The Duran Podcast - Putin Exposes Ceasefire Trap, Outlines SMO Goals, Admits Alaska Concessions

Episode Date: June 30, 2026

Putin Exposes Ceasefire Trap, Outlines SMO Goals, Admits Alaska Concessions

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation with Project Ukraine, with Russia, Putin's speech to the United Russia Party ahead of the September parliament elections. And a far more interesting interview from Putin right after the speech, or maybe it was recorded before the speech, with Russia won, Russian media, where Putin said some interesting stuff, some some some shun. shocking things, actually, from Putin during this Russia one interview. And then we have the general situation on the front line, which even the collective West media is starting to admit that Donbas is all but lost. You still have drone strikes and a missile strike into Volgograd. You have drone strikes continuing to hit the refineries in Russia, but you also have Russia hitting military facilities. and refineries and fuel stations inside of Ukraine as well. So anyway, the general situation in Russia with the general military situation in Ukraine,

the situation in Russia, the speeches from Putin, where do you want to begin a lot to get? Well, I think the first thing to say is that it's been one of the busiest 72-hour stretches in terms of the special military operation that we have seen from Vladimir Putin. I mean, there are moments, Sweener, where he gets really deep into things and very, very heavily involved, and you get one thing after another. But this has been one of the heaviest. So, firstly, he has a two-day meeting with Lukashenko, who's the president of Beloit. Lukashenko, which is, and he has that meeting in Valdai, which is extremely interesting because of course, Valdei was the location where he was supposed to be in December when the Ukrainians launched drone attacks. which were clearly intended to kill him.

So anyway, so he meets Lukashenko in Valdai. Then he comes to Moscow on the same day, because that's a two-day meeting with Lukashenko, he comes to Moscow. He addresses in the morning the United Russia Party in what is clearly an election speech. Then in the evening, he has a meeting to discuss the fuel situation,

of which a large chunk of it is made public. And then, as you rightly say, he gives this really incredible interview with Pavel Zarubin, who is, of course, not just any Russian journalist. He is the Kremlin's authorized journalist. And that's on Russia One, and it's broadcast to the Russian people. And very interestingly, it contains several very shocking, as you rightly say, and very sensitive things. so shocking and so sensitive, in fact, that whilst the Kremlin has provided a Russian transcript of this interview, it has got sections of the interview deleted, and there has been no English translation of the interview provided. That, as you correctly say, is the single most revealing

revealing set of comments of all. It is so extensive that, like yourself, I suspect it was recorded first before all of these other various meetings took place. But it is nonetheless within the last couple of hours because in it Putin gives a very detailed, the most detailed account of the whole situation, on the front lines that I've seen him give ever. And that clearly is well up to date. So he can't

have, you know, he can't have done it very long ago. So an extremely intense period of activity from Putin. And the reason for this is a number, there's a number of things. Firstly, he says very clearly, And he says this, both to the United Russia Party and at the meeting with the people who deal with the energy situation and in Zarabin, the program with Zarabin, that there is a major information campaign underway from the West, not just Ukraine, but from the West, in order to try to destabilize the situation in Russia, the internal situation in Russia. So there's been the attacks on the refineries, there's been the attempts to create fuel shortages. Above all, there's been a big campaign, information campaign, intended to create the appearance of fuel shortages. And he goes into great length to discuss all of this. He says that in reality, there is as much fuel in Russia now as there was roughly this time last year.

There is no overall shortage of fuel. But all of this campaign, this information campaign, which has clearly been very coordinated and which has led to, presumably there's been messages and all sorts of things being circulated in Russia itself, that that has led to panic buying in some places. And this is creating problems. He's now put himself in charge of a committee basically intended to sort this out. He's energy minister, Alexander Novak, is also directly involved. So he says there's an information campaign to try to create uncertainty in destabilization

inside Russia. He says that, yes, of course, we have these drone attacks, and they are a problem. But he says that, you know, we're going to sort this out soon. We've got air defense systems coming. And then he provides this incredibly detailed discussion of what the situation on the front lines is. And he paints an absolutely disastrous situation for Ukraine, which, by the way, I believe is true. I don't think that this is propaganda. I think this is an accurate description of the situation on the front lines.

And then there's the part of this that we don't know, which is what he discussed with Lukashenko. but I'm assuming that we're going to get military deployments in Belarus by the Russian military and by the way they are in a position to make those military deployments. And then lastly, and most incredible of all, he talks about the diplomacy. He tells us that there was in fact no real agreement made in Anchorage. The Americans did make a proposal. The Russians accepted it. The Americans have now walked away from their own proposal.

He's still prepared to have interactions with the Americans, but clearly, anchorage, whatever it was that Putin and Trump did agree on, and they did agree on something, despite what everybody is now saying now, that's all dead. It's been written off. That's in the past. But the Russians have been getting messages from someone. Perhaps Lukashenko brought them with him when he met with Putin. Possibly the Europeans have been communicating it.

This might have come from President Costa of the European Council, who we know has been in touch with the Russians, perhaps through other parties that the Russians have been getting proposals, firstly, to agree a ceasefire in the war in the sky, and Putin rejected that completely. And then, alternatively, a ceasefire in part of the front lines to limit the fighting to Dombas, Zaporosia and Herson regions. But to have a ceasefire everywhere else in Kharkov region, in Sumi region, in Yeropovsk region, and Putin said that this is an obvious device to try to enable the Ukrainians who are suffering severe manpower shortages to redeploy their forces, to hold the Russians bag in Dombas and

in what Putin said was Novorossia. And Putin again talks now about Novorossia. He doesn't just talk about Zaporosia and Herson region. As everybody knows, Novorossia, the Russian province of Novorossia, was a huge, huge territory that includes Odessa. I believe that Odessa was the actual capital of this region. And he's talking now about the Russians continuing operations to liberate the whole of Norfolk Ossia. So an extraordinary set of meetings, discussions, speeches, Putin trying to do various things at one and the same time to reassure and start. stabilize the internal situation, which is where the only real threat comes to provide us with an

insight as to the kind of negotiations that are taking place, to coordinate in some way with Lukashanka and to give us an update about the situation on the front lines. There's an extraordinary performance from Putin, if you will. And perhaps, just to say, he's finally been listening to these people who have been warning him that if he continued along the line that he's been taking up to now, he would lose the information war. He finally seems to have understood that and decided that he has to take action about him. Yeah, dealing with the stabilization of the domestic front, on the drone strikes and all of that. stuff. He didn't really give a solution to that, how he's going to deal with the pressure that the West is placing on Russia to try and destabilize things to try and cause chaos. The drone

strikes hitting refineries, the drone strikes hitting civilian targets, he said. He actually used the word terrorism. So he used that word as well. I believe he used that during his speech to United Russia. But he didn't. really provide any solutions as to how he's going to deal with that. I mean, he talked about getting fuel to Crimea. He talked about how things are not critical. It has caused problems that strikes into Russia, but it's not at a critical level. He talked about Russia's reserves. We're hearing reports about export bans on fuel and diesel. But he's not getting to the root cause of it, is he? No, he continues to avoid it.

Well, can I say something? He didn't really, I don't know, in my opinion, he didn't really address what the root cause is. He just, he just talked about, you know, Russia taking more of a defensive position on this. He entirely took a defensive position. He says that they're going to ramp up air defense. And he seemed fairly confident that the additional air defense would be sufficient to deal with the situation. He said this some time ago, by the way. He said that if the air defense forces had actually prepared in advance for this, then the problem would never have arisen in the first place because Ukrainian drones are easy to shoot down.

He said this about two weeks ago, actually. And the previous air defense chief was actually sacked, I think, on the strength of that. I think that Putin believes that this is going to be sufficient to deal with the problem. And the word in some quarters, and difficult for me to assess this, is that over the last couple of days, the Ukrainians have launched lots of drones, but that the numbers that are getting through are starting to dwindle. So I think that Putin is fairly confident that he can get through this. And I think he's also very confident that he can get through the problem with the oil and fuel shortages, which he puts down overwhelmingly to panic buying. If you are talking about taking aggressive actions against the West, he didn't talk about that.

And he didn't say this because as far as he's concerned, the problem is not a problem of actual real damage done inside Russia. It is of an information campaign. And that's, I think, what he feels he needs to counter. Yeah, he's, I think it's very clear that he's going to play defense on this one. Yeah. Yes. I mean, I think that's his position. I don't think he's going to deviate from that.

No. No. No. It was obvious. He's telling what he's basically telling people. Look, we've got this under control. We got plenty of fuel. We got plenty of oil.

By the way, export bands on diesel, especially, are very common at this. time of year. Because the Russian economy, especially the agricultural part of the economy, uses heavy, large amounts of diesel to bring in the harvest. So export bans on diesel regularly take place at this time of year. I've seen this happen several times before. Issues with gasoline. I think he puts that down mostly to panic buying. And I think he's going to try and say to people that this is all about panic buying. Don't be scared by it. And we've got we got the situation under control.

We've got abundant energy and fuel. We can deal with this. Crimea and Herson regions, which are frontline regions, are in a different position for what you might call pre-2014 Russia. They've had to absorb attacks many times over the course of this war, Crimea especially. For Putin, what is particularly sensitive is what goes on in pre-2014 Russia. Where I think, and I've discussed this in previous programs, he's particularly concerned to preserve the spirit of normalcy that exists,

then. Yeah, he did, he did admit that the drones are, are causing problems. I mean, he, he had to admit it publicly. He would have been, he would have been extremely unwise to have done otherwise. I believe it's the first time he has admitted this. Yeah, I know, but he would have been extremely unwise to have done otherwise. Even if the amount was, you know, even if the problem is mostly panicked by, the worst thing, the worst mistake, um, a political leader can make when there is an apparent problem is to deny that the problem exists, even if the problem

has been massively exaggerated. I remember being told all this by my aunt years ago when she was a minister in the Greek government. I mean, the thing you do, the thing you must do, is firstly,

admit that there is a problem. Tell everybody that you're in the process of getting a handle on it. And then when you do get a handle on it, when the situation with supplies, for example, stabilizes, then of course you take credit for the fact that you have got the handle on it. But telling everybody, don't worry, there's nothing going on, the situation is under control, is extremely, extremely foolish behavior. Many Western politicians do it. Putin is far too experienced to make that mistake.

Yeah, okay. What I got from his statements is that there will be no asymmetric or symmetric response to Ukraine or the West launching missile strikes or drone strikes into Russia, even pre-2014 Russia. I think the general message from Putin is we're going to focus on. Donbass and on strikes hitting Moscow or Petersburg or Crimea or anywhere else, we're just going to play defense. I think that's, I don't want to oversimplify it, but that's the general position that he took. He's going to remain focused on the front line and on Donbass and everything else is just going

to be a more of a defensive posture. I think that he's basically true. Basically, I'm simplifying it. I want to just be clear. I'm simplifying it, but that was a general message that he put out there. I don't think it is entirely true. He spoke to the, this is where the election addressed to the United Russia Party was particularly interesting because he said that Russia has been placed under extraordinary pressure.

There is clearly an attempt to destabilize the situation inside Russia. He made it very clear that it is the West altogether. that is doing this, and he did so in ways that suggested to me that we are probably going to see asymmetric reactions. Now, he didn't talk about that because I think a lot of this is going to be covert, and unfortunately, that is the problem, because covert operations like supplying more drones to Iran. I'm just saying that kind of thing.

It might actually have an effect. It might actually cause hurt to the West. But of course, it isn't something that anybody knows about because by definition it is covert. So he may be in the process of doing things. The Russians may be in the process of doing things. But in a world where information manipulation, inflammation control is so important and so powerful, I'm not sure that it makes much difference.

Look, I think the West is going to go through this speech and this interview of Putin, if they even are listening to Putin anymore. But if they go through this, I think they'll interpret it as Putin conceding that Russia can now be hit, even pre-2014, Russia, can now be hit with drones and long-range missiles. I think they'll look at it. They'll interpret it as Putin moving away from what was a red line that he defined in 2020, 23, 24, right before Trump took office. So now that we're talking about concession, this is how I think they will interpret it, because he may do covert things and he may do other asymmetric things that are in response to the strikes into Russia, but as you rightly said, I don't think it's going to

register with many of the leadership in the collective West. Well, no, I think these people are not receptive to those kind of messages. And this is something maybe that Putin doesn't understand. He said a couple of days ago that if there are missile strikes or drone strikes carried carried out from European territory, then the Russians will conduct counter strikes, and the Europeans know that, and that's why they don't do it. Well, maybe, but in all other respects, provided it looks as at the drones and the missiles are coming from Ukraine, whatever the Russians do, and whatever they might be communicating privately to the Americans, and it's mostly the Americans

that we'll be talking to. I don't think the Americans are going to pay much attention. Yeah, going on on the theme of concessions, an admission from Putin that he did make concessions to Trump in Alaska. How do we read that? The most likely concession that he made, in my opinion, was freezing Zaparoje and Herzson. I was probably the big concession that he made. That has been massively talked about. It has never been confirmed. I guess. That's my guess.

Yes. It's not being confirmed even by the Americans. It's very, very difficult to get a sense of what exactly it was that Putin and Trump agreed about, agreed with each other in Alaska. But the Russians have always said that Witkoff came to Moscow. with a proposal, the Russians decided to accept, or rather, I should correct that, Putin decided to accept that proposal. Doing so was difficult because it required concessions from the Russian side. This is something that Putin has often said, and Loverov has often said.

And the other members of the Russian leadership, as I very well remember, were clearly not happy about it. And we've never been told what those concessions were. But the rumors, the stories that have circulated at the time, is that it was for a freeze in Zaporosje and Herson region, as the Russians, rather as the Ukrainians withdrew from Dombast. I think we are now going beyond this, actually. And this takes us back to what Lavrov has now been saying, because Lavrov is sort of suggesting that Anchorage all along was an American trick, that it was an act of duplicity, that what the Americans were really angling for was, again, a ceasefire on the existing conflict lines. So what they were trying to do was to get Putin to agree

to this formula that Trump presented him with, maybe do some kind of deal or something. And then the Americans would have said, well, we've now got this agreement. The Ukrainians will withdraw from Dombas. So let's have a ceasefire until that happens. And that's what Lavrov seems to be ending at. And it would make complete sense, given that we know that the person who actually came up with a proposal, that Witkoff took with him to Moscow, was none other than General Kellogg. So, given that it was Kellogg's idea, Kellogg who first proposed that the Ukrainians withdraw from Dombas, it starts to look as if it was indeed some kind of a trap.

Well, we do have reports, very good reports, which claimed that Whitkoff actually when he was in Moscow, he wrote on a piece of paper, I believe he wrote three and two in that the deal was Donets, Lugans, Crimea, and the two, that the two concessions were Herson and Zaporosha. The freeze. I mean, we have a lot of reports, which I believe are accurate at this point,

because it's reports from Russian media, from U.S. media, and they all come to the same conclusion. And we've talked about this many times, that most likely that was the scenario. I believe even Lavrov touched upon this. He never stated anything in the definite, it, but I believe he did touch upon sort of a phased out withdrawal of Ukraine from the constitutionally recognized regions of Zapadoz and Herzlm, but it would be phased out.

It wouldn't be, it would be a freeze and then Russia would, and then Ukraine would over time move out. Whatever it was. There's nothing definitive. We don't have anything in writing and Putin said as much. And these are just media reports and a couple of statements from Russian officials. and they dance around the subject. But the 3-2 model does look like that was the proposal.

Well, yeah, but this is what I'm going to say. Whatever it was that Putin and Trump agreed with each other, and they did come to some kind of agreement, notwithstanding what each of them is now saying. Whatever it was, it's clearly very embarrassing to both of them. It's embarrassing to Trump. and it's embarrassing to Putin. Because if it was not,

we would surely have by now been told what it was. So that's, I think, the one thing we can definitely say. Probably there was a proposal for a ceasefire or a freeze in Zaporosia and has some regions.

And probably there was an agreement that the Ukrainians would withdraw from Dombas about that. I think we can be fairly gone. But whichever it would, but as I said, it was something that neither side wants to actually tell us exactly what it was, despite the fact that from what I can tell, the documentation is all over the place.

I mean, there's lots of documentation that sets it out. And obviously there's a stenographic record of what the two of them discuss of the meeting. It's all history now because the Americans have said that there was no deal in Anchorage, And the Russians are now saying that there was no deal in Anchorage. Putin has just said there was no deal in Anchorage. There was just a discussion of possibilities. So Anchorage is dead. Whatever it was that each conceded to the other, it's now history.

Well, I don't know about what the US conceded, but I don't understand why Putin would say, and I quote, we were asked to accept the compromise formulated by the American negotiators. We agreed. We agreed. That's his words. His words. Yes. I mean, why didn't he just leave it at? There was no deal. There was no written agreement in Anchorage, full stop, ended there. Why would he take it one step further and say the U.S. asked us for compromises? And we agreed. Why would you say that? Well, there's nothing new. That's a part that's really strange. Loveroff has been saying this for months.

I mean, all the way back to November, he's been saying that this was an American proposal. The Americans were asked to implement the proposal. They weren't able to. There was apparently, and we've had this all from Love Roff over many months, that Putin asked Trump at Anchorage, right? This is what we've agreed with each other. Can you guarantee that you will be able to get? Zelensky to act on this and Trump allegedly told Putin, I think it was allegedly, I mean,

Lavrov says this, so I'm prepared to accept that this is true. And Trump told Putin, yes, I can guarantee I will get Zelensky to work, to move forward with this and of course it didn't happen. And then Trump starts talking again about an unconditional ceasefire on the existing conflict lines. And then there's the talk about the supply of the tom. missiles and then there's an angry call between Putin and Trump in which Putin asks Trump, why aren't you moving forward with your own proposal? And then Trump proposes this summit meeting in Budapest, which doesn't happen. And then we get a whole pointless exercise. And what now really looks like obfuscation with Dmitri F and Witkoff coming up with 28 point proposals,

which lead nowhere as well. So the point about the Russians, except, an American proposal in Anchorage. We've known about that since about September. I still don't understand this statement from Putin. Okay. I'll leave it there. What a monumental, gigantic, waste of time and what a failed strategy. That's my opinion, coming from the Kremlin. But anyway. Failed strategy altogether by everybody. And one which has just created distrust. If the American intention, which is what Lavrov is now saying, was to get a ceasefire, then clearly it failed. And that might explain a lot of the frustration and anger that does appear to exist around this in Washington as well. And clearly a failed strategy on the part of the Kremlin because they continued to try to work with Trump and thought they spent an enormous amount of time.

in the spring and early summer to trying to move these things forward and to secure some kind of a deal with the Americans. And that wasn't going to happen either. So it's one of those situations. And I think this is where I come back to a point I've made many, many times. If you conduct negotiations in this incredibly unconventional way, if instead of having proper diplomats and proper negotiating sessions with proper negotiating teams, if you rely on people like Dimitri F and Witkoff to do all the work for you, you're inevitably going to end up with massive misunderstandings of the position of the other side. Everything is going to fall apart. A huge amount of time is going to be wasted and all that you're going to get is more mistrust and a lot of embarrassment. And that's,

I think, where we are. But Putin knows this. Oh, absolutely. Everything that you said, he knows this, but he still went down the wrong route. He played along with Trump. He did it? He played a wrong. He played a wrong. To appease Trump.

He did it, exactly. He did it because he wanted to see, obviously, he thought that there would be some way forward. But it was, it never happened. So anyway, it's history now. The point is, the point is that on the issue of Donbass, he never made a concert. He refused to make any concessions. And the Europeans and the Ukrainians, perhaps stupidly, wouldn't play along with what Trump wanted, which is obviously their folly.

The good part was opening up dialogue with the United States, was getting a meeting with Trump in Alaska. The bad part was that Putin should have forgotten the entire thing the minute the drones started to fly into Valdei. He should have forgotten about the entire thing the minute Trump started to walk everything back. He should have said, you know what? We tried. We went to Alaska. We had our meeting. We even made concessions. We did our absolute best. But there's no way moving forward with this administration. They just sent drones into my residence in Valdei. It's over. But we went from April all the way to to now, and Putin continued to try and appease Trump over the past couple of months,

which has led to Lavrov is right. It has given the United States and NATO and Ukraine a bit of time and space so that they can organize the drone campaign, but more importantly, organize the propaganda and media campaign that goes along with the drones. And we're seeing that now in full force. say it's article after article now about Putin drowning and Putin's in trouble and there's going to be regime change and Putin's going to lose Crimea and then you have a soldier talking about how he's going to march the, all the stupidest things in the world. But this is obviously

organized. Without a doubt, all of this is extremely organized and coordinated. This is, I think, Lavadov's point is that Putin, by not cutting losses back when the drones were hitting his home, he provided a couple of more months for the Trump and minister. and the media, and Zelensky and the Europeans, to get everything in order so that we can come to this point where we are today. I mean, the drone offensive, I think, was basically decided by Trump back in May of last year, to be honest. I remember when the discussion still placed. That, by the way, was the moment when Putin arguably should have called this thing off. You should have said to Trump, look, I mean, you want me to sit down and negotiate with you.

And now I'm reading in, I think it was the New York Times, that you have actually been encouraging Zelensky to conduct drone and missile strikes against my capital. I mean, don't you understand that there is a fundamental discordance between these two approaches? He called them neutral mediators. That was probably, that surely was the mistake. I don't think what has happened since Valdei has made much difference there, because if I have to be honest, there haven't been in any. negotiations, meaningful negotiations anyway since Valdei. The one thing that has continued to happen is that the Americans and the Russians do still speak to each other.

And the Russians, the Russian media are still under instructions not to criticize Donald Trump. And I think, again, I have discussed this, I think this is causing a lot of stress amongst many people in Russia itself. I think the party strategy is, you know, prepare for the day when the war is won, talk with the Americans after that, and at the same time try to maintain some kind of dialogue with the Americans in order to, in the perhaps forlorn hope that the Americans might act possibly as some kind of restrained on these crazy people in Europe who are indeed becoming very crazy. By the way, the Russians are still getting proposals, which are very interesting

proposals in themselves, and Putin is apparently rejecting them. So, ceasefire in the sky, which the Americans have been trying to push since the spring of last year. There's been endless proposals from the Americans and from the Ukrainians for an end to a drone and missile strikes by each side on the other. Putin is having none of that. He says the Americans, well, he didn't say the Americans, but the West knows perfectly well, that our strikes on Ukraine are multiple times more powerful and affected than what the Ukrainians are managing on us.

So there's not going to be a ceasefire there. And as I said, this extraordinary idea of a ceasefire on all the other front lines and a focus instead, leaving the fighting in Don Bassan's Upper Oggia to continue. So you can see that there is still all kinds of attempts being made by all sorts of people, probably through multiple intermediaries, quite probably through global south intermediaries as well, just saying, to try to get the Russians to agree to a temporary ceasefire in some form to take the pressure of the Ukrainians. And Putin is rejecting everyone.

Well, this brings me to my next point. You actually made my point, my question. to you. You actually answered much of it. But the reason that the collective West and the Europeans, on the instruction of the U.S., there's no way that the Europeans are actually making this proposal without the U.S. telling them to go make this proposal, the reason they come up with ideas like fighting being restricted only to the four regions, or let's not have any air strikes, no more, like no fly zone is basically what they're saying. That's what they're proposing. The reason they come up with these proposals is because they understand that if they

throw enough proposals at Putin and if they approach it in different various ways, eventually they're thinking, they're thinking is that eventually he'll bite on one of them like he did in Alaska or like he did with Minsk or like he did with 2022 and remove your tree. troops from surrounding Kiev or, I mean, this is their thinking. I'm not saying this is correct. And I'm not saying that Putin is, he's rejecting these proposals. But their thinking is keep on pushing all of these proposals on him. Let's try different techniques.

Let's try Trump calling him. Let's try try Trump flattering him. Let's try Trump bashing him. Let's do all these different things. Let's try Gosta. Let's try stoop. Let's try Schwerter. Let's try Merkel.

Let's, you know, I'm exaggerating a bit. But eventually, he'll agree to something. Oh, no, there's no doubt that he always has in the past. There's absolutely no doubt that that is correct. I mean, he engaged the Europeans, first the Europeans and then the Americans in years of negotiations. He made concessions. He agreed to Minsk one. He agreed to Minsk one.

He agreed to Istanbul, which many Russians also saw, by the way. As a big concession. He agreed to whatever it was that he agreed in Istanbul. Sorry, not in Istanbul, in Anchorage. So, of course, you throw all of these proposals at him. We do it from all directions. You get Erdogan to do it. You get Modi probably to do it.

You definitely get Lula to come up with proposals. You talk to the Chinese as well. You do everything like this to keep this pressure on Putin. But what Putin is basically saying in this interview with Zarabin is that this is in the past now. We made concessions. We're not making any more concessions. This strategy that the West is engaging in this diplomatic strategy is going to fail and the

pressure they're going to put on us is going to fail. And you know, I've made all of those concessions to them in the past, but I'm not going to be doing that again. And in a sense, I mean, I think that's probably true. I mean, Razorabin made the point that negotiations between the Americans and the Russians and over the whole issue of Ukraine have now come to essentially a stop. So he doesn't seem to be in the mood to make any concessions, but you're perfectly correct. The fact that he's done it in the past leads them to think that perhaps he may. I think there are people like Zarub and like Lavrov, like Medvedev, who are telling Putin in their own different ways, enough.

You've made so many concessions over the past 10 years. Yes. Please know more. There are the parts of the Kremlin, which are pressuring Putin. Come on, man, just make a deal. And let's go back to the way things were in 2010 or something. I'm sure there are parts of the Kremlin. I don't know how much influence they have.

It's probably on the downward, right? They're their influence. Yeah. But he definitely has that as well. Putin's character, his character and his instinct, I think, is leaning, is always leading more towards, to his credit, is always leading more towards diplomacy and talking. I mean, at the end of the day, Putin is, without a doubt, a moderate through and through, right? So I think his instinct, his character definitely is not towards the hard line. He definitely feels more comfortable on the diplomacy.

front. Well, one of the reasons he does is because he's very good at diplomacy. And as often happens with people who are very good at something, they perhaps over-rely on it. He is, and this is the thing always to remember about Putin. He is a civilian. He does not have a background in the military. A military man in Putin's position might take a different approach. He might play diplomacy down and focus on war more. But he was an intel. He wasn't Intel. He wasn't Intel. He wasn't Intel. But in intelligence, as anybody who's been involved in it has often told me, does involve an awful lot of what might be called diplomacy too. So I think this is partly the background. And he's been a lawyer as well. And lawyers, I should say, what they are first and

foremost always is negotiators. Now, let me just actually talk about this because about But the pressures on Putin to negotiate and not to negotiate because a Russian journalist, very well-connected, very well-in-informed Russian journalist, Marat Heirulin, has now provided some interesting insight. He says that he was informed and knows for a fact that back in February 2022, when the decision to launch the special military operation started. The economic block of the government, Michustin, Siluana for the finance ministry, people in the commerce ministries, and Nabilina, no doubt, of the central bank, said, you know, hold on, is this really a good idea? Can't we come up with a more soft approach?

Can't we find negotiations to ease this thing? Do we really have to start the special military operation? And even more interesting, some important regional governments in Russia said the same thing. They were also apparently opposed or had doubts about the SMO. And I'm going to guess that these were the regions in the Arctic and in Western Siberia and the Urals, who were most connected with the oil and gas industry. And on that occasion, Putin overrode them, and that was probably very difficult. Now, that was, I think, where the real opposition came. I think that it did not come so much from people within.

in what you might call the inner core of the Kremlin, the Security Council, people of that kind. Now, since February 2022, the concerns of the economic bloc and of these regional governments have probably been moderated very considerably. I think that there are people who want to see a return to normal and a return to what existed, not just before. before February 2022, but probably to what existed before February 2014. In other words, a complete retreat all the way back to the position Russia took before the Maidan events, before Crimea and all of that. But I think that they are outside the Kremlin now.

I don't think that they will much influence. and I think that there are still perhaps some forces within the oil and gas industry that are giving Putin that advice. But I think that their influence has fallen very considerably. The people who are giving the advice in the Kremlin, I think overwhelmingly they want him to take a harder line. So it's Putin who is the moderate, the negotiator, the lawyer, the diplomat, the person who talks to the BRICS leaders, is Putin who represents moderation in the Kremlin. I don't think there's anyone else. Novorosia, his statement about Novorossia.

Yeah. Yeah. His statement, he also made statements about a buffer, expanding the buffer zone, Sumi, Krakov, what I said? Harkov, Kharkov. Krakov is a town in Poland. Yeah, I know. You know what?

It's the outro to my video, and for some reason it popped in my head on all my videos. I have the outro. That's actually the main square in Krakow in Poland. So anyway, you're a beautiful square, by the. the way. Absolutely. The Harkov, and he even brought up Kursk, just your final thoughts on those statements. You're going to pay for Kursk, he said.

Which is an interesting statement because Kersk was a year or half ago, that one second. Yeah, absolutely. Well, I think the first thing to say is that he presents an absolutely catastrophic situation for Ukraine on the front lines. And he says, and I'm sure he's right about this, that this is partly the fact that this is partly the urgency to try to get the Russians to persuade the Russians to stop, that despite all the narrative, all the media propaganda, all the talk about Ukraine winning back the initiative, that the reality is the exact diametric opposite, that the things are going from bad to worse.

He seemed to suggest Lima, 99% under Russian control, Konstantinifka, 96%, under Russian control, the Russians being big advances in all sorts of other places. Let's talk about Novorossia. I've already said this. Novorosa, if we're talking about the Tsarist region of Novorossia, that absolutely includes Odessa. That includes all of Ukraine's Black Sea coast. I have had the sense since the autumn of last year that Putin has basically been telling

the military, your ultimate objective. is in fact, Addessa. So, you know, he even took them, I remember, to the tomb of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. This is, you know, way back in the autumn of last year. And he said, you know, these are the people who should inspire you. Peter played a big role in defeating the West in Ukraine in Poltava. And Catherine, of course, is the founder of Odessa.

So, you know, I think that the signals there are very, very clear. He talks about Kusk. He talks about revenge for Kusk. Very interesting. And again, what does it mean? Well, I thought what he said about the city of Sumi was very interesting. He said, on the one hand, we're still only talking about buffer zones. We've still got no political interest.

in the city of Sumi. But ultimately it is for the military to decide what they should do. So in effect, he's leaving the decision, or he says he's leaving the decision to the soldiers to decide whether to capture Sumi or not. And frankly, that all but tells me that the decision to capture Sumi has been made. All right. We will end the video there. The durand. Dotlocals.com. We're on Rumble. We're on Telegram. Go to Duran.chhop. Pick up some merch. Also check us out on sub stack take care