The Duran Podcast - Macron or Merz, who will rule over Europe?

Episode Date: December 22, 2025

Macron or Merz, who will rule over Europe?The Duran: Episode 2418

All right, Alexander, let's talk about what is going on in Brussels in the EU. An interesting article from the Financial Times talking about a German-French split, talking about how Macron, according to a German diplomat, how Macron stabbed Mertz in the back. Because Macron, he decided to stay quiet in the run-up to the discussions on on taking the Russian frozen assets. And then when the time came to make the decision, Macron, he sided with Maloney, actually, Maloney, Orban, Fizzo, Babich, Maltosipers, Bulgaria.

Okay. Interesting that Maloney was also thrown in there as being in opposition to Mertz. But Macron put an end to Ursula and Mertz is planned to take the Russian frozen assets. It has to be said that Mertz was in the front with regards to taking the Russian frozen assets. He put himself in the front with that idea.

But the EU and Ursula was absolutely aligned with Mertz. Mertz and Ursula do not like each other. They despise each other, but they decided to join forces on the seizing of Russian frozen assets. So Mertz looks like Mertz took the fall. He was thrown under the bus. He's very upset. Macron, in my opinion, is thinking beyond Ukraine.

His goals are to lead Europe, to rule over Europe. And he's even talking about a meeting with Putin now. So anyway, your thoughts on interesting developments in Brussels. And we still don't really know much about the deal that they worked out, the 90 billion loan. I wouldn't call it alone, but anyway, they're calling it a loan. We still don't know much about that as well. So anyway, your thoughts.

We'll turn to the 90 billion loan shortly because it is very actually very interesting and it begs many, many questions. But let's talk about the intrigues, the politics, the fact that this extraordinary affair, what it has done is that it's so ranker and division at the very top of the EU. it's probably split them, and I'm going to suggest it's going to split them indefinitely. Now, let's start with Mertz. Mertz was a fervid supporter of the seizing of Russian assets idea, of using the Russian assets as collateral for this 140 billion euro loan that we've been hearing so much about. The plan that crashed and burnt last week, but he not only surprised,

supported it, he wrote a long article in the Financial Times in which he said it was originally his idea. So it was his idea. Of course, Ursula, who as you absolutely correctly say, he detests, their longstanding rivals, she insists that it was her idea. A third person, who's Weber, who is the head of the European People's Party in the European Parliament, who's also, of course, German and a CDU politician. He too says it's his idea. See, we have three German politicians, all of them insisting that it is their idea. And as I said, all rivals, all demanding going into the European Council,

insisting that this is how it should be done. They were saying at one point, in fact, they were saying right up until the moment of the start of the council itself, that there was no real plan B. They only put forward this alternative proposal, which we will look into soon. They only put it in because other countries, Maloney basically insisted, and Bart de Vava, the Belgian Prime Minister,

insisted on doing it. Then obviously the legal advice started to pile up. And as I understand it, with a very few exceptions, you'll always find some lawyers who will take contrarian, views, but with very, very few exceptions. The legal advice overwhelmingly was negative against this idea. As we've discussed in programme after programme, Euroclear itself, the IMF and the European

Central Bank said this is a very bad idea. In Britain, the British banks were warning Stama, who was also supporting this idea that it was illegally, extremely risky idea. And Others, others apparently around the world and in Europe were saying the same thing. So it crashed and burned. Now, let us just take a step back and ask ourselves or look at something which happened, which is very, very remarkable. The Chancellor of Germany finds himself opposed by the Prime Minister of Italy and the President of France The Prime Minister of Italy is insisting on fiscal prudence and legal process.

She is backed by the President of France against a Chancellor, a German Chancellor, who is insisting upon the adoption of a policy that is neither fiscally prudent, nor legally, nor legally viable. Now, that is standing reality on its head. I have never known at all at any point in the history of the EU, a situation where it has been this way round. Normally, it is the Germans who insist on fiscal prudence, on financial caution,

and who insist that the rules must be followed. this time it is the opposite. When Mertz goes into a meeting and demands something that even Maloney and Macron think is too reckless and too dangerous, then we really are living in a world where the world has been turned upside down. Now, what has happened is that Mertz, of course, has been isolated. He has been shown not just to the other members of the European Council, but to the German people as somebody who cannot deliver. He promised people in Germany that the proposal, the funding of Ukraine, was no longer going to be at their expense.

He said that he would find some clever magic to make it possible to fund Ukraine through use of the Russian assets. He made all sorts of claims that the funding would be funneled primarily to Germany, ultimately, because it was the Germans who were going to take the contracts for the new weapons deliveries that were going to be financed through this scheme. So this was going to help his policy or building up the German military industrial economy. And of course, he's failed. He's failed. He couldn't bring the others along.

with him because the plan that he proposed was too reckless and too extreme, even for Emmanuel Macron. So he is looking at this moment in time, in Germany, at this time, in Germany, I would suggest as a reckless and over-ambitious chancellor. And of course, what he's doing, unsurprisingly, is he's running off, and he's pointing fingers, and he's pointing fingers at Macron and Maloney, and we have these words about betrayal now floating around. Now, Macron is not going to take that well. Maloney is not going to take that well either. Ursula and the others of Weber,

who must have assumed that they could support this proposal because Merz was backing it, and Germany always gets what it wants. out of the European Council. They must also now have doubts about Mautz's ability to see these things through. And I have to say within the coalition itself, amongst some of the people in the CDU, I'm going to say that I think there must be serious doubts now about Mouts himself and about the kind of chancellor they have. So this is a disaster for him. I mean, politically, and you could see that he's now talking to his friends in the Financial Times,

which, by the way, backed this scheme. I mean, they were fervently supporting it. And they gave Matt's space to write his article in which he claimed it was his idea. So he's now going to the financial tribes. He's trying to give himself an alibi. He's trying to make it seem that, you know, he was this great hero. who was portrayed at the last moment by Macron. And, well, there we are.

So that is maths. Macron himself doesn't come out well from this either, because, of course, he could have stopped this right in its tracks. He could have said weeks ago that he backs Bart de Vava, the Prime Minister of Belgium, that this is a disastrously bad idea. In France, the French had previously suggested that it was a very dangerous thing to touch the Russian assets.

But no, he basically drifted along because he didn't want to be seen to be too hard line, rather not hardline enough. He didn't want to be out of step with mouth and Ursula. And what appears to have happened is that the people of the finance ministry, the prime minister, the people within the German, the French, sorry, financial world, tell him this is a terrible idea. If we do this thing and it fails and the Russians get a court judgment against Belgium, and we are going to be on the hook for billions in extra liabilities,

given the state of finances in France at the present time, we're going to be in a mess. We are already in a mess. We're going to be in a far bigger mess, maybe an uncontrollable mess. So right at the very end, they told him you've just got to stop. And he's now trying to cover his failure here by talking grandly in the way that Macron does. oh, now the moment has come to talk to Putin. Putin is, of course, entirely to blame for the war. It was entirely right up to this moment that we didn't talk to Putin because Putin was the

aggressive, but now that this talk of a ceasefire, of which there is no talk on the Russian side of a ceasefire, but now that there is talk of a ceasefire, maybe this is the great moment when I can come forward and appear to be the leader of Europe again. Merz has been humiliated, but I am the strong one. I can come forward. I will be the person who will be able to start negotiations with the Russians. I can't imagine that Merz is listening to any of that with anything other than complete fury. The only person, the only two people who come out well from this within the European Council, well the three. One is, obviously Orban, but Orban has been opposed to these things right from the start.

The second, it must be said, is Bart De Weaver, the prime minister of Belgium. And the third was Maloney, who acted at exactly the right moment and killed this thing. Yeah, De Weber comes out real big. He comes out very strong from this, even though he was under a lot of pressure. Orban. Everyone knows Orban's position. and Maloney, she took the right side. She's had troubles with Orban.

They were friends. They were very close, and then they had a split. But she decided to go with Urbana on this one, and she chose correctly. Macron is a flip-flopper. Everyone knows he's a flip-flopper, and that's how he played this. He was quiet, and he was talking a lot of escalation with Russia. and then he started to see that the tide was shifting against the escalation, at least when it comes to the assets. And I imagine Lagarde also told him to not go through with this, right?

So you have a France contingent there with Lagarde who's probably telling Macron you're going to be in big trouble if we're going to be in big trouble if we go through with this seizing of the Russian assets. The reason that they could do this to Germany and to Mertz, the reason that Macron can flip-flop to a different position is because Germany is no longer the strong country in Europe. No, of course not. This would never have happened with Merkel. No. And Merkel and Macron hated each other.

They despised each other. Absolutely. But Macron never decided to cross Merkel in this way, the way he's crossing Mertz. And finally, I thought that Mertz was a finance. guy, right? He's the Black Rock finance wizard. It seems like he doesn't know anything about finance. Absolutely. I get to say it. I mean, everybody who remembers are many years of discussions about Merkel when she was Chancellor of Germany. No, that I can't stand her. I think

that she was a disastrous figure for Germany and that she is the ultimate author of many of the problems that Germany faces today. But I never ever doubted, and we never doubted on these programs, that Merkel was, you know, in some respects a strong leader who knew exactly what she was doing and never always knew how far to go and when to stop. She would never have embraced a scheme like this. If it had ever been proposed, she would have killed it immediately. She would have said to Ursula and Weber and Kyakalis and all of those people,

no way are we going to do something like this. It would have been impossible to repeat again a situation where the German Chancellor proposes a plan, a fiscal or financial plan, which is seen as too reckless by, of all people, Emmanuel Macron tells you a great deal about Friedrich Mertz and where he is leading Germany and you're absolutely right. Germany's

weakening. Germany's piling on debt. It is de-industrializing rapidly, as we've discussed in program after program. Mertz himself is unpopular and this affair is going to make him in the long run

in the not so long run more unpopular still, and he's starting to lose support within the EU Council. I don't remember, by the way, a recent time when Germany made a proposal to the EU Council and failed. I mean, no doubt it has happened, but I've never remembered it happening. I mean, it was always, Merkel always knew how to manoeuvre and to propose things in a way that they would carry.

Metz, obviously, doesn't know how to do that. He's a hopeless diplomat. And as for him being the wizard of finance, the man who understands how to fund things, how to arrange these things, the man who understands about loans and assets and things of that kind. Well, I'm just absolutely incredulous because it's clear that at this level, at the level of high politics, he doesn't understand anything. And by the way, the scheme they've come up with, well, it's not a catastrophe, like the original scheme that was proposed.

But I'm not at all sure how it's going to work, because there are fundamental problems with it. It's a 90 billion euro loan, we're told. But is that 90 billion that's going to go entirely to Ukraine? Or is it going to repay the 40 or 45 billion euro loan, which, um, that's, you know, which the previous scheme was intending to repay. The G7 loan. The G7 loan.

If it isn't, if it isn't, if that loan is still on the books, if it's being rolled over in some ways, then the actual lending is bigger. I think that's the first point to say. It's not 90 billion. It's more than that. I think it is intended to repay that 45 billion euro, G7 loan.

in which case Zelensky is only getting 45 billion euros. He's not getting 90 billion. He would have got 100 billion euros under the previous plan. He's going to get less than half of that. We've already discussed how even the 100 billion euros would not have been enough to tide him over two years or even one. So that's the first thing. But the second thing is the funding of this.

How is this loan going to be floated? Now, if you go to their statement, they say that this is going to be, this loan is going to be done through some kind of Euro bond scheme, floated on international financial markets through the headway, through headspace provided by the EU budget, which I have no idea what the latter means, what it means, actually what it in fact means is that the European states, apart from Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic who managed to get exemptions. The other European states are on the hook for this land. But what has been proposed is a bond issue, but a bond issue where there is no redemption date, when there is no date given for when these bonds mature and the bondholders get their capital back. because it's only going to be repayable by Ukraine when the Russians pay reparations. That is the redemption date.

That's a redemption date. But, I mean, that is not a date. That's a contingency, a contingency which everybody knows will never happen. So what is the attraction to the international investment community for, what? would make it appealable for them to buy these bonds. I mean, they don't know when they're going to get their money back. I mean, at the very least, it seems to me, they are going to demand a super high rate of interest for buying these bonds. I mean, I simply don't see how else it can be done.

Not only interest rate, Alexander, aren't they also going to demand some sort of collateral, some sort of, of backstop, which would mean that if you're going to take part in this bond, you're going to say, okay, I want a high interest rate. But I also want to know that if Russia does not pay back this loan, then I want money from the EU or I want assets from the EU. Yeah, absolutely. From EU member states, not the EU member states. Absolutely. The Russian assets are now untouchable because, I mean, we've now had a decision, which makes it all but inconceivable legally that they could win a case over them.

So, I mean, the only guarantee, the only asset, the only guarantee would be the member states themselves coming forward with guarantees. That would have to be approved by EU, by national parliaments. So when people say that this is going to take less time than the asset seizure collateral idea, well, I'm not sure. that that is right. So a very high interest loan, I would have thought, with, as you can absolutely rightly say, guarantees from the investors that they will one day get back their money. And I suspect that at some point, in some way, they will insist, I mean, the international investment, the kind of people who buy these bonds, they're not a huge numbers of people. I mean, we all know

who they are. They may seem mainly a big financial institutions. They will say, well, we do. need to know to have some idea of when and how the capital is going to be paid. You know, we understand what you say about, you know, reparations from the Russians, but we can't wait indefinitely for those. We have to have our money back at some point. We have duties, if they're funds, which the vast majority of them are, if we have duties to our own holders, our own fund holders. So we've got, we have got to have much more certainty about this.

Again, this looks like something that was proposed on the back of an envelope. It clearly hasn't been thought through. It'd be very interesting to see how it works. And of course, if it does go to the job, to the German parliament where remember Mertz only has a relatively small majority and where a group of CDU MPs rebelled and didn't support him as Chancellor when he was first proposed. Well, if it goes to the German parliament of the Bundestag, I could quite easily see how there would be trouble.

Mertz is already being mocked in Germany by German media. I mean, they're already mocking Mertz. That's happening right now. So I wouldn't be surprised if we see Ursula start to distance herself from Mertz. I would not be surprised if we see Ursula saying, no, it really was Mertz's idea. That would not shock me either. Mertz does not seem like the sharpest knife in the drawer. And this is following Olyph Schultz, who was definitely not the sharpest knife in the drawer.

But, you know, Mertz, he did that. to himself. Absolutely. So no one is to blame, but Mertz. The numbers for the, for this loan don't add up. I would think if the 40 billion loan to the G7 was, was part of this package to pay back that loan, then it would be in the numbers. They would say that we've decided for $430 billion, a dollar loan or whatever.

140 billion, whatever the amount is that they owe to the G7, I believe it is 40 billion or 45 billion. It would be in there, but they're saying 90 billion euros. Yes. That's what they're saying. So you've got to assume that the 40 billion is in there. Or maybe they're going to work out another arrangement. Maybe they're going to take out another loan. I don't know. But even if that's the case, even if you take out the G7 loan and you're talking about 90 billion, you have all the corruption in there as well, so we're not going to be looking at just 90 billion. But the original plan with the taking of the Russian assets had earmarked more than 50% of the money going to the MIC and going to purchasing weapons through another one of Ursula's

funds, another one of her schemes that she put together. So of the 90 billion, half of that, more than half of that, is going to go to purchasing weapons, which doesn't leave Ukraine with hardly any money to keep the state functioning. Yeah. What is happening is that they're running off against their own limits. National parliaments, one sense, is the beginning to become increasingly restive. The Ukraine, obviously, has an insatiable demand for money. I mean, however much money you give. of it. It's never going to be enough. And they've obviously had to fall. They're caught between these two things. Ukraine's Zelensky's demand for basically unlimited funding and the fact

that they don't have the scope to provide, unlimited funding. But they couldn't go into this meeting on Thursday and not come out and come out of the meeting without some funding for Ukraine. I think they've written this thing out on the back of an envelope. They say 90 billion euros. I don't think they worked it out at all. I don't think they've made any decision. This is my own sense. I don't think they've made any decision at all about the repayment of the G7 loan.

I think they've put that completely to one side because they know that addressing that problem is going to be immensely complicated. Remember, it's a G7 loan. So the Americans of the Japanese also have a say in it, and Japan is in a ropey financial position, and Trump is not going to be happy to provide more lending to Ukraine or to roll over lending to Ukraine. So they are in a very, very tight hole. So I think they came up with this sort of back of the envelope number. and that just got them through what was, in every other respect, a very, very difficult, very, very bad European Council meeting, which I'm going to say, I think it must be.

Logically, it should be the beginning of the end of Friedrich Mounts. Now, I might be wrong here because, of course, German politics is a complicated business, and there's always the worry and the fear that if you start a play, musical chairs, it's going to open up the way for a new election, which the IFD might win. So there's always that problem in Germany, that issue in Germany. But I can't imagine that there aren't many people in Germany, within the CDU especially, who are saying that we have a dud, or perhaps that we use an even more uncomplimentary words, fool, for example, for a chancellor. And he's created a design.

We are now left with this 90 billion euro loan, and none of us really can figure out what that means, at a time when Germany is piling on debts and deindustrialising, and our popularity is sinking. And when we are becoming marginalised within the European Council, and when our relations with the United States are deteriorating, because we have amounts coming along, talking about the end of Pax Americana and Europe, needing to take it all on itself. And one gets the sense that relations between the United States and Germany have never been as fraught as they are now at any point since the end of the Second World War. So I can't help but think that, as I said, this 90 billion euro plan, as you rightly say,

the maths doesn't add up. It doesn't make any kind of sense. No part of this proposal actually make sense. I mean, we may get clarity, but I suspect that any clarity they provide is only going to result in a new set of problems and potentially legal challenges in Germany. And there are people in Germany who would bring those legal challenges. And also perhaps open up situations where the Bundestag, the German parliament, has to be involved. I think my senses, Mertz is on the slide now. I wouldn't be surprised if Macron is trying to save his own butt from all of this, from this debacle.

And he sees a small opening to get out of this with himself looking good or at least still intact. He only has one year to write it out. That's all he needs to get through is one more year. And then he's done with being president of France. and he can look forward to being president of the EU, of the commission or whatever, whatever's next for Macron. So I would not be surprised if Macron is saying, you know what, we've lost the war. There's no more money.

Trump is doing his own thing. Let's blame it on Mertz. Let me blame it on Mertz who I don't like anyway. Let me bypass Ursula and Callis. Let me position myself as the reformer, as the reformer, as the negotiator, as the mediator, maybe that will endear me more to Trump. He already has a good relationship with Trump.

It has to be said. So maybe this will bring me closer to Trump. And I could position myself as the person that's ready to talk to Putin. Ursula's not ready. Callis, obviously, can't discuss anything with Russia. Mertz, obviously, is not going to do it. So he can position himself as being the person that finally breaks the cycle, that says, okay, enough.

And I wouldn't be surprised if Macron throws Zelensky under the bus, or throws Ukraine under the bus, either. I would actually say that Macron is more prone to throw Ukraine under the bus than Trump is to throw Ukraine under the bus, because at the end of the day, Macron is now looking at this from his own self-preservation, He's saying, how do I get out of this mess? You're absolutely right. Looking like Napoleon, looking like the statesman.

I don't think he cares about anything else. I don't think he cares about France, about Germany, about the EU, about Ukraine. He's saying this is a small opportunity that I have now to get out of this mess and position myself as the leader of Europe. You are so, so right here. You are so completely right. If you listen and watch and hear and what the French themselves, are writing about Macron. You are absolutely correct. I mean, Macron has only one overriding

obsessive priority, which is the glory of Emmanuel Macron. If throwing Zelensky under the bus is the way to seal that glory, if splitting with his dear friend, Keir Stama in Britain is the way to do it, well, of course he will do it. And he will do it without any hesitation. And you're absolutely right. He could see a German chancellor who is not just in trouble, but in more serious trouble than I think people outside Germany understand. And I mean, he's sinking. And he also sees that there is no real rival to him, or as he believes, in Europe. I mean, he doesn't get on very well with Maloney. He probably hate each other too. But, you know, at the same time, he's French, So he can't, I think, quite believe that Italy of all places can really be the rival of France and the president of France.

And if you can't be Napoleon, the great military genius, well, he can be Talirin. Instead, the great foreign minister of Napoleon, the man who did all the great deals, who brought peace to Europe, who negotiated so brilliantly and successfully the Versailles Treaty. with whom principally? Why were the Russians actually with Tsar Alexander I? So if he said, he can't be Napoleon, he can now be Talirang. He can be the person who goes to Moscow, speaks to Putin, gets the Russians to agree to some great historic compromise. And then Macrault is hailed across Europe as the savior, and including France itself, his reputation is restored. And he becomes, you know, president of Europe, at the very least, perhaps something even more important and resplendent than that.

I am sure that all that is in his mind. And as you rightly said, I mean, he's got this incredible vanity. And he's nowhere near as clever as he believes, obviously, that he's got no wisdom at all. But that's not to say that he doesn't have some intelligence. And he must realize that Europe, the West, is now at its limits. Americans are not giving money. The Americans are not giving weapons. I'm not giving weapons. They're selling weapons, but they're not giving weapons. The EU is hitting its financial limits. Germany is going down. The Russians are advancing. So this is the moment to make the great move, to establish

himself as the peacemaker, the person who sees the reality, who seizes the chance. And that's exactly what did at this European Council meeting. Of course, what he doesn't realize is that the Russians don't take him seriously. I mean, they figured him out long ago. Putin, as it happens, doesn't like him. He's made that very clear in numerous comments. He's, of course, Putin talks about Macron in the way that Putin usually does. He doesn't engage in ad homin. He doesn't engage in ad homin Em attacks, as he's recently pointed out, against leaders. But it's absolutely obvious of the kind of things that Putin has said about Macron the past, that he doesn't like him. And the Russians just don't take him seriously. So yes, Macron can put himself forward as, you know, the great

foreign minister, the Talirah or Metternich of our age. But I mean, he's going to fail in that as well as he's filled in everything else. Yeah, and with Macaron, as we said, he's a flip-flopper. So he can flip right back to the escalation neocon position as well. So, I mean, you have that with Macon. Maloney despises Macaron, but their interests appear to align, and Maloney is also very ambitious as well. Yeah.

And so if she sees that the wind is behind Macron and that everyone else is sinking, she's going to align with Macaron. And obviously, Maloney sees that Orbán. is on the rise and does have the support of Trump, right? At least that's how it looks. She's going to align with Orban's position as well. And as far as Macron not being clever, very true.

But when you compare him to this bunch, he's a freaking genius. Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. I would invite people in Germany to think very hard about the Chancellor they've got. To repeat again, a Chancellor who proposes a plan that is too risky for Italy and France, especially when France is led by someone like Emmanuel Macron,

is someone that the German people have never had up to now, and maybe they shouldn't want to have. Just a second. Yeah, well, you know, the fear of AFD is what keeps Merch in his position with the CDU-CSU. Agreed, agreed. But I think at the very least now, even if they can't ditch him, and I accept that there might be political issues there, I think that other members of the German government, particularly members of the CDU, need to start being a lot more assertive.

And they need to take amounts to one side and say, look, Frerich, this is. going too far. We can't continue along this line if you continue with these crazy schemes, because everything that has been discussed, I mean, the scheme of giving Ukraine money and the money comes back to Germany, because it is ultimately Germany and fuels the German industrial and military revival. That's also a scheme. I mean, these crazy schemes, which is a very un-German thing, I mean, un-German in terms of post-war German politics. These schemes are just unworkable. They are only creating trouble and problems.

You've got to stop. We've just got to stop. And we need to sort out our relations with the Americans, all this anti-American rhetoric that you're slipping into is also a big mistake. You can see how Maloney, I mean, Maloney is very, very careful to keep her relations with Trump as good as possible. I mean, she is not trying to cut across what Trump is doing. So, Germany always used to be very careful not to get on the wrong side of the US. And we've got to stop this as well.

And we've got to find a way back, both with the Americans, and back to some kind of stability in Germany. And in Europe, and maybe, maybe just possibly, at some point we might have to speak to the Russians as well. Though doing that in Germany is going to be incredibly difficult. And getting Mets to do it, I would have thought would be all but impossible. Yeah, I mean, from what I've understood, I don't think there's anyone in the CDU-CSU who is. was ready to take merch aside and give him that talk. I mean, it seems to me that everyone in the party is drinking the war with Russia Kool-Aid. Yes, I know. Though I would say that many of the people who are talking in this way now used to talk completely differently just a few years ago.

So as I said, what they're actually thinking is another thing. I mean, they're going along with the rhetoric at the moment. Maybe this part of their minds. I hope there is. I mean, I say all of this because, as you know, I have a liking for Germany. I hope that some of them are just going along with the flow, flowing with the current at the moment. And, well, they now see that the current is sweeping them far out to sea, where if they continue, they will all drown. That's what I hope they can see.

if morality and principle and a sense of responsibility for Europe doesn't do that, maybe a sense of self-preservation will do it instead. But anyway, we'll see what they do. Well, you know, just the final thought, if Macron has the guts, has the balls to do it, and I doubt he does. But if he really is clever, then he will seize the opportunity and remove the German coalition from Europe once and for all. And maybe he'll align it to a French, Italian, Southern Europe type of power structure.

In which case, he throws everyone under the bus, including Zelensky, including Ukraine. He tells Trump, look, take Istanbul Plus, take root causes. It's the best deal we got. Trump says, okay, Europe is on board. That's it. Let's wrap this thing up. I mean, if he's smart about it, that's what he does. And he comes out looking like the leader of some sort of new EU architecture, which is not so focused.

on Germany and the Baltics and is more focused on France, Italy, Spain, Hungary, the Visagrad countries. That's what he should do if he's smart. But I doubt that's what he's going to do. I think he's going to flip-flop back to the hardline position, but we'll see.

We'll see. Of course. I mean, another French leader, a future French leader, might do it because you're absolutely right. That coalition is there. I mean, that coalition, is absolutely there for a really capable, intelligent, well, competent president of France to put together.

I mean, DeGol could have done it. Macro? I mean, I can't see it myself. But anyway, let's see. Let's see. All right, we'll end the video there. The durand.orgas.com. We're on X-Rond, Rumble.

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