The Duran Podcast - Russia Hits Odessa As Black Sea Standoff Risks Wider War

Episode Date: August 10, 2026

Russia Hits Odessa As Black Sea Standoff Risks Wider War

All right, Alexander, let's talk about what is happening in Ukraine, and let's start things off with the big missile and drone strike into Odessa. I believe the largest, or one of the largest Russian strikes into the Odessa region. Not only is Russia hitting the port in Odessa, but now they are taking out various transport corridors, including a key bridge, which linked the Odessa port to the Danube ports. What is happening? I will just add to that that there's now also, just shortly before we started making this program, reports that they're saying that they're coming after the big energy infrastructure in the area of Addessa as well. And not just energy storage infrastructure, but also energy generation infrastructure. These are massive attacks.

It has been going on every single. night now and every single day quite often. For weeks, we also see Russian aviation aircraft, bombers, in other words, starting to drop bombs on harbour installations and other installations. Odessa and the greater Odessa area and the whole port infrastructure is being pounded. and we've talked many times about a sea blockade, but it now looks like a land blockade is being implemented around Adessa as well. Now, I am, as you know, not a military person. I forgot to say real quick that there's no air defense, by the way.

There's no air defense. I think everyone knows this already. Absolutely, everybody can see this. Now, I'm not a military person. We're not military people. We're not here to try and calculate. We're not authoritative in terms of military assessments. But I have to say that to me, all of this looks increasingly like,

not just an operation, to close the Black Sea ports and to blockade Ukraine, which it has done extremely effectively. Apparently, no ships have passed through Odessa, been able to exit Odessa since the 22nd of July. That's what the Ukrainians themselves are saying, with catastrophic effects on the Ukrainian economy. It's also starting to look as if the Russians are preparing the ground for some kind of operation to seize Adsa itself.

I mean, I have to say this, because if you're starting to cut off the land corridors, the energy generation and energy storage facilities, and all of those things. It looks like an operation to capture Odessa, perhaps by sea, and the Russians have a significant sea lift capacity in the Black Sea, the extent of which has been underestimated by the West, which has been peddling this fantasy about the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, having been destroyed.

And of course, no doubt that is indeed going to happen. it is presumably going to happen in conjunction with some kind of Russian advance across the Dnieper as well, from Herzon region and perhaps also from Zaporosia region, where the Russians are also making big advances. There are reports that there is now actually fighting going on inside the key fortified town of O'Rejov in Zaporosia region. are the last major place that the Ukrainians control in Zaporosia region, apart from the city of Zaporosia itself. So perhaps that is taking us too far forward, but I have to say that this massive, sustained aerial offensive

we've never had from the Russians throughout the period of this war, an aerial offensive of this kind conducted against one specific location. This massive aerial offensive does look to me like it is a preparation for some kind of operation against the desert, maybe not tomorrow or in a week's time, but maybe at some point, say later in the winter after the rains when the weather starts to stabilize again and you start to get a situation where you can start to contemplate an operation of this kind. Just say. Yeah.

Turkey is trying to step in and open things up for Odessa, for the port. Yes. And try to prevent a Russian advance in the Black Sea area. I think this is a huge story. And I think that we are perhaps now closer. than we have been ever since Putin and Erdogan took over the leadership of their respective countries. We're closer to an outright clash, I don't mean a military clash, but a political and geopolitical confrontation between Russia and Turkey than we have ever been. Now, this has been a very strange

relationship. It's widely known that Putin and Erdogan at a personal level have tensions with each other. There are lots of people in Russia especially who've never had much belief in this relationship and believe again that Putin has over-invested in it. Erdogan, as we know, went completely against Russian policy in Syria and orchestrated the fall of Assad there. He's played a very complex game, which is ultimately an anti-Russian game in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. But nonetheless, and in spite of all of that, the Russians have held things together with Erdogan. They continue to build a nuclear power station in Turkey. There's talk about building another nuclear power station in Turkey.

They supply Turkey with energy on a big scale via Turk stream. they also invest heavily in the Turkish economy and of course large numbers, millions in fact, of Russian tourists come to Turkey where at some level, which I don't fully understand, they're apparently able to use their meerkarts. So this has been a fairly close relationship. But we are now approaching the point

where if our analysis about Odessa is correct, this is going to start Russian actions are going to start to infringe Turkish interests. Because for Erdogan and for Turkey, the absolute nightmare, the strategic nightmare, is the Russians gaining control other days. and Ukraine's Black Sea ports. In other words, gaining control of the entire northern coastline of the Black Sea. They already control Crimea. If that happens, then Russia is reestablished conclusively as the major decisive power in the Black Sea. Turkey has a lot of economic interests in the Black Sea.

It will be very, very alarming for the Turks and for Erdogan, if that happened. It would mean that the power balance between Russia and Turkey would have shifted decisively and indeed overwhelmingly in Russia's favour. And the Turks Erdogan will not like that. And they're now trying to put spokes in the wheel of this process. So they're now demanding a ceasefire in the Black Sea. They want the Russians and the Ukrainians to stop attacking each other's ships. Well, again, like all proposals for ceasefires, given that it is Ukraine that is being hammered,

that would obviously favor massively Ukraine. it would mean in effect the reopening of Ukraine's Black Sea ports and the resumption of the grain and export trades through the Black Sea, which obviously would be an economic lifeline to the Zelensky government. And I think beyond that, if there is going to be a Russian military operation over the next few months to capture Odessa, which I have to say over the last two or three days, I've started to think it's becoming likely. Then the Turks are not going to be happy and they're going to try to oppose it. And in the meantime, they've taken the first steps to try to close the Dardanelles, the Turkish straits, to shipping, heading to Novorosisk, to collect oil and other goods from there,

and to be absolutely clear about that, that is an anti-Russian move. Outside of closing the Dardanelles, what else could Turkey do? Well, they could do one very important thing, which they have not done a lot. Russia can do a huge amount. The Turks can also do something else, which they haven't done since February 2022, which is open the Dardinels for the passage of Western warships to enter the Black Sea. Now, that, of course, would set up a potential situation for a clash between the Russians and NATO. Who would send their warships?

Well, that is an excellent question. I don't know. I mean, I think, France. I would have hardly. I would have thought that by now, by this point in the war, the chances of that that happening are less back in 2022 at the start of the special military operation. It would have been different. I think if NATO warships had entered the Black Sea, it would have been a major problem and crisis for the Russians. If NATO warships enter

the Black Sea now, it's going to be a crisis for those warships. Because Russian air power in this in this area is now overwhelming. Yeah, but in 2022, if NATO had sent in their warships, then they would have been a party to the war, which they were trying to conceal and hide that. Absolutely. Absolutely. From the very beginning. Absolutely.

It may have actually worked in Russia's favor because it would have cleared things up. Well, in mind you. And Russia would have understood, the whole world would have understood that NATO was a party to the war from the very get-go. Well, yes, but that's the past. Anyway, that's the past.

I mean, today, today it's an obvious step that Erdogan might make. He might say that this is a, he might even argue that this is an Article 5 situation, even though, of course, Turkey itself is not being a doubt. Well, it's not. But I, you know, I can imagine that given Turkish interests, this is something, and Erdogan's own policies, this is something that he might want to take very, very far. I don't think there is anything he can do. and the Russians have many, many levers against Turkey.

They've shown that they have those in the past when there was a crisis in relations between Turkey and Russia. Back in 2015, when the Turks shot down a Russian fighter jet or bomber over Syria, the Russians imposed sanctions on Turkey. They stopped imports of Turkish food staffs. They stopped Turkish construction companies working in Russia. They stopped Turkish, a Russian tourist going to Turkey. It created a significant crisis in the Turkish economy.

The Turkish economy looks very wobbly at the moment because they're suffering from the fuel shortages arising from the crisis in the Gulf. They look more vulnerable now than they did in 2050. Yeah, and Erdogan traveled to Moscow. Yeah. To apologize to Putin and Putin hadn't waiting outside of his office for three to four hours. That's right. That's right. With the sculpture of Catherine, the great victory, right?

That's right. Yeah, remember that? Yeah. Yeah, and they had Erdogan's waiting for like three, four hours. Yes, yes. Not to mention that Putin saved Erdogan's butt when they tried to Kuhi. Absolutely, to Koo-Hu-Hu-Hing. Exactly.

And Turkey should have thought about all of this as should have the United States and NATO. When they started to strike at the Russian grain ships in the Siavasov a couple of weeks ago, they should have thought about all of this. But they didn't tell Zelensky or they didn't tell NATO and the U.S. Turkey or the one, whoever, they didn't say, look, don't go after the grain ships because we have a deal in place, a shaky deal or we have an understanding in place. place about the grain ships and the Black Sea and the Black Sea is for us as Turkey is of critical national interest and security interests. So let's not push it. Please tell Zelensky and Ukraine or the United States, NATO, don't launch drones to hit the Russian ships because we're just going to get into a world of a mess. But no, they said nothing. They did nothing. And Russia retaliated. That's why we are in this mess.

Or at least that's why Turkey is about to enter this mess. Absolutely. This was one of the greatest acts of folly that we have seen throughout this entire conflict. I suspect what happened is that far too many people in the West internalized this false narrative. about Ukraine having won some kind of great battle against the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. Now, we've discussed this in program after program. We've been about the only people to do that, by the way. Even in alternative media, we said that there's never been a Ukrainian victory in the Black Sea.

The Russians have always had the ability, if they chose to do it, to blockade Odessa. Go back a year, you will find programs in which we said this. We said this before, but they all thought they could do it. They all thought that they could put pressure on the Russians by attacking Russian economic interests, by going after the grain ships and interfering with Russian trade through the Sea of Azov. And of course, what they did as a result is that they brought this disaster now upon themselves. You don't hear so much about attacks on Russian shipping in the Sea of Azov, but shipping throughout the Black Sea has been cleared of shipping that headed for Odessa. And I understand that ships are now also becoming increasingly reluctant merchant ships. This is what I'm hearing. To go to Constanza in Romania as well, because this is too close. to being a war zone altogether. And that, by the way, is putting strains on Romania's economy, which is also in trouble. But I mean, the folly here was off the scale. And you're absolutely

correct. Those people who back in 2022, when for a time it looked as if the Russians might be thinking of some kind of blockade of Odessa then, Erdogan. the European Union, the United States, who rushed and said, we can't have attacks on grain ships. This is in July 22. We can't have blockades. We can't interfere with shipping in food products because this is going to create a humanitarian crisis, especially in the global south. All of them rushed to persuade the rush. to agree to this grain deal, this lopsided grain deal with the Ukrainians.

But when Russian grain ships were attacked in the Sea of Azov, what did all of these people do? They did nothing, which in effect was a sign of support for what the Ukrainians were doing. And now what they've had is that they've been landed with this total blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea coast, the crisis for the Romanians in Constanza, and we are even talking about a potential Russian operation against Odessa itself. Well, according to the Russian military, the way they were moving weapons into Odessa was, I mean, they were moving weapons into Odessa, and then they were shipping grain out of Odessa.

So that was kind of what was going on in the court of Odessa. And any ship that is trying to get into Odessa at this point in time is obviously a ship that's trying to smuggle weapons in. Absolutely. No merchant food ship is going to try to enter Odessa now. Absolutely. That is exactly what was going on. The whole thing, as I said, was again, an exercise in propaganda and duplicity, no different from any other that we have seen. They were bringing in weapons.

Most of the weapons apparently that Ukraine has been receiving from the West. it was getting through ships that were coming to Adessa, because that's the easiest way to handle big cargoes. Anybody, and I've been involved in logistics, I know all about this. Sending heavy equipment by Lorry is incredibly expensive and very, very difficult. Only the United States can do it on. scale and it doesn't make economic sense for the US to do it in Europe and in Ukraine, especially in Ukraine, where the roads, simply, are not that good. You can send a lot of goods by train,

but again, the economies, the economies of scale make it far, far better to send them by ship. So they pretended that it was all about grain. It was mostly about keeping Odessa open so that they could send weapons supplies into Odessa by ship. I am sure this was going on at all points throughout the war. They were sending weapons in by ship. The ships were coming out with grain, keeping parts of Ukraine's economy. including its agricultural economy ticking.

They made all kinds of promises at the time of the original grain deal in 2022. To relax sanctions on Russian agricultural exports, the EU went completely back on all of those promises. They never did that. They played the Russians for fools, and now we see the results. Yeah. And look, Romania is getting poor. into this conflict. We have to say that. It's very different than Bulgaria. Bulgaria is making an effort, a very successful effort to not get pulled into this conflict. Romania is doing

the exact opposite. I mean, under the leadership of, if you want to say the leadership of Dan, Nikasur Dan, Romania is actually making an effort to push itself into this conflict. And there are reports that a lot of weapons are moving through Romania. Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely. Except that that's going to become more and more difficult. But the barges on the Danube and the Nistre are very vulnerable, as I said. The Russians are now systematically attacking the railway system.

They're destroying locomotives and all of those things. You can ship quite a lot through barges. But barges are easy targets to attack because they're slow. And with the hot weather and the fact that the rivers and the canals are drying up, it's becoming more difficult to do that. And you're absolutely correct. And it's causing a stress on the Romanian economy. And it is making Romania itself more vulnerable.

The one point where I disagree with you is it's not the leadership of Dahan that is bringing you, Romania to this crisis. It is the leadership of Emmanuel Macron and Oslo von de Lyon, who decided that they were going to adjust Romania's electoral and electoral politics in the way that we all know. I was going to say the exact same thing. I mean, now we understand why it was so important to maneuver Joryescu out and to bring this guy in, because he'll obviously do whatever, Macaron and Ursula and then whoever else tells him to do. And it also tells us why Gorgiaska was so popular in the first place.

Because people in Romania are going to be perfectly aware of what is going on. And they didn't want to be involved in the way that they are being involved in this war. I doubt, by the way, that there is a huge amount of love for Russia in Romania. Romania and Russia have had tense relations. And this has been true at, you know, many, many levels within Romanian society. And there are historical reasons for this, which we don't need to discuss at great length in this program. But the point is they did not want to be drawn into this war. Yeah.

Whatever the tensions are between Romania and Russia, their historic tensions, I have no doubt that the people of Romania don't want any part of this conflict. Yes. By the way, I'm going to say something else. I think the same is true of the people of Turkey. One of the great changes. I was going to say this as well. But yeah, I mean, look at Radev in Bulgaria and how he's handling things, which is the correct approach and then look at Romania.

And you can see that Romania is heading down a very dark and dangerous path. But my question on Turkey, and I agree with you, I think the citizens of Turkey don't want any part of this conflict. I'm wondering if this is in a strange way. the way everything has lined up beneficial to the globalists, to the EU, to the United States, the neocons, that Turkey is now inserting itself into this conflict via the Black Sea. Well, maybe they're looking at this and saying, well, this kind of worked out because maybe if Turkey starts going up against Russia, that can save Ukraine or provide some,

some breathing space for Ukraine. Another headache for Russia if we push Turkey to get into some sort of a conflict, even a non-military conflict with Russia? I am absolutely sure that they are saying that to each other. I mean, they never liked the fact that Turkey and Russia got so close to each other. And they don't like Erdogan either. They do not like Erdogan. D.C., the Neocans, they also hate Erdogan.

Absolutely. Absolutely. What I would say is that, you know, creating a split, a real lasting split between Turkey and Russia plays absolutely to their advantage. But it would not make up for the loss of Odessa if it comes. Adessa is a key strategic port. If Odessa falls back under Russian control and again, I mean, the Russian general staff, as I said many times, not share his plans with us. I mean, you know, they're not going to tell us what they're intending to do. But if the Russians reestablish themselves on the Black Sea, if all of these places, not just Adessa, Nikolaev, Ismail, all of these other places, come back under Russian control, as they were before 1991, then this is a major shift in the balance of power. In the Black Sea, ultimately the Mediterranean, and in the United States.

and in eastern and central Europe as well. I mean, this would be a decisive shift. And, of course, it would completely change the situation in the wider conflict in Ukraine as well. I mean, Ukraine would not just be a landlot country in the sense that it already is, because he can't trade in maritime terms. It would become obviously and permanently a landlop. country, beyond any hope of a diplomatic resolution which might reopen the ports, at which point, of course, Ukraine's own prospects as a pro-Western independent state become incredibly bleak.

So, yes, creating a conflict between Turkey and Russia would be excellent for the globalists, but losing Odessa and the Black Sea, the Black Sea coast would be a disaster. It would be devastating for Turkey. It would be devastating for Turkey. And of course, you would have a landlocked Rump State Ukraine, which is probably where we're heading towards anyway. Is this a problem for Turkey, or is this a problem for NATO and the collective West? I mean, Russia reestablishing their presence on the Black Sea. They have Crimea.

They have the Sea of Azov, Mariupil. So they extend to Odessa. They extend all the way to Transnistria. Yes. Which is probably where we're heading with this. Absolutely. Right? Is that really such a big problem for Turkey?

I mean, it is. Turkey can say, okay, we used to have a weak Ukraine. And a little bit of Russia. Now we have a strong Russia right on top of us. But we get along, but we get along. I mean, on certain levels, there's tension between Erdogan and Putin, understood. There's a history understood. But we get along to a certain extent.

We have tourism. We have many Russians visiting Turkey. We have our construction companies in Russia. We do have many shared economic infrastructure interests. Is this really a problem for Turkey? Is it not something that Turkey and Russia would be able to sit down and figure out? It seems to me that this is more of a problem for NATO, for Europe, for the U.S., the fact that Turkey is in NATO, and the fact that Turkey is one of the U.S. is main allies next to Israel.

I would say that Turkey is the second most important ally, strategic ally of the United States. That's what I would say. First is Israel, then is Turkey. But anyway, I mean, it doesn't seem like this would be a huge problem for Turkey, but a much bigger problem and a concern more for NATO and for the collective West having Russia on the Black Sea in such a way. You ask an absolutely excellent question. Why would the Russian capture of Adessa be a crisis for Turkey? Of course, if you are Erdogan and you run a number, neo-Ottoman foreign policy and you want to position Turkey as a rising great power and one day as a superpower, something which to be absolutely clear is far beyond Turkey's current strength. Well, then of course, it is a disaster because realistically, if the Russians are in control of the Black Sea,

which they would be, I mean, they'd be again the dominant military power in the Black Sea. then your ideas of establishing Turkey in that way as, you know, the neo-Ottoman superpower are going to turn to dust. But is it actually in Turkey's long-term interests to try to pursue that kind of objective? Isn't it already beyond Turkey's reach to do that? Isn't it involving Turkey in all kinds of problems in all sorts of places. Syria, where again, there's been more reports that Jalani just survived a coup attempt and that the situation for Turkey there is very brittle. Isn't it far better for Turkey to have a stable partner on the northern coast of the Black Sea than to have weak countries along the Black Sea, with the Americans and NATO playing all sorts of complex

games there, which result in a war. What ultimately does Turkey lose if the Russians gain control of Adessa? It's, again, a geopolitical fantasy, but it's one I think that Erdogan himself believes in and which some members of his inner circle do. The one of the one, a Turkish public, I don't think they care. From their point of view, the relationship with Russia has worked. Well, at the nuclear power stations, the people who run the hotels in Antalya and indeed on the Black Sea are very happy to get the Russian tourists. The small business people who have various dealings, selling agricultural products and some industrial products, and consumer goods to Russia, they do very well too.

The people who run the big construction companies that have had business in Russia, they also did perfectly well. Why should they care if the Russians ultimately get to Odessa? It's not as if the Russians any longer have plans as they did in the 19th century, or at least some Russians did in the 19th century. to advance all the way to Istanbul. I mean, this is not part of Russia's agenda anymore. So objectively, practically, for Turkey, it makes absolutely no difference.

It doesn't undermine their security, one jot if this happens. But as I said, Erdogan is unlikely to think about this in quite these terms, because he has, as I said, these are alternative fantasies of Turkey becoming, again, this great power, one day, something which is well beyond its reach, which is getting Turkey into problems, and which is causing major stresses within the Turkish economy, which partly explain its persistent current account deficit, and it's very high inflation problem. Just a final thought, perhaps there are some people in Turkey, Erdogan, without a doubt, and his inner circle, which will argue that losing our dominance in the Black Sea will then

make us less important to NATO or to the United States. Because the big importance of Turkey, let's say, to the United States, why I would argue that Turkey is one of the most important allies of the United States. It's because of the geography. Yeah. Right. And so if they lose that dominance in the Black Sea or have to share power of the Black Sea with Russia, they may say, well, you know, we're going to drop a couple of notches in the eyes of the United

States as far as geographical importance. And that can lead to loss of money, investment. I mean, you know, military, military support, all these things. Well, absolutely. And again, I'm sure Oderwan thinks that because, again, he measures Turkey's attractiveness in terms of what he sees as its geopolitical weight. But you could make exactly the opposite argument as well. You could say that if the Russians establish themselves as the dominant power in the Black Sea, NATO needs Turkey even more.

True. Because that as well. Yeah. I mean, you know, this is, this is, it becomes even even more vital ally in that case. And control of the, Turkish control of the Dardanelles of the Straits becomes still more important. Because if the Black Sea becomes a Russian lake in the same way that the Caspian Sea is a Russian lake, it is already becoming a Russian lake, by the way. I mean, Russians already have military dominance over the Black Sea. We can see that now.

but if the Black Sea becomes an uncontested Russian lake, then it becomes even more important that you have the Turks preventing the Russians from being able to send their fleet unresticted into the Eastern Mediterranean. A Turkey that aligns with Russia, opens the Dardanelles to Russian warships, changes the entire military balance potentially in the eastern Mediterranean. because the Russians can then build up their Black Sea fleet, send their forces through the Dardanelles into the Eastern Mediterranean,

challenge the US-6 fleet there, and potentially because they have the advantage of proximity, extend their influence all the way to Italy, to the central Mediterranean to the Italian coast. Turkey in NATO, an ally of the United States, States prevents that happen. Yeah. True. It might actually work in Erdogan's favor. To his benefit, he'll have more bargaining power and more leverage vis-a-vis the U.S. and NATO, which he likes, he likes that stuff. He likes that stuff. So you can say, look, I need, you know, what do I need now?

I need, you know, I need F-35s. Because without F-35s, you can't really expect me to hold back the Russians. I need to balance Russia, yeah. I need to contain Russia and balance Russia now, yeah. Exactly. Yeah. And Erdogan knows how to play those games better than anybody. Absolutely. And that, in my opinion, is the, is the real, is the wiser policy, actually. All right.

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