The Duran Podcast - Iran's Secret Weapon: China Holds The Real Power

Episode Date: July 7, 2026

Iran's Secret Weapon: China Holds The Real Power

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation in Iran. We have the funeral that is still taking place of Hamé, who was killed by the United States and Israel in the beginning of the conflict. His death was supposed to bring a quick victory for Trump. It did not happen. And the turnout for Hamene at his funeral has been massive. Yes. 20 million, 30 million people showing up. You also had on the first day of his funeral, you had many leaders from many, many countries,

including Saudi Arabia, sent the delegation. Medev was also at the funeral, Pakistan leaders, a big turnout for the funeral of Hamenei. And Trump is watching all of this. We know he's apparently watching all of this because Axios interviewed Trump. And Trump said that he was watching the funeral of Hamene unfold. And it was an interesting interview from Axios because it painted Trump as clueless about Iran. He said, I was told, I was told that people didn't like Hamene, that the Iranians were going to rise up and they're crying now for him. Are those fake tears?

Trump said. It seemed as if Trump didn't quite understand what was unfolding in Iran or was clueless about the actual situation in Iran. Anyway, Netanyahu is going to be meeting with Trump in D.C., not this week, but the week after, after the NATO meeting in Ankara, and we're going to see where everything goes. Your thoughts? Well, there's a number of things to say here.

Firstly, in terms of the authority and legitimacy of the political system in Iran, the turnout of people for Harmonis' funeral should really put beyond doubt any speculation that this is a system that is in crisis and that's on the brink of losing legitimacy. It's a system that has many, many problems that runs into all kinds of economic difficulties. But it clearly has a large reservoir of support, a critical mass of the Iranian population support it, or at least supported sufficiently that they're prepared to come out in the way that we just saw over the course of this funeral. And that is an important thing in itself, because, of course, the narrative that we have been fed for the last many years, is that in fact, the regime, as people call it, in Iran is deeply unpopular, that it's very shaky, that it's about to collapse, that protests tell us how

deeply unpopular it is, how it lacks legitimacy, all of those things. So Trump is shocked by all of this, and it's unsurprising. So that is the sign of how strong Iran is. And Iran, over the last six months, has indeed shown considerable strength. It's shown that it's a cohesive society, that it has a well-organized military, that it has many strong technological competencies, that it has a very strong and effective diplomatic establishment that's able to put Iran's case very well. So we see that Iran is not something that is going to collapse tomorrow.

Expectations that economic problems are going to be so bad that they're going to lead to a political internal crisis are obviously wrong. So we see that Iran is stable and that it is actually in some respects quite strong. But I would push back a little about the turnout of world leaders in Tehran. I thought it was actually very patchy. Pakistan sent a very strong delegation. So General Munir, the chief of the general staff of the Pakistani military was there. The Pakistani prime minister was there. you had quite a lot of senior officials from Pakistan come.

Saudi Arabia sent a representative, but the representative who came from China was a fairly junior person. The various militias that Iran was allied to is allied to in the Middle East. They sent their representatives too. But again, they didn't seem to me to be very senior people. far in a way the most senior person to turn up at this funeral, apart from the Pakistanis, was Medvedev, Dmitri Medvedev, who is the Vice-Ch chairman of Russia's Security Council, and who went there specifically as Putin's representative. So Iran may be strong and may have many competencies, but it doesn't have the large,

reservoir of friends and allies that it perhaps would want to have at a time like this. Modi, the Prime Minister of India, was invited to go. But again, he didn't come. He again sent a relatively low-ranking representative to represent India too. So the Iranians must balance all of that. And the other thing that this showed is that the Supreme Leader, the new Supreme Leader, Mustada Harmoné, he did not appear, or has not appeared so far. He's not had meetings with any of these officials who did come. He's not met with Medvedev, for example, which might have been expected. And what we have instead visible is a governmental structure which at the very top looks somewhat fragile, you know, with people like Galibaf and Pezishyuan and Arakshi,

but which seems to lack that level of coherence that Iran had before the 28th of February when Ali Khamene was the supreme leader and was clearly making the decisions. So there are weaknesses that are visible as well and divisions also that are visible as well with increasing disagreements within Iran about whether the MOU was worthwhile, where all that is going and what approach Iran should take forward. Well, they have to, they sign the MOU. Yeah. They have to see it through.

I mean, Trump even said that the 60 days, he has no problem if they go past the 60 days as well. I mean, I think the U.S. is making better use of the time with the MOU than Iran is. Well, to their benefit, right? They're chipping away at whatever leverage. Iran has, or they're trying to chip away at whatever leverage Iran had before the conflict and during the conflict. And that's what they're working on during the 60 days. Well, that is exactly correct. And we discussed this in previous programs. And that's the reason that there's all this dissension and argument within Iran. Now, there are some questions

now about this because it looks as if traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continues to be very well down on what it was before the 28th of February. So far from all ships are able to transit. It seems that those ships that are transiting are carrying cargoes of oil, mostly to China. So it's not yet replenishing American strategic reserves. And interestingly, the Americans are still drawing on their reserves. So, um, We have seen a reduction in the extent to which the drawdown continues as been happening. I mean, it's not as big as it was a few weeks ago when before the MOU was signed. But a drawdown continues to take place.

So it's not quite as one-sided as I thought it might be a few days ago, for example. But overall, I still agree. The Iranians have the MOU. The Americans are treating it very much on an al-a-carp basis. They will stick with what suits them, but they will ignore everything else. I think Iran does have actually a choice. I mean, do they say that the Americans are not complying with the MOU? The MOU is being violated by the Americans.

The moment has come to close the strait of Hormuz fully again. There are people in Iran who appear to be advocating this, but we see through this very thin representation of people who came to Tehran that almost certainly if the Iranians were, to take that step of closing the Strait of Hormuz again, they would face massive opposition across the entire international system, countries like India, countries like China, which are sort of vaguely sympathetic but not full-hearted in their support of Iran. They would probably be very, very angry, and they would strongly complain. So the Iranians are in a difficult position, more

difficult than in some ways they were in when the war was ongoing, when everything was very simple. Well, that's the problem for Iran is China. I mean, that's it. China's not going to want the Strait of Formosa completely shut again because it's their ships that are making it through. Yes. That's the big problem for Iran is China and China support. If they were to close the Strait of Formos again, will they get that support? I mean, The MOU was completely one-sided towards, I mean, Iran got everything that they asked for. Yes. Everything that they asked for.

Yes. The problem is that the Trump administration isn't complying by the MOU. I mean, you see that in point number one with Lebanon. Point number one, it sees fire in Lebanon. That's not happening. It doesn't even, it doesn't look like it's going to ever happen. I mean, you start from point one, but everything in that MOU is, is, is, is, As I just said, the Trump White House is maybe complying a little bit with some parts,

but most of the parts, they're just, you know, are just being ignored. I don't even think people are talking about the other 13 points in that MOU, to be quite honest. There's Lebanon and Hormuz, which are the two points that are, you know, in discussion. Yes, just as if I can just repeat a point I've made before. The Russians got everything they wanted from the February 2015 Minsk Agreement, which they basically drafted. and then they discovered that they got this thing agreed and ratified by the UN Security Council. And it still wasn't worth the paper it was written.

And that's exactly the same situation that Iran finds itself in today. It's in a much weaker position than Russia was after February 2015, because it's not as powerful the country. It's not a nuclear power. and it's facing again exactly the issue that you said. The China would take it very, very badly indeed, if the Strait of Hormuz were closed a second time. And the Persian Gulf states, obviously, would be very angry

if the Strait of Hormuz were fully closed again. So the Iranians are doing something at the moment, which has sort of... have made some countries that are reasonably well disposed towards it, more well disposed, but by doing it, they've diluted their leverage, critically diluted their leverage over the Americans. So what do they do? Well, I personally think that it would be a mistake for Iran to walk back to the MOU. I think whether to do this, the amount of opposition and criticism they would receive

would be so great that it would be unsustainable and a return to war, an outright return to war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz all over again would not last very long. Iran would be forced to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and would come out of. the process in a weaker position than it is in today. I think what the Iranians need to do is something completely different. They need to say to the Chinese, specifically and mostly to the Chinese, right, we are doing what you want us to do. Now you must come and make it worthwhile for us. And we need economic aid. We need to stabilize our economy. We need to stabilize our economy. We need to stabilize the currency. We made a terrible mistake after we did the big

agreement with you five years ago, where you would prepare to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in Iran. And instead, we went off, we made all those contracts with Western companies. You have an absolute categorical assurance that that is not happening again. So we need you to come in and show that you are backing us in return for our restraint with our promise that that's not going to happen again. And in the meantime, Iran needs to build up its defenses. And this is perhaps where Medvedev's visit is important because Medvedev, as well as being vice chairman of the Security Council, is the acting.

head of Russia's military industrial commission. He's the man, in other words, who runs Russia's military industries. And there are now finally reports that at long last, we are going to start actually seeing deliveries of important Russian weapon systems to Iran over the next few months with reports that 30 Suhoi 35s are eventually going to be delivered to Iran, that 17 have now been built and that the first deliveries will begin in the first weeks of January. So the Iranians must stick with this and must in fact deepen their military cooperation with the Russians, even as they develop deeper economic links with China. Iran has very, very good diplomats. It needs to give them their head and needs to let them mend the fences, which are

China and strengthen the connections with China and move towards full cooperation with Russia. I appreciate this is not always an entirely easy thing to do, but I didn't myself think Iran as much choice. Yeah, I was going to say that Iran should tell China, should work with China to tell the US to start abiding by the MOU to start putting pressure on the US to go through the points of the MOU and fulfill those. Otherwise, you're just going to end up in another Minsk debacle. Exactly.

China actually is the key because China is the country that is the only country in the world that has leverage over the U.S. to the extent that he can force the U.S. not only to make concessions, but to comply with those concessions. The Iranians had leverage with the US by closing the Strait of Hormuz. But all that happened, because the Americans signed a document giving the Iranians all that the Iranians were asking for. And then just walked back on it. China, by contrast, if it gets an agreement done with the Americans, because it has continuous leverage, can ensure that that agreement is actually fulfilled.

So China is the pivot. It's the more important country, I mean, it's more important for Iran than Russia is. Russia is important because that's where the weapons are going to come from. And Iran absolutely needs weapons and it needs technology. But it needs to have China fully on side. There was a lot of talk about Arakshi, the Iranian foreign minister, making a visit to Beijing. And so far it hasn't happened. And as I said, the Chinese did not send a strong delegation to Iran.

All right, we will end the video there at the durand.orgas.com. We're our next round, rumble, we're on telegram. Go to Durandshop, pick up some merch. We are also on Substack. Those links in the description box down below. Take care.