The Duran Podcast - Iran-Israel round 2; Diplomacy and war preparations

Episode Date: July 1, 2025

Iran-Israel round 2; Diplomacy and war preparations

All right, Alexander, let's do an update on the situation between Israel, Iran, and the United States. And let's start off with what is happening in Iran. We have some developments with the IAEA and Kurosi. It looks like Iran is not going to let him into the country. No surprise there. They're also disabling the cameras in the facilities as well, that the IAEAEA uses to monitor the facilities. Grocy is hitting back.

I guess you could say he's hitting back by saying that Iran is going to develop a nuclear weapon in a couple of months. So he's throwing that out there as well. A very dangerous statement for Grosie to make. But anyway, that's his response to Iran. And we have developments happening between Trump and in Israel and Netanyahu and the narrative about the nuclear facilities being obliterated or not obliterated. This is the big debate that continues. I don't know how important that is anymore.

The obliterated narrative in the big picture of things. But we are getting some reports which claim that the Trump White House is looking for some sort of a meeting with Iran. And of course, There's China and Russia also involved in whatever diplomacy or lack of diplomacy may be taking place. What are your thoughts on everything that is going on? This is an incredibly complicated diplomatic and political situation at the moment. And one of the reasons it is so complicated is that it's not fully easy to decipher what Iran's intentions at this moment are. I think we can easily say now what Israel's intentions.

We've said it a long time. They want regime change in Iran. And it attracted almost no attention. But the Israeli defense minister, Israel Katz, has said quite straightforwardly that they were planning to assassinate to kill Harmony, that that was one of the prime objectives of the operation that Israel launched, that if they'd had Harmony and their sights, they would have killed him. The fact that they didn't kill him is only because they couldn't find him. It was nothing to do with Donald Trump telling them not to kill him. And the reason, obviously, they wanted to kill Harmonia was because they wanted to achieve regime

change in Iran. Now, as for the United States, as for Donald Trump, I think that again here, there is a division of opinion within the US government. There are the hardliners of whom there are many and who are very deeply entrenched in the deep state, the permanent bureaucracy of the United States. They too want regime change in Iran. I think Donald Trump himself and some of the people immediately around him are much more guarded about all of this. What they want are restrictions on Iran's nuclear program because they don't want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. But you can discuss what the Americans want. I mean, it was absolutely clear what the Israelis want. Iran remains, at least for me, currently the

the place where you know, you have to ask the big questions. Now, I think there's a number of things that can be said over about the 12-day war. The first is it did expose many major weaknesses within the Iranian military. The air defense system wasn't working well. The country is deeply infiltrated by Israeli intelligence people. and all of that. But it is clear that Iran is fully capable of holding its own in a war with Israel. I think that we now have an accumulation of evidence about this. The Israelis weren't able to do any significant damage to Iran's nuclear sites. They were able to launch bomb attacks and missile

strikes against Tehran, but Tehran is only one big city. Iran has many. It is a country of 92 million people. It can absorb an enormous amount of damage, relatively speaking, and the damage it was inflicting on Israel, as we are getting the information coming through, was much more extensive than some of the initial reports suggested. We now have clear evidence that they were hitting targets like the airport, the Israel's only international airport, the ports, many of the military bases, many of the military facilities, the Iranians were doing real damage to Israel. Had the war continued and had it been limited to a war between Israel and Iran, the Iranians would have been in a very, very strong position. The factor that complicates everything is that the United States inevitably became involved.

And whilst Iran can win a war of attrition against Israel, obviously a war of attrition against the United States is a completely different proposition. We're talking about a superpower. So the question now is, what does Iran do? Because it's obviously not just in conflict with Israel. it is potentially in conflict with the United States also. And it seems to me that it has a choice between three options. Option one, get back and start negotiating with the United States, see whether you can put aside all of the things that have happened over the last two or three weeks,

get back onto the negotiating track, find some kind of modus vivendi with the Americans, kind of return to something like the JCPOA. Now, that course does have advocates, apparently within Iran itself, still, which surprises me, but it seems it does. And people like Peter Van Buren, who is a former State Department official, who writes for the American Conservative, thinks that that is what the Iranians ultimately are going to do. And what apparently, um, apparently other people within the US bureaucracy also think Iran is ultimately going to do. That is one option. Option two is to forget about negotiations with the United States, to keep certainly the

IAA and Grosse at harm's length permanently, because we talked about the fact that Israel had heavily infiltrated Iran in looking. as if a lot of Israel's intelligence was obtained from the IAEA itself, that the IAEA was providing Israel and the United States with an awful lot of information that was used for their targeting data. It provided them with information about Fodil, Natanz, Esfahan. It identified many of the scientists who were involved in the program. It gave a huge amount of information. And as we've seen, and as we've discussed in many places, Grosse sat back, let the attacks happen, didn't criticize them,

hasn't criticized the attacks on the Iranian nuclear scientists, insists that he simply be allowed to go back into Iran and resume the same activities that he was undertaking before. and discuss and presumably go on providing the same information to the Israelis and the Americans. So keep the IAEA permanently away from Iran and do one of two things. Either go nuclear, which I suspect some people in Iran are advocating or in the alternative, develop a much closer military relationship with the two big URAP. States, China and Russia, who have made it absolutely clear that they are prepared to help Iran

in that capacity. I don't think that Iran has yet made a decision. And I suspect there's still arguments about this within the Iranian leadership. I can't imagine that there are many people at the moment who support the negotiation option. But between the other two, going for a straightforward military alliance with the Chinese of the Russians or going nuclear, I suspect this argument is still being played, is still playing out and still being made. They seem to have some time to make a decision maybe over the summer. It's hard to get a clear understanding as to how much time Iran has before an escalation

resumes. But I get the sense that Israel is now rearming, resupplying, because it really did get depleted. The U.S. did not do much better, to be quite honest. I mean, I understand what you said when you say a war of attrition against the United States is very difficult for Iran. But that war of attrition, a 12-day war of attrition, did affect the United States. Yes. Thad missiles and stuff like that. I mean, it also exposed that the United States is really not prepared for a long war of attrition with a country like Iran. At least, you know, the numbers that we're getting show that. So it does look like Israel is going to resupply. It looks like the United States and the Trump administration maybe because of the summertime, maybe because Trump has the bill back. The Big Beautiful Bill, I say the Bill backped or the BBB, the Big Beautiful Bill. Maybe he wants to focus in on that. Iran does seem to have a little bit of time so that they can make a decision,

even though it is obvious that Kurosi is trying to put pressure on Iran. And the way I read his statements, he is basically sending a warning to Iran, either let me in or I'm going to give the United States and Israel more pretext to start a conflict with you guys. I mean, that seems to be Grosie's warning to Iran. So what do you think about Iran's next move and the time that they have to make this next move? It would seem that Russia and China will not be happy with the nuclear Iran, and they're pressing Iran to go the route of military assistance and to fall under some sort of a military umbrella of Russia and China.

Do you see it that way or how are you seeing this going forward? I get just, if I can just before answering that question, just deal with some of the points that you have made. Absolutely, Israel does not have the resilience by itself, the depth of resources by itself, to take on a long conflict with Iran. About the United States, you are absolutely correct. The THAAD missiles were running. up fast, the heavy bombs that were used against Fordor and the Tarns, the bunker busters, the bunker busters. The United States has used up around two-thirds of them. It's widely overlooked, but it cannot actually conduct a similar attack on Fawdor again or any

of the other big facilities that the Iranians have, including a new one apparently that they're creating, which is much, much deeper. than Fordor. I am going to now state my own belief, which is an in-expert one. I've gone through every piece of information that I can find about the outcome of the American strikes on Fordor, especially, and indeed on Natanz, and I have come to the view, and it's my own view that the attack was not successful. I think that Fordor has survived. I suspect that the Iranian facilities were designed to withstand precisely this kind of attack. I understand that there are things that can be done to protect the centrifuges,

even from the vibrations. And I can't imagine that the Iranians who have enormous technical skills would not have done those things. So I suspect that all of these facilities have survived. and there are reports now that the Iranians are carrying up repair work at all of these facilities. Apparently, the satellite photos would show repairs being done at four door to clear the entrances and in Esfahan and Natanz too. So I suspect that the program has indeed survived. Obviously, it's experienced some damage, but it hasn't been damaged anywhere close

to beyond repair. And supposedly, there is a recording of comments being exchanged between Iranian military officials in which they confirm that the damage to Fordor

in particular was less than they expected. So, if the United States resumes its attack on Iran, it has to face the reality that the first attack that it carried out was not a success or not a complete success as it claims and that it only has a limited amount

of equipment that it can bring to bear against Iran's nuclear sites. What the United States does have in large quantities are lots of aircraft, lots of missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and it could sustain an aerial campaign against Iran for many weeks and probably months. Now, Israel cannot do that. The United States can, whether it will be good for the United States or be wise for the United States to do a thing like that. I strongly doubt it would mean immersive depletion of American resources. it would commit the United States to a protracted conflict in the Middle East against Iran. It would weaken the United States military position in other places.

But if you are an Iranian analyst, you have to take into account the possibility that whilst Israel has perhaps a two to three week ability to sustain a conflict against Iran. Iran, the United States can conduct a conflict against Iran lasting for many, many more weeks and months than that, and that is going to inflict a lot of damage and a lot of harm against Iranian society. So that now brings me directly to your question. There will be some people in Iran who will say, look, we're being attacked. for a nuclear weapons program, which we do not have. We had a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Our relationship with the IAEA has completely collapsed. They did not fulfill their terms of their

obligations. To us, they provided targeting data to the Americans and the Israelis, and Grosse, exactly, as you said, is now making implicit threats against us. Because that's exactly what he's doing, by the way. He's saying that if we're not allowed back in, then Iran could move towards going nuclear. And in light of that, I'm going to give a green light to the Americans and the Israelis to attack Iran again.

So forget about cooperation with the IAA. forget about seeking safeguards, forget about any other diplomatic option. Do that which you are being criticized and accused of doing. Get yourself a nuclear weapons capability. Become North Korea and that way at least you'll be safe. Now, I'm sure there are people like that in Iran who are arguing those things. I think that there is the other option, which is to go for the alliance with China and Russia. But that does mean Iran changing a lot of the policies and indeed apparently some of its constitutional arrangements,

which were put in place after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iran has up to now always valued its complete independence, its freedom of action. It has a very long, very complex history of relations with Russia especially. And it is good reasons to be suspicious of Russia if you know that history. I mean, maybe not good reasons with the Russia of today. But, you know, the Iranians remember, some Iranians remember that in the 19th century, the Russians had a kind of hegemonic position in Iran. They remember that in the 1940s, the Soviet Union invaded Iran alongside the British

during the Second World War and occupied Tehran. They remember that the Soviet Union occupied after the Second World War for a certain period, Iranian Azerbaijan. So, you know, there is this history and there is this suspicion, and you can see where it comes So they may be nervous of the Russians, they may be careful of too close a relationship with them. They might say that China ultimately has its own interests which are not identical to Iran's. But it seems to me that if you want to both ensure Iran's protection and And at the same time, create a situation where Iran can rebuild its economy and develop its

society, then seeking an alliance with the Eurasian powers with both China and Russia. I'm not saying with Russia and not with China. I'm not saying with China and not with Russia. Do it with both. I mean, through the Bricks group. Then I think that's the advice I would give the Iranians to go down. The fact that the Israelis and the Americans ran into all of these problems in attacking Iran this time, despite all of Iran's vulnerabilities, strongly suggests that if the Chinese and the Russians really do go into Iran properly, really do build up an integrated air defense system in Iran.

Iran, as they have apparently offered, really do provide Iran with military and technical support, then the option for Israel and the United States to attack Iran will gradually melt away. So that, it seems to me, is the most logical course that I can see for Iran to follow. But I am not the decision-maker. I think there's a big debate going on within Iran. And I'm not going to say what the outcome of it is going to be. No, it's a big debate and it depends on how far Russia and China would go as well. Yeah.

I mean, if Iran is threatened with another attack, you know, does Russia and does China, do they come out and say, you attack Iran, you know, we're coming after you in a way? I mean, I'm simplifying it. But, I mean, do they take it to that level? Or is it just we're going to build? an integrated air defense and, you know, you guys are on your own or will supply money and weapons, but effectively Iran, you're still fighting Israel and you're still fighting, more importantly, the United States. If it was Israel, Iran would have no problem. I mean, that's obvious. It showed in the 12-day war.

But it's the United States that adds the complexity and the problem for Iran. So, I mean, it depends on what Russia and China are telling Iran. and how committed they would be to protecting around or how extensive this security umbrella would be. I think that's the main question. You want to comment on that? And then I would like to hear your thoughts to wrap up the video on the U.S. side of things connected to Iran.

But I think there's a lot more going on here with Trump's recent statements, his true social posts on Netanyahu, the trial, the 12-day war, the ceasefire, the posts about Netanyahu, the trial, also the posts about coming to some sort of a ceasefire in Gaza. Obviously, there's some sort of deal or something that has been worked out behind the scenes between Trump and Netanyahu, between the United States and Israel, which has a connection to Iran and the 12-day war, which has a connection to Gaza and also has a connection to Netanyahu's legal difficulties. What I haven't figured out is, is this agreement or is this understanding between Trump and Netanyahu? Is this about de-escalating from a conflict? Or is this about

escalating towards a conflict sometime in the future? This is the part that I'm still kind of working out, but I would like to hear your thoughts on that. So two questions, a two-part question to wrap up the video. Yeah. Well, let's start with the first one, because here I think actually we do have an answer, which is that, yes, the Russians did offer integrated air defense system to Iran. They have also, however, spoken about the attack on Iran by Israel and the United States being an act of aggression.

China has now started to use that same expression as, you know, well. The Russians has said that the agreement that they were offering Iran was essentially the same as the security treaty that Russia has with North Korea and that is a direct military treaty. That is an alliance with North Korea. I understand that China would be prepared to go to the same in the same way. Bear in mind that North Korea has military alliance agreements with both China and Russia. So in effect, what Iran is being offered is the identical package. And that would mean if there were further attacks against Iran that the Chinese and the Russians would tell the United States and Israel back off, because if you do, we have these obligations

and we're coming after you. So I think that is the package that Iran was offered. The difficulty for Iran in doing that is that, of course, if it enters into alliances, then it is no longer a fully independent sovereign country, because if you enter into an alliance with countries that are far more powerful than yourself. You are inevitably going to find yourself in a subordinate role relative to them, at least in some respects. And Iran has always resisted since 1979, since the Islamic revolution, putting itself in that kind of position. And as I said, I understand its constitution. actually prohibits Iran from entering into those kind of alliances. So it would need to make significant internal changes to the way it functions and to the way

it's run if it were to go down that route. But to answer your question, yes, I think that the offer that is being made to Iran, not just by Russia, by the way, I think I think we've now, I've seen. enough commentary from China to get the sense that China is on the same page here. And Putin and C had that telephone call, which it seems that they were agreeing to coordinate very closely with each other. So I think that that package that Iran was being offered was essentially a military guarantee along the same lines as the one that both China and Russia and Russia, have with North Korea. It would mean Iran, as I said, ceding some of its, some of its, you know,

not, well, its status as a non-aligned country, as a fully non-aligned country. And it was obviously also mean that Iran would not be able to go nuclear. So that's, that's, that's the deal. I'm not certain that the Iranians will take it. But they do need to make a decision. They can't continue to hold these debates indefinitely. And the risk is that from Iran's point of view, that what you'll get ultimately is that the advocates of a full alignment

with the Chinese and the Russia and the advocates of Iran preserving its independence and sovereignty and going nuclear will cancel each other out and we'll get into that very unsatisfactory compromise, which is a little bit like the compromise over the 60% enriched uranium, which is an unsatisfactory situation in which Iran simply drifts back into negotiations with the Americans because there aren't, there isn't enough of a critical mass supporting either of these courses and Iran isn't able to make a decision. And that will be a very, very dangerous outcome in the long run, it seems to me, for Iran, because it absolutely does expose Iran

to further attacks. And what you could perhaps find is a situation where going forward, we have more 12-day wars of the kind that we have seen, and this becomes a recurring problem in the Middle East, which would be very bad for Iran and very bad for the Middle East and indeed for everyone. So the Iranians need to get their act together, have a proper debate with each other, and come to a final decision about what they're going to do. The present situation, I think, is an unsustainable one. At least that's my own personal view. Now, let's talk about the other thing, which is extremely interesting and very important, which is that Trump has, as you absolutely rightly said, come to public support for Netanyahu.

There are reports also that Trump is also trying to get a ceasefire in Gaza, that he's finally again looking at getting a ceasefire. with Gaza. I wonder whether at some level the thinking in the administration is that you offer Netanyahu this deal. The United States provides you with personal protection. You've got all of these people who are gunning after Netanyahu in Israel. He's surrounded by political enemies on every side. He is at serious risk of going to prison if he ceases to be Prime Minister. So the United States gives him protection prevents these prosecutions. In return, Netanyahu breaks with the ultra-hardliners within the Israeli cabinet, people like Ben Gvier and Smotrich, agrees to the ceasefire in Gaza.

Perhaps gives the green light ultimately for some kind of deal between the United States and Iran, going back to the original idea of getting some kind of an agreement with Iran, which Trump still seems to hankerful. And then, of course, Netanyahu steps down. He's safe. He can't be prosecuted. And then a new Israeli leader and a new Israeli government emerges with which the United States is able to work with, or at least the Trump administration.

is able to work with and they're able to move forward on a general stabilization of the situation in the Middle East with the immediate objective being the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. So I wonder whether there isn't something of that kind of thinking going on within the White House and within the administration as well. It's very complicated and it might not work. And I wonder whether it, if it's true, whether it judges the dynamics of Israeli policies, politics correctly, and Netanyahu's own intentions.

But I wonder whether there isn't something of that kind going on. In other words, a massive deal, Netanyahu is able to go free. He is protected. The United States, the Trump administration says he's a war. hero. He's the person who bashed Iran into sense. That's why we're going to get this big deal with Iran, some kind of a deal over Gaza, with perhaps the Arab states basically taking control of Gaza and normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel as the ultimate prize. It could be something like that. And it's the kind of

thing that big deal that Trump, I think, is always attracted to. And if he can pull it off, he might also explain some of his actions over the last

couple of weeks, which is that basically what he was doing, more than anything else, is coming to Netanyahu's rescue. What if it's the reverse? What if it's about coming to Netanyahu's rescue because he is in trouble? And it's coming to his rescue in order to prepare for another go at regime change in a month or two.

Just try to calm things down with Netanyahu, give the impression that you're sorting things out, but keep them in power so that eventually in a month or two, you can have another crack at regime change in Iran. What if it's the exact opposite of what you say? Well, absolutely, which you could very well easily be. And can I just say that many people will think that that is the objective. And they've got very, very good reason to think that. Maybe based on what we've seen over the last month, that is the objective.

That is an absolute disaster. It means another attempt at regime change in Iran. The regime under the pressure of this 12-day war came nowhere close to being changed. It strengthened. It's popular support. and this is now, I think, being widely acknowledged, actually rallied to the defense of Iran. By the way, I have acquaintances in Britain who are Iranians. Pretty much all of them are pretty secular people.

They don't like the regime in Iran. They were furious about the Israeli attack on Iran. So obviously, this is completely an unrepresentative sample, and it is an anecdotal impression. But I suspect that a lot of other people in Iran are like that. So the regime came nowhere close to being changed. It doesn't look as if this kind of attack is going to change the regime. Attacks of this kind, all that they're going to do are that they're going to tie the United States indefinitely into an open-ended confrontation with Iran, sapping American resources, weakening the United States' global position, creating major

conflict within the United States with Trump's base. I mean, people like Marjorie Taylor Green are now becoming increasingly outspoken. And she's in the House of Representatives, but we've also got to throw in people like Tucker Carlson, Tom Massey, the Federalist, all of the, those people, they'd be furious if this is the course that ended up being followed. And, of course, ultimately, continuing to put pressure on Iran in that kind of way, intensifies the, strengthens, the arguments within Iran of those who say that the only option for Iran going forward is to go nuclear. All right. We will end the video there. The durand. Dotlocals.com. We are on Rumble

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