The Duran Podcast - Iran in a Changing World - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris and Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: December 17, 2023

Iran in a Changing World - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris and Glenn Diesen

Welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Dyson. With me is the St. Alexander Mercuris. We're also joined today from Iran by Professor Sayyad Mohamed Marandi. Welcome. Thank you very much for having me. So, well, I guess Iran often falls in this category of countries, of which many people seem to have a strong opinion about, even though many tend to know very little about that country and its position. So I would say often we see the media lean on their emotional slogans and catchphrases, which makes it very difficult to get an informed view on Russia's, sorry, not Russia's, Iran's positions and perspectives on key issues, which is why, again,

we have the privilege to speak with Professor Marandi today. And, yeah, as a prominent professor in Iran and also an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiations team in Vienna, I think, yeah, he would be in an excellent position to make us all a bit wiser. So the topics we really wanted to address today is everything from Iran's efforts to improve relations with the Gulf states, you know, a strategic partnership, an economic partnership with China and Russia, the tensions with the United States. But I guess, well, my first question to you is about the economic integration of this, you know, massive Asian or Eurasian continent, which somewhat ties all of these topics together. Because there seems to be a desire to decentralize the international economic system among all these countries on this continent to reduce dependence on the Western economies. Of course, this is to enhance prosperity, but also to prevent countries like the United States, to use. economic dependence as a weapon to preserve its dominant position in the international system. So, and I feel like Iran often takes a key role in all of this because we see these huge initiatives from, you know, Bricks, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We have the Eurasian Economic Union, which is signing free trade with Iran. We have the international north-south transportation corridor. Again, Iran being there at the center. We see tech partnerships, energy, new transportation corridors, currency swaps, new payment systems. So I was just wondering first on your perspective. Do you see this economic integration as a key influence, something that's driving Iran's policies and vision for the future? Also, what do you see the role of Iran being in this wider transformation of the Eurasian space? You're absolutely correct. the events that we're seeing today, the economic integration that is gradually taking place across Asia is profound.

It has been going on for a while. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has been pursued for a decade now. the whole idea came from an article written by Professor Wang Jisu at Beijing University. I think it translates in English marching westward or marching west, where when after Obama spoke of pivoting to Asia, he wrote this article that China should pivot to the west, meaning Central Asian. After that, the Belt and Road Initiative became Chinese government policy. And now, especially, I think, after the war in Ukraine, many of these changes have been taking place at a much more rapid pace.

In the past, Iran was, of course, sanctioned. It was very difficult for Iran. and it was very difficult to convince countries like China or Russia and others to break away from the Western financial institutions because, of course, Iran is not a huge economic player. It was important. It continues to be important, but it wasn't an economic powerhouse. So the incentive for China and others to do something that could anger the Americans was limited. So countries would cooperate with Iran, but they would be very careful. Even the Belt and Road initiative that China was pursuing it when it came to Iran, even though Iran was a part of the Belt and Road initiative, less work was done because the Chinese were cautious. But I believe that after the war in Ukraine began, things changed much more rapidly.

First of all, we had a new administration in Tehran. President Reyesi is different from the previous president, President Rohani. President Rouhani, I would argue, looked more to the west. I wouldn't say President Reyesi looks to the east. but I think President Reisi looks to a policy of Asian integration. And so the war in Ukraine coincided with this new administration in Tehran coming to power. I was in Vienna, of course, during the negotiations when the war began. And I think even then I could see how things were changing when I was having discussions with certain.

colleagues from Europe or journalists in Europe, you could already see how the future would be very different from the past. So after the war in Ukraine began, Russia changed. The situation in Russia changed dramatically. Russia became like Iran sanctioned, and it turned to Iran for help with regards to dealing with sanctions, but also as you pointed out, the development of the North-South corridor between Iran and Russia became much more important and much more a sense of urgency

existed with regards to its development because Russia wanted to have alternative routes for trade. It both wanted to be able to trade with Iran, but also through Iran trade in the Persian Gulf and then use the Persian Gulf to trade with India, Africa, and Chinese ports, and other countries across the world. And of course, the North-South corridor provided Iran with an opportunity to have access to Russia and the North Caucasus and Central Asia. So integration between Iran and Russia, economic integration and greater military and political cooperation grew very fast. Simultaneously, I would argue that the Chinese felt that now that it was both Iran and Russia, they needed to rethink many of their policies because after Iran and Russia,

would be China that's targeted. And China was, of course, being targeted by the United States, especially during the Trump years. During Obama, it began, but during the Trump years, the economic warfare between the two countries expanded. So China began to change its policies towards both Iran and Russia, and that increased the pace of integration. The Belt and Road Initiative became more important, the Iran-Chinese relationship, the Iran-Russian relationship, so Iran became, for Iran suddenly these connections, the connecting north and south, east and west through Iran, became a priority for the current administration. And right now the government is developing the roads and rails and the shipping at a much faster pace than before. Also, I think after the war in

Ukraine, the war in Gaza enhanced these relationships. I've been to Russia a couple of times over the past couple of months, and I've been to China a couple of times as well. And you can see that the mood is changed even further when it comes to the situation in Gaza. So there's much more cooperation and coordination between Iran and Russia and Iran and China and Russia and China. And of course, I think the Russians and the Chinese appreciate the fact that Iran has a very large sphere of influence. It has allies in Yemen and Lebanon and Syria and Iraq. And in Afghanistan, it has significant influence. And of course, the Persian Gulf is right beside Iran and that is where much of the world's energy comes from. So you are absolutely correct. I think

that this integration is speeding up and we saw it when Iran became a part of the Shanghai cooperation organization. It was manifested there and again more recently when Iran joined Briggs. I think again it showed that these countries, the core or the countries that set up bricks, that they appreciated the role that Iran plays and that the role that Iran can play in future. So I think that it's very fair to say that while Asian integration or South-South cooperation has been increasingly discussed over the past couple of decades, but I think it's really U.S. policy that has pushed things in this direction so far. The events that we've seen over the past couple of years have brought about dramatic change.

And Iran has benefited a lot from this. Of course, it's sad to say that, in a way, because the war in Ukraine is a tragedy, and the events in Gaza are heartbreaking. But that aside, the tide is turned, and the Iranians have broken out of isolation. Relations with regional countries have improved significantly, especially with Saudi Arabia. And the Iranians and the Saudis were negotiating for three years to reestablish ties. but there was always a sticking point when the Chinese were asked by the Saudis to mediate

and the Iranians subsequently accepted the two sides spoke in Beijing and the Saudis put aside that preconditioned and ties were restored. So now Iran's relations with countries across Asia have improved significantly, but also in West Asia the tensions have decreased.

So I would say that a lot of this is due to U.S. policy, due to European policy, due to Israeli policies, and that they have actually brought countries closer to one another, countries that they would have rather kept apart. If I could ask about a little bit about the moods amongst policymakers, and about people in Iran, because as we've previously discussed on other occasions, I mean, Iran is witnessing this year an extraordinary change, almost a year of miracles. You've talked about the reproshment with Saudi Arabia, which I think still took an awful

lot of people by surprise. We've had this close convergence with the Russians. We've had a big arms deal with the Russians, of a kind that the Russians, I can remember Alexander Formin, the deputy defense minister of Russia, reassuring the Israelis that an arms deal of this nature between Russia and Iran would never happen. And yet, here we see it, it has happened. China's developing its relations. You now have, I believe, a free trade agreement coming up with the Russians, coming up with signature in a few weeks. And of course, the Chinese and the Russians are closely integrated with each other. And this, in a country, that must have felt itself very much a fortress under siege,

going all the way back to 1979. You've had a prolonged and very difficult war in the 1980s and with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. You've had to worry about what might be happening in Iraq. You've had all the various threats of attacks from Israel. from the United States that have happened on many occasions, and you've had a concerted policy of economic strangulation, if you like. Do people in Iran generally understand how completely the situation has suddenly changed from Iran?

And what do people, if you have any contact with and people in government feel, do they suddenly see opportunities, diplomatic, opportunities specifically opening up for Iran, which never existed before. Yes, I think that people do in general feel that the walls surrounding Iran are cracking and collapsing. And joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was symbolic of that, joining Briggs was also symbolic, perhaps even more significant, the symbolism there. But also I think that people see in general how countries in the region and major powers across the globe are speaking with

the Iranians. They're more keen on cooperating with the Iranians. There are signs of economic growth in the country that didn't exist for the past few years, the last two quarters, the country has experienced high economic growth. But at the same time, life is still difficult for most ordinary Iranians. The sanctions over the last decade have made life much more difficult than before. Although I think that if someone from outside comes to Iran or visits Tehran or any other city, they would be very surprised by how, by the fact that it's very developed, that it's very modern. But when you live in Tehran and you, as a government employee or ordinary people, for many,

it's difficult to make ends meet largely due to the sanctions. So we're still not, or I think most people still are not seeing the benefit. of the current situation, but if it continues, I think that within a year or two, things will begin to become easier for people. And we are already seeing investors coming in from China and Russia into the country, but in particular China who are keen on investing in the country. So there are these changes taking place. I think that government officials do Do appreciate what is going on because they are more deeply involved on a day-to-day basis with the changes that are taking place across the region. And one other important thing that I should add is that the West, and I mean Western governments, have, they have been working very hard to undermine Iran for decades, as you've alluded to.

they have a huge media apparatus in Persian, many TV channels, many telegram channels. They have many thousands of people who are working on Iran just in media and working against Iran. You have more Persian media outlets that are based outside the country and are hostile to the, the state, then you have inside the country. You know, BBC, VOA, Iran International. There are many. And then, as I said, there are many online platforms as well. And there's also a cyber army that is where thousands of people are working in Albania,

24 hours a day against Iran. And the list goes on. And you have terrorist organizations such as Dami K and the monarchists and certain Kurdish groups funded by the West alongside Iran's borders with Iraq or alongside the no man's land in Pakistan near the Iranian border that are constantly either carrying out terror attacks or trying to create unrest inside the country. So, and I think it is unique. Russia and China don't have this huge anti-Russian or anti-Chinese media apparatus, not because they're not as important, but with Iran it started a long time ago. The antagonism towards Russia is more recent. It is, I mean, it is huge now, but, you know, 10 years with Iran, this began 20, 30 years ago.

And now I think it's beginning to decrease the funding because one of the key TV channels that anti-Iran is shutting down. So I think they're probably redirecting funding towards bigger fish. But in any case, this onslaught, this psychological warfare against Iranians, has been going on for many years. So on the one hand, they strangle Iranians through sanctions. They threaten Iranians with military attacks. All options are on the table. And then you have this constant media attack on Iranians, where people are told day and night how miserable they are, how this is the worst country in the world.

And so this has been going on for a very long time. And there is a class of Iranians, let's say pro-Western. liberal class that have been influenced by the West and influenced by this media. I have some of my students, some colleagues at university. They are very hostile or very critical of the state. I mean, the state institutions and often very pro-West because they've been under the influence of these media outlets. And also the problems that exist in Iran, incompetence, corruption, just like everywhere else, but largely because of the influence of this Western media. But as a result of the war in Gaza and the role that Western countries have been playing in this genocide

and blocking a ceasefire or aiding the Israeli regime, the West has really destroyed its image among that class of Iranians that they were always counting on. So on the one hand, I think it's fair to say that these walls surrounding Iran are crumbling slowly or gradually. But on the other hand, I think that the damage that the West has done to itself in the eyes of Iranians, and I'm sure this is not just true about Iranians, I think this is true about across the globe. You know, whenever, let me give you a good example. whenever the Iranians and the Chinese or the Iranians and the Russians want to agree on something,

you have this huge online assault on that agreement, on the meeting between the two presidents, whether it's Iran and China or Iran and Russia, as examples. And how this is going to hurt Iranian interest, this is terrible. Russia is the enemy, China is the enemy. And so you have a segment of Iranians and then, for example, they say the Russians are doing this in Ukraine and the Chinese are doing that to their Muslims. But now, regardless of whether any of that is true or not, but now people are seeing day and night what's going on in Gaza. So the U.S. soft power has been, in my opinion, demolished. And I think that is something that is not easy to.

put a number on, or let's say, to calculate its significance. But I think it is going to create great harm to American interests in the months and years ahead across the globe. And in particular in our region, because I'm absolutely certain that this is not unique to ordinary Iranians. When I was in China, just last week, I was invited for a conference. I went to three different cities. And in all my conversations, the Chinese were saying before Gaza, people in China, those who were interested in our region, it was sort of 50-50.

Some sympathize with the Israelis, some sympathize with the Palestinians. But that has all changed. People are overwhelmingly pro-Palestine. In my trips to Russia, the two of you know Russia as well as I, if not much better. The mood across among those who I speak with in Russia and I communicate with in Russia and I meet in Russia has changed significantly as well. So this is not just about Israel. This is about the collective West. So what Israel does in Gaza reflects upon Berlin.

It reflects upon Paris. It reflects upon London. But most importantly, it reflects upon Washington. I think you can put some figures on this, and that is by looking at the voting and the General Assembly, which is about the international situation. So we had a general assembly resolution on the 26th of October, calling for a humanitarian pause leading to a sustained end cessation of hostilities, complex use of language on the 26th of October. It attracted the support of 120,000. one states, and two days ago, we had another stronger General Assembly of Resolution, which caused for a humanitarian ceasefire. It used the word ceasefire, and it attracted the support of 153 states. So the number of states is growing, and the language of the resolutions is hardening.

And I think that is happening every day. That trend is happening every day. And I don't know whether this is true, and I want to make it clear that I really don't know if this is true, but somebody who is well informed has told me that opinion polling in Russia is showing such strong sympathy for Palestine that the Kremlin itself is being telling the polling agencies, don't publish this, because he's going to make problems for us with the Israelis. And one thing I can say is that Putin has spoken to Netanyahu on two occasions since the conflict began in Gaza. And both of those calls, but especially the last one, if you compare the readout, the Russian and the Israeli ones, were becoming very tense and very difficult indeed.

and go back a few years. It's not so long ago that I can remember Netanyahu invited to Moscow attending the Victory Day parade on the 9th of May as the guest of honor. So you can see the huge shift

that's happening in attitudes there. So I just wanted to just add those points. You can actually see illustrations to this things. You can, up to a certain point, you can measure them. numerically in some respects and certainly mood-wise as well. So can I just ask about Iran and it's economic, well, before I do that actually, security situation is still difficult for Iran.

You have a USS Navy carrier, as I understand. The Eisenhower is now in the Persian Gulf. This is said to be another submarine lurking around somewhere with law. lots and lots of cruise missiles. What is the mood about this in Iran? Are people worried that this might result in some kind of an attack on Iran? Is this a fear that people still have? Do the government people, do they see these actually very substantial American military deployments in the Middle East?

Do they worry about them? There's reports that there's been fighting in Iraq, in American bases, in Syria and there's all sorts of confusing information about what's going on in the Red Sea. What do people in Iran feel about this? I mean, government people, people generally. We've been threatened by the Americans for decades now. We have seen different American presidents and secretaries of state or defense secretaries use the phrase all options are on the table many times.

But I think as we've moved forward, Iran has grown stronger, especially militarily. I think Russians would agree that Iran's military technology and capabilities are very significant. and the United States, because of these never-ending wars, is not the United States of 30 years ago. In fact, I would argue, and this is just an opinion, that the biggest tragedy for the American people was actually the victory over Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, because, in my opinion, the ghosts of Vietnam

made the United States a more cautious country. And after, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also this tremendous victory in Kuwait, which really wasn't all that important because Saddam didn't fight. I mean, we could discuss that in detail some other time. But what appeared to be a big victory, I think sort of did away with the ghost of Vietnam and made America, the United States.

very confident about its capabilities. And probably that had something to do with all these wars that we've been seeing, whether in Yugoslavia or in Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya and elsewhere, or the dirty wars that we've seen like in Syria or Yemen and so on. But I think now the United States is not seen by ordinary Iranians as some imminent threat. In fact, U.S. assets and the Persian Gulf are very vulnerable. If the United States really was serious about targeting Iran, the first thing that they would do is that they would remove the aircraft carrier from the Persian Gulf. Because this is like the 1950s and the

1960s technology with missile, the sort of missile technologies that we see. see today, the nature of war has changed. And naval ships and the, you know, as they used to, the role that they used to play traditionally, I think their role in now is very different from the past. So I don't think that American ships in the Persian Gulf really have any, they mean anything except for perhaps the opposite. They probably mean that nothing is going to happen. otherwise they'd have to move all of those ships outside of Iranian missile range, which would be all the way to the Red Sea. And then, of course, you have Yemen in the Red Sea.

So that still makes things very difficult for the American. So I don't think anyone in Iran feels that any war is imminent. Iran doesn't want a war in the region. No one does. But the Iranians and their allies will support the Palestinians. And something that I should like to point out here is that something that I've been saying for many years, but I think many in the West, at least among mainstream Western politicians and mainstream Western journalists, that they fail to appreciate, is that Iran has powerful allies across the region.

And I'm sure that as a part of the American calculation when they refrain from striking, from striking Iran. So Iran is both powerful at home, but it has powerful allies. But I have to stress that these are allies. You often hear how the Ansarro-Lah or what the Americans and the Europeans call the Hothis, how these people in Yemen are Iranian proxies, or that Hezbollah is in the Iranian proxy,

or that the hashid or the resistance groups in Iraq, they're Iranian proxies. or Hamas and Islamic jihad, their Iranian proxies. That I don't believe to be the case at all. And I think that is one reason why Iran is so powerful. The United States and many of its friends in the region, they do have a history of using proxies.

But in the case of Iran, these are close relationships. These are allies. Iran doesn't tell San-A what to do. It doesn't tell Hezbollah in Lebanon what to do. It doesn't tell its allies in Iraq what to do. And that's why I think the Americans made a major miscalculation. When they thought that by sanctioning Iran, the resistance across the region would collapse because they would have a shortage of funding, I think they really misunderstood the

nature of the relationship. First of all, the amount of money spent in the region is really almost nothing compared to the amount of money that the United States and its allies spend. But more importantly, is the fact that there is a bond that exists between these groups and organizations. And in the case of Yemen, it's effectively a government. That brings them close together. And therefore, you see that, for example, Sanar, Yemen is actively fighting alongside the Gazans or Hezbollah is fighting in the north to keep part of the Israeli army in the north so that they cannot be used in Gaza. So this is a sort of, I would say, a bond that exists. These are allies. and not proxies. If they were proxies, I think they would, the Americans would have had much, they would have had, it wouldn't have been very difficult for the Americans to tear this network apart.

I just want to ask quickly on the relationship between the evolving relationship between Iran and Russia, because I guess unlike, you know, Iran and China, the history of Russia and Iran has been, you know, burdened. with more problems in its path, mutual conflicts. But you also mentioned before, after America said it would pivot to Asia to contain China, that's when the Chinese began to march west. But the year after in 2014, when the West supported the coup in Ukraine, that's effectively when the Russians began to march east. They decided then that Europe didn't work anymore, that they had to connect. their economy closer with Asia instead. So similar ideas of what the Chinese had. And of course,

I see similar ideas, of course, being prevalent in Iran, that modernization and economy can't depend on the West, obviously, given the history of sanctions. But for the Russians, this meant when they started to look east instead of West, that suddenly the relationship with Iran had a very different role. Suddenly, it's not something you can trade away. It became, you know, a, key core or pillar of this greater Eurasian partnership they had envisioned because you can't build greater Eurasia without Iran. So suddenly they went from being, you know, almost peripheral to being one of his main partners. So, you know, when they intervened in Syria to prevent the regime change there, then, of course,

they partnered up with Iran. And, you know, this had a limited purpose. And, you know, I remember in Moscow, many people were speaking about how. how the objective should be to convert this very limited cooperation in Syria with Iran to something wider, something more strategic, encompass, a wider area of interest to make sure that interest are harmonized and deal with the areas where they do not harmonize. But I was just wondering, I kind of seen it from the Russian perspective. I was just wondering, what is the views in Iran?

Is this still relation with Russia? Is it still something that's a bit divisive in society among government? Is this some worry about too much economic dependence on the Russians, the military cooperation? Is this? What are the thoughts around these topics? Yes, you're absolutely correct. Iran and Russia do have a history, and there has always been sensitivity towards,

or with regards to the Iran-Russian relationship. And those that Western media apparatus that I was speaking about earlier puts a lot of focus on this. It constantly reminds people about Russia's role in the past in Iran. Of course, it's ironic that most of these media outlets are based in London. And their activities in Iran were not exactly benign. And they are right now among, you know, these are the countries that are sanctioning Iran. But still, they do constantly try to play upon these fault lines and to create as much division as possible and to impede progress in the relationship between Iran and Russia.

And I would say that they, the Iranians and the Russians have a long way to go. still to create greater understanding between the two peoples. We don't have, for example, a Russian TV channel in Iran that is directed towards a Russian-speaking audience. The Russians don't have a Persian-language TV network that explains Russia to Iranians. Whereas the BBC, VOA, and Deutsche Wella, the French, they all have, as I said, they spend a lot of resources on this. So there's a lot that the two have to do,

and also they have to be careful about the past and how to deal with that history that existed. But I think you're also absolutely correct, that things, I think, changed in phases. I think the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the nature of the relationship. because the Soviet Union was always seen as a threat. It was our borders to the north.

It was the Soviet Union, what is now Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian, of course, and Turkmenistan. This was all the Soviet Union. So our neighbor to the north was the Soviet Union and no one else. When the Soviet Union collapsed, I think that sense of fear or concern that, existed, it was swept away. And the relationship began to grow, but very slowly because Russia itself was in crisis. And then when Russia began to rebuild itself, especially over the last couple of decades, I think its focus was largely on the West. And the same is true, I think, with Iran. The Iranians were still, we were still in a different world back then. The Iranians were

trying to rebuild or, you know, try to preserve their relations with the West. And the focus wasn't on bilateral relations. In fact, the North-South Transport Corridor, which is becoming very important now to both President Putin and President Recy, and they speak regularly on the phone. They speak every few, you know, three, four weeks with each other on the phone, and they meet regularly as well. a lot of the conversation, a lot of the discussion is about North-South corridor. But this was actually something that the two sides agreed upon a long time ago, but it wasn't really pursued.

I'm not sure if it's mostly the fault of Iran or Russia. I think it's probably Iran's fault more than Russia's. But I think it wasn't a priority anyway back then. But still, Russia no longer had that image that existed with regards to the Soviet Union. Then in Syria, when the Russians decided to join, and General Soleimani went to Moscow and President Putin agreed to send military forces to Syria and especially the Russian Air Force, which played a big role, that was very important for Iran, because Iran would have lost a lot more lives if it wasn't for the Russian Air Force. The Russian Air Force played a great role in defeating ISIS and Al-Qaeda and Iran. Iran was mostly on the ground. And, you know, so if Iran, if it wasn't for the Russian Air Force, I think a lot, we would have

a lot more people sacrificed to defeat ISIS and al-Qaeda. But more importantly, in the long run, is the fact that the two armed forces began to mingle. They began to know each other better. They began to cooperate with each other. They'd help each other. They'd save each other their soldiers under circumstances. So that pushed things forward. But I think the biggest push by far, the biggest change was the war in Ukraine.

And Russia refocusing its relationship, its relationships altogether because the West was now a dead end and the Russians had to rethink. And also it made sense. It made sense for the North-South Transport Corridor, for example, whether Russian relations, with Europe or the United States were normal or not, it made sense to create this alternative route, but it wasn't a priority because I think traditionally people viewed the world in Eurocentric terms. So they didn't see the importance of having the Belt and Road

or the North-South Transport Corridor back then as much as they do now. So often something that's really, you know, it's right in front of your eyes and you should see it. You often are blind to it. And then when circumstances change, you suddenly realize that you have some huge potential in front of you that you never really explored or noticed before. Can I just add little historical context to some of the points made, which is that, of course, talking about Iranian relations with Russia, the problems in them,

It might just be worth pointing out to some of our viewers that in 1907, Iran was actually divided into spheres of influence by the British and the Russians. They actually said, you know, this is country where Russians are going out of the north and the British will have the south. And there's been many wars before that in the 18th and 19th century between Iran and Russia. and at the time of the Tehran Conference in 1943, of course there were Soviet troops and British troops in Tehran. So there is a very long and very complex relationship between Iran. So, for example, there's a very famous photo of the President of the United States, the President of Russia, and the Prime Minister of England during the Second World War,

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in Tehran. But when they came to Tehran, they ignored the Shah of Iran. He was, they didn't even, he wasn't even invited

to the meeting or even invited to have a photo opportunity with them. So Iran was never a colony like most, many other countries, but Iran had some very low points in history.

And these, those, years that era, the early 19th century, the mid-19th century, these were times when Iran was foreign influence was huge. And as you rightly point out, the North was under Russian occupation in the South, basically under British occupation. So that history exists, but it's interesting how the British and the West play on these historical facts that try to divide Iran in Russia, in Iran through their Persian media, but they somehow don't seem to

take note of the fact that they were very much a part of it, if not much more than the Russians. And as I said earlier, today, it's not the Russians who are sanctioning Iran. It's these Western countries. Can I ask about Iran's relations with Central Asia? Because, of course, Iran has a huge history in Central Asia. I mean, it's perhaps not something that the Uzbek government wants to acknowledge, but Samakand, for example, I know people from there.

They tell me that the language that people speak, there is Persian, for example. And Afghanistan, again, it's very much part of the Persian sphere. We don't hear very, we think of Iran very much being involved in the Middle East, in the Arabian Peninsula. and the events in Palestine and Syria. But of course, it's a very strategically located place because you've got Central Asia to the north, you've got the Caucasus, you've got Turkey, you've got Afghanistan. Turkey has been trying to make big moves in Central Asia.

Now that this relationship with Russia has been, to a great extent, resolved, will Iran be looking to be looking to be. develop some of his historic relationships with the central nation states to, with Tajikistan, where they also speak, as I understand it, a form of Persian. Will this, is this something the people in Iran are talking about? Because again, if you look at the geography, it seems to me that the advantages of this are very obvious and very clear.

Yes, I think that, again, the current administration, because of its differing worldview than the previous administration, or at least the two presidents are different. I don't think everyone in the previous administration had identical views to the president. I don't think that's what the previous, I think the previous foreign minister, Dr. Zadif and President Rohani were not of the same view. So I'll just say the two presidents. I think the difference between President Reyesi and President Rohanee made automatically made Central Asia a much higher priority for Iran.

And when Iran went to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it was actually in Samarvand. And I did accompany the delegation. And it was clear that the two presidents, when they met before the meeting of the heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that they were both keen on pushing relations to a new level. And with the Belt and Road Initiative, of course, that makes a lot of sense

because these countries are between Iran and China. But also, the north-south corridor, part of it runs to the east of the Caspian Sea. So to the west of the Caspian Sea, it runs through Azerbaijan. It also runs through the Caspian Sea from Russian port to an Iranian port, but also it runs through the east, where it goes to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. So Central Asia is very important for Iran's policy of South-South cooperation, Asian. integration, but also what President Racy is pushing for close neighborly ties. So it has changed. I think Turkey's influence in Central Asia is limited because the language isn't the same.

They have their own languages. Some do speak Persian, some speak a type of Turkish, which is not the same as Istanbul. Well, actually, in Uzbekistan, the Turkish language is much closer to our Ozari language. My family name Marandi is means from Marand. Marand is an Azeri city in Iran. So in many ways that Iran is both linguistically but definitely geographically, much more adequately located for improving

economic ties for expanding these ties and I think that this is something that is happening Turk and Afghanistan has huge gas resources and the Iranians and the Russians want to create a sort of triangle between these countries so that

they can work together on the gas market and then maybe with also Qatar later on although Atara is a bit different, but there is a lot going on. And since Russia is now sanctioned and Iran is sanctioned, the incentive for Central Asian countries to work with Iran is greater because these alternative means of business is no longer something that has to do with Iran and Central Asia. It's also Central Asia and Russia. And as I said, the same, just like in the case of China, where they have to now,

starting to rethink how to do business to protect themselves from Western sanctions or financial institutions or Swift and so on. This is also happening with all of Iran's partners, especially those partners that have a lot of business to do with both Iran and Russia. So things are changing past, but there's still a very long way to go. Iran's, I think Iran has not been successful in developing trade relations in the past. Iran has a very big bureaucracy, a very burdensome, it creates a burden, I think, often,

and prevents investment and trade. But that is changing. That is gradually changing. We are seeing serious Chinese investors coming to the country. we are seeing tariffs at the beginning of the program

I think Glenn alluded to tariffs are going to fall for many of the goods between Iran and Russia, Armenian and other countries in Central Asia. So things are changing. It's not as fast as I would like,

but things are changing pretty fast. And again, a lot of this has to do with the stupidity of the policies of the United States. And if I would be able to name the number one reason why all these changes are taking place, I would say it is the policies of the United States. Bureaucratic, bureaucratization in economies is often a consequence of the fact that economies are under intense external pressure. It means that the government has to control the economies and that

causes them to develop bureaucracies in order to do this. So if trade opens up, bureaucratization sometimes ends, can I just ask you to talk a bit about Iran's economy itself? Because a lot of people, I think, are not familiar with realities about Iran. You mentioned the fact that if people come to Iran. They're struck by what a advanced and modern country it is. Now, I've never been to Iran myself, but I've actually had many discussions with many people who have done Westerners, and they have all made precisely that observation to me, that it is in fact,

it's got a very significant industrial base, an expanding industrial base. It produces a large variety of products. It's potentially agriculturally, very rich. What it has lacked is not expertise and infrastructure and those

kinds of things. It's lacked investment more than anything else. But could you perhaps speak to that a bit? Yes. First of all, what you said about bureaucracy is absolutely correct. Iran, especially in the 1980s, had to

expand the bureaucracy. Often it's not only because when you're under pressure, when countries are under pressure, they have to have a bit bigger bureaucracy and more control, but also you hire people who don't have jobs. And during

wartime and during economic difficulties, if people don't have jobs, that becomes a problem in itself. So the sanctions and the war that we had in the 1980s, These helped expand the bureaucracy. But that is changing.

Recently, there were over the past year, I would say, there are a number of quite a few serious businesses coming from China to Iran to invest. And the reason is that they have been saying that there hasn't been investment in Iran for a decade. And so there are many more opportunities in Iran than other parts of the world. And Iran has a highly educated youth. It's strategically located.

And it has enormous underground wealth. And the price of energy in Iran, natural gas and gasoline, is very low. So it's very good for businesses. Gasoline for ordinary Iranians is like three. cents, four cents, a leader, which I think would be something that just people in Europe at least cannot even comprehend. So these do create enormous opportunities for these investors. And so we are seeing this change. I think that if things continue as they are, within the next two or three years, you're going to see a lot of investment in Iran. But there's

always been this fear. I mean, just as an anecdote, I recall once I invited two professors to come to the University of Tehran for a program we had, and one was from a university in New York. And he brought a big, very heavy suitcase. And I, the, the, the, the the university driver who took him to his place of stay told me that I couldn't even lift the suitcase. And then when I met him the next day, I said, by the way, why was your suitcase so heavy? And he was sort of embarrassing. He said, it's like full of canned food. And I said, why did you bring canned food? And he said, well, you know, I wasn't sure if there was food. But, you know, if you go to a supermarket in Tehran, it's very much like a supermarket.

in Moscow or in London or in Paris, there's everything there. But, you know, often people or when the war in Gaza began, actually, I was invited to a dinner where there were a number of Chinese, influential Chinese academics and Chinese people close to the government. they invited me to a dinner and during the dinner someone one of them was someone called from

Beijing and spoke to one of the Chinese friends at the table and said you should come back immediately there's a war in Iran because they thought that if you know since there's fighting in Gaza somehow there's fighting in Tehran

so the image that has been created over the last four decades or the security of Iran in the West has created this fear. But those walls are crumbling too, because the world is changing so fast. And I think the credibility of Western media is also dented to say the least. I mean, it's far more than that. And now countries have their own media.

It's not like when I was young and it was Reuters and Associates, and Associated Press, and later on CNN or the BBC, where people got their information, Russia has its own media networks. It has its own online. You have all sorts of people in Russia, in China. There are all sorts of alternative media that are interested in our region that have their own perspective. So I think attitudes towards Iran have changed a lot, and that if they hadn't changed, these investors wouldn't have come to Iran in the first place. I think the very fact that these private investors are coming to Iran shows that these attitudes are changing. And again, we don't know what is going to happen in future.

The war in Gaza could expand. Netanyahu may do something foolish alongside the border with Lebanon. But as things stand, I think that there are lots of opportunities that the Iranians are going to be able to benefit from in the coming months and years. On the topic of war, though, is there any way, do you see any possible scenario? in which Iran would be pulled into a wider regional war, either in Syria or if the war would escalate currently in Gaza or, I know in the United States, the rhetoric is, you know, they assume that Iran is the big puppet master pulling all the strings, but also, you know, possibly Yemen. I mean, is there any, do you see any path in which this could actually spread or is this

did you see it as being contained all of these different conflicts? Well, I know you know this, but I just want to repeat this for your audience that I am not a member. I do not play a role in Iranian government. My views are my own. But I think it's very obvious that

Iran fully supports the resistance in Gaza. Iran supports Hamas. Iran supports the other groups, Islamic jihad. I think it's quite clear that the capabilities of the Palestinians to defend themselves that they have to do with Iran, and Iran will continue to support them. I think the Iranians are, they're proud of that, and as we speak, the Iranians will continue to support them. The Iranians, we know, before the revolution itself, and during the years where there was

resistance in Iran against the Shah, two key foreign policy, issues for the revolutionaries, including Ayatollah Khomeini and his people especially, were apartheid South Africa and Palestine. These were issues that were key before the revolution and key criticisms directed towards the Shah with regards to foreign policy before the revolution. So, and of course, Iran broke off ties both. with Israel and with apartheid South Africa after the revolution and after the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa, Iran established ties with that country and has very good

ties with it. But so Iran's support for Palestine is not new. And but I don't think that as things stand, any of the major players have a vestibre vested interest in expanding the war. Israel, of course, I don't, I mean, they would, I probably, Netanyahu would like to expand the war, but I don't think anyone

who's a decision maker in Washington wants the war to expand. Because let's imagine that it does expand. The more intense the fighting becomes, the more chances are for further developments and and events that could trigger even a further expansion of the war. So let's say somehow the American strike Iranian targets somewhere for some reason,

that would change everything altogether because Iran would strike back. And those countries in the region, which Iran has good relations with, they host American bases. And so if the, but if the Americans attack Iran, then those countries will be seen as hosting the hostile entity. And that could lead to the destruction of their infrastructure, which would mean that there would be no more oil and gas coming from the Persia-Rov region. And I think Iran's drone and missile capabilities, and especially the fact that Iran has

been preparing itself for some sort of confrontation. with the United States for decades means that there is a balance of terror. In other words, sort of like between the United States and the Soviet Union before, where there's a balance of terror where both could destroy one another, therefore it made them smart enough not to do anything really stupid. I think there is a sort of balance of terror now between Iran and the United States, where both sides know that a war would be catastrophic. So both sides have a vested interest in containing the violence

But of course Iran will continue to support Hamas Islamic jihad Hezbollah and others because Iran believes them to be Legitimate resistance organizations Remember, as well as actually I know you know this but I'm just saying this for some of your audience who may not know Although I know your audience is very politically aware But Hezbollah was created during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon when they took the capital, Beirut. So it was a national resistance organization which ultimately expelled the Israeli regime from almost all of Lebanon. I say almost all of Lebanon because there's a small piece of Lebanese territory that's still occupied by the Israelis.

And the same is true with Khansara-Lah. or in the case of Iraq, Iran's, again, this is, you know, it's really extraordinary what American and NATO policy has done. Iran and Iraq fought eight years of war. I was a volunteer in that war. I have been shot. I have shrapnel wounds. And I was injured twice with chemical weapons. Chemical weapons that were given to Saddam by the West.

They gave him also the military intelligence to use those. weapons and the political cover to get away with it. But that aside, so Iran and Iraq never had really good relations. When the Americans invaded Iraq, that relationship evolved, and it became much better, something detrimental to U.S. policy. But when the West began the dirty war in Syria, and then ISIS spilled over into Iraq, and Iraq was about to collapse, the Iranians and the Iraqis fought together. against ISIS. And that changed the relationship completely between the two countries, because

their blood was spilt together against this, you know, so we were fighting before, thanks to Saddam and his allies, but now they were fighting alongside one another. So the relationship between Iran and Iraq is a very different relationship today than ever before. And therefore, I think that the West recognizes, the United States recognizes that war with Iran or conflict with Iran would ultimately lead to the expulsion of the United States from West Asia. But it would come at a horrific price for the international community and for everyone. So Iran doesn't want war. The United States doesn't want war, but Iran will continue to support Palestine.

and the United States will continue to support Israel. Thank you for that, and that very good explanation. Can I just ask, because of course, we've been discussing about the economic links, the trading links that are now developing, the fact that the walls have now coming down, that Iran is now finding its way economically in ways that it has not been able to do before. But, of course, for all this to develop, one would need a certain security that there would be a long-term peace, peace in the Middle East, peace in the regions.

Now, there's this crisis in Gaza at the moment. There's this urgent push in the United Nations, in which Iran is fully involved, by the way. The Iranians have been very clear about what they want. They want to see a ceasefire in Gaza. most of the international community agrees. It is the United States that is isolated at this present time on this issue, not Iran. There's also, I think, a widespread sense around the world that American diplomacy has not been successful to put it mildly in terms of the Palestinian Israeli issue. And we're starting to hear increasingly people talking about a peace conference,

an international conference bringing together many players to see a way towards a long-term, sustainable, just solution of this conflict. Do you think this is something that Iran might be interested in and might support? I mean, it's a big question that I just thought I'd put it. Well, I'm really sorry for all my long answers. This one is going to be. be a bit long and I'm not very charismatic, so I hope I don't bore your listeners, and I hope it doesn't reflect poorly on your show for having a boring guess. But I think if we look at the South Africa, the Iranian position on South Africa, I think we can learn a lot from that. The Iranians believe that apartheid in South Africa has to end, but Iran didn't believe that

white South Africans have to leave or that white South Africans should be punished. The Iranians believe that there should be rapprochement and that South Africa should be South Africa for all South Africans. The belief in Iran when it comes to Palestine and the conflict there is the same. Iran doesn't believe that, first of all, a two-state solution is possible. Because the West Bank has been so deeply colonized, and by the most hard line of Zionists, that it's just, it's not an option.

They're not going to leave. I think they're like 700,000 of them right now. And they are really hardcore anti-Arab Zionists. So the two-state solution, as things stand, is not really an option. But also, even if it were an option, hypothetically speaking, for the Iranians, there are two questions that would remain. And that is that what happens to the millions of Palestinians who are in refugee camps, not the refugee camps in Gaza, because as you know, 70% of the Palestinians in Gaza are actually people who are expelled from the homes in the rest of. of Palestine. They were ethnically cleansed and take, and they had to go to Gaza. But I mean, the refugees that are in Lebanon, I've been to their refugee camps in Syria. Again, I've been

to a very huge refugee camp in Syria, of course, in Jordan, and there's the Palestinian diaspora. Their right of return is not something that can be morally. speaking, ignored. And also there's the issue of equal rights for those Palestinians who for whatever reason agreed to acquire Israeli citizenship. They are not,

I mean, former President Jimmy Carter, when he wrote his book on apartheid in Palestine, his focus was actually on, if I recall, I didn't read the whole book, but if I recall, his focus was actually on the Palestinians, a lot of the focus of the book was on Palestinians inside the

the 1967 borders. So there are lots of issues at play, but to make it easier, or let me say to respond to questions that I'm sure many have, because many people in the West, they think that in Iran they're executing people on the street corners and they're, you know, and I don't know, gays are being executed and the Jews are being, in Iran, in Tehran, we have, I've never seen an execution, by the way, anywhere, anyone, but this is all, you know, narrative, Western narratives. But in Iran, in Tehran, we have restaurants that are kosher. We have synagogues.

We have a Jewish population that exists in. many of Iran cities. And we have a Jewish MP, in fact, according to the Iranian constitution, there must be a Jewish MP in Parliament. So if there's only one Jew in Iran, that Jew will be an MP. And if there are no Jews one day in Iran, they'll have to bring someone to, I guess, to fulfill that role. So Jews have to be in Iranian parliament, just like Christians have to be in Iranian parliament by law, they have to be represented, no matter how small their community is. So Iran is not hostile to the Jewish population in Palestine. What it's hostile to is ethno-supremicism, racism, and of course the ethnic cleansing and

genocide that is ongoing at a very rapid pace. only in Gaza, by the way, what's going on in the West Bank is really, really terrible, especially after October the 7th. But Iran does not seek to expel anyone from Palestine. What Iran wants is to have the whole of Palestine to be an area where Muslims, Christians, and Jews can live together. It's not something that's going to happen tomorrow, but I think the Iranians believe that Israel has, the situation in the region has changed dramatically for Israel. Israel, and this is something that I've noticed in China, that Israel is no longer seen as a strong country.

The Chinese are no longer, for example, see Israel as a high-tech country and a powerful country. They're actually quite surprised by its weakness and its inability to even win this battle in Gaza. And I don't think there's going to be any more. Chinese investment in Israel. That's at least what the Chinese who I speak to say. And some Israelis are leaving in, but also public

opinion has shifted against Israel across the world and there, and a segment of that population that we see now speaking out against Israel is actually they're Jews. And I should

stress that some of the most heroic figures who are standing up for Palestinian rights and the people of Gaza are Jews and some of them I'm very proud to be their friends, personal friends. But in any case, the world has shifted. And while it's impossible to predict the future, I think that it is going to be increasingly difficult

for Israel in the years ahead to maintain the status quo. I think it will be impossible. So even though right now, the Israeli population is totally against, I mean, they're actually very much pro-genocide from what we are hearing in the polls. But I think that the situation in the region and the world

is changing. The West is declining pretty rapidly. The world is turning against the Israeli regime. many, many Jews across the world are playing a heroic role in opposing apartheid and opposing genocide. I think the years ahead will force change upon the regime. And hopefully, I mean, at the moment I don't see the future,

it's dark and today it's very dark what we're seeing today, but I'm optimistic that ultimately our region will see peace. Professor Mirandi, we have many, many more things to discuss and say, but I'm afraid time calls for me, and I'm sorry to finish, but this is a good place in some ways to finish, because the dark often comes before the dawn, as people often say, especially in the Middle East. And as you correctly said, I thought this is indisputably true. the world is changing and the world is changing in ways faster than anybody expected. And one point, I should say, I would actually like to push back on a little because you spoke

about Iran or the changes around Iran, Iran having benefited from changes that have happened around the world. But one mustn't underestimate as well the role that the Iranians themselves have played the fact that they've done their outreach, that they've conducted their diplomacy, that they've met, spoken with the Russians, they've met, spoken with the Chinese, they've been active in all sorts of places, putting their case. And I think that Iran has a significant role to play in the future, in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in Eurasia, and in other things, and no doubt we'll be talking about all those things again. So on my part, I just have to say, I have to go, and I have to say thank you for your

wonderful program. Thank you, Alexander. I agree completely. I think that Iran has capitalized very cleverly when it comes to the mistakes made by a far more powerful United States. It's sort of a battle between David and Goliath. So Iran, yes, they did play a very They did play their cards very well, and let's see how things play in the months and years ahead. Thank you very much indeed. Yeah, thanks again for your time. And, yeah, just like I say, I agree. I think the world is transforming very quickly and to fully appreciate it,

one has to have a close eye at Iran as well. So thank you again for being so generous with your time. Thank you, Glenn.