The Duran Podcast - Russia, Iran and divisions in the White House

Episode Date: April 19, 2025

Russia, Iran and divisions in the White House

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the divisions in the Trump White House, something that we have been talking about for more than a month, actually, the possible divisions in the Trump administration. At the time when we reported on this, we weren't 100% certain about the divisions. We analyzed that there were two factions. that were emerging in the Trump administration, there was this neocon, new neocon, or neocon-lite type of faction, whatever you want to call it. On one side, consisting of definitely of Kellogg and his unconditional ceasefire plan, and Waltz, definitely supporting Kellogg and Rubio as well. And on the other side was Whitkoff, Vance, possibly Gabbert. At the time when we were reporting this, I believe Gabard was just about to enter as DNI. And she was definitely in the way we saw.

She was definitely on the Whitkoff side of things, which is negotiating with Russia, perhaps agreeing to Istanbul plus the June 20, 2014. terms that Putin laid out. And so we talked about these divisions. It needs to be said that Rubio has been floating between the two groups, it seems, to be fair to Rubio. He has talked about the multipolar world. He has talked about the inevitability of the multipolar world on one side of things, but he's also been siding with Kellogg and Waltz. And he's definitely got the the neo-Kan tendencies, at least when you look at his past as a U.S. Senator. So the Wall Street Journal, many other collective West publications, they are now openly

Reuters. They're now openly talking about this division in the Trump administration. And it's not only connected to Project Ukraine and Russia, it's actually also connected in a way to Iran as well, as the New York Times has revealed. So, Alexander, we have this division in the White House. What are your thoughts? Yeah. To simplify, I'm going to say, we can talk, we can call the Rubio-Waltz-Callob group. I'm going to call them the neocons, because though I think they are neocon light.

I do think they're, you know, full, hard neocons. John McCain type. John McCain-type. John Newland type. Victoria Newlin, John McCain. I mean, I think that. They're significantly more connected to reality than that. I think nonetheless, they share enough of the outlook and thinking of the neocons,

that we can call them that, you know, as in a shorthand in this program. And I'm going to call the other side, Whitgolf, and the people who support them. I'm going to call them the realists. I think that's the simplest way to describe them. So I think there is this division. I think it is there through all, through every part of US foreign policy. The neocons, very, very reluctant to make any significant concessions. At some level, they understand the project Ukraine has failed.

They understand that the United States needs to disengage. I think this is probably true. But they can't make the break that is needed in order to make. that disengagement effective. They can't accept, for example, that the Russians are going to get all the five regions, Crimea, Donets, Lugansk, Zaporozhier, and Herson. This is something that they ball cap. They ballcat a long-term commitment to keep Ukraine outside NATO. They're very reluctant to accept these things. They are very unhappy about concessions to Iran. They still want to pursue the neocom policy of not just getting Iran to basically stop its nuclear program and doing various deals, not just with Iran, but with other countries to try to stabilize the situation with Iran, give Iran certain guarantees in return for Iran giving up its enriched uranium and all of those things.

But they want to extend it. They want to stop Iran having ballistic missiles. They want Iran to stop support for Hezbollah and the Houthis. They're even trying, it seems, to involve the United States in some kind of a war in Yemen, which seems to me a disastrous idea. And with China, obviously, they are deeply hostile to China. On the other side, there are the realists. And this is Witgolf.

Whitkoff has now had meetings, three meetings with Putin. He has come away with an understanding that the Russians are not going to shift from Istanbul Plus. Lavrov gave a very interesting interview to a Russian newspaper, important Russian newspaper, Commerzant, in which he said Istanbul plus is not a negotiating news. position. Chaya is an important message that the Russians are not there to negotiate about the fundamentals of Istanbul Plus. So Witkoff has come and told Trump, if we want to do a deal with the Russians, we have to accept Istanbul Plus. And I think there are, and it's clear that there are people within the administration, Vance, probably, Gabbard, probably, who are backing him.

And he's had apparently a productive meeting with the Iranians in Oman, and he even met afterwards with the Iranian foreign minister briefly, and he's come back to Trump, to tell Trump, look, there is a potential deal that can be done that. And in the middle of all of this is Trump himself, and one sense is that he's sometimes pulled in one direction. Sometimes he's pulled in the other direction. We've learned from the Wall Street Journal that Rubio and Kellogg have been telling him, you must take a tougher line on Russia. It's unclear how they think this line on Russia can be made tougher. What exactly they're proposing that the US should do, which it hasn't already done to put preference.

on the Russians, but anyway, that's what they're saying. But it looks as if Trump himself on Ukraine specifically is starting to accept the logic of Wikov's position. So he's been making comments about Zelensky, which, to put it mildly, are unflattering. He's been talking about, you know, the whole Ukraine conflict, how Ukraine took on an adversary 20 times more powerful than itself. And going around and scrounging around the place, the world for more missiles is, you know, a ridiculous thing to do if you haven't thought through in advance how you can find yourself in such a war.

He's said no to any proposal of coming from Ukraine to buy more patriot missiles from the United States. The reports are that American military aid to Ukraine is now dwindling and will soon come to a stop. And it looks as if Trump is not prepared to exercise. He's drawn down authority to send more aid and supplies to Ukraine. And absolutely, he doesn't look as if he's interested in going to Congress either and obtaining a further appropriation. So I get the sense that gradually slowly, as Trump does, though with Trump, he initially moves slowly and then he makes the decision

and then he tends to move very fast. But gradually, I think he's coming round to Whitgolf's perspective on Ukraine. And I think that we are probably definitely now in the last weeks, the last months of direct American involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. And we're getting more reports that American troops are being pulled out of Europe. We're getting reports that the, you know, the Wiesbaden Centre is being closed down. Pete Hegsseth didn't attend a lost a Rammstein meeting in person. He was there on a sort of, he was, he was there virtually, you know, some kind of a hookup, but obviously he wasn't there in person. There's no sign that Zelensky's coming to Washington again. And the Trump,

people are saying that Trump has no intention of going to Ukraine. So it looks to me as if, at least on Ukraine, Trump is gradually coming round to Whitgolf's thinking. Perhaps even with Iran, if you go by the New York Times reporting, which is that Israel, they presented the Trump administration with a plan to bomb Iran, to bomb the nuclear facilities of Iran. And Trump, along with Gabbard, Vance, and HECSeth. Yes. And even Waltz. It said even Waltz was not so hot on the idea.

They decided to engage in diplomacy instead. So that was an interesting report from the New York Times as well. It was. So again with Trump, just to repeat a point we made on a recent program, he tends to go through various stages before reaching the point. of decision, but certainly with Russia and Ukraine, I think he's reaching that point where he's going to embrace Istanbul Plus. There has been a very bitter comment by the French Prime Minister, who says that Trump is putting pressure on Ukraine to accept the demands of the aggressor. A horrible statement, by the way, really nasty statement from the French. But, you know,

I suspect that that is what's going to happen. I think that Trump is going to say, say, enough's enough. We've done all we can. We've gone through all of the efforts to try and negotiate a peace. Ukraine hasn't abided by the energy truce, which is indisputably the case. And let's go ahead and secure our deals and our rapprochement with Russia. And the Russians have an awful lot to offer us on all kinds of fronts. They can help us with the Middle East. They can help us with Iran. Apparently, the Russians have been. offering various types of economic cooperation. Let's go ahead with that. Let's have the meeting with Putin. Let's put aside this disastrous project, which has been this catastrophic failure.

It was Joe Biden's war. It wasn't mine. He's gone out of his way now, repeatedly to say that. And it is true, by the way. And it seems to me, I'm being a bit, I'm being a bit, I'm being perhaps positive here, but you know, I sense that this is the direction that things are going. I suspect that sometime around May, June, we will have a final decision and we will see things move forward and probably there will be finally that meeting, that summit meeting between Putin and Trump, most probably in Saudi Arabia. Apparently the Saudis are very keen to see. see an American-Russian rapprochement happen because they want the Americans to lift restrictions on the oil market, you know, the cap on sales of Russian oil and all of those sort of

things. So the Saudis are keen to host this meeting. I think the meeting probably will happen in Saudi and, well, the Europeans will be left hanging. The Ukrainians will be left hanging. I think that's the trajectory to which we're going. And probably, I'm guessing, Kellogg will at that point leave the administration because his purpose will have gone and his plan will have been rejected. Yeah. Even with Iran, the reports are that Russia could play some sort of part in a future Iran deal, perhaps with monitoring the enrichment or something along those lines.

As we reported, as you noted about three weeks ago, that this is a possibility. And sure enough, we are getting reports that there could be some sort of Russia component in a final deal. But anyway, that's one thing that was interesting that stood out with the Iran side of things. Any comments on that? And then I'll ask you a question on Russia. The Russians have now said this again. There have been further comments from the Russian diplomats saying that Russia is absolutely willing to help facilitate an understanding between the United States and Iran.

That they're prepared to do whatever they reasonably can to make it happen. So they are saying this publicly. They're saying something else as well. You have to now go to, you know, more deeply into the commentaries that the Russians are making about this. They're saying that it was Trump who first brought up this idea when he contacted Putin over the course of their first telephone conversation. It was Trump who's asked Putin, can you help us with Iran? And Putin said, absolutely. Yes, we can.

And apparently the Russians have been in contact with the Iranians, and the Iranians are open to this. Putin's had apparently extensive contacts with Pezishkan, who is the Iranian president. Apparently he mostly talks with Pezishkan, not with Khomey. But anyway, it does look as if this idea of a Russian involvement in the rapprochement or at least not reprossement, the relaxation of tensions between Iran and the United States is firmly on the table. So we could see, perhaps by the end of the summer, outlined deals being done over Iran, between Iran and the United States, the Israelis won't be happy, some of the neocons in the

United States won't be happy. I think most people will be greatly relieved. And I think the mood in the Middle East will start to improve if there is that deal done between the US and Iran. With Ukraine, I don't think there is going to be that kind of deal. I think the idea of a Ukrainian settlement is really off the table. I don't think Zelensky is going to accept any of the proposals that Trump has been floating and certainly not the proposals that Putin has been floating.

He didn't want to agree to the ceasefire. If you remember, the Americans had to put enormous pressure on the Ukrainians in Jeddah to get them to agree to a 30-day ceasefire, which was never really a viable option. They've not abided by the energy truce. Zelensky continues to insist on all of the demands that he's always made. Ukraine must have unlimited rights to join NATO, to join the EU. It must eventually regain control of its territories. The only thing he's been prepared to concede is that as a technical matter,

Ukraine can't regain control of its territories immediately. It might have to wait for some kind of process in order to do that. I don't think Zelensky is ever going to shift from that position. He's got the Europeans behind him. The war in Ukraine is going to go on, but the United States doesn't have to be involved in it. Yeah, it's even worse than that with Zelensky. He's like lashing out at Whitkoff, at Vance, like openly mocking them. I mean, you know, the vice president of the United States and Trump's envoy, as well as, from what I understand, Trump's very good friend.

And Zelensky is mocking these guys. So, I mean, you know, Zelensky, it seems to be as if Zelensky has pretty much decided that he doesn't need. No. Trump. He doesn't like Trump. He doesn't need him. And he feels very secure with Macaron and Stamer and Mertz. At least that's how it looks.

What do you make of the reporting that, I believe it's from Bloomberg, that the Trump administration is talking about a minerals deal where they, will ask for $100 billion in back pay from Ukraine. Instead of $300 billion, they've lowered it to $100 billion, but all the other terms have not changed. So control of Ukraine's resources and perpetuity. All of that hasn't changed, but they're just asking for less money in back pay from Ukraine. It does look like Ukraine is balking at that as well. They consider that whatever money was given to them was not given to them in the form of a loan. He was given to them in the form of gift. There might be some truth to that.

Biden did seem to just give this money away to Zelensky. But that's the one story that I would like you to comment on. And how about the build reporting? This is coming from the German publication, Build, which claims that Zelensky offered the Trump administration $50 billion to purchase Patriot Systems, Patriot Missiles and Patriot Systems, and the Trump administration rejected that offer. which to me signals that we finally broken free of the sunk cost fallacy when it comes to investing in Project Ukraine. At least that's how it looks. If you believe the bill reporting, and if you

believe the Bloomberg reporting, what are your thoughts on those two stories? Well, let's start with the Bloomberg report. I don't think it makes any difference, actually, because contrary to what many people think, the, I haven't seen the text of the mineral rights extraction deal that apparently the Americans have proposed. But it doesn't seem to be linked to any specific figure of American aid to Ukraine. Now, there's been many different figures that have been thrown around about the amount of money that the United States has spent on Ukraine over the last couple of years. Trump spoke about $350 billion. A lot of people then did the sums and came up with different figures, some 40.

it has lower $65 billion. Others said around $100 billion. The point is the Ukrainians cannot pay back whatever the amount actually is. They don't have the resources to pay those back. I think all that has happened is that the Americans meeting the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians say, well, we didn't actually receive $350 billion from you. We only received $100 billion. And the American said, fine. You know, if you want to insist on that, fine, but you still have to sign the mineral rights extraction deal, which gives the United States essentially, well, not essentially, it does give the United States indefinite rights to extract resources from Ukraine on an absolutely massive scale, which, given that it's indefinite, would very quickly, well, would in theory,

go well beyond the $100 billion that the United States is supposed to have given to Ukraine. I get it quickly, by the way, on this point, say my own thing, which is that like Dr. Jack Rasmus, I've looked at these numbers. I think $350 billion, if you look at the totality of aid that the United States has been giving to UK, Ukraine since at least the 2014 crisis is probably much closer to the truth. We're not talking about just Biden aid, we're talking about Obama raid, aid during Trump 1, which of course Trump perhaps doesn't really want to talk about too much. But I think it is at least $350 billion. And aid that's gone through all the various different agencies that have been going

into Ukraine. The problem is there might be some difficulty getting proper accounts for all these numbers, but I certainly think it's an awful lot more than $100 billion. But ultimately, it makes, in terms of the mineral rights extraction deal, it makes no difference. It doesn't matter. That's a feature, not a bug, by the way, Alexander. Not being able to account for all of the the money, right? That's not by accident. That's not by accident. That is absolutely. That's totally true. So that's that. Now, sorry, can you remind me the second?

The $50 billion. The $50 billion build story, if it's true. First of all, I do think it's true because Zelensky actually publicly said that he wanted to buy 10 Patriot missile batteries and was prepared to pay $50 billion to buy them. With whose money? I mean, Ukraine doesn't have $50 billion. Is it supposed to come from Europe? Is it supposed to come from the United States?

Is it credit, which is going to be added on top of this $100 billion that we're talking about? Trump and the administration quite rightly said no. And you're absolutely right. It is finally making the only logical principle. proper business decision, which is to put the sunk cost fallacy, and it is a fallacy, to one side and say, enough's enough, you know, you cut your losses and you move on. Because that $50 billion is just more money thrown into the black hole. What would happen is that the United States would supply the missiles and it wouldn't get money because Ukraine doesn't have any money.

And the European Union, as we know, is going to struggle to raise that money, and they probably won't want to provide it anyway. And American taxpayers aren't going to be happy if the United States gives all these missiles on credit, which is ultimately what would have to happen. And Russia would destroy the missiles. Russia would destroy the missiles anyway, and the missiles are needed in other places. So I think this is finally the end point to this thing. And about time is all I can say. All right. We will end the video there at the durand.com.

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