The Duran Podcast - Putin says Russian history is continuous. Hints at Ukraine endpoint

Episode Date: December 1, 2023

Putin says Russian history is continuous. Hints at Ukraine endpoint

Right, Alexander, let's talk about Putin's speech that he made the other day, a speech that was heavy on the Russian culture, Russian history, Russian religion, the unified civilization that is Russia. A very interesting speech, and I know you have a lot of thoughts about this speech that Putin made. And by the way, he said some things, which could be hinting at the possible endgame for Ukraine, for the special military operation as well. So what are your thoughts? I was one of his most interesting speeches, and certainly the most interesting speech he's made this year, actually. So, I mean, that is how important it is, because it shows very much how what the trend of discussion within the Russian leadership, is and it's not just Putin. We've seen other Russian officials talking in something like the same

way, but it's been taken much further by Putin this time. And of course, as Putin often likes to do. He gives a whole historical context to all of this. And he made some very, very interesting points. The first thing he said, I mean, not in order of what he said, but the thing that he said, which the starting point for me of what he said is, that the starting point for me of what he said is that, there is that Russian history is continuous. That, you know, you had Kiev and Rus, notice that ancient Rus, which starts of Kiev. Then you had the Tsardom of Moscow,

which is what you had from about the 14th century until the 16th. Then you had the Russian Empire, you know, started by Peter the Great. Then you had the Soviet Union, and now you have Russia today. But all of these are Russia. They're part of Russian history. We should take pride in the achievement of each part. It is part of our story. We should not be embarrassed or upset about what happened during all of that time.

We shouldn't go out and say, you know, this is good and this is bad. This is all part of the procession of our history. So that was already interesting. The second thing that he said was that Russia is a, multi-ethnic country. It's a country of many different peoples who have been brought together. Now, it's important to stress

this is not a product of immigration, mass immigration into Russia. What happened was that Russia expanded from about the 14th century right up through to the 20th century, emerged as this huge land mass.

It brought together these many different peoples inside it. But each of these peoples has a connection to Russia, that they have an involvement with the Russian state and that this is, in that respect, a multi-ethnic, civilizational country bringing together all these different peoples. And he made a very interesting point.

He said that this is something which makes Russia completely different from countries in the West and Westerners find this extremely difficult to understand that a single country with a single conception of itself a nation in other words with a single conception of itself

can be established in this way he then went on to say that even though it is a country of many peoples there is one nation which nonetheless brought it about and which is its glue. And that is the Russian nation. And the Russian nation is the glue that holds the whole thing together.

And the Russian nation has been able to do that. Firstly, because of its own traditions, its culture, its adherence to traditional values, values, which is something that all of the peoples of this great region share, and of course because of its religion. And he placed more emphasis on orthodoxy and the importance of orthodoxy as forming the Russian historical experience in this speech than he has ever done before. And of course, the patriarch was there and participated in the whole discussion, and he was also alongside Putin, essentially the key presence at this conference.

And then he went on to define the Russian nation. And this is where it hints at the eventual outcome of the SMO, because he said that the Russian nation historically is formed of three branches. He called it a triune. and it's just the Russians, the Belarusians and the Ukrainians. They're part of the historic Russian nation. And he strongly criticized the policy of what he called artificial division that was created. He didn't make it clear who was responsible for that,

but he clearly was referencing Lenin, that it was that Lenin and the Bolsheviks created these artificial. divisions within the Russian nation by separating them, creating Belarus and Ukraine and Russia and pretending that these were different nations when they are in fact all branches of the same Russian tree. And he said about the current conflict that Russia is fighting this existential struggle, that the West doesn't understand that the West doesn't understand. stand and won't accept this big construct that's been created, this Russian state that's been created, that he wants to break it down, that it's reviving rhetoric from the Dharist

era about Russia being this prison house of the peoples and that the Russians being a nation of slaves. He said this is all completely untrue and that this is therefore an existential struggle for Russia and for the Russians. And that is the nature of the struggle that they're fighting, and they're also fighting for traditional values, but also for the independence and freedom of all countries that oppose Western hegemonism. That's the part of the speech that he's made in the past.

But if you follow through the logic of what he was saying, then you can't help but sense that the preferred end point for him, and I'm not saying this is yet a political strategy, is where all these three branches of the tree are brought back together. The Russian nation is once again made whole, and that Ukraine and Belarus, therefore, are brought back into the motherland. Yeah, I wonder for Ukraine, what type of form that's going to take. You know, Belarus is part of the motherland, say, the Rusky Mir as its own entity, as its own sovereign country, but very much tethered and anchored into Russia. I wonder if that's what all is said and done, if that's going to be the end game

for Ukraine or if it's going to be as an actual federation of Russia, of course, taking out the west of Ukraine, which I think now everyone understands Russia has no interest in. I don't even know how interested Europe is in the west of Ukraine, to be honest right now. But I just wonder what form this unification of the three branches is going to take? Well, I don't think if you ask Putin himself, he would be able to. at the moment to answer that question. I think that will depend very much on the outcome of the war.

But for the record... What do you think he would prefer? Yeah, I think he would prefer a result similar to the one of what he has with Belarus. In other words, a Ukrainian state,

but a Ukrainian state which did not include the Russian areas. And by the way, he apparently had a meeting over the course of this address. I'm quite sure how this meeting happened because he addressed these people by video link, but apparently he did speak with the governor of Herson region, Russian appointed Herson Regents, Sladko.

And apparently he basically tells Slatko, yes, we're going to get all of Herson back, including Herson west of the Nipur, the Ukrainian control part of Heson. And he pretty much made it clear, apparently, that Odessa, Ismail, Nikolai, F, will also become Russian once more. And apparently that's what Sladko is telling us. And he said, Sladko also said that he spoke to other Russian officials

and Russian military people who were present. And they all took this for granted. They were all in agreement that this is indeed the eventual plan. So a Russia that is expanded to include all of these other territories. and also two independent states. Ukraine, based on Kiev, Jitomir, Chernigov, central Ukraine, Belarus within its existing borders. But these two states absorbed again into the Ruskiymir, the Russian world,

tied to Russia in all kinds of intense and collect strong ways. and essentially brought back together, brought back together with Russia again. I think this is probably he's preferred outcome. Yeah, and it would be a Ukraine that would be landlocked, but because it would be part of the Ruski-Mir, it would have the access, the accessibility to the Black Sea as well, and whatever trade it needed. Yes, yes.

I said that's exactly right now I want to stress again this is what I think Putin's ideal result would probably be and by the way note again the importance of orthodoxy Russian orthodoxy

playing a role because every all of these countries are orthodox they share the same civilization they're all Eastern Slavs they're ending the sense of division that existed between Russia and

these people, these peoples. So I ask his ideal outcome. I'm not saying necessarily that that's how it's going to turn up. I get the sense that some people in Russia now, maybe the Atchislavlovodin, the speaker of the Duma, are actually thinking more radically than that about outright annexation of places like Kiev as well.

But, you know, I don't think that Putin himself has reached that point yet. Yeah. What about the talk of trying to break up Russia? Because I think Putin was hinting at that in the sense that the one way that the collective West could look to sabotage Russia to break apart Russia is one of the tricks that they've always used historically, which is to create differences in ethnic groups and really build those up. and eventually you get to some sort of a conflict. What do you think the chances of that are at this moment of time, given the fact that I imagine, I haven't been following this too closely, but I imagine that Russia has dealt with to a great extent. I guess it was called the fifth column is what they would call it,

say the NGOs, the think tanks, the Western sponsored universities. I imagine that Russia has clamped down on that quite a lot over the past couple of years. But maybe they still do have a presence or do have some sort of influence in Russia or in the government. I'm not sure. But what do you think the chances are of the United States and the collective West trying to stir up tension and division? It does. I mean, there are people like that in Russia. But I think there are a residual presence in the sense that, you know, in the 1990s,

And in the first decade of Putin's time, Russia was wide open to this kind of thing. So, I mean, you know, and I mean, the point is that the doors have now been shut. So there's people who were still educated like that. Many of them, of course, have left, but some of them are still there. But I think that increasingly, their influence is diminishing. And by the way, I've been looking at opinion polls in Russia. And it's interesting, again, you know, you could see a steady drift away from, you know, that kind of thinking amongst young people especially.

So just saying, so I mean, you know, Russians are increasingly receptive to these ideas of Putin's. And amongst young people in particular, I noticed that there's been the opinion both suggest a growing interest in Soviet period, which is unsurprising, by the way. And you notice how careful Putin is to make it clear that the Soviet period is part of Russian history as well.

But whatever the Soviet Union was, it was not the kind of thing that we've just been talking about. It's not what the NGOs and all of those things were seeking to promote. What Putin is going to do is he's going to, first of all, I should say to be very clear, this breakup agenda most definitely does exist in the West. You get occasional denials that it does, but it absolutely does. You've seen seminars held about it, you've seen conferences about it, you see articles appearing about it, you see mats, you see even opinion pieces appearing in the mainstream media.

So, I mean, it most definitely does exist in the West, and not just on a fringe, by the way. I mean, the kind of people who support this thing are not in any conceivable sense, the fringe at all. I think what Putin remembers, and I think what many Russians remember, by the way, at least those who think about and care about these things, is that when the Soviet Union in its last months held a referendum about whether or not people wanted to remain together or go apart, the overwhelming majority of people who voted, 80% voted to remain together. So I think that Putin says to himself, that's the instinct, that's the fundamental sentiment that most people have. Provided, we don't open ourselves up to having that kind of influence brought into our country from outside. And he made it, I feel, I feel, I feel, that if there are stirrings of interest,

conflict, that is basically coming from outside. Provided we don't let that come to us from outside, and provided we don't make the disastrous mistake that the Soviet Union did, of dividing ourselves up into constituent republics, pretending that each one of these is somehow independent and that each one of them has the right of secession, which is what Lenin insisted. way back in the early 1920s.

Provided we don't make those kind of mistakes, we are going to be able to hold together, not just hold together, but hold together successfully and build up our country and prosper and succeed. And I think at the moment, I think he's probably right. I mean, I don't really see any great sign that that's going to change. And I think that what Putin also says,

is of course there are some places like Western Ukraine which emphatically do not want to be part of the Ruski Mir. So for that reason it's better that they stay outside because bringing them in might contaminate and might contaminate the rest. And I think he also feels that that was what happened when Stalin absorbed Western Ukraine. into the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Yeah. I agree with that too. Absolutely. The narrative has always been that the problem for Ukraine was the East, the Russian part.

But that's not true. The problem for Ukraine was the incorporation of the West, which never wanted anything to do with the Ruski Mir. They hate the Ruski Mir. Yes. They also hate the Polish world as well. I mean, they don't really like it. anybody, which is the problem. And so I think that the narrative about Ukraine has always been, well,

you know, we have to deal with the east of Ukraine. I think that's false. I think the problem was always the west of Ukraine. Absolutely. And no one really knew what to do with the West. No one, Europe wasn't too keen on it. Russia wasn't in Stalin. You know, he put it together. I think that was the big mistake anyway. I think, I think that's, I think that's Putin's thinking. Anyway, it's a very, very interesting speech. Now there is one thing else I wanted to say, which is that there are domestic dimensions to this speech

as well, which are partly connected to what we were talking about, but Putin is clearly working towards doing something very similar to what his great friend Orban did in Hungary, and what he has always been working towards anyway, which is that he wants to

promote, not just when he talks about traditional values and family values, and who wants to make the family very much, again, the centre of Russian policy. And of course, this is all partly connected with increasing the birth rate, increasing the, you know, reverse the demographic slide in Russia's population, which has, I mean, that slide has significantly slowed in the last 10 years, but it's never been fully reversed. So I suspect that after the speech, over the next couple of months,

next year we're probably going to see a major program being unveiled in Russia, possibly patterned on what has happened in Hungary to try to increase the birth rate, to try to strengthen families to do that kind of thing. And probably going to be funded, there'll be more creches, more kindergartens, more financial support for families, perhaps other things also. Which has worked for Hungary. Which has worked for Hungary, exactly, yeah.

And, you know, a period of economic upswing, which is what we're seeing at the moment in Russia. And with lots of men probably eventually returning from the war and wanting to, you know, have families, it's quite plausible. afterwards what happened also in Europe by the way after the Second World War we had the so-called baby boom at that time and it was because all of these three things came together at the same time at that time too good time to be in Russia I guess yeah so okay we'll we'll wrap it up there and what I mean like the West of Ukraine I'm talking about the bander rights I'm not talking oh yeah absolutely absolutely territory of Maviv and I'm talking like the Banderites, the Bandera ideology. Yes, yes. But I'm talking about the problem being the Western Ukraine. I completely agree with that. Now, I think that one of the points I would just make on that,

just to finish, is that, you know, I'm not, again, I'm not predicting outcomes, but I can possibly see how if we get into a situation where Western Ukraine becomes a standalone state, and I'm not saying that's going to happen, but let's assume it does. That might be the way that Western Ukrainians find of getting through all of this, finally have a state and not being absorbed

into the Ruski Mia and they're able to work through all of these issues with Bandera and all the rest. And finally... That's my question. How do they deal with... Well, finally...

You say that... Yeah. How do you deal with the Bandera issue, though, Alex? I mean, this is, to me, this is the core issue. Well, this is it. How do you deal with this ideology,

which is, you know, 80 years old and it's... And it's very, very strong. I mean, the band-aira people, they really believe in bed, that they have statues to the guy. They hold photos of him. Solution, he has a picture of the guy in his office. I mean, how do you deal with this?

And two busts, apparently. If you're Europe. Yeah, yeah. If you're Europe, if you're the EU, how do you deal with this band-dair ideology? Well, how indeed? Perhaps, well, let's be straightforward about it. The EU has shown absolutely no concern about it. whatsoever, they're going to look the other way and pretend it isn't there.

And, you know, they will be happy with a Western Ukrainian state, provided it is not pro-Russian. But if you have a Western Ukrainian state, a state which Western Ukrainians feel secure in, then perhaps over time, and we're talking about decades, not in any, you know, short space of time, you might begin to see within Western Ukraine itself more and more people. starting to question and challenge this thing because what is keeping it alive is this sense that you have to have it because if you don't the Ruski Mir will absorb us so you know that that that's just a possibility I'm not saying that's what's going to happen but anyway I mean that's that's the only thing I can my question I don't want to make this video too long but my question to you is if you're Poland don't you make a demand of this Western entity to remove all streets named Bandera, all statues,

anything consisting of Bandera, if you're Poland, don't you make that request? Don't you demand that request? Well, you should do, and you should make it absolutely clear that if it doesn't, then it should not, this entity should not be allowed into the European Union or to NATO.

That, it seems to me, is the obvious, logical and correct thing that Poland ought to do. Of course, whether they will or not, it depends very much on who's empowering Poland at that time. All right. We'll leave it there. The durand.locals.com. We are on Rumble, odyssey, bitch, shoot, telegram and TwitterX

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