The Duran Podcast - Iran's Impending Retaliation - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: August 8, 2024

Iran's Impending Retaliation - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi, everyone. I'm joined today by Alexander McCurris and Sayyad Mohammed Marandi, who is well known to be an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiation team and overall, a huge expert on Iran and its relations with the West and the wider world. So this is all lies on Iran at the moment, I guess, as the world is anxiously looking toward the Middle East as a possible. direct Israel-Iran war could be imminent with unpredictable consequences. So, of course, it's been building up for some time, but Israel now seemingly assassinated this Hamas leader, Hanje, who was also a chief Palestinian negotiator to end the war. Making matters even worse, he was killed in Iran as he participated in the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president. So this is a provocation on a multitude of levels.

And it seems to put Iran in a bit of a dilemma, because on one hand, this attack on Iranian soil under these circumstances makes it almost impossible not to retaliate. And I assume at least that there's some growing consensus in Iran that retaliation is required to assert deterrence. So I was, well, I'm still expecting a somewhat hard response. On the other hand, I guess it's no big secret that Israel is also aiming to provoke Iranian response to the extent that they can pull the Americans into a wider Middle Eastern War. So to dig them out of the hole which they have created. So I guess my first question would be to Saeim Mohammed, is this, am I reading the situation correctly? And if so, what do you expect Iran to do now?

I think you're absolutely correct. On the one hand, the Iranians know they must respond and it must be robust because obviously the Iranian response in April was not enough. When the Israelis bombed the Iranian consulate, Iran took their complaint to the UN Security Council and the British, the French, the Americans, and I think the Germans were in the council too. I'm not quite sure, but they all opposed Iran's complaint. They refused to condemn the Israelis. So the only thing left was for Iran to strike at Israel.

Now, we've gone over this all of us before. I think your viewers being very politically aware don't need us to go over the stand. The Iranians carried out a limited strike. It was very costly for the Americans and the Israelis. I think it caught, it was it, they spent up to. billion dollars in missile in anti-aircraft missiles.

The Iranian inspired cheap drones and missiles and except for a handful of more developed and high-tech missiles which got through and struck Israel. The rest were brought down by the Americans. So it was a limited response by the Iranians. It was an intelligence gathering operation. Also,

it was sending a message. And again, it was very costly for the Western Israel. But for a couple of months, it worked because the Israeli regime discontinued its attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. And so it seemed that that would be enough. But the attack on Tehran, I think, showed that to the Iranians that this was not enough. And that this time around, I think, they're first. the Iranians are going to strike significantly harder. But at the same time, the Iranians don't want a regional war for a host of different reasons,

because a regional war would mean a global crisis. If there is a regional war, Qatar will no longer have gas to export. The Emirates, the Saudis will no longer be able to export oil. That would be great for the Russian oil industry, And I think that's something that the Americans and Europeans should fear. But it would bring down the global economy because the absence of oil from our region would make the price of oil and gas go up so hot that the whole system would collapse. And we saw what was happening and continues to be happening in the global stock markets. The situation is not good.

We are entering what is probably a very deep deep. recession if not a depression. So this, I think, would be something that the Iranians would not want to happen because Iran's friends would suffer. The Chinese, the global south, Iran's neighbors, Iran's friends. So Iran wants to contain this. Iran does not want a regional war. Ordinary Iranians would suffer. Everyone would suffer. However, if the Iranians don't respond adequately, then the Israeli regime will do this again and again. So the response has to be in a way which makes the Israeli regime regret what it did. So we have to see how things play out.

Because if the Israeli regime strikes back after Iran strikes, then the Iranians will hit them back again. And the Iranians will continue this until the Israelis stop, until the Iranians feel that the Israelis regret going down this road. They have no other option. However, I would add one thing, and that is that I don't know Israel well enough, but I think that Netanyahu's interests are different from those of many others in Israel. And Netanyahu and the people around him do want escalation. They've already escalated. We already have an escalation now.

And what happened in Yemen, where they struck civilian targets in Al-Hodeda. In Beirut, they struck a civilian target killing ordinary civilians and murdering a military commander. So we are in an and then we've already escalated. There is escalation. But I think that many Israelis probably do not want. this but Netanyahu because he's in a dead end he's failed in Gaza he's failed on the border with Lebanon he's the Americans have failed in the Red Sea and the Israeli regime has become hated across the world for what it's doing to the Palatians he needs to change the equation he needs to escalate to maybe achieve some sort of victory

for his own self-preservation. Mohamed, on the last point, just about divisions in Israel, I don't know whether you're aware of the fact, but there was an extraordinary article yesterday in the Financial Times, clearly very, very well-sourced, which talked about a very, very angry meeting that apparently took place in Israel last week. We're not told exactly which day,

but apparently it was between Netanyahu and his war cabinet, or his cabinet and the security chiefs and the security chiefs apparently pushed back and they said that Israel needs a settlement. It needs a ceasefire in Gaza. The army is tired and apparently Netanyahu lost his temper and according to the Financial Times they quoted what they lead us to think of the exact words. He used, he called his own generals weaklings. He called the weaklings and he said, you shouldn't be putting pressure on me, you should be putting pressure on Sinwar, who is now, of course, the new head of Hamas. That's the Financial Times.

And that's not going from me or from some other independent news outlets. So it was very, very interesting article. But that brings me actually to another point, which is a very strange one, something I really can't get my head around at all. Israel attacks the embassy, the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Israel assassinations one of the commanders of Hezbollah. Israel attacks and assassinations in Tehran. We've had other assassinations since then.

We've had bombings, more bombing of Gaza. And yet we've had a succession of people, people, the Foreign Minister of Jordan, apparently the Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Lots of people, apparently, from the United States, through Oman and Qatar and all the rest. And they're asking Iran to show restraint. They don't see to be asking Israel to show restraint in this situation. Do people in Iran notice this? And, you know, are they pointing out to all of these dignitaries who are coming to them with all of

these messages, that these calls for restraint are somewhat misdirected. Because, by the way, it's the same if you read the media here. They're all, you know, calling, saying, you know, Iran needs to show restraint in this situation. I mean, it seems to me Iran has been showing for all the reasons you set out a great deal of restraint. But it is the party that gets continuously requested to show restraint, even as the the other side shows none.

Are people in Iran noticing this? Are they commenting on the fact? Yes, and I think this is one reason why the Iranians feel that they have to respond, ironically, because every time the Israeli regime carries out this sort of attack or an atrocity or a violation of international law, they get no pushback whatsoever from the West. And immediately, instead of the Americans condemning it or punishing the Israelis, they say we will protect them if the Iranians respond. So basically what the Americans are saying is that next time around, the Israelis, if they attack Iran, we will protect them. If they do it again and again and again, whether it's in Lebanon or Yemen or Syria or Iraq or anywhere else, we will protect Israel.

And that means that the Israelis can do whatever they want. So we recognize from the, or Iranians recognize that from the feedback they're getting or from the messages that they're getting from the West, that the West has no intention to resolve the issue. They will continue to. It's just like the JCPOA, the nuclear deal. when the Americans, from day one, the Americans began violating the deal, because the negotiator, the chief negotiator in Iran, he negotiated in good faith. He made a mistake for not having a building a structure to protect the deal, but in any case, he negotiated in good faith. And so after the deal was signed. And in fact, I told him on the day when the deal was signed, because I was in

Vienna, I was a part of the team. I told him that the Americans will violate the deal. I said, I didn't think this would work. And it's for the very same reason, because when, as we see today with the Israeli regime, whenever the Americans violate the deal, no one is out there to punish the Americans. No one in Europe is going to say, well, we are going to ignore the Americans and we're going to continue to abide by our commitments. The Europeans constantly would tell the Iranians to have patience. They would constantly tell the Iranians that you should abide by your commitments. So increasingly, the Europeans and the Americans were violating the deal, making life more difficult for Iranians.

And then they would constantly tell the Iranians that you should continue to abide by your commitments. And then when Trump tore up the deal, the Europeans didn't come to Iran and say, look, we're sorry, we will not, we will disobey Trump, we will continue to work with you. All they said is that you should show restraint. You should continue to abide by all of your commitments. And then the Europeans, they did exactly what Trump wanted them to do. So under Obama and Trump, we received all the same sort of messages as well. because the Rohani government was vulnerable, felt vulnerable and weak, they basically did that until ultimately the leader pushed them to discontinue abiding by the deal and gradually Iran

after a full year of abiding, fully abiding by their commitments, whereas the Americans and the Europeans were opposing maximum pressure, the Iranians then gradually began to discontinue their commitments over a year. So it took two years for the Iranians to leave the deal completely or discontinuous commitments. So this is very similar to that. And I think the Minsk courts are another good example where the West discontinues abiding by commitments, if it ever did in the first place. but it expects the other side to continue abiding by commitment. So in this case, the Iranians are being asked to show restraint. And of course, Iran will show restraint.

If it didn't want to show restraint, it would be lobbying drones and missiles from day 1,000, 2,000 every few hours. But the Iranians will have to strike back hard because the Iranians. the Iranians know that the only way to stop the regime from continuing this is to make the regime regretted. Because as I've been explaining, the West is not going to do anything. All they're going to do is to ask Iran to show restraint. The next time that this happens, if it happens again, that's going to be the message from the West. And the Israelis will have, they will face no consequences at all. This is why it's so difficult to make agreements under this, well, what we refer to as the rules-based international order,

because it's often summarized as rules for thee, but not for me. And then it's often difficult. But given what you explained with this dilemma for Iran, on one hand, it has great pressure to retaliate to have a deterrent. On the other hand, it also has an interest to be restrained. but of course that restraint can't be seen as weakness. And the analogy to Russia, I think, our comparison is good because this is one of the critics I often hear many times in Russia is that they let NATO step over so many red lines

that even now the official discourse in NATO is how we can do what we want. The Russians, they don't enforce their red lines. So it's a difficult position to be in. But what is it that the West can do or is it doing anything in order to attempt to, reassure Iran or incentivize it to show restraint because you brought up the previous case when Israel struck the Iranian embassy and I assumed then that there was some behind-the-scene discussion between the Americans and the Iranians where the Americans, again, so this is my

assumption that the Americans promised Iranians who will restrain the Iranians if you either do nothing or limit your attack. But obviously, the is the, the Israelis are not restrained. So what is it that the US or West can do actually at this point? Because as you said, they don't want to even condemn any attacks on Iran. So is there any other tools in the toolbox? What I'm asking for in terms of trying to bring this situation down? Or is it just, is our older cards played now? Well, I think the Americans can do many things.

They can stop the genocide in Gaza today if they wanted to. The point is that they don't have the will to do so, or they're not interested in doing so, depending on who you ask. So when the Americans and the Europe, I think we've all seen the footage of what happened in the Israeli, detention camp where footage has just come out hours ago from Israeli television. And I don't

want to explain further. I think your viewers know what I'm talking about. Nothing is going to happen. There's not going to be any punishment. There's not there's not going to be any sanctions. The West will continue to provide weapons and ammunition. They're going to continue to provide funding and support and financial assistance so that the Israeli regime can continue with what it's doing in Gaza. So when I see that continuing, I don't see any reason whatsoever to imagine that the Americans or the Europeans are going to do anything different when it comes Iran, although they should be more fearful because if it stands, it will be catastrophic for the global economy. And those countries that have the most to lose, I think, are Western

economies because Syria, for example, it is strangled. The West has been prushing its economy for over a decade. If the global economy collapses, I'm sure it will have a negative impact on Syria, but not nearly as it will in

the UK or in France. So, North Korea or, I don't know, Cuba, countries that are heavily sanctioned will not suffer that much. Those countries that will suffer the most are those countries that have larger economies and which are dependent on business and trade.

And I think that makes the West among the most vulnerable. So this is something that the West should be very careful about. But when we look at what's happening in Gaza, when we look at what's happening on the border with Lebanon, I find it very difficult to imagine that the Americans or the Europeans will do anything substantial. And I think this goes back to, American exceptionalism, Western exceptionalism, which became, I think, a lot worse after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

I've always been of the view that the United States felt two tragic events happened for the West. One was the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the second was the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. On the surface, these were two major victories for the West. But because in the way, the ghost of Vietnam went away, disappeared. And with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we'd reached the end of history, as Fukuyama once said. Even though I think that's what they still believe, even though Fukuyama later changed his position. I think this is basically what the Western political establishment has concluded. And so in their arrogance that they intensified, that exceptionalism intensified,

it made it much more difficult for the world to deal with the West. So I think the reason why the Minsk Accords bore no fruit was because of a change of mentality in the West, during the Cold War, the West would have been more careful about abiding by its commitments. It may have tried to violate it here and there, or them here and there, but in general, it would have shown more respect. But I think after the Cold War, the West thought, the other side has to abide by its commitment. We will abide by our commitments if necessary. I think Clinton once said this when he was president, and I haven't been able to find the clip,

but I read this somewhere, that he said that the United States will abide. by its commitments unless it doesn't want to. And the audience left. That's where we still are today. And so whether it's the JCPLA, whether it's the Minskicords, whether it's human rights, what Israelis are doing in Gaza or to prisoners, I think that this change in the West is largely, or at least to a large degree due to what happened in Kuwait and what happened with the Soviet Union and this mentality that we are, we are supreme, we are exceptional, we have exceptional

rights, we have exceptional privileges, everyone else has to abide by the rules and the rule-based order, but we are the ones who decide the rules and we can change the rules based upon what we see as necessary, pragmatic and extreme. Yeah, I mean, I just, just on that point, I think you're absolutely right about, about what you've said about the mood of exceptionalism. also think that something else is now happening, which is that over the last couple of years, the West senses that all that is slipping away. They don't want to admit that to themselves, and that is causing them to double down and become more frenetic and more reckless and therefore more dangerous. That's my own view. I wanted to ask you about the situation in Iran,

because you've just had an election. You have a new president, Mr. Peschian, if I got the name correctly, correct me if I haven't. There's been a lot of commentary about this in the West. There's been talk about the new president being somehow more open to good relations with the West and even to Israel. And there's been some suggestions that there are now divisions within Iran, that divisions in Iran have emerged. I mean, it's an endless trope. gets here. But it's now being, you know, it's now being given renewed life because, as I said, there's been this election. And there's, you know, assumptions that maybe there's cracks in Iran that can be exploited. And if we sort of increase the pressure a bit here or increase the

pressure a bit there, that's going to somehow change things. Can you comment about this? Because it's something that I personally get lots of emails about and messages and all kinds of people tell me, and I've looked at his background, and I don't really see that myself, but maybe I'm getting this wrong. Tell me what you think. Definitely. I just want to add one thing first, and I agree with you completely. Ever since the war in Ukraine, actually, I think that's roughly a good starting point where we can really see that the West has become much worse. But I think if we go back, back further. I think actually from 9-11, this trend began and the stupidity of the war in Afghanistan. And I was actually in the UK at that time. I was a student at the University of Birmingham.

I think I was at the first anti-war rally in Birmingham against not the Iraq war, but against the war in Afghanistan. And Blair was going to the University of Birmingham to open the European Studies Institute or something like that. And they're like 60, 70 of us there. And I think that was really the start where then Iraq, the West, wasted billions of dollars, and then the world was witnessing or saw bits and pieces of what was going on in Iraq and Afghanistan and the deaths and the destruction. And so things began to go, I think, downhill faster. But after I was in Vienna during the negotiations, the nuclear negotiations, and we'd almost reached a deal. when the war in Ukraine began.

And I was speaking to Western journalists, some of them, I'm sure you know, and I would be telling them that you need a deal now because you're going to have a harsh winter ahead of you, and this winter is going to last for years. But they, in their arrogance, thought that, no, we can deal with the Russians, we can deal with Iran, we can deal with China, we can deal with everyone simultaneously. And they thought, as Biden said back then, that will turn the ruble into Russia, they thought, collectively, those who I spoke with, that this will happen and that the war will end shortly.

I know your viewers know this, but I want to sort of mix this with the nuclear program and the nuclear negotiations as well. The West did not take into account its needs. even though it's declining rapidly, you would think as an intelligent person that it would be best not to have multiple conflicts going on at the same time. And if you recall, back then when the Americans went to the Chinese to ask them to steer clear of the Russians, they were provoking them simultaneously over Taiwan. And the Pelosi, if you recall, she traveled to Taiwan. So while the Americans wanted the Chinese to see or clear of the Russians, they were also provoking the Chinese. While the Americans need and the Europeans needed Iranian oil and gas, they were still pushing for maximum concessions from Iran. And they were trying to refrain from giving concessions to Iran despite their energy needs and despite the crisis in Europe.

So that this exceptionalist mentality continues, even as things deteriorate today, and I think, as you rightly pointed out, since Ukraine thinks have become much worse, much more rapidly, but that mentality hasn't changed. Now, when it comes to Iran, I often say that I don't understand Iranian politics. So if you don't understand Iranian politics, I don't either. So you shouldn't be very surprised. First of all, the names that are used in Iran don't really mean much. And for ordinary Iranians, they don't mean much. It's among political elites and those who are very political, they make sense to them to a degree. But for example, conservatives, I don't even know who.

they are because a lot of people who are often seen to be in the conservative camp don't see themselves as conservatives. And the conservatives don't call themselves conservatives here. They call themselves principalists. In other words, that they are people who have principles. They believe in values and principles and principles. The reformist camp, there is no reformist camp. It's the same thing. It is so broad that it's, for me, it's meaningful. I have many friends who would be considered to be reformers, and they would, the first thing that they would do in some discussion say, look, I'm not a reformist. It's sort of like a bad word for many of them, just like the other side as well. So again, it doesn't make, it doesn't mean much. President Hezishkyan, first of all, like all of the other candidates, he volunteered in the Iran-Iraq War. So that is a plus in Iranian society. Second of all, he didn't come in as a reformist.

He presented himself as a man of the people. And the reformists are usually seen as liberal, at least among elites. Again, among broader society, reformists in Tehran, by the way, means something very different than reformists in the provinces. And I don't want to make a comparison because I think politics in Iran is much more dynamic than the United States, much more dynamic, ironically. But let's say you have a Republican senator in Illinois. He will be very different from a Republican senator in Texas.

a democratic senator in, you know, Trump land would be very different from an American senator in California or in New York. So when you say Republican and Democrat in the United States, it's not, you know, the definition is not very easy to make sometimes. In Iran, it's much more difficult. It's much more difficult. So President Pezichion presented himself as a man of the people. He was, I think, the only candidate who didn't wear a suit during the debate, whereas the reformists are usually the ones who would be more, you know, they would, the more expensive suits, they would look more like the elites.

And one thing that I should tell you about reformists in Iraq, is that the reformists in Iran were the leftists in Iran during the 1980s and the 1990s. They were called the third line. They were called the left. They were in charge of the government. They pursued very, very socialist policies in economics. Culturally, they banned a lot of newspapers. Mr. President Khatemi was the head of the minister of,

culture and and he banned a lot of newspapers at that time. So there was a war going on by the way so to a degree it was understandable but they after the collapse of the Soviet Union

and this is my personal opinion many may not agree with me but I'm pretty I think it's pretty clear. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, even though the left in Iran was religious, right, the left, which later became the reformist. And not all of them changed. But anyway, after the fall of the Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein's humiliation in Kuwait,

a lot of these people in Iran, like the left in the West, became disillusioned. And they began to believe that in the end of history, sort of. I don't know if you're getting, you can get what I'm saying. So a lot flipped to liberalism. So they became liberal, religious but liberal, maybe less, some of them less religious, more liberal because liberals, of course, in the West are secular. So their identity shifted a lot during the 1990s. From the mid-1990s, you can see the big change.

Pezishkyan is not like that. Pezishkyan is a leftist in many respects. He's a person who believes in social justice. He worked for social justice when he was a minister of health, when he was also the head of the Ministry of Health in the province of East Azerbaijan in Tamperee. He pursued policies that helped the poor, that exist and franchise. So in a sense, he is old-school left. and not so much reformist, in my opinion, when it comes to social issues.

Also, and that is actually very similar to what the late President Reisi was doing. He also was leftist in many of his policies on social justice. Not that he wasn't friendly to a private sector or that position is hostile towards the private sector. But they both believed in, they were both somewhat left-leaning. in Western terms. Let's say social, they pursued social justice, their policies or their beliefs were to pursue social justice. So in that sense, the two are similar.

And with regards to foreign policy, what Pezishan has been saying is that he wants to continue expanding time. I don't know if your viewers have read his letter, which was printed in the Tehran Times. I think it's a useful document for everyone to read. those who are interested in Iranian politics, he basically was saying that he wants to continue building relations with those countries that stood with us during the era of sanctions.

He spoke in particular about Russia and also China, but even more focus on Russia. He spoke about BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, expanding ties with the global South and neighboring countries. And he said he would like to rebuild ties with the West if they change their policies. that's basically what hezishian was saying sorry what rei si was saying what president racy was saying

so when it comes to foreign policy based on what he's been saying is not different from reissiam i mean i'm sure every he's different because everyone is different none of us are identical to one another but in general you see that his economic policies and his foreign policy

is very similar to what we had for the last three years at these based on his statement. He will be using a different set of people in government, I'm sure, but the stated policies are very similar. Also, he is in his inaugural speech, he was very pro-Palestinian. It was extremely pro-Palestinian. And Ismail Hanier was in the set, it was there, and they hugged afterwards. And by, and then literally later, is in an official guesthouse,

where presidents and prime minister stay, the Israelis murdered him. And that was a personal insult to President Pezishian. So this was, you know, literally hours after they hugged and they'd spoken, they had a meeting together. They murdered this person in the government guesthouse where foreign leaders stay.

And there were still foreign leaders in the country at the time when this attack took place in one of the guest houses. So I think that the Israeli regime, while it does seek escalation, or at least Netanyahu seeks escalation, what it has done is that it has made the Palestinian issue more personal for the president than it would have been under different circumstances. I like what you framed it, the curse of the collapse of the Soviet Union, because I think in the West, we don't often appreciate the negatives, because it has to be either or celebrated. But I think it should be recognized that at least during the Cold War, there was a balance of power. And when there's a balance of power, you accept the principle of mutual constraint out of necessity, because, well, as political realists would suggest, they don't balance themselves. So I think this has been one of the huge challenges also for the West now after the Cold Wars. By not being in constraints, not only does it incentivize with expansionist behavior,

but these kind of agreements, which are even in our own interest, can't really be made because why would you accept restraint on yourself? So instead, most international agreements become one where you impose restraint on the other side, but not on yourself. So earlier on you mentioned Bill Clinton. In Europe, after we decided to expand NATO and effectively exclude Russia from the New Europe, we had the Russia-NATO founding act to try to, yeah, we promised not to put new troops, it put troops into the new member states.

And when Clinton, President Clinton, was given this agreement in front of him, he stated that, well, so let me get this straight. We can't put our military in the former allies of the Russians until we maybe wake up one day and change our mind. and then we can do it. And they say, yeah, yeah, that's all it means. So we don't have to commit too much. We'll just to get their consent. And we're the same with the Budapest memorandum.

The Americans openly said, oh, it's not binding. They could breach it, but the Russians still had to hold on. So I think this has been a huge problem. And we see, I guess, with Iran as well, as you pointed out with the nuclear agreement, the Americans unilaterally pull out and still will punish Iran if it doesn't still abide by it. This is not the way to do international diplomacy. I think that this is an Alexander and you would know this better than I, but I think this also is true about policies at home in the West,

in that, for example, the riots that we see in London, although they are exaggerated, but whether it's the English or whether it's the English or whether it's the refugees or the immigrants who live in the UK. The situation 20, 30 years ago, was very different from what it was, from what it is today. The social welfare net across Europe was much broader. And the disenfranchised, whether white or non-white or people of color or blacks or whoever, they had more state support. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

these policies changed as well because a lot of these policies were based upon the need or the feeling that they had to prevent their citizens from becoming sympathetic to the Eastern Bloc to the Soviet Union. So they had to do certain things that made life bearable for the, for the poor or the disenfranchise or the working class, so that they would not tilt towards the Eastern Bloc.

But when the Eastern Bloc collapse, and I'm not saying that the collapse was a bad thing altogether, but it had these consequences too. It could have been managed in a completely different way. We could have had a better world. But what happened was that the United States became more aggressive and more exceptionalists, and same is true with Europeans, but also at home, they began to say that, well, we don't need to take care of these people anymore.

We don't need to have such an expensive social welfare net because there's nowhere for these people to go. And so I think that a lot of the problems today are a combination of both these endless wars, the money that they're wasting, the trillions of dollars that they've been wasting in Iraq and, Afghanistan now in Ukraine and on Palestine, but also simultaneously withdrawing the social welfare net under more difficult circumstances because of these wars. And I think it's just making things, it's going to make things much more difficult for ordinary people,

and it will lead to greater social instability. I don't have any doubt about this whatsoever. I mean, one of the great events of the last, 40 years since the Soviet Union collapse, it even began to some extent before in the last decade of its existence when people sensed that it was weakening. It is the complete collapse of European social democracy, of which, of course, I was part.

That was where I began my politics, as I often remind people. And if we're talking about the events in England today, You know, we've had protests before. All you have to do is go back 30, 40 years, 50 years and see how completely differently governments in Britain responded to those events from the way in which they respond to them now. I mean, you know, there would have been investigations, there would have been reports, there would have been attempts to find out what was happening and why it was happening, and what could be done to deal with it in a morgane,

humane way, if you like, which is not the case today. But can I move on? Because, you know, we're now talking about the Soviet Union. We now, Iran has just hosted a very important Russian visitor, who is Sergei Shoyko, who was the defense minister. He's now secretary of the Security Council, which is a very important position in Russia. I've had it on good authority that he's still the person who overall supervises the conduct,

the military conduct of the Ukraine war, by the way. So this is somebody who's still extremely well connected, perhaps even better connected than he's been. So he's come to Iran. He's had meetings. He met the chief of the Iranian military staff. He's met other Iranian officials. so I understand. And there's been a lot of talk and rumor.

I'm not asking you, by the way, to confirm this. But there's been lots of rumors about Russian sending missiles and radar systems and all of those things. I don't think any of us know whether or not that is true. And we're not going to be told about this. But what I wanted to say is this. I read the Russian media. I read the Chinese media as well. there has been such a very big shift also in these two countries, not just Russia, China as well,

about the whole Middle East conflict over the last two or three years. And it didn't happen, as some people think, because of the Ukraine conflict. In the first year of the Ukraine conflict, Russian-Israeli relations actually continued to be quite good. Nafthali Bennett, of course the Israeli Prime Minister, even acted as a mediator for a time between the Ukrainians and the Russians. What has happened is that policy in Israel has become increasingly hardline and one senses exasperation on the Russian side, growing exasperation on the Russian side and growing exasperation on the Chinese side. Now, how is that translating in Iran? Because you're now finding yourself again in a potential confrontation with the United States,

because the United States, as we discussed earlier in the program, is going to back Israel to the hilt over these events, even as I read every day articles appearing about how angry President Biden is with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the storm. me conversation that they had. And there's even another article today in the Washington Post about how furious the Americans are with the Israelis, but they're still going to back me to the hill. So the point I'm making is Iran isn't isolated anymore, at least not in the way that it was. Does that have an effect?

Does that increase a sense of confidence? And can you also tell us a little about this meeting that's taking place, I believe it's today of the Organization of Islamic States, which I think is an important meeting for Iran. And again, it would not have been a given a few years ago that the Organization of Islamic States would be coming out fully in support of Iran before. You had countries like Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf monarchies, with difficult relations with Iran, more likely, perhaps, to tilt towards the Americans than to show solidarity with the Islamic Republic. How do people in Iran feel about this?

I mean, you know, both, you know, the political class, the political leadership, but perhaps is this something that people sense, you know, in the streets, in the cafes, when people talk about these things? I'm sure they do talk about these things. What do people feel? But Iran is a very political society. And so if you're in a taxi, if you're in the bus, if you're in the metro, you will hear people saying all sorts of things.

Some of them are very strange, some of them very profound. But you'll hear everything. There are two or three things here that I should pursue. But first I also want to point out that if there is war, in this region. If there is a broader war, those in Europe and in the United States who are against all these refugees, then they should join the anti-war movement because the reason why there are so many refugees in Europe is because so many countries have been destroyed, just like Latin America.

I was in Venezuela. I was invited to Venezuela as a monitor for the elections. and many Venezuelans told me that the relatives of theirs had left, and they'd gone to the United States. The numbers are huge, and it's because of the sanctions. So the Americans have imposed sanctions on Venezuela, and I think a least significant portion of all those people who are entering the United States from the South are from Venezuela.

Of course, they're from all across Latin America and even beyond from what I've been hearing. But the point is that when you cause suffering in Latin America, these are the consequences. And now, whether the elites in Washington want this or not in their opening, that's a different debate. But in any case, the fact that the people feel they need to leave their homes, that's another issue altogether.

So that is blowback. And in our region, if people, in England and in Europe, if they're concerned about the huge influx of refugees, which I think is understandable, then they should be at the forefront of anti-war protest. But Iranian, I can't really comment on all the things that I've been seeing online, as you have as well, about all these planes coming and going. I don't know how true that is. I really don't know.

But what I can say is that Iranian-Russian relations have evolved a great deal. And Iran has been supporting the Russians extensively. A lot of Iranian technology has been transferred to Russia or Iranian products have gone to Russia. I think we know that. and vice versa. The Russian technology has been Russian weapon systems and other good, of course, they've been coming to Iran.

The relationship has evolved a lot, especially since the war in Ukraine. First of all, the Iranians don't see the West as the good guys in this war. They, and I don't want to go over this because your audience, I know they know this very well. But this is what the Iranians, how the Iranians perceive it. Iranians have a history with Russia. And so ordinary Iranians always do have suspicions

because of a very long history, the occupation of Iran by Russia alongside the West. So it's not as if the Russians, Iranians have more suspicions towards Russia than they do the British or the French or the Americans. But that historical feeling does exist. And there are a huge number of Persian language media, beaming in from the West, television, online media, that are very hostile towards Russian.

Because they're hostile towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, but they're hostile towards all of Iran's friends. So they're hostile towards China, they're hostile towards Russia, they're hostile towards Iran's allies and Yemen. in Lebanon, so they're constantly promoting anti-Russian propaganda within this context. But the relationship between Iran and Russia has evolved tremendously, and despite all that. And Iran sees the West as the main culprit in Ukraine.

Iran sees the expansion of NATO to be a threat to Iran, because, of course, if with Ukraine comes Georgia. And then with Georgia, who knows? Armenia, Azerbaijan. And so this is a threat to Iran as well. And of course, the Iranians saw how the West dealt with the Minska course, just like they dealt with the JCPOA. And the Western media, as usual, they never blame their governments.

They only blame the Russians or the Iranians or whoever is non-Western. So the exchange, the business exchanges, the military exchanges between the two countries has changed rapidly. So I don't know if there have been a lot of planes coming and going over the past few days in particular, but I'm quite sure that a lot has happened over the last few years and especially over the last two and a half years. And Russian sentiments have and Chinese sentiments have changed since the war, but also since Gaza, because the social media, I've been to China a couple of times since the war, since the genocide in Gaza and to Russia a couple of times too.

Social media in Russia and in China are showing things that social media in the West, and of course the mainstream media in the West, are censoring. So the Chinese are seeing children being slaughtered every day on social media, and so too are the Russians. So it's not as if the whole, it's not like 20, 30, 40 years ago when we are all reliant to a very large degree on what Reuters said or what the New York Times said or what CNN was showing us or what the BBC was showing us. No, now different countries that are on the rise, they have their own means of gathering information.

People online have their own means of exchanging information. It's a different world. So Russian China, their mood towards Israel has evolved a lot, and it has to do a lot with Ukraine and a lot to do with the last 10 months in Palestine. And Iran has benefited from that. And so have they. So the Iranian-Chinese relationship has evolved. The Chinese are buying large amounts of Iranian oil, completely ignoring the Americans. and of course, within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

and more importantly, BRICS and other regional organizations, they are moving towards trade and business and investment that has nothing to do with Western financial institutions and the dollar and the incentive has grown because back in the past it was Iran that was sanctioned. Now, Russia, Iran, Belarus, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, the list goes on. So they're, and China is fearful that the Americans are trying to cut them off from all of their partners and allies and friends.

And then that the Americans will gradually push their own, let's say, allies or their own client regimes away from China. So China has a very strong incentive, especially within the context of BRICS, to move towards building financial institutions. and means of trade where the Americans and the Europeans will have no say. All of this is important for Iran. But I think in particular the Iranian-Russian relationship has evolved. It has evolved a great deal. And Israel has suffered for a number of reasons. One is because of its actions, which I think is clear as day.

But also, Israel used to be seen by many as the road to Washington. It was seen as the person you had to go to to get influence inside the United States. And although the Americans and the Europeans will do almost anything for Israel, they have put pressure on Israel to keep a distance from China and to keep a distance from Russia. and the Israelis have the role they've played in Ukraine for example I think has made the Russians unhappy and in general

and in general but in general though Israel not only for Russians and the Chinese but also for the Emirates and countries in our region it becomes clear that they can't really

get much from Washington through Israel in other words the situation between the United States and China is not going to evolve because of Israel's support in Washington. The situation in Ukraine is not going to evolve because of Israel's influence in Washington. And I think that it's increasingly becoming clear for countries in the Persian Gulf region that Israel really can't do all that much for them.

So Israel is losing its influence in that respect as well. So it's Ukraine, it's, it's Gaza and Palestine, but it's also the divorce that we're seeing taking place and the fracture that we're seeing across the globe taking place. And which, of course, Bricks and the Shanghai Corporation Organization and other regional organizations, their rise is also influenced by this reality. I think if you were going back 20 years, probably when Russia was obsessing about integrating into a greater Europe, it was more willing or prepared to trade away relations with Iran in order to buy its way into Europe. But since that came to an end and this new strategic vision is greater Eurasia, I think now effectively Iran has been elevated to an indispensable strategic partner, which changes that whole dynamic, of course. But also, I think you're correct at the same time now, especially the past two years, the relations with Israel has collapsed a bit. I remember I spoke very briefly to the Israeli former Prime Minister Eud Olmert back in 2018 in Kazakhstan,

and he was kind of making this big thing about Russians and, you know, Israel is being, you know, having this historical connection. But a lot of this has suffered greatly over the past two years due to Israel. involvement in the Ukraine war. Anyways, I just had a very quick twofold question. Let's just add one example. You know, blood has been spilled in Ukraine, a lot of blood, Russian blood, Ukrainian blood. And this is not going to be...

So even let's say if Trump becomes president, he's... I don't... I'm not sure he's going to be president, and I don't know what his policies are because he shifts and changes all the time, and he's very much influenced by the last person who meets him. But we will demand things of Russia that the Russians cannot give because the Russians have made too many sacrifices. And the Russians will be demanding things

that the West and its arrogance cannot easily give because of that exceptionalism. So I don't think that the change in presidency, whether it's Harris or Trump, can change things that easily, if at all. And the example that I want to give was the Iran-Iraq war. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, lots of Iranians and Iraqis died. Hundreds of thousands.

Over 200,000 Iranians died and probably more Iraqis. So after Saddam was overthrown by the Americans, ironically, and the Americans actually undermine their own position in the region by these invasions, They invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, surrounded Iran, then gradually through their own decline in Iran supporting resistance groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Americans had to back off. And now we see Iranian allies and the Iranians basically spreading across West Asia. Now the Iranians have surrounded Israel with their allies in Yemen and Lebanon and Iraq and Syria. But that's another story. But the point is that Iranians and Iraqis, because of the bloodshed, even though the new government in Iraq was friendly to Iran, many of them were exiled in Iran, but Iranian people in Iraqi people didn't like each other very much.

They had lost family members. The only thing that brought about change, a real change among Iran—and I went to Iraq at that time. I could see—I was at the airport. there was tension between the Iranian pilgrims and the Iraqis working at the airport. But what fundamentally changed the relationship was ISIS. When ISIS attacked Iran, the Iranians went and fought alongside the Iraqis. And their blood was spilled together. And that created a new environment between the two countries.

So even after the Iran-Iraq war and after the fall of the war, and after the fall of Saddam Hussein, relations between the two countries were still very problematic. And so I don't, and this is what, the reason why I'm saying is that this is that I agree with you completely. The situation has changed,

the North-South corridor, the trade relations between Russia and China, the evolving, the growth of the strengthening of the Shanghai cooperation organization, Bricks and other organizations, These will bring about a permanent change. And the West, in its stupidity, by pushing Russia away and humiliating Russia and discounting the importance of Russia, they've helped bring about this change. And it is not going to go back to where it was for the reasons that I think, for the reasons that I stated, if not for many other reasons as well.

I should act that there's a massive levels of distrust, mistrust now between Russians on the part of Russians towards the West. And I'm talking about ordinary Russians. I mean, Russians I meet in London. I meet a few. I don't know many Russians in London, but I do enough. And many of them were fervidly anti-Putin, by the way. And they've changed precisely for these reasons,

because they've seen this extraordinary chain. The experience of the West and of the way the West has acted has changed their feelings. And you know, Alexander, the same is true with Gaza. Two years ago, some of my own students participated in the protests and the riots. And they were influenced by these Persian media outlets based in the West and say how evil Iran is. And if, you know, the West wants to solve the problem. And the Iranian government is insisting on conflict. with the West, and now they're seeing what's going on in Gaza, day and night, and how the West

supports this. And they, when I say, when they have discussed, when we have discussions, they see the world in a very different, from a very different perspective. I'm not saying they've all suddenly shifted in their pro-government or pro-Islamic Republic, although that has happened, but their views of the West have evolved dramatically. Tramon, I think. Can I just quickly, our last question for me, about the Arab world and Iran's relationships with the Arab states, because I saw the king of Saudi Arabia, one of the people who sent a letter of congratulations to President Bezeshgan. He seems to want to continue the relations. We've had statements from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, I believe, all of them

saying that they're not going to allow their airspace to be used. in a military way by any party. But of course, one gets the sense that ultimately they're really talking about an attack by Israel against Iran. So they're not going to be able to fly over Saudi airspace, for example, to do it. What is the relationship now between Iran and the Arab states? What is going to happen specifically at this meeting of the OIA? I mean, is that going to, are we going to see a coming together of the Iranians, the Arabs, all of the Muslim worlds, not just the Muslim world, but of course we're talking about specifically the Muslim world.

Are they all going to come together? Are they all going to speak out with one voice about this conflict? Or is it going to be riddled with tensions and disagreements and worries and splinters? I've been reading articles again in the media here that say, well, you know, even, you know, even. even if they do all come out and say how they support Iran, ultimately the Arab states, their alignment will continue to be with the United States and with the West. How do Iranians think about this? What is your own feeling about it?

Mine ask the question. Yeah, I think that I don't think there's going to be any arguments. I think that it will be very difficult for anyone to defend the Israeli regime now. And, you know, one of the things that in the West they constantly talk about is, let's say, an alliance between Arab countries and Israel. But the problem is that they are erasing public opinion from the equation. These family dictatorships, they may want to have good relations with Israeli regime, but the population doesn't. And the more this, the longer this genocide continues, so the more. atrocities we see, the more discontent there's going to be. And we all remember what happened

in Tunisia a little over a decade ago when one young man burned himself alive and we saw the consequences across the region. So the waters may seem calm today, the sea, the ocean may seem calm, but there's a lot of things happening underneath. And the more the Americans push and help, and the more the Europeans push and help the Israelis continue with what it's doing, I think the more tensions there will be underneath this calm surface, and ultimately something is going to have to give. Now, I don't think for these reasons anyone in this meeting is going to side with Israel. But I do think that many of these countries will still be under American pressure,

and they will not move against the Israeli regime. I don't think that the Saudis or the Qataris or the Turks, that they will actively help Israel. But the American facilities in their countries will be used, just as they were used in April. The Injulik Air Base in Turkey was used against Iranian drones and missiles, and so were facilities in Bahrain and Qatar, and across the Persian Gulf.

And these countries continue to allow the Americans to do that. Jordan, of course, allowed the Americans to use airspace. But when the Israelis would bomb Syria, so the Jordanians would help block Iranian drones and missiles. But when the Israeli planes would fly over Jordan to bomb Syria, the Jordanians have no problem with that. I think that will continue. That's my personal opinion.

However, the tensions that are building up in Jordan among ordinary people, the tensions that are building up across the region, I think these are things that the West is ignoring. The revolution in Iran was a very, very good example. We had tens of thousands of military advisors from the United States and Iran during the late 1970s. And they were each taking a lot of money and doing really nothing in the country.

And the Iranians were not allowed to even touch their own F-14s. So the Americans were making a lot of money in Iran, selling a lot of useless weapons to the country, and the Iranians weren't allowed to touch. All this was creating anger in Iran. And they were imposing themselves on the country, making decisions, trying to change the Iranian culture, all that sort of thing.

But the Americans never saw it coming. They never saw the revolution coming. In fact, Carter, Jimmy Carter, just before the revolution began to explode, he came to Iran and said Iran under the Shahs an island of stability. So it's very foolish for the Americans to allow the Israelis and the Europeans to allow the Israelis to continue down this road. because all of these regimes in the region that are silent in the face of the atrocities in Gaza, they are becoming increasingly vulnerable. So I don't think that they're going to oppose Iran, and I think it's going to be a platform for Iran to hammer the Israeli regime

and the Americans and the Europeans politically. And it gives Iran space to speak to global public opinion, but more importantly, regional public opinion. But I don't think that in reality, these countries are going to do much. Although everyone does see the decline of the West. Everyone sees it. The Saudis see it, the Emirati see it. And that is why they are trying to improve relations with Iran.

That is why they're trying to improve relations with China, with Russia. For example, the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia with the help of the Chinese, all of this is a result of the fact that people in this region recognize, even those who are very close to the West, and they are very close. Their children are brought up there. Their investments are there. Their bank accounts are in Western banks.

They go to the West for vacation. They don't usually travel to Russia or Iran or China for this sort of thing. So they are bound to the West, but they do recognize that the world is changing fast, and they are looking for ways to hedge their bets. And I did it, by the way, interrupt Glenn, and I don't think he asked me his question, although I think Alexander may have to leave soon. So I apologize.

No, actually, well, I was going to say, I'm a bit overtime, so I'll keep it brief. Actually, I wanted to, Alexander, I think, stole my question of it. I was curious about how Iran would, at what extent is speaking now with its Arab neighborhood in anticipation of this. But let me instead ask, though, because often, you know, we discuss whether or not Iran

will I retaliate or not retaliate. But is there an alternative to the large, like a similar strike with drones or missiles? Is somewhere in between, like an assassination or attack through proxy or is there something else to do to restore the turns? Or do you see it now most likely to be? something similar, but more advanced missiles, more advanced drones. If the previous time was a warning shot, now it's going to be more severe. But along the same lines, or is there no go-between answer, I guess?

Well, I'll try to be very brief. First of all, the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf are very scared because the Americans, the Americans have bases in their countries. And if the Americans strike Iran for any reason, they will be seen as Haasana. And their key infrastructure, including their oil and gas infrastructure, ships, but also other infrastructure. Their water purification, their electrical power plants, all of these are very vulnerable. Iran can take out anything it wants within a couple of days. They can just destroy everything.

So these regimes know that they will not last if there is war. They will be gone very short. In fact, some people sometimes joke, they say that the Emirates will become a non-Arab country because 80 to 90 percent of the people in the Emirates are not even from the region. They're from the Indian subcontinent. They're from Southeast Asia. So it will be a non-Arabic-speaking country. Hopefully we'll never get there.

But if the Americans attack Iran, the Americans will lose everything in Iraq. Iraqi resistance will expel the Americans. and probably the Europeans, and the same is true, of course, in Syria. So it would be catastrophic. It would be catastrophic for the world. So these countries in the Persian Gulf are very fearful of an expansion of war for it to become a regional war.

With regards to the Iranian response, I think that it will be much, more significant than it was in April. I think the response in April was not really a show. It was important. The Iranians use their very old drones, hundreds of 300 drones and mostly older missiles to gather intelligence, but also to draw fire from everyone. And as I said, the Americans and Israelis together, I think spent roughly four billion dollars, where for Iran it was almost nothing. But also the Iranians sent a handful of missiles, over 10 missiles, that went more advanced missiles that went right through the shield and hit their targets to send a message. But it was basically an intelligence

gathering operation, but also it was the first time that Iran carried out a direct strike against Israel. Israel gave Iran that opportunity. Because until now, the Iranians were not able to strike Israel because Israel never struck Iran. They did kill Iranians in Syria, but not. They never targeted Iranian-owned targets, Iranian territory, like the embassy or Tehran. So the Iranians did that both to punish the Israelis and the Americans. It was costly for the West. It was a great intelligence-gathering operation as well. But they also wanted to show that, look, we're not seeking a regional war.

And that's also sending a message to the Russians, the Chinese, and neighbors. And, look, we're not the ones. You know, you have to yank on the leash. It's not us. Since that didn't work, Iran will have to hit harder. I have no doubt about them. It will hit harder. It will

the Israelis will suffer more. And it's not just Iran. Hezbollah will hit them because they have their own grievances. The Israelis crossed the red line. They bombed Beirut. And they hit a civilian building. Get to one person. They bombed the capital. And Yemen, they bombed al-Hodated. They didn't strike

and Sardulah. They didn't strike the Hothi forces. They struck a civilian target. And so I think they're going to have a, it's going to be a punishing response and then it will be up to the west to make sure that we don't get a regional war. Because they're the ones that

they hold the leash. If they don't want to pull on the leash, it's up to them. But after April, after April, Israel could have been everything could have been contained but after what they did in Tehran Iran knows

that if they don't hit back it will happen again and again and again so they really have no option well these are terrifying times so yes Saddam Mohammed Brandi thank you so much Alexander

thank you as well yeah this is very interesting so yeah thank you for both for your time Thank you both for having me. Thank you, Mark. Thank you, Muhammad. Thank you.