The Duran Podcast - Kremlin debates next move, reaching the Dnieper

Episode Date: June 9, 2025

Kremlin debates next move, reaching the Dnieper

All right, Alexander, let's talk about what is going on in Ukraine and the conflict in Ukraine and recent statements from various Russian officials. The other day, the Russian ambassador to the UK, he was giving an interview to Sky News, and he brought up the topic of the bridges over the Dnieper River. And he hinted at the fact that Russia could make its way to the Deneper. He said that this is still a special military operation, but if this ever was upgraded, then what Russia could do is they could go all the way to the Deneper, as well as destroy the bridges, cutting off Ukraine over the Denebara to the east, from west to east.

So we have these various statements coming out from the Russian side, talking about the advance all the way to the Dnieper River, and we have the actual progress that is being made on the ground towards the Deneper River. Actually, Denepro Petrovsk, to be more precise, the progress being made in that region. So, what

is going on here? Well, I think the first thing to say is that the Russians have entered Neapro-Betrovsk, NEPROV region, if you prefer. They are now there, and the Russian defense ministry is saying that they're going to continue their offensive. So,

So it's no longer a question of whether the Russians are going to advance deep into this new region. The fact is that they are now doing so, and it is getting the official stamp of approval. And it's clearly something that has been coordinated and discussed in Russia and that is on its way. Now, the other thing is that there are lots of reports circulating, that there is going to be a meeting of the Russian Security Council. very soon. This is the top decision-making body in Russia. Putin himself chairs it and that the Russians are going to be formulating their response to the various actions that Ukraine has taken over the last 10 days or so. The attacks on the railway bridges, the attacks on the air bases, the fact that Ukraine has been making very negative statements about the Istanbul process, the fact

that they are delaying, at the very least delaying, perhaps trying to call off completely a prisoner exchange that was discussed and apparently agreed at the last meeting in Istanbul on the 2nd of June. The fact that they are refusing for the moment to accept the 6,000 bodies of killed Ukrainian soldiers that the Russians are offering to return. Now, Kirila Budanov, the Ukrainian intelligence chief is saying that Ukraine is going to have to accept these bodies of these soldiers. The very way in which he's put it, however, shows how deeply reluctant Ukraine is to accept them, which is interesting and that there's clearly a discussion about this, and I suspect outside pressure upon Ukraine to accept, there may be some domestic pressure too. But all of this

taken together, all of this is pointing increasingly to the Russians, perhaps not publicly upgrading the SMO, but starting to take more aggressive measures against members of the Ukrainian leadership. I have been told that there are now discussions about getting authorization for the Russian security services and others to actually target specifically. top Ukrainian officials who are seen in Moscow as being involved in various incidents inside Russia itself. And the statements by the Russian ambassador in Britain, who is undoubtedly being briefed, and he's clearly being used here as his spokesman. He's a senior figure, by the way, within the Russian diplomatic service.

Anyway, that clearly points to a Russian plan now for victory and for pushing to the Dnieper, cutting off the Ukrainian forces east of the Dnieper. The Russians absolutely do have that capability. And for the Russians, in other words, moving towards outright victory. And that, it seems to me, is where this is going. It's more than a buffer zone that's been talked about in the NEPRA region now. It is clearly in advance all the way to the river. in order for for this to happen the advance towards the deneber as well as Russia perhaps

going after say the the officials the top officials in in the Ukraine government that they believe have have committed acts of terrorism inside of Russia wouldn't Russia have to upgrade the SMO like legally officially upgrade it right it's it's very interesting because I had been told that, in fact, if we're talking about targeting specific officials, there is already a law that was passed in the mid-2000s, which would enable the Russian president after he's obtained authority from the Federation Council to do that without specifically targeting, changing the designation of the SMO.

And there might be logic to that, because, of course, that would mean that this could be done covertly without providing express warnings to Ukrainian officials that they are going to be targeted in that kind of way. So the legal machinery, if you like, the legal mechanisms to do this already exist independently of the SMO, of changing the status of the SMO. of changing the status of the SMO. However, if you are going to advance deep into NEPRO region,

reach the river and above all destroy the bridges. And again, it's been explained to me that the reason the Russians up to now have not been destroying the bridges, I mean, let's say reason. It's the rationalisation for not destroying the bridge. is that it is inconsistent with the original terms of the SMO, which spoke about not attacking civilian infrastructure. I mean, very much, we're talking about a very legalistic country.

So if you're going to destroy the bridges, you absolutely do need to upgrade the SMO. And the very fact that this topic is now being talked about suggests that this is probably in the pipeline. I'm going to make a guess. There's going to be discussions about this in Moscow. I suspect that a decision is going to be made. I suspect that decision is going to be at some point over the next few months or weeks or days to upgrade the SMO.

And eventually that will lead to the destruction of the bridges. And I'm going to also suggest that maybe that was the plan for some time already anyway. And that the targeting of the officials is something that's now been added on in the right, light of the recent events. It doesn't make much sense. I mean, I understand what you're saying about the logic of the Russian administration, the rationale, is that it went contrary to the SMO, the original agreement of the terms of the special military operation, the objectives of the special military operations.

How do you square the fact? How do you argue the fact that you have 40 countries at war with Russia? 40 countries trying to destroy Russia, openly admitting that they want to break up Russia. And you do have a string of attacks and very violent attacks against civilians in Russia over the past three years. And the rationale from the Putin administration and his officials is that they didn't want to win this war for the past three years because it goes against the terms, the fine print of the special military operation. That sounds shocking. It sounds shocking.

And it really does make the point that a lot of hardliners have when it comes to how Putin has been going about this special military operation, which is for some reason, he's been slow. walking this is, which is what hardliners say. Absolutely. Hardliners have an issue with the way he's been conducting. I'm not saying which one's right or wrong. I'm just saying with hardliners inside of Russia say about Putin. But Putin does have huge support as well. I mean, he has overwhelming support. And I've just been looking at the latest opinion polls. And his support levels are rising, by the way. They're now again, well over 80%. So, I mean, that's something to bear in mind. I think the

to understand about this is that this is an almost continuous topic of discussion in Russia. There are obviously people with many different views about this in Moscow. There are people who have favoured slow walking this because they're worried about what Russia's external allies will say, who are worried about severing completely the option of coming to a negotiated solution with some people in Ukraine who may be in discussion with some people in Ukraine. There are others, particularly within the military, who want to end the conflict much more quickly and who want to destroy the NEPA bridges because that would have isolated the Ukrainian army east of the NEPA. There's also, I suspect, in fact, I've heard this, that there's also

concern that if you act too quickly about this, you will leave a substantial military force that Ukraine has west of the Dnieper. And if you destroy the bridges too early, that would enable it to be preserved. And that might become a long-term threat as well. So you want to put yourself in a position where you are west of the Nipa yourself, bikes, for example, in Hurson region, so that you're in a position to take action against this force before you destroy these bridges. There's been a lot of complicated, apparently, discussion and argument, and some of it, I suspect, has been extremely heated with people taking different views and arguing about these things, with the military expressing their own views and others.

perhaps on the civilian side pushing back. I don't think this is a decision made by one individual. And I think that the nature of Putin's government, which people perhaps don't fully understand, is that he likes to work within a consensus, within the top level of the decision-making process in Moscow. And that is a very complicated one, with an awful lot of people involved

and talking about things and discussing things together. But the point is this, we are now in a situation where the Ukrainian military east of the Dnieper is already starting to collapse. The very fact that the Russians have entered the Neapar region is now in itself changing the balance. The fact that the Russians are making further advances in Sumi region is changing the balance. There's been a change of administration, as we know in Washington. The Russians have been following the discussion that has been happening in Washington.

They're getting the sense, I think, now that the United States, the administration is finally coming to the view that there's really, really no point in continuing. The effort to sustain Ukraine, apparently Ukraine is not going to get more patriot missile systems. it looks as if talk of further sanctions is being abandoned. In fact, the talk now again is about relaxing sanctions and about restoring air links. And I think the balance of discussion in Moscow has probably moved, especially after the events from Ukraine over the last two weeks towards finally ending this thing once and for all. And Putin himself said this a couple of weeks ago, if you remember. He said to the military that this is, the time has now come to bring this conflict to an end. And he used the word war in another discussion.

So you probably get the sense that the debates and the arguments that take place in Moscow are now coming to the point of being resolved. Yeah, I mean, the whole topic of the bridges and the thought that. that you would, by cutting off the bridges, you would leave much of the Ukraine military on the other side of Dombas, you would leave it intact because Russia would not be able to get to it. I think that's wrong, isn't it? I mean, Russia has, from the north, they're able to engage with whatever military is on the other side of the river. And also from the south, they're not dependent. Yes. I mean, the Russian military is not dependent on the rivers, on the bridges, it seems like the West and the Ukraine military and NATO, they're dependent on the bridge.

I don't know. I could be wrong about this. Maybe they see the bridges purely as a civilian infrastructure, and if that is the case, then you don't go after that. Well, the original terms of the SMO, which have never been published, by the way, and I think this is a thing to say, when Putin declared an SMO, there would have been original. provisions in it, an instruction given to the military, which we have never seen, and which sets out apparently very clearly what the military is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do. Now, as I understand it, both terms have been modified at regular intervals, and I'm going to make a guess that the topic of the deeper bridges is probably regularly brought up, and there's

probably been an enormous amount of argument and discussion about this. It's probably also fair to say, by the way, that back in the spring of 2022, Russia might not have actually found it that easy to destroy the NEPA bridges. I'm not saying that they couldn't have done it then, but they didn't have the hypersonic missile stoppiles that they have today. They certainly didn't have Woreshni missiles that they did, that they do today. They didn't have large numbers, huge numbers of precision-guided bombs. Destroying bridges is not easy to do. It might have exposed parts of the Russian Air Force to attacks. So, you know, we have a constantly evolving situation with the SMO. So the SMO is not cast in stone. As I said, it, it, it, it,

changes until eventually it reaches a point where it's no longer an SMO anymore and it's upgraded to something else, a counter-terrorist operation maybe, or something even more stronger than that. But on the topic of allowing the Ukrainians to retain positions west of the Dnieper, I do know that that has been discussed. And the point is, yes, the Russians can reach areas in the north because part of Russia, apparently, is west of the deeper. And of course, Belarus entirely is. But the logistics there would be very difficult. And this is what happened, by the way, in February, March 2022, that the Russians found that it was not easy to move large numbers of troops west of the deeper in the northern regions.

because the roads were bad and the area was heavily forested and there were rivers and that kind of thing. And south, in the southern regions, in Hurson region and Zaporozia region, the major bridge that they controlled there was the Antonovsky Bridge. And there was the Novayakarovka Dam bridge. And those have been destroyed. And those were not located by Ukraine. By Ukraine. But these were destroyed. were destroyed and in any event that isn't a particularly easy area to advance from because it's

connected it's contained by other by many many other smaller rivers which basically form part of the estuaries of the NEPA and the Nista you really want if you want to advance deeper westwards you want to be able to cross the NEPA in a more central area of Ukraine. So, look, until we get access to all of the internal discussions that have been taking place in Moscow over the last three years, it's all but impossible for us to reproduce all of those discussions or to find out what the various different people have been advocating and what arguments have been made. Probably there's been divisions

between the military and civilians. Probably there are divisions amongst the civilians and amongst sections of the military. Trying to second-guess all of these discussions is going to be incredibly difficult. All I will say is that the indications now

are that we are at a tipping point and that the Russians are going to start taking strong moves like this than they have been up to now because they sense that things are going very, very strongly that way and at the moment has come to do this. Yeah, well, we'll see. I mean, you know, definitely the special military operation, it's my sense of things that the SMO was focused on looking for a diplomatic solution. Yes, yes.

It wasn't focused on a military victory. No. And probably for the past three plus years, the focus has been on a diplomatic solution. and I believe the Putin administration was hoping that the Europeans and the Americans, but more so the Europeans would come to their senses. Maybe they're just now starting to realize that the Europeans are not going to come to their senses. Well, maybe they're just starting to realize this. At least if you go off of what they're saying, it seems like they finally realized it's going to be very difficult to be friends with the Germans and the French in the foreseeable future.

but it wasn't made for a military victory, the special military operation. It was made to get Ukraine, the Europeans, the Americans to the table so that they could come up with a negotiated diplomatic solution. Well, can I provide what I think is a very, very general timeline because as I said, we can't fill in all the details. But I think certainly the first five months of the SMO were entirely about seeking a diplomatic solution. I mean, you know, the troops were sent to Kiev and all of that. We now know that they numbered around 2000 initially, not the vast army that everybody was saying. The Russian army at that time numbered around 150,000 men that were sent to Ukraine. Putin has straightforwardly admitted recently that this was no.

we're near enough to occupy the whole of Ukraine or to win a complete military victory there. So the first five months were all about that. It was all about security, preventing Donbass from being rolled over and obtaining a diplomatic solution. Then in the summer of 2022, the Biden administration began to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons. And, uh, we had the lead up to the offensives that took place first in Harikov and then Hirsson region in the autumn and then there was the big Ukrainian offensive organized by the Americans and commanded by the Americans that we know in the summer of 2023. So then the whole strategy was to counter these offensives and to defeat those offensives.

Then after those offensives, I remember that in the autumn of 2023, Russian officials, including Lavrov, began to say that the only outcome to this war was that Ukraine accept Russian terms or be completely defeated. That began after the defeat of the summer offensive of 2023. Then in June 2024, Putin spelled out the terms. I noticed the gap. So there was probably a lot of discussion in Moscow as to exactly what those terms should be.

But anyway, in June 2024, Putin spelled out the terms, which are, you know, the 14th of June, 2024 proposals, Istanbul Plus, in other words. And then, of course, we had the complicating issue, which was Donald Trump's victory in the elections, he's coming to power, his proposals for ceasefires, and all of that sort of thing, which may have, will have inevitably caused

and adjustments in the diplomatic process. I think in the Russian decision-making process, it will have undoubtedly absorbed time and energy deciding all of this. But now we've moved to that point where I think the Russians are now looking beyond the June 2024 proposals. They're now decided diplomatic solutions are not going to happen.

We've seen what Trump could come up with and he hasn't really been able to come up with very much. We've seen what the Ukrainians are up to. We've had two meetings with them in Istanbul and they've come up with nothing. They haven't even rescinded their own decree which prohibits negotiations. So the point has now been reached that we must move forward. and move towards a outright military solution. And the fact that the Russian ambassador to London, who, as I said, is an important man, is now talking about the destruction of the Dnieper bridges,

that tells us that the planning to do that has already begun. All right. So what does Ukraine think about this? What does the collective West, the United States, Europe think about this? You know, the Ukraine leadership. they're watching the watching on as the as the Russians are saying that they're going to to ramp things up and maybe maybe even ramp things up against some of the people in the in the Ukraine leadership I mean I mean what do they what do you what do you think they're saying or what do you think they're they're worrying about obviously I mean let's

let's start with the Americans however because the Americans bear in mind that this has been in most respects up to now a conflict between the United States and Russia. I mean, there's been the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but it's been a conflict between the United States and Russia. I think the Americans are finally coming round. I'd say the Americans. I mean, again, the United States, just like Russia, just as Moscow is a place where many discussions take place. Washington is exactly the same, even more so, far more so, in fact. But the Americans are gradually, I think, working towards a coherent position, which is that they're not going to be able to sweet talk the Russians into agreeing to a frozen conflict.

The Russians don't want it. The Ukrainians don't want it either. We come to the Ukrainians. shortly, at least not a frozen conflict in the way that the Americans wanted to be a frozen but there isn't going to be a frozen conflict in Ukraine, that the outcome is going to be a Russian military victory. I think there's been a decision also in the US that sanctions, that, you know, Lindsay Graham's sanctions are unworkable. And the White House is now pushing back on them, apparently. And we're getting reports that people in Congress are starting to cool on this idea. So I think that the Russians have, sorry, the Americans have finally come around to the view that we suggested back in August of 2024, that the best thing that the

Americans can do now is to walk away, wash their hands of the whole thing. So it's all Biden's fault that we got involved in this mess. It's not Trump's war. It's not this administration's and just let events take their course whilst trying in some way to get back into a dialogue with Moscow. And I mean, we've had Trump's very latest comments. We've had a very interesting interview by a man called Dr. Sumatra Mitra, who apparently advises the administration and is at least very influential about people, there and he actually said that, you know, the United States should walk away and this has been his opinion all along. It hasn't, but that's, let's not go there. I mean, but anyway, that's

what he's now saying. And I think that the Americans are gradually, very reluctantly, of course, there's going to be lots of pushback and all of that. They're gradually moving towards that position now. I think in Kiev, it's different. The dynamic is very different. I think that, the predominant attitude amongst the Ukrainian leadership is that they would rather go down to complete defeat than compromise. It's Germany, 1945, all over again, that defeat is somehow psychologically easier to accept than compromise. and if that means that some people who are in the Ukrainian leadership are going to lose their lives, I think they will probably accept that. I think that's the kind of mindset that's taken hold there,

because compromising in the way that the Russians are demanding is not only a colossal defeat for Ukraine, but it is an end of the entire Banderite project. I think that from this point onwards, the priority for the leadership in Kiev is not going to be to try to find ways to end the war or to win the war. It is to maintain control in Ukraine right up until the very bitter end. And I think that is probably what we're going to start to see. As for the Europeans, they're all over the place. I think Ushula and Mautz are looking to expand the war. They're still deluded enough to believe that some kind of way can be found to turn this round.

I think probably in Britain, there are probably people who still think that way. Also, I think others are more realistic. I think the people in the Baltic states and in Scandinavia are now looking to the next war against Russia, which is going to be fought out in the Baltic, and it's not going to be the Ukraine war any longer. either the Europeans are all over the place. And to be frank, I don't get the impression that the Europeans are at all interested, at least not the major European powers, Britain, France, Germany, are interested at the moment in some kind of rapprochement with the Russians

or coming to some kind of understanding with them. On the contrary, their priority over the next year at least is going to be, be to try to prevent the Americans from moving forward to a reestablishment of good relations with Russia. That is going to be even more important to them from now on than trying to hold back the Russians in Ukraine or even preparing for war in the Baltic. So that's, I think, where we are, the Americans starting to understand, or at least a consensus starting to develop in the US, that everything's been tried, everything has been failed, more sanctions don't work, more Patriot missile deliveries don't work. Let's walk away from this, blame it all on Biden

and Blinken and Sullivan and all of those people, see whether something can be restored from the wreckage by at least re-establishing a channel to the Russians, even if we don't make friends with them again, with the Ukrainians, as I said, a glorious defeat, which they can talk about and preserve the myth of heroic Ukraine, going down in battle, betrayed by its allies against the Russians. And lastly, as I said, the Europeans, unable to formulate a response, but absolutely committed.

nonetheless to a long conflict with Russia. I think that's basically where we are. A long conflict with Russia. And indefinite. Or a long conflict. Or the Europeans are committed to using Russia in order to go to conflict against their own civil, against their own people. Well, well, the one, probably where this is going.

As well, the one, as we've discussed, as we've discussed in recent programs, the one follows from the other. I mean, you need the Russian. Russian scarecrow to keep your entire European project going. And we'll be discussing this in other programs. But the European project, I mean, people should understand this. We'll say this again. And I think we need to say this again and again and again.

The EU is no longer any kind of economic association or trade association or anything of that kind. It is an attempted state or empire or whatever you want to call it, a geopolitical project, which is information and which is now basically warring against the peoples of Europe themselves, and they need the Russian scarecrow to justify doing that. Even Ursula the other day called it the EU project. Oh, the EU project. By the way, just to say, I mean, you know, who was it who coined the expression, project, Ukraine? Who was it who coined the expression project, a project EU?

who was it who first mentioned the Olensky curse, which I now see being used all the time, including in mainstream media, by the way. Of course, they say the Zelensky curse. But anyway, where do all these expressions come from? I just mentioned, I just ask these questions. No, because she's, yes, as you say, she's calling it outright a project.

Project, yeah. Not even a union anymore to be quite honest. I know, I know, I know. I know. Who knows? Maybe they'll call it the EP instead of the EU. I know. Undergo name change.

All right, we'll end the video there. The durand.com. We are on Rumble Odyssey, bitch, shoot, telegram, and X. Go to the Durant Shop, pick up some merch, like what we are wearing in this video update. The link is in the description box down below. Take care.