The Duran Podcast - Putin and Russia's Military. John Helmer DEBATES Gilbert Doctorow (Live)

Episode Date: October 17, 2024

Putin and Russia's Military. John Helmer DEBATES Gilbert Doctorow (Live)

Okay, we are live with Alexander McCurris and joining us today for this show we have with us, John Helmer and Gilbert Doctor. And gentlemen, John Gilbert, before we get started, let's say hello to everyone that is watching us on Rockfin, on Odyssey, on Rumble, and the durand.com. A big shout out to everybody that is watching us on YouTube as well. And hello to our moderators who are helping us moderate this live stream. Zarael is with us to help out. And I believe that is it for now. But hopefully more moderators will join us soon. So Alexander, John Gilbert, before we begin, this debate on Putin.

and the Russian military. Alexander will be moderating. If there are any questions, any super chats during the debate, and you would like to address either John Helmer or Gilbert Doctaro, just put in the super chat to who you would like to address your question too. We will answer the questions at the end of the show. And before we get started, Alexander, before I pass it off to you, let me read you the information, the bios of our two guests.

John Hilmer and Gilbert Doctor. John Hilmer has had an unusual career as a U.S. government official university professor. And since 1989, the longest serving foreign correspondent in Moscow. He was in the Carter election campaign of 1976, then the White House and Office of Management and Budget from 1977 to 1981. His professorships have been at George Washington University in D.C., University of Exeter in the UK and University of Melbourne, Australia. He negotiated face-to-face with Vladimir Putin when he was in Mayor South Chick's administration.

Since we may get discussing the Middle East, John's experience includes years of years on the staff of the Secretary General of the Arab League. His latest book is titled, Dunst Upon a Time, Autobiography of Mistakes. And Mr. Gilbert Doctaro is an independent political analyst based in Brussels. He chose his third career of public intellectual after finishing up a 24th. year career as corporate executive and outside consulted two multinational corporations doing business in Russia and Eastern Europe, which culminated in the position of managing director. Russia during the years, 1995 to 2000, he has published his memoirs of his 25 years of doing business in and around the Soviet Union and Russia, 1975 to 2000.

Memoirs of a Russianist, Volume 1 from the ground up was published on 10 November 2020, volume 2, Russia in the roaring 1990s was released in. February 2021. A Russian language edition in a single 780 page volume was published by Liki Rossi in St. Petersburg in November 2021. Alexander Mercuris, John Helmer and Gilbert Doctoro. Let's begin. Absolutely. Let us indeed begin because we have an extremely interesting subject. We have somewhat two people who are really going to be able to help us with this, because it's an incredibly important subject at this particular time. We're in a conflict, a military conflict, between Russia and Ukraine, obviously,

but everybody can see that it's also a proxy conflict between Russia and the West. And, of course, the interconnections between not just Putin, but the Russian civilian leadership, the political leadership in Russia, and the various political forces that exist in Russia, and the military in Russia at a time of conflict are incredibly important and very, very interesting. Now, as I have said many times, it always provokes humour. I'm not somebody with any kind of background in military affairs. I have got to know quite a lot of people in the militaries in Britain and the United States at various times over the last couple of months, especially since we've been doing

programs on this subject, I've been looking increasingly at Russian military, trying to understand it. We did a program with John Helmer, which explained a great deal. And I'm going to make a quick, few quick observations about the Russian military and about the core institution at its centre, which is the general staff. And I've come to the conclusion that it is completely different from any similar institution which exists in the West. I have been looking at the background of the kind of people who become general staff officers in Russia and indeed an officer training programs in Russia.

And I've been astonished at the extent and thoroughness of the training these people go through. Multiple different schools, schools which they pass when they've been. want to become officers, further schools, colleges, further institutions that they pass through in order to qualify to the higher command levels. And also, when they become general, when they go to join the general staff, much later in their careers, they go through the general staff Academy. They are trained to become general staff officers. And the general staff in Russia is

organized intellectually and organizationally in a completely different way, as I'm now going to understand, from analogous institutions of the West. It is not like, say, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States. It is a single corporate entity when you become a general staff officer. That, it seems to me is what you principally are, irrespective of whether you started before as, say, an Air Force officer or an army officer or a naval officer, you become part of this specific institution. And the general staff isn't there simply in order to plan and conduct wars. It's also to think about war. It is an extremely

intellectual body. It produces vast amount of material. I'm absolutely astonished at the amount of material it produces on war, about thinking about war, about developing doctrines of war,

that kind of thing. So we're talking about an institution that has existed for well over a century that has a very strong corporate identity, or so it seems to me, that consists and considers itself to be something of an intellectual elite, and which the kind of people who go into it, to some extent at least, they're not just military officers, but they are particular selected group amongst

the military. And they're there at the centre, at the center of the military structure in Russia, And I personally am sure that an organization, an institution like this is going to have not just a conception of itself, but particular ideas about how war and policy is going to be conducted. Or by definition, it is going to be a significant lobby group in itself, in a self, in a, how policy is formed. And of course, at a time of war, its power, its influence within the political system is inevitably going to grow because, of course, it's doing what it is there to do, conduct war and advise the political leadership as well. So I just wanted to say something about this because I said, I don't think we have anything quite like this in the West. I'm going to throw it open to the two of you. First of all, I'm going to start with John. I was going to go to Gilbert.

John, am I right in my discussion of the general staff? Because as I said, it is quite different from, say, you know, the staff structures that we have in Britain or the United States. I think the closest analogy that we can think of is the general staff they used to have in Germany, but that's long, long since gone. And I don't think there's anything quite like it anywhere else in the world. John, what are your thoughts on this? I think, I'm glad you gave us the introduction there, Alexander. There is no doubt, and I believe you're right. And I think all the evidence indicates that the general staff operates not only to defend Russia now in war, but in the long term, and it does so collectively and corporately and acts collectively on the final decision-making

that the so-called commander-in-chief, the civilian, the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, decides. Gilbert has tried to make the case, and I'll come to this in a minute, that this is a top-down administration, and I think to use Gilbert's phrase, put into, calls the shots. That's not right. I'd like to just quickly go through what I think, because we've heralded this as a debate, and because the issues of how of the terms for end of war of the Ukraine are on the table. They will be very affected by the outcome of the November 5 U.S. election, but we're also looking to the next Russian presidential election, because these issues of end of war are political issues as well as military ones. Now, the winners of the war

are the general staff. Everyone in Russia understands the Russian army is winning and will win this war. The questions on which Gilbert and I differ, and I'll try and summarize them, are these. I believe that Gilbert is wrong on the history of the negotiations that have gone on since before this war began before February 2022. There will be no guarantors of the end of war. No guarantors. Why? Because no guarantor country can be trusted to secure the Russian interest.

You can go back to the history of guarantors in, for example, the history of Cyprus. The British never defended Cyprus from Turkish invasion. listeners in Cyprus like Alex understand guarantors are worthless because the states that guarantee pursue their own interests but in in the terms that we're discussing but consider that the guarantors of the agreement with Yanukovych to protect a civilian transition of power in February of 20 of 2019 the guarantors were France Poland and Russia and France, Poland and Germany, Steinmeier for Germany, Fabius for France, and Sikorski, who's still there in Poland, deliberately betrayed the guarantee. It was worthless

the minute the document was signed. There can be no guarantors for the alleged guarantee process in the Istanbul One agreement. That treaty, so, called, provided for guarantees, including the United States. The Russian side has concluded, not just the general staff, that the U.S. doesn't guarantee. The U.S. lies. The U.S. will pursue its policies. That's what guarantors do. So no guarantor. Second, wrong in the history that Gilbert has told. There can be no neutrality of the Ukraine unless it's enforced militarily, militarily. It's military protection that guarantees permanent neutrality, which is the phrase in the Istanbul one draft treaty. And it's being bandied around as one of the

foundations of an end-of-war outcome. Second, I think that Gilbert is wrong on the foundation of policy. It's my view, and I've repeated it many times, in books and on the website, that the U.S. policy does not date when Gilbert has put it from Madeline-Alein-Al-Brighthood or the Clinton administration or Mrs. Clinton. U.S. policy since 45 has been to destroy Russia and prevent Russia from ever forming the kind of partnership with Germany in Europe, if such a German-Russian partnership post-war were to develop, that would end U.S. control of Europe. I think this is obvious. It needs to be said, however. If it's obvious, then what are the stakes now for end of war? What Gilbert is advocating,

What he says in print and in talk shows is President Putin's line amounts to the Gorbachev treason. The Gorbachev treason was not just, not just to accept an American James Baker's promise, not one inch eastward for NATO. That's not just how the mistake that Gorbachev made that we keep hearing about. The fundamental treason was that Gorbachev, followed by Yeltsin, withdrew the Russian or Soviet army from Germany, withdrew the means by which Russia and the Soviets then, the Red Army, could secure the promise that was made. Without an army to secure a promise, U.S. policy will revert to what it is, what it is today. It's not an invention of the neocons, Ms. Neuland, Blinken and others, these sort of Ukrainian

Arabis who now have power in Washington. This is not a neocon invention. It goes back to non-Ukrainian, non-Jewish decision makers, general staff and civilian decision makers during World War II in the United States and England. it's the destruction of the possibility of Russian, German, European power as an independent force in Europe. And thirdly, I think we could say to just open that Gilbert's wrong on method. My efforts here, and in a podcast obviously you've invited us to give our opinions. Fine.

But in my reporting and in the books, I don't give my opinion. I'm trying to base what I'm trying to say, including about what the general staff currently think, on what the evidence is when they talk. Now, nobody, no senior general staff officer has been speaking. None will. On the other hand, Admiral Avakians, the former head of the Pacific Fleet, fired by Putin earlier this year, has gone in print. And I've talked about that in print.

That's not just the only evidence. Of course, what Gilbert is saying is he watches Russian television talk shows. He watches Soloviev, Kisseljov, Nikanov and others. In my view, this is an absurd method for understanding either President Putin's role in the command structure or the general staff's role. role or what the future security of Russia is required to be in a settlement. It's like who takes seriously the Rupert Murdoch approach to truth. You don't read the London Times or watch Fox News to determine what is true.

Therefore, the notion that we should watch Russian television with that group of talk show presenters as an example of what is the truth of a Russian debate is inappropriate. So I'm sorry to say, Gilbert has is well meaning, but we're not talking about Dr. O. We're talking about Dr. zero. This is the basis of a fundamental agreement on which if we don't settle the outcome of the war according to Russia's security needs now, by the time there's an expert, presidential election, there'll be more war. Yeah. Okay, shall we move? Shall we move on? So, first of all, Gilbert, can you just tell me what you think about my view of the Russian military?

And then can you start to respond to John's points here? No, I'd rather start to respond to the not point, but this whole denunciation, because that's not what I expected this would be. I've written a lot of things. I've been writing since 2010. I've collected many of these essays in five books. And you are completely misleading in your remarks about what I was doing, just as you're misleading in remarks about the relevance of watching Russian television. You are not looking at what I'm trying to do.

I am not trying to be John Helmer. So our missions have been quite different. I'll tell you frankly, when you set a 90-minute time limit on this, I thought, my God, these talk shows usually go 30, 25 minutes, one hour is pretty tough together an hour. But listening to John, we could be going for two days. Okay. I have no intention of answering any of the points that he made. I had the courtesy three days ago or four days ago to, as I said, telegraph my punches.

And to answer the critical question that was before us, what is Mr. Putin going to do? Is he going to collapse? Is he going to follow through on Russia's state interests or not in the days ahead? And I said my point of reference was, I'm sorry, Mr. Elmer, it was precisely television, the most important television program that Russia has for the general public, which was the Kislyov wrap-up of the week. And Mr. Kisdanov is not just a presenter. He happens to be the general director of all Russian people.

news and he showed on his program he gave us again the june statement that mr putton made uh in the foreign ministry of what how this war will end in a way that was saying that there's no way back that this mr putting cannot deliver less because the whole russian public watched that but that's a separate issue i thought that you were telegraphing your your punches in the article you published today on Ragozin. And there you dealt with a lot of issues related to the general staff. And I was preparing myself to discuss that with you. I was not preparing myself to discuss my whole life with you.

I think that's pointless. Well, shall we actually then get onto the track of discussing what you think is going to happen and what you think the policy. No, I would like, Dr. take a step back, because you made a very important point. you said that the Russian general staff is like nothing in the West. You omitted the other side of the equation. The Russian civil structure is a civilian structure is also like nothing in France or Britain or the United States.

So let's get that straight. Mr. Putin's position is not the same as the U.S. president. So this is a special situation that requires a lot of attention. As for using television, my friend, you are ignoring totally. my mission. My mission is to fill in a big blank because the general public doesn't know anything about the Russian side of the story and not the artistry, but the Russian story. Can you discuss a bit? Because this is, I've spoken about the military structure. Do you want to talk about the civilian structure, the way in which things are organized in Russia and

how all of these different factors interact with each other? as your perspective. Unlike my counterpart, I don't speak with a position of certainty. The only one who could be certain of what Mr. Putin is doing would be maybe Massad. Maybe they have a microphone under his pillow. We don't. And so we don't really know what his motives are

for many of the issues that Mr. Helmer finds offensive and that obviously some people in the military are not satisfied with. But life is very complicated, particularly political life. And Mr. this is an issue that I've discussed privately and also publicly with Paul Craig Roberts. Is Mr. Putin really just a bluff? Is there something serious there? Does he really have a backbone? These are a serious issue.

And behind it often is a lot of ignorance or inattention to detail. The detail I have in mind is the world of large. Why didn't the Russians just run over Ukraine in 2014? Oh, was it because Mr. Putin was indecisive or foolish? And he didn't use the military advantage they had? No. He was acting like a statesman and politician who understands the complexities of the world. Just as the complexity is the world of, if he had done that, which he could have,

Russia would have been brought to its knees by American economic. sanctions in 2014 for which it was not ready. It took, sorry, it took 10 years to get ready. And the, or eight years to get ready for this stress test. And so when you speak about very blithely that the, how the Russians were taken for fools, and this is the general consensus view, that they were taken by fools as fools in the midst of two agreements,

which the German and French sponsors had no intention no intention of fulfilling and were buying time. Yeah. And the Russians were buying time too, because they weren't ready for a fight in 2014, and they were ready for a fight in 2022. So let's not kid ourselves if the Russians are naive fools. They're not. Mr. Putin is not a fool. He can go to the Polish border as some people like Ragoz and want, and that will be the end of this war and the start of the next war. And he knows that very well. Is he the only sole decision maker here? Because you mentioned that there is a complicated political structure,

which is very different from that in the West. That's one of the things I want to explore, if you don't mind my sake. Let's look at the paperwork, Alexander. It's a good question. Let's look at things as they developed. Let's look at the treaty. the draft treaties that were presented by the foreign ministry on December the 17th, 2021, when they were dismissed in the weeks that followed,

dismissed categorically and arrogantly by Blinken and the State Department without public discussion in the West, that was the last obstacle which the foreign ministry with the Kremlin's approval had placed in front of the general staff's view that war was inevitable and that the Ukrainians with U.S. planning were intending to mount an offensive. Let's look at what the treaties say in military terms. The draft treaty that was proposed to NATO proposed to roll back, roll back the military threat to Russia's long-term security to the position that NATO powers exercise in 1997. 1997.

That would have meant that Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Hungary, Czech Republic, the Baltic states and Romania, to give a few examples, would not be part of the NATO threat to Russia in future. What does that particularly mean? and what's President Putin said about it? Well, it's very clear, and I've reported it many times. He said it in Athens in front of the Greek Prime Minister. It was what I'd call the crosshairs warning.

The crosshairs warning was that if the US bases dual-capable, nuclear-capable, Tomahawk missiles in the Aegis ashore batteries in Poland and the Romania, those countries and those bases and those missile batteries go into the crosshairs. That was the term President Putin used in Athens in 2016. Crosshairs meant then, and it means still, and it meant when the foreign ministry presented its draft treaty, that if NATO for Russia's long-term security and indivisible security for all of Europe,

there can be no basing of offensive missile attack weapons in Poland and Romania, as there currently are. Now, that was a position if appeared President Putin accepted back in 2016 and subsequently. If you go fast forward to Istanbul, 1, the provisions of the so-called agreement between Ukraine delegation and the Medinsky delegation representing Putin in Istanbul, you see a very much shorter, briefer, less secure set up that it appeared President Putin accepted. And he repeated in the June 14th speech he gave at the foreign ministry in June, mid-June.

a few weeks back, he repeated these terms. Gilbert accepts that these terms are an acceptable end-of-war outcome because Putin says so. What I say is Gilbert, in his June mid-2020 version, with Professor Petro, the ex-state department official, offered even softer terms. What I'm saying is very clear here. The foreign ministry and the general staff on the military assessment of long-term security of Russia requires the demilitarization of the Ukraine as a platform, permanent neutrality enforced by the military. Going to the Polish border, as Dimitri Ragozin says, doesn't mean Russian occupation of the Ukraine, doesn't mean that Putin wants to rule the Ukraine. It's very clear Russia does not want that. However, what the treaty that was rejected proposed was that no country

can become a platform for external powers, meaning the United States, to use nuclear weapons pointed at Russia. This is the military significance of the run-up to the war, that Istanbul-one terms would have betrayed the Russian security concerns expressed only weeks before, and they were rejected internally in Moscow, not simply because Boris Johnson showed up in Kiev. That's a Kana. So what I'm trying to say here is that there is a collective decision-making process in Russia. It's not visible to everybody.

in the same way that we accept that the deep state decision-making process in the United States or in France or in Germany or in the UK, is the deep states not visible, nor should it be for military and political security. What we're debating here or discussing or trying to understand, as you put it, Alexander, is what is the collective assessment of Russia's security needs to prevent another war of the kind the US has been running against Russia and the NATO alliance since 45. Can I, before we go on, just a few, just two questions, Gilbert. Firstly, did the Russians, when they agreed to Minsk II, believe that Minsk II was going to be implemented?

because if we say that they were playing for time, that might suggest that they too didn't believe in the future of Minsk too. I mean, I just want to just clarify that point because I'm not quite clear what that is. And secondly, I mean, John's point, Istanbul does seem like a significant retreat from those two draft treaties that the Russians propose in December. December 2021. I mean, it's difficult to see. I find it difficult to see Istanbul as anything else. My request.

Just asking me your thoughts about this. We have a time-limited discussion here. I don't see the sense in going back to what I wrote with Mr. Petro. It's utterly irrelevant to the discussion today. And I find it just an exercise in character assassination, not a serious debate. I have written many things, you have written many things, and so what? Time marches on, and our positions change as we learn new things. I want to talk about the situation today and in the recent past,

not going back to the start of the world. I'm concerned that the answer to your question, Alachandra, is not knowable. One of the unique things that I'm doing on these talk shows, and it came up critically today in the show that I have done. in the show that I put on with Judge Napolitano, some wise guy said, all we hear from doctoro is I don't know. Yes, when I don't know,

it's usually because nobody knows. Only I say it and they don't. You're asking me a question, Alexander, which nobody knows. In 50 years, perhaps, when archives are opened, if there's any historian left on earth to open them or any archives that haven't been burned, the answer will be there.

But frankly, no one knows. The idea that the man, man, Mr. Putin, is not an absolute dictator. It should be obvious to anybody who is professional. Also, what meaning of dictator is should be obvious too. There is nobody on earth, even Joseph Stalin, who had absolute and total control of everything in a country. It doesn't exist.

It's only in the writings of our various scholars from Harvard and Colombia in the 1970s and 80s, he could speak about totalitarianism in such absolute terms. There's always politics. Politics means there are always factions. And they're representing not just personalities and personal ambition, which of course is always a factor in history, but also political stands.

So on as good or not bad for the country. That always the case. And I'm at the least bit surprised that I don't find any discovery that there would be different factions within Russia. I also, I hope that we will come back to Mr. Ragozan. I find this particularly piquant, just as I found your remarks about our famous culture minister and his role in the negotiations to be piquant because the personalities in both cases are quite mediocre and substandard.

I know Mr. Ragozan, he was here in Brussels. He served, or he did a term as the, as the Russian ambassador of NATO. I also know as a reader of Mr. Rogozim as the one who's a terrible administrator, whose period as Ros Cosmos was beleaguered with scandal and with corruption and with late performance, which was one reason why he was given the boot,

the famous Vastotchni Cosmodrome, which was badly delayed under his period in power. So I find it remarkable that you view him as a candidate for president. In any case, there are a lot of other people around, Khaziazheniti, as I call them, people who know how to manage things. He's not one of them.

But that's a side issue. But I wouldn't like to stay close to the present and not pick into each of our, into your past or into my past, because it's not relevant to the discussion. It just becomes, as I said, character assassination. But specifically, well, let's put aside 2014, 2015,

Minsk Agreement, whether in fact, the Russians ever expected it to be implemented or not. Let's talk about Istanbul. It was Istanbul a retreat from the two draft treaties that were proposed in December 2021. I mean, to me, I'm going to say straightforwardly, it looked as if they were. It was. I mean, it had nothing to do with the draft treaties. It didn't discuss the security arrangements in Europe. It didn't talk about withdrawing NATO infrastructure westwards to the 1997 borders. Why, given that the Russians made this big move in December 1991, when the discussions came up in Istanbul, did they pull back so completely from that?

was that because they felt we can't really talk about that with Ukraine. We need to sort out Ukraine first and we're going to come back to the two draft treaties or have they given up on the two draft treaties? I mean, again, obviously we don't know the internal debates. But these are questions. We can ask these questions and we can debate them amongst ourselves. And we can get understand things a bit better that way. I agree that it is important to flag these issues.

I personally have long believed that there are many loose ends in the Russian power structure. There are many inconsistencies. There are many things that are hard to understand. For example, how it is that some real scoundrels were kept on at the highest levels of government by Putin. and a true bias of being the outstanding case. Why did this go on? There are many contradictions here. But if something seems odd, it probably is odd,

and they may just be considering the caliber of intellect and political experience of Putin and his immediate entourage. It may well be an explanation. I don't have it. Can I just add a point on which Gilbert and I agree. It's not a contradiction to say that Putin, the president of Russia, changes his mind. This is what good politicians, first-class politicians, should do. It's not the case, as Gilbert said, and we'll take it a little non-literally,

that if a microphone, a Mossad microphone, don't know why we consider they a particularly expert, had a microphone under Putin's pillow, we'd know what he thinks. Actually, we do know what he thinks because we know he changes his mind on what he thinks. He changes his mind, acknowledges mistakes. This has been one of the great advantages of Russian decision making, both military and civilian, since Stalin tried to buy time against Hitler with the Ribbon Tchop pact. Okay. I mean, for politicians with multiple constituencies, arguing their interests fiercely, as they do in Russia, as they do in Washington and so on, for the leader or the president, the elected head of government to change his mind is normal. It should happen. It won't happen with Kiyosama, that minor figure now ruling that small, diminishing country of the United Kingdom. But it won't happen with Macron, the president of another dwindling, diminishing country. But in serious countries like Russia, like the United States, the president can change his mind.

That is if his mind is still all there, which we understand is not the case with President Biden. Now, if President Putin, we acknowledge, changes his mind. is the Putin decision making, a bottle half full or a bottle half empty. Gilbert and I can differ. Gilbert might say it's half full. I might say it's half empty. Either way, we're treating the president, the head of state, the senior decision maker, as a bottle. Well, it's normal politics to do that. What we're trying to understand here, and you raise the question, Alexander, Why did President Putin authorize his spokesman and his business representative, Ramana Abramovich, who was behind the negotiating table in Istanbul,

to agree to terms which the collective decision-making, represented by the foreign ministry, the defense ministry, and the intelligence services and the general staff, had incorporated in those treaties? Why did he change his mind? and then why again did he change his mind and dropped it? Well, it's to his credit that he changes his mind. And in Dmitri Rago's injustice, to give an example,

analysis of his own interactions over 22 years as President Putin's personal representative in Beslam, in Kaliningrad, in Transnistria, Putin had enough confidence in Ravre, Ragozin to negotiate. But Ragozin's record of what the interactions were, were. I proposed the following to the president. Sometimes he accepted my advice.

Sometimes he changed his mind. Sometimes he told me one thing and did another. This is normal. I'm glad that Ragozin is one of the people who've left a record of this. But what we've got to get here clearer for the benefit of the audience is change. changing one's mind about the security requirements to end this war must not lead to the opening of the next war because we can either debate it or not debate it for days. The next war will be the same. It will be to destroy any possibility that Russia and Germany can form a

partnership. Well, Germany has been destroyed. The Nord Stream explosions demonstrate German capacity to form a partnership with anybody in Europe was blown up by its friends with Schultz's acquiescence. So we know that the world has changed since the war started February 2022. What we want to discuss here is what we think our Russian counterparts think should be the outcome. and is President Putin about to change his mind again? I agree completely. It is very important that we focus precisely as you have just done on the end game here. I think that will be the most illuminating discussion for this audience.

The question is, you've mentioned Germany, and I think it's very appropriate to what I'm about to say now. Is this going to be another Congress of Berlin of 1878? I think that's really what is on your mind. Are the Russians going to give away with the peace table what they won on the battlefield? That is the number one question. And when you spoke about in your various articles about the general staff being discontent and nervous, anxious about what the president may or may not do, I think that is a central question. Is he going to take Russia's fundamental state interests?

or will they be substantially defended in the peace? Also, who is going to be sitting at that peace table? Let's go back to the June desirata, the requirements set down by Mr. Putin. It had a final point, the last punch, which really puts into question what he hopes to achieve in requiring not just the recognition that Russia, is the rightful owner of the four Oblos plus Crimea that have been removed from Ukrainian rule or governance since 2014 and since 2022.

But is Russia going to neutralize Ukraine and so forth? The last point is that the West will have to raise raise its sanctions. That leaves me with the question, does he really want a peace or not? It's hard to imagine that that is well come about unless Ukraine is really ground into the dirt and a lot of American soldiers also are ground into the dirt doing service in Ukraine. I don't see how that can happen. So we have to consider not a flip-flop by Mr. Putin coming ahead, but does he really want a piece at all? Can I just quickly

to something which is, it goes slightly outside this framework, which is that there's another government, which is perhaps in constant dialogue with the Russian government. And the Chinese government has been talking specifically and continuously

about one important thing, which is that the final analysis, the way in which this conflict has to end is through a revisiting of the issue of the security structure in Europe. Now, they say this all the time. They say this in every statement that they make about the end of the conflict. And of course, they have multiple contacts with the Russian government at multiple levels. They talk to Putin, obviously. They talk to the military. The defense minister has just been in Russia. The Russian

defense minister has just been in China. Is this taking us back? Is this taking us back? Just again, I come back to this question. Is this taking us back to the security, the two treaties of December 2021? Is that the desired Russian anger? No, it isn't. And I'd like to correct what you just said. The Russian position today is not what you said. The Russian position has gone beyond that.

The Russian position is a revision of security in Eurasia, not in Europe alone. Okay. accepted. I don't have what to add, Alexander. I think the Chinese position in the short term is their 10-point peace plan for the Ukraine, which is accepted in principle, but impossible to negotiate in practice. What one can say, as the Chinese mark out their principles, is that the called Zelensky Victory Plan with its secret annexes, contradicts the Chinese plan completely. And we can discuss if it's worth discussing the Zelensky plan and its secret annexes if there's time. But the Chinese position has got to be the long term.

What's the future of a security of Europe? And there is interested in a stable Europe. but not occupied Europe, stable Europe without of the indivisible security so that Europe isn't a platform for attacking Russia. The Chinese are as interested in that as they are as interested in the stable Middle East and a stable Pacific region. We're not here to discuss countries, country policy making, which I personally don't understand very well and don't pretend to comment on. That's the Chinese. But for the time being, what we have is a pretty clear understanding that the Chinese and the Russians share a strategic idea of stable, indivisible security in Europe that benefits

everybody. Gilbert, I mean, what do you say about, and by the way, I accept that. I mean, it is about Eurasia. Can I just say about the Chinese peace plan? I don't think it's a peace plan. I think they just made a number of very general points as far as I could see as a basis for discussion. But the statements that they've been making about, and they talk about Europe, by the way, that it should look, re-examine the architecture of security in Europe. I've seen that. I've seen Chinese statements about this.

It comes out in Chinese readouts. It comes as statements from the Chinese foreign ministry. and they are in dialogue with the Russians. But what does that mean? Does that mean going back to the treaties of December 2021? Or does it mean something more? Because I'm starting to think, actually, that it might even mean something more.

But what that might be, I'm not sure. At the very least, you've got the Chinese apprehension that if Trump wins the election on November 5, there will, the Trump more or less says it explicitly to the extent that that man can speak explicitly. Has indicated that he would make a piece, a separate peace in Europe in order to focus his warmaking capability on China. So the Chinese have to say to themselves, as we all understand, if Russia doesn't achieve

a stabilization against the United States in Europe, we are next. And we're already next from a Chinese point of view, which is why they ran a little demonstration of how they would tie off the Taiwanese with a maritime blockade that will be a hell of a lot more effective than the one Napoleon tribe on the England during the beginning of the... 19th century. So if not for Russia, China is next. The contact to this question of December 2021. That was very tough and you've called out the terms, particularly the rollback

to the period before the expansion of NATO. I'm not sure it was that was the question of NATO membership, but certainly it was a question of having NATO installations, relations precisely, for the most egregious abuse from the Russian standpoint, is precisely those two supposedly anti-ballistic missile bases, but actually dual-purpose bases in Poland and in Romania. The Russian statement for negotiation, the opening points, they were delivered by Ravkov, who's probably one of the toughest guys in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So it's not just the military who can be tough. Within the rather weak-risted Sergei Lavrov's group, you've got a guy who's tough as nails,

now that means, name is Rethkov. Coming back to the, we had a difference of opinion which you haven't raised regarding those negotiations in Istanbul and how the interests of Russia might have been betrayed and how Mr. Medinsky and how Mr. Medinsky was not really the person who could deliver the goods for Russia because of his rather meager achievements as overall, as an historian, as an administrator, and ministry of culture, and otherwise. And we, I raised the question of who we're sitting

next to them. You've said that behind the scenes was Abramov. could be. But who was sitting next to Medinsky? Slutsky, the heir to Geronovsky. And I find it incredible that the, that party could tolerate a sellout of Russian interests. It just doesn't add up. Can I just ask a quick because can I just quickly ask a question here? Slutsky as I understand it is a politician. Medinsky is, I think we all agree, a rather well, he's a historian. Let's call him a historian. Let's be kind to him.

Surely, on a negotiation of this seriousness, you would have to have someone like a half, whom I agree with you about, by the way. If you're going to be serious about it, you want somebody who's tough and, you know, knows how to conduct

negotiations. I mean, you know, Snutsky may be a passionate nationalist and all this, but is he the sort of person you would want to conduct negotiations? Does he have experience in conducting negotiations? When you see something that doesn't make any sense, look further. I'm persuaded, and I've said many times, that Mr. Putin is the best HR manager of any head of state or head of government in the world. He has kept next to him.

In this respect, I find him very similar to Peter the Great, who had a lot of scoundrels around him, people who came from rags to riches, the riches being at the expense of the state treasury. And he tolerated them because they brought enormous talent with them that he put to use for the state's purpose. So it has been with Mr. Putin, why he tolerated pre-ghaussian, why he tolerated Chubias,

why he's tolerated a lot of things. scoundrels in high places and I may also say it's why he's why has he tolerated mediocrities like Medinsky or like by the way well we can go on to this it's not important but there has to be a reason there has to be a reason and I assume that Medinsky was useful to Putin either as his eyes on the ground Fatma's reporting back to Putin in a way that he did not trust. Why did he appoint, why did Putin appoint Gelowusuf to replace Shoygo? Is it because of his managerial skills, maybe, his loyalty and his ability to perform for Putin?

And I think the same thing may be true in this case with Medina. We don't disagree, Gilbert and I, but I would like to suggest that, there is a very clear way in which we don't need to speculate. Most of our audience is going to have that war and peace moment where they run out of interest and ability to follow the Russian names. And we don't have a glossary here of all these names who play a part in the story, especially the battlefield story. We're not war and peace.

What I think I can say is that in all of my time in Moscow, I've been trying to use a method, a case study method of how the president makes decisions. I did the same during the Carter administration for Jimmy Carter, when we identified how dangerous for Carter, as Vinya Brzeinski was. But that's another story. Case study method, how the president makes decisions, is one of the ways in which we can reduce the amount of speculation. Case study method applied to military decisions, very difficult for foreigners, impossible for Russians.

So what I've tried to do over the years is to look at particular decisions in particular civilian sectors. The book called SOVCOM plot is based on 15 years of British high court documentation of how Putin made up his mind, changed his mind, changed people, replaced people, appointed people, promoted people, to establish the Russian oil tanker fleet and gas tanker fleet, the Russian fleet as the largest and most important fleet in the world. Softcomplot is a story of how Putin makes decisions. And what you get there is documented by corporate files

and witnesses, including ministers, in the High Court indicating how the decisions were made over, let's say, between 1996 and 2004. By 2005, the whole matter became vengeful and was in the High Court in London. That will never happen again. The evidence base will never happen again. But what it shows is the capacity of the President to change his mind admit mistakes, not admit mistakes, favour one constituency over another.

And again, we come to the heart, is the bottle half full, or is the bottle half empty? The interpretation comes later. The evidence, however, is how we should start. Can I just come back again to the negotiating? I mean, is there a sense, perhaps, that the negotiating team that was put together

in 2022, which is to say to me looks a thin one, frankly, that that might perhaps have reflected the political balance in Moscow at that time. And perhaps that the political balance is now shifting.

And that if we do get a renewed negotiation now, maybe more, a stronger, rather more purposeful people will appear in it. Because both of The difference now is the Russian army is winning, has nearly completed the annihilation of the Ukrainian military forces. Today's bulletin from the defense ministry shows again a near record number. 2,195 men killed or disabled on the five directions of the front.

And that isn't counting the 23,000 casualties in Kourosk. the huge difference is back in February 22 then March then April general staff goes to the Kremlin and says to the commander-in-chief we told you so boss now let us do the job and finish the job now that's not exactly what's happened sources that I talk to speak of the presidential foot on the break and you can see it a foot on the break, means that the electric light capacity of the Ukraine is still on. Before the winter, despite all the electric war raids, electricity is still on in Levov and Kiev. It needn't be if the foot wasn't on the break. But President Putin and the general staff and the

Security Council have all agreed to do things in a particularly deliberate, casualty reducing method. That's the way it's going now. But we're trying to say, we're coming to the point where there is a major argument of what terms guarantee the future against another war for Russia. And that's not only military calculation, nor is it the diplomatic calculation of how the treaty terms varied from December 2021 to put in June 14 speech of this year. It's a political process in which the succession to the presidency, either in 2030 or 2036, will be decided. It's a domestic political issue in Russia that's keener than the Ukraine war is in the U.S. presidential election to be decided shortly.

Once you combine domestic politics, the money involved, the factions involved on the civilian side, and leaving aside the late Chabais and the late Kudrin and their protégé, who's still the governor of the central bank, El Diorna, why is she still there? Well, these are, again, names that the war and peace blindness will affect our audience. We don't have to mention names, but Gilbert and I could go offline and talk about this for a long time with you and with Alex. But what we want to try and get here is that the end-of-war terms are a domestic political issue in Russia, just as they are in the United States. but they're acute in Russia because Russia faces existential threat to its long-term survival. Well, the Russian public mood has been changing in a single biggest shock to the Russian public mood,

was the encouragement in Korsk. That changed the nature of the war for the Russian public. It's one thing to send your boys abroad. I can say that Ukraine was not really abroad. but strictly speaking it was abroad and it's another to to realize the mission of national interests national interest of real poitique is never beloved by the general public least of all by mothers wives and daughters the what they are but that's a different story when your own country is invaded and that changed the public mood and obviously changed the expectations of the outcome of

the war in the broad public. So that has been a big factor and that is not done by Mr. Putin, he was done by Mr. Zedensky. As regards, there are a lot of points John that we can have in common, not least of one, which is the last one you were talking about, about Nabilina. And every three days when Mr. Babakov is appearing on, this is a Russian Duma member who's, I'd say purpose in life is to get rid of Nabilina. And every time he's given a microphone on the Solvioph show, he spends 10 minutes explaining to the general public exactly what John is concerned about, that she is a very destructive presence and very much in the tradition of Kudrin,

who is arguing for many years, why are we spending money on the military, who needs it, or Mr. Chubias, who just busy siphoning away billions from the state treasury. There are a lot of interesting side issues that have that could capture the imagination of the broad public watching this show, but obviously we don't have time for it. The key issue is how will this war end? And as I suggested a minute ago, there was a reason to believe that Mr. Putin is not yet ready for an end to the war because that point about raising the sanctions is hard to imagine that the West will swallow that. And perhaps the appointment of the chief negotiator, if it is a continuation of where we left off in Istanbul, but also be a signal that the Russians truly are not ready to end the war. But we'll see very soon.

The single biggest issue facing us all is not on Russia, it's in the United States. It's what happens on 5 November. The Russians, as you will know, John and perhaps some people in this audience know, the Russians have zero respect for Donald Trump. They didn't have much respect in 2016. I was president. I was then in Moscow when these elections were taking place. I was then meeting with Mr. Nikonov on Solowov's program and heard from Solowov then that the Russians, that the Russians, his Russians, didn't have any trust in, in Trump because he was a loose cannon on the deck.

That has not changed. The Russians laugh behind the back of Trump over his claims that he can end the war in one day. He can end it, yes, in two weeks, by cutting off all money and arms going to Ukraine. But in the sense of knocking hits together, no way at all, and nobody in Moscow believes in. Or correct, I think of it.

Can I actually just bring. up Zelensky's victory plan because I listened to Zelensky's plan. I know this has been received with some dismay among some people in the West. They've spoken about this. He doesn't seem to me

to be interested in negotiations. This is clearly I couldn't see any glimmer of him wanting negotiations. Isn't this exactly playing into the hands of those people in Moscow who do want to see the wall?

conducted through to the very end. I mean, you know, there might be people in Moscow who might want a piece sooner rather than later. But Zelensky doesn't seem to want a peace sooner rather than later. He seems to want war, as he says, until victory. Unachievable, though, that is for him. I mean, isn't he doing their work for them in some ways, the people that you've been talking about in Moscow? Let me respond a bit. The issue isn't what Zelensky says publicly.

It seems to me the major security threat for Russia is in the secret annexes. And as you, Alexander and Alex know from the Greek history, what goes into a U.S. secret annex with Greece was the deployment of nuclear weapons aimed at Moscow. That issue of the secret annex of the Greek-American security treaty was exposed in 1981 when Andreas Papandre was running for election for the first time and won triumphantly. Secret annexes mean secret weapons, deployments and dual capable at the very least, but bombs and missiles and warheads. That's to the extent it's secret. Nothing Zelensky actually says about his victory plan has meaning for Russian security except for secret annexes.

And if you accept that the U.S. is capable as it currently is of making these secret agreements, there's another one with Greece now, with the UK, with Germany, with Poland. with Poland and with Romania, if you understand that whichever administration takes office next January 20 is capable of pursuing secret annexes worked out already and signed or planned to be signed, then we know we're back in the world of nuclear targeting on Russia. and the only way that that can be dealt with from a Russian civil or military security point of view is to remove the Ukraine as a platform for such weapons. And it doesn't matter what Zelensky has signed or agreed or negotiated with.

It's in the secret annexes. And that brings us back to the general problem. What's U.S. policy towards Russia? and can anything, anything, a US administration ever offer Russia be trusted unless the Russian army is in place? And that brings us back to the Gorbachev treason, repeated as the Yeltsin treason. And no Russian president, no Russian president can repeat those two things. The Russian army won't tolerate it and neither will the Russian people. That's a treason.

It can be hidden as Gorbachev hit it. We still think that the Gorbachev promise of no further eastward of NATO is the crucial thing. No, the crucial thing, as I repeat, is the withdrawal of the army to protect the viability and honesty of the U.S. signature. Without the Russian army, the U.S. signature on agreement is worthless. And that's what I think the Russian consensus will be. Gilbert? Gilbert. You can negotiate points that have

justification and principle only so far as you have the real possibility of enforcing them or of realizing those terms. You're going back to Gorbachev from the There's many, there's so many criticisms of the way Russia left Eastern Europe and left Germany. A single biggest factor is that Russia was economically in collapse. So how long Russia could maintain an army of that size in Germany is questionable. But let's not look back so far.

Let's look at the present. And in the present conditions, Russia will get much of what it wants. but I think it's unrealistic to say it will get everything at once. Because to get everything at once means we're going to have a nuclear war. The overriding concern of Mr. Putin, in its clear as day, is to avoid a nuclear exchange and to find a way out, find a, to find an exit ramp for the Americans from this catastrophe that they have created in Ukraine. That does not turn him into a Gorbachev. Gorbachev was in a period when he was not uniquely soft-headed.

I think the most interesting thing for me, that's come out of these talk shows, which you dismiss, is confessions by people like Soloveyov that we were all wrong in the 90s, not just Mr. Garbojov. We all expected some kind of accommodation with the United States. We all were pro-Western, not just a few, few comparators.

And that is... I could agree there. All is not right. Solovov, yes. Posner, yes. Nikonov, yes. Kisanov, yes. But they're not all.

And I can tell you that in my family, my father-in-law, who survived through World War II, always guided me on what the Russian people think. And he lived... lived in Tomsk, in southeastern Siberia. No, no, not all. That group of so-called journalists do not represent,

and have never represented anyone but themselves and the powerful people behind them. And they represent them in the same way that people who run talk shows at CNN and Fox News and so forth represent them. I mean, the Russian sense, if you move east or out of the television studio, is, I believe, what we've just described. And maybe now it's time to have the audience respond and ask us questions. We will.

We'll. But what is? I also had a father-in-law, who's Russian, and he happened to be a counter-admiral, a rear-admiral. And so I have a little bit of insight into thinking in those circles and not just by listening to Mrs. Zolvio. But that's a separate issue. Can I just ask, is Russia changing? I mean, clearly it is, but are we in the West going to be faced with a Russia that is completely different from the one that we had in the 80s, early 2000s until very recent? one where the blinds have come off, that people that I was talking about at the beginning,

we went a bit away from that, but never mind, the people in the military are going to be much more, much more powerful and assertive from this time. The industrial system is going to become much stronger relative to the other parts of the economic system. Is this going to change conclusively and forever? Are we looking at a kind of rebalancing inside Russia taking us forward? Nothing's forever, Alexander, and certainly I'm not. I mean, we've only got a few more years. I'm not being pessimistic about that.

And we as foreigners who wish Russia well won't be around to answer your question. They will, we won't. There has been a definitive change in Russian economy. There has been a large exodus of the liberals of the capital L, who were otherwise known today as a fifth column. They haven't all gone, for sure. But the most visible and the most damaging and dangerous of them are out of the country. The Russians are in the arms of bricks.

They are creating a new world. They are the intellectual leaders of this fundamental global change. I don't think they want to step back from this very appealing world role that they have assumed. And so that I don't think that can be negated in the future, whatever changes there are within the top leadership of Russia. There's also a change in the distribution of political experience in Russia. There's been going on now under Mr. Putin. And I think that we're going to see a significant change in consciousness as the tax laws have changed from these from the straight line 15-priced.

percent of what it was to up a progressive tax. I have said in the past that there is the Russians turn things on their head no taxation without representation. And the present situation is that they've had a stat with a flat tax no representation because there was no taxation. Now, they have taxation and I expect the representation would become a more significant factor in public life in Russia. That's to say, those who are now paying taxes have more reason to be interested in political life. So there's a lot that's changing as we are observing. These are long-term changes. I think the course is set.

there's no chance of going back to the way Russia was before the special military operation. Well, gentlemen, I'm going to stop here. We've done, we're at one hour, 17 minutes. I think I will pass over quickly to Alex. He's probably got he's probably got heaps of questions, but I'm going to ask him to put to you just a few questions specifically directed to yourselves for the next few minutes that we have you. And can I just say, first of all, Thank you both for joining and having this discussion. And answering my questions too, my points as well. All right.

We have a couple of questions addressed to both of you, gentlemen. From Bin Lind, thoughts about the North Korea angle to both John and Gilbert. Zelensky's claim that Korean combat trips is rubbish, but then to say that about Zelensky is not. new. There very well may be Korean construction workers building fortifications, moving cement, behind the lines work. There may very well be North Koreans, but that's not combat. That's the way I see this particular round of nonsense propaganda from the Financial Times and the New York Times and so on.

Gilbert, your thoughts on the North Korea? I think it's extremely important if this alliance is now being ratified by the Duma. The significance is in East Asia. The United States has been busy forming a containment group around China. And the Russian, raising Russian relations with North Korea in a defense area, overturning all of the limitations on, cooperation that the Russians had subscribed to according to UN deliberations of decisions. But that is of significance in relations in East Asia.

North Korea's position as having a common boundary, land boundary with Russia, makes their exchanges of all kinds quite easy. North Korea is just above South Korea, which is a pressure point the United States is trying to use together with Japan on China. So in that sense, in the restructuring of security across Eurasia, this relationship is very important. From Sparky to both John and Gilbert, gentlemen, in the 1990s, the U.S. actively pursued transferring their industrial base to China and achieved that outcome. What right does the U.S. have to complain? about it now?

That's a question about China, not about Russia. Who's complaining? I mean, I'll defer to Gilbert on that one. I mean... Well, I'm no China specialist either. But as regards the United States,

yes, of course, what Mr. Trump was calling attention to the way that American industry had been hollowed out, that was quite obvious. The remedies, of course, are not so obvious. And he didn't succeed in his presidency. It's unlikely that any immediate successor to Biden will succeed any better.

They can do what they like in terms of tariffs or attempts to squeeze the Chinese economy by technology restrictions. But I think the horse is out of the stable. There's no way they can contain China anymore. it's economic growth. They can just make it more difficult and venom the atmosphere. All right. To John and to Gilbert from Elsa, gentlemen, could you comment on Zelensky's statement that Ukraine could build the nukes within a short time? Who is pulling the strings now? Well, there have been a variety of reports, some very reliable, some not so reliable that that the UK has been assisting Kiev to compose so-called dirty bombs for use against Russian targets along the front line.

I've seen those reports. There's been no attempt at using such a nuclear device yet. On the other hand, we know that there is an active nuclear policy, nuclear artillery, policy because the Ukrainians regularly shell Zaporosia nuclear plant in an attempt to trigger a nuclear explosion and the discharge of radiation. We now know that the Khmelnitsky explosion exposed uranium-tipped weapons which generated a radiation cloud that flew across Ukraine, Poland and headed towards England. And we now know that there's conceivably another depleted uranium explosion when a Russian missile attack destroyed ammunition stocks in Odessa. Nothing that Zelensky or his regime

will say will admit to. Radiation clouds flow. over the Ukraine. All these are, let's call it, less than nuclear weapons exchanges, but the capability of the Ukraine to house, stock, store, US weapons. That's what's in the secret annex, whether it's to be called the Ukrainian nuclear weapon or not, is beyond my incompetent, my competence to say, and I don't have sources that would talk about this with any reliability. Gilbert, your thoughts? I would add to the line of argument of the line of explanation that John was just making. I think why was there such concern about giving or not giving the Ukrainians the right to use

storm shadow or scalp or or any other long long distance precision missiles to the to Ukraine for use against Russia. Well, as the Lloyd Austin said publicly, the Americans knew very well that the Russians have pulled back their aircraft and supplies from the range of these potential range of such missiles fired from Ukraine. And so the purely military argument in favor of their deployment for use against Russia had been taken away. So what's left? What's left is, firing on the course nuclear plants. That type of terrorism is the only logical a result of giving the Ukrainians the right to fire to fire these weapons into Russia.

So with this, it says the dirty bomb was one type of terrorism that was being considered, and destruction of or serious damage to this, otherwise not properly defendable, nuclear plant in Korsk, is an extension of the same type of strategy. John Helmer, Gilbert, Doctora, thank you very much for joining us on the Duran. Fantastic discussion. And let's do it again soon. Thank you very much, John Helmer and Gilbert. We would have you both on our programs again.

By the way, I have all the links to follow both Gilbert and John in the description box down below. and when the live stream wraps up, I will add the links as a pinned comment. I strongly suggest everyone follow both Gilbert and John's work. It's fantastic work that they are putting out. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Well, thank you for having you. Thank you. Take care.

Are you with me, Alexander? I am indeed. I'm here. Great. Far in places, but nonetheless, very, very, very, good. A lot of light, came. out there, I think. And ultimately, I'm going to make an observation.

I think that in the end, quite an interesting, a consensus has reached. I don't know whether that that's also your impression. But ultimately, they're coming together and coming together to the same sort of views. Well, same use, but, you know, anyway, there we are. I agree with you. Towards the end, definitely a consensus was reached. Let's get to the questions from Sasfka. Welcome to the DRA community.

J.B., welcome to the Duran community. Nitzwitch says, looking forward to this, J.B. says, ladies and gentlemen, start your engines. Sir Mug's game says, the magnificent, Melbourneian, Marvel, Mr. John Elmer. Absolutely. Lover of the Russian team says, my government is my enemy. Thank you for that. Paul Walker says, wonderful content from an inspirational quorum. Thank you for that. Paul, Sir Musgame says, not one inch is also the title of Olenski's sex tape.

You know, I've said this, I've said this on other occasions. The level of weight that one gets in the Iran community. It is quite remarkable. You're not going to find it anywhere. You're not going to find it anywhere else. Imam, welcome to the Duran community. Sparky says, make Ukraine Russia again. Don't even leave a patch called Ukraine.

At least it remain a NATO playground, carpetbaggers, money laundry, and becomes a black rock property. Thank you, Sparky for that. This place says, what makes any leader outside the collective West believe anything that the EU, UK, US says, given the vast amount of historical precedence not to lunacy. I think that question answers itself, actually, ultimately.

I don't know what your views on this. Yeah. It's itself. Sparky says Israel has killed far more Americans than Iran has. Remember the USS Liberty. Most true enough. And Sparky says, break it off in Black Rock by spoiling their plans, make Ukraine Russia again. Thank you, Sparky, for that.

Can I just say before we proceed to that, I thought one of the most astonishing parts of Zelensky's speech to the Rada was the part where he basically said, you know, we've got all of these wonderful assets in Ukraine that you can have. They're all yours. And I mean, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, it was, he was basically selling everything in his country to the Americans in return for all of the things that he was doing, offering to sell all the things in his country to the, to, to, to, to, to, in return for, you know, all the things that he, he was wanting in return. It was quite astonishing, actually. We're, we're seeing a Zelensky unravel. Absolutely.

Yeah. Zelensky's unraveling before, before Ukraine unravels. Absolutely. I mean, I, we'll, we'll, we'll, we'll do a show. Yeah, we'll do a dedicated show. So I want to ask you about the, listening to John Helmer, I want to ask you about the secret annexes as well. Absolutely. And the fact that he talked about nuclear weapons, I think that's, that's what he's aimed for. Yeah. I completely agree. a secret deal to get nukes, yeah. Okay. We'll talk about that at dedicated show tomorrow. Anyway, the alchemist says, as previously stated, the conflict in the Middle East is considered an eschatological war that is expected to escalate an increase of magnitude. Alastaircook has been saying this. Eschatology is not my thing.

Certainly we're going towards that war and we're moving fast in that direction. And by the way, I mean, the fact that Sinwa has been killed by the Israelis, that is just an, that's a punctuation mark in this story. I mean, he's an obviously important person, but it's only taking us one little bit further in a process that was already baked in before that event happened. That's my clear view. Sparky says Putin is a reasonable, if not righteous man. Most, if not all, negative things heard about Putin are the result of Western propaganda, which includes false flags. I didn't think we got any negative or unreasonable things about Putin.

What I think we got was a discussion about how policy is decided in Russia. And the key thing to take away is that there are some things that are difficult always to understand, But the most important thing is that he works within a complex political system of which he is part the creator, it must be said, and very much somebody who's been able to manage it and direct it with remarkable skill. Yeah. Sparky says make Ukraine Russia again to deter a bay of pig style invasion using a Ukrainian government in exile. The alchemist, welcome to the drag community. Sparky says some may say Iran is next, but maybe if Iran is considered part of the Russian sphere, China is next.

I think that Iran is first. I think the Russia project, which is really, it was never a project Ukraine. It was always Project Russia. Project Russia has failed. So now they're focusing on project Ukraine. That's project to run. That's what I basically think. The alchemist says absolutely no way Western powers will win any war.

Displaced says if Russia can't be broken by NATO, what chance has the US against China when all war simulations have resulted in failure? I agree. Displaced says what makes leaders watch surrounding nations succumb to instability and destruction at the hands of a known source, US, and yet still seek to negotiate. It's akin to negotiating with your murderer. Yeah, well, I agree. I think that, I think that quite apart from the fact that Zelensky's ruling out negotiations, I don't think there's going to be a negotiation between Russia and the West, not for a long time.

maybe, maybe a new administration in Washington, if it is led by Trump and Vance, will make proposals, and that might start to take us a little forward in that direction. Certainly, I mean, I am more optimistic. I'm more generous towards the Trump Vance team than our guests were. they might be able to move the dial a little, but I don't think we're going to get, we're going to get back to a kind of detente type situation

that we had back in the 70s, left alone, the kind of situation we had in the 90s, or early 2000s. I just don't see that coming back at all. Do you think last week, though, the Biden White House reaching out to Russia to negotiate the strategic nuclear agreements, that might have been a time.

of maybe they were putting out the feelers. I don't know what they are they are putting out the feelers. But look what the Russians are doing. They're coming back and they're saying now. We can't negotiate with you on anything at the moment whilst you are acting towards us in the way that you are. So the the US, the Biden administration, as I said, they made this feeler, but the Russians slammed the door. Sir Mug's game says a live stream with Alexander and Mr. Helmer discussing the Papadreou Pazok years would be mind-nummingly. Not mind-nummingly.

Fantastic. It will happen. It will happen. Bear in mind. Bear in mind that my aunt was a member of that government. And Helmer was there as well. So it would be. By the way, I've learned things from John, which maybe my aunt knew.

but which she never shared with me. And I could probably tell him a few things, which he wasn't aware of all. I've got a lot to add on the Semites, Venizzeo Zosokosos years. I lived through those years. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Absolutely. The group that Papadreel brought up. Absolutely. Well indeed, yeah. Sparky says, although Trump's only as good as the last person with whom he spoke on a specific issue. At least he's flexible. The trick is to surround him with good people and get him away from Pompeo types. I come back to the point I just made, which is I am,

I have a more generous and sympathetic perspective of the Trump vance. I think you've got to say JFG team than our guests do. I think the Russians will require an enormous amount of persuasion but I think that the new team could conceivably move the dial a little on Russia. Sparky says build a better world with bricks. Lowe's, thank you for that. Super chat. Ralph Steiner says the British American Jewish Empire will be furious that they fought two world wars to attain world hegemony,

and now their plans are disintegrating thoughts. Well, they are furious. All you have to do is read their. read their newsbeckers and you see how angry they are listen to their talk shows listen to the way their politicians speak i mean uh wasn't it jonathan turley who spoke who's written just just written a book now about the age of rage where do you think that's coming from why do you think they're so angry sparky says gentlemen will bricks be turned to lose to bring peace to the middle east after the october 24th bricks summit we have a long way to go before that happens i think the

BRIC states, the big ones, China, Russia, especially, will watch and wait. The Russians are more involved, more directly involved than the Chinese are. But they will watch and wait. They will let this process run its course because it's going to. There's nothing that can be done to stop it. There's no diplomatic initiative that's going to be made. And then when it's all over, and we have. the smash, after it's all smashed, they will pick up the pieces.

That's what I think they're going to do. Sir Mug's game says, Mr. Helmer, after you mentioned it, I can only eat ice cream with a fork now. Ralph Steider says, Americans would be loath to return freedom of maneuver to occupied vessels in Europe, such as Germany. Can we expect more USA sabotage, example, Nord Stream? They're going to fight tooth and nail for their position in Europe and especially in German. I'm going to say something. Any students of European history knows that when the Russians and the Germans are working together,

I mean, when they generally, sincerely, fully are working together, they sweep the board. When the Germans and the Russians combined in the early 19th century, they defeated Napoleon. when Bismarck formed his alliance with Russia in the 1860s, he was able to defeat France and Austria and unite Germany and dominate Central Europe. Even that brief period, which we don't really like to discuss very much, the period of the non-aggression perhaps between the Soviets and the Germans, between 1939 and 41,

it was absolutely indispensable to the Germans achieving what they did. So when the Russians and the Germans come together, Europe shakes, just to say. And you could argue that the whole focus of international relations in Europe since the 19th century has been to try to keep these two countries apart. Petros says, Alex, with everything going on in the Middle East, are you and other Cypriots worried about a direct strike given how Cyprus is used as a staging area? No.

There's no sense of fear in Cyprus right now, I would say, but I wouldn't use the word staging area either. I get a lot of comments, Alexander, about Cyprus. The UK, it's the UK sovereignty. territory, the bases in Cyprus, which allegedly are being used as a staging area. I'm going to make a comment about this. First of all, Israel has no interest in doing this. Why would they attack Cyprus?

If you're talking about Iran, the very last thing Iran would want to do was be to expand the war. I mean, that is what the Israelis want. They want to have the war expanded by bringing in the Europeans, the Americans and all of the others. So there's no threat to Cyprus from Iran, and realistically, there's no threat to Cyprus from Israel either. And the Cyprus government is very, they try to be very careful with the British bases, the territory that is here in Cyprus, which once again is British territories, because people

tell me, go to the British bases, check out what's going on. I can't. You can't know exactly. Just can't appear, yeah. Sparky says, gentlemen, although Russia would prefer not taking all of Ukraine and making it Russia, wouldn't that be advisable since the West has made it plain, that it will always use Ukraine against Russia? We had a limited amount of time to discuss this.

For me now, the big question, the big question for the Russians is, is it going to be possible to stop? After Zelensky's speech, I think that question becomes even more pressing because I don't see Zelensky interested in negotiations. I don't see anybody in Ukraine interested in negotiations. I think the situation is very dangerous at one level,

but I think the Russians conclusively are winning the war. And the question is, can they stop? Would they want to stop, given what they're hearing from Kiev now. And I would have wondered, I would wonder about that anymore. Summer of 1970s, thanks everybody.

Ralph Steiner says, Britain would find itself in a devastatingly isolated position in Europe if Germany and Russia realigned. Would Lords Stammer and Lammy try to sabotage this? Well, they're not lords. Don't call them that. But in any event, you're absolutely correct,

about your essential point for the British, this is the ultimate nightmare. I mean, the idea of a German-Russian pact is, it's not just the German, not just the British, of course. I mean, other European countries would be nervous about this, but the British would be horrified at such an outcome. Boa Omega says, Biden's bio as POTUS should be not one brain cell.

Raphael says, now I understand and comprehend why Stalin eliminated Trotsky. Putin is just like him, too much of a lover of the West. I'm not sure that that is true, actually. I think that Putin, when he became leader of Russia, generally wanted good relations with the West. I think that was absolutely his idea. At that time, of course, China was far less powerful. the options of building the bricks did not exist then. But I think today it's completely different.

I mean, don't forget, he is called the United States, the empire of lies. That is pretty strong language. Sir Mugge's game says, can we get Sir Keir and Gilbert into the same room so the world can finally acknowledge their brilliance? Or would the dullness meter explode? Oh, come. I wouldn't put them in the same category. Sparky says, Head of the Snake theory is ineffective

when dealing with a decentralized opponent. True. I agree. I think that's entirely, that's entirely correct. I mean, this is obviously, I presume you're referring to Ben Gvier's statement about this is our opportunity

to cut off the head of the snake. And he was talking about Iran. But I absolutely agree. I think this is a completely misguided and misconceived approach that the Israelis are taking. They're decapitating strikes. In Greek mythology, there's a creature called the Hydra,

which has had lots of heads, the chop off one and two grow in its place. I think that's what the Israelis are going to define. Communism Incorporated says, have you guys seen those BYD cars? As an American, I wish they'd let BYD compete here. They'd probably lay waste to our car industry. I haven't. I haven't seen them.

Sir Mugge's game says maybe Putin the elder Maybe Putin The elders should copy the Israelis And never sign anything with the Americanos Whatever you sign with the US They consider it an unconditional surrender The Israelis have signed lots of things with the Americans It's just that we don't know about them

Because it's mostly secret just as certain Sparky says Ukrainian quality of life Will be better than it ever has been Once it is Russia again I agree with that, by the way. I think the best period economically for Ukraine since it achieved independence in 1991 was the brief period in the early 2000s, when relations between Russia and Ukraine were very good.

I can remember at that time Kuchma and Yanukovych coming to Moscow, having a meeting with Putin and telling him about how trade between the two countries was progressing and how Ukraine was achieving a 7% growth rate. That was what the synergies that exist between these two countries was achieving. And then, of course, the Orange Revolution happened and all of that went away, was thrown away. Ms. Texas G says George W. Bush reached out to Putin and invited him to the Bush family compound, but even during the joint press conference, Putin spoke his mind, and I think Bush could see Putin wasn't.

Correct. Correct. Very true. Ralph Steiner says, the Americans appear set on global conflict now. I think this is absolutely correct. There was a brilliant tweet that someone made, you know, that, every handbook of diplomacy tells you that what you want to do is to take on all your enemies at once and have them all combined against you. So that is what American foreign policy at the moment is. That's exactly right.

That's exactly what they're taking on everybody at once. At a level of grand strategy, it is bonkers. That's the anything I can say about it. But it's what they're doing. Sir Muggeame says, Hey, Alex, YouTube would not allow me to post this on your channels. Olenski should have kept his speech very simple. Send money, guns, and lawyers at the end.

True. William says some uncomfortable moments, but great telly. Thank you, William. Jamila says, what does the future hold for the West think after the war is finished? We are a civilization. The West is a civilization. I mean, all right, we have a political things, but there will be a West beyond this,

provided we don't start World War III and destroy ourselves, which is possible, but I hope we will avoid. But, you know, we will come through as a civilization, as a culture, as, you know, an entity. But we have to understand that we are no longer going to be the center of humanity in the way that we have been

for the last 500 years. This was an unusual, specific period, which is now, Andy. The alchemist says, I doubt Trump has the power to make any changes, and I am not optimistic as long as they receive funding from APAC. USA has been hijacked. Well, that is a very common view, and of course, it may be true. Sir Mugscape says, boy, do I remember your aunt during that time? I was living in Greece for a few of those years.

I remember her too. Thank you for that very generous comment. I should say that, you know, I miss her, by the way. I think Greece would have been better off. So she had been there. I'm glad that she isn't, by the way. I think she would have been deeply, deeply distressed by what happened to Greece after she died.

Ralph Steiner says, someone said that North Korea is now using its proxy Russia to kill Americans. The truth is always stranger than fiction. Could it become yet stranger? No, I don't, I just don't buy this idea at all. I mean, the idea that North Korea is using Russia as a proxy is surely too much of the case of the tail wagging the dog. I mean, the Russians would never let that happen. That's what they thought up, though.

That's what Zelensky thought up. I know, yeah. It's incredible. The alchemist says, I believe the octopus here in Israel, USA, and the West are its tentacles. They call every shot. I think this octopus does exist,

but I think you'll probably find it's center more in New York and Washington and in Washington than elsewhere. That's my own person, of you. London has a role to play as well, by the way. Yeah, big role. Petros says, good about Cyprus, never know what to believe. Thank you, Petros, for that. Sir Mug's game says, Trump lost the parolologist vote with those vomit-inducing watches he's selling. Note his sharp-tooth signature, very pointy, very sharp, extremely psychotic, if you give any weight to signature analysis, that is.

Well, I know. I mean, I haven't been looking at these watches, so I can't come. on this one. Raphael says, what is the difference between Zelensky and Yamamoto? He loves to fly. Yamamoto had a brain. That's the fundamental difference

between the two. Sophisticated caveman says, we in the West could meet little green men from Mars and understand them better than we understand the Russians and Chinese way of thinking. Absolutely.

Ralph Steiner says, if you don't know what you're doing, then neither does your enemy. Joe, Joe, Sue, as Supreme Commander of the Yankee forces, is Joe Biden, is Joe Biden a competent leader? No, he's not. I mean, I don't think that's a controversial point. I mean, if he's not competent to stand for president, then he shouldn't be president. We've made that point many times, and I stand by it. Matthew says, is World War III out of the question given nuclear weapons? No, it's not out of the question. I once thought it was, but it's not out of the question.

I still think we will avoid it, but it's not out of the question. Communism Incorporated says, as an American, I have zero confidence in the prospect of our government, improving the interests of the people with power, our oligarch lords, and their M.C. pets are irreconcilable with ours. well I agree the one thing I'm going to say about this is that what the political culture that has developed in Washington is so contradictory to the principles of the original American constitution and the way that the United States was founded that I won I still have I you know alone practically now and saying this but I still believe that that it's going to find in the end, the United States, an impossible environment to survive in. That's my view.

And from Boa Omega, make EU bricks Eurasia again. No World War for. Well, indeed, yeah. Thank you that. And finally, Sir Mug's game, to wrap it up, the photo of your aunt in front of the Acropolis

at the Acropolis. metro station says it all. Absolutely. Yeah. I agree. And there's a statue near where the arch of Hadrian is. Right across the street. Right across the street. And as I said, I go there. It's always very moving to be there to be there and to see it. I get to say this. When my aunt died, for a while, it was very difficult for me to go back to Rapids.

because it somehow seemed an empty place without her. So having these statues and pictures helps a bit, yeah. The Alchemist says, by the way, you know, Sinwar is not dead, just confirmed now, is now dead, is now dead. I know, I know, absolutely, yes. That's been confirmed, or not, I guess, yeah. Yeah, that he is dead, yeah, absolutely. Yeah.

Yeah, yeah, okay. as I said, important but also incidental important because he was an important person. I mean, you know, he wasn't discount the effect he's had but at the sense of incidental

because the course of events is now, you know, becoming so strong that it's moving, you know, is moving things forward in ways that his death really isn't good of effect. It's like saying that Gavril O'Pinkip, the man who assassinated Franz Ferdinand, was a very important person,

but the fact that the Habsburg subsequently executed him, who cares about him? Yeah. Alexander, final thoughts while I do... No, I mean, we did have... There was a bit of fire, but there was an awful lot of light, and I thought that was an excellent discussion overall.

move things forward. I do wish people that said a little bit more about the structure and the military. I've been reading a lot about it recently. And I do think the Russian military, by the way, is very, very different from that in the West. And Gilbert says correctly that the political structure is completely different also. And we need to discuss all of these at some point. And with both of those two gentlemen. Yes, I agree. Ralph Diner says he was killed in a gun battle. fighting Jews. That's one would expect. I mean, he's going to be killed in Gaza.

How else would he die? I get to say something else, by the way. I am quite sure that Sinwa expected to be killed. I mean, by now, this is something he must have known would happen. given his theological beliefs, he would probably embrace it as a kind of martyrdom. Now, you know, we may have our views about that. I mean, theoretically, I completely disagree with it,

but those would have been his beliefs and many, many other people within his movement will also subscribe to them and they will see him as a martyr and they will probably want to embrace martyrdom in the same way. So that is why Stimpley eliminating someone like him ultimately is not going to achieve as much as I think people in Washington, London, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Paris, Brussels expect, just as so.

All right, that is, that's the show. Thank you, everybody, for joining us on this. this live stream. Thank you to Gilbert, Doctor, and John Helmer. Once again, I will have their information as a pin comment down below. And thank you to everyone that watched us on Rockfin, Odyssey, Rumble, YouTube, and v.urand.orgals.com. Thank you to our amazing moderators, Valle, S, Peter, T. Jordan, Zaryel, and Brett

and I think that's everyone that was helping us to moderate this live stream Excellent Thank you everybody Thank you everybody Take care