The Duran Podcast - Iran deal or a drift towards war

Episode Date: April 17, 2025

Iran deal or a drift towards war

All right, Alexandra, let's talk about the negotiations that wrapped up over the weekend in Oman between the United States and Iran. Once again, you have Whitkoff representing the U.S. side. You had the foreign minister of Iran, representing the Iranian side, the Department of State, the U.S. Department of State, nowhere to be found. Actually, I've read reports which claimed that Iran didn't want Rubio present. They preferred Whitkoff, which makes sense. sense. But the general outlook of those meetings, the conclusion that we got was that everything

went very well. It was positive. And we're going to have a follow-up talks. And those talks could possibly lead to some sort of a bilateral negotiation and maybe even a deal. Trump does not want Iran getting nuclear weapons. Iran is looking for some sanctions relief. And we are off to a good start. At least that's how it looks. But what are your thoughts? Well, I get to say something. If one puts aside all the rhetoric and all the emotion and all this, this should not be a particularly difficult deal to do. Now, what happened in Iran? was this. There was Wittgolf in one room. There was the Iranian foreign minister and his team, Arachi, in the other room. The foreign minister of Oman was going backwards and forwards between

these two rooms, passing ideas between the two sides. Apparently, it went well. And at the end of this meeting, Arachi and Wittkoff actually met. So there was actually a meeting and an exchange, a brief one, but apparently it was all very courteous and very friendly. And if you look at what the Iranians are saying, they thought that the meeting went well. And apparently Wikov himself also thought that the meeting went well. Now, what happened is that the Iranians came with proposals to the meeting in Oman. And the first thing was they said that, you know, there's three things that Iran simply cannot negotiate on. It cannot negotiate over its relations with third parties, with the Houthis, with Hezbollah. This is simply impossible. Iran is a sovereign country.

It conducts its own foreign policy. It's not prepared to sacrifice its friends in order to get some kind of understanding with the United States. Any self-respecting country, would say the same, by the way. The second thing that the Iranians also said is that these are nuclear talks. These are talks about our nuclear capabilities. They are not talks about ballistic missiles or any of the other things, topics that have been brought up incessantly and repeatedly by Americans and by Europeans and by others. And the third thing that the Iranians said, the other thing that they're not prepared to talk about is the entire thing that they're not prepared to talk about is the internal structures, political structures, within their own country.

I mean, they're not going to change their entire system of governance because the United States wants them to do. But on this specific nuclear issue, which is what Trump, when he became president in January, said for him was the issue that mattered. the Iranians came with proposals. They said that they're prepared to end enrichment at 60% levels. They said that they're prepared to beef up surveillance of their sites. And they apparently said that they would be prepared to dispose of their nuclear stockpile,

presumably transfer it to Russia or the IAEA or something of that. guy. Now, that looks very much like the JCPOA of 2015, which Trump rejected. But I think that there is a very important difference, which is that the JCPOA was only for 10 years. So Iran retained all its infrastructure to enrich uranium with the ability to start reenriching uranium after 10 years. And Trump always made an issue that this was wrong and that an indefinite agreement, an agreement whereby Iran indefinitely committed never to produce nuclear weapons. not just have Haminae say that there's a fatwa that forbids it, but, you know, absolute signed treaty agreement is the least that Iran should provide. The JCPOA did not provide that.

So this time, I think the Iranians might agree to that. And the reason is, because their position diplomatically and strategically has changed. radically from what it was in 2015. In 2015, Iran was isolated. It was in a state of conflict with Saudi Arabia. It was heavily sanctioned through the Security Council. Russia and China at that time were supporting the sanctions against Iran. And you could see why the Iranians were saying, look, we're going to, we must retain this capability to enrich uranium to these kind of levels because at the end of 10 years, if we find ourselves in the same situation, we could be at very serious risk. So this time, Iran's position is quite different. It's patched up its quarrel

with Saudi Arabia. It has excellent relations with Russia. with which it has just signed a strategic partnership agreement, which the Russian Parliament has just ratified. It has excellent relations with China, which has become the main buyer of its oil. The Chinese are saying that they are prepared to invest in Iran's economy. The Russians are saying that they're prepared to help Iran build up its air defenses and its air force. So Iran doesn't arguably need that option to start enriching uranium again. They could agree to Trump's demand that they give up once and for all their capability to enrich uranium to that level.

They can enrich uranium on a much smaller scale for the research reactor that they have. this can be popularly supervised. The Russians are there to keep an eye on what's happening. And then, as I said, they give up the plan once and for all to develop nuclear weapons. They do it convincingly. Donald Trump can go away legitimately and say that he's achieved a win. So there is a basis. One could see where an agreement might come. The trouble is there are some people who don't want an agreement. I don't think Netanyahu in Israel wants an agreement. There are other people in the Israeli cabinet who absolutely do not want an agreement.

Much of Israeli society is deeply hostile to Iran and wants war with Iran because they see Iran as the snake and they say kill the head of the snake so that we are once and free. all secure. There are people in the United States who fully agree with this perspective of Iran that is promoted in Israel. And there are many, many people in the United States who quite independently of what the Israelis say loathe Iran because of its political system, because of the history of difficult relations between the United States and Iran, who remain. remember the Iranian seizure of the U.S. embassy and the holding of American diplomats as hostages who have developed strong feelings of antipathy towards Iran because they came up against Iranian agents in Iraq during the American presence there. So, you know, there's all of that.

But if you can get through that, there is a deal, a possible deal. that could be done. Whitkoff, I think, can see it. Perhaps Trump can, but the fact that the State Department is being excluded is a very, very bad sign. And I wonder whether ultimately this deal will be done in the way that it might be. Yeah. It's a pretty easy win-win deal when you take a step back and think about it, isn't it? Yes. Iran doesn't get nuclear weapons. The Trump administration wins. Iran gets sanctions relief.

Yes. Iran wins. Maybe even business and trade begins to open up a bit, maybe between the United States and Iran, or maybe not directly between the United States and Iran, but maybe by your third parties. You even start to get some business flow, possibly. Yes. So that could be a kind of win. There's no big war between the United States and Iran. So the world wins, the people of the Middle East win. The sides that lose, Netanyahu, the hardliners in Israel, and the hardliners in the United States, the neocons like Lindsay Graham and these types. And the military industrial complex, I guess, you could say, does not like this.

So that's the situation. I mean, which side prevails? Well, which side prevails? I'm not going to say it. I'm afraid that in every conflict in the Middle East, the hardliners have always prevailed. The neocons have always won out in the end. And, of course, if this is a deal of the same kind as the one that was agreed in 2015, in other words, one that isn't ratified as a treaty, and I have great difficulty seeing the Senate

ratify a treaty even in the form that we've set out. Then there's always the possibility that at some point in the future, this could all fall apart and the Americans could walk away. So the Iranians will be aware of that, and they might very well insist that it has to be done as a treaty. And that would be a commitment by Trump, or at least something that Trump might not be able to offer. So we have the basis of agreement. It is very tantalizing. But I have to say, I think the accumulated feelings about Iran in the United States, in Israel, in Europe as well, by the way, are just too strong to actually deliver it in the end, even though the alternative

is clearly a drift towards war, which would be a total disaster. But when was there a war anywhere that the neocons wanted that they weren't able to get? Or you could make the argument that Iran doesn't push for a treaty, and they just buy three, four years of time, four years, and they continue to build up defenses alongside Russia, China. Bricks, Bricks continues to gain momentum, continues to get stronger. Iran is a part of Bricks. And you just, you know, play it that way. You gain four years and yeah, and the world continues to move.

Yeah, towards multipolarity, yeah. Exactly, a very sensible and wise approach. And maybe the Iranians who are not fools would see that. And they might also be able to get some of the UN sanctions lifted, which would facilitate trade as well. And then when the next administration comes and tears this all up, Iran will be in a much stronger position than the one it is in today and a far stronger position than the one it was in back in 2015. But that requires far-sightedness on the part of the Iranian leadership. Maybe they have it. I mean, there's some very intelligent people in Iran, but there are

there are also hardliners there. And obviously one can't overlook them. And I don't know how well-organized the Iranians are and how capable they are of seeing things in that way. So, I mean, there's a lot of uncertainties. I know the major problem is with Iran. I think ultimately it is in the United States getting the American Congress, the U.S. Congress, getting the political class in the United States to accept any sort of deal with Iran, I think is going to be extremely different. Never, never, yeah. That's never going to happen. You're not going to be able to control the U.S. side of things, especially Congress. Congress, you're not going to be able to get them on board with this. But, you know, if you're Iran, you gain the

four years and as far as planning long term. As Iran, you can plan, but you also have two of the best long-term thinking countries in the world, the two best. You have China and Russia there. Absolutely. They can absolutely take a long view of this. So maybe you look at it like that, I don't know. Absolutely. I mean, that's what should happen. I'm moderately hopeful about this, but I have to say, hopeful in the short term, but the problems are enormous and one mustn't assume that this is going to end well in the end. Well, the interests are enormous. Sorry?

The interests are enormous. I don't know if the problems are. Yeah. The interest. Go ahead. Yeah. The interest. The thing to always understand is that the dangers in.

involved in a war between the United States and Iran are colossal. Now, there is a view in the United States that Iran is weak, that the various assassinations of Hezbollah leaders proved as much that the assassinations in Tehran proved as much that you can decapitate the Iranian leadership, that Iran's air defense system was badly destroyed by the Israelis in the raids that took place last year. That Iran is an open target that you don't have to worry about flying over Syrian air base so you could launch many more missiles against Iran that you could previously. Now, I don't know for a fact that all that is wrong.

I don't know how strong Iran is. I don't know that information. But my sense is that it is completely wrong. And of course, if it is completely wrong, and if a conflict with Iran is launched, and Iran turns out to be far stronger than all of these people who make these calculations and make all these claims expect, then we are in a conflict in the Middle East with possibly the Middle East's strongest power, backed by China and Russia. And that would be a disaster for the United States, be a disaster for Israel as well, because the one thing that neither of these countries can afford is a prolonged war in the Middle East.

We saw how much damage the Iraq war did to the international prestige and resources of the United States. This would be that magnified by 100. All right. We will end the conflict. We will end the video there at the durand.locals.com. We are on Rumble Odyssey, pitch, telegram, Rock for the next. Go to the Duran shop, pick up some merch like what we are wearing in this video update. The link is in the description box down below.

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