spokesman

in Russia has made it clear that she thinks, and the Russians think that the Trump campaign statements about Ukraine really don't add up to much. And she's telling them to get realistic. The Russians know they're in the driver's seat. They're going to drive a hard bargain. they want the Ukrainians to recognize that they control these four oblasts forever. They want NATO to cease its talk about bringing Ukraine into the alliance and so forth and so on. I find it hard to believe that Trump and Vance will be able to accommodate the Russians because the Russians will be driving for good strategic reasons, a hard bargain with whoever is elected. So I'm not optimistic that even if Trump and Vance come into the White House, that they can

put an end this war, end the war, when we get some sort of meaningful peace agreement. And I'm just curious what you two think about that. I think that Trump could probably deliver on restoring Ukraine's neutrality, something similar along the lines of what was done in Istanbul two plus years ago, which was then sabotaged by the U.S. US and the UK. But of course, the territorial issue is the main issue and the main problem. And you mentioned the four oblast, which have been annexed by Russia. But a key challenge is that Russia doesn't control all of the territories of all of this oblast. So I think what Trump probably would have more in mind is, you know, he comes into office. They're willing to find a way of

accommodating, restoring Ukraine's neutrality. But then in terms of results, the territorial issue. I think at most where the troops are at this point in time. So this is why I'm thinking if it looks like Trump's going to take, or either of the party is going to take the presidency, I think Russia would like to control as much as these four oblasts before the American presidential election, because if negotiations will start then, it's better to sit on what you're not willing to trade away by the time. time of the elections. But of course, it's very hard

to say. Trump doesn't share much of his plan besides because they have to take into account of communication as well, what you're allowed to say. And these negotiations, you know, we have to be

honest, it's going to be humiliating for the West as well, because we gamble a lot on this. So they probably don't want to admit what kind of concessions they want to make just yet. That's why. I think the territorial issue will be the main problem, which is why I think that the Russians will push very hard from now until January as well. I'm going to just quickly say,

I think the first thing that Vance and Trump need to do is to reopen contacts with the Russians. The major problem is that we are not talking to them, and they're not talking to us. So we probably will not be in a position anyway. the military situation is on the 1st of February 2025 to come up with a proposal and to agree to discussions. And I'm not even sure that the Russians really have formulated their own ideas very clearly beyond what Putin said a few weeks ago at the foreign ministry session, which I would

suggest is not really a negotiating position as rather a stake out of, you know, Russian, general Russian, positions which could be discussed further over the course of negotiations. So I think the first thing to do is for the Americans, for Vance and Trump, to tell the Russians, look, we want to talk to you, we want to meet with you, maybe not ourselves, not president to president to secretary of state, but we will appoint a representative, you will appoint a representative, let's have more discussions, maybe, anchorer, maybe somewhere else, start getting into a situation where we're talking about things and looking at where and how we go forward from this impossible situation that we are in.

And that can take a while to try and, you know, through a discussion process, start to develop ideas and find common ground. But I think that is the first step that must be made. made as it is, we really don't know very much about what the Russians would accept and what the Americans would accept because they're not talking to each other. The Americans are constantly expressing maximalist positions, which are unachievable, as is now obvious. The Russians have shown a little more flexibility, but they haven't really fleshed out exactly what their ideas are. And from a Russian point of view, it's going to be even more difficult, actually. If the Russians have gone beyond the four oblasts, if they've captured territory in Kharkov, are they going to give

that back? What does that mean if they do give it back? Is that going to be an easy sell in Moscow now? And what about the general security situation? Not just whether Ukraine is part of NATO or not, but the Russians have been talking about new security arrangements in Europe. What do they even mean by that now? Are they going to go all the way back to demanding what was previously rejected in December 2021? You know, lots of things, but a proper discussion, it seems to me, is the place to start. It's fascinating the lack of diplomacy because it shows how poorly each side understands each other.

You probably read the article in the Daily Mail by Boris Johnson, in which he was arguing, you know, Trump can bring peace, and then Boris Johnson outlined what kind of peace he envisioned. For those who are watching, it's worth noting that there was the Istanbul peace agreement in early 2022 based on, you know, restoring the childhood of Ukraine and Russia would pull back to where it was before he invaded. Now, it seems as if Boris Johnson would like to revive some of this. Of course, he had a key role in sabotaging this peace deal

by instead telling the Ukrainians, listen, US and UK will give you all the weapons you need if you choose to fight instead of making peace. Now, now he seems to suggest something along those lines. Obviously, Russia would have to give up those four oblasts. He made it seem like this was just common. sense. And then they couldn't, the Russians could get what they want the most, which is to restore relations with the United States. And yeah, they could also speak about restoring some language

rights for Russian speakers in Ukraine. And this was the extent of the concession. So it's, it doesn't, it didn't touch on the two key issues, which was neutrality and, and of course, resolving the territorial issues, because this is now a territorial dispute. I know many people don't like to see it as such, because these are the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, but for the Russians, this is now considered to be Russian territory. And indeed, what Russia says matters, as they're the one who's controlling this territory. So I just find it fascinating how what the piece that Boris Johnson's now selling, it sounded a lot, of course, a lot like the PC Council, but it's a lot.

There's been a lot of death and destruction and the battles since those days. So I just thought if there had been some diplomacy, we could have perhaps had a discussion which would be more bound to reality, though. A couple points. One is that Boris Johnson is as delusional today as he was in March, April of 2022. You just wonder, did these people ever take a course and strategy? Do they understand how international politics works? It's really just remarkable that he's talking like this today.

And therefore, he's not to be taken seriously, except as an indicator of how delusional the West is in general. Second point is, I agree with the two of you that diplomacy is essential, and we have been remarkably foolish not to talk to the Russians at all all along. So we all agree on that. Excuse me, but I would argue that if you're the Russians, right, well, let's assume we're playing the Russians hand. You want to get everything you possibly can. You cannot trust the West at all.

Putin has made it clear on numerous occasions that he was foolish to have trusted the West in the past. And all this talk about, you know, Trump is pro-Russian and Trump didn't support the Ukrainians. I mean, Trump ended up arming the Ukrainians. He is the one who decided that the United States and the Westmore generally would arm the Ukrainians in 2017. And furthermore, he ended up as supportive of Ukraine as his predecessors. So Trump was no great anomaly with regard to U.S. relations toward his. You can't bring. And if I'm Putin, I don't care that Trump is in the White House or Biden or Harris is in the White House.

It doesn't matter to me. And furthermore, even if you trust Trump, Trump is not forever in the White House for four years. And you cannot be sure that his replacement won't be some second incarnation of Joe Biden or whoever. And you're back to square one. So if you're the Russians, in my opinion, you want to grant. as much territory as you can without running into those areas where there are lots of ethnic Ukrainians. But if I'm the Russians, I'd want to take more than the four oblasts that they have now annexed. I'd want to take more territory than that. I'd want to make sure, of course,

that Ukraine cannot become part of NATO. And I'd go to great length to sever security relations between the West and Ukraine. And probably the best way to do that is put significant limits on how big the Ukrainian military convictions will push very hard in this direction. All of this is to say the Russians are going to drive a very hard bargain. And from their point of view, not from the West point of view, but from their point of view, it's the smart thing to do. And then the question is, what are we willing to this?

And I think it's going to get, it's going to be very difficult to get West, whether Trump is in the White House or Harris is in the White House, to reach a deal that makes the Russians happy. I hope that I'm wrong, but that's my sense. I agree. I think this. How are you going? Go on, Glenn. I, I, I, go, no, Glenn, go forward. Sorry, I'll keep it short.

I was just going to say, this is how. the two components usually have threats, how you determine threats, you would look at the intentions and the capabilities. And obviously, as John pointed out, the intentions will always change. And this has always been an point which Putin makes time and time again. Like he's seen a lot of American presidents come and go and they usually make, you know, this lofty statements and promises. But after a while, they, yeah, they continue the, well, the policies which have been laid in front of them. So there won't be many changes. And even if there would be changes, they could be reversed again shortly thereafter. And furthermore, intentions. I think we're

quite obvious open about our intentions in NATO. We keep saying, you know, Ukraine has to be a bulwark against the Russians. They will eventually become a part of NATO. At least they will should be in our orbit. So, you know, it seems as if any peace agreement is obviously just going to be temporary because time is not on our side. So, you know, we're telling the Russians very openly what our intentions are. That is to put a pause on this and come back and fight later. So I couldn't agree more. Then the Russians will have to then look at the capabilities. And for Ukraine, it's, to a large extent, the territory they hold, which can be a vulnerability to Russia. And the key area of this war, I think, is the Black Sea. So this is why Odessa, the idea of Odessa

becoming a NATO city, I think it's unbearable. But this is a very difficult target. Karkov they could take with greater ease. But, Odessa, you have to cross the Nipur and it's going to be, they need more time unless there's a complete

collapse in Ukraine. Sorry for you interrupt. No, no, please. I agree with all of this, but I think the key thing, and it goes back to a point that John, you've made several times, is a severance of security links between the United States and whatever Ukraine comes out of this process in existence.

So I think this is going to be for the Russians a major thing. Now, one of the things that has been said by people who look to be close to the Vance Trump team is that Ukraine is basically a European issue. It does not concern, it is not an interest of the United States. Now, just possibly, maybe that opens a way towards accepting that a security connection between the United States and Ukraine can be ended. And by definition, a security arrangement between NATO and Ukraine can be ended. ended as well, so that Ukraine becomes, again, purely neutral in ways that secure its future without posing a future threat to Russia, because that thing which the Russians most fear, which is a connection between Ukraine, the United States, the other Western powers,

that's been put an end to forever. I think that some, of the language that's coming out of the Trump vans team. I'm not saying that's what they're saying. I'm not saying that they've accepted that. But some of the language that they are using suggests to me that maybe over the course of discussions and negotiations. And the negotiations would take place whilst the war was still happening. The Russians would be advancing. We would still be getting a fluid dynamic situation on the battlefronts. And that would also shape the understanding of what's going on in Europe and in the United States itself. Maybe the combination of the two, the talks, as I said, the original premise that Ukraine isn't an American problem and the changing environment, maybe we could start to move towards that point over time. I mean, what I'm thinking about is something more like the Paris negotiations between the United States and the North Vietnamese, which ended with agreements which were completely different from what either the Americans or the North Vietnamese would have started with.

Of course, it all fell apart later. But anyway, perhaps with the Russians, something that comes out of this might be more enduring. Let me ask you to another question. what is your sense as to the position that Russia is in today? In the mainstream media in the West, you'll occasionally read pieces that the Russians are suffering enormous casualties. There's pressure on Putin and on Moscow to put an end to this war as quickly as possible. But my sense is that that is not true. And I just read a piece by Anatole Levin in responsible statecraft. Anatole had been in Moscow, and he was amazed at the calm there, and he believed that many of the

people who originally left Russia when the war first started because they feared they would get drafted have come back because they don't think they're going to be great. Anatole says that the Russians have carefully limited the draft in both Moscow and in St. Petersburg, and they're drawing mainly on people from the hinterlands. And that the country, is able to sustain this war and continue this war, and they have lots of troops and so forth and so on. And if you sort of buy Anatole's basic story, the Russians can hang in on this fight for the foreseeable future. They're not in bad shape. Of course, nobody wants to see Russia continue to die, but they're capable of sustaining. But if you read a lot of the stuff in the West that's coming

out these days, which is designed to make it look like the Ukrainians are doing quite well, and the Russians are doing bad. different story about the state of the Ra and where Russian politics is today. I'm just curious what you two think about this issue because this matters enormously for the issues that we're discussing. I don't know. Whenever I speak to former colleagues in Moscow, I get the impression of what I'm not only even saying that, you know, there's a lot more optimism now. And, you know, society has made itself more comfortable with the direction of the war as well. So I just don't see why they would want to put a quick end to it as well. And keep in mind that this has been a war of attrition.

Now, one of the key rules in a war of attrition is, you know, you want to deplete the adversaries resources before you go for the territory. So you don't spend all that resources and manpower to, you know, to take over small chunks of land. You'd rather destroy the enemy and then take all the land. Now, this seems to be, if you look at how little territory shifted hands, initially and how it's escalating now. Every day there's some new towns falling to the Russians.

It just seems like a strange time to stop unless there's a very good peace deal on the table. And so I think a lot of the media reporting, it always goes into the same. Whenever we need to boost the motivation in the West to continue the war, whenever things aren't going our way, we get the same stories. are the Russians are running out of weapons.

Someone might take out Putin. You know, the Russians want this war to end as quick as possible. I just don't see any evidence for any of this. And on the country, I think all the things we're communicating to the Russians, we are creating all the wrong incentives because we keep saying, as soon as the war is over, NATO's going to come in and secure Ukraine, so this won't happen again. Well, you know, what's Russia going to do? First, it will take as much territory, whatever territory they don't.

take will end up with NATO, so then they have to take a lot of territory. And second of all, you want to really mess up the rest of Ukraine, because if you listen to the language of JD Vance, you know, this shouldn't be our problem. In other words, Ukraine is a problem. So the more you can mess up Ukraine, the more is going to be a drain on resources. The less interesting the country will be to the United States. So you strip Ukraine of its main economic territories. It's coastal regions in the Black Sea, anything that might interest NATO. And then you ruin the rest and make sure that it's a huge drain on NATO. And then they lose interest.

It becomes a problem instead of an opportunity. So I think this is direction Russia's going, which is why I find it so horrific when all the people are labeled to themselves, the pro-Ukrainians, friends of Ukraine, who keeps sending out all the wrong signals incentivizing all the wrong things. but no, I would have to agree 100% with Arnold Levin on this issue. I too. I mean, I have not been to Russia recent. I mean, last time I was in Russia was in 2018.

Glenn has been there much more recently. I think he was there quite recently, in fact. But my colleague, Alex Christopher, who has just been to Moscow. He reported he's been telling me, actually, before that Anatole leaving piece came out, that he found the city very calm, that he was talking to be. people there. There doesn't seem to be any wavering of support and resolve. And of course, he is talking much more, I suspect, to a wider cross-section of Russian society than Anato Levin will have done. I'm guessing, maybe I'm discharging this, but I suspect that Anatoleven

inevitably is going to talk to more elite Russians, whereas Alex is going to have been talking to more, you know, people who are or perhaps would not be defined as elite Russians. And in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, they seem to be generally supportive of the war and very confident about the way that they're going. And I have a number of contacts beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg and for what it's worth. and these are purely anecdotal impressions. I get the sense that Russian society generally has in fact become increasingly confident about the direction of the war. They sense that things are going Russia's way and that the population in general has largely accepted the view of the war, the perspective of the war, that the Kremlin has been giving them.

that this is an existential threat, that they are defending Russia's security and national interests, and that for that reason, the war has to end on Russia's terms. And I think that's the general feeling across Russia based on, you know, the sentiments that I've been able to tap into. And can I just quickly add that some specific steps that the European Union took, right at the start have solidified those feelings very considerably. The fact that there was this basic, you know, travel ban on whether these restrictions on air flights from Russia to Europe gave the Russians many, many Russians a feeling that Europe was closing its doors to them

and was hostile to them. And I know also several Russians who have been complaining to me that money that they placed abroad in Europe, Europe is no longer accessible to them. And that has also made some people, I know, very, very angry and very hostile to the West as well, to the point that one of them, even though he's able to travel to the West, no longer is prepared to do so. Now, I stress these are anecdotal, you know, discussions. But I'm fairly confident that they are reflective of what most Russians, most of Russian society thinks about. this war, that the war is going well, that it's in Russia's interests, that Putin and the Kremlin

are right, and that the war needs to be continued until it ends successfully. Well, I was going to ask, how would you answer your own question, John? Meaning what exactly, how do I think the Russians are doing? Yeah, I think they would... In terms of public. Everything I read come out of Russia and outside of the Western media tells me the Russians are doing fine politically. And that meshes with how they're doing on the battle floor. The Russians are dominating the Ukraine.

They're depending heavily on firepower and not on frontal wave attacks. which would cause huge amounts of casualties and might generate real problems back in Moscow. So I think when you look at what's going on on the battlefield, it's consistent with the argument that things are okay. So I don't see any reliable evidence that Russia wants to end this war quickly because it is in deep trouble politically or militarily. This is not to say the Russians wouldn't end the war very quickly if they could get the right deal. But I don't think they're going to get the right deal,

and I think they are resolved to winning this war of attrition. And again, I think you're doing well on the battlefield. I found it fascinating how it changed over time, after the Russians invaded in 2022, I went for quite a few conferences in Russia. I was in Sochi, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Moscow, and all. Every time people were very anxious, I felt, well, most academics and people linked to all the politicians I would speak to. A lot of them thought that they'd walked into a trap, which was set by them by, you know, Boris Johnson and all that. They would, yeah, make no deal except invasion.

they went in to invade and then effectively the West had a proxy fighting for them. But so, yeah, there was a lot of pessimism, especially towards the end. I remember I was in Vladvostok around September or no, October, I think of 2022. But when it was back again in 2023, the mood was quite different. It felt, you know, they were just, you know, the ship was going the right direction, just don't create too many waves. And the confidence was already there. But when I went back again this year, they're already planning after the war.

Like, how will the new trade arrangements be done? Because no matter what peace they get with the West, economic ties will still have to be towards the East. So all economic connectivity has to go to the West, not East, while the military deterrent is built up pointing to the West. And so all the discussions now are effectively post-war. What would we do afterwards? And that's why, yeah, I also agree, I think, given that the new period of time is now,

the Russians don't lose that much and more in this war because, you know, the Russians, the Ukrainians don't have air defense, so they can just smash through a lot of the defenses with this Fab glide bombs. You know, the Bahmoud day seems to be behind them where they pay such a heavy toll taking cities. So again, nobody wants to have their, you know, best, young, youngest men come home in coffin. but given, as you point out, they consider this to be an existential threat. I can't imagine why at this point, when they're having very favorable attrition rates, they would start to pursue an unfavorable peace agreement.

So it just doesn't seem likely. Sorry, Alexander. I was just going to say the economic situation has been absolutely fundamental in the sense that the greatest worry and fear that I detected, you know, from a distance in Russia was at the very beginning when the sanctions were imposed. People were very, very worried. There's been, you know, a succession of economic crises in Russia going all the way back to the 1980s. People were afraid that everything was going to fall apart, that, you know, industries would close, factories would close down. People would lose their jobs. People would lose their savings.

When that didn't happen, when on the contrary, the economy actually started to grow and real incomes started to increase, that not only came as a surprise to people, but I think that has enormously boosted confidence. Unless that changes, I think Russia can absorb the level of losses that it is suffering. You know, putting aside, you know, the actual numbers, which we don't know, I think what we can say is that they're not high enough to demoralized Russian society overall, given especially that Russia has a history of fighting wars and absorbing losses. It's a harsh, harsh things to say, but it's true. but provided the economy remains stable and continues to grow, then I think that confidence in what the government is doing will remain strong. And I think that that will ensure that the Kremlin has the freedom it needs to continue to prosecute the war in the way that it wants.

I agree completely with Alexander's point. about the economy and the fact that in the beginning, the Russians and the West thought the sanctions would cripple Russia's economy and cripple Russia. And that didn't happen. In fact, in many ways, the opposite happened. And that accounts for a great deal of the change from pessimism to optimism. But I want to go back to the military dimension that you started with, which is the other strand of this issue. Important to understand that it was an army at the time that was not designed for offense. It was an army that was built and Russia against an invasion.

Ukraine, 22, with the equivalent of the Vermaq, it was a very small army. It was not designed to conquer territory in Ukraine. It was designed to coerce Ukrainians into going to the negotiating table. And it almost worked because we got the Istanbul negotiations. But that's what the army was designed to do. But once the Istanbul negotiations, and of course there was an Israeli track as well with Nathali Bennett, once those two tracks fail, you're in a war of attrition. And the Russians are in a war of attrition without an armed.

army that was designed to fight that war. They weren't anticipating this war that they got themselves into. And what happens is in September, Putin mobilizes large numbers, 300,000 Russian troops. And then over the course of 2023 and now in 24, huge numbers of Russians are enlisting. They're being trained. up, they're gaining battle experience. And the fact is that the Russian army today is a much more formidable fighting force than the Russian army of February 2022. You know, you'll hear this talk in the West about how we've decimated that Russian army of February 22, implying that the Russians today are much worse off than they were in February 22. This is a laughable argument. Exactly the opposite is the case.

Right. That army that existed in February 2022 is gone. It was not a highly efficient force for fighting a war of attrition. And you now have in its place a formidable Russian military. Again, it's not the second coming of the Vermacht,

but it is a formidable force. And when you look at how it compares to the Ukrainian military, oh my, the Russians have a great advantage. advantage, as we've talked about that nauseam in terms of quantity and quality of weaponry, and in terms of quantity and quality of the manpower at this point in time.

So I think the mood has changed, Glenn, not simply because of what Alexander said about the economy, but also if you look carefully at what happened militarily, you have a fundamentally better situation for Russia today than you did in the beginning. I would say both aspects have helped, though, because if you look at organizations like Bricks, they've been there for a while, but it was more of a talking club. Even after they started to develop the new development bank, it didn't really gain that much speed. I think once the Western sanctions really came in hard against Russia, a lot of the Bricks country woke up. This is why I think you're seeing this huge decoupling now and D-Dolarization. and the development of bricks really take off.

So I think a lot of this, well, had a lot of optimism. It wasn't just economic. It also showed that there was a wide world outside the West and that Russia could successfully decouple. But I agree. I think a lot of the optimism also derives from the battlefield. And this is why there was a lot of pessimism when I was in Russia in 2022, because, as you said, they dissent in this army of,

what, 100,000 they had available, who wasn't really built for such an event. But again, on day one, our media never tells us. On the first day after the invasion, the Russians did contact Zelensky, and they started already, on the third day, agreed to start discussions and negotiations. So this was obviously the purpose to push through what they couldn't get through in Minsk. But then when they realized that the Ukrainians would fight to the last man, and with all of NATO's weaponry, obviously there was a good reason for pessimism, but this is what they did.

They boosted their industrial production, they recruited men, and they built a huge, very powerful and effective army, which could then handle this task, which is why by the time 20203 and 2024 came along, the optimism has only been growing in confidence, of course. but it's yeah I think this is another shocking thing in the West we don't reflect that much on our mistakes because this has been very very foolish

not just on the economic side we don't seem to learn much and actually I want to ask about ask from you John because you know the whole idea of realism the principal assumption should be that you know the rational actors act in accordance with the balance of power logic but

but we seem to be doubling down on all our foolish policies, be it economic, all our sanctions with Russia failed. Now, in Europe, they started discussing seizing Chinese assets, as if this would be a great decision to make. But also, we're not learning much from the war in Ukraine. We just keep doubling down. And even when we're losing the war, we keep discussing whether or not we can deport Ukrainian refugees here so we can send more people to die.

It's just, if you look at politics in Europe, one gets an impression. We're not acting in our national interests anymore. This should be a defining characteristic of a rational actor. So I would like to know what you think as well, Alexander, because this is really something standing out in Europe especially. One could argue the same would apply to the US with the Israeli question, of course. But in Europe, it's quite shocking to see this is why we're having all this political, crisis as well. Well, can I just quickly jump in because going back to what John was saying,

and indeed you were saying, just the other day, General Cavali, who is the NATO military commander, he comes along, he says, we're going to end up with a Russia that is very powerful militarily, led by the same people as it's being led with today and seeing us as a threat and very, very angry. And he's absolutely right. This is what we managed. We managed a situation where we have a militarily much more powerful Russia than we would have had, one in which the population is now mobilised

and prepared to think of us as adversaries, enemies, in fact, in a way that many Russians before did not. a Russia which is pivoting towards other countries that are unfriendly to us in Iran, China, North Korea, things that have turned out very badly for us and Russia which is economically thriving on the back of all of this. however you look at this, this has ended, this has turned out absolutely terribly in terms of Western interests, which is why going back to our earlier discussion at the beginning of this programme, you know, one would like to believe that with all of this now coming and becoming clear and obvious, somebody would seize this opportunity of a change in an administration and, you know, the fact that Biden himself is slowly, fading from the scene or quickly fading from the scene to at least finally call a stop and to look

for a way back. You know, we have this expression. I don't know whether they have it in the US. When you are in a hole, stop digging. Now that seems to be obvious. But anyway, whether we will do that, I really, I really truly don't know. But that's, it seems to be, what we have to do. and sooner or later we will have to do it. We are going to have to speak to the Russians again at some point. And we're going to find them a much more difficult and awkward people to talk to than we had before. But there it is. We have to do this.

Now, if I can just say something about the Vance Trump team, one thing I will say for J.D. Vance, you can say many things for Jady Vance. But one thing I will say about him is he does seem to understand that power has its limits and that you have to start setting priorities. I was listening to John Bolton, which we all know who he is, and he doesn't seem to accept that there are any limits to what power, American power, can do at all. He wants to confront China. He wants to confront Russia. He wants to confront everybody everywhere all the time in every place. At least the Vance Trump team seemed to understand that that isn't achievable. And that trying to continue with that line is going to end up creating exactly the kind of nightmare situation that we have in Europe,

which General Cavalry was talking about, of a much more powerful Russia on NATO's borders, because Cavalry made that point as well, and a very, very angry one. Yeah, let me just jump in here and respond to a couple of points that both of you have made. Just starting with what we're saying, Alexander, I think there has, what I would, the limits of power in ways that the neo-conservatives, and this would include John Bolton, do not understand. And so I think there's no question that Vance is a great advancement in the Republican ranks in terms of foreign policy. And he and Trump should be able to move us somewhat forward in solving the Ukraine problem. Another point I want to make is one does not want to underestimate what a sophisticated strategist Putin is.

it's almost verboten to say that in the West. You'll be accused of being a Putin apologist or something even worse than that. But the fact is that the West is up against a highly formidable adversary, and he has done a superb job, not a perfect job, but he's done a superb job of managing Russia's situation since February, 2022. And the Russians are in very good shape today, in large part, because the leadership has done its job. And it's, you know, not an argument that you'll hear in the West where people generally portray him as a fool and somebody who committed an egregious error by invading Ukraine,

and now he's just making a bad situation worse and so forth and so on. But I don't think that's true. You don't have to like Putin, but I think you should respect his abilities as a strategist. And then finally, getting back to Glenn's point about why, contrary to basic realist logic, the United States continues to sort of double down in Ukraine. Let me make two points about Ukraine. One is that we got into Ukraine. We got into the mess during the unipolar moment when we thought that we shoved NATO expansion down the Russian's throat. As you know, did that in 1999. We did it again in 2004. Those were the first two big tranches of NATO expansion. And in April 2008, we set off to bring Ukraine into NATO. And we thought we could shove it down

their throat again. And in 2014, when the crisis broke out, we doubled down because we still thought we were powerful enough. It's still the unipolar moment that we could shove NATO expansion down their throat. Now, that proved not to be the case, obviously, and we ended up in this war in 2022. Now, why haven't we corrected? One lesson I learned as a young man during the Vietnam War is I like to tell people, I was in the American military from 1965 to 1975, which was co-terminous with the Vietnam War, I've learned a number of important lessons during those years. And one lesson that I learned is when you're the United States of America and you get into a war, it's almost impossible to get out, right? Or to put it in slightly different terms, it's almost impossible to turn the ship around.

It's like a super tanker in the water, and it takes a long time to turn that super tanker around. And just look at what happened in Afghanistan, Glenn. I mean, we were in there for 20 years, and there were many people who did not want. Biden to pull us out of Afghanistan. And in Vietnam, we'd still if Congress had admission and no, I mean, there were just all sorts of people who wanted to continue the war. So my point is that when the United States gets into a war like this, it is very hard to turn the ship around. And this is one of the reasons I'm very pessimistic. I hope I'm wrong here. But this is one of the reasons I'm very pessimistic about our prospects, whether Trump is in the White House or Kamala Harris is in the White

House, are prospects of actually settling this diplomatically. I tend to think, and I'd be curious what you guys think, but I tend to think that the only way we can really settle this is if correspondingly we have a disastrous defeat of the Ukrainian military. on the battlefield. I think if the Ukrainian military suffers a serious defeat on the battlefield, that will open up the opportunity for us to reach some sort of meaningful peace agreement with the Russians.

I may be wrong on that. Maybe absent that we can work out a deal, but I don't see that happening. Well, I guess it's a good explanation for the American side, I guess, because, yeah, this big boulder began to be pushed back in 2008, obviously, by promising future NATO membership for Ukraine. But even then, of course, you have people like Robert Gates, William Burns, warning that this would be a disaster. We shouldn't go down this road.

What was interesting is with the European side, because at least in 2008, you had the French, the Germans, they were pushing very hard back against Bush's attempt to push NATO on Ukraine. Ukraine. Again, they ended up folding on the condition that a membership action plan wasn't provided, but back then at least there was a bit of backbone. But if you look, we seem to have gone the other way. There's no more efforts to stand up for how we see our national interest being different from the United States, it seems. Germany, I guess, is the most extraordinary example with, you know, they can have their pipeline blown up and they still stand there bowing and not really pursuing any national interests anymore.

It's very hard to explain, that's all. Well, in fact, I would go further than that. I'd say that the Europeans are now extremely worried that the Americans are going to show realism and are going to seek peace in Ukraine. Even though it is the Europeans who actually would benefit from peace in Ukraine, even more than the Americans would. I mean, the Americans, all that they're going to suffer in Ukraine is a prestige loss. That's all.

Whereas with Europe, we have a basic problem of insecurity now because we have a crisis in Eastern Europe with the Russians. We have major problems in our economy, which the United States does not share. So, you know, we have a much more present. interest in seeking peace than the Americans do. But the Americans are talking peace, and instead of being happy about it, most of us in Europe, or least our governments, aren't happy about it at all. They're worried. And some governments, some of our governments, like the new British government, is actually calling him Zelensky, telling him again, you know, we're going to give you all that you want.

We invite him to attend the British cabinet. He's the first leader to have been. He's the first leader to have done so since Bill Clinton did in 1997 when Tony Blair invited Clinton to the British Cabinet. Well, now it's Zelensky, apparently. And, you know, we're all very, very worried that Donald Trump and J.D. Vance will come along and will somehow agree peace in Ukraine. It is anybody who has been a student of European history would be absolutely bewildered that great nations like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and all the others should have reached this level. But there it is. That is the reality at the moment. What exactly has to happen to shock the Europeans back to their senses? I really don't know. But maybe it is exactly what John says, a major defeat by Ukraine in Ukraine. Maybe we need it even.

more than the Americans do. This is the Sarjan. Let me just quickly jump in here and just sort of build on this discussion. If you go back to the 1990s, there was huge opposition to NATO expansion in the

United States. Huge opposition inside the Pentagon from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all sorts of of all sorts of outside strategists, including hawks like Paul Nitz and of course George Cannon, who was not a hawk, but was a very prominent figure. So there was huge opposition to NATO expansion. But the decision was

made. The first tranche went in 1999. And that opposition in the United States disappeared like snow on a May day. There has been hardly any opposition after that initial wave of opposition in the 1990s, to go back to where Alexander and Glenn, where both of you were talking about what happened in 2008. If the Europeans had had their way in Bucharest in April, 2000 would have been no NATO expansion. Angola Merkel understood full well that expanding NATO into Ukraine was the equivalent of a declaration of war against Russia. She was adamant. She was adamant. opposed. But what happened is the Russians, excuse me, the Europeans caved. And after they caved, you never heard a peep from a European leader for a long, long time against NATO expansion.

And that's the situation that Alexander's described. And it's analogous to what we saw in the United States. And this supports my general point about once you launch the boats, And you get going down the road on a major policy decision, and it involves, you know, a great power like the United States and major powers like Germany, France, and Britain, you're really kind of locked in. And it's quite difficult to turn the boat around. It's really amazing. And I mean, why we find it so incredibly difficult to get out of it. Yeah, there is something about the status quo. Once a decision has been made, the narrativeist developed, everyone aligns with it.

This is why I find it so strange. All the debates which were being held quite open, the opposition, the positions that people were taking in the 90s, the arguments. All of this now effectively equates to being Russian propaganda. It's quite strange because I try to, often, when I give speech, and remind people and use some of the actual quotes from our own leaders from, you know, back in the 90s about, you know, they warned what would happen if we choose to start to expand NATO? How would the Russians react? And, you know, they quite explain why they thought it was a bad idea. They predict how it would end, how the Russians would react. Everything they predicted

has played out. And if one brings it up, it's, they don't want to hear because, as you said, John, we already picked our course, and now we have to stay in our line. So now it's quite extraordinary. I can't add anything to that myself. I mean, it's been extraordinary to see it play. I mean, the British, I should say, to my memory, there was never very much debate or opposition to NATO expansion in Britain, which there should have been. I mean, the British should have known a lot better, but anyway, they didn't.

I mean, Blair and Brown and. in the 90s and the 2000s were very much in favour of it and the British governments ever since have been and they've now all got onto, they've all clambered onto this ship and they can't get off it even as it's sinking. As I said, I was beside myself actually when I saw that Zelensky had been invited

to the war cabinet, to the war cabinet, to the cabinet meeting in Downing Street. I mean, I just couldn't quite bring myself to believe that that would be almost the first step that the new incoming British government would take in terms of foreign policy. At precisely the moment when the situation in Ukraine is going militarily so wrong that they would recommit themselves to this obviously failed policy at the very moment when in the United States there's at last now the beginning

of a debate about it. But there it is. I mean, I don't understand how decisions like this can be made, but that's how it is. It seems that in Britain, at least, whether it is because of historic reasons, you know, antagonism to Russia or whatever, we have now so boxed ourselves into this strategy that we simply don't know a way out. John, before we wrap this up, have any final thoughts? Yeah, I just want to jump in on what Alexander is saying. There's a real paradox here, if you think about it. Britain and the United States, your fact, I think quite correctly, have been the most NATO expansion and continuing the support to Ukraine.

But historically, Britain and the United States have had, one might, one might have one might, I call an isolationist outlook towards the continent unless there was a potential hegemon in the region. Remember, the British used to talk about splendid isolationism, right? Michael Howard wrote a famous little book on the continental commitment, which was all about getting the British to commit to fighting on the continent. And of course, the United States has a rich tradition of isolationism. And many people feared when the Cold War ended, when World War II ended, that we would go home as we did after World War I. So you have this paradoxical situation that it's the British and the Americans who have historically avoided a continental commitment who not only want a continental commitment, they want to push NATO down the Russians' throats more than the Europeans on the continent do.

very interesting. Well, this has been a lesson from, taken from the Americans and British, this idea that, yes, everyone has alliances during times of war to restore an equilibrium. But peacetime alliances, this has been something that especially political realists have been cautious about.

If you look back at Morgantau and many other sins, simply because you instigate new challenges, new formations to balance you, and furthermore, it locks you into conflicts which you may not want. John Hertz, he referred to this peacetime alliance as something from having the right to go to the war, to have the responsibility to go to war. And also, of course, instigating this counter-alliances. So there's always been a big literature about the dangers of peacetime alliances and obviously the British and Americans have

due to their offshore balancing I've always embraced this perhaps a lot more than the continental Europeans but it's again this is why I was curious where what happened to the rationality of the actors but well rationality has been in short supply is all I can say at least recently I I do hope actually that with recent developments in the United States and on the battlefronts in Ukraine, at least some people will come down to Earth finally and start dealing with the situation as it is and

not as they would want it to be. Great. We'll keep our fingers crossed. Oh, indeed. Okay. Well, perhaps we'll wrap it up there as we've, yeah, almost reached our time. John Mersheimer, thank you so much for your time. Absolutely, John. Always a pleasure.

My pleasure. Likewise. I enjoyed it thoroughly.