The Duran Podcast - Israel Lost the War - What are the Consequences Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: February 1, 2025

Israel Lost the War - What are the Consequences Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone. I hope we're having a great day. I'm Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercurris and Alistair Crook, a former British diplomat, negotiator and one of the best advisors and experts there is on the Middle East. So let's, I thought we could start off by with the Middle East and more specifically Israel because we now have, well, fragile ceasefire. Some hostages have been released for many reasons. This doesn't necessarily look very good for Netanyahu. And I was also curious how stable his position actually is these days, given that he seems to be in a very strange dilemma. On one hand, he wants, if he keeps the ceasefire, then you see the return of Hamas. On the other hand, if he breaches it, then

he's held accountable for not getting the rest of the hostages back, which is even worse, given that they seem to have been treated quite well. How do you see this situation playing out for Israel as this looks a difficult position for Netanyo? Well, two things that have happened have really shot, if you like, the Israeli psyche in a dramatic way. And the first was, and I'm talking about ordinary Israelis, all of them. I mean, first of all, was with the first hostage hostages released.

I mean, they saw images of Hamas parading in their trucks in Gaza. in smart uniforms, clean uniforms, clean weapons, all modern, modern, the most latest guns. In fact, they'd taken from the Israeli special forces, I suspect. But, I mean, it was a huge shock. And the crowds cheering and the Hamas moving. And I think just today, they had a military parade in Gaza, a large parade of their All in uniform, all smartly, I mean, like a professional, disciplined army. And what's more, out of this came, first of all, the three hostages, and instead of what they were expecting,

these girls, the three girls, the young women who were military, Israeli armed forces, were smiling and waving. and in fact, staying in the car, thank you, Cassam Brigades, the way you've looked after us and you've fed us and everything. And, I mean, they didn't look as if they were in poor health. In fact, they looked in very good health. And, you know, the Israelis who have rather this sort of psychological framework

was expecting to see them sort of barely able to stand and being in a terrible condition instead of which, you know, they walked the car and they went off and they were, they've been fine. And so, you know, the great cry Israeli sort of come up with many, many, many Israelis and say, what was this war for? What was it about that? I mean, what was going on for all this period? Because there they are. There's Hamas still very much in charge of God.

And we've seen some of the hostages coming out that you've tried to obstruct all the time, Prime Minister, by one route or another. And there they are and they're in good health. So the rest are probably in good health too. And it really has. And you know, as one journalist, Nahang Bahanea, who I used to know well when it is that. He's a very respected journalist. So what have we done? we've simply swapped

Yahya Sinwa for Mohammed Sinwa. Muhammad, his younger brother is now the commander in Gaza of Hamas. Is that the summit of what we have achieved?

Because, you know, there's no sign of a victory here at all. Actually, it looks like a Hamas victory. And that's what even the right-wing press

are saying it's a Hamas victory. And then you have the next dramatic, and I'm illustrating because it so often doesn't sort of penetrate into the Western sphere as much. But then you've had this dramatic picture of hundreds of thousands, maybe a million people, moving back to northern Gaza into the empty space that the Israelis had cleared of all. Palestinians. And part of the agreement allows them to pass through into to there are no homes left. I mean, it's rubble. But they're going there and they're determined to get there

and they are determined to reclaim their homes. Even though they are rubble on the ground, they're looking for skulls of their grandfather. They're looking for bits of their children under the rubble. But they are going there and they say, this is our land and we are going back. And that had a huge impact on Israel. Because after all that effort, clearing northern Gaza,

which was going to be the sort of pilot scheme for new settlers to go in and occupy this territory. And then this human wave of excited, enthusiastic, Hamas flag waving people, They stormed into that. And just about at the same time, Lebanese from the north and from elsewhere started another human wave going back to reclaim their property in south of Lebanon. And the Israelis are blocking it and the Lebanese forces, too, are trying to keep them back. But there have been many killed and wounded. I mean, 22, I think, killed. I don't know how many wounded.

As the Israelis stopped them from coming back to their homes. But the ceasefire expired on the 26th. And the Israelis are still there. And now America has unilaterally, i.e., without consulting the Lebanese government or anyone else, has extended it, I think, to the age. of February. But it doesn't look as if the Israelis are probably going to move from a number of hills in the south where they're sort of ensconced themselves. So really there's a huge turmoil in Israel from all of this, a real sense of, you know, where are we going? I mean, what are we doing?

And, you know, the right had, and this is where Netanyahu is in such a real sense of, you know, where we're going. real dilemma because the agreement, the actual deal that was made for the hostage release, very clearly states that the first part is 16 days and hostages are released on both sides. Then it goes on and the second stage starts after 42 days with complete final withdrawal of Israeli troops. But in the cabinet meeting, the six-hour cabinet meeting that finally gave approval to this deal that Whitkoff, Trump's envoy, played a part in saying, you know, you've got to sign it. There it is. And don't mess it up. He said that quite firmly. And then so in that second meeting, in that cabinet meeting, the right.

were in rebellion and complaining and saying, this isn't what you told us. You've sold us a false prospectus. He put in another secret clause in Hebrew only and in this cabinet meeting, which tells Gavir and Smotrich, yes, if there's any failure on Hamas, we go back to war.

Well, this puts him in a complete bind with Trump. Trump does not want this to fall apart and return to war, nor do most Israelis now after what's happened. But he's given his word, and they're threatening already Ben-Gavir, and he has, I think,

he has seven seats, has left the government, that it's still intact then. But if Smotrich goes, and he's threatening to go, then he will not have a majority in the Knesset. He could drag on by being a minority government, but it's quite difficult.

And at the same time, then you've got Lebanon, where he's in breach of the agreement, that Hochstein on behalf, first of all, Biden, but on behalf of the US government, negotiated an absolute ceasefire, and an absolute withdrawal of Israeli forces, and they're not gone. And so this puts him at odds with the Prime Minister, with Trump. And actually, I think, as you hinted at, Alex, just now, is much to the advantage of Trump,

because now Nanyahu needs really Trump to help him through the second phase. of this deal and release of hostages, and he needs American help to sort out. I mean, the general sense in Israel is Netanyahu's completely mismanaged both of these deals, hostage deals. Israel has suffered a huge defeat. And Netanyahu is ill, very quite ill. and in trouble and has to go to court periodically each week.

And here's where I think Trump precisely wants him, utterly dependent on the goodwill of Trump to survive and not end up before the court or going to jail in due course. I mean, I'm going to say something, and I'd just like to say this first, which is that I remember right at the very start when this crisis began. we had a discussion then, and you were saying at the time, and I want to remind people of this,

that the Israelis were massively underestimating what would happen if they did start this offensive in Gaza, that Hamas would not simply collapse, that the tunnel network was extremely well organized, that Hamas itself has now become very, very organized, that this is a long war, that they prepared for this long war, and that the Israelis have not calculated this out properly. And I think we've found that. That's exactly where we are. We've had a situation.

I think it was Kissinger, who once said, that when a conventional army fights an insurgency, if the conventional army doesn't win, it loses. If the insurgents survives, he wins. And that is exactly what we're looking at in Gaza. We are looking at exactly the same situation, I think, in Lebanon as well. There was this huge operation against Hezbollah. There was the assassination of Nizrala.

There was the assassination of his successor. There were the pager attacks. There were all of those things. Many people, myself included, I don't know the region. I did wonder whether Hezbollah would withstand these blows. It withstood these blows. It is there. It is still in control in southern Beirut.

It is still a very powerful force in being. And again, the operations that Israel launched, Hezbollah, Netanyahu launched, they have failed. Now, I think this is the biggest strategic defeat that Israel has suffered. since its creation. It goes beyond the events of 2006, the Israel-Lebanon-Hesbollah war of that time. This war has continued for a year. It has taken a major toll on the Israeli economy. It's created stresses within Israeli society. It's exposed the limitations of the Israeli armed forces. and however you spin it, Israel has completely failed to achieve the objectives that it set out to achieve, and it is therefore in a much weaker position than it was in before.

Now, Netanyahu is in obviously very, very severe trouble, but he is one individual, and I do wonder how much of the future he still has. the big question now I would have thought is where does Israel go? Do they continue to do the do they continue to listen to people like Smotherich and ben-Vivir and all of these people? Does that policy of confrontation still continue? Or do they take stock? Ask themselves, why did we fail in Gaza? What are the problems with our military? Iran itself has turned out to be a much more powerful military force than they realized it can strike at positions in Israel. Do they adjust their policies?

Do they start thinking towards some kind of diplomatic process? Or do they just wait a few months, hope that the situation in Washington will change, and start all over again, in which case they'll face an even bigger defeat in a few months' time? I mean, I throw all of this out. I mean, I might be wrong. It may be that they've got more cards to play than I can see. But I remember what you said at the start of the conflict, and it has turned out exactly, exactly as you said it would.

Just saying. Well, you ask a very difficult question about what's next, precisely. Let me just say that Nanyahu's health is he has. has a pacemaker, he has a hard problem, which is really quite serious. He has his doctor attending often at cabinet meetings. His son has taken off to Miami and his wife is there and she doesn't seem to be coming back, Sarah. And he's suffering from, he can't stand up for long periods or walk for very long periods. He seemed to, he complained to the court. you know, that he would take time to heal, that he was torn and that he was weakened,

and he's in very, and he's under huge pressures, political pressures as prime minister. So he himself is in a crisis, and the country is in a crisis too, because the answer is that, you know, what we've been seen, in this period has been pure Jabotinsky, the Iron Wall, pure Jabotinsky, and it hasn't worked. And the Israeli army isn't big enough or effective enough to actually change very much the ground situation. They haven't even succeeded in Gaza, which is only, you know, 20 miles by five, let alone sort of to take it much further. And so they don't really have an answer.

And what I think we're going to see is a split. If he either is too ill to continue or the government falls, we are likely, I think, to see that the right wing, which is now very powerful and armed, will decide to take action on their own. I don't think necessarily that means in Gaza, but they will in West Bank, I think, start to push. They will build on Trump's comments about displacing the Palestinians

out of that demolition zone of Gaza and move them to either to Jordan or to Egypt, and they're building on that and they've already started in the West Bank and it's getting worse. There's Netanyahu to keep them in line, added a

provision in the cabinet meetings to say that war in West Bank was now part of the Israeli agenda. So, I mean, this is where things are moving. And it's always possible

to sort of ignite something in the West Bank and others by some outrage on the Temple Mount Haram al-Sharif, Al-Aqa Mosque, that is always the sort of trigger point should Ben Gavir want to trigger, if you like, a clash with the Palestinians. And so, and I mentioned, I think, to you before, I mean, you have really the kingdom of Judea at war with the state of Israel. So there are, and it's about 50-50, so there are many people in the security in the army who believe in the state of Israel and they're fighting in the constitutional court and other ways

to try and keep it that way. But Ben Givir has huge support amongst settlers. and there are about 800,000 in the West Bank. I mean, we're not talking small numbers. It's not easy to remove that size of people. So what happens? Now, Trump talks about, you know, extending the Abraham Accords,

and he says, you know, they're all off to talk to the Saudis about it. I'm really not sure if Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince, has the ability to move very far in his direction for two reasons. One is because of the Beirut understanding that his father signed, which provided that there could only be normalization in reality. return for a Palestinian state and West Bank and in Jerusalem. And that was signed by all the Arab states. And under the Saudi system, it's absolute monarchy.

You know, the king's word is law. There's no disputing it, no questioning it. The king is absolute monarch. And yes, he's in a coma. And no, he may not recover. but until he dies, then that accord from 2002 is difficult for the son to overturn, and it's not certain that the family would necessarily accept it. And also because the whole mood in the region is changing,

and he's getting more and more concerned about what's happening and security inside the kingdom. And so a major move towards Israel will likely exacerbate. He's very concerned that what's happening in Syria, where you have, if you like, former ISIS members who believe in, you know, the caliphate

and a jihadist achieved state of Islam across the region are mixing now with the Muslim Brotherhood are fusing with the Muslim Brotherhood, certainly in Syria

they are fusing with the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood has always had sort of leanings towards the Salafist, the Wahhabi, the monotheist work of Abdul Wahhab anyway, and now there's this sort of fusion. And so in Syria and from Syria at the moment, there are lots of calls, for example, from Egyptian HTS members saying,

let's take down Sisi, let's destroy Egypt, let's take over Egypt. And Cici is very worried about this and so are the Israelis and so is Jordan, but even Saudi Arabia sees us as a sort of a second awakening taking place, again, supported and given the nod by America and Western intelligence services, but always, always, I mean, this has been the story I've seen throughout my career, always, always, you know, they favor the most muscular part of the Islamist spectrum of Islam. They, you know, when I went to Afghanistan first, you know, there were different types of there were different types of Islamism.

Some of them even had a sort of Maoist foundations. But all of Kandahar, which you now think of is sort of total. sort of hard line Wahhabit was actually Sufi. So was Gilgid. All that hurt. All gone. All gone. And I went to talk to Prince Turkey at the time,

who was the head of intelligence. And I said, do you know what you're doing with people like Kobedin Hekmatia? These are hard line authoritarian people that you're talking to. You're dealing with and you're supporting. I mean, there are others that actually rely on bottom-up ideas. You want only to support the top-down elements within that. And this is what we're seeing happened in Syria.

A group of, if you like, militants, there was no revolution in Syria. I mean, they just walked into an open shop. The doors were open and they just walked in. A third of them weren't even Syrian and they took it over. And now they are trying to portray themselves. And this is another long theme of the West and the intelligence agencies, trying to build a sort of Islam that the West could plausibly work with, even if it was Al-Qaeda underneath.

And this is what they've been doing there. But they have no legitimacy. They have no mandate. They just, you know, these were forces that just came in and took the government. They now talk as if we the people demand, you know, that Assad has returned to us for trial and all of this. On what legitimacy? How do they stand for the people of Syria? Syria was always a secular country, very diverse, very pluralistic.

But anyway, so Saudi Arabia is watching this and is watching Qatar is very, what they see, it is very dangerous involvement because Qatar was, you know, anyone I don't know, perhaps, Glenn, you were at the Doha Forum. But people who were at the Doha Forum tell me, you know, the Gatoris were, you know, both arrogant and sort of absolutely in excitement. We've taken down Syria, what next? And I remember a long time ago going to visit the Emir of Gata, not the present one, the earlier time.

And I just got into his office. I can't remember who took me. I just got into the office. And this was the time of Mubarak. at the end of this time. And, you know, it's like crossing a football pitch to get to where the Amir is. It's a big office.

And we'd only got in the door, and the mirror stood up and said, we've taken him down. We've done it. Who should we take down next? And I was a bit surprised at the comment. But now you have that same sort of atmosphere the sort of enormous enthusiasm in Doha.

I mean, we've done it. I mean, because they were working very closely, financing Turkey's involvement with this operation that ended up with the ouster of Assad, or at least Assad leaving. I mean, the details of what happened in that period is complicated. But, I mean, essentially, you know, there was nothing left. It was completely, you know, there was no economy.

There was no army. I mean, the army was there in name, but they were paid $7 a month. And they were, I mean, the corruption, obviously, people, you can't survive on those sort of sums. People go into corruption and other things. I mean, those Caesar sanctions completely destroyed the economy, apart from America having stolen all of the oil and gas revenues in the Northeast and the agricultural, productive agricultural sector. And Turkey having taken a lot of the industrial world around Aleppo and that part.

So, you know, so I think, you know, even if it seems to Washington, well, I mean, you know, now we can just pull in MBS into this. I don't know. He may agree to do some normalization. I think he will be very worried about the consequences of this. And he'll be very worried about what's happening in Egypt and in Jordan with, as a real thing, result of the euphoria or jihad in

sort of we're sort of almost seeing the beginnings of a new awakening but a different one from the previous one was a sort of Saudi Saudi-led Wahhabist one this is a sort of ISIS Muslim Brotherhood

junction and the Saudis really dislike the Muslim Brotherhood distrust them and are at odds of them for philosophical reasons, which I won't go into it. I couldn't agree more that toppling of Assad obviously unleashed a lot of uncertainty for Syria. I mean, it's very difficult to predict what will happen next.

I was also curious this war now, what other ways it reorganizes the region, because, again, Israel also, of course, went to war against Lebanon. the ceasefire doesn't seem to hold. The Israelis aren't that interested in leaving it appears. Also, yeah, one can also look at what Iran, how it affects them. Also, yeah, lack of clarity how Trump will play this. But overall, the relations, well, how the West relates to Israel also appears to have changed. We often speak of narratives as a key component of,

politics and again Israel was supposed to be the liberal democracy the most moral army in the world and the Palestinians who in Hamas were going to play the role as of the savages in this classical civilized people versus barbarians you know liberal democracy versus terrorism good versus evil but then it turns out the stories of you know Hamas killing israeli babies was not true instead we have Palestinian babies being massacred in great numbers. The genocide was carried out by the Israelis backed by the West. And again, Israel, which was supposed to be the big powerhouse, as Alaster, you point out very clearly, they now see Hamas signaling essentially victory. So what also does this mean for the

West? Because not only are we complicit, but we kind of, the whole relationship with Israel at some level has to change as well. I mean, how is the wider international region shook up here? And again, if Syria is unpredictable, then I guess we might be able to put Trump in that same category. I'll just come back to the second part of your question, but the first one is the other part that is less noticed is, of course, that, or despite their rhetoric, Jolani is a very thing. sectarian. I mean, this is sectarianism, anti-Hizbullah, anti-Iran. And, you know, this is something

that Qatar, no doubt, is applauding. They are. They, they, Ahmed Mansour, the correspondence on Chazira, has been coaching Jilani and coaching him about also about, you know, Iran is the great enemy of everybody. And we're seeing this play out in Lebanon. And I think that is very dangerous at the moment, the sense of, you know, that everything is blamed on Iran and Hezbollah. And, you know, if it gets much worse, we could start to see, we're already seeing, you know, weapons coming into some of the sort of militant Islamist forces, well, jihadist forces in, in, in the in the north in Tripoli and places like that.

There's a very sort of strong sort of vein of really hardline radical Sunni Islam in that part. So we could see that turning very unpleasant as well. And it's very unwelcome to be going back to this to the sort of sectarian, Sunni, sectarian anti-Iran language, which certainly will be destabilizing. When you say, where might this all go with Israel? I mean, there are a couple of hints that Trump gave, which were very interesting. But I mean, are they substantive? Are they addressed to one audience?

Are they addressed to another audience? Are they just ruminations that he's prone to give? when he was talking about the ceasefire at one point, and he was complaining that he wanted Netanyahu to get the ceasefire done, and he said, he said, well, it's their war. And that was really interesting.

It's the first time that you really hear someone like the president say, you know, the American interests aren't necessarily coincidental with the interests of Israel. It's their war, he said. It was just an aside. Maybe it means nothing, but I think particularly some of the number twos, the new head of the Middle East policy

in the Department of Defense, the choice of this man is he's very much saying that, sort of language that, well, you know, sometimes our interests align with Israel, but, you know, don't take it for granted that, you know, we automatically, this is a big change in American thinking for me over the years. I've never sort of experienced even the glimpse of this. But again, you know, it's so hard to read because, look, what's happening, you know, to the Trump nominations. And really, I think we're, we're.

missing something and I this is why I wrote a piece before by saying is is is you know is actually Trump positioning himself for no deal on Ukraine in in in in due course because I don't believe you know that you know Trump doesn't know better that there aren't that there were a million Russians killed I I don't believe that he really thinks the Russian economy is in ruins. I think what we're seeing is he's very deliberately taking the line of the neocons of the hard line in the Senate and in the Congress. He can't be, he can't be, if you like, attack if he says the CIA line.

You know, if he says, yes, a million, their economies, they are hopeless, you know, Putin is a loser. I mean, that's, you know, that's actually the CIA line and he is able to sort of use that. At the same time, I think probably people have been saying to him, you know, we're not going to get a deal because, you know, Ukraine is lost and Russia has won. and it's going to be over and maybe over quite soon. And maybe, you know, he's taking Steve Bannon's advice and saying, you know, don't end up owning this war. If my advice to you is cut as soon as you can, otherwise it'll be like, you know, Nixon was ending up owning the Vietnam War, you should cut it and cut it. And he says, I'm giving Trump that advice, but others are giving him different advice. So we get all these stories about leverage and how we need to sort of increase leverage and balance out and this is going to get a deal.

Does Trump believe that? Well, we just don't know. But I was putting out the possibility that, you know, he doesn't. And therefore, you know, he can say, oh, you know, Ukraine doesn't matter. You know, Putin's a loser anyway on this one. or he can do what Putin hinted at and has been, and I've been plugging for a long time, is changed the narrative, change the discussion. Forget Ukraine and the details of Ukraine because it's going to, you know, facts in the ground are going to solve this out.

What you need to do is to the big picture. Go to the big picture. You know, Putin some time ago in that speech from behind the desk in his office said, You know something? That was a great mistake, I think, in 2019 when America withdrew from the intermediate missile treaty. Well, of course, it was Trump who withdrew from it in 2019. And why not, you know, have a talk with Putin about many things and, you know, come out and say, we're saving America from World War III.

We've got the basis of an agreement on intermediate missiles. They're going to remove those. I mean, it's going back to the sort of Cuba crisis type of, you know, can we get a process in and that it would be organized so that Ukraine becomes, you know, irrelevant, not so important. The big win is, I've persuaded Putin to pull back. He's not going to threaten Europe anymore. He's not going to threaten us.

This is the win, not having some frozen conflict. The Russians won't agree to that anyway. Why should they? They're winning. So I think that with all these things, you know, he may be positioning himself. But my point at the bottom is, you know, he hasn't yet done. the deal. It's not complete yet and may not be complete. And what is the essential deal? The essential deal is he needs some key people to be confirmed. Cash for the FBI. He wants to have, well, he's got

he says now. And he wants, of course, Gabon to be able to tell him the truth about what's happening. and you saw what happened even with when it came to the defense secretary. It just squeaked through by the casting vote of the vice president. And McConnell was organizing opposition to it. McConnell, who was supposed to be the head of the Republican caucus, that was one of the biggest, you know, never Trumpers. The Senate is, you know, is organizing. I mean, previous defense secretaries have got through almost the last ones almost unanimously sometimes, but, you know, one or two votes against.

Now it's a margin that is tiny. Trump has to do the deal to get these people through. That's why I think he took so many of these Israeli first as it. That was the price you have to pay to get into this discussion. You know, this was the entry price to a discussion about who gets, who I'm having and who they say, well, you're not having that. Or I can tell you, and what I think they are saying is, you know, there are deep structures of agreement in America. Israel first, Russia to be weakened and pushed aside.

All of these things, you can't have all of those. What do you want to do? Well, I think Trump's priorities are the domestic. He's got to sort out the complete, out-of-control fiscal situation in America, which is not going to be easy because so many people are dependent on this. sort of huge slush fund of money appearing every year. So how are we going to, how are we going to get that? And in a way, that's why I was suggesting my only way I think he can do it

is by giving these people, you know, their pound of flesh, if you like, in allowing the far reaches, the periphery not to be a forever worse, and to come, turn it all inside out, and then to have, if you like, recolonize what is already colonized. You know, Canada, a green, I mean, all these apart, some of them, all native members,

to recolonize these and to say, Western Hemisphere, this is our territory, and it's bigger, and it's American, and it's great, and this is it. And, you know, Ukraine, does it really matter to us if Zeparifia is Russian or Ukrainian? I mean, why does that matter to America? I mean, you know, and what does it matter if in Odessa they're allowed to speak Russian? I don't want to get into all of that.

But, you know, let's come back from these far the periphery, just as ancient old Rome did at times it had, when things were not going right, they'd pull back from the far provinces because they were costing too much money to, you know, the Roman Empire and the center. So I have a feeling, you know, all of these things are playing out in a complicated way with Trump. So, I mean, what do you think? Well, I think that may be true. I mean, there's a number of interesting things, which is that, of course, we have all of those extraordinary comments that continued through the weekend about, you know, the Russian economy being on the brink of collapse, the Russians having a million losses.

And then after the weekend, we've had relative silence. We've had no diplomatic initiative at all. We've had no contact from the Americans directly to the Russians. We've had no criticisms, no further criticisms. of the Russians. What we've had is a stop order on Ukrainian funding, which is now starting to affect Ukraine very significantly. And that seems to be provoking a crisis within the Ukrainian Defence Ministry and the Ukrainian media, that they're running out of money. And the other thing, today, I was going through the White House readouts of Rubio's

conversations over the last couple of days with European leaders. And of course, these are the readouts. This is not the same as the conversations. One of the things that struck me immediately is that Ukraine is barely mentioned in some of the conversations. Absolutely. With Berbock, for example, and with the French foreign minister, you will not find the words Russia or Ukraine. mentioned in the readouts. It's just that they've, you know, then it's as you'd be led to think that the conflict in Ukraine

is not being discussed at all. So I think this is exactly what I think. I think you've got this correct. I think that what we are seeing is a very, very complicated and very, very difficult process for the United States. in which it gradually, it understands

at least some people in the United States understand that it cannot continue this project of trying to run everything everywhere and it's trying to navigate away from that and retreat to being one amongst several great powers. This is a very, very difficult thing to do because obviously there are people in the United States, who are ideologically committed to the United States,

continuing the great forward advance, reshape the entire world, change everything, make it all like America, make keep America at the focus. But I think that this is the process that is underway. This is what the Greenland and Mexico and Canada and the Panama Canal things are ultimately all about. You have the retrenchment going on with Ukraine, you're getting Rubio avoiding to the extent that he can, making public commitments about Ukraine at the moment.

When he does mention Ukraine, just a few of the readouts, it's very interesting. He talks about the Russian-Russia's war against Ukraine. It doesn't say the war of aggression. He doesn't use any of that extraordinary language that you used to see with the Biden-Blinkin people. So this gradual attempt to retreat, but it can't be done easily and it can't be done quickly because doing so would be an admission of failure, not just on a small scale, on an enormous scale, which of course is very, very difficult to sell in Washington. So I think this is probably what we're seeing.

And I think it applies to the money. It's not just difficult. I think, you know, Americans are used to winning. I mean, they just can't believe it. I mean, you should see that, I mean, there was quite a striking example, the meltdown with this new Chinese initiative for an artificial intelligence, that they produced this artificial intelligence better than the American systems for about $3 on the $3 on the dollar.

I mean, an amazing thing. And there are people saying, it's impossible. It can't be. I mean, are you saying that the Chinese are ahead of America on this? I mean, I just can't believe that. It's not possible. And, you know, it was a sort of a really very clear insight in how difficult it is, you know, to do this, to do this thing. So there's now a big sort of, well, it wasn't quite what it seemed, because of course it puts the whole of a strategy of this huge expenditure in sort of capital investment around sort of big structures of big, you know, a big computing capacities.

And then China comes up and says, no, we can send it to your phone. Do you want it? You can have it for $200. I mean, it is a bit shocking, but I'm just saying, you know, you're right. I mean, you know, America's used to winning. So Trump has got to find the way of, so that's why I think he was sort of positioning when he was saying all these damaging things about Russia. Maybe it was about sort of, you know, saying, well, Ukraine, you know, oh, Putin's a loser on that. but we had a really interesting discussion about nuclear issues, about intermediate.

And we're going to have some agreements. And they're going to be very important for America. Go on. Can I just ask quickly, very quickly, about all of these awful things that he's saying, really terrible things that he's saying, about displacing the entire population of gas. Is this also something, an element? of this, that now you've had a peace agreement in Gaza, in which Hamas has won. So you mustn't talk about the fact that Hamas is one.

And so you move on to this grandiose and appalling, but nonetheless still seemingly grandiose narrative that will, in fact, you transfer them all to Jordan or Egypt or even Indonesia or somewhere else, because you don't want to address the fact that it is, in fact, Hamas that he's still there in Gaza and in control. You want to move the narrative away from that. I can't guarantee you that this is absolutely correct. But an Israeli minister said, of course it was concerted with Netanyahu, that statement. And the purpose of it was obvious because, you know, when he said all those things

board Air Force One. I mean, smart for it it, should Ben Gavere, we're in ecstasy and say, well, let's start now. We're going to work on this. We're going to have a new government plan for it. He put Netanyahu completely in his pocket

by doing this, by making this statement. And he's now completely dependent on him. And then Trump sort of nuances it by sort of fudging it and saying, well, you know, well, you know, if we can't do that, maybe we can find some other solution that would

solve the Palestinian issue, leaving it all opaque and unclear. But if it's correct, and it came from a minister in the government, there was this sense that, you know, this is the only thing to keep Netanyahu in business. And I think, you know, from Trump's point of view, better the devil you know. I mean, he knows how to deal with Netanyahu, and at the modemate Netanyahu is, you know, complete and ill and weaken Netanyahu is completely dependent on Trump. So I think it won't be very difficult for Trump to say. And also, by the way, I don't think I want you to attack Iran. I may do try other things.

So, of course, then we'll have another sort of outburst of sort of how awful Iran is to sort of balance out these things, I suspect. But I think that was what was behind it. Because, of course, I mean, even Israelis understand. I mean, you know, they saw these people, a million and a half heading up to their ruins looking for skeletons and things and saying, we are never going. They know that the Palestinians are not about to be sort of, you know, like sheep led off to wherever it was, Indonesia or Albania that he suggested. So, no, I don't think it's in the bounds of realism. But I think he is looking for trying to find a solution. And, you know, again, it comes back to Jabotinsky.

and the failure of the whole Jabotinsky story. I just tell you, have you got time for two minutes? Of course. A long time ago, I was involved in South Africa and working with Swapur, because South Africa wanted a ceasefire with Swap from Namibian. The South African defense force, forces were very effective at destroying things in Angola and Mozambique.

They were hugely destructive, rather like the IDF. They were capable of massive destruction. But it brought no change to South Africa's position. There was no political dividend coming out of that at all. So they went and ceasefire was almost arranged, but the South Africa's public couldn't bring themselves. They've been so, if you like, they've been so propagandized that these were not only terrorists, but they were Marxist terrorists. I mean, nothing could be worse. So the whole thing broke down and it was 10 years before it ever came into position.

But part of that was then, that was the time when some of these Afrikaners were beginning to say and say to me then and then saying, But what we can tell our grandchildren is our future here simply we've got to go on smashing up Angola and Mozambique and other states endlessly, killing people, anyone that sort of doubts us or questions us. Is that your future as our grandchildren? And so the beginnings of sort of a sort of more substantive shift I saw take place there. And in many ways, you know, it hasn't, Gaza hasn't produced what Israelis imagined. Lebanon has produced that. Syria hasn't produced what they were looking for.

And America may not produce what they want for Iran. So all of this. So I think it may come back in a ways we can't imagine at this stage. It's too early. It's too difficult to see it. But this is a big, in Israel. I mean, where are we going? Do we just go on killing Palestinians and their children? I mean, is that the Israeli sort of karma forever?

I just finished one comment because I really enjoyed your article and I would advise everyone to read it as well. But it's, but also this comment you had on. I just say they can find it on Conflicts Forum Substack. Yes. You can find it there. I say because it's not in my name, it's Conflicts Forum, Substack, you can find it. But as you mentioned now as well, the Americans are used to always winning. And in all fairness, throughout their history, they tended to go from strength to strength,

from being at the East Coast, going to West Coast, taking over the Pacific. And, of course, culminating finally in the post. Cold War liberal hegemony, which was supposed to be the end of history. But I think in reality, what we've seen since the 90s instead is this imperial overstretch as all this resources have been sent from the core to the periphery. And we see this with the economy, society, political system becoming exhausted. Like Trump often refers to this, though, he says, suggesting it's not sustainable. He keeps pointing out, you know, allies haven't treated them fairly.

fairly. They should have been paying for these services. There should have been some, you know, return on investment on the empire. And it's something that is, you know, sidekick. Musk also points out that we're going broke. We don't have much time left. So if you're sinking in debt, what do you do? Well, first of all, at the front lines of the empire, you pull a bit back. So Israel, as you said, Alashter, this is your war. Ukraine, that's the Europeans problem. And instead, you begin a little bit to cannibalize your vassal. So take the Europeans, to buy your energy, you take over their industries. Taiwan, the semiconductor industry,

have to go back to America, and you impose a new Monroe Doctrine. So let's take back the Panama Canal, Greenland, why not Canada, even though that seems very absurd? Send your military to the border to control it, deport their migrants, illegal migrants, I mean, and restore your industries and technology with this 500 billion to AI.

and overall, I think as you pointed out in the article as well, I think this enables America or Trump to pull back from the empire to lick its wounds and recover and at the same time claim victory. So I think there's some logic to what is being done. I don't think it's always clear when he's arguing for taking over Canada, but the core of it, there's something logic here. If you see this as a withdrawing from empire to some extent, at least getting better return on it.

Anyways, Alastair Crook, Alexander McCurs, thank you so much for your time. And yeah, for anyone who has been listening, thanks for your time as well. Thank you for hosting you. Thank you, thank you very much, Alistair, for joining us again. Always fascinating and full of insight, if I can just say.