The Duran Podcast - MoU Turned into Trap. Hormuz Tensions Rise as Hardliners Gain Ground

Episode Date: June 29, 2026

MoU Turned into Trap. Hormuz Tensions Rise as Hardliners Gain Ground

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation with the United States and Iran. The MOU is crumbling or has disintegrated. Is there an MOU? The United States is actually saying, now as the markets are opening on Monday, the U.S. is saying that the MOU is still holding. It's still talks are proceeding. All is good Friday as the markets were closing. And we know from NBC News that the Trump administration did not want to announce the strikes.

into Iran until after the market's closed. But as the market's closed, we got a whole lot of strikes and then we got the Iran retaliations. We have the IRGC hitting tankers that are taking the southern route instead of their approved routes. A weekend of strikes and counter strikes and fighting between both sides. What are your thoughts? I think that there isn't a powerful faction in Iran. which concludes, I think rightly, that Iran has been played here in the sense that they presented to the Americans, this MOU, which contained all of these enormous apparent concessions by the Americans. And what the Iranians are now starting to understand is that the Americans signed the MOU

with only one purpose to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened and that they have been. no interest or intention of moving forward with any other part of the MOU. They're not going to repay any money to Iran. They're not going to freeze any assets. They're not going to lift any sanctions. They're not going to do any one of these things. And, of course, the Israelis continue their pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and have just come to an agreement with the Lebanese government.

which is Christian-dominated and therefore hostile to Hezbollah, which basically an agreement which basically requires Hezbollah to disarm and concedes Israeli control of large parts of southern Lebanon. So I think there is a faction within the IRGC, which has been looking at all of this. They're saying this is really, we've given away our most important pieces. of leverage. So they're striking at tankers that have been trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. They're trying, in other words, to create issues with the Strait of Hormuz again. They are probably trying to lay mines or talking about laying mines. And the result is that the MOU, exactly, as you say, is starting to crumble. There is still within Iran a

group, probably Ghalibuff, maybe a Rakhshi too, who on the contrary is saying, and Pesnishan, obviously, who are saying, well, you know, let's not give up on this yet. We've got the MOU. The Americans conceded an awful lot. Let's see whether we can take this thing forward. Let's see whether the negotiations lead anywhere and is still acting as a force for restraint. As it becomes increasingly clear that in fact, the MOU process is going to go nowhere. I think you're going to see the hardliners in Iran with now.

There's a big military buildup that has been taking place and continues to take place from the United States into the region. I don't know what that's going to result in, for what the reason for that is. Many people suspect. Many analysts suspect some sort of a renewed large-scale operation. Yeah. Some analysts say ground forces. I don't think so, but a lot of the buildup is happening in Iraq.

We had these Iraqi raids into the green zone, the purging of politicians and officials, who I believe now it has been confirmed. were working with Iran, at least an oil minister, and his team that seemed to have been working with Iran that the Trump administration was not happy about. And so we had the raids into the green zone. By the way, a lot of people think the green zone is, why would Iran-aligned Iraqi politicians be in the green zone? I mean, the green zone is not only U.S. embassy. It's a huge area of land. It has the U.S. embassy, but also as all the politicians are there. The NGOs are living. there. I mean, it's basically where all of these people are living. That's where they are. But I think

that was an interesting development. It shows that the Trump administration is using these 60 days and the MOU, in my opinion, to put a type of squeeze onto Iran. So they're looking at Iraq and they're saying, okay, let's try to remove Iranian influence in Iraq. Let's continue the military buildup. Let's continue to to restock on our weapons and whatever we had in the Middle East. Let's pour weapons in there. We might need them after the 60 days. Let's look at point one of the MOU, which is the Lebanon ceasefire. Let's find a way to work around that. Okay, let's get the deal between Lebanon and Israel until Iran, here you go. Point number one, there has to be a ceasefire in Lebanon. Well, the Lebanese government and the Israeli government, they've signed a framework, which says that

Hezbollah needs to disarm. So we're throwing the ball back at you, Iran. Yes. And then you have what you said, which was the ways to work around, Hormuz, by looking at the southern route, at the Oman route. And then, of course, the price of all, which has gone down considerably, which does give the White House time and space. Exactly. I think that is exactly. I think you some besides. I agree with you, by the way, about the events in Iraq, they're clearly a purge of pro-Iranian politicians in Iran. Of course, you can always talk about corruption. Corruption, there is everybody in Iraq is corrupt or a certain degree.

Anybody in public life is corrupt. But ultimately, this is just the rationale given for what is really a political purge. But you absolutely know, there's exactly what's going on, and the American buildup is taking place. And the U.S. never really planned, never really intended to implement the MOU. And the original Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hamine, the one who was killed by the Israelis on the first day of the 40-day war. He warned about this. He said, you know, we must never ever convince.

see temporary ceasefires to the Americans. They will never implement the terms. They will always take advantage. It will just mean that we are prolonging the conflict and that won't play out to our advantage. Now, he was killed. There's been this unstable political situation in Iran itself because the new supreme leader is untested. He's probably been badly wounded. He doesn't have the authority of his father. There's been very heavy pressure from China to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened. The Chinese do not like the idea of straits and international waterways being closed because they worry that will create a precedent that the United States might one day use against them. So instead of sticking to the policy of the assassinated

Supreme Leader. The Iranians got the MOU, which was, as we know, essentially set out, set out their shopping list of demands. But of course, what they've discovered is that the American sign a document, but they're not really interested in implementing its terms. They're doing exactly what you said. They're coming up with workarounds, and they're conducting buildups, and they're purging the friends of Iran in Iraq. So that's exactly what happening. I think you've described it exactly correctly. The question is this, will the Iranians continue to be strung along in this way? Or alternatively, will the hardliners win the people in the IRGC? I think that in Iran, the IRGC, the hardliners, have been greatly strengthened

by what has happened over the last few months. They are, all can argue that it was they who fought the Americans to stand still. And in the end, I think they will prevail. And at some point over the next few weeks, we'll probably see the Strait of Hormuz essentially closed again. And we might quite easily be drifting back into a wall. But that's a guess. There are obviously people in Iran, Pezishkan, Galibav, Arraqi, others who probably take

another approach, and of course, there's still the issue of China and what it wants. Yeah, China. This time around, wouldn't Iran have a difficult time explaining the closing of Hormuz? I mean, what is Iran going to say this time around? They have the MOU. They signed up to it. They're going to say we're closing Hormuz because Oman is allowing ships to pass through their territorial control of the strait? I mean, how do they justify that? And then you have the

pressure of the Chinese who are going to, as you said, who are going to tell Iran, look, just try to work through the MOU because we don't want waterways closed because if this precedent is set, then they're going to close our waterways, the U.S. or they might. I mean, you know, let me just reveal to China. They will close your waterways with whatever happens. Ormuse or not. So, I mean, I understand the Chinese rationale there. They might be used as a precedent to possibly close. We know they are going to close the waterways around China.

Eventually. It doesn't matter what happens in Iran. But how does Iran rationalize us? How do they convince the international community this time? Or the first time around, it was pretty straightforward. We were attacked. We have to defend ourselves. One of the ways to defend ourselves, we close Oramus.

Whether you like it or not, Oman, or the Gulf. countries. But what are they going to say this time if they decide to close Hormuz? It's going to be very, very difficult indeed. And I think that they are politically, diplomatically, in a much weaker position than the one they were in if the policy of the original Supreme leader had been followed and they, you know, held out for, you know, a complete withdrawal from the U.S. by the U.S. and had said, you know, we're not prepared to agree temporary ceasefires and instead stick to the policy that there must be a final agreement, which the United States dishonor and basically withdraw from the Middle East or that part of the

Middle East, it's going to be much, much more difficult. I think that the IRGC, their approach is We don't care. We don't care what China is saying. We don't care what the Persian Arab Gulf states are saying. We don't really believe that the Persian Arab Gulf states are interested in the security architecture that they're stringing us along with. So we just do that which is going to work for us and what these other countries do, what policies they follow, what complaints they make. That really isn't our concern. We're here to defend Iran.

We're not here to keep the Chinese, the Russians, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Qataris, all of those people, the Amman is even happy. And I think probably that view will eventually prevail. Now, about China, we come back here to the way that the Iranians have in the past treated their friends. And I think that the Chinese would have been much more sympathetic to Iran if Iran had been more cooperative with them in the past. And we've discussed in these programs, the fact that the Iranians did not fulfill, it was the Iranians who always walked back or resisted offers of military help from Russia. And the reason that Iranians, that Iranians

Iran didn't acquire the Suhoi 35s before or didn't acquire the air defense system before that the Russians offered was because various factions in Iran didn't want them, which seemed strange to me, but it does seem that that was the true reason. And it turns out it's been the same story with China as well. Apparently, I'm sure you both remember that a few years are back, there was a mess. agreement signed between China and Iran, a strategic partnership deal. China was going to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the Iranian economy. It would have transformed the Iranian economy. And then as soon as that deal is signed, Iran takes the deal, leverages it and uses

it to sign a whole set of deals with Western companies and not a single Chinese company apparently landed a deal directly after this agreement was signed. The Chinese were apparently furious about this and felt very offended and this soured badly their relationship with Iran and it meant that the Chinese then pulled. back on their offers for aid to Iran. Iran has not treated those who would be its friends well. If Iran in the past had moved forward and worked with China to build up strong economic links with China, if there had already been hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese investment aid in Iran, probably the Iranian economy would be much.

more stable, perhaps the attack on Iran would not have happened because China was there. And certainly China's stance towards Iran would be different from the one we have seen. The Iranians have repeatedly made this mistake. And it begs the question why. But, you know, this thing with China, which I read about, by the way, first read about in The Guardian. I've asked around, it turns out it's true, and it tells you an awful lot about the way in which Iran has not handled its diplomacy very well. Well, it's complicated, yeah, because China is supporting or did support Iran and continues to support Iran in a way to a certain extent with regards to the conflict of the United States, and China needs Iran to survive for its own well-being.

for its own interests. It needs Iran to survive. And of course, you do have the energy trade with Iran, which is important to China, as well as the shipping lanes and the waterways. Absolutely. Absolutely. But there's a huge difference between China making pragmatic decisions to support Iran in its own self-interest. And China's supporting Iran because it likes Iran and feels a certain degree of affinity for the country. In relations between people, and it's also true, in relations between states, actual friendship that goes beyond merely self-interest can actually affect behavior. The relationship between China and Russia has also been very complicated.

The Chinese weren't in happy about the SMO. From a Chinese point of view, an operation that seeks to redraw recognized international borders is something that the Chinese find very difficult. But the Russians have gone out of their way to make friends with China. They've opened up Russia to Chinese investment. They've worked very hard with China. Putin meets with Xi Jinping regularly. So the Chinese have gradually been one round.

Iran has not done that to anything like the same degree. Final question. We turned to the Trump. We said it was a good deal, the MOU. Yeah. Very good that Trump signed it, very good that he accepted it. Yes, the United States did take a loss in the 60 days. the 60-day war with Iran, but at the end of the day, it was a smart thing to do to sign the

MOU, and it did provide the Trump administration with a way to get out of this mess, to walk away from this mess. Now the Trump administration, it looks like they're not walking away from this mess, and they're using the MOU. Correctly, they signed it. It would have given them a way out, but now they're using the MOU to get back. in and to turn a loss into a win. Yes.

It's a classic example of how to be cunning and not to be wise. Signing an agreement that you have no intention of honoring in order to trick the other side into making concessions is can be cunning, it can be clever, it can be devious, but it's not really wisdom. And it's certainly not wisdom in this case. I think we can reiterate what we said in our previous program. The MOU, the terms of the MOU, were for the United States a deliverance and escape from these entanglements in the Middle East, which have just drained away American power

and have been tying the United States into a region where it doesn't have any real long-term interests or even business to be. So get out of the Middle East. That's what most people in the US want. That's what most people who serve in the US military, it seems to me, also want. It was one of the things that enabled Trump to win the election in 2024, that he said to people who'd been in the military and had been involved in all the regime change wars, I'm not going to do this. I'm getting America out of this region. Instead, he's used a agreement, which is what the MOU in a sense is, which could have been a pathway to achieving precisely that objective, as something completely different, as a trick

to get deeper into the Middle East and to reverse this defeat. the Iranians have inflicted on him. That's cunning, but it's absolutely not wise. We have in Greek a word kutoponiros, very difficult to translate into English, but I think you know exactly what it means. It means to be cunning and clever but stupid at the same time. All right, we will end the video there, the durand.com. We're on X-ron rumble. We're on telegram. We are also on substack. Go to Durant Shop, pick up some merch, all those links in the description box down below. Take care.