The Duran Podcast - Istanbul talks. Russia offers Ukraine/West one last chance

Episode Date: June 3, 2025

Istanbul talks. Russia offers Ukraine/West one last chance

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the negotiations that took place in Istanbul yesterday. These are the second talks that have taken place in Istanbul. The second recent talks that have taken place in Istanbul. If you go by how the Russians see it, then these are the third talks that have actually taken place in Istanbul. If you go back to March 22, and then Boris Johnson flew into Kiev and he sabotaged everything. Anyway, we're not going to go there. there, but we are going to discuss the memorandums that were presented. We have the Ukraine

memorandum, which I describe as the Kellogg 22-point freeze-P's DMZ plan. I don't think it's very different from Kellogg's plan. You might want to discuss what Ukraine presented. And then we got the Russian memorandum, which was presented to the Ukrainian side. Now, this memorandum is very similar, if not exact, to root cause Zistadbopal plus. I would like to hear your thoughts on this, but I just want to say it's on the interwebs. It's on X. It's on telegram. It's on all the sites, the entire memorandum. It's not long. It's broken up into three parts. It's very easy to understand. You don't need to be a lawyer, you don't need to be a diplomat. Very simple to understand. It outlines Russia's position

very clearly. It does not get into a lot of details, for example, when they're talking about scaling down the Ukraine military. They don't get it to the numbers, obviously, but they mention it. So it's in bullet point format. It's three parts. The first part talks about Russia's terms, I would say the second part gives an option for how you can begin a 30-day ceasefire, and it is a 30-day ceasefire, and it provides two options. And then the third part is a timeline, and it talks about an election as well in Ukraine. So, Alexander, you've read the plan. Once again, everyone can find it on just about every site.

It's all over the place. The plan, and I just want to say, again, it's very clear. It's very easy to read. It's very easy to understand. And I think Russia made it this way for a reason. I mean, I think they want it to present a very clear, very understandable memorandum that everybody, including journalists, including leaders anywhere around the world, whatever language you speak, will finally be able to understand Russia's Istanbul plus root causes from June 2024.

And we also have Alexander, which we'll talk about, I don't know if you want to discuss it now or maybe in the second half of the program. We'll also talk about the prisoner exchange, which is a big deal, a big prisoner exchange. And Russia also calling for a two, three-day ceasefire so that the bodies of the fallen soldiers can be collected. Where do you want to begin? Well, I think we'll start with the memorandum. I think you described it exactly correctly. And I think this also further clarifies why the Russians were not prepared to provide it to the Ukrainians in advance.

I think they're so tired of having their position completely misrepresented all the time that they wanted to make absolutely sure that this time it would not only be clear and succinct and short and easy to understand in exactly the way that you said, but that we would not have a couple of days or a week of the Ukrainians and the Americans and the British and all of the rest making it up, changing it, distorting it, making it look like it was completely different from what it actually was. before the meeting even happened. So I think that for once, the Russians seem to understand a little about media management. And I think that explains an awful lot. Now, let's talk about

what happened yesterday, well, when the meeting took place. It's, I think, a mistake to refer here to negotiations, exactly, because no negotiations of any kind of. actually took place over the course of this meeting. It was not as if, you know, the Russians presented a proposal and the Ukrainians and commented on that proposal. Basically, the Ukrainians and the Russians exchanged documents. And then they walked away. Apparently, there was no essential discussion about these documents at all.

Let's start with the Ukrainian proposal. You described it as Kellogg's plan. that is exactly what it is. It is Kellogg's plan. It's Kellogg's plan with a few knobs on. The Ukrainians have added, well, I presume it's the Ukrainians. For all I know, it is Kellogg itself. But they've added on a few things like reparations that Russia must pay reparations, which is a impossible demand. But it is basically Kellogg's plan. It is about freezing the conflict along the existing conflict line. And this is something that the Russians have always resisted. By the way the Ukrainians in the past resisted it as well. But that was before they realized that they're going to lose the war.

Now the Ukrainians also want to freeze the conflict along the existing conflict line. That is what Kellogg proposed in his article that he laid out his plan back in April 2024. this doesn't deviate in any essentials from that position. And of course, just as happened in that, just as Kellogg set out in his article of April 2024, no restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian military can be built up as far and as long as it likes. It can receive weapons and it can continue to mobilize

and it could continue to do all of those things. and no real commitments about NATO membership either. I mean, Kellogg may be going around telling everybody at this particular point in time, Kellogg, NATO membership is not on the agenda that the United States isn't moving to that direction. But this proposal that the Ukrainians put forward doesn't in any way preclude Ukraine joining NATO at some point in the future. Trust me, trust me, no NATO. Trust me. Exactly.

Exactly. I mean, it's that sort of thing. So the Russians have ignored it. I mean, they were provided with that plan some days ago. They've not come forward and set out in a document why the plan is unacceptable. They've just moved ahead and presented their own proposals. It's as far as the Russians are concerned, this plan is so obviously and completely unworkable that they're not going to even discuss it. That was the line they took already some weeks ago when Witt Goff was supposed to go to Moscow and bring it with him to Putin. And Putin apparently refused to agree to meet Wittgoff and already said at that time that this plan simply isn't going to work. I mean, the Russians at that time, the Americas, this isn't going to work. And it's not even worth discussing. So Kellogg is persisting with this thing.

the Ukrainians are continuing to run with it. It continues to have the support officially of the government of the United States. And this is an important thing to understand. I mean, Trump may be positioning himself, as he says, as a mediator, but the Ukrainians are actually presenting to the Russians an American proposal, which is not what mediators are supposed to do. I know I'd been a mediator many times in the past. Mediators do not propose the settlement plan,

the negotiating strategy of one party in a negotiation. I mean, it's absurd. It goes completely against the entire philosophy of mediation. So anyway, that is the Ukrainian-American Kellogg plan. You know, we could put it, we could package it however way we like, but that is what it was. The Russians not only said no, but they said no, this isn't even fit for discussion. They present their own plan. And it is exactly Istanbul Plus.

It's actually slightly, goes slightly beyond the original Istanbul Plus that Putin proposed way back on the 14th of June. Because we now have something which wasn't so clear last year, which is that the Russians are now expecting not just Ukraine to recognize the four regions as Russian territory, but they want international recognition of the four regions as Russian territory. They want the security, the UN Security Council involved and a resolution. They want to, this is Vladimir. Crimea, Crimea as well. Crimea as well, absolutely. This is Vladimir Putin, the lawyer, tying up all the loose ends or wanting to tie up all the loose ends. And as I said, this is, this is, you know, a major, you know, step beyond what had been discussed previously by the Russians. Now, taking it to the Security Council, of course, it's going to put the United States and the Europeans in a very difficult position because they are expected to recognize Crimea and the four regions as Russian and vote in the Security Council for a peace plan that recognizes that. Now, you know, that's a very, very tall order. I wonder whether

Putin really believes that the Europeans at least will agree and, well, we'll worry about all of that problem until it comes. But anyway, it's the four regions plus, Crimea, part of Russia, reductions in the size of the Ukrainian armed forces. As you correctly say, it isn't going to go, it doesn't go into details about this. But there was already quite a lot of progress on that topic back in Istanbul in March 22, the first round of these negotiations, as the Russians say, as you correctly said. So there was already some progress there. There was also provisions about denuclearization. Ukraine isn't going to have nuclear weapons.

It makes it very clear that the original Russian condition about purging Bandarite influence in Ukraine, that that still stands. That was also, by the way, in the original Istanbul proposals as well, the ones from March, April 2022. So the Russians are not shifting on any of that. much more, this goes into more detail about the rights of Russian citizens in Ukraine that had previously been agreed in Istanbul in March, April 22. It also brings up the topic of the Orthodox Church, as I understand. So, I mean, you know, that's something that's going to be

pushed forward. I mean, apparently that's been made clear by Medinsky in various discussions. So there's no question about that either. But it's, it is Istanbul plus with as a I said, a certain hardening of the position. Now, the second part, as you rightly say, is about the ceasefire, the ceasefire idea, which is one that the Americans, Donald Trump, committed himself to. And basically, you're getting here two options. And it's not difficult to see where these two options have come from. Option one is the one that. that Putin proposed back in his speech to the foreign ministry on the 14th of June 2024. This was that there should be a ceasefire to enable the Ukrainian army to withdraw from the four

regions. That was what he said then. That's the position that the Russians maintained consistently up to the 18th of March 2025 when Putin and Trump had. a telephone call. Now, on the 18th of March 2025, over the course of this telephone call, Trump called Putin and said, the Ukrainians have agreed to a 30-day unconditional ceasefire. What are you going to say? Why don't you agree to this also? And the killing, save the lives, all of that sort of thing. And as you, of course, remember, we discussed it at the time, and we pointed out that Putin made what was in effect a polite no. He said, we're not prepared to agree to an unconditional ceasefire.

We have our various nuances. We are concerned about how this ceasefire would work in practice. And in order for the Ukrainians not to take advantage of that sort of ceasefire, we propose that there should be a complete stop. of military supplies to Ukraine during the period of the ceasefire and also an end to intelligence sharing for Ukraine during that period of the ceasefire. Proposals which of course the Ukrainians and the Americans and the Western powers have rejected. Now but the Russians have gone somewhat beyond this now because in addition to what Putin said to Trump,

on the 18th of March, the Russians are now also saying that Ukraine must begin a process of demobilization. And this is, in other words, essentially means that not only will Ukraine's army be at a standstill, but that it will start to reduce in strength. Unwinded. Exactly. You mean like, yeah, okay. Yeah. And end to mobilization.

So this is the 18th of March 2025 ceasefire proposal that came from the Russians. So the Russians are telling the Ukrainians, look, you've got a choice. Either you go with the 14th of June 2024 ceasefire proposal, which Putin made, which means that you withdraw from the four regions. Or you go... In their entirety? In their entirety. in their entirety. Yeah.

Zaparosia-Herson, Heron, Heron City, the city of Zaporosia. You withdraw during a period of 30 days entirely from these territories were prepared to grant you a ceasefire in order that you can withdraw your troops from these four regions during that period of time.

And if you, of course, obviously don't agree, then fighting resumes. But that was the original 40, of June, 2024 proposal that Putin made for a ceasefire. He said that's the only basis upon which he's prepared to agree to a ceasefire. Then as is it, on the 18th of March, 2025, under pressure from Trump, he came up with this alternative, which is that we have a ceasefire. Again, just for 30 days, but it's a ceasefire in which Ukraine doesn't get any weapons, doesn't get any intelligence, ends mobilization. And then the third part of this is the timeline.

And this is very, very important because the ceasefire will only really work if the timeline is implemented. And the key provision here is elections, that there has to be a little bit. of martial law and new elections in Ukraine, which means ultimately in this kind of context a situation where we see the end of Zelensky in his government. I mean, that's basically what it would all amount to. So these are exactly the terms that the Russians have been talking about one variant or another for over, for around a year now. The Russians have not shifted by one iota.

They haven't retreated by a single punctuation point. In fact, they've slightly hardened their position on some things, on international recognition of the four territories and on some of the ceasefire provisions, you know, demobilization of the Ukrainian forces. The British media are interpreting these Russian demands as a demand for Ukraine's capitulation. And that might be putting it a bit strongly because there would still be a Ukraine at the other end of this. But certainly these are terms which would signal a Ukrainian defeat. I mean, a clear-cut Ukrainian defeat and, by the way, a defeat for the collective West.

But Ukraine is saved. But Ukraine is saved. But it would not, I should quickly add, it would not be able to have Western troops on its territory. But the country exists. But the country exists. There would still be a Ukrainian nation at the end of this process. It would still have access to the Black Sea because Odessa is not covered by these provisions. Right. I mean, the threat that it might lose, Dessa, is there hanging in the background if it rejects this.

But that's why I personally would not say that this was a demand for Ukraine's capitulation. Certainly Russians, the Russians would not see it in those terms. It says these are terms dictated to Ukraine, which, if Ukraine were to accept them, would signal Ukraine's defeat. They are far harsher than the terms Ukraine could have accepted if it had implemented the Minsk agreement of 2015. I mean, completely harder than that. They are harsher than the terms Ukraine appeared to accept in April 2022. But I think they still fall short of the outright capitulation, which is what people.

people in Britain in particular and some people in the United States are saying, in other words, contrary to the narrative, the Western narrative, these are not Russia's maximalist demands. The next time, if these proposals are rejected and the war continues, the next set of demands will come closer to being the kind of maximalist demands that some people in the West are talking about. And those would certainly involve the loss of the Black Sea Coast and probably of Kharkoff and Sumi region as well. Yeah. The agreement is actually, it was just my opinion.

I think it's very, it's reasonable. I think it's very reasonable, especially when you look at it from the standpoint that these terms have been available since June 2024. Yeah. Russia is demanding something a little bit extra from June 2024, which, as you said, is the international recognition of these territories, which, if we're honest about it, does this really affect the United States or Europe if they recognize these territories? I mean, their interests, does it really affect their interests?

And as far as a Ukrainian state goes, everyone has come to the conclusion that Ukraine is never going to be able to capture these territories either. So does the recognition of these territories on an international level, will it really make that much of a difference for Ukraine as well? Whatever remains of Ukraine according to this agreement, should they accept it? I don't think it really affects the United States, the recognition of the territories. I don't think it affects Europe. And in the long term, I don't think it's going to affect Ukraine. I mean, in the long term, Ukraine is allowed to exist with the Black Sea, with a part of the Black Sea.

You take the deal. If I was Trump, I would advise him, take this deal. Does the deal talk about the European Union? Does it prevent whatever remains of Ukraine from entering the European Union? If this was to go to the UN Security Council, Minsk was voted on by the UN Security Council, and they broke that agreement as well. How does that work? Well, indeed. That is a very good point indeed. And again, we see, and this is perhaps Putin's never-ending blind spot. He approaches this always as a lawyer. And he seems to imagine

that if it gets a UN Security Council resolution, which will mean that this treaty is part of international law, that that in itself is enough somehow. It won't be. I mean, you know, as night follows day, we can be sure that there would be criticism and opposition to this in the West. And we've seen that the Western powers repeatedly violate UN Security Council resolutions. A particularly egregious example were the ones. involving Yugoslavia and Libya, just to say. And of course, the Minsk agreement itself. So, I mean, why Putin clings to this belief

that UN Security Council resolutions really matter is, you know, questionable. I mean, I just don't understand that myself. It could be, it could be, that he thinks that unless he goes to the Security Council and gets this resolution passed, it will mean that the thing will not be legally watertight in some ways. But I think, again, he's perhaps giving too much time and effort to this question of legalities.

But let's get to your core point, because this is absolutely correct. What you're saying is absolutely correct. As far as I am concerned, nothing that is proposed here in these Russian proposals affects the core interests of the United States, of the European Union, of NATO, or of the European countries. It does not make them less secure than they are now. Quite the opposite. I mean, it provides for a peace settlement of the biggest conflict we've had in Europe since the end of the Second World War. It keeps the Russian army further away from NATO territory than it might otherwise go. It preserves an independent Ukraine with access to the

Black Sea. I would have said unequivocally that this is not only, you know, the best deal that you can get, but it's the only deal that makes any kind of sense at this stage in the conflict when so many better opportunities for better deals have been thrown away. In fact, as I said, I think the West, if we were to accept this, will come out lucky. Now, have you able to come. We'd be lucky. I mean, absolutely. I mean, you know, from that point of you.

Now, of course, if you are a neocon or European globalist or you're Ossila von der Leyen and you continue to have fantastic plans of driving Russia out of the Black Sea and pushing it eastwards, it deeper into Eurasia, perhaps even beyond the Urals one day. You know, these plans do exist. And then breaking up the Russian Federation and all of that, well, then this, of course, obviously puts an end to those plans. So, I mean, but those plans are not just unachievable. They are insane.

It's the pursuit of these plans that has brought about this crisis in the first place. So any rational statesman in Europe would understand that by now. I mean, you know, doing this has created a massive economic, political, social crisis across Europe, affecting the United States as well. It is degrading the West's military arsenals. It's putting at a serious risk of a military defeat. So they would abandon those plans. Neocons never abandoned their plans. Osceola von der Leyen is incapable of abandoning her plans.

So that is, that is unfortunately the problem. And I don't think they will accept them. Because, you know, like the kind of unreasonable people that they are, they will never give up on these plans. And they will come up with all kinds of fantastic and specious arguments to reject them. They will say that this is the first change in borders brought about, by war in Europe, which is a lie. They will say that this is going to encourage Xi Shumpin to capture Taiwan, which is ridiculous. They will come up with all these fantastic

and ludicrous arguments to derail this process. And it was Zelensky himself, whose entire position is now on the line, because if this is ever implemented, he will not remain president of Ukraine. And most importantly, the money flow to Ukraine, which it is his priority to keep going will stop. He won't accept them either. So what we're going to get at some point over the next couple of months is a position where it's clear that these, they're not even negotiations. These meetings aren't leading anywhere towards an ultimate resolution of the conflict.

And the war will continue. And then we will get the next harsher set of Russian demands. I could say this. A good way to understand the way the Russians are handling this whole process is, again, to think of litigation and to imagine Russia as a very, very well-organized and very big New York City or London law firm. As the litigation continues, they make one proposal and it's reasonable. And then that's rejected.

And you go on losing. And then the law firm comes and puts up another proposal, which is harder than the one that preceded it. And then this process continues until eventually either you end up losing the case entirely, or you end up with the proposal, which amounts to the same thing, having to accept a proposal, which amounts to the same thing. It's Putin the lawyer, but it seems to me that the whole structure of the Russian foreign ministry and the way in which conducts negotiations is very like that. And I think that's why I said one of the things that Trump could do,

which might assist him is if he can't find people within the foreign policy world who could help him to deal with the Russians, he could actually reach out to people in commercial law. And they would probably explain to him the Russian approach a lot better than the neocons in the State Department are capable of doing. Unfortunately, he shows no sign of doing anything like that. But anyway, that's where this is going. There is no possibility that the Russians are going to retreat from this position. And all attempts to try to obtain leverage over them, drones, drone attacks on Russian cities, drone attacks on Russian air bases, terrorist attacks on Russian trains.

And the Russians are now clearly saying there's a terrorist attacks, by the way, And they're right. I wanted, because we've discussed the drone attacks on the air bases. The attacks on the railway lines and the blowing up of the train with the civilians inside, that was clearly a terrorist attack. And there is now reports that the Russians are intending to respond to retaliate strongly in relation to the train attack. But anyway, whatever, sanctions, Lindsay Graham's bone crunching sanctions, you know,

Blumenthal and Lilland, Lill and Lillian. Lindsey Graham, you know, touring Europe trying to drum up support for these brown crunching sanctions. None of this is going to make the Russians shift. And it is fantasy to suppose that. Nor is trying to embarrass the Russians by bringing up the child abduction allegations, which Medinsky completely shot down. By the way, he has hardened. He's a much, much tougher and more incisive Medinsky than the one that I remember from March

2022, who many people in Russia at the time thought was a very weak negotiator. This time, he's turning out otherwise. But anyway, he basically shot that one to piece. He said he's right to. Again, I have extensive experience of child abduction cases. I dealt with them many times, including international child abduction cases. This is not one. I mean, that's all I can say.

I don't want to say too much more because, you know, the sensitivities. But I don't understand the claims. I don't understand the case that the ICC has brought. It makes no sense to me at all. Political. And it's political. And that is exactly what Medinsky was saying. So you're not going to embarrass the Russians by doing that.

You're not going to intimidate them. You're not going to scare them by launching drone attacks. you're not going to unsettle them in some way. Again, if you are familiar with big commercial litigation type cases, you know that sometimes weaker parties in those negotiations do try to rattle the big law firm by engaging in all kinds of complex and silly maneuvers. And it never works. And that is exactly what we're seeing in this negotiation as well.

Zelensky, he has already come out, he lashed out at these negotiations at the Russian side. He once again said that this is the lower level team and these are lower level officials. He said they're idiots because he's very upset about the two, three day ceasefire where Medinsky said we're going to designate some areas on the front line, some areas, not the entire front line. And these areas are going to fall under a ceasefire provision where we will allow, each side will be able to collect the bodies of their fallen soldiers. Makes sense to me. I don't see anything wrong with this. And Zelensky was very upset also with the 6,000 Ukrainian dead soldiers, which Russia says

they're going to unilaterally return the 6,000. soldiers and they said, and Medinsky said this is a humanitarian gesture. Umerov then said that we're going to also return 6,000 soldiers, but the Ukraine side has been a bit of a gray area as to what they're going to return. My sense of this, of this part of the talks that took place is that Russia is going to unilaterally return the 6,000 fallen soldiers, Ukrainian soldiers. But Ukraine doesn't have 6,000 Russian fallen soldiers, and they don't want that exposed because for them it would point to the fact that the loss is contrary to what they've been saying and contrary to what the collective West has been saying and the collective West media

and the United States. It's going to run counter to the claim that there's been more Russian casualties and Ukrainian casualties, if this does go through this exchange of soldiers, it's going to highlight that the opposite is the case. And you're looking at many, many more Ukrainian casualties than Russian casualties. That's why Zelensky is lashing out at Madinsky. That's why he's lashing out at the two, three-day ceasefire. He once again said that the only way forward is a 30-day ceasefire. What are your thoughts on that? No, what the Russians have been proposing about the three-day citruses in order to collect the bodies of fallen soldiers is what happens in many wars, by the way.

It did not happen on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. I mean, the Germans and the Soviets did not do that. But it did happen on the Western Fronts in Normandy and in other places. So it's actually standard practice in war, and it's a humane thing to do. I mean, it's an absolutely normal, humane thing to do. It doesn't put anybody in a more disadvantages military position or anything of that kind. There's also the proposal, as you rightly say, to hand over 6,000 bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers. It's a unilateral proposal.

The Ukrainians don't seem to be very pleased about it. Again, the obvious explanation is the one you said. It's that it goes against the whole Ukrainian narrative that their casualties are very light, that their total casualties are something like 40,000 men or something killed, 6,000 bodies already appears to go against that. It shakes that whole narrative. And of course, the Ukrainians don't have anywhere near that number of dead Russian bodies. to hand over. So they don't want to go there. But again, it's a humane action on the part of the Russians.

And of course, there's other things that have come up as well, the prisoner exchange. And this is an interesting one because I understand that, you know, this is going to be another 1,000 for 1,000 prisoner exchange. It is apparently, if it's fully implemented, it'll mean that Ukraine will have no Russian prisoners left because apparently the number of prisoners, Russian soldiers who are prisoners in Ukraine, now numbers around 800. The Russians still would have several thousand more Ukrainian prisoners. In fact, you know, I've heard about 4,000 Ukrainian prisoners. So what the Russians are prepared to do, apparently, is take political prisoners.

from Ukraine to fill out the numbers. And one wonders again of who exactly those people would be, but it would mean that the Russians get all their prisoners back, which is of course important from a psychological point of view, from a moral point of view, in Russia itself. The Ukrainians are having to go along with this, and there's apparently there was some anger in Ukraine from the Banderites because during the last prisoner exchange, there weren't any people from the Azov Brigade. And, you know, this time they're going to try and get some of those people back. So these are, again, the sort of things that one would expect, especially from the winning side in this kind of negotiation, basically saying, look, our terms are harsh, but we've been brought to this point.

We are not unreasonable people. We are not what we are represented to be in the West. We absolutely do take into account humanitarian issues. So we're going to do these things. And of course, some of them, like the return of our prisoners, it's in our interests and it's in the interests of our society. So we're going to take these steps. We want to bring the conduct of the war itself back towards more humanitarian situations with three-day ceasefires so that bodies can be collected and that kind of thing. And of course, Zelensky, as played straight into Russian hands, by basically ridiculing some of this, ridiculing the idea of the three-day, the three-day ceasefires, in ways that the Russians will be able to just explain to their own people

and to the non-Western part of the world will show how impossible Zelensky continues to be. All right, let's, yeah, I agree with what you're saying. Let's wrap up the video. My thoughts on the prisoner's change is just a final comment there. I think it's a very smart move from Russia to get all of their prisoners back. Maybe it hints to what's coming in the future. If this deal is not accepted, you get all of your prisoners back and then the hammer comes down. Maybe that can hint to or that points to something big that's coming if this deal is not accepted.

So Alexander Yadmach, there are reports. I haven't been able to fully verify these reports, but it does look like Yermak is heading to D.C. These are what some early reports are saying. Once again, I'm not 100% on this. But let's just assume he's going to D.C. And he's obviously going to be meeting with the Trump administration, I imagine, with Kellogg, maybe with Trump himself. I don't know. But what do you think is going on here?

Is he taking the deal to the Americans? I mean, the Americans know what's in the deal, but he's taking it to them. He's going to get advice from Kellogg. He's going to get advice from Rubio, from Trump. What a mess. Just one final thought. What a mess Trump has found himself in. Yes, exactly.

He's gone all in with Kellogg. And now he can't get out there. There are other reports, Alexander, that I'm also. reading, once again, I can't verify this. These are reports that just came up before we recorded this video, which are saying that once again, Trump is frustrated, he's upset with the process and how things are going. He was expecting a ceasefire after these meetings, and he hasn't gotten it, and now he's hinting again at walking away. He's stuck in this. He is absolutely stuck in this, and he's even more stuck in this from the drone strikes into Russia and that true social post

He really, really screwed this one up big time. Your thoughts on this. What's going on here? What is the strategy? What are they looking to do here? What are your thoughts on everything? Once again, if all of this is verified because the Yermak trip, once again, I'm not 100% on this. No.

But even if Yermak is not going to D.C., even if the reports about Trump being. frustrated are not true. I mean, it doesn't in fact ultimately change the reality of what you've just said. This is a complete mess. He's had those proposals from the Russians since before he became president. The Russian proposals, in essence, have not changed since the 14th of June last year during the election, in other words. They've steadily hardened since then, not so far, decisively so, but they have become harder, harsher and harsher. And we said, I think it was in August of last year. We said that Trump should not get involved in negotiating, trying to negotiate the end of

the conflict in Ukraine. He should simply walk away from the conflict in his own interests and those of the United States. Let the Europeans and the European. Ukrainians, sort it out, wash his hands of the whole thing, say it's Joe Biden's war, and not get drawn into this negotiation mess at all. He didn't do that. He listened to Kellogg. He listened to Rubio. Kellogg told him all sorts of stories about how the Russians are suffering massive losses and that their economy is cracking and that they're on the brink of the hyperinflation

and all of that, and said to Trump, of course they will accept a freeze of the conflict in the way that I'm proposing. And Trump went along with this. And here he is. I don't know how he gets out of this. I mean, if he walks away now, he will be blamed when the eventual collapse comes. I mean, they will attach the blame on him. If he sticks with this and becomes Joe Bollap.

Biden, he'll also be blamed when the curtain comes down. I mean, one way or the other, I mean, he completely misjudged this whole process and misunderstood it right from the beginning. But there it is. That's what we do. What if he takes the deal before you continue? What if he takes this deal? Let's just assume.

Then what happens? Well, it would be the least worst outcome. It would be the least worst outcome for this. United States. But of course, in order to do that, he would have to put massive pressure on the Ukrainians to force them to do this. And that would be extremely ugly. The Europeans would be furious and they would be absolutely complaining about it. And of course, he would risk an open break with the near-cons in Washington. So, arguably, I would say, you know, if I was Donald Trump, if I was advising Donald Trump, that is what I would be telling Donald Trump to do.

I would say, Mr. President, this is your least bad course. But of course, you know, there would be severe political damage. It would probably continue for a long time. We would probably see all the old claims about some kind of Russian connection between Trump and Putin revived again. It would be the least bad outcome, but it would come at a heavy political, Just a second. The electoral base would support him.

The people at the Federalist and Marjorie Taylor Green and the Maga Buhnman would strongly support him over this. I reckon he would prevail in the end. But as I said, it would not be easy. And he would not have had to go down this route at all if he'd done this, we suggest. and actually kept away. But there it is. I mean, that's what...

Now, coming back to these reports about Yamak going to Washington, and I don't know that he is, I should say, I have also seen these reports, but I don't know whether they're true or not. My guess is that what Yomak is going to try and do when he gets to Washington is he's going to try to tell the administration, look, we went to Istanbul,

you forced us to go to Istanbul, you told us that we had no, option but to go to Istanbul. But you saw what the outcome was. Instead of the Russians agreeing to ceasefire, they came up with all of these demands. This has to end. This is causing instability in Ukraine itself. It's creating doubts about US support for Ukraine. We have to end this now. What we need is telling the Russians, either you agree to that 30-day ceasefire, unconditional ceasefire that we insist on, or we get Lindsay Graham's and Blumenthal's bone crunching sanctions, and this is where it must stop. I think that is going to be the message, Yamak is going to try to

get to Washington. In other words, try to maneuver Trump to impose those massive sanctions against Russia, which he clearly doesn't want to impose, because this is what he's been constantly trying to avoid doing ever since he himself designed. again on Kellogg's advice. It's there, by the way, in the April 2024 article that Kellogg wrote, that you threaten the Russians with further sanctions if they don't capitulate. Trump never thought he would have to act on that threat. And they're now telling you, now, Mr. President, the point has come when you've got to do it. But don't worry, Russian economy is a house of cards. If you do that, it will collapse and all will be well.

Others in the administration now. Otherwise, J.D. Vance has said that this is illusion. He is right. But that is what I suspect, yeah, Mark, he's going to go to argue for in Washington if he does indeed go there, which I think is likely. It looks like he is. Just one quick question. This video is running long, but I have to ask you because I'm kind of curious as to what happens to the United States if they follow Lindsay Graham's lead. What happens when they put the 500% sanctions?

Well, to repeat again, these are not sanctions against Russia. They're sanctions against China and India and other countries that buy Russian oil. The Russian economy will sail through. I mean, the one effect is going to have is it's going to increase the oil price and Russian oil will continue to reach the markets, may be in reduced volumes, but the Russians have shown repeatedly that they can adjust to any sanctions challenge that is imposed. on them and they will adjust to these. We did a whole program about this some months ago when these sanctions were first proposed. What it will do will enrage the Chinese. It will

lock the United States into an economic war with China. Again, exactly something that Donald Trump has been trying to get out of. And Scott Besson, the Treasury Secretary, clearly doesn't want. And well, it will create shortages of Chinese goods in American shops. We're already getting reports of supplies of rare earths starting to run out and that this creating problems in supply chains. There was a big article in the Financial Times about two weeks ago on this very topic. So we're going to get all of that. And all of that to achieve nothing, because to repeat again, it is not going to make the Russians

changed their stance. And there was a Security Council debate over the weekend. And it was very interesting, very striking there, that the Chinese delegate came out and spoke more strongly in support of the Russians than the Chinese have ever done up to now. And India, real quick? India too. I am sure that the Indians will want to continue to buy Russian oil. The Indians will be furious.

The Turks will be furious. I mean, Erdogan's entire economic policy hinges upon importing gas from Russia. so that he can re-export it to Europe. That's what enables him to pay his bills. He's going to be absolutely furious about this. I have to admit, there's a part of me that's curious to see what happens if Lindsay Graham gets his way. I hope not, but... No, I hope not, too.

I mean, because obviously... You know, with the neocons, they always get their way and they make a mess of everything. Yes. They always get their way. Absolutely. And then, of course, there'll be chaos in the markets, and they will never apologize, and they will look for other people to blame, and they'll blame the Turks and the Chinese and the Indians and whomever.

They'll blame weak people in the administration, and they'll demand even more. And because that's all that the neocons are ever able to do. If it all goes horribly wrong, don't expect Lindsay Graham to come along and say he was wrong and apologize and to agree to a retreat. He's not going to. And of course, they will continue to say, well, we've got to keep this going because, you know, the Russians will crack and we have no option. And we're the mighty and ever powerful, ever powerful United States and what we say must prevail because that's who we are. We can't retreat from that. What have we said about them many times? No reverse gear. That's the nature of what these people are. And you must never expect.

otherwise. Yeah. He'll never apologize. The American people will suffer. Yeah. That's what's going to happen. Yeah. And he'll get reelected.

He'll get reelected to the Senate. And Trump will campaign with him. Absolutely. And Trump will support him and endorse him. Yeah. Even though the sanctions are going to, are going to just make an absolute mess of things. Yes. For the United States.

Yes. Exactly. Exactly. You're completely correct. I mean, never any penalty for failure for these people. And there it is. I mean, that's true. We'll end the video there.

Take care.