The Duran Podcast - Neocons will NOT be satisfied until White House strikes Iran

Episode Date: February 5, 2024

Neocons will NOT be satisfied until White House strikes Iran

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation in the Middle East. And over the weekend, we got the strikes against Iran-aligned militia in Syria and Iraq. The other day, we also had strikes from the U.S. and the U.K. into Yemen. And my question to you is, what is the purpose? What is the end goal of all of this military? activity from the United States and from the UK as well. What are they working towards with these Well, if you're talking to me about what is their own gold in the Middle East, I don't think they have a clear idea themselves. But if you're talking to me what the purpose of these strikes is,

I think it's giving a little red meat to the neocon wolf to keep them, to keep the neocon wolf from snapping further at their heels in an election year, despite the fact that what the neocon wolf really wants is a strike on Iran, and they're scared of doing that, and the Pentagon is telling them, don't do it. So I don't think it has any real purpose in terms of a sort of diplomacy or policy in the Middle East, it's essentially yet another example of, you know, a media operation using, as I say, bombs and missiles, a very expensive media operation, expensive in terms of

money, expensive in terms of equipment, expensive in terms of lives, though so far we're not getting reports of huge numbers of men being killed, but anyway, that's what they seem to be doing. And the important thing is, for the moment, they are not attacking Iran. They're saying this is all to deter Iran, but of course, by not attacking Iran, what they're showing to Iran is that they're scared of Iran. So it's clear that to the extent that there is deterrence at the moment, it's in the opposite direction. It is Iran that is deterring them rather than Iran being deterred by them. Is that making the case to, is that making the neocon case to go after Iran? I mean, that's,

that is the neocon case, isn't it? Yeah. That's their argument. Yes. And one more quick question. Isn't there the fear that these continued strikes, if they continue, will eventually lead to the neocons getting their way and going after Iran? You're absolutely right on both points, because, of course, what the neocons are saying is, you know, there's no real point in going after these various militias, the militias in Syria, the militias in Iraq, the hooties in Yemen. They're, you know, renewing, redoubling their attacks on the hoothies in Yemen, but they don't seem to be achieving anything.

The neocon argument is that these are just tentative. of the octopus, which is Iran. So you go for the head of Iran. They don't say that. They say go for the head of the snake. And always they mean Iran. So they're not going to be satisfied with this. They're going to say, look, this is weak.

This actually shows weakness to the Iranians. What we are doing is we are dodging the real battle, which is the battle against Iran. And for the moment, the neocons are quiet, but within the next couple of days, when it becomes clear that these attacks have solved nothing and are in fact making the situation more dangerous, they will start to agitate and they will say exactly as you've just said, well, look, we're now already committed. We're bombing Iranian targets in Syria, Iranian targets in Iraq, we're bombing the Houthis,

to Iranian proxies in Yemen. So now we must take this to the logical conclusion and take bomb and launch strikes against Iran because it's clear that nothing else will work. So actually, we've taken another step towards attacking Iran. And it's strange that people in Washington, and the people who ordered these strikes don't seem to have understood this.

One gets the sense that there was an enormous argument last week between the advocates of a strike on Iran. And it's always the usual people, you know, Victoria Newland and her crowd from, you know, the Kagan family and the Institute of the Study of War and all of those people who are there in the National Security Council and the State Department. So it's clear that they want a strike on Iran.

It's absolutely clear that there are people in the Pentagon who don't want to see it happen. I was watching Lloyd Austin's address last week in which he said, you know, that he announced the fact that these strikes would take place. I found him, I have to say, looking very fragile after his operations. And, you know, not his fault, perhaps, but maybe that didn't convey, you know, a strong message to the Iranians. It didn't convey a message of a strong and decisive secretary of defense

in overall charge. But beyond that, I got the enormous clear impression that he was announcing something he didn't really want to do and that his heart wasn't in it because the Pentagon knows. that they can't afford another big war in the Middle East. They've still got the unfinished business in Ukraine. They got worries about Taiwan. But the political pressure to do something was clearly overwhelming.

So there was this debate, this argument within the administration. And people like Lloyd Austin have agreed to these. missile and bomb strikes. But of course, that argument is never resolved within the United States until the point comes when the neocons get what they want, which is an attack on Iran. And they've just managed to shift the United States that bit closer to that position. I feel like, you know, the American people, the world is being duped by the, by the neocons in this case. I mean, they understood that if they put enough pressure on the Biden White House, I don't even know how much pressure did they really have to put on Biden himself, who is a neocon, but let's say some moderate forces somewhere in the administration. I can't think of any right now, but let's say there are some moderate forces in the administration.

that we're saying, you know, we don't want to escalate. Let's not do anything. And the neocons put the pressure so that Biden signed off on this 86 target strike in Iraq and Syria. They telegraphed, you know, where they were going to strike. They gave Iran an ample amount of time to prepare for it. But anyway, they got their way, the neocons. And they got the strike. Perhaps knowing that once they did get their way and they got this, this strike, which, as you said, is more for optics than anything else, they knew that then they would be able to push to the next step, which is to go after Iran, because they would then be able to go onto the media channels and to make the case of what you made, which is, okay, well, you know, you did this strike, you telegraphed where

you were going to hit. It doesn't really make any difference. with regards to Iran and Iran's behavior, we have to go after the head of the snake. I mean, it seems like they knew how all of this was going to play out. And once again, the Biden White House or whatever moderate forces are in the Biden White House have been outplayed by the neocons. And that doesn't really speak too well of the moderate forces to be outplayed by neocon strategy. But that's the way it seems to me. I mean, it seems the neocons knew how to get to.

to an eventual conflict with Iran. They understood this. That's absolutely correct. We mustn't talk about moderate forces in the administration because there aren't any. There aren't any moderate forces in the United States government. The only reason there's an argument about this is not because there's a fundamental aversion to military action. It is because the dominant faction in the Pentagon is concerned about China. And they want to focus on China, and they're worried about the fact that there aren't enough military assets in China to confront China in the Indo-Pacific region, and that's why they want to pull some US troops and missiles and equipment from the Middle East, and why they're unhappy

about the fact that a fifth of the US Navy, or a quarter of the US Navy, according to some people, is floating around the Middle East, doing nothing of any use. But then, not ultimately moderates. They're simply people who want to go to war somewhere else against an even more powerful adversary, which is China. And that is the heart of the problem. Because in these discussions that take place in the administration, it's not a discussion between those who say, look, war in the Middle East is fundamentally a bad idea. War altogether is a fundamentally bad idea. Your entire conception of foreign policy, your near conception of foreign policy, is bad and consistently fails to work. What you're getting instead are people who come along and say,

look, there are practical problems. We share your hatred of Israel. We also feel that the Iranians are terrible people. But at the moment, we should calibrate our response to what we can do. And therefore, we're going to agree to these more limited strikes so that we can concentrate on the Chinese. And of course, if you take that kind of approach, if you take that kind of approach of the neocons, you're actually going on to their territory and you're going to ultimately lose the argument because they will then come back and say, look, you're agreeing to weptu, bombing and missile strikes. So, you know, we're all in agreement about that. But the problem with what you've agreed to is that it isn't succeeding because it is not going to.

to the logical conclusion, which is a strike on Iran. So in these debates, the neocons perversely have logic on their side, because they could correctly say this isn't working, and they can go on from that point and say, well, in light of that, let's go for broke, let's go after Iran, until and unless there is a faction within the US government, which is straightforwardly and clearly opposed to the neocons, neocon thinking, and the whole approach that the neocons are taking to foreign policy,

unless in other words there is an anti-neurcon faction within the US government, the neocons who are nothing, if not extremely skilled, bureaucratic warriors, are always going to win these battles. And in practice, they always do. Such a messed up situation. How does Yemen fit into this? You know, I read reports that claimed that the U.S. UK strikes on Yemen were just, completely about the Red Sea shipping lanes. I read other reports and other analysis,

which claimed that the strikes on Yemen are part of the containment of Iran and this Middle East, I guess you could call it, let's just say a Shia uprising against the U.S.'s position in the Middle East. I mean, where does Yemen fit it to all of this? Is it just about the Red Sea shipping lanes or is this really part of a broader strategy to assert the U.S.'s dominance in the region? Well, first of all, there is no larger strategy, not in the sense that you and I would think of if we talked about a strategy.

There's no clear plan. I mean, I think that's absolutely clear now. There is a series of improvised attacks on Iranian, as they see, targets, leading up eventually as the need. neocons intend to a strike on Iran. So the original attacks on the hooties, the pretext for them, and it was, you know, there is, this is really happening. There were problems in the Red Sea. No question about it.

But the attacks on the houthis were initially connected with that. But always Iran is there in the background. Because, of course, the neocons say, well, it's not really the houthies, the huthies. Houthis are just a militia in Yemen, the reason we're getting all these problems in the Red Sea is because Iran is disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea. So from their perspective, it's always been about Iran, even if other officials in the U.S. government say, oh, this is a much more limited operation, it's only about the Red Sea. But ultimately, for the neocons, who are the people who ultimately drive these things,

It's always been about Iran. So you attack the Houthis. And of course that escalates the situation. It creates a situation where there's now fighting and war, and there's missiles going backwards and forwards in the Red Sea, and there's missile strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. And of course, that is provoking, and it's partly intended to provoke more fighting in other places.

and we had that attack, that drone attack on Tower 22. And of course, then the pressure to escalate and to start fighting and attacking other Iranian proxies in more places. So yes, ultimately it is about Iran. And they're going to say, you know, that these are, this is the final warning against Iran. This is the final action we're going to take against Iran before we take the big action. They make it look as if Iran is in a position to sort of pull the switch, stop operations in the Red Sea or in Syria or in Iraq. But of course, probably Iran doesn't have that kind of influence. And besides, Iran anyway, has its own domestic constitution.

you insist to consider. And it might be very difficult for the Iranians to simply say, well, look, we're going to do pull out all the stops, use all the influence we have, burn our credibility with all these militias in the Middle East who are our allies and try and get them to stand down, even whilst the fighting in Gaza continues. And even as Israel makes more threats against Hezbollah, because of course, if the Iranians do that, then they're only, supporters will say, well, actually you are conceding to the US and you are working for the US. And that is not a position the Iranians want to be in. So it's most unlikely the Iranians either can or will de-escalate. How can they de-escalate when the United States is itself escalating?

Yeah, and that brings us to the talk that there is going to be something targeted towards Hezbollah in Lebanon. It seems like that would be the natural progression of this escalation. But what do you make of the rumors, not even rumors, the reports, actually, that they are very close to getting a 45-day ceasefire greed between Israel and. Hamas. I mean, that would, would that eventually calm things down if that was agreed, or could this be looked at as a way to provide 45 days for the neocons to prepare for something larger? I mean, I guess you can look at it from both sides, but, you know, there is talk that they are very close to getting this ceasefire. There is, there is a lot of talk to in about that. And it seems that the Gulf states have been pushing very hard,

and then there is a Saudi peace plan, as we know, that MBS is putting together, and they've been able to get some governments, like Britain, to talk about recognizing a Palestinian state, and there's even some murmurs that within the British, sorry, the US government, there's even a faction that wants to do that as well in order to get this mutual recognition between Saudi Arabia and Israel underway.

The trouble is all of this talk is almost certainly going to enrage the neocons in Washington and is going to create many more problems in Israel itself. Because to be absolutely clear, we have a 45-day ceasefire. That's a long ceasefire. it might be very difficult after a 45-day ceasefire to resume hostilities, given the amount of criticism that there has been. If we have a ceasefire in Gaza, Hamas is still there. If this moves to proceed towards setting up a Palestinian state,

then Hamas can come out and say we won. because we've managed to move the child, shift the entire dial in the Middle East. We've pushed things in our direction. And you might try and argue that the Palestinian state should exclude Hamas. But how do you do that if Hamas survives as an organization, still armed, still organized, and of course in a position to say that this is our victory. A lot of Palestinians will feel that if Hamas did this, then they should at least have a say in how the Palestinian state,

this new Palestinian state is organized. Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government, his ministers, are dead set against this. They're strongly opposed to the setting up of a Palestinian state, in state, they would regard any situation, even a temporary ceasefire, which Hamascan claim as a victory, as a major defeat for themselves, the neocons in Washington will agree with them. And I would have thought that if we are actually moving in the direction of these kind of settlements, all that's going to do is going to harden the neocons.

the Israeli hardliners even more, they will turn on Biden and say he's been weak, he's giving way to Hamas and to Iran, that Iran is coming out as the winner in the Middle East, and that means that we've got a reverse policy fast in order to retrieve the situation in the Middle East and secure Israel's future. That is how they will present it. So, I'm a very much. So, I'm I'm not sure that we're going to see all of this happen in the way that people say. I think the neocons and the Israeli government are going to do everything they possibly can to stop agreements like this crystallizing. And there was a big protest in Israel two days ago.

I think it was two or three days ago. And there's a succession of Israeli ministers who came out, Ben-Givir, Smotrich, people from. leakhood and they were taking extremely hardline positions. They were again talking about displacement of the population from Gaza and Israel annexing Gaza. So I think that if we get a ceasefire, it'll be very wobbly and very tenuous and might not survive for very long. That's my view. So how do we get to a ceasefire then? There has to be a clear. Is Israel following the Is Israel following the ICJ ruling real quick?

No, no. I mean, I've seen no sign that they are, and I'm going to add this. I mean, those comments at that very same protest rally, to my mind, and we'll wait to the case against Israel in the ICJ, because, I mean, these people are not being deterred clearly by the ICJ ruling. They're still talking about annexing Gaza. And when I say annexing Gaza, you know, clearing it entirely of his Palestinian inhabitants. All right.

I mean, Ben-Vir said, you know, remove them legally and voluntarily. But we know that is impossible. And it's a contradiction in terms. But they want to clear Gaza entirely and resettle it with Israeli settlers. And, I mean, that was clearly what they were saying over the course of this rally. So, you know, I can't see how you get around that problem. The only way you get around this problem is for the Biden administration to make it absolutely clear to Israel that it regards a ceasefire in Gaza as an absolute overriding priority and to back a Security Council resolution,

calling for a ceasefire with provisions that it will be enforced by the United States and other countries. countries, either initially through diplomatic methods, but if not through diplomatic methods, conceivably by action under Chapter 7. So, I mean, that's how you get a ceasefire. I think this administration is very far from that point. What if the resolution, a final question, what if the resolution goes to the General Assembly for ceasefire? It doesn't make it through the Security Council because the U.S. will veto whatever comes their way. it makes its way to the Security Council, and the Security Council does have the votes to demand

a ceasefire. Without the U.S. support, without the mandate, but without the U.S.'s support, what happens then? Yeah, and there's now ample legal advice that he can actually do that. As I said, I appeared on a program with Francis Boyle on consortium use, and he explained the mechanisms, and he's a lawyer who's presented cases to the ICJ, and has worked with the UN. And he explained that the UN General Assembly does have this power. It was a power given to it, by the way, by the United States.

They did that because they wanted to override Soviet vetoes at the time of the Korean War. And so they went to the General Assembly, and they got a vote from the General Assembly. and they said that uniting for peace, this formula, enables them to do it. So it's an American constructed legal tool that the General Assembly has. Well, if we get into that situation, and we are much closer to it than we have been previously, I mean, we remember when this all started in October,

we said that inexorably we are, heading in that direction. We've now got a decision from the ICJ, which is not being adhered to. We've had lots of talk about ceasefires, but there's likely opposition to that, going to be opposition to that, both from Israel and by the way, I suspect, I mean, I don't, haven't discussed Hamas. I'm not sure that everybody in Hamas particularly wants a temporary ceasefire at the moment, because from their point of view, they've shown that they can withstand what Israel is doing. So I can easily see Hamas turning around and saying, well, you know, we're not prepared to agree to a temporary ceasefire. We wanted to be permanent.

You know, so they could put a spoke in the wheel as well. So we're not getting a ceasefire. We might not get a ceasefire. We might not get adherence to the ICJ decision. It's highly likely that at some point the UN General Assembly will take a vote and could very well pass an instruction under Chapter 7. And at that point, of course, the United States isn't an absolute bind because there would be no doubt about the legality of this decision, especially if the General Assembly on its own initiative also decided, as it can do, to recognize Palestine as a full state and gave it voting rights in the General Assembly. So the United States would be in a very difficult position

indeed. He'd go against the will of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Did he set his face against that and see its international position on many other things collapse, see people come forward and say that the rules-based international order is a load of nonsense, as we of course have always known it is, does it do that, or does it submit to the decision of the General Assembly and act to enforce its decision, which would play catastrophically with the neocons in the United States, and by the way, with many people in the United States who do not like the United Nations and who do not think that the United States should submit to its authority. So, you know, it's not an easy situation, but it's one that the Biden administration has

constructed for itself. They put themselves in this mess. All right. We will edit there, the durand.com. We are on Rumble odyssey, bitchchute, telegram, rock fan, and Twitter X and go to the Duran shop 15% off all t-shirts. Take care.