The Duran Podcast - Iran and Israel, is the escalation over?

Episode Date: October 30, 2024

Iran and Israel, is the escalation over?

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the Israeli missile strike on Iran. We are a couple of days removed from when it happened. And we still don't have that much information to go off on, to be quite honest. But I think the results of the strike is starting to crystallize at least what happened. We're starting to get a little bit of a better picture. And I believe the two narratives, and you were talking about this as well in your videos, in your video updates, the two narratives about the Israeli missile strike are that either Israel pulled its punches a bit. It was a limited strike and they just left it at that or that the Iranian air defense system, at least the first wave of missile strikes, the Iranian air defense system was able to absorb those missiles. and it just resulted in Israel calling off what might have been a bigger operation.

And that's the reason we got what everyone is agreeing was a limited strike on Iran that apparently didn't do as much damage as many people were analysts were thinking that an Israeli strike on Iran would do. It could be a little bit of both, Alexander. It could be that Iranian air defense did absorb the missile strikes and at the same time, Israel decided that it would just go forward with a limited attack on Iran. But what are the reasons you believe that the strike did play out the way it did, especially after a month of Israel saying that they're going to hit Iran very, very hard and

it's going to be devastating? We didn't get any of that. Israel didn't hit Iran hard. and it wasn't devastating. Why do you think that is? I think the point you've just made is it has to be the starting point because after the Iranian strike on Israel

on the 1st of October and we steadily got information about how effective that strike was and it was clear as the days and weeks passed that it was actually quite effective that a lot of Iranian missiles got through that the Nevitim air base in the Negev Desert in Israel was actually badly hit. The Financial Times said three dozen Iranian missiles hit the base, which is, you know, a lot of missiles.

One base, admittedly a massive base, extending over a territory of 50 square kilometers. But anyway, the Israelis afterwards gave everybody to think that they were going to launch a massive, very powerful counter-strike against Iran. And some Israeli officials like Itama Ben-Gvier, the security minister, were saying this is the opportunity to cut off the head of the snake. There was talk about decapitation strikes in the Israeli media. The Israeli defense minister, Yoav Ghallah, came out and said that the Israeli strike when it came would be powerful, precise, and above all surprising.

And they all seem to lead up to some great, you know, major attack. And there was rumors that the Israelis were going to go for Iran's nuclear facilities, and then others said that they would go for their oil and gas facilities. And then still others said they would actually aim to, as I said, go after Iran's leaders. Well, we got a strike, a missile strike, which is now several days since it happened. And we're getting very, very little limited information about what it actually achieved. Now, the Israelis have made claims that it hit the air defense system, the Iranian air defense system. They're saying that industrial facilities within Iran were destroyed,

facilities that produce Iranian missiles. They've provided very little actual corroborating information to confirm all of this. I mean, one would expect, given the kind of claims that we've just heard, that the Israelis would produce, you know, satellite pictures or imagery, that kind of thing, the sort of thing that is provided generally after strikes like this do take place but we've had nothing like that we waited for the commercial

satellite pictures and they do show some damage an air defense missile battery I believe close to Tehran was hit it seems to be a rather old one using American old American missiles left over from the Shah's time but anyway it was hit there was damage done to some facilities that appear once upon a time to have been connected with Iran's nuclear program. But apparently those facilities have not been in full use for some time either. But again, very limited information. And obviously there's not been a decapitation strike because all the key Iranian leaders are still there. I mean, Hamenei has spoken, and Peschikan is alive and well.

The Iranian foreign minister Adakshi is very busy. So, I mean, clearly this was not a decapitation strike. So we're left asking why, why it worked out like this. And as you rightly say, there are two theories. Theory one is that the Israelis deliberately pulled their punches. The Americans leaned on them that told them that we don't want an escalation. with Iran immediately before the elections, leaked information about the kind of missile strikes or air strikes that the Israelis were planning before the strikes took place, basically to scupper

the plans, in other words, that the US acted as a force for restraint. That is theory one. Theory two is that Israelis did intend a much, much, bigger strike, but the Iranian air defenses were able to parry the strike. The Israelis realized that Iranian radars or radars possibly supplied to Iran by the Russians were successfully tracking some of Israel's aircraft, stealth aircraft, F-35s and all that. And the result was that they didn't press home the attack because the Iranian air defense is proved stronger than they were, and therefore most of the attack was called off. And that theory is now circulating, and it's gaining some traction. But I want to say this. At the moment, I mean, it may be true,

but we don't have any independent evidence to corroborate it. So, you know, we are left with this very difficult question of what exactly it is that the Israelis tried to do, whether they intentionally pulled their punches, or whether the Iranians successfully parried what was intended to be a much bigger attack. And as you absolutely correctly say, the two are not mutually exclusive. It may be that the Israelis did plan a more limited attack and that the Iranians were successful, in shooting down a certain number of Israeli missiles. There is rather dramatic pictures of what looked like Israeli missiles flying over Tehran, and then suddenly, you know, the lights which are the missiles, suddenly go out,

and we see all kinds of flashes, which suggest some sort of successful interception by the Iranian air defense system. So it could be a combination of the two. We can't be absolutely sure. But in a sense, I'm not saying it doesn't matter, but in a sense, thinking about this is distracting us from what I think is an analysis, a clear-eyed analysis of what has happened, looking at just the information that we know.

If the Israelis did pull their punches, and I'm going to say that I suspect in some level they probably did, then why did they do so? Maybe the Americans did lean on them to a certain extent, but why did the Americans lean on them? Well, we've talked about the election. But overall, it clearly suggests that Iran is a much, more formidable target than I think some people in the West and perhaps in Israel as well believe

it is and that there is concerns. There were concerns that if there was a major strike on Iran on the scale that's been that was been talked about before, that that would result in an Iranian counter strike and that that would create an accelerating move to towards an all-out war. And for that reason, the Israelis and the Americans pulled their punches because they're not in any position to do that. So if the Israelis pulled their punches, however you explain it, ultimately it comes down to the fact that Iran is more powerful and better organized than many people suppose. And of course, if the Iranians did manage to shoot down missiles, and that was why the biggest strike was called off,

Well, then that is the case all over again. It's another demonstration that Iran is more powerful and better organized in its defenses than many people imagine. And that is consistent with what we saw with the Iranian missile strike of the 1st of October, when, as I said, a lot of missiles did get through. and with a story that I read this morning on the Times of Israel, which is that the Israeli cabinet and top Israeli officials are no longer able to meet in their normal places of work or residence, including the headquarters of the IDF, the Israeli defense forces, because obviously, they're worried that these places could be targeted by uranium or perhaps Hezbollah,

drones or missiles. So one way or the other, it suggests that we are looking at a power shift, a power shift away from Israel and towards Iran. Is it over short term, the escalation? Because right after the missile strike, the U.S. was very quick. The Biden administration was very quick to issue a statement saying, This is a paraphrasing what they said. They basically said this is over. We believe that the escalation is over between Iran and Israel or should be over. We consider this the end of the escalation.

And it came very quickly after the missile strike. Are we at an end to the escalation, at least short term, given that we do have the elections coming up, given that Netanyahu has stated that he's waiting to see the outcome of the elections. And it does look like Netanyahu is leaning more towards Trump winning. At least that's what a lot of the analysts are saying that Netanyahu prefers Trump. Probably, probably he does. But Israel has, at least I think it's Channel 13 in Israel. They've come out with a statement and they said that possibly, possibly, probably there's going to be an Israeli retaliation for Hezbollah's drone strike on Narenehu's residence, and that's going to be a retaliation against Iran.

They didn't say definitely. They said that the Israeli cabinet has been notified that this is possible. So they're hinting at some sort of possible retaliation. And then you have on the side of Iran, we've gotten statements from Iran, which have said that Iran has the right to respond to Israel's attack. But maybe they will not. respond. They would like to see a resolution to Gaza and to the conflict in Lebanon. And they've kind of, they say they have a right to respond, but then they qualify it with a statement saying

if certain things go in a certain direction like a ceasefire in Gaza, then we will not respond to Israel strike. So we don't really have a clear picture either from Israel's side or from Iran's side, if this is the end, at least short term. But the United States, the Biden White House, whether you believe them or not, I don't believe them, but they have said that this is, it's over. What are your thoughts? Yeah, I think you've actually described it exactly.

I mean, we're getting conflicting signals from each side, which, to my mind, by the way, is a clear sign of division on the part of each side, both the Israelis and the Iranians. In both in Israel and Iran, there are people who want restraint, And there are people who want to push back hard against the others. Now, the first thing to say is about the White House, the United States. They said this should be the end of it. And they moved not only fast, they moved suspiciously fast.

That's something that I think I would say. I mean, they didn't wait for any publication of any post-damage assessment. They didn't even discuss what the strikes achieved. They just quickly rushed out a statement, suggesting that this should be the end. Now, that's another reason, by the way, why I think that perhaps this strike didn't achieve all that it might have been intended to achieve,

because it suggests a degree of nervousness on the part of the United States that if this thing escalates and escalates further, Iran is turning out to be rather more formidable than it initially appeared, in which case the United States might become involved, and that is the one thing they don't want in any cost, especially ahead of what he's looking like a very difficult election. So the Americans officially want this thing ended. Now, of course,

within the United States, as we know, there are different factions. We know that even as the United States was negotiating a ceasefire with Hezbollah a few weeks ago, between Hezbollah. on Israel a few weeks ago. White House aides who are all still in place were briefing the Israelis. Just go ahead and attack Hezbollah and assassinate Nasrallah and the United States will be there right behind you. So we know there are divisions in Washington, but publicly the Americans want an end. Now, the Iranians shortly after the Israeli strike also said that as far as they were concerned, they were prepared to take the win because of the Iranians are representing that the Israeli strike was completely unsuccessful. And then the Iranian said, look, if there's no more attacks on us,

then we won't attack either. We're prepared to let that go. And then that survived just a couple of hours and then the Iranian foreign ministry started to say, well, actually we have a right to defend ourselves and then other officials came forward and said that we, Iran, are going to respond to this Israeli attack eventually. And then Hamanay, the Supreme Leader, came out and made a very, very complicated statement, which I discussed extensively in my last program, in which basically split the difference. He said, we shouldn't underestimate this attack and we should overestimate this attack, but we'll leave it to the officials to decide what Iran is going to do. So in effect, he's handing over the decision about what to do further back to the various

different branches of the Iranian bureaucracy. So you get the sense of dissension within Iran And as I said, I discussed at length some of the other things that he said in my program yesterday. We might want to touch on that later. But anyway, from the moment, clear sign of division within Iran. And then Israel, Israel says they carried out this attack. They say it's successful. The hour just after the attack, they said that this was the entire attack, that there wasn't going to be any more of an attack, that there's no reason for a further attack.

And then, as you absolutely rightly say, a few hours ago, they come back and they say, well, actually, we're not really finished because now there's been these drone attacks on Netanyahu's residents. And therefore, we must respond to those. And it's clear that the perpetrator of all of these is Iran. And we're going to come after the Iranians and that there's been a decision to that effect also. So again, one gets the sense that there are divisions and arguments within Israel about whether to stop or not to stop. I'm going to again say, let us put the close analysis of this to one side and just take a step back and look at where we are. Iran has launched two big missile strikes against Israel, one in April and another much more powerful one on the first. of October. Israel has conducted attacks on various Iranian facilities in Damascus, it's assassinated Haniyah in Tehran, and now it has launched a missile strike directly on Iran, much more powerful than the counter-strike. It also launched in April. Iran and Israel, in other words, are now attacking each other. They are missile strikes by the Israelis against the Iranians in Iran and by the Iranians

against the Israelis in Israel. Now, this is a major crossing of what until recently had been a red line on each side. In other words, we are in a completely different situation now. The Israelis have shown that they have the means and the will to attack Iran. In Iran, the Iranians have shown that they have the capability and the will to attack Israel within Israel. Given the feelings that each side have about the other, feelings which are driven by sentiments of loathing and fear. I cannot believe that this is the end of this. I think we are now on a slide and that even if until the election or beyond the election or for some weeks or months or even a year or so, we avoid any more direct conflict, it seems to me that now that the taboo has been broken,

we are going to see more attacks by the Israelis on the Iranians and the Iranians on the Israelis. And we are now, to repeat again, in a slide, an inexorable slide towards a bigger war. I think that is my own view. I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu, by going all out over the course of the last few months, to strike at Iran in the way that he's done, he has done, has unleashed forces, which are now going to be impossible to control. Yeah, that's why I said short term because, you know, maybe short term, maybe the month or two months or three months, but eventually things will heat up again. Yeah.

Is this why Iran is now talking about their nuclear program again? You mentioned this in your video update the other day. This is the reason for them discussing or hinting at, hinting at restarting, if you believe that they've seen. stop their nuclear program, restarting their nuclear program, depending on where you think it's been left off at. What are your thoughts there? Right. Well, again, I come back, this really comes back to what Ayatollah Harmoné, who is Iran's leader, the comments that he made. Now, I passed them very, very carefully over the course of the program I did in which I looked at them. And I was very, very careful to choose Iran's

Iranian translations, English translations, but English translations of Haemone's words made by the Iranian authorities. Because obviously, you know, if, you know, the Americans or the Israelis or the Russians or someone else translates Harmonese words, they may not be getting the nuances exactly. And I, you know, I don't speak Farsi, the language of Iran, and I don't speak Arabic. And I know that Harmane often talks in Arabic. So I don't. I'm not able to read his fat words in the original, but I went to the officially provided English translations from Iran. And to me, it was, I mean, I would say that it was quite clear that he was hinting fairly clearly that Iran is on the brink of restarting its nuclear program. He talked about taking action that would demonstrate to Israel unequivocally Iran's power and the strength of its resolve. And he was also talking about the fact that this should be a decision made by the officials. In other words, he was delegating the decision to the most. more technical people. And I think if you put it all together and you look at the context,

to me, it was a fairly straight signal, both to the world, to Israel, to the United States, to the Arab world, to Iran's allies, Russia and China and others, and ultimately to the Iranian bureaucracy and the Iranian people, that Iran is now going to press forward with restarting its nuclear weapons program. Now, that nuclear weapons program, the general widespread consensus is that it was put to sleep in 2003, but it was never completely dismantled. Iran retained the technology to move forward. It retained the centrifuges, you know, to enriched uranium and all of that. It has maintained. a uranium enrichment program.

It's built up a very, very substantial infrastructure. And no one should be under any doubt that Iran has the technological skill to build a nuclear weapon if it eventually resolves to do that. And of course, it also has firm friendships with countries like North Korea and Pakistan who do possess nuclear weapons. And in the case of North Korea, they function entirely outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So if Iran makes that decision,

then I think it can press forward and achieving nuclear weapons capability. I think that Harmony signalled that Iran is on the brink, that it hasn't quite made that decision yet, but that he is giving the green light for a positive decision to be made. He has in the past issued Fatwa's religious edicts which suggests, to me at least,

that use of nuclear weapons would be prohibited under Islamic law. But he, of course, is an Islamic jurist by talking about it being decided by the officials who must act, as he says, in the best interests of the country. He's essentially, I think, delegating that decision to people who are not going to be circumscribed by Islamic law to the extent that he, as an Islamic scholar and cleric, is. That is my reading of what Harmoné said.

And I think you're absolutely right. I think he's now moved, that this decision has been made because one way or the other, the Iranians have become convinced over the course of the last year that a conflict between them and Israel is now inevitable. And the only way to deter and stop it is by Iran following where North Korea led and acquiring nuclear weapons. Yeah. And don't discount Ukraine as far as nuclear technology. Easily bought the Ukrainians that are floating around with this understanding and this technology. And, you know, they'll go to the highest bidder. They don't have any allegiance to anybody. So with the United States, my final question is with the United States, I guess we're waiting for the elections, obviously. I don't anticipate a move until the elections. Who knows? That's just my hunch is telling me that the next week,

there probably won't be any moves made in the conflict, the escalation between Iran and Israel. I could be completely wrong. Maybe something happens tomorrow or in the next day or two. But, you know, Netanyahu has signaled that he's going to wait to see what happens with the elections. And then we have a two-month period. where you have, oh, you already have a lame duck Biden,

but you're going to have a much more lamer duck Biden, I guess you can say, whether it's Harris or Trump. And we'll wait and see what happens with the elections. That'll probably dictate a lot of what happens on the side of Israel. The Biden White House, pretty much a blank check to Israel and to Netanyahu. They don't get along Biden and Netanyahu, but Trump would probably be a different story.

I'm not saying that Trump would call for de-escalation, but it would be a different relationship. How that relationship plays out, you may want to discuss this. What about Russia? What about the other side? Iran and Russia. How much of an influence is Russia playing on not only Iran, but also on Israel? We are getting news of Israeli delegations in Moscow, of Russian delegations in Israel.

And, of course, we have the close relationship between Russia and Iran. What do you think Russia is doing behind the scenes? So maybe you want to talk about the U.S. If Trump wins, maybe. And then we can talk about Russia and we'll close out the video. Let's talk about America first and let's turn to the Russians. Because with the Americans, it's, I won't say straightforward, but at least we have a little bit more light there than we do with Russians.

Now, I think the first thing to say is that it's very interesting that Netanyahu is now talking about waiting until the US elections, because that's not been the pattern he has followed up to now. If you remember, going all the way back to August when he went to the United States and spoke to Congress and gave a very, very confrontational speech talking about, you know, going after Iran and making comments like if we go after Iran, the United States and Israel, we win, they lose. That's the result. I mean, he was talking, you remember, we talked all about this. And we said at the time that what Netanyahu was doing is that he was taking advantage

of the power vacuum that exists in the United States since Biden's decision not to seek re-election as president. And he has used that, you know, constant. as we have seen in the week since. He's just paid no attention to any cause for moderation that have come from Biden, if they really have come from Biden, as the report's claim.

Now, suddenly, we're told that actually Netanyahu is not going to take any further big steps until the US election. Now, that to my mind suggests that he's changed he's thinking about the US, instead of thinking as he did in August and over the last couple of weeks, that he can change the political and military and strategic geography in the Middle East by taking advantage of American weakness and the power vacuum in Washington. He has now decided that he needs an administration,

Washington, which is fully on side with him. And I think he assumes and believes, perhaps wrongly, that a Trump administration will support him strongly over Iran. And that is another reason for thinking that perhaps Iran is proving a rather more difficult. adversary than Netanyahu expected that it would, and that he's now come round to acknowledging that without the Americans, that he needs the Americans to really win against Iran, and that whilst the current administration is in office, Israel is not going to get that backing from the Americans, and therefore it needs to wait until the Trump administration comes in order for that to happen. So we see a shift on Netanyahu's side, and it may be another signal that, as I said,

Iran is stronger than the Israelis initially thought. But then that brings us to what happens if there is the election and if Trump does win, which of course hasn't yet happened and may not happen. But let's assume it does. Well, it seems to me that there are divisions on the Republican side, too. Because I mean, Trump has now spoken to Netanyahu, and apparently he's basically said, you know, that, you know, we're with you all the way and all of that. But then J.D. Vance comes along, and he says it's not in the U.S.'s interest to be at war with Iran. Now, I think that, I think the the Trump, a new Trump

administration's policies on this are not yet fully worked out. But my own senses that if a Trump administration does appear, the people within it, like Vance, who are more hostile to the idea of the United States becoming drawn into another conflict

in the Middle East are going to win out over whatever voices within that administration, actually want the United States to become involved in an all-out war in the Middle East. And Trump himself, though he is very, very, you know, positive, strong, supportive of Israel, he's also someone who clearly doesn't like wars and has an aversion to them. absolutely has a record of not wanting to get the United States drawn into forever wars in the Middle East. So I think that if Trump is elected, and that's not having yet, if Trump is elected, then Netanyahu might be disappointed. He might find that the Trump administration, which is going to be a stronger administration than the current one, any administration would be a

stronger administration than the current one. A Trump administration might not be as keen on this war with Iran that Netanyahu and certain other members of his cabinet apparently are. So we can look for tensions there as well. So that's the Americans. Let's talk about the Russians. Now, this is very complicated because the Russians are keeping everything very quiet. and very, very secret.

There's good reasons to think that the contacts between the Russians and the Iranians are extremely strong, that Shoyahu, who is the Security Council Secretary, has been to Iran several times. Certainly we know about some of those visits, but there's reason to think that he's been there more often than we've been told. Putin has had two recent meetings with Pezishgyn, and there are reports that Pezishkyan, is going to Moscow again. There are also lots of reports that the Russians are on the ground in Iran, that they have been helping the Iranians in all sorts of ways. And it's also been suggested that if the Israelis called off their big strike, the main part of their strike against Iran, because they realized that radars were tracking their stealth fighter jets,

that that happened because there were Russian radars in Iran tracking the Israeli fighter jets and that the Russians have played a significant role in strengthening Iran's air defenses. But the Russians, and Putin, by the way, in Kazan, went out of his way to say this. The Russians, even though they strongly disagree with Israeli policy towards Iran and disapprove of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and want ceasefires, the Russians have gone out of their way to make it clear that they're not anti-Israeli. On the contrary, they agree that Israel was the target of a terrorist attack on the 7th of September, 7th of October, 23. Putin said that, and Putin also said that Israelis, like everyone else, have a right to be safe from terrorism. And there is a dialogue underway between Israel and Russia. And there was a big Israeli delegation in Moscow a few weeks ago, though this was barely reported in the media. and apparently there has been and may still be a big Russian delegation in Israel.

Now, again, the fact that delegation went there, there were a few reports about it in the Russian and Israeli media, but it's been barely discussed about since. So clearly, the Israelis and the Russians are communicating. And one again gets the sense that the Russians, as they always do, are trying to calm things down. They don't want a major escalation of the crisis. They don't want a war between Iran and Israel. They don't want to be put in a position where they have to publicly take sides,

where they would have to defend Iran and send weapons and all of that to Iran and commit to Iran against Israel. with which, as I said, they've had relations. And besides, they don't want to be drawn into a long, protracted conflict in the Middle East. So what they're trying to do is that they're telling the Iranians, show restraint. Don't take action that will aggravate the situation. Try not to provoke the Israelis too far. don't conduct strikes or limit the strikes that you're conducting against the Israelis.

Tell Hezbollah to keep calm, don't launch too many rockets, don't do too many missile strikes, and that sort of thing. And at the same time, the Russians are telling the Israelis, look, we are there, we are in Iran, we are providing the Iranians with some assistance, we're helping them to parry your air defense missile strikes. we might even be providing the Iranians with some satellite data, which has enabled them, and targeting data, which has enabled them to conduct these effective strikes that they carried out on the 1st of October against you. But we don't want an all-out war. We are fundamentally sympathetic to your concerns. So we are also telling you, act,

moderately, don't press your luck, don't strike too hard at Iran. We're prepared to act as an honest broker. We can pass on communications backwards and forwards between you and the Iranians. We're also talking to Hamas. We're also talking to Hezbollah. If you want to ceasefire, we are able to broker it. We can probably help you get your hostages released. We're able to do all of these things. And we're able to do all of these things. And we're able to do all of the these things much more effectively than the Americans can because unlike the Americans, we have leverage over the Iranians. So that's probably what the Russians are doing. All right. We will end the video there.

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