The Duran Podcast - Restoring Peace With Russia - Ambassador Jack Matlock, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: December 8, 2024

Restoring Peace With Russia - Ambassador Jack Matlock, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone, I'm Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris and Ambassador Jack Matlock, an American diplomat and, of course, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union. It's great to have you back, sir. It's always good to see you. Whenever we speak with you, it's a bit like a conversation with history, so we greatly appreciate it. Yeah, to be with you. So, yeah, you have written a book, looking back to look ahead and I thought this was a great

title alone because we can learn a lot from the past as we enter a very uncertain future and again you graduated from high school when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan you specialized in Soviet

studies, you entered the foreign services you were a diplomat for 35 years and of course towards the end of your service you were the US and to the Soviet Union and participated in negotiating an end to the Cold War in 1989. So you really lived through the entire Cold War through all its faces. And so how also then the post-Cold War peace came, but also fell away,

as we instead pursued NATO enlargement. So I really wanted to today address this issue as we appear to have squandered the Cold War peace, but now we're entering a new period of mult polarities. So I guess a very straightforward, maybe broad question. Where do you see us going wrong after the Cold War? What could have been done differently? I think that our governments and media encouraged a misunderstanding of how the Cold War ended. And

they looked at it as if it was a a quasi-military victory and that also that Russia was a loser because the Soviet Union broke up. Now there were several things wrong with that. We ended the Cold War before the breakup of the Soviet Union

and we ended it by negotiation. When Gorbachev actually basically changed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which had caused the Cold War, and that was the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the idea that the Soviet Union as a communist power would try to create communist powers elsewhere by using the proletarian revolution. He dropped that philosophy, and he also actually not only allowed, but facilitated the democratization

of the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. So that the idea that this was a quasi-military victory was wrong. The idea that Russia was a defeated nation was also wrong because it was Russia that led the breakup of the Soviet Union. Then the third

assumption was that in as much as we had had a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union and the two most militarily powerful countries, now

we had a unipolar world. that the United States. Now, this was basically mistaken for a number of reasons. One is that the world was no longer, it was never bipolar in a full sense, and it was never unipolar in a full sense. Because military dominance, yes, can cause create damage to others,

but military dominance does not, ensure a peaceful world necessarily and certainly it cannot be used to create what they call democracy in other countries. And the same is true, I think, with using economic strength as a political tool, which has become a positive. Because neither of these help us, from, foreign countries to become more democratic. And one also has to wonder about what do we mean by democracy? Because the idea of just putting labels on countries, this is democratic and this is not, can get very, very misleading because the degree of democracy in a governed country

could be on a sliding scale. and in many cases those that are called democracies today are not by any means you take for example the idea that one is supporting democracy if you help Ukraine to defend against Russia

and gets it absolutely wrong Ukraine is one of the least democratic countries in the world and it has a government that came about because of a coup d'etat and so on. So that the use of these general terms, some of them highly emotional, has simply been misplaced.

And I would say that that is one of the basic problems of the current foreign policy. Can I ask, do you say Kellogg's appointment might represent a return to dialogue with Russia? I have no idea. If we judge by his first administration, he made a number of decisions that were very damaging to the U.S. Russian relationship.

Now, I think he made these because he was being accused. I mean, one of the biggest scams in American political history was the idea that Russia helped Trump get elected. That was a total deception, and that was used. But being the, I would say, the egotist that Trump is, he didn't want to be said that he did anything favorable to Russia. and so actually our relations deteriorated during the Trump administration. They had a series of expulsions of diplomats started by President Obama just before he left office. I mean, less than two weeks before he left office, he started expelling Russians from the United States. The Russians retaliated, and this went on back and forth to the point that both of

of us have only bare skeleton diplomatic representations. And the second thing he did was to continue sanctions. He began to give the Ukrainians offensive weapons in the battles there, which, well, Obama had given them defensive weapons, but Trump gave them offensive weapons. Now, he says now that he was being advised by people who were not loyal and so on. So we'll have to see. Of course, he has said that he could end the war in Ukraine on the first day of his presidency. But he makes a lot of statements like that, and then it turns out they don't.

And so we really don't know. I know that it does seem that his people are talking. Well, they've had some meetings with the Ukrainian, and I hope and think they are communicating, rather than you might say, back channel to the Russians. But so we'll have to see. But on the basis on his record in his first administration, there's no reason to feel that he's going to be any way partial to Russian.

Yeah, well, I noticed as we're trying to negotiate or not negotiate, we look towards offering some peace proposals to end this war. This seems to be a lack of recognition for Russia's security interest. This stands a bit in contrast to what happened during the Cold War. And again, when you were negotiating, because then that point of departure of any negotiation was recognition of mutual security interests, where the conflict, where they can be harmonized. But it seems to me that since the 1990s, we hardly ever even mentioned or discussed Russia's security interests. And a little bit in the early 90s, because I remember yourself, George Kennan, U.S. Secretary of Defense, will impair. and many other political heavyweights. They warned, for example, that NATO would undermine Russia's security interest.

But since those days, we don't really speak much about Russian security interests at all. I was just wondering, how do you interpret this as, again, a diplomat who negotiated with the Soviet leadership? Well, obviously, one of the problems we have had is that a series of American administration, simply refused to take account of genuine security interests the Russians had. Many of things that a succession of American presidents have done have been seen legitimately, I think, as threats to Russian security. And I recall that Russia repeatedly, particularly during the Medvedev presidency, asking for agreements that would guarantee Russian security

and these were turned down, were simply not taken seriously. And it does seem to me that those of us who point these things out are being called, well, apologists for Putin. Well, let me say one thing. Those of us who predicted that it would be bad for American security

to expand NATO before it was started in the 1990s. To be called apologists for Putin is like calling a meteorologist who tracks a tornado as a friend of tornadoes. Of course, those of us who have predicted,

that didn't want it to happen and don't like it that it has happened. It has been a great tragedy. And I think in the final analysis, it has been not only potentially fatal for Ukraine, but very damaging to Russia and eventually it's going to be if it's continued to be very

damaging to the West Europeans and ultimately the United States because it is bringing about forces that are opposing many things that actually are a benefit to Americans and to West Europeans. So it seems to me that this idea of demonizing Putin, and when Putin probably reacted as almost any Russian leader would to the deployment of weapons close to the border, which could become nuclear. And this was happening in beginning in the Obama administration.

So the American presidents, beginning with Clinton, and then the first Bush, who seemed to get along with the, President Putin, in fact, President Putin was very favorable to American interests in supporting the invasion of Afghanistan and approving American bases in former Soviet territories. But the United States pulled out of virtually every arms control agreement that we had negotiated in an end of Cold War. that started with the second Bush administration, and then we had an Obama administration, which was openly trying to turn former Soviet territories like Ukraine and Georgia, which were very vital to America, to Russian security interests, into NATO members. All of us who really understood the situation, and particularly those of us who negotiated the end of the Cold War, opposed this. We said all along, this is going to bring about a crisis situation with the Russian government.

Meanwhile, I would say beginning in this century, the 21st century, it seemed to be much of, of our major media was determined to create a degree of Russia phobia. The coverage of Russia was increasingly negative, and you could never get through sort of the Russian side of things. Now, that doesn't mean that those of us who criticized our policy walk on what is happening in Russia. Of course it is terrible, and we didn't want it to happen, but it was the U.S. and Western policy that encouraged it's happening, and I think that's something we have to understand. What I don't understand is how so many of the West Europeans got caught up in this, because what they're doing economically is not in their interest, and in Germany's interest in particular. Clearly, Germany had a very great economic interest in access to Russian oil and gas.

And, of course, the major symbol of that was the pipeline. And why that was opposed? I'm sure not know. Because the Nord Stream pipeline made a lot of economic sense. It also made political sense for Germany. But, you know, so much has happened now, and these things are argued in very emotional terms, rather than really analyzing the facts. So, again, I think that we have gotten in the West in a situation where the use of arms and of,

economic sanctions has reached such stages that it is simply getting a pushback. And to what degree President Trump in his second term will be able to change that as, I think, unpredictable? We now have had missile strikes using American missiles. against Russia. People say that what the Russians have said about that is bluff. Do you think the Russians are bluffing? I think, I'm sorry. Do you think the Russians bluff when they say they will respond to the strikes against their country? Well, I think that if we're talking about the strikes of Western supplied arms, the long-distance ones. I think that what Russia has said, that they have a right to retaliate against those who use it.

Now, their actual retaliation occurred only against Ukraine. And I found it very interesting that people were surprised. at some of the attacks close to Kiev. I will say in this whole war, there have been very few Russian attacks toward Western Ukraine or even on Kiev, the capital. It has not been an all-out war,

as it has been claimed in the West. But I think at first, Russia would retaliate against Ukraine for these long-range men. missiles, and they would reserve the right to hit bases that have these weapons aimed at Russia. I have saw a report today there have been no attacks by Hamas into Russia since the retaliation. So I suspect that we are now calling that off.

but I think that Russia although they have changed their nuclear posture to some extent that doesn't mean they're threatening immediate nuclear war I think you have to look carefully at what they say and people who say oh we keep crossing their red lines

and they do nothing these are quite frankly idiots who are understand do not understand exactly what is happening. Yes, they have

nuclear weapons and they now have weapons that can be armed with them which we have no defense against. And I think

we need to recommend that. Now, what is dangerous about this is that once both sides start putting

their nuclear weapons on alert or things, a mistake can set them off. And that

can be catastrophic. And we know that back during the Cold War, there were several very close times where a nuclear war could have been started because

of sheer mistake. And because the people involved had second thoughts and didn't actually fire the missiles and started. So, the problem is not that you're going to get a Russian nuclear strife against somebody.

I'm sure if they do decide if there are further Ukrainian attacks on Russian deep into Russian territory, particularly if they start aiming at something in Moscow, the first reaction would be to hit Kiev. and they have actually said that this means they could go after the command and control. So I think the idea is they're not going to initiate nuclear weapons, but they're going to hurt you in many other ways. And I would say, you know, in general, we forget when we talk about our military superiority. Yes, there is military superiority, but the thing. is that

we total the discount the possibility of damage in other ways we are

dealing probably with peers in cyber warfare and that goes also with the

Chinese and even the North Koreans and there are so many different

ways that they can get back at us without being able to

attribute it that I think that those who are continuing this military course don't understand how damaging that can be to the American people and to the

people in Western Europe. It's an interesting narrative we often have in the West. I remember in the 90s when we began to expand NATO. If Russia did nothing, it meant we can continue to expand. If they're posted, it meant now they're aggressive and now we have to expand.

And it's a little bit like these missiles and the crossing red lines, because when the Russians don't respond, as you correctly pointed, they say, well, Russia doesn't defend its red line. They're weak. When they do defend the red lines, we say, oh, look how aggressive they are. Now we have to respond. But my point is our reaction that is on NATO's side every time is to escalate further, no matter what the Russians do. But I wanted to ask you about Biden because until recently, the Biden, the Biden administration, the Biden administration, said they would not do long-range missile strikes on Russia because it wouldn't be significant enough in order to turn the war, and it would come at such a huge risk because it would be seen by Russia as a direct attack by the United States. And then suddenly they reversed very quickly. Is this because the collapsing front line? Is it to sabotage Trump's peace, or

how do you read Biden's sudden switch in terms of beginning to attack Russia with attack I missed the question. How do you interpret the Biden administration's decision to suddenly reverse its decision not to attack Russia with attackams? Because now these long-range missiles are used. All I can say is when you have a president who said repedia, he wouldn't do something because it means war or two. And then he does it. it tells you more about that person than it does about what's going to happen. I think that we are stuck for another few weeks with a senile president

who has actually fueled a genocide in the Middle East and has also, in effect, led one. which is talking about the possibility of war with China. These policies have to change. I hope they will change in the next administration, but I have no solid confidence they will, particularly toward the Middle East and China. The only thing I can say is that,

although Trump seems very competitive in many ways, He does seem to be interested in peace, and though he may talk a lot about competition and such, and I think as enunciating some very damaging economic policies for the United States, we'll have to see how much of this works out and how it works out. But in terms of Europe, it does seem to me that Europe, the West European countries missed a real opportunity in the 1990s of establishing European security for the entire continent,

which was not based upon a military alliance with the United States. And so it does seem to me now that the problems in Western Europe are going to be exacerbated until they begin to make the policies for themselves. And that needs to be a policy of peace and a policy of stability in Europe. And unless you have a border between Ukraine and Russia, which is peaceful and, in effect, accepted by both sides at least, you're not really going to have peace in Europe. And so I think people who look at the, you know, the current goals of the Ukrainian government are totally impossible to achieve and to consider throwing lives into that, as they have been doing, mainly Ukrainian but also Russian lives and maybe a few Western lives. to keep throwing into that, I think will be a great tragedy.

So I think partly it begins that the Europeans have to start understanding that they are strong enough to support themselves. And Russia is not that strong, and Russia is not making any claims against them. One of the most ridiculous things we hear, and it has become almost a conviction. Oh, you know, if we don't stop, they say Putin, now, then he'll go after the Baltic states or even Poland, and this is nonsense.

I think Putin has very clearly, if you listen to him, said what was in his mind, but even if he did wish to do that, he does not have the means to attack the others. So to continue to support Ukraine on the grounds that you're defending Western Europe is, in my sense, a total lie. Do you think the Russians would be interested in a dialogue with the United States? I mean, there's been so much mistrust now. The Russians would be interested in what? A dialogue, repairing relations with the United States,

good relations with the United States again. Well, of course, after all that's been going on, that's going to be very hard to do. But, you know, I witnessed a transformation in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that went from extremely bad to cooperative in a period of three to four years. But that was because of the changes in Soviet policy and leadership

and American presidents who were eager to make peace and to end the Cold War, if that is possible. That was particularly true of President Reagan and also to a great extent with the first President Bush. And by the way, you know, it was President Bush administration, which actually gave Gorbett.

off when there was still a Soviet Union a promise that we would not expand NATO into Eastern Europe and even not into the territory of East Germany if Germany was written. And when

President Putin talks about these assurances he's absolutely right. Now they were not written down in a treaty. They were part of negotiations but they were very clear. And these assurances were given not only by the American political leaders, but by the British and the German.

And so now to have German is supplying tanks, you know, to Ukraine. I mean, it just boggles the mind. Or for Germany to sit still and have the North Stream type line sabotaged. And this was, you know, completely contrary to all of the German national interests. And I really don't know how one gets it at this. But I do know that the reaction in Europe on the extreme right is not a very good thing. But on the other hand, the current governments are acting so much not in their interests that they're bringing that upon themselves.

Germany is a bit of a hustle. A month ago, the German president, Frank Walter Steinmeier, he gave Joe Biden a medal, the highest honor from Germany. And this was, again, after many people now in Germany, believe that, well, quite reasonably, that it was most likely the United States who attacked their energy infrastructure. and also now cannibalizing a lot of their industries. But it begs the question whether or not we're really after peace. But I wanted to ask, hopefully this Ukraine war can be brought to an end, we see possibly new conflicts opening up, especially in Georgia, in which you mentioned this simplistic narrative of either something is democratic or authoritarian. and the Georgians, they appear to vote for the Georgian dream, which are very pro-European or pro-EU,

but they don't want to be anti-Russian. They don't want to be a front line against Russia. And suddenly, we say that the democratically elected government are Putin puppets, and the people who are rioting on the street are peaceful protesters, which we stand with. I mean, it's beginning to look like a little bit like Maidan in, in U.S. Ukraine, and indeed, the Georgian Prime Minister is warning that the West might be trying to convert his country into a second front line against the Russians. How do you see this?

Well, you have so much diplomatic experience from Georgia as well. I mean, how do you see this development? I think that situation is truly tragic in many respects. Actually, Georgia had actually started. the fighting that eventually led to Russian intervention. And because Georgia was moving against their minorities in South Ossetia and Anakasia, even while they were still Soviet Union. And eventually, when Sakashvili was president,

they actually attack the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, bringing on the Russian invasion. Now, the Russian invasion, of course, was something to be deplored, but I think absolutely expected under these situations. And because the thing is that Georgia really needs good relations with Russia for a whole lot of other, reasons. And the however,

the idea that people have that if they were just members of NATO and members

of the EU, this would solve all of their problems. That is ridiculous.

They don't qualify under the normal criteria either for EU membership or for NATO.

And the idea that EU membership would solve their economic problems is not true. Now, the reason of course right now that you might say the

Western funded organizations are pushing for is at least EU membership but also NATO membership. But at the present times, for

Georgia to become part of the EU of which they don't qualify for economically but they would be required to terminate economic relations with Russia which is not in their interest in the slightest

and indeed right now with the prospect that maybe within a few months there there will be an end to the war in Ukraine. It's all the more important for Georgia

practically to stay in at least speaking terms with Russia. They don't have official diplomatic relations at the moment but I'm sure there's a lot of communication going on and certainly trade is very active between them. There's also the matter

of the, you might say, the fate of the Georgian diaspora in Russia which is very extensive and of course that should be of interest to the Georgians to keep that relationship. So I can understand

given the difficulties there how people think, oh if we could only be and the EU we would live like other people in EU. Well actually if they don't qualify yet and it's just a political

decision it's not going to help that much. So I sympathize with those who I know that they're demonstrating for reasons they think is very important, but I think it is tragic because I do think that Georgia's interest is going to require a fairly normal relationship with Russia. And Georgia has at times been totally, I would say, hostile to its own minorities, treating them the way it did not want to be treated by Russians. So I love that country, but I do think that it isn't the best interest of the country to keep relations with Russia and not try to try everything on things like the European Union.

Certainly not with NATO, because Russia would not tolerate NATO bases in Georgia. Let's face it, any more than the United States would tolerate a foreign bases in Cuba or Mexico or Canada. We wouldn't, and they won't. And these things, they don't really solve what the real problems are. why do you think some people in Europe are so worried about a possible rapprochement between the United States and Russia because in Britain people do talk about that they are worried about it why are they worried about it I don't understand why but have you any thoughts well you have well I think you know a number of propagandists they are basically

you know we call them the neocons in the United States they were very much present in the Reagan administration and one of the main things those of us who have negotiated into the Cold War

we had to oppose them within the administration because basically Reagan didn't agree with them now but they were the ones that predicted you couldn't negotiate with the Soviet Union, you could only bring pressure to bear.

And then you get from them the misinterpretation at the end of the Cold War that somehow it was a military victory or that we caused them to

spend themselves you know out of economic viability, I think all of those things were not right. As I said, we negotiated an end to the war to the benefit of everybody,

including the Soviet Union. And then when Gorbachev tried to democratize, it was the the problem's internal problems as to the way the Soviet Union was governed without real autonomy for the so-called autonomous or Union republics that it caused the breakup. Now, I think that actually the country would have been better off. And meeting the future, if Gorbachev had been able to negotiate a union treaty with the 12

non-Baltic republics. It was always clear to me and others that the Baltic republics needed to be free. In fact, the United States never recognized they were legally

incorporated in the Soviet Union. And I would point out to them that they were legally freed before the breakup of the Soviet Union. And that Garbachev had had finally gotten through the State Council of the USSR, a recognition of their sovereignty and their freedom.

And that was before the Soviet Union broke up. So the idea that somehow there's a revanchist attitude in Russia. Well, I'm sure there are some people that feel that way, but the point is that, legally speaking, they got their freedom recognized by the Soviet Union when it still existed. But in any event, there simply now is not a possibility. And, you know, it does seem to me the reaction

of the current generation of politicians in Sweden and Finland ignores their own history. Both are benefited greatly during the post-co-war period from the fact that they were neutral and they really didn't need NATO to defend them. And it does seem to me that there's no possibility have, you know, Russia military moves

against them unless they allow American military bases there. And that, you know, I think the problem for Russia with NATO expansion has not been so much the Title V guarantees.

That, by the way, do not guarantee that the other countries will go to war, necessarily if they're attacked. What Title V says is that if one member is attacked, it will be considered an attack for all,

and they will consider how to respond. It doesn't say it has to be with war. But what is particularly sensitive for Russia, and they've told us all along, from the

1990s on, what we're sensitive to is the presence of foreign bases, particularly American bases, in those countries. And that has been clear all along, but this is distorted by the propagandists saying, well, they are really threatening Finland or Sweden or Estonia or Poland or Poland. because they're members of NATO. I think the threat has come with bases. And when we started putting bases in Poland

and Eastern Europe, that these were anti-ballistic missiles bases, well, first of all, Putin said, if these are defensive weapons, why don't we have a joint program? And actually, President Reagan would have jumped at the idea of a joint program, by the way, because he thought these weapons were pretty defensive.

But it happens that the particularly ABM weapons that were being deployed could be very easily used for offensive weapons. In fact, they were designed first for the Navy to be either offensive or defensive. So it was quite rational for President Putin to consider this an offense. Now, why did we want to put them there? We said, well, it's in case Iran tries to attack Western Europe. Why in the world would Iran have wanted to attack Western Europe at the time when they didn't have weapons to do it? I mean, but you know, the general public simply doesn't follow these things.

They have not been publicized by our principal media. And so when we were told, oh, we have to defend Ukraine or else other countries are going to be threatened, the general public has no fund of knowledge to understand how mistaken that is. My final question is about what diplomatic advice would you have for Europe? Because the world is changing very fast. We see the non-Western world, they are working very hard to create their own supply chains, their own transportation corridors, their own banks using their own currency. Again, Bricks being the main manifestation.

Meanwhile, the United States appears to be in relative decline, but also wants to focus more on Asia. And in Europe, our governments are, well, our countries are de-industrializing, economy is not doing well. And, of course, there's political crisis, France, Germany. Well, actually, you could put a whole continent almost under this category. What do you think, well, I guess not just Europe, but also United States. What is the path forward? How can we get out of all this trouble, which we have, to a large extent, created for ourselves?

Well, I think that Europe has to understand that its interests are strongly in favor of peace and also free trading arrangements, particularly within Europe, in the Western Union. And that it is not a good idea to, you know, I would say to be misled that we're living in a unipolar world. We're not living in the unipolar world. We have never had a purely unipolar or bipolar world. and the thing is we're all going to be served if we begin to stop using violence I would also say it is totally immaterial to Germany or other NATO members

where the precise line is between Ukraine and Russia the borders of Ukraine that the current Ukrainian government claims were created by Hitler and Stalin and those that say they have a sacred right to go to those borders

I think get it absolutely wrong these borders are not traditional borders that have been fought over and negotiated and so on that happened almost accidentally with the breakup of the Soviet Union when Boris Yeltsin, the Russian leader, was so determined to get rid of Garberchov and the Soviet Union that he made what Russians were considered a very bad deal with Ukraine.

But the Russians were willing to live with that as long as there was not a prospect of Ukraine becoming an ally or a part of a hostile alliance, something that the United States would never have accepted. And why people don't understand this, I don't know. It means absolutely nothing to the security of the United States or of Germany or of that matter, Poland, where that border is between Ukraine and Russia. And not to recognize that the current Ukrainian government

had been carrying out locally, you might say, anti-Russian, anti-ethnic Russian things, taking the status of Russian culture out of, they changed their constitution, in effect to be anti-Russian and so on. Now, this should not be of great concern to Western Europe and the others. Where that border is between Ukraine and Russia has never been a true security interest to the other countries in Europe or to the United States and Canada.

but to make that a goal and to encourage a very destructive war that is destroying more of Ukraine than anybody else is, I think, totally irrational and it's based upon a total misunderstanding of history. Now, how one gets out of this, because these are very emotional issues. I would say it's going to take, you know, different attitudes of our government and a refusal, first of all, to continue the war there. And maybe the best we can get would be a ceasefire, but we forget also a lot of what had been our principles.

That is the principle of self-determination. It is very clear that the great majority of the people in Crimea, if they're ever given a choice between part of Ukraine and part of Russia, they would choose Russia. Frankly, if they were giving a total choice, they would probably choose independence. But the thing is that the Russian, the referendum that the Russians conducted.

It may have been somewhat exaggerated with over 90%, but I think anybody who's close to it would have thought they could have easily gotten 70% a referendum. And so Russians are saying, okay, you have often talked about self-determination. Why is it that everybody has the right of self-determination except Russia.

And I think that's something that Europeans tend to think about. So in a way we have been swept with these highly emotional terms, putting labels

where they don't really apply because concepts like authoritarianism or even democracy are sliding concepts that have many aspects. and yes, elective democracies can be very authoritarian. And at times it's necessary.

You know, if France had not occasionally elected Charles de Gaulle, a very authoritarian president, they wouldn't have gotten out of Vietnam, they wouldn't have gotten out of Algeria. Sometimes, particularly on very emotional issues, It takes a fairly authoritarian leader to, I would say, preserve the democracy at home. So it does seem to me that there has to be a sort of rethinking. And the United States is simply not capable of carrying out all of these commitments that it seems to be making.

and it looks now as if and I think particularly the combination of in effect fueling military wars and then politicizing economic relationships are actually are not going to work in the long run

and that certainly in my opinion not in the interest of the true interest of the American people or the Europeans today. So I think we need a lot of rethinking, and we need, I think, both in Europe and the United States, a much more open information system, that lets more of these ideas be debated. What strikes me about the United States is that in the past, a lot of these. issues were debated very openly. Now they're hardly debated at all. You'll get often a very biased approach, even in our most popular and prestigious media outlets. Sir, I have no questions just to say thank you very much for answering our questions so thoroughly.

Thanks for having me on. Thank you so much. You've been very generous with your time. So thanks again.