The Duran Podcast - Putin's Dark Valdai Speech; Kaliningrad Warning; Khrushchev Playbook Returns

Episode Date: October 2, 2026

Putin's Dark Valdai Speech; Kaliningrad Warning; Khrushchev Playbook Returns

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the Valdei event and Putin's speech at Valdaai. Quite a, I don't want to say pessimistic speech, quite a sober. A sober speech. I've got a word in Greek, but I've tried to translate it in English. unsettling, quite an unsettling speech. Yes. The word I was thinking of was concerning, actually. It was the most extraordinary speech that he's made, in my opinion, ever since he became

president of Russia and ever since the start of the Special Military Operation. It was really quite extraordinary and it was very, very different from most of the other speeches he gives. First of all, it wasn't properly. speaking, a speech at all. It was a conversation he had with Fyodor Lukianov, who is a Russian journalist. And in some ways, Putin is always at his most interesting when he talks in that way, rather than when he speaks from prepared texts. He's at his best, actually, in conversations and Q&As and things of this kind. But basically, what?

he told us was this, this is a world in crisis. We have a situation where the unipolar moment is passing or has passed, where the era of Western dominance is ending. But in order to prevent its end, in order to preserve Western dominance for as long as possible, or in fact to reasserted, The Western powers, the Americans and the Europeans, have taken an extremely violent and aggressive turn. And they've been escalating and using increasingly aggressive and violent methods to try to shore up their dominance. And the result is that they have brought the world closer than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War to an outcome. right general war, in other words, a third world war, a potential nuclear confrontation. And what he did say, and this is the hope he offered, that this is a particularly dangerous

moment, if we can get through this period of intense crisis and finally get ourselves to that period of proper multipolarity and great power balance, then the international situation will stabilize. But that is not the position in which we are in today. We are on the contrary, in a period of acute crisis. And I think that there's a number of things that obviously have led Putin to this conclusion. Obviously, there is the conflict in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, which we've discussed many times. Secondly, there has been these various attacks that the Western powers and the Ukrainians have been conducting inside Russian territory itself.

And, well, we've discussed those two. And these have been a major issue of obviously Russia over the period of the summer. But I am going to also guess that one of the reasons for this really rather dark way in which Putin has been speaking is because of some of the messages that the Russians have been receiving from the West over the last few weeks, I think Radcliffe's visit to Moscow played an absolutely key role. We now have reports in the British media which confirm that after this meeting, the CIA distributed a report to Western intelligence agencies in which it said that Russia is losing the warming Ukraine and that its economy is going to collapse in the same way that the Soviet Union's economy was going to collapse. and that that was the message that Radcliffe intended to take with him to Moscow. Now, the Russians must have found that all fantastical, given the actual situation. But nonetheless, they must have found that very alarming because they will have seen this as an attempt by the Americans, and the Americans threatening them,

that the United States is going to work towards the collapse of Russia, just as it worked towards the collapse of the collapse of the. the Soviet Union. And obviously they didn't like that message. Then there was the disastrous train crash of a meeting between Vardiful and Lavrov in New York. I think there must have been other communications and discussions as well. The Russians clearly believe that there is a threat to Kaliningrad. And yesterday, in my... program, I discuss, and I think your program too, we both discussed the fact that the Russians have given warnings about Kaliningrad. Some people, by the way, have pushed back and have

questioned whether any warnings like that were given at all. Putin, over the course of this Valdei speech, confirmed that they had been. He said that there has actually been a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which by the way has not yet been published on the Russian Foreign Ministry's website. Just before we did this program, I went to see and check for myself. But there has been a specific statement made by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which has been circulated to Western governments about Kaliningrad. And apparently this message has been backed by letters that have been sent by the Russian foreign ministry to all Western governments, including all European governments, telling them basically that if there is an attack on Kaliningrad,

the Russians will use all available means to defend it. And though Putin said that there was no specific reference to nuclear weapons in the statement that might have been in the letters, he made it absolutely. clear that nuclear weapons are part of that threat, that the Russians are prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend their national territory. So he spoke about a world in crisis, a world where threats of that kind are being made to the Russians and which the Russians themselves are now responding to about crisis all over the world and about a real possibility of general war.

He said that you need to be careful, you need to be sober, you need to be realistic. He held out the hope that we would get through and that there will be better times ahead. But nonetheless, this was a speech by a man who wants to convey to the world that this is a very dangerous and very serious situation globally. indeed. Yeah, whenever Putinke's speeches like this, it's not good. No. Not good, but he's given his warning now. No. The Russian foreign ministry has given their warning. Actually, the Kaliningrad situation, the warnings for Kaliningrad were actually posted on ex-byarious Russian embassies as well. Yes, I know. Yeah. So, I mean, the, you know, the, the warning, the message is out there. Yes.

The West cannot say, well, you know, we didn't know or Russia. Russia is bluffing or anything like that. I mean, it's very clear. Stay away from Kaliningrad. Whatever you're thinking of doing, stop it. Yes. Because we're going to use everything that we have in our arsenal to protect Kaliningrad, which is part of Russia.

Yeah. Yeah. The collective West is preparing the ground for the continuation of the war past Ukraine. Yes. What that means, I think, is up for analysis, up for debate. Can Europe engage in a conflict with Russia, a conventional war with Russia? There are people in Europe, we've talked about this, who actually believe they can. because they believe the messages that the CIA is sending about the collapse of the Russian

economy and they believe the messages and the reporting from Collective West media about Russia is down to their last missile or down to their last shovel or washing machine chip or whatever. But there are other people in the collective West who are thinking more along the lines of the covert war, the dirty war. I think Putin in his warning, he's basically saying whatever type of wars you're thinking of continuing, we're ready and we're going to hit back. Yeah. That is exactly correct. And he did go on and point out again that these threats of war are not coming from the Russians. They are not looking for war with the West. It is the West which is obsessed and incessantly talking about war with them.

And obviously, when the West talks about this, when West and leaders talk about this, they talk endlessly and incessantly and continuously about responding to a Russian attack. But of course, we've now had statements from the Baltic states and from Finland, which, by the way, are clearly themselves now starting to get cold feet about this whole whole. situation, that in fact there is no sign at the moment that the Russians are on the brink of attacking any country in the West. My own personal view, and I get to say this, I think the Baltic states are playing a role.

I think Finland, Sweden are playing a role as well. But if you want me to say, where I think the major drive for war, a general war is coming from. I think it is coming from three places, from the deep state, the neocons, those people in Washington. They have never given up on Project Ukraine. They remain as hardline and as antagonistic towards Russia as ever, they're probably looking forward to a Democrat triumph in the midterms and are hoping that that will enable them to refocus America's power back towards Russia and away from the Middle East and things of that kind.

So that's one group. The second group is London. in London. And the third group is in Brussels, the European Union and Ursula and Kaya Kallas and the EU and NATO bureaucracies and Mark Ruta and that group. They are, I think, the real people who are driving this confrontation, this situation of war. But Putin sees this, the Russians see this. They know that they're not out to attack Europe. Putin made this. She said, look, they outnumber us more than twice.

This is just the Europeans in population. Their economic, their aggregate economies are so much bigger than ours. I mean, who in Russia is going to want to launch a war against an economic and political and demographic block of that size. I mean, it makes absolutely no rational sense for the Russians to be thinking in that way at all. But the Russians see all this rhetoric. They know that they're not seeking to attack the Europeans.

The Baltic states, the Finns, those people are saying the same. The threat the Russians perceive is coming from the West, and they're now starting to take steps. And going back to your point, I agree. I think that there is talk, a lot of talk in Europe at the moment, about war with Russia in 2008, 2008, 29, 2030. Putin mentioned it. He mentioned it, by the way, for the first time. He discussed it at length for the first time.

He again made it very clear that if there is a conventional war, between the West and the Russians. The Russians are prepared in extremists to use nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves. He made that absolutely clear. But I agree. I think the real plan, the real intention is the one that you've just laid out to continue a long-term war, a dirty war and a war of economic subversion and internal destabilization. against Russia of the sort that some would say led ultimately to the collapse of the Soviet Union. That I think is the threat the Russians took from Radcliffe's visit to Moscow when he came to Moscow a few weeks ago. In other words, a long-term plan by the United States, by the Western countries, to destabilize,

to stabilize Russia and eventually to break it up. And Putin also talked about that at very considerable length too. Yeah, they're never going to give up. No. As we say on this channel over and over again, they have no reverse gear. Whatever happens in Ukraine, for them, Ukraine is just one part of the battle to an overall war. And the goals of that war is to destroy Russia, to break Russia apart,

and eventually to get to China and destroy China. Those are the objectives of that war. You could frame it as destroying bricks as well. Yes. Right? They're not going to give up. No. They're never going to give up.

And Putin was asked about the state of the European Union and the breakup of the European Union. And Putin's reply to that was they're doing it on their own. We don't really need to do anything. They're doing it on their own. Russia is getting attacked now by the collective West. And we had many statements from many Russian officials from Lavrov to Zagharova to Medvedev. Lavrov the other day was getting a question from the BBC reporter Rosenberg. And Lavrov said that, you know, it's you guys that are launching the weapons, that are creating the weapons and the drones that are being launched into the Russian Federation.

Right? and Rosenberg just shut up. No. Right. Is Putin failing to see this? Because he continues to make it as if it's Russia and Ukraine or continues to frame it in that way, while his entire administration, I believe his entire administration, Patrush, everybody, frames it in a much different way.

I read Putin's speech and the clear conclusion, came to is that he shares the views of his administration, that it is the West that is the problem, not ultimately Ukraine. As far as Putin is concerned, as far as the Russians are concerned, the conventional war in Ukraine is all but one. I don't mean it's going to be finished in a few months time or in a year. I'm not going to give a date to it, but the Russians are no longer in any doubt that they are going to win in Ukraine, that they're going to prevail in Ukraine. But what they have now come to understand is that this is not going to be the end of the conflict. The conflict with the West is going to continue and it is going to intensify and it is going to escalate. And I think this

was something that Putin himself admitted it has taken the Russians themselves a very large long time to understand. There's a very interesting moment when Lukianov directly asked him, I mean, do you now regret all those long years of attempting to build good relations with the West? You know, the work that you did, the way that you work with people like Berluscomi and and Scherach and Schroeder and all of these people, you know, all the agreements you you reached all the deals you did with Merkel and all of that. Do you regret all of this? And Putin said, it was very interesting.

He said, look, I don't regret it. Because if we hadn't attempted it, there would still be people in Russia who would say that we would thrown away opportunities for better relations with the West, that we needed to make that effort in order to convince ourselves that a good relationship with the West is impossible. Now, when a leader talks in that way, what it says to me is that absolutely he does regret it. He is saying to himself, well, I had to try all of this in order finally to arrive at this point where I am now, when I realize how impossible it is to have any future relationship with

the West at all. And that, so Putin in effect was admitting that the West remains absolutely implacable and hostile, and that his attitude to Russia is never going to change. So what does Russia do to prevent a conflict? A conventional war, God forbid, nuclear, but most likely a covert war along covert war by the CIA, by the United States, by the MI6, by Europe to sink Russia, to break Russia apart. What do they do? The one takeaway that I got from the whole Kaliningrad incident, and I talked about this in my video, is that the messaging from, from the embassies and from Russia worked.

Yeah. For a short period, it's going to work. I mean, the Europeans, they'll start talking about war with Russia again, and they'll start poking around Kaliningrad again, give it another couple of days. But at least for a short period of time, you had Ruta saying, we can defeat Russia, but everyone needs to calm down. We had the Lithuanian prime minister. And then they told the Lithuanian prime minister to say this.

There's no doubt about it. The Lithuanian prime minister said with Ruta standing right next to him, you know, I asked the Secretary General, have you seen any intel about Russia and hostile actions towards Europe or any kind of operation, invasion, whatever? And the Lithuanian prime minister said that there's nothing. Zero, none, he said. None. Russia's not doing anything to Europe.

That was pretty much his statement. That was scripted. They told him to say that. Yes. And Ruta was standing right next to him. So for a short time period, that type of warning had an effect. But the problem that we have with these people in the Collective West is its short time periods.

It's going to last 24 hours to 48 hours. And then they're going to start up again. They're never, ever going to stop. Yes. And it's going to be Europe at the beginning that's going to pay a very big price for this. Absolutely. But eventually, it will get to the United States as well. Yes, it will.

This constant conflict and this trying to go after Russia in whichever way they're thinking of going after Russia. Eventually, it's going to get to the United States. What does Russia do? Right. Well, it's very interesting that you made that point because you're absolutely correct. The statement, the warnings did indeed work. And you also had comments from Rudev, the Bulgarian prime minister. No, I don't think he was put up to do it in his case.

But he was clearly also responding to these warnings and said, Let's just take a step back. Remember, we are talking here about a nuclear power. We can't continue to make these threats and engage in these kind of wild words. Now, he's the one rational leader in Europe at this point. Thank God for that. Rudolf. Thank God for Bulgaria.

And, and FISA sometimes. And FISA, too. And FISA too. And FISA. Now, here I'm going to say something. the Russians can take one of two different courses. Now, the one that Putin, I think, would prefer to take is to develop multipolarity, to build up relations with China.

He spoke very warmly about the relationship with China, to gradually work towards the recreation of a balance of power system, which will then deter the West from taking further action, which I think is a viable problem. plan, but of course, it's a long-term plan. And it also runs up against certain problems, which is if you're talking about multipolarity, then you also have to bear in mind that other parts of this multipolar system are not necessarily Russian allies in the way that the Russians might be seeking at this time. And it was very interesting what Putin said about,

Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, because Modi came up and Putin made no attempt this time to conceal his irritation with Modi. He said that every time we meet, Modi comes along and basically badges me to find some way to stop the fighting in Ukraine. So, in effect, by the way, corroborating the analysis. that we made a few weeks ago about the problems of a BRICS gang up on the Russians. So China is, I think, reliable on this. I think that in other countries, North Korea, for example, obviously, is reliable.

But I think that the Russians, at least for the short to medium term, they must understand that they do not have a solid backing of. of countries all over the world that are behind them in this. So it is a strategy, but it is a strategy with problems. There is an alternative strategy, which is the one that Medvedev has been alluding to in various comments that he has been making. And it is the one that the Soviets used in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the period associated with the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Now, Nikita Khrushchev today is mostly remembered as the man who brought about de-Stalinization within the Soviet Union. But what people don't remember is that he was the person in the late 50s and early 60s who pursued a policy of basically terrifying the West. He was constantly talking about threats, about the women. willingness of the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons. He arranged the Soviets to explode in the Arctic, what remains to this day far and away the world's biggest and most powerful nuclear device. And of course, he was the person who engineered the Berlin crisis of 1961

and who played a decisive role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. So that point, policy ultimately was a policy of terrifying the West. And Medvedev's point is that it succeeded. The West, by the 1960s, had become so scared that they eventually changed their policy. And that was what brought about the period of detente. So I think they have these two options. They go back to the sort of Soviet policies of the 1950s and early 1960s. Take on foreign policy an incredibly hard line. Use incredibly powerful rhetoric, very frightening and threatening rhetoric. Or alternatively, work with China, try and work with the BRIC states,

work to try to build up this BRIC system. Say to yourself, well, ultimately, time is alive. on our side and we will eventually find our way through that towards a more peaceful outcome. Now, judging from Putin's comments at Valdai, he obviously prefers the bricks. Obviously. He obviously prefers the bricks route. And it's his temperament. I mean, that is the kind of leader he is.

He is a sober, rational, calm person. He doesn't like to make fiery threats or engage in fiery rhetoric. The Medvedev faction obviously takes a completely different approach. They say, yes, relations with China, very good. Relations with India, well, not perhaps quite so reliable, but also ultimately good. But ultimately, we must look to ourselves and the way we must proceed. is through, as I said, this policy of scaring the West finally into recognizing the incredibly dangerous path that they are taking. And this set of warnings that the Russians have given

over Kaliningrad in a sense reinforce Medvedev's position. Can't you do both? Can you do a mix of both in that you follow Putin's approach, which I think is the correct approach. I mean, let's take a step back and look at what a world would be what the power of a block of Russia and China means. I mean, that's a huge, powerful alliance, much more powerful than NATO, much more powerful than the collective West, Russia and China working together. Yes. And I think you're right.

The reliable countries, there are a few reliable countries for Russia. But those are the countries that are in the crosshairs. Those are the countries that have been targeted for destruction by the empire, right? We know what those countries are. And your names are some of those countries. And China's one of them. Without a doubt. And I think the Chinese realize this.

Absolutely. Maybe they don't, but I think they do. Yes. So that alliance is incredibly strong, if not the strongest block in the world. If it continues to move in the direction that it appears to be moving towards. Of course, if India would play along and if they decided to align with China and Russia, you'd be looking at an unstoppable block, but they're not. Yeah. I mean, India is going to continue in its policy of being.

being with both sides. Yes. Can't you also cut off the West in the way that Medvedev is describing the way that Khrushchev did in that you can scare the West, but isn't it time for Russia to start to start realizing that at least for the next 10 years, 20 years, there's going to be no trade with the West. There's going to be no sanctions relief. There's going to be no, no Schengen, no tourism, no IOC Olympics.

Maybe you make it little trickles of positive news here and there. The Russian hockey team can play here. But I mean, it's just not going to happen. No. Right? Yes. You know, sanctions are not going to get lifted. I don't think they're going to get lifted.

And Putin talked about it. He tight-end sanctions in his speech. The people leading Europe are never going to back down, ever. You're still providing gas. You're still providing uranium to the United States. You're still providing fertilizer, all these things. Isn't it time for Russia to say, you know what? We're done with the West.

We're shutting the door for now. And we're going to focus on China and a multipolar world. Yes. I think that this is going to become an increasing trend, actually. I mean, Putin obviously, as I said, is a sober, really careful man. He doesn't like to engage in enormously powerful rhetoric. But the nature of events is obliging him and the Russians generally to become much more assertive. And we see this with this statement and the warnings about Kaliningrad,

which, as you rightly say, have been heated at least for now. I mean, in a week's time, of course, they'll be forgotten. And people will say, you know, this is another Russian red line, which we can cross and the Russians are bluffing and all of the usual things are going to be trotted out again. But no, I think that the Russians have seen that making powerful warnings does have an effect and probably it will become more of the pattern of what we are going to see. Now, I think that there is a difference with the 1950s, with the Krushchev period.

I think one thing to say about the 1950s is that, again, there was a massive imbalance of power at that time. The Soviet Union was much weaker at that time than the United States was, both in military and economic power. In the 1950s, the United States had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons over the Soviet Union. So, Khrushchev's rhetoric was partly to compensate for Soviet weakness at this time. And in that, by the way, it was effective. So there was that element of imbalance, but there is something else about the 1950s, which is at that time, the Soviet Union, even there was much less powerful than the United States, was the most powerful country that was the adversary at that time of the United States. It had essentially to rely on itself. I mean, there was China, obviously, but China in the 1950s was a.

still a very underdeveloped, economically, you know, poor country. It was nowhere near as powerful as it has subsequently become. I mean, there's not even a comparison. The world at that time in the 50s was just a world between the United States and the Soviet Union ascension. So the Soviets could be as frightening and as terrifying to the West as they wanted. And what others thought about it around the world was not so important. Today it is different. If the Russians start using the kind of aggressive rhetoric and language and make the kind of threats that Khrushchev was making in the late 50s and early 60s, then of course that has to be cleared and explained to people in Beijing and people in Delhi and all of these places.

And if you're talking about China, they probably would not, they would definitely not be happy to see the Russians return to that full escalatory rhetoric that Khrushchev engaged in all those decades ago. So from a Russian point of view, maybe they can be more assertive than they have been. Maybe they can be and will become much more assertive than they have been.

But I think there are always limits to what they can do because they're reliable friends. The Chinese and the others will put limits on it. The Chinese do not want a situation where the Russians, talk all the time about possible war, and the Chinese become worried that the Russians themselves are losing control of their own rhetoric and might involve China in conflicts in which China itself is not interested. So it has to be more carefully calibrated than it was in the 1950s. So I think we're going to see a mix of the two, as you rightly said, something of both but because it's going to be a mix of the two, by definition, it has to be much more careful and more moderate than, as I said, what saw in the 50s in the early 60s.

I would say they don't even need to, as you say, to fry it in the West. I don't think they need to do that. If you look at it from the standpoint of diplomatic, continue the diplomatic initiative with China, continue to deepen the partnership in the alliance with China. At the end of the day, the countries, they complement each other so well. Absolutely. And the one country raises the other country up. I mean, they're almost a perfect fit.

And they're neighbors. By the way, so I mean, it doesn't get any better than that. We're on the other side of things. The U.S. is a superpower, a huge power. But Europe doesn't complement the United States. Europe brings the United States down. It's a net negative to be in an alliance with Europe. So the U.S., in alliance with Europe, is hurting the U.S.

It's going to bring the overall power of the U.S. down. it weakens the United States. There's no doubt, no doubt about that. You're completely correct. Yeah. And my only point, just so you can finish off the video, wouldn't it be beneficial to Russia to just end the whole, you know, trading, trying to trade with Europe or providing or trying to provide the gas or trying to open up Nord Stream or get this pipeline working or even

getting uranium to the U.S. or fertilizer to this European country or anything like that. I mean, Whitkoff, even to Moscow, Lavrov, hanging out with 20 minutes with Wadde Paul. That's 20 wasted minutes. Yes. I mean, wouldn't it be better for Russia to just say, you know what? We're just freezing, you guys. Yeah. We're just done.

We don't want to waste even a second on dealing with you guys, not even a second. Would that be a better approach? Without the whole frightening thing, we're just done with you guys. We just want you to know if you take one of our ships, we're going to take one of your ships. Yes, I know. Like what Iran does. You hit us, we're going to hit you. Yes.

Which, by the way, again, Putin said what happened, by the way. I mean, he talked about this and he repeated that he'd given instructions to the Russian Navy to start seizing Western ships. So, you know, I am sure that's going to come, by the way. Now, here again, I just want to go back to the differences between the 1950s, because one of the points about Khrushchev's policy is that Khrushchev wanted ultimately to be friends with the West. I mean, that was the objective. First, you scare them, and then you scare them to the point where they start to make up with you. And then you actually develop a friendly relationship with them, which is one. ultimately happened and it was what ultimately created the crisis between the Soviet Union and China.

So his rhetoric in the 50s and early 60s may have been incredibly scary for people in the West, but the objective ultimately was good relations with the West. Today, I think, it has to be the opposite, in the sense that I think, as you rightly said, there is no real future. The Russians must look at the situation with Europe. They must look at the way in which they tried to establish good relations with the Europeans and the Americans. And Putin, by the way, went through this very systematically. He went through all the various meetings, discussions, the way in which the Soviet leaders in the late 1980s. He didn't name Gorbachev. he was clearly thinking about Gorbachev, went out of their way to accommodate and appease the West

at every single turn and how disasters that prove to be. So what he's basically signaling is even he realizes now that good relations with the West, with the Europeans, the Americans are not going to happen. So the point is not to scare the West to the point of actually the West wanting friendship with Russia, because that's not going to happen. It's scary the West, the West doesn't attack Russia, which is a completely different thing.

And then you work to develop your relations with China, which, as you rightly say, these two countries complement each other perfectly. They are different, and yet in so many ways, they fit together so well. And I think that is, I think if you go to the rest of Putin's speech,

his comments in Valdai. That basically is the outline. That is what he's thinking. And I don't think there's any real disagreement about this within the Russian leadership, just to say. There is differences of emphasis. Medvedev wants Russia to be much more assertive,

much more forceful in its responses than it has been up to them. now. And I think, as I said, he's winning that argument, Franklin. All right. We will end the video there. We are on locals. We are on substack and go to Durant Shop, pick up submerch. There's a link in the description box down below. Take care.