The Duran Podcast - NATO, Russia & the Endgame in Ukraine - George Beebe (fmr CIA), Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: October 26, 2024

NATO, Russia & the Endgame in Ukraine - George Beebe (fmr CIA), Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Welcome, everyone. My name is Glendizen, and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris. And today we also have the great honor of being joined by George Bebe, who is a former director of Russia analysis at the CIA. He's also been an intelligence analyst, a policy advisor to Vice President Cheney and currently serving as director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. it. Welcome. It's, again, a very great privilege to have you on. Well, thank you. I very much appreciate the invitation. So I thought perhaps a good place to start would be a big question, which is why the post-Cold War piece fell apart. As well, often here in the West, the narrative often is that the relationship was progressing until, of course, Putin came along and spoiled it.

But I often see in Russia that this narrative is fiercely rejected, where they obviously blame the West for having ended the containment, for having, well, I guess, failed to end the containment policies. And this is how they see it. And as a former director of Russia analysis of the CIA, surely spent time on this. So I was wondering how you assess the reason for why we lost the Cold War peace. I know it's not a

necessarily simple black or white answer, but it's a good place to start. Yeah, it's a very, very complex question. A lot of variables went into producing the situation that we're in. Of course, there was a lot of optimism, I think, both in the United States and in Moscow at the end of the Cold War that we could build something fundamentally new

and transform that relationship. but I don't think there was ever really a uniformity of views in the United States and in Moscow about what the vision ought to be that we could both pursue. I think in Russia, broadly speaking, there was a desire to build what Mikhail Gorbachev called the common European home. In other words, we would have a common vision of Europe that would be inclusive, that Russia would be a part of, or in Gorbachev's case, the Soviet Union prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But that this would not be premised on transforming the internal politics, the nature of the government. It would be a big tent that would include diverse approaches to politics and economics,

and yet still allow for harmony within Europe and stability and order. And I think with the end of the Cold War, the United States embraced a little bit different vision from that. We decided that Europe should, in fact, be united and won, and that Russia should be a part of it. But for that to happen, Russia had to fundamentally transform itself. It had to change. It had to become like the United States, like a liberal market-oriented West European at the time regime. And that that would be the basis for this common European home, a Europe that would be whole free and at peace, as we called it. for many years. And the Russians never really bought into that. They wanted to be a part of Europe,

but also they recognize that Russia should be able to be Russia, that Russia has its own culture, its own history, its own way of perceiving its own interests, and that ought to be okay. There ought to be a place in Europe for a Russia like that. And I don't think the United States ever really accepted that. I think we, you know, throughout the 1990s, were intent on transforming Russia. And that didn't go well, quite clearly, in retrospect. And the Russians, you know, by the end of the 90s, were in a state of collapse. I mean, there's no other way to put it. They had deindustrialized, you know, the average life expectancy for Russians had plummeted. There was a return of deadly diseases that had once been eradicated. And this was really a disaster. And, you know, the United

States looked at this and said, oh, well, we tried, you know, we did our best. I think a lot of Russians, not all, but a lot of Russians looked at this and said, well, you know, the most powerful country in the world came in, told us what to do, we did it, and we got disaster. Well, they must have wanted a disaster. You know, this was all intentional. And I think, so that was part of the problem. Now, there were many other problems, too. The United States, I think, embarked on similar kinds of transformational projects along Russia's periphery. And I think the Russians interpreted that as a security threat to Russian interests. Many of the groups in these neighboring states that the United States supported provided money, training, etc.,

to tended to be nationalist forces, and the nationalism in many of these states, not surprisingly, tended to be anti-Russian. Now, these nationalists also talked about wanting to build democracy, etc., etc. They spoke all the right words that resonated with the transformationalists, if you want to call them that, in Washington. But we thought we were supporting Democrats, liberal reformers in this part of the world, helping to build better, more functional, more prosperous societies, that Russia should embrace that. The Russians looked at this and said, why are you aligning with anti-Russian extreme nationalists?

And so there were real perception gaps that emerged in all of this. And all of this had a cumulative effect over time. But I think things really started to go bad with the NATO-Cosovo intervention in 1999, which I think had a profound effect on Russian perceptions. We had urged Russia to trust us that NATO enlargement did not threaten Russian interests, that NATO was purely a defensive alliance, no reason for Russia to have security concerns. And then, you know, only a few weeks after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally brought into the alliance, suddenly NATO is engaged in a military operation out of area against a state that had not.

attacked NATO for things that had gone on inside that state internally, and we did it without a United Nations Security Council authorization. In other words, from Russia's point of view, it was clearly illegal, and they regarded it as offensive, and they asked themselves, what would prevent this allegedly defensive alliance from doing this sort of thing inside Russia for similar reasons? And Russia, of course, at the time had an ongoing separatist problem in Chechnya, where they were being accused of all sorts of atrocities, war crimes, etc. And so this, this I think, also had a real effect on perceptions. So there are lots of other parts of this.

I don't want to go on at too great length here, but there were many different factors that I think combined and reinforced one another to produce a break that has culminated in where we are today, and unfortunately I'm not sure things have gotten as bad as they might. Sorry. I was just going to say that Gorbachev's common European home is often presented as one big house with many rooms where each side could preserve their distinctiveness while I guess the American counter project, Europe, Holland Free, which is now more or less a NATO slogan as well, more or less envisioned a one room when which based on universal values

and I guess implicitly it meant that not only everyone had to conform to the same values but given that these were the Americans were the champion of these values it would be what would legitimize leadership or even dominance or hegemon in the new system and I guess

yeah that's where it's where the tension came in and otherwise it sounds well what you said was also similar about Kosovo what Kisinger said because I think it was about 12 days after NATO expanded, and this is when we went into Kosovo without a UN mandate and instead rested legitimacy on liberal democracy.

Yeah, and from the American point of view, at least the folks that were in Washington running the show at the time, it was quite perplexing as to why Russia would have objections to what we were doing there in Kosovo. And to us, it was obvious that war crimes and atrocities were taking place. Somebody had to step in and, from a human rights point of view, protect these civilians from repression. And Russia had just a different perspective on all of this. And we never really were able to have the kind of dialogue about this and understanding that I think was necessary to,

avoid the kinds of that erupted and became very difficult to control over time. Do you not feel that one of the reasons that that dialogue between the Russians and the Americans, and not just between the Russians and the Americans, but between the Russians and many European countries, never really happened, is because in Europe, in the West,

to a lesser extent, I'd say, in the United States, in the United States you do debate these things, rather more. But there's a fundamental inability to understand, not just that the Russians have a different view, but that they have a right to a different view, that it's something that, you know, one might not agree with them, but ultimately, you know, they're a power, they're a country, and they have their own opinions about these things

and it's opinions that we need to take seriously. I agree with the points that you made before. I think that they are fully consistent with the history which I live through, I remember from here in Europe. The point is that it is very, very difficult to discuss these questions in Britain and I believe in many other European countries in the way that you have just done

because people will say, well, this is simply, you know, accepting what the Russians say and ultimately, we can't appease them in that fashion. We are right, they are wrong, and they have to accept that fact. Well, yeah, I think you're putting your finger

on a very important aspect of foreign policy analysis. One has to be able to empathize with other governments' points of view. You have to be able to walk in their shoes to the degree that you're able and see things from their perspective, but not to sympathize with them. There's a difference between understanding why they see things the way they do and how they perceive their own national influence. interests and then saying, oh, and they're right. And I feel for them and I want their perceptions to be realized.

The danger with sympathy is that it can cloud your analytic judgment. It can inject an emotional component that biases your perceptions. But the other problem is when you attempt to communicate your analysis, if your audience believes that you're actually sympathizing with the other country and all of this, they'll simply dismiss your judgments altogether and say, okay, you know, you're an apologist. You like the Russians. You want the Russians to be right. You want them to win, et cetera, et cetera.

And so it is important as an analyst that we cultivate that ability to empathize, to see things from the other side's perspective without endorsing those perceptions as being justified and right. We have to be neutral about that latter part of all of this. Now, if you don't empathize what happens, you get surprised. They do things that you can't understand. They do things that seem, from your perspective, to be inconsistent with their national interests.

You know, why would they possibly do this? How could they believe this sort of thing? When those sorts of questions arise, that should be a red flag that you're not empathizing. You're in fact imposing your own perceptions, your own beliefs and values onto them and saying, here's where I do. That's a mirror imaging problem.

And it's a trap that a lot of people fall into. Well, I've seen this all challenge here in Europe as well, because again, when you analyze international security, you want to usually start with security competition as the point of departure. So if you want to understand the security policy of any state, you first have to see what is challenging is their security and then assess how they likely respond. But when the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2022, in Norway, our former Minister of Defense, she actually said, this is the time to condemn not to understand.

And, you know, I think the Americans say, you know, you should be able to walk into gum at the same time or something along those lines. I thought it was amazing, and it kind of shaped the next two and a half years, because if you try to explain the policies of the opponent, it said, well, now you're legitimizing their view, and everything is seemingly these days about shaping narratives to construct a favorable reality, if you will,

and it becomes very difficult to do any analysis, I noticed. Right. And yes, there's been a lot of narrative management, if you want to call it that, going on in the West. There's a policing of public discourse that's meant to rule out certain things. And it began happening even before the Russian invasion, but it was quite clearly intensified afterwards. And if you go back, I've not done this personally, but I would imagine that if I were to go back and look at Western media coverage of the invasion, just from a content analysis point of view, that word unprovoked would be very, very frequent in its use in front of invasion.

Anybody that suggested that there may have been some element of provocation that affected Russian decisions on all of this, of course, was immediately anatomitized. You know, you are not allowed to say that word. And that actually obscures our ability to understand what's going on. It doesn't enhance it, unfortunately. Do you not also perhaps feel that this constant inability to even try to understand the other side not only has got worse, but it has entrenched attitudes on the other side as well, in the sense that they're trying to talk to us, and they're getting very, very frustrated.

that we don't seem to be listening to them. Again, we don't have to agree with them, but we can at least listen to them. And it doesn't seem, is it? A lot of the time, we were doing even that. No, I think that's right. I think the United States got into some bad habits with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

There was an element of triumphalism in Washington and in the West more generally, a belief that the breakup of the Soviet Union the end of the Cold War had in fact proved the superiority of the American system. And it justified an effort on our part to evangelize that system to spread it in various ways. And we, I think, got a little bit flabby diplomatically. Our diplomatic muscles atrophied. We no longer felt that we had to,

engage in normal diplomatic give and take, attempting to balance interests as well as balance power, the kinds of things that statecraft has involved for many thousands of years, we thought, you know, that wasn't necessary. Number one, we know we're right. We don't need to listen to the other side's views on this. And number two, U.S. power was just so disproportionately greater than any other country's power. We really didn't have to worry about their ability to push back. We could simply impose our views, whether they liked it or not, and more often than not, we did, and we did so very secure in the belief that we were doing the right thing. And that obviously left a bad taste in the mouths of a lot of governments, not just the Russians,

But I think the Russians were particularly unhappy about this because they didn't believe they lost the Cold War. I think the Russians' perspective on this was, you know, we recognized that we needed to end communism. We recognized that we needed to let go of empire. We did all that voluntarily. shortly, in, you know, by historical standards, a remarkably unbloody way. And the United States basically pocketed all this and then blamed us for a lot of things. And I think, you know, that, of course, had an impact on the Russians. And that is one of those variables that has accumulated and contributed to the problem that we're

today. Now, does the United States need to be able to listen more in its diplomatic discourse? Absolutely. Are we going to have to engage more in normal balancing of interests and balancing of power-type diplomacy? Yes. I think we've relied too much on coercion. It's having a counterproductive effect, and we're going to have to add more diplomatic muscle. And that's going to take a little bit of doing that part. And we... Sorry, you go this time. No, well, I made, I was going to go to Ukraine and ask perhaps the way, perhaps that we get out of this

particular situation now, because you've been discussing it recently, very extensively. I mentioned before we started this program back in 2023, you and Jim Webb, I read many of your articles, I should say,

But you were pointing out, even then, at the time of the height, if you like, if Ukraine's summer offensive, that the offensive wasn't working, time perhaps to go on the defensive, think about negotiations. You've been discussing the idea of negotiations of moving forward with negotiations in what everybody can, I think, see is a tragedy, a tragic war in Europe. playing out every day in which thousands of people are dying and a country is being destroyed. The trouble is, and I have to say this, at least in Europe, I don't know whether this is so in the United States to the same degree, there doesn't seem to be much enthusiasm for negotiations at all, because again, we have this idea that negotiations with somebody who we believe to be straightforwardly and simply wrong, and who we can't really argue or discuss things with is somehow an inappropriate and wrong thing to do. So any thoughts about this? Any ideas about some possible way forward from that?

Well, yeah, I do think we've got to find a way out of the situation that we're in right now. It is certainly a tragedy for the Ukrainian people. I think it's a tragedy for Europe more generally. this is not helping at all with European stability, with Europe's economy,

the prosperity of the region. I think all of this is boomeranging on the West collectively in ways that are very destructive and geopolitically

it's a disaster. It has pushed Russia and China together to cooperate in the security realm against the West, against the United States, in ways that make absolutely no sense from a strategic point of view. Every school child knows you divide and conquer, you don't unite your enemies against you and turn them into even more hostile enemies than they might otherwise be for you. And that's what we've effectively done, I think, very unthinkingly. So if you accept that the situation that we're in is really a disaster for everybody involved,

then you have to start saying, okay, what do we do? How do we get out of the situation we're in? And that's not going to be an easy thing. We are going to be dealing with years of accumulated mistrust between Russia and the West. and you don't fix that problem quickly. You don't just say, you know, hey, what we've done, you know, we've made some mistakes, we'd like to reach a deal, what do you say, and the rest of it? Oh, thank goodness you've come to your census, sure, you know, what do you want to do?

We're going to have to put a lot of effort into trust building itself while we're attempting to negotiate a way forward on all of this, and that's not going to be an easy. thing to do. Secondly, I think we've got a lot of educating to do in the West to get exactly the question that you've just raised. Why is there a deep conviction in much of Europe and in the United States that negotiating with an adversary is fundamentally wrong? That's really in a historical belief. Nations have negotiated with adversaries constantly. That's the norm. What has happened is we've fixated on one particular type of international relations problem.

What Bob Jervis called in his book perception, misperception in international relations, the deterrence model problem. This is the Nazi Germany prototype where you've got an aggressive expansionist actor, who is intent on aggression and must be deterred. And the one thing you don't do with a problem like that is attempt to negotiate and compromise because that is perceived as weakness. It feeds aggression.

And we have internalized that model as a universal truth in international relations. We believe every problem that we're facing is that deterrence model problem where everything is Nazi German, everything is Hitler, we can't possibly negotiate. But historically speaking, that's not true. And Jervis also talks about the spiral model problem that's rooted in what international relations theorists called the security dilemma, where you have one state that attempts to enhance its own security by taking measures that another state, state believes are threatening. And you get into a dynamic of action and reaction that can spiral

to the point where you get into a conflict. And the classic example of that, of course, is World War I, but there are many examples of this kind of problem. And I think we've treated Russian aggression in Ukraine. And I don't dispute that the Russians have been aggressive. And I don't at all want to say that the Russians bear no responsibility for the decision to invade Ukraine. They certainly do. But I think that problem in Ukraine that we're dealing with right now is a lot closer to a spiral model problem, a security dilemma problem, than it is to the deterrence model that we think it is. And when you attempt to deal with a spiral problem.

By refusing to negotiate, you make the problem worse on both sides. It's like pouring gasoline on a fire. So we have some educating to do in capitals in the West and among Western publics to help people understand the complexities of the situation that we're dealing with. So this notion that it's simply wrong to negotiate with an aggressor state or with an autocrat and authoritarian regime, you know, and the only way forward is to defeat them and to change that regime to transform that country in some way. And that's the only path toward peace and stability. I think as a fundamental misperception of the situation, it's likely to make this situation far worse than it already is. is. And the stakes in this are great. I mean, this is not some peripheral issue among, you know, small and

medium powers. We're talking about a conflict between the world's, you know, largest nuclear arsenals that could easily get out of hand, not because anybody wants a nuclear war, but because, you know, there's deep mistrust and misperception and not any communication really going. on between the side. So this is a very very volatile serious problem and it requires more than just platitudes to get out of. So we need to have deep discussion about the way forward. Just it seems to me the ideology has perhaps a very negative impact here because when as you began to speak you argued that in the West we're convinced that we're simply serving a good cause in terms of promoting a more

benign liberal democratic international system. But if one believes that one is solely a force for good, then by definition one wouldn't recognize a security dilemma. And this is largely the language I hear here in Europe. That is, well, we expand the military block on the Russian border, but no, surely they don't consider it to be a security threat. They know, we're just here to promote democracy. And similarly, if this is then a struggle between, you know, good or evil or liberal democracy versus authoritarianism, then, you know, diplomacy becomes appeasement. Meanwhile, war becomes almost virtuous. That is, you know, stick with your principles. You fight for what you believe in. And again, of course, everyone becomes a new reincarnation of Hitler when,

you know, you have to defeat the evil, not compromise. But I didn't want to ask, how you see this Ukraine war ending, because I get the impression. And please correct me if I'm wrong, that there's seem to be at least the start of an ongoing collapse among the Ukrainian armed forces. I would say that it's slow, but seemingly intensifying. Again, I could be wrong about this, but how do you see all of this ending? I mean, what will happen to Ukraine? What are its different options and what sort of peace would Russia pursue? And again, what's the game plan for the United States now that we see the war obviously is not going our way?

Yeah, I see three different possibilities for how the war in Ukraine plays out. One is that it escalates into a direct military conflict between the United States and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other. That would not end well. I think it would quite likely be disastrous for everybody involved. So I pray that that's not what happens. another possibility is that it doesn't end. And by why I mean, Ukraine essentially collapses. It reaches a breaking point.

And Ukraine can no longer put a trained and equipped military fighting force in the field that sustain this. And it goes into some sort of collapse. and the exact way that plays out is, of course, difficult to forecast. But its ability to govern itself and maintain order, I think, would come under severe strain. And in that circumstance, I don't think the Russians would attempt to militarily occupy all of Ukraine. I think they're too smart to do that. It's beyond their capability or desire. they don't need to.

It would probably get them into a long-term, you know, guerrilla-type resistance situation, and the West would almost certainly, you know, continue to fuel that by providing aid to resistance. It would, you know, be probably wouldn't be centrally organized. But I think the Russians would, you know, choose a point at which they had defensible lines. and then dig in, try to create some sort of no-man's land security zone between their defensive lines and the rest of Ukraine.

And then essentially say, you know, to the West, over to you. Ukraine becomes your problem. And, you know, that would be a tragedy for everybody involved, quite honestly. And I don't think that that is Russia's preferred outcome. I don't think if they had their wishes fulfilled, that's what they would like to see. But if that's their only choice other than, you know, if they don't believe they can get an agreement with the West about the broader European security architecture, and particularly Ukraine's place in it. They cannot get some sort of firm guarantee that Ukraine's not going to be a member of NATO

and NATO is not going to have a military presence in Ukraine, then I think they will resort to that because that is the guarantee that they will face neither of those circumstances going forward. Which brings me to the third possibility, and that is we reach some sort of diplomatic compromise. and the exact terms of that compromise, you can only know once you get into talks and figure out, you know, what's the difference between maximalist demands that each side is going to have going into this and where the sides are actually prepared to show some gift. But I'm not sure that. that latter scenario is the most likely one, unfortunately. I mean, if I, wearing an analyst hat,

I would say the more likely scenario is Ukraine collapses and becomes some sort of dysfunctional ward of the West. We have more or less a security black hole in the middle of Europe that causes real problems. I mean, that's not going to be a stable situation. It's going to be very volatile and the chances that we can get it to new crises going forward are fairly significant. You know, we've got a succession that will inevitably happen in Belarus at some point. We've got Kaliningrad, which nobody is particularly happy about. Moldova is, you know, a potential crisis point. There are lots of things that could flare up.

And so I don't think we're. we should be under any illusions that if the war in Ukraine settles into some sort of no war, no peace situation, that Europe is going to be stable. It's not going to be like the Cold War where you've got two sides and broad understandings about what the rules of the game are to keep this from going out of control. I have to say, for what I have been reading of what the Russians have been saying. I agree with you. I think that they do not want to have

an open-ended conflict here. I don't think they want an open-ended conflict with the West. Again, maybe I'm assuming things. But I can't see why that would be in their interests. And I think it's enough to understand that. Yeah, now the problem here, of course, is I think the Russians have profound doubts that we're actually willing to negotiate and compromise

and to respect what they regard as their core national interests in all of this. And there's no trust in the relationship. So if the Russians don't believe they have a negotiating partner who's actually willing to negotiate and adhere to the terms that might be agreed, that really reduces the chances that you're going to find some sort of diplomatic,

way forward. So I think part of what has to be done here is that the West has got to recognize that it is important for us to find a negotiated settlement here. The alternatives to that are quite grim. And the other thing is we've got some work to do to demonstrate that we actually believe it's in our own interests to find a compromise here. now, I think the Russians don't think we're there. Do you not feel, as I do, that it has to be the United States that takes the initiative? I can't see people in Europe being able to do it. I've given up thinking that Ukraine itself can. I've been looking at the situation in Kiev. They came up last week with a plan, which I thought made no sense at all, the so-called victory plan. I do think the Ukrainians are able to come up with an initiative of their own. Ultimately, it has to be the Americans. I think the Russians, my senses, that the Russians wanted to be

the Americans in the end, because it's the Americans who can guarantee, if that, you're level of trust is re-established, who can guarantee that the outcome that is agreed will stick. What the Russians, I think, have come to realize is that Europe is far too fragmented to come to that kind of collective decision. And what are the chances that the US is going to do that? I read a very interesting piece, but I was mentioned it again before we started by Thomas Graham, which I saw on the national interest, in which he basically said this thing that we're not going to do anything without Ukraine is absolutely unsustainable.

I think the words he used was an abdication of responsibility. I entirely agree, isn't it time that we picked up the telephone and spoke to Moscow? I mean, I'm obviously that, I'm putting it not metaphorically rather than literally, but that we started to do something like that, to avoid these terrible scenarios, which are the alternatives? Yeah, no, I think that's absolutely right. I was in a panel discussion on Monday that addressed this question. It does the United States have to be directly engaged in order to steer this war toward a compromise end?

and my answer to that was yes, absolutely, for multiple reasons. The Ukrainians, I think, are not themselves capable of initiating that kind of move without suffering quite severe internal political stresses that might actually break that government. And then you're in trouble. Your challenge diplomatically becomes that much greater. So to some degree, I think the Ukrainian need the United States to play the role of bad guy. And we can do this

in a diplomatic way. We don't have to twist the Ukrainians' arms on this, threaten to cut off aid, et cetera, et cetera. I think we can simply come out publicly and say, you know what? Ukraine has performed incredibly well, much

more effectively than I think anybody believed at the start of this invasion. And they have achieved an awful lot on the battlefield. They have held off the Russian military limited their ability to conquer Ukrainian territory. And however else this war ends, there is going to be a large amount of territory that the Russians are not going to be occupying and running. Ukraine, in other words, has preserved the ability to be an independent and sovereign state as a result of this.

And that is a success, quite honestly. the problem is we've defined our war goals here in ways that are unrealistic. You know, the belief that we're going to inflict a strategic defeat on the Russians, drive all Russian forces off of Ukrainian territory, you know, force Putin into a humiliating concession. That's not going to happen. It's not realistic. And the degree in which we pursue it is actually dangerous.

It's a violation of what, John F. Kennedy said was the key lesson from the Cuban missile crisis. You don't put a nuclear superpower in a position where it faces a choice between humiliation and using nuclear weapons. And unfortunately, to some degree, we've allowed our war aims to become exactly that. And I think that that was an enormous mistake on our part. So we need to define success in a much more realistic way. And I think what that's going to have to be is we want to preserve Ukraine as a functioning independent state with a chance to reconstruct itself, a chance to attract the refugees that have fled the fighting, reverse the, I think, catastrophic demographic decline than it is now

in and become a viable functioning stable state again. And I think that is still possible. And what's ironic about all this is I think to some degree the Russians want that too. A Ukraine that is a failed state on Russian borders is a problem. And if the Russians can avoid that, I think they'd like to. not at any cost. They're not going to say, hey, we don't want to fail to say, so we're going to let Ukraine into NATO. Absolutely not.

But I do think there are some things there that we can work with. And back in the early part of this war, in the months after the invasion, when Russians and Ukrainians were negotiating through the offices of Turkey, among other mediators, the Russians did, in fact, say, that they're okay with Ukrainian membership in the EU.

And as far as I understand it, they have not reversed that position. And I think that's a very critical point in all of this. If Ukraine comes out of this with, you know, 75 to 80% of its territory intact and the ability to apply for EU membership, that's, you know, I think, striking success, it would be.

That would go very well for Ukraine and for stability in Europe more broadly. I was wondering, though, what peace might look like, because if we recognize that the war in Ukraine is to a large extent, the product of this rivalry between the West and Russia and the absence of a mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement, it suggests that we need a dual solution that is a solution between the Russians and Ukrainians, but also between, as you suggested before, between the West and Russia in terms of doing what we didn't do after the Cold War, that is, establish a security architecture with both sides can be comfortable with.

But they say trust is a lubricant that makes a good deal's work. And in the absence of this trust, it seems very difficult because the Russians, they look back at 2014 when the European signed under guarantors for this unity government in Ukraine before we didn't support it. They see the 2015 Minsk

Agreement, which was not implemented instead. They saw Western countries cementing their military presence or footprint at least in Ukraine. They also see the West sabotaging the Istanbul negotiations. So the great fear, I guess,

is that a many in the West now call for effectively just freezing their front lines that we're more or less stating quite obvious stating openly in the West as well well we'll give them this territories but over time you might be able to take them back

so it sounds as if we're just doing another Minsk agreement that is freezing the conflict re-arming Ukraine so we can fight the Russians and bleed them another day so this is why I think the Russians if this is the optioned and they rather impose a settlement than a very ugly peace, if it must be.

So I guess my question is, what kind of peace would we ideally see? And again, what is possible as well? Yeah, I think you're exactly right. I think I think of this conflict is sort of a nested conflict. You know, there is the bilateral aspect of this war between Russia and Ukraine. There are things that really only Russia and Ukraine can negotiate bilaterally. But then there's the bigger geopolitical competition over Ukraine and over the contours of Europe's security architecture that I think underlie this conflict and must be addressed if we're going to move toward a broader understanding with the Russians

and a stable European security order. That's not going to happen quickly, but it has to be in motion. We can't simply say to the Russians, let's freeze the conflict in Ukraine, and someday we'll get down to talking about these broader European security issues. Trust us. That's not going to work. We're going to have to indicate that we understand that these issues are important and that it is in our self-interest. to address them in a way that accommodates Russia's core security interests. Now, the Russians are not going to get everything they want out of this.

Neither will we, but both sides are going to have to get their most vital interests protected in all of this. That's, you know, a truism in diplomatic agreements. And that means we have to recognize that the Russians do have some legitimate interests at stake here. And we have not, to this point, allowed ourselves to say that out loud, that Russia has some legitimate security interest at stake in all this. And the fact is that they do. Now, the other thing we've got to understand is that many of the principles that we're talking about that have underpinned European security for 60-some years are in tension with one

another inevitably. When you talk about territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of peoples, well, guess what? Those are in uneasy tension with one another. Do the peoples of the Donboss have the right to self-determination? Well, if you say they have an absolute right to do that, then territorial integrity becomes not quite so absolute. the principle of indivisibility of security.

That was one of the Helsinki principles that we worked out in the negotiations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Well, that principle of indivisibility of security says that one state should not enhance its own security at the expense of another state's security. That's an operational definition of that security dilemma concept that we talked about. That's something we have to recognize. The principle that a sovereign state has the right to choose whatever alliance it wants, well, that's not an absolute principle. It is an uneasy tension with that principle of indivisibility of security. And the United States itself, in its history, has not treated that sovereign right to choose alliances as anything close to absolute.

when Cuba decided it wanted to ally with the Soviet Union, we didn't say, well, you know, this deserves us. We find it threatening, but we recognize that Cuba has the absolute sovereign right to ally with anybody it wants to. No. And rightly so. You know, we treated that as a situation where our core security interests were under threat, and that was not acceptable to us. did find a way forward. We found a compromise that allowed us to protect our vital interests, but also allowed the Soviet Union a face-saving way out of the problem that we found ourselves in. I mean, this is a good point that you brought back Helsinki, because we have been through all of

this before. I mean, we went through the Cold War. There was a very, very bad period of mistrust at the start of the Cold War. People overlook how difficult and how difficult it was. And there were many very dangerous moments. But eventually, we found our way through. We did talk to each other. We did find compromises.

Nobody was completely happy with any of those compromises. Nobody was happy with the Berlin compromises, for example. How could they be? But ultimately, they worked. they preserve the peace of Europe and they allowed everybody to sort themselves out and to find their own way and of course that opened the possibility for other things

but in order to do that there was an awful lot of hard work that had to be done an awful lot of discussion an awful lot of meetings leaders had to meet foreign ministers had to meet there were all kinds of conferences and discussions of that kind

And it brings me back to what you said before. We have to educate ourselves back into thinking in that way. And we don't, for the moment, seem to want to do that, at least not in Europe. Again, I think that in the United States, you are well ahead of us there. I don't know why in Europe, given that we're at the center of all of this, and we're the people who will be paying the heaviest price. we find this all so difficult. But there it is.

I have to say, I think without the Americans, all of those bad outcomes that you said are going to arise. And if they do arise, I'm just going to finish with this. This isn't really a question. But anyway, it's a point. If we do find ourselves in these terrible situations

with an unstable failed state between Russia and the West and all of the instabilities and a whole region that is unstable. The thing people need to understand is that soon or later, in order to get out of that problem, we will have to find a way to talk to each other. So we might as well do it now before those even greater and more intractable problems come around.

Yeah, I think that's absolutely right, which is part of the reason why I was so frustrated that we weren't willing to take the diplomatic steps that were necessary prior to this invasion to forestall it, to find a way forward that would not result in war. And we, unfortunately, did not take the steps that I think could have and should have been taken at that time to prevent war from erupting. And now the problem is more difficult, you know, with all the blood that has been spilled. to solve that it would have been in 2019, 2020, 2021.

That's a cat. I just said, yeah, I guess a last question while building a bit on my previous question. I mentioned these two layers of Russia, Ukraine, NATO, Europe. But I guess, you know, you can add a third layer here, which kind of goes back to what you were talking about now as well, which is the wide rules of the international system, because this also appears to be something that is being deeply contested. In the West, we increasingly frequent refer to the international rules-based order instead of international law,

and although sometimes it's treated as synonyms, but we then accuse the Russians of undermining this international rules-based order. And I find it interesting that here there seems to be some agreement, because the Russians, much like the Chinese, they very openly state, do reject international rules-based order, but this is because they argue that this so-called rules-based order is an attack on international law and thus repudiating it. So how do you read this situation of the wider agreements?

Because on this issue, the Russians appear to be getting much support by parts of the global south as well. So it signifies a wider divide, if you will. Yeah, I think all of this is a symptom of the changing balance of power in the world. After the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself alone at the top of the world order, so to speak, with a wide gap between itself and any other powers that were out there. And I think during that time, the United States decided that it was able to become the rules setter and the world's rules enforcer that could decide when other countries were in violation of the rules as we perceived them. And when the United States could exempt itself and its partners and allies from those rules when we thought there was a compelling reason to do.

And I think what happened over the past 30-some years is that, A, much of the world grew quite resentful of that situation, felt that the United States had exploited and abused its disproportionate economic and military power, used its domination of the world's financial system coercibly, as well as used its military capabilities. to impose things on other countries against their will. We got into the habit of being very intrusive in our involvement in other countries' internal domestic affairs. All of that, I think, had a cumulative effect. And then on top of that, while all this was going on and resentment was building,

that gap between American power and other country's capabilities narrowed quite considerably. And we now find ourselves in a situation where we're facing a peer, or at least a near peer in China, that has enormous economic clout and growing military capabilities. And in Russia, Russia is no longer on its knees. There was a long period of time where Russia could object to what we were doing but could not really do anything to block us or stop us. that's no longer the case. The Russians now can do more than just complain about NATO enlargement. They can put a stop to it, which they did in Georgia in 2008 using military force, and they're doing it again in Ukraine today.

They're saying this is a red line for us and we can enforce it. And so this changed situation in the world, I think, is forcing the United States to try to come to grips with what the new world order is going to look like, what the rules of the game are going to look like. And I think China and Russia are saying there need to be some adjustments to take into account our interest, but also our greater capabilities. And the United States, I don't think wants to do that, of course. We were quite comfortable with how things were arranged during the post-Cold War period. but I think we're going to have to recognize changed circumstances and find a way forward here that negotiates an approach to things that I hope will preserve a lot of the post-World War II order as it was constructed,

which I don't think the Russians and Chinese and others fundamentally dispute. I think a lot of what they're asking for is a return to the conceptions that were underpinning that post-World War II order as it was designed. I don't think they're trying to throw that out. And I don't think they're in a situation where they don't want any rules of the game, which is something you hear sometimes in Washington. The Russians don't want any rules. they want the world to be turned into some sort of chaotic wild wild west where might makes right. And I don't think that's an accurate reading of where they are. What they don't want to be is in a situation where the United States dictates to them what the rules are

and when the rules can be suspended. I'm obviously not somebody who's researched Russia to your depth, but everything suggests to me that far from the Russians wanting a free-for-all in the world, a country which has had so many issues of security for so long, they want a stable situation, or at least a relatively stable situation that will not feed their own insecurities further. And I know even less about China, but I'm sure there's the same there. I have no more questions. I just wanted to say thank you from my side that you've come again and spoken to us.

And can I just also briefly address the audience here? responsible statecraft is a place I go to every day. I find the articles that are published there, the debates that they host, they are absolutely indispensable to anybody who wants to understand international relations. And I'm just going to end with this. I actually am a little more hopeful over the last couple of weeks than I have been. I think we are not actually that far from the point when we are going to stay. start to see people, well, the United States specifically, starting to talk to the Russians.

I mean, Lloyd Austin, actually, when he was in Kiev, he said almost exactly the things that you said, were you, Ukraine has achieved all these great things. He didn't go to all the conclusion, you know, now we must talk. But it was, it was almost like he was prefaceing by saying exactly the kind of points that you were making. So I think we might actually be starting to move in that direction at last. Anyway, hope dies least. Or just one last bonus question on a building on what Alexander said.

Yeah, because I remember you were one of a few people who seem to see the Russian invasion coming. You gave an interview with Radio Free Europe, was it, in December of 21, so two months before the invasion, in which you made the argument that inaction, you said, from the Kremlin side now is becoming very risky because if they wait taking military actions, the US would entrench itself much more firmly within Ukraine to the point it would be impossible to this logic. So it's either military force now or never. But given that we've seen this, not just by the US, but NATO more broadly have this incrementalism in terms of how it asserts itself in Ukraine.

Do you expect that the Russians would consider accepting any presence at all for the US and NATO in Ukraine in any peace deal? Because we hear some people suggesting territory for NATO membership, that obviously is way, way above anything acceptable to Russia. But do you think they would accept any presence of US or NATO in Ukraine? this, given, again, the concern this fear of incrementalism? Well, I don't know. That is something that you can only discover in the course of negotiations, and that's going to be contextual, my guess.

There are some things that I think are clearly unacceptable to the Russians. There's just no way I could conceive of them accepting, such as Ukrainian membership in NATO. A U.S. military presence there, I think, would make Russia very nervous, and the degree of mistrust in the relationship is so great that I think they would be very reluctant to agree to some sort of conditions on something like that that could change over time. But I don't know to what degree the Russians might be flexible on something like that depending on the broader context of an agreement and what else is going on

in talks about the broader European security order. That just remains to be seen. Well, let me at least, yeah, thank you so much for your time. This has been very, very interesting. So thank you again. Thank you for the invitation. I watch your show regularly. I'm a big fan of what both of you are putting out. So I very much appreciate it. the chance to talk to you. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Thank you, sir. Thank you.