The Duran Podcast - Raisi's BRICS Legacy Shapes Iran's Future as War Resumes

Episode Date: September 6, 2026

Raisi's BRICS Legacy Shapes Iran's Future as War Resumes

All right, Alexander, we have the war between the United States and Iran restarting, at least military operations, have restarted. And once again, the focus of the operations, the military strikes from the U.S. into Iran, and Iran's retaliation is focused and centered around control of the Strait of Hormuz. Just about every day, Trump is posting something on true social connected to the Strait of Hormuz. even the name change to call it the straight of Trump, I believe, is what he's posting about. It's about Hormuz. Who controls Hormuz? And we have very different reporting coming out of Hormuz as to what's getting out of Hormuz and what's getting in, what's getting out, and who actually has control of the Strait of Hormuz. If you go by Trump's statement, his administration.

They claim that they're getting 30 to 40 ships out a night. It used to be at 140 when it was open, fully open, but they're claiming 30 to 40. If you go to many of the reporting, the reporting tracking services, which are looking at what's getting out of Hormuz. They're putting the number at around 10, give or take, on a daily basis. So what do you think is really happening here? Yes. Well, I think this is an interesting story. And I get to say what I think.

Certainly some ships have been getting through the Strait of Hormuz. I think there is enough external data to suggest that this has indeed happened. And I forgot to mention using the southern route. The southern route is what the Trump administration says. And I am going to say something else. I cannot imagine that. that this has been going on without the Iranians knowing about it and without the Iranians in some ways, in some way, green lighting it. Now, this takes us back to Iran, which is, as we've discussed

many times, a very, very complicated country with a very complicated political system. There are hardliners in Iran, people mainly perhaps concentrated within the IRGC, but also in other agencies within the Iranian system, who want a confrontation with the United States, who oppose any concessions to the United States, who want the Strait of Hormuz to remain completely closed, because they see that as providing them with leverage in the end over the Americans, and whose hardly concealed objective. is to get the Americans to remove themselves completely from the entire Persian Gulf area of the Middle East. So there is that faction.

Then there is another faction, and the probable person that is best known relative to it is Pezishan, the president. Pezishkan wants a deal. He is responsible for the economy in Iran, which isn't going through very tough times. There is the, there's very, very high inflation. There's budget deficits. People's incomes have been falling. And Pezishkan recently made a speech in which he said that this is the moment, this is a good moment to end the war.

Iran is ahead on points. We've seen off the American attack on us. Our political system is intact. Now is the time when we're strong to make a deal. And clearly, I think he probably would accept that the Strait of Hormuzes part of that deal would have to be reopened. And I think what he wants to do is to return to something like the Memorandum of Understanding, the MOU, or something very close to it. And I think the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ghalibath, is of the same view. Anyway, I think that there are other people in Iran who share those views.

And I think some of them are in the military. Some of them might even be found within the IRGC. We can't always know, you know, who holds particular views in Iran. But it does seem to me that this argument, this disagreement does exist there. And I think that some of them were saying, look, the Americans, the Omanis, our letting ships go through the Strait of Hormuz, let's look the other way as that happens, and then gradually, as the situation stabilizes and normalizes, we can move further towards some kind of return to the MOU and to some kind of agreement with the Americans, long-term

agreement with the Americans. And then what happened was that Donald Trump, as so often, couldn't restrain himself. He started to talk about this on true social. He talked about the fact that the United States controls the straight-of-war moves. He basically said things about Iran, which suggested that he was in no mood to make any kind of compromises with. him with them. And the result was that this informal arrangement that existed between the Americans and the Iranians fell apart. The hardliners in Tehran once again regained the ascendancy. There were strikes on ships in the strait of Hormuz. The fighting in effect has resumed. And my own personal view is that as of this moment when we're making this program, the Strait of Hormuz,

is completely closed again. Because without some degree of Iranian, let's call it, complicity, I don't think any ships can pass through the Strait of Hormuz. It's as simple as that. Why would Peseshkian want to go back to an MOU that the United States doesn't want to deal with? I mean, the U.S. doesn't want anything to do with the MOU. So how do you think, if you're Pesesh Kian and you're making the argument for a deal, and I understand what he's saying, if he's in charge of the economy, and he's trying to focus on getting Iran's economy back on track, and he's thinking the best of the best. way to do that is to try and work through a deal with the U.S. But the MOU was not realistic, was not

workable. Both sides didn't want, but the U.S. especially didn't want anything to do with the MOU. And Israel is never going to allow the U.S. to agree to that type of deal either. So, you know, how does Pesesh Kian see this? Well, I go to say where I think the fundamental problem, within Iran lies, which is that I think that there is a hardline faction, as I said, which is very anti-American and wants conflict. And then there is another faction which wants to rebuild and focus on the economy. But the entire discussion is exclusively centered around the United States. So it basically comes down for as far as far too many people within the Iranian policymaking machinery are concerned to a debate about whether you can achieve peace with the Americans so that you can rebuild the economy or whether you have to fight the Americans and accept decades of hardship until you win. And I think the entire discussion within Iran is framed in that way.

In other words, they think only of the United States, either as the source of all their problems or as the solution to all their problems. I think that within Iran itself, there are relatively few people within the upper reaches of the political system that are prepared to think of alternatives, like developing bricks, strengthening relations with China, building stronger relations with Russia. I think the previous president, the one before Pezschean, Abraham, Raizi, I think he did think in those ways. I mean, he brought Iran into bricks.

he had close relations with the Chinese. He had close relations with the Russians. We're starting to get more information about the fact that during his time, military contacts between the Russians and the Iranians began to grow and even burgeon. But obviously, he died in a helicopter accident, the nature of which has never been fully clarified. And in his absence, unfortunately, and I do so unfortunately, the entire discussion within Iran has again reverted again, as if by default, back to a question of whether or not to make a deal with the Americans, nobody looking for alternatives instead. Is there a military alternative for Iran?

I mean, Trump goes on and on about the military victory of the United States. Yeah. But is there a military victory that's apparent to the IRGC or is there a path to a military victory for them? Well, you know, this is, this is, this is difficult. I would say ultimately, probably not. The IRGC and Iran can re-devastation across the Middle East. They can destroy all the pipelines. They can destroy all the energy facilities.

They can destroy the desalination plants. They can create a massive humanitarian crisis. But ultimately, the United States is a superpower and Iran is not. In a war of that kind, if it is extended indefinitely, I have to say, just as we said at the start of the war, that if the war continued longer than a week, the pendulum, the pendulum of advantage over time would shift in Iran's favor, and we would prove right about that. If Iran is unwise enough to get itself into an indefinite military confrontation with the United States, then the pendulum of advantage is gradually going to shift in. favor of the Americans because the Americans have resources that Iran simply by itself is unable to match. At least that, it seems to me, is a reasonable assessment. I mean, there are

uncertainties. There may be a crisis in the U.S. economy, as we discussed in a previous program. There might be a change of policy in Washington. There might be. There might be a sense of exhaustion within the United States about the length of its commitment to the Middle East. But if we are talking about Iran undertaking a war of choice, a long war of choice against the United States, I would say that this was a very reckless, a very risky approach to take. That is my view. By contrast, I also have to say this. The hardliners are absolutely right

that you cannot trust the Americans and that you cannot make long-term deals with them and that if you make those long-term deals, then all you're going to end up with is a deal which the Americans will break and which will leave you in an enormous position of disadvantage. My point is that there are other options that Iran has that don't involve the United States. And the Iranians don't seem to be thinking about them and don't seem to be

interested in taking them. Pezishkan continues to be focused on the Americans, I think, to an extremely unhealthy degree. Yeah, that is why all the fighting is about Hormuz. Yeah. Because it holds the key to this entire war. Yes. If the United States can get ships through Hormus, a certain number of ships, if they can exert some sort of control, whatever that may even mean.

Yes. Then they can keep the economic indicators, economic factors. They can keep those. that risk low, the price of oil, the interest rates, the U.S., all these things that ultimately would lead to the United States retreating and to losing this conflict. Those are the things that are very much dependent on the U.S.'s ability to get ships or even to make it appear as if ships are going through the straight of force. Maybe there's no ships going through the straight of formers.

But Trump being the salesman, the con man that he is, he can take one ship and turn it into 30 or 40. Yes, yes. Even though only one is crossing, he says 40. And there's going to be certain parts of the public and a lot of sections of the economy and the financial institutions and the market that will believe Trump. And whatever he posts on through social, they're going to believe it. And so that'll keep the price of oil down. And that'll keep everything moderated, which is what Trump and Bessent are trying to do. And for Iran, they have to keep Hormuz closed in order to inflict pain on the United States and on the global economy so that the U.S. does eventually retreat.

Yes. That's what this is all about right now. It is Hormuz. Yes. Yeah. But it is exactly as a result of what you said. Hormuz is the key in a confrontation between the United States and Iran. But perhaps a wiser game, a wiser long-term game for Iran, is to play a different game altogether.

Get out of the Hormuz paradigm. Exactly. Exactly, because Hormuz, the leverage it gives, in effect, traps Iran in a confrontation with the United States. So it is frustrating. It remains very frustrating that within Iran, they don't seem to be able to think of these alternative options. Raizi, who was, as I said, the former president, did. And now we're getting more information. I mean, there's been this very interesting article in the Financial Times, which, by the way, I take completely seriously.

I mean, I can tell when an article has been completely spun out of nothing. And another article, which is based on some real information, which has obviously been provided to the Financial Times by a Western intelligence agency. But we can now see that reports, rumors, information we've received, I think both of us are privately received, that the Russians have been providing Iran with technical assistance, that they've been providing Iran with all kinds of military assistance as well to help Iran build up its defenses. That is real. And if you go to the timeline that the financial times is providing, It all goes back to the period when Raezi was Iran's president. That's when it really started. That's why they took him out. And that's why it happened. Right.

Because he had just did these things. To say it simply. So it was because Raezi did all of those things that Iran has been as successful in my opinion, as it has been. Because Raezi made the economic connections, which ensured that food and gas comes from the north. Raezi made other economic connections, which would mean that Rick states like China and maybe others might actually help Iran stabilize its financial system. It's probably because of Raizi's role that Iran improved the technology of its ballistic missiles and developed the effectiveness of its drone technology.

But the trouble is, and the worry is, from an Iranian point of view, that they are resting on the benefits of Raizzi's policies without actually building on them. they've, as I said, slip back into saying to themselves, well, ultimately it's all about the US. Do we do a deal with them and hope that that will enable us to get our economy back running again? Or do we fight them and fight them indefinitely, which basically means keeping the Strait of Hormuz permanently? And that's, it seems to me, I think that's a false choice. Just to finish the video, I wonder if there's a middle ground for Iran and all of this in that they make a deal with the United States, understanding that the deal is going to be

broken, but they put a deal together, which does give Iran the time that it will need to build things up, to a level where they understand that. five years or 10 years, there's going to be another conflict with the U.S., but at least we'll be in a much stronger position. In a way, a Minsk type of deal, which benefited the western Ukraine. And Angela Merkel let everybody know that Minsk was about giving Ukraine the time that it needed to build up its military so that it could fight Russia. But the argument made on the Russian side of thinks, is that what Mintz gave Putin and his administration was the time that it needed to prepare their economy for the eventual sanctions that did hit.

Yes. I think that is a coherent and intelligent policy, but in order to execute on it, you must prepare the ground for it carefully. At this moment in time, I get the sense that both the Russians and even more the Chinese are very wary of having anything to do with the Iranians, especially the Chinese. So what you must do, what you should be doing is you should be going to China, you should be going to Moscow, you should be going to other places like that, and you should be explaining to these countries. Look, this is what we're going to do. We know that any deal,

make with the Americans is not going to be honored. We only have a limited amount of time. I think five years, by the way, is far too long. I don't think the Americans are going to wait five years. I don't think the Israelis are going to wait five years. A year at most is what I would guess. So we're going to do this deal, but we need time. We need help. Do you help? Do we have? Do we have your support. David, that's what they should be doing. And yes, no doubt, all sorts of contacts between Iran and the other BRIC states do exist. Pezyskian was at the big summit in Bishkek. He met Xi Jinping and he met Putin. But quiet, private contacts, in my experience, of diplomacy are never enough. The leaders, the top leaders need to be involved.

Persishgun, because he's the president, the prime minister, the entire cabinet of Iran. We should be seeing a constant movement, a constant flow of people from Tehran going to these capitals, talking, doing deals, sorting out arrangements. The military people should be going to. And at the moment, I just don't see that. All right, we will end the video there. Check us out on Substack and look for us on the Dorad Shop. Those links in description box down below. Take care.