The Duran Podcast - Russia ironclad guarantees. Ukraine federalization?

Episode Date: March 17, 2025

Russia ironclad guarantees. Ukraine federalization?

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation between the United States and Russia. Trump on Air Force One mentioned that he will be speaking with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday. And just before recording this video, we got the confirmation that Putin from the Kremlin, that Putin will indeed be speaking to Trump. So what's going on here? We are getting close to a ceasefire or not? Trump mentioned two interesting things on Air Force One. He talked about territory and he talked about the nuclear power plant, Zapadoza, is what he's referring to. What do you make of these statements and what do you make of these phone calls?

It's extremely interesting because, of course, what it suggests is that we've moved away from discussions about ceasefires towards the far more substantive questions about how. to settle the conflict, which is, of course, exactly what the Russians have been saying, needs to be discussed and needs to be discussed in order for a ceasefire to be effective. So I think let's not focus too narrowly on the exact points that Trump is making about the Zaporosia nuclear power plant. The very fact that he's talking about territory, the very fact that he is talking about the Zaporosia nuclear power plant, that he and Putin are going to be moving towards a discussion about the overall settlement of the conflict, a framework agreement. And, and this is extremely important, this is taking

place in direct discussions between the President of the United States and the President of Russia. Ukraine itself is not directly talking about this to the Russians anymore. So this is actually quite an important revelation. It suggests, as I said, that we've moved beyond the technical discussions about a ceasefire. And I'm going to make a guess here, because it is a guess, but I think it's an informed guess, that the whole ceasefire issue, the whole topic of the ceasefire. was brought up, firstly, to get the Ukrainians, to make the Ukrainians understand that there have to be discussions about peace, and also to see whether the Russians were interested in talking

about peace as well, about a settlement of the conflict as well. Now that both sides, in their very completely contrasting ways, the Ukrainians agreeing to the ceasefire unconditionally, which is absurd, by the way, and the Russians raising very serious issues about the ceasefire, but again, indicating that they are open to negotiation with the Americans. Now that's all been established, Trump and his people are moving on to discussing the substantive issues. Well, if you're Ukraine, you would want unconditional ceasefire because you're getting crushed in the front of the front lines. So absolutely, you want the conflict. to stop so that you can gather your bearings and rearm and rebuild fortifications or

retreat to wherever you need to retreat to. So I mean, that makes sense that they would, that they would go for the unconditional. Europe is also calling for an unconditional agreement to the 30-day ceasefire. The question that I have is, and by the way, Wittkoff also talked about the the ZNPP in interviews that he gave to the Sunday TV shows in the United States. He also talked about the Black Sea ports as well, which was interesting. But what are we looking at here as far as where each side is in terms of what they're going to be asking for? or what concessions each side is going to make. Because we have a negotiation now taking place

between the United States and Russia, which also makes sense because this is a proxy war between the United States and Russia. So you have the two sides negotiating. Is the United States looking at Istanbul as their starting point and perhaps they'll make concessions towards Russia

but always starting off of Istanbul. When I talk about Istanbul, I'm talking about the March 22 agreement, which Boris Johnson sabotaged. And is Russia talking about root causes June 2024 Istanbul plus? I mean, one side is looking at 2022 March Istanbul. The other side is saying Istanbul plus root causes June 2024. And are they going to meet in the middle? Is one side going to move closer in the direction of the other side?

Is this how you're seeing it? Or are we talking about something totally different? We do have some agreements. Before you answer, we have an agreement on no entry to NATO. I believe that's been agreed. I think they're on the same page as far as Zelenskyy has to go. And you could say that they've agreed on the ceasefire. or at least they got Ukraine to agree that a ceasefire is needed something that they would not agree to over the past three years.

So, anyway, what are your thoughts there? Right. I think the first thing to say is that there has never been in history, as far as I'm aware, an unconditional ceasefire. I mean, the idea that you just have a ceasefire, that each side somehow stops fighting and that it all ends there. Well, I mean, things like that have happened. people have talked about that in the past. But whenever a ceasefire of that kind is ever established, it breaks down almost immediately. Because in order for there to be a ceasefire,

there have to be exactly, as Putin said, all kinds of mechanisms in place to make it work. So there's been across the media, especially in Europe, some kind of, you know, reaction, you know, what Starrma said, that Putin is playing games. He's raising all these complex issues. He's really spinning and playing for time and all of that. And there may be some truth in that. Maybe Putin is playing for time. I mean, we discussed previously. We said that in fact, Putin is actually rejecting this proposal for an immediate ceasefire, the way it was set out in Jeddah. And that's absolutely right. He's raising all of these issues. But the key thing to say is that whatever you see as his motives, These are valid issues, which if there's going to be a ceasefire, have to be worked out as well. Now, the Russians are repeatedly saying that any ceasefire must lead immediately to, or very quickly, to a peace settlement.

And I've seen absolutely no sign that the Russians up to this time are moving from Istanbul Plus, what I call Istanbul Plus, what we call Istanbul Plus, what we call Istanbul Plus, which is the formula that Putin set out in his speech to the Russian foreign ministry in June 2024. Now, the Americans, Wikov, have said that they do accept Istanbul as the original framework. And clearly, they are talking about Istanbul 2020. And that's the difference. That is the gap. I think the Americans understand that they're going to have to shift from that position. And how far they're prepared to go is really the only question now that as far as I can see remains between the Americans and the Russians. Between the Russians and the Americans and the Ukrainians, it is an entirely different matter. Because since that meeting, it's a lot of, in Jeddah, the Ukrainians have walked back practically everything that they seem to agree with the Americans in Jeddah. They're still insisting on NATO membership. They're still insisting on EU membership. Interesting that that is now at issue. They are still talking about their right

to have armed forces as big as they want and to be rearmed and all of those things. There's no sign that on any of the substantive issues, Ukraine at the moment is ready to make any substantive concessions at all. And unless it is, and unless it does, then there cannot be peace, or so it seems to me, because the Russians have said there has to be clear indications that we're going to be moving towards a peace settlement. And if the Ukrainians dig in, then they cannot be peace. So it's up to the Americans, probably, before long, to put the squeeze on the Ukrainians again. Now, I just wanted to say something. Talking about Zaporouji nuclear power plant, obviously it's the Ukrainians who are bringing that up. Talking about the Black

Sea ports, which ports, presumably that means Odessa. Adessa. So it means. It means. that the topic of Addessa is being brought up in the discussions. So the assumption must be that it's the Russians who are bringing it out. Now, when Lavrov spoke to Larry Johnson and the other bloggers, the other American bloggers, a couple of days ago, I noticed that he was talking a lot about federalization again. This is a idea. that was being floated and talked about back in 2014, directly after the Maidan coup. It was actually first floated by Angela Merkel, a fact that nobody talks about today. Lavrov and the US Secretary of State of that time.

Kerry actually met. They issued a declaration in which this basically endorsed federalization. Federalization would be a mechanism for giving Odessa autonomy within Ukraine and maybe the other Black Sea ports as well. Maybe that's where we're going to, where the Russians are thinking. So, yes, it looks as if they are talking about territory and the substantive issues as well. And the Americans are moving towards a final settlement with the Russians as quickly as they can. We talked about federalization in a few videos that we made. about a year ago.

Absolutely. Actually, one video that we made about three months ago, four months ago, and then a video that we recorded a year ago as probably the ideal solution for Ukraine, given how Ukraine has been pieced together over the many decades, that federalization could probably be the solution, especially when you're dealing with not only about Odessa, but when you're dealing with the west of Ukraine. So, I mean, that makes sense, federalization. I think that makes a lot of sense.

But do you remember the Istanbul agreements? What was so different between Istanbul 2022 and root causes Istanbul plus June 2024? They discussed demilitarization in March of 2022. And they were far apart, but I remember Putin saying that that would be something they would be able to solve the demilitarization. I'm not sure what they said about the denazification. or if they had anything in the Istanbul, 2022 agreement about that. But I remember they talked about Crimea, that that would be discussed later, and they discussed the territories of Donets and Lukansk at the time.

Do you remember what were the key differences between, say, 22? What was actually initialed in 2022? And then Putin's terms in June 2024. Obviously, the four territories are the big difference. difference. The four territories are the key. I mean, that is the biggest change because the Russians have advanced far beyond the lines that had been, that existed in April 2020. I mean, they now control nearly all of Lugansk. I think there's a couple of hundred meters, square meters of territory in Lugans still to take. They now control around 70% of Darnetsk,

including they have access to most of the main roads. And by the way, I'm absolutely sure convinced that they will insist on the whole of Donets being pulled under Russian control. They've established and secured the land bridge to Crimea, which they're not going to walk back on. I don't myself believe they're going to give up any millimeter of territory in the four regions at all. So that is a fundamental difference. But in all other respects, in many other respects, Istanbul, the original Istanbul agreement went a lot further from what I know. Of course, you've never been published, but there were extensive reports about it then, and there's been information provided about it since. First of all, the were disagreements about the size of the Ukrainian army in 2022, and these needed to be resolved.

But what people, I think, don't remember or recall about that is that Ukraine nonetheless did agree that the Ukrainian army would be significantly reduced in size. So, I mean, they were further disagreements about the Russians wanted even greater reductions than those that the Ukrainians were asking for, were prepared to agree to. So there was a gap, but it was not as big a gap as people think. And there were also disagreements about the type of armaments that this remaining Ukrainian force would be allowed to have, whether the Ukrainians would be able to have long-range missiles, by which I don't mean, by the way, not very, not at Akams or anything like that, but whether they would be able to retain missiles, say of the kind of range that the

Haimars do. The Russians said, no, the Ukrainians wanted to keep some kind of a missile capability. But there was nonetheless, in principle, an agreement in Istanbul that the Ukrainian army would be significantly reduced in size. So I think that this is not as big a gap as people say. And again, there is a lot of rhetoric about how Istanbul did not agree any provisions for the denastification. But in fact, my understanding is that it did. And I've even seen some, you know, purported paragraphs of this agreement, which say that it did. So again, it's not quite as big a shift from Istanbul 2022 to Istanbul plus as people perhaps think there is. I mean, it's differences of degree rather than differences of principle.

nonetheless, I think the Russians will want to go well beyond Istanbul 2022. They will want the four regions. I don't myself think they're going to concede on that. They will want not just Ukraine to hold back and say that we're going to negotiate about this in 15 years' time, about the status of Crimea and Dombas and all of that. The Russians will want that. sorted and resolved now. And I think the Russians will hold out for actual formal recognition by Ukraine that these territories are in fact Russian. So that is, you know, one of the things that the

Russians will want to insist on now. I think they will probably want, I think they are already thinking about federalization for the rest of Ukraine. And federalization could go in different direction. by the way. I mean, if federalization happens and there is autonomy, well, what is to prevent, say, a desk are holding a referendum, which says that it wants to join Russian? Anyway, these are topics that may need to be talked about and people need to talk about what the nature of federalization, if that's what is going to happen, will be. And whether we're going to be looking at a loose confederation or something. But anyway, these are. I think there's a difference between federalization and confederalization.

Yes, exactly. But, you know, we've got to, I mean, this is no doubt something that can be ironed out over discussions. I don't think that's going to be a problem at this stage. But you're absolutely right. On the two key issues, Zelensky must go. I think the Americans and the Russians are in complete agreements. So there will need to be elections. and the Russians will want those elections to happen quite soon so that whoever the new leader of Ukraine is,

that person can sign the peace treaty because they clearly don't want Zelensky to sign it. And the Americans want Zelensky to go because they don't believe that he's really interested in peace. So that is one thing. And about NATO membership, they're also in agreement. But the Russians have been saying over the last couple of hours that they want actual concrete guarantees that there won't be NATO membership for Ukraine in the future. And it's not just enough for Donald Trump to say that, you know, he doesn't want NATO membership for Ukraine.

And this is an issue that's not open to discussion. Because the Americans are given those kind of promises in the past. and new administrations have come in and have reversed them. And the Russians are saying that they want that absolutely cast in iron. They need to have it secure. And that might be a difficult thing to agree. Well, how? I don't know how.

I mean, presumably through creating facts on the ground. And this is where federalization comes in. Because if you federalize Ukraine and it then has to be agreed, by all the regions of Ukraine and Odessa is one of those regions, then that gives a veto. And on the basis, on the assumption that Russia will then establish very close ties with the regional government in Odessa, that in effect gives Russia a veto. Just say. Yeah, federalization can also work for the West as well. You could have the West of Ukraine and say, you know what, we want to align more with Poles and more with whatever.

Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. We could go both. ways. Absolutely. Not that that would bother Russia, to be quite honest, actually. No, I think they'd be delighted. I think if Western Ukraine succeeded and either set itself up as an independent state, which I think more likely actually, or joined Poland or joined Poland in some kind of confederal structure, then the Russians would be extremely happy.

And they would probably say to themselves that if that starts to happen. and Ukraine starts to break up, whatever of Ukraine is left will not only drift closer to Russia, but might one day actually rejoin it. I mean, it's not impossible. But anyway, we mustn't get ahead of ourselves. But, I mean, there's a lot of work out here, and we'll see where it all goes. Does the issue of the European Union concern Russia? because maybe the European Union 10 years ago was not an issue as far as Ukraine joining.

During the Maidan, for example, if the deal was okay, you can know NATO, but you can join the EU back then. It wasn't so apparent that the European Union and NATO were pretty much one and the same. Now, I believe it's just accepted that the European Union and NATO are pretty much the same organization, two sides to the same coin. So, I mean, allowing Ukraine to enter the European Union would effectively be allowing Ukraine to have one foot into NATO, wouldn't it? So, I mean, Ukraine wants the European Union. Perhaps the United States will push Russia to say, look, as a concession, no NATO, but at least let them enter the European Union.

Would that be a big mistake for Russia to concede to that? Well, it would be a huge mistake, in my opinion. Now, you know, Putin made some comments about this a little while back, and they were actually very interesting, and people didn't read them correctly, in my opinion, because what he said was that, you know, if, you know, joining economic, it wasn't Putin, it was actually Pascoff, he spokesman, joining an economic association is the sovereign right of any country, and for that reason, on the assumption that the European Union is an economic association, Russia doesn't have any objection to it. But Beskoff also went on to say that Russia does have concerns

that would not apply if there were defensive defense and security issues that affected Russia. Now, not only is the EU now essentially the other side of NATO, but the EU is busy re-alping, or what he's saying it is. It's talking about, you know, floating wall bonds and setting up vast funds and all of that. So it looks as if putting aside the fact that the EU is the other side of NATO, part of the Euro-Atlantic system, as it calls itself. It's also starting to look like a military alliance in itself. So, you know, on that basis, I think Peskov's words are starting to to depart from the previous position that the Russians had back in April 2022 in Istanbul, that Ukraine should be free to join the EU, and Russia would even support its application.

They're now starting to put in caveats or nuances, if you prefer. They're starting to say, well, look, it can't be done because, you know, things with the EU have changed in exactly the way that you said? Now, the other point to say is, again, if we have federalization and Russian-speaking territories like Odessa, for example, have a right to vote on or to decide whether Ukraine as a whole can join the EU, then again, if you assume that Odessa will establish very close ties with Russia. That gives Russia a further veto over whether or not Ukraine does join the EU. So there is the federalization mechanism to think about as well. Final question. How does Russia sell this? How does Putin sell this to the Russians, to the

Russian people. Say there is a ceasefire agreement or some sort of a deal is worked out tomorrow or we have some sort of pathway to a deal. I don't know, whatever comes out of tomorrow's phone call. Say it looks as if we are heading towards some sort of negotiated settlement, some sort of ceasefire, maybe even with peacekeepers from China or India. I don't know. Whatever. Let's just say they agree to something. Istanbul. Plus, how does Russia sell this to their people, the Russian government? Here we are negotiating with the United States, a country that that waged a proxy war against us, that wanted to overthrow us, that wanted to break up the Russian Federation into different pieces. Here we are with a possible deal that may, oh, open up the lifting of sanctions and doing business once again with the Europeans, a block which is openly saying that they want to rearm in the next 10 years in order to go to war with us.

I mean, they're openly saying it. We're rearming so we can go to war with Russia. That is the purpose of the European Union now. That's their purpose. Nothing else. We're rearming to go to war with Russia. How do you deal with people like Macron? How do you deal with people like Stomber?

How do you deal with the United States? kingdom, which has been so aggressive with Russia. How do you deal with Zelensky, with Budanov, with Bedoliak, Yermak, the SBU? I mean, maybe I'm asking you a lot. No, you're not sure. I mean, you're asking these questions. Yeah, I'm just asking these questions because I don't know, how do you pitch this to the Russian people after everything that's been waged against them? Not over the past three years, but going all the way back to 2014, perhaps even going all the way to 2003? Yeah?

Well, this is going to be very difficult. And if Putin isn't extremely careful, it will certainly damage his authority because my own sense, and this is my own sense from Russia is that Russian society not only wants to see the war end, but I think this is a misconception many people have. When the Russians say they want to see the war end and they want to see it end on a negotiated basis, they want victory to come out of that negotiation. So I think he has an awful lot of credit with the Russian population, but he's going to be very careful not to draw on it too much.

People remember in Russia very well, Minsk 1 and Midsk 2, and they certainly don't want to see a Mince 3. A Russian official has just said that. So they will be expecting Putin to take a hard. line, at least to get a good deal for them. And if he doesn't, he will face political problems and, you know, challenges for the first time. So I think he probably understands that. And I don't myself get the sense that he anyway wants to go down this route of, you know, giving too much away to the Americans at this time. He made comments at the latest Security Council meeting,

which happened again, I think, on, I think either Friday or Saturday, on Thursday, actually, sorry, Thursday, Thursday, in which he spoke about how the US administration wants to improve relations, but it's going to be very complicated and very difficult. And we don't yet know whether all the damage that was done can be repaired. And then he asked for Lavrov and Naryshkin, he's foreign minister and his intelligence chief to brief him on where all of this is going. So my own sense is that he's taking a very, very cautious line. And his comments on Wednesday, he's talked at the press conference with Lukashenko, when he talked about, you know, the nuances about the ceasefire and the fact that it must lead to a negotiated solution which takes into account

the root causes. That doesn't suggest to me somebody at the moment who's thinking about making significant concessions or indeed concessions. When Lavrov again spoke to the American bloggers, he said that Russia is in no mood to make any concessions at all. Now, I assume that Lavrov is in regular contact with Putin, I'm sure he is. So I presume that Lavrov is expressing Putin's views, just saying. So I think that Putin understands very well what the sentiments in Russia are, which, as I said, I think, are much more hard line than many people assume, including, as I said, people that, you know, we know.

And I mean, this has been a war. Thousands of Russians have died in it. People in Russia will want to be confident that when it's ended, this has been ended once and for all, and it's ended in a victory. I think that that is the widespread sentiment inside Russia. I think Putin knows that. And I, anyway, don't get the sense that he's in any mood to soften his. position on these things. Why should he, after all, his army, as he pointed out on Wednesday,

is advancing and advancing steadily. He's won a major battle in Cusk region. There's still some things to do there, but I mean, I think it's down to one village, and there's probably quite a lot of Ukrainian troops trapped in Corsk as well. There are now other Russian advances taking place, elsewhere along the battle lines. There's been any number of articles now in the British media which say that further sanctions by the US are not going to change Putin's position and are going to backfire and will lead to more economic problems in the US itself. So I don't really see why he would feel under pressure to make concessions. He wants to deal with the Americans, and I've discussed this many times in many places. He wants, he would prefer

to have a deal with the Americans because as he said, in another speech, he go to the foreign ministry back in September 2021. He wants security on Russia's western borders so that Russia can focus on its own internal development without having to look over its shoulder all the time and worry about what's going to happen on its western borders. He sees in Trump a president which, with whom he might be able to do a deal, which will at least provide that security for four, eight, ten years, whatever, which is about as long as I think as anybody can realistically expect, and probably as long as Russia,

under Putin's calculations would need. So he wants to seize the moment in that respect. But I don't think he's going to make big concessions otherwise because he understands how ultimately uncertain the realities with the United States actually are. So he wants to end this conflict in Ukraine on a basis, he can take back to the Russian people and say, look, we have achieved this victory. All of your sacrifices have been worthwhile.

And at the same time, he wants an outcome in Ukraine that will be stable and which will last for at least four, ten, whatever it is years, so that Russia can focus on its own internal problems. All right. federalization, I mean, the more I listen to you, the only solution that could probably give Russia that is federalization of Ukraine. I mean, I don't know, obviously, I'm not involved in any of this stuff. I mean, but I can't think of another way that Russia is going to be able to have stability on its western borders, in Ukraine and on its western borders.

And even the federalization model, if that is being considered, of which Lavrov said, That's something that they're thinking about. It doesn't solve the problem of Europe. I mean, the United States changes administration in four years, so that's a problem. As you said, NATO could change its mind. It has in the past, so that's an issue. And then you have a Europe, which is openly stating that their purpose to exist is in order to go to war with Russia, nothing else.

Their only purpose right now is to go to war with Russia. So how do you deal with Europe? Do you just wait it out and allow them to allegedly, we don't know if they're going to be able to do this, to rearm and to prepare for a conflict with Russian 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, however long it takes. I mean, what do you do? I think the Russian calculation here is that if they can get what is from their point of view a good deal with the Americans, even if it is relatively temporary. And, you know, again, I want to stress this, whatever deal is done with Trump, it will survive presumably through Trump's presidency. But even if Trump is replaced, succeeded by somebody who thinks like him, a J.D. Vance, for example, that doesn't mean that longer term relations with the United States for Russia will, you know, be stable. But if the Russians can do a deal with the Americans, then however hostile the Europeans continue to be, the Americans and the Europeans will have been split and the Russians can handle the Europeans.

I think that is probably what the calculation is in Moscow. But they do see this implacable hostility towards them in Europe. They do see how there are attempts right across Eastern Europe at the moment to organize color revolutions against leaders who are either friendly to Russia or at least, you know, neutral towards Russia. Protests in Serbia, protests in Hungary, protests in other places as well. So, I mean, they see all that. They watch all that. But as I said, they think if they can split the Americans with the Europeans over this, if they can do a deal with the Americans, then the Europeans might not be completely

uted, but they will be significantly weakened and that the Russians can deal with them by themselves, as they have always been able to do in historical time. But having said that, you know, even that isn't certain. and there are for the Russian significant risks in all of this. But bear in mind something else. If the Russians pursue a military solution, and my own view, by the way, is that Ukraine is much closer to military breakdown

than people are saying. We've seen the collapse in Korsk, which is astonishing. There are now reports elsewhere along the front lines that the Russians are moving again. Don't get into too much detail. We were going to do a separate video. We're going to do a separate video. Exactly.

But even if Ukraine were to collapse and the Russians were to advance all the way to Ukraine's western borders, that wouldn't solve the problem that you've just identified because you'd still have hostile Europe to deal with. So, you know, you still have to think this through. and it is an intractable and difficult problem for the Russians. And by the way, one they have faced throughout their history. It's not a new problem. I mean, every so often, every couple of decades, a European coalition is formed,

whose mission is to defeat Russia. We had that with Napoleon. We had that with the British and the French in the Crimean War. We had that in the First World War. We had that in the Second World War, and we're seeing it again now. So the Russians had this problem with the Europeans, which never goes away. All they can do is manage it. All right.

We will end it there. The durand.com. We are on Rumble Odyssey, but you tell the grandbracfinitex. Go to the Duran shop. Pick up some merch like what we are wearing in this video. Update. The link is in the description box down below. Take care.