The Duran Podcast - Preventing empire collapse

Episode Date: December 8, 2025

Preventing empire collapse

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the big document that everyone is talking about, which is the U.S. National Security Strategy, the new security strategy document, which defines outlines and defines U.S. foreign policy going forward for the next one year, two years, three years, I don't know, until a new president comes into power. Anyway, this is another document, an important document. Many people believe that much of it was drafted by Colby in the Pentagon. And this is going to be the United States' roadmap for foreign policy going forward over the remainder of Trump's presidency. Your thoughts on this document?

Well, 33 pages. 33 pages. And I would say that it is very, very different from similar strategic security documents that we've seen out of this series come out of the United States, come out of the Pentagon before. But I think a few things to say about it. Firstly, it is not a complete break with the past. I mean, it would be an error to think that it was.

But neither is it a continuation of the past into the indefinite future. It's somewhere in between. So there is a lot of neocon thinking, Wolf of its doctrine thinking still there. But at the same time, it does actually represent a real break and a real evolution of policy and a change in direction. if, if, and it's a very big if, it is ever put into practice. Now, Trump himself obviously endorses it. He's not only signed off on it, but he's written a preface for it. So he's obviously in harmony with the ideas that it sets out.

But we've seen that Trump himself can change from one week to the next. So, you know, it might be the strategy that, guides the administration for the next three years, or it might be dumped in a week's time and disappear unnoticed. But having said that, any document of this kind that comes out of the US government is an important document. And it does give us an insight into the debates that are taking place in the United States. Obviously, I would agree much of this has the fingerprints of Elbridge Colby and people like that all over it.

And I do get the sense that they are a growing force within the United States and within the national security establishment of the United States. So let's first of all discuss where the break is, where the change is. So this document says that the United States was no longer seek domination. Now, that's an interesting, it uses the word domination. So it comes very close to acknowledging a point that has been made by us, by all sorts of other people, that neocon policy is for a policy for world domination. It says the United States must no longer pursue that. It says that the United States lost out from globalism.

It hollowed out the U.S. economy. It didn't achieve any beneficial things for the American people. And ultimately, it weakened U.S. power. It also says that this policy, this constant forward policy, meant that the United States got sucked into all kinds of conflicts, and it blames America's proxy. and allies for that. It says that the United States couldn't assert its control

fully over its proxies, and that meant that the United States got drawn into all kinds of conflicts that were not in its true interests. And it doesn't name them, but Israel is obviously one of these proxies or allies that I suspect is a subtext here.

I'm going to say it also. I think the Europeans, with Project Ukraine, they're also being up point, there's the finger of, you know, a blame to some extent being pointed at them too. So no longer quest for world domination. Instead, the United States focusing on itself, seeking to pursue policies of reindustrialization, and there's a lot to say about that, rebuild its manufacturing, develop its technology, and all of those kind of things. And all,

Also, and this comes back to a program that we did many months ago, just, I think, two weeks after Donald Trump was inaugurated, a return to spheres of influence with the United States having a huge sphere of influence, which is the Western Hemisphere, all of Latin America. it says that no other power is to have any presence in Latin America, any part of Latin America. The United States must have a vice-like grip over Latin America as well. And, you know, it's absolutely stark about that. It talks about bringing back the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine that he's talking about is not the doctrine that was penned by John Quincy Adams. and was announced by President Monroe in the 1820s. It is the sphere of influence doctrine, which is what most people assume the Monroe Doctrine is all about.

So, you know, it has that view. It no longer seeks world domination. It talks about spheres of influence. But there are also some continuations of, the ideas and policies of the past. The United States must remain the world's most powerful country and the world's richest country. This is not about the United States giving up its position as the most powerful country or as a superpower or as a great power or anything like that. It's about stabilizing and securing its position in the future. So the United States must

remain the first, the most powerful, the most economically successful, the richest, the militarily strongest of all the great powers. And secondly, it must prevent any other great power from reaching a position where it could challenge the United States or dominate the United States. I mean, which great power would want to do that, I can't imagine. But anyway, it must not, it must ensure that no other great power achieves the level of dominance that the United States itself had, say, 10, 20, 30 years ago. So that, in a sense, creates a potential for common. conflict with the other great powers.

And it recognizes that there are great powers. And China obviously is the great rival, competitor, adversary. Now there's a lot of commentary that this document basically scaled down the challenge from China, it seems as if China is no longer an enemy, but only a rival. I have to say that having read it myself, I think that this is really more a changing wording than a change in substance because China clearly remains the main challenge for the United States because it's the only country that can achieve not just parity but even conceivably one day supremacy over the United States. And if you look at what it says about Taiwan, for example, it's quite clear to me that it is. opposed to any reunification of Taiwan with mainland China and considers that to be a priority too. But with the other great power with Russia, it seeks an accommodation and compromise. It talks about the importance of achieving stability in relations with Russia.

And of course, it is utterly scathing about the Europeans. I mean, it clearly doesn't think much of the European leaderships. In fact, it's very hostile to them. It loaves the European Union. It says that the whole policy of the European Union has been utterly destructive of the realities of European civilization, of European economies. It says that the European Union has a completely delusional policies say over things like Ukraine and all of that. And it talks about stabilizing Europe. That means that it's a core interest of the United States to end the Ukraine war so that stabilization of Europe can take place.

And that must be done in partnership with the other great power in Europe, which is Russia. And the objective clearly is to free the United States so that it can focus on more important things, controlling the Western Hemisphere, rivalry with China, and all of those things. The part about world domination, it talks about Atlas holding up the world, the globe, and the United States can no longer do this. And so you're seeing an evolution in the business model. That's the way I looked at this document. Instead of trying to do everything yourself, you're going to focus on your core competencies as a business, right?

Your core competency, your neighborhood. And then you're going to outsource everything else to partners. So Europe will be outsourced to the Europeans. Asia will be outsourced to the proxies in Asia. Africa, they pretty much say when it comes to Africa, they're looking for transactional partnerships with Africa. All they care about is resources, nothing else. The Middle East, it's complicated, right?

It's a complicated area, the Middle East. But it is a model of outsourcing the rest of the world. But the partners are still going to be answering to the United States, right? I mean, that's the model. So you're franchising it out. Maybe that's a better way to look at this. It's like a franchise, right? You know, we're going to focus on our neighborhood and then we're going to have our three, four franchises out there and they're going to pay us.

There are 7% of franchise fees, but they're going to take care of their region. My question is this evolution, if you want to call it that, this change of models that we see this document laying out, Is this common in empire collapse? Yes. I can give you an immediate example, and it's a very, very striking one. And even some of the language is exactly identical. And let's take the obvious parallel, which is Britain. Now, in the 1890s, a British politician called Joseph Chamberlain emerged.

Now, he was a businessman. He'd been a businessman. He became mayor of Birmingham, which was at that time the big industrial economic city, a little bit, similar in some respects, if you like, in importance at that time, to New York in the US economy. And he came in and he said, look, this model that we have, the model of the British Empire, the British Empire doing everything by itself everywhere all the time is impossible. And the policy of free trade is hollowing out our industrial base. And he sought to change policy. And he made a speech, a very famous speech. I've discussed it in many places. He said that Britain is a weary titan. Remember Atlas is a titan. So Britain is a weird.

titan, buckling under the over-heavy burden of its fate. Isn't that rather like what you are reading in this? It's almost word for word, exactly. And Joseph Chamberlain suggested that the way to do it is to discover allies and proxies. His main objective, his immediate objective, was to get the Commonwealth country. the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand to actually support the empire and to help Britain prop up the empire. But of course the country that he ultimately had in mind as propping up the empire was, surprise, surprise, the United States. So we're talking

about the 1890s now. And so he wanted to move from the previous policy of Britain doing everything by itself, to the new policy of Britain's English-speaking allies, the United States first and foremost, helping to prop up Britain's empire, but of course always with the assumption that the British themselves would remain in overall charge. And he also advocated for a complete change in British economic policy. So he wanted to move from a policy of free trade to a policy of tariffs, specifically with the objective of building up Britain's industrial base. Now, Chamberlain was an extremely clever man, a very, very clever man. He was, by the way, the father of Neville Chamberlain, who is the prime minister, we all know. But he was one of the dominant figures.

Joseph Chamber, but the dominant figures in British policy in the early 20th century. And of course, a lot of what he was advocating in the 1890s was heresy and was fiercely resisted within Britain. But some of these policies, like tariffs, for example, especially after the First World War, did come into effect, and Britain very successfully did achieve. new alliances with the United States with other countries. But, but it did not prevent the collapse of Britain's empire.

In fact, looking back on it, and it's absolutely clear now, Chamberlain's words at that time were an acknowledgement, a recognition that Britain was moving towards imperial collapse. It was something that he was trying to prevent, but the forces that were going to bring it about were irresistible and far too strong for the British by themselves or even in alliance with others to do anything about them. And of course, one of the key points was that, of course, proxies, vassals, allies have minds of their own in time. And will, sooner or later, anyway, slip from the control of the imperial overlord. And that was what obviously happened with the United States, but it happened with all of the other countries of the Commonwealth too.

So in the case of Europe, the same day that the strategy document came out, we had a report from Reuters. Now, the two are not connected, except that the Reuters report actually originates from sources in the Pentagon. So I guess you could say there is a Pentagon connection, if you believe Reuters is reporting. Reuters said that, according to their sources in the Pentagon, the demand of Europe is that they are rearmed and ready to fight by 2020. I don't believe the article gets into the specifics of why they need to be rearmed and ready for conflict by 2007. I don't believe the article actually specifically names for conflict with Russia. Maybe it does, but obviously that's what they're talking about, right?

And the Europeans are pushing back on the Pentagon's demands saying, look, there's no way we're going to be ready, have a complete military to the the level of the United States by 2007, we're going to be ready by 2030. That was basically the pushback from the Europeans. Orban actually came out with a statement and said that Europe absolutely is preparing to go to war with Russia. I mean, he just says it. That's the policy in Europe. I imagine Orban would know. I mean, he sits in on the meetings. He hears them talking. So if he says this is the official, and I believe he does use those words, This is the official policy of the European Union, which is for a 2030 conflict with Russia. How does this fit into the document for the new strategy document, which is basically saying

Europe, you need to take care of your own affairs, your own security, but as the United States, we're going to seek some sort of understanding with Russia. If the reporting from Reuters is to be believed, and if our bonds, state, are to be believed, it sounds more as if the United States is telling Europe, you guys need to prepare for our conflict with Russia. We're going to be in the background as we try to get some sort of a freeze or reproshmoan with Russia, the illusion of a freeze, reproshmoan or some sort of diplomacy with Russia. Europe, you guys have to have to lead the charge. What I think all this means, and by the way, I think it is completely consistent with this

strategy paper, is that the Americans want to get out of Europe before Donald Trump leaves office. In other words, they want to engineer a not complete divorce, but major steps towards a divorce from Europe before Donald Trump goes. Because I think the calculation is that if it's left too long, there's always a risk that the new administration might want to recommit the United States back to Europe in the kind of way that we saw in the past, and that this would be a disaster. And this is why this paper goes into enormously critical comments about how bad the situation in Europe is, how the European Union, its agencies, are destroying the European economy.

By the way, this is almost word for word what we've been saying for years. And it shows that some people in the United States are very well aware of the realities of what the European Union is doing in terms of economics. It also talks about how the European Union is becoming increasingly authoritarian,

how it is moving towards censorship, how it is trying to pursue increasingly authoritarian. domestic models. It's meddling in the affairs of sovereign states. It talks about a Europe of sovereign states being what the United States ultimately wants to see. And it also says that the Europeans are utterly delusional and have unrealistic policies about the conflict in Ukraine and about Russia. So what it is saying in effect is that these are absolutely. hopeless, impossible, terrible people. The United States cannot continue to be attached to them to the extent that it is.

So what it wants to do, what the United States is basically wanting the Europeans to do, is to take over the burden of their own security and it says that their economy is multiple times bigger than the Russian economy. They should have no problem looking after their own defense. So why do they even need the United States to be physically there? So it wants the Europeans to get a move on and to do that as quickly as possible. 2027 being the date, because I said that is the year before the election, the next US election. And if the Europeans aren't able to do that, which of course they weren't.

be, they won't be able to achieve American levels of military power by 2027, by 2030, by 2035, by 2050, by any date. I mean, you can pick any date you want. They will never achieve that level of military power. It is inconceivable. Anyway, if they cannot achieve it by 2027, before Donald Trump, as I said, is his term ends and the new election cycle in the United States begins, then what the report, what this document basically says is, well, in that case, we have to go for the other option, and it's not quite put as an option, but you can see that it is deep down an option, which is that we talk to the Russians and we come to an understanding with them. And that means that we have to end the war in Ukraine. So I think this is what this is all

about. Now, I don't believe this is going to survive, actually. The Europeans will push back, exactly as you say. The neocons, the hardliners in Washington, are going to mobilize against this part of this strategy paper, especially. And of course, the very last thing they want is to see NATO dismantled and all the structures dismantled, which is what this paper ultimately is leading towards. I don't mean that it wants the Western Alliance completely to disappear, but it doesn't want it to continue in its present form

with the kind of bureaucracies in Russia. the native bureaucracy, the EU bureaucracy that exist at the moment. There are far too many people in the United States at multiple levels who will oppose this. But I think that this is what is at the back of the minds of the people who are drafting this document. They're giving the Europeans the choice. Either you re-an by 2027 and sort out your end. by then, which of course they will never do. Or we will come to an understanding with the Russians

over your head and you'll just have to lump it. But one way or the other, it's going to be done before President Trump leaves office. But we arm for what reason, to take on the Russians, right? To take on the Russians. Yeah. The exact quote from Marban, by the way, is there is the official European position that by 2030 it must be ready for war, the official European Union position, that it must be ready for war. Okay, for war with Russia, right? Okay. Nobody else.

They're not going to get to war with India or China. I mean, it has to be Russia. By 2030. Exactly. Right. So Orban is hearing all of this. Yes. And he's now stating all of this in public.

He's sitting in on the meetings in Brussels, and he's hearing all of the leaders and the commission say that we need to prepare for war. You need to be ready for war by 2030. That's our official position. Yes. And Arban actually takes a step further and says that the EU is shifting to a war economy. Remember when the EU was constantly saying Russia's in a war economy, projection. All of its projection.

Russia's not in a war economy. You've explained it a thousand times. Yeah. But what they were basically saying is that Europe is going to shift to a war economy. Exactly. And in a weird, weird twisted way, it's the only thing. It's the only economy that Europe has left because they've destroyed everything else. And this takes me to my next point. They've destroyed everything else at the behest of the United

States. Yeah. You know, in your video, you made the point that there's a part of the document where it actually blasts Germany for having to offshore to China because they can't get cheap energy in Germany, so they have to work inside of China and in Chinese facilities to obtain the cheap energy, the German businesses. Yes. Well, energy, which still comes from Russia, by the way.

I mean, what makes it so? Hello, Nord Stream? Yeah. Right? I mean, where did all the deindustrialization come from? Exactly. Exactly. The US didn't even tell Germany you need to deindustrialize.

The US said, okay, Germany, Olaf Schultz, you don't want to deindustrialize? you have some doubts, don't worry. We'll make sure that you're forced to deindustrial lies. That's exactly what we got. So how do you square this circle? It seems like the document and everything that is playing out in reality, everything's a contradiction, it appears. Even the point of NATO, that NATO's going to have to wind down or we're going to have to dissolve NATO or scale it back, no more expansionist policy of NATO. Well, Trump in the document brags about how he's the one that got everyone in NATO to bump up their defense spending to 5 percent. Well, you know, defense spending of 5 percent for EU member states pretty much means

a collapse across the entire EU member state economies. Yes. It's 5 percent of your economy going to weapons manufacturers in the United States. Yes. So, I mean, Europe. prepare for war to take on Russia, but at the same time, we're going to try to stabilize things with Russia and NATO should not expand, but we want NATO to expand. And all of these different contradictions that are just right in front of us. How do you explain all? Is this just more chaos? You cannot explain it.

And that's the heart of the contradiction to this, because there's the aspiration, or at least the announced aspiration. you know, concentrate on your hinterland, go for spheres of influence, prioritize deindustrialization, seek stabilization with the Russians, peaceful rivalry, but rivalry conducted very much on American terms with China, but try and avoid war, but at the same time have the most powerful military, be the world's most powerful economy. and in Europe itself, you are utterly scathing about the Europeans. You give the impression that they're hopeless and incompetent and unable to do anything,

that they're delusional and that they're on another planet about Russia. But at the same time, you're urging them to rearm and to take care of their own defense. I mean, it's full of this. As you're funding a proxy war in Ukraine, and you continue to fund the proxy war in Ukraine. Exactly. And, of course, coming back, you're further. point. Yes, Germany is going through a massive process of deindustrialization because it followed American orders. I mean, it was the United States basically that led them into this situation.

There is no recognition anywhere in this document, by the way, that the United States is the source of many of these problems. It criticizes, in general terms, globalization, aircon policies, all of those things, but it purely relates them back to what this has done to the United States itself. It never acknowledges that these policies also had very bad and negative effects on other countries, including, of course, European countries. And I would say, by the way, that this is a major blind spot. I mean, there is a degree of victimhood about this document. Everybody is taking advantage of the US. We always had good in wonder. intentions and it hasn't really worked out. It was all a mistake to pursue it because these people

around the world just don't understand what good people we are. So, I mean, there is this aspect of this document, which is, to me, it's unattractive. I mean, this is where Joseph Chamberlain, to say it simply, was very different. I mean, he was absolutely straightforward about what the British Empire was and what it was all about. But as a result, as a result of all of this, it is full of contradictions. Yes, what I think they're saying is European Union, you have these delusions about Russia, you're unrealistic about them, you want to fight them. This is fine for us, just do it by 2027 or 20, you know, and they say, well, we can't do it by 2027, we're going to do it by 2030 and, you know, we can already see the debate that's going to

take place about that because I said the Americans want it done before Trump goes, but the Europeans presumably want to keep it after Trump goes because they're hoping that the next president will be a Democrat and will have different policies to the ones that Trump has. You can see that this is probably the subtext behind all of this. But I mean, you know, they talk about re-arming for war against Russia, even at the same time as they talk about the need to stabilize Europe and stabilize relations with Russia. There are just too many contradictions here to make this viable. If the United States, straightforwardly and simply said to the Europeans, look, we understand that you have these issues with the Russians. We, however, have our own interests

and our own concerns, and our interests are to come to peace with them, then, well, that will be a coherent position. But there are just too many contradictions here. Too much that opens the way for argument and dissension for this ultimately distinct. And you can see this is a compromise. It's a compromise between people like Elbridge, Coldbred. who you once suspects if he could get the United States entirely out of Europe, he would probably would.

And others, including others within the administration, Radcliffe, Rubio, Susan Wilds, all of those people, and many, many others in the deep state, in the United States, in Congress, in the State Department, all of these people, who obviously want, the United States to remain in Europe and are as committed to the anti-Russian policy as ever. And given that in the first case, you're only dealing with individuals, Colby and a number of others, maybe Gabba, maybe Vance, maybe others like this, against what is an entrenched bureaucracy, it's very difficult to believe that the individuals are going to win against the machine, if I could put it like that.

And by the way, going back to Joseph Chamberlain, basically that was what happened then. I mean, he came up, well, all of these very interesting ideas expressed them an awful lot more coherently. They're expressed in this document. But I think most people who look at what he was trying to do will see that he feels. failed. He wasn't able to rescue to extend the British Empire. And in fact, I think many would say today that the policies that he did pursue, to the extent that they did involve Britain in all kinds of conflicts, which Chamberlain did not want. He wanted, by the way, he wanted Erakhrm with Germany as well. Remember, Germany was the big rival to Britain.

Because his priority was to stabilize and preserve the empire, he actually sought good relations with Germany. But of course, that never really could work out. So in the event, it all came tumbling down. And today in Britain, Chamberlain, who is such an important figure in the early 20th century, has become a completely forgotten person. I mean, you have to go. It has been, yeah.

You have to go into the academic world to read about him and to find out about him. So I suspect something like this is going to happen here. There are other cases. You talked about other examples of imperial collapse and reform and changes. Again, another empire I read an awful lot about and know an awful lot about was Spain. Well, Rome, obviously, but Spain too. And again, in the early sense, 17th century, Spain also had an official of Olivares, who also wanted to carry out major

changes and reforms in Spain and concentrate mostly on reform in Spain. And again, it's widely accepted that his policy ended up becoming a massive contradictions. And again, he probably accelerated the Spanish empire's collapse. So this is what this could quite easily turn out to be. well-intentioned in places, I mean, well-intentioned in terms of prolonging the United States and its position. Prolonging empire. Prolonging the empire, which is what was his goal. Exactly.

As it was Oliveris as it was Oliveris' goal. But more likely than not, it's going to introduce dissonance into the system, an argument into the system. And that is going to make in some ways policy, the formulation of policy from this point on in the United States more difficult and less coherent than it was. Whatever you may think of the near cons that we've expressed this many times, the neocons were at least coherent. This document is not. Now, there is one major difference between the United States and Imperial Britain. and Imperial Spain, which is that the United States is a republic.

It has a very powerful democratic tradition. I know a lot of people push back when we say that, but it is there. If you know American history, as well as I do, you simply cannot ignore it. And it could be that these ideas will finally gain traction and that they will be adopted and that a more coherent policy will come out of this. Both Olivares and Chamberlain worked inside closed imperial systems. The United States is not closed in quite the same way. But anyway, as to that, we'll just have to wait and see.

You know, at the end of the day, you're dealing with the machine. That's the word that you used and this machine. whatever papers you may put out, even the best intentioned documents or strategy papers which say America first and we're pulling out of everything. We really are pulling out of everything. We're not going to get involved in any more adventures, any more foreign conflicts, any more regime change operations.

We're done. Even if you put out a paper like that, the machine is so strong and the people in the machine are so deeply entrenched. that it makes this a nearly impossible proposition. It's just so difficult. How do you change the State Department? Even if you have a Secretary of State that is completely for peace and wants complete America first,

you have this huge organization, which is the exact opposite of that. Exactly. That is completely great. I mean, when Trump became President the first time, he did actually, tried to sack practically, you know, huge numbers of people in the State Department, but it didn't work. And Rubio shows no interest in doing anything like that this time. So you're absolutely right. There is a difference in that people like Olivares and Chamberlain were solitary figures against the machine.

In the United States, you can believe, you can hope that it won't be just. that because along with the machine, there is the elections, there are votes, there is the wider American public, that public has expressed its feelings and its opinions many times. But the machine is there. It is very strong. It has the media, the media machine as well, is part of that machine, the wider machine. I mean, the entire US media is going to be enormously, already is enormously hostile to this dog. The NGOs, the think tanks, much of the tech industry as well, Wall Street.

I mean, you're taking on all of that. I mean, the odds have to be against it. But anyway, it's a try, and it's an interesting indicator of the way things are going in the United States. A final question and comment. The thinking is, at least with, with the Europeans and probably with Asia as well, with Russia and China. I would say it's about the same thinking with regards to this document.

Europe, yeah, sure, fight Russia, go to war with Russia, fight them, but do it on our behalf, but without our participation. Yes. Right? We're going to support you. We'll sell you the arms. We'll sell you the weapons. Sure, no problem.

Do it. Fight Russia. But at the same time, we're also going to support. going to seek some sort of stability with Russia. The same holds for China with regards to this document outsource the conflicts while at the same time the United States pretends, or maybe in actuality, does come to some sort of an understanding with these countries. Does Russia and China, do they buy into this? Do they believe this? I mean, you know, you're going to get Europe to to fight us while at the same time you're going to pretend to want to have some sort of

understanding with us. I mean, do you think the Kremlin has said that they like this document? Yeah. I don't know if they're trolling or if they're just, you know, faking it. But do you think they're buying into this? Do you think they're to blame for this, actually, because of the policy. that the Kremlin has taken so far with regards to the United States, which is that Europe and the UK, they're the ones that are behind this proxy war, and the United States has nothing to do with

it. It's the United States. That's the neutral mediator. I mean, are they in a way fueling this, this type of thinking from the United States? Get others to fight for us while at the same time we pretend to be the peacemakers? The Russians are not going to be fooled by this for one moment. are doing, and you saw that especially with Medvedev, who wrote a piece on Telegram, is that they see that the Americans are saying rude things about the Europeans. They want to fan that. They want to increase dissension between the Europeans and the Americans at this specific point in time, because that facilitates what the Russians are doing in Ukraine itself. The Russians, by the way, have just released their own strategy, security strategy,

It came out just a few days ago, profoundly different and much more coherent and far more realistic, focusing on alliances, you know, friendships and alliances and bricks and security strategies and things of this kind. But, of course, they can be more coherent because they're more united about these things. But you're absolutely right. The Chinese and the Russians are not going to be fooled for one microsecond that the United States pursues good relations with them, whilst at the same time egging on its allies to pursue proxy wars against them. I mean, the contradiction is obvious, and Beijing and Moscow will see right through it. And you can see that they won't take this particularly seriously. But they will say to themselves,

well, the Americans at least now are acknowledging that their limits to their own power. they are at least acknowledging that we are great powers, and even if it won't accept that we're there equals, the fact that it acknowledges that we are great powers and that it also is a great power, not a superpower or hyperpower anymore. Well, that is progress. And the Russians, as I also pointed out in my program, will see what the US says about, the fact that the US wants peace in Ukraine and that this is a core interest of the United States to achieve peace in Ukraine and that it is a core interest of the United States to achieve some

kind of stabilization of the situation in Russia and with Russia and the Russians will say to themselves given that this is so all we need what we need to do all we need to do on the conflict in Ukraine is stand absolutely firm and the Americans will move towards us because it's their core interest. So we are under no real pressure to make concessions to them over Zaporogia or Hearson region

or over the size of the Ukrainian army. Bear in mind the Russians are focused on these particular things. The Russians always focus on detail. They're never particularly keen on these sweeping strategies and things of that kind. So they will say to themselves, we have no reason to give ground on any of these questions, because sooner or later, based on this document, the Americans are going to accept the entirety of their demands because they say that peace is a core issue for them. Peace in Ukraine is a core issue for them.

Stabilization of their relations with us is a core interest. for them. So we are in a position of advantage. We are in the strong position here. And that's what the Russians are going to think. And by the way, the Russians are also going to say to them, so all this talk about stabilization of relations in Europe. What does that mean in practice? This is something the Russians always do, by the way. When you come up with grand plans, they come along and they say, you know, what is the detail? What does this actually mean in practice? Are you talking about renegotiating the security architecture of Europe, something that even Goulbachev was asking for back in the 1980s? And we have been coming back to time and again ever since, and which we first floated, and we last floated in those two treaties that we sent to you and to NATO back in December 2021.

Are you saying that you want to come back and negotiate about that? Because unless you are everything that you're talking about, stabilization and all of that, well, these are all daydreams and interesting words, but they mean nothing. So that's how the Russians are going to respond to this. So on the one hand, yes, they're going to say this is progress. We give it a C plus because it's progress. It's moving further and further in our direction. Like the 28 points.

I mean, you know, we don't accept them, but, you know, there is some good points there, which we can talk about. So this moves in our direction, but it doesn't go anywhere near far enough. And if you really want stabilization with us, we must sit down and work it out and work it out properly. And in the meantime, let's fan the dissension between the Europeans and the Americans and the Americans as much as possible, because let's face it, I mean, if the Americans and the Europeans are quarreling over Ukraine, that can only work to our advantage. And in the meantime, we keep

going in Ukraine because the Americans have already made it perfectly clear that we're on the strong position. They're in the less strong position. They're in the weak position. And sooner or later, they will accept everything we ask. Yeah. Let's play along with this good cup. bad cop thing that they're giving us. Good cop, bad vassal. I would say it's not even good cop, bad vassal that they're presenting us. All right, we'll end the video there. The durad. Dot locals.com. We're on X, we're on Rumble, we're on telegram. We are also on substack as well. So check us out on substack. The link is in the description box down below. Take care.