The Duran Podcast - Russia-US talks. Putin's Odessa plan

Episode Date: March 24, 2025

Russia-US talks. Putin's Odessa plan

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the negotiations that are taking place in Riyadh, the negotiations that finished between the United States and Ukraine. I don't know if you can call them negotiations. You may want to talk about the talks that occurred between the United States and Ukraine and the real negotiations that are taking place between the United States and Russia. What are your thoughts on the diplomacy that is happening right now? in Saudi Arabia. It is extremely interesting. I mean, it's a point which I made in my program yesterday, which is that the negotiating team that the Ukrainian sent to Riyadh was, on the face of it, a very, very powerful one. It's headed by their defense minister. There are some close aids of Zelensky himself. There are apparently lots of military officers coming.

joining the meeting. And they came to Riyadh for what was supposed to be a meeting between experts, American and Russian experts, to discuss the revival of the grain plan in the Black Sea. So clearly what the Ukrainians were trying to do is that they were trying to shift the negotiations, to discussions to a completely different footing. I mean, you don't just send your defence minister, a whole pile of people like that, to discuss technical issues. You're trying to renegotiate, essentially,

what Putin and Trump agreed with each other over the course of their recent telephone call. And it's quite clear what the Ukrainian agenda is. They want to move from this very limited ceasefire that we have at the moment, which is unsatisfactory to them, this, you know, a ceasefire which places a hold on attacks on the respective energy systems for 30 days. They want to move beyond that. Basically, I think, towards the Macron-Zelensky plan of a ceasefire, a cessation of all operations on the sea,

and in the air, which is intended to pave the way for a Western no-fly zone over Western Ukraine. So I think that is what they came for. And they had a meeting, very long meeting yesterday with the Americans. And after the meeting, they said absolutely nothing. The Ukrainians came away and were very silent about what they said. They said that it'd been a good meeting and things that moved forward well, but they didn't say much more. And obviously, they've apparently been told by the Americans not to say anything more. But when you are dealing with the Ukrainians, you know that they always leak information about whether the talks went well.

But I get the sense that the Americans were not responsive. the American officials were at a much lower technical level, people who work in the National Security Council and the State Department, middle-ranking officials. And I think they did not expect such a high-powered Ukrainian negotiating team. And I think they told the Ukrainians, we're not here to discuss these things. we are here to discuss how to secure the ceasefire on the attacks on the energy systems and how to revive the grain deal in the Black Sea. So I think the meeting didn't go especially well. Now, the main negotiations are taking place today.

The Ukrainians have been told to stick around and apparently they're still in Riyadh, but the main discussions are taking place today. And the Russian negotiating team is pitched at the same level as the American one. And they've been speaking for several hours with the Americans. And there's been a break in the discussions. And the head of the Russian team, who's a man called Karasin, Grigori Karasin, he came out and he said that, you know, they've had a very creative discussion. All kinds of interesting ideas were floated. the two sides are maintaining contact with each other.

All that suggests to me a very tough and difficult negotiation and probably signs that for the moment at least not much progress is being made both on the seas fire over the energy systems and over the Black Sea issues as well, which suggests also, by the way, that the Ukrainians have dug in their heels on some of the key points, especially on the Black Sea issue. There is a lot of opposition, by the way, not just in Ukraine, but in Europe to reviving the 2022 Black Sea initiative. This is an idea that apparently Trump came up with and which he floated in the conversation with Putin on the 18th of March.

The point was that the Russians said that in order to implement the Black Sea Initiative in 2022, there needed to be relaxation of sanctions on some of their banks and agreements to allow them to export fertilizers and things like that through EU ports. But they also wanted intrusive inspections on Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea. And Erdogan was supposed to ensure that happened, and he never did. And that was why the Russians mostly pulled out of the ceasefire. Now, apparently, the Russians are sticking to that. And there are reports that Ukrainians are unhappy with that idea. And there's reports in the Financial Times that some of the EU states, Romania, Bulgaria,

are unhappy about it also. and that they worry that if there is a ceasefire of that kind of the Black Sea, we're actually going to start getting Russian warships in the western parts of the Black Sea, stopping Ukrainian commercial ships and inspecting them. So you can see that there are lots of issues to talk about, and you can see why the Ukrainians might be pushing back and why this might be a very difficult and complicated negotiation altogether. Yeah, there are rumors that the United States can go into the black scene and inspect these ships. That would be crazy if Russia would to agree to that. Well, if there are just rumors, though. These are just rumors.

These are just rumors. But I can't see, I can't see Russia accepting. I cannot see that either, but I could see that that might make some people very nervous because if it leads to joint inspections by the Americans and the Russians. Russians. If it's joint. Well, absolutely. I think it would be joint. If it's joint inspections by the Americans and the Russians of Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea, well, I mean, that would create, you know, an enormous shock in Kiev, but also in European capital, also.

Yeah, also the idea that you're going to trust Erdogan to inspect those ships, I also think, is ridiculous. I don't think you should trust Erdogan to inspect those ships to make sure that weapons aren't moving into Odessa. But with the negotiations between the United States and Ukraine, it appears that there were less negotiations and more talks with the United States, basically, not even talks, the United States basically sitting across the table from the Ukrainian delegation and basically telling them, look, here's how this is going to unfold. This is what we're looking to get accomplished with Russia. This is what you're going. You guys need to accept.

So take these terms back to Zelensky, get him to sign off on this, and let's move on to the next phase of their ceasefire roadmap, which is, according to Mike Walts, he wants to get the Black Sea Seasfire out of the way, and then he wants to move on to a complete ceasefire and then move on to talks about territory. That's what Mike Waltz said is the roadmap for the United States. But the talk seemed very, very short, 40 minutes. at least those are the reports that we're getting. And it was more about the U.S. just dictating terms to the Ukrainians in order to take back to Kiev and get Kiev to sign off on this.

Why do they need Kiev to sign off on this? Well, because the Ukrainians need to commit to the ceasefire as well. And I mean, they need to be part of this process. But then that brings us back to the question of the makeup of the Ukrainian delegation, because they clearly didn't come to Riyadh with that purpose in mind. The Americans and the Russians are talking about technical issues. The Ukrainians are trying to reopen the whole issue to try to move it, as I said, to well, ultimately to a Western no-fly zone over Western Ukraine. And clearly the Americans are not having any of that.

And that's why that meeting didn't go particularly well. So, I mean, it didn't go particularly well from a Ukrainian point of view. because the negotiation is not between them and the United States. It is between the Russians and the United States. By the way, Ushikov, who is the ultimate person in charge of the negotiations, he's not actually gone to Riyat, by the way, any more than Mike Walsatz. He made it absolutely clear when he discussed the makeup of the Russian negotiating team, that these are bilateral negotiations between the,

the Russians and the Americans to establish this, to reinstate the grain deal in the Black Sea. So the Ukrainians were supposed to come along, send people at the same level, put this all into effect, and instead, as I said, they tried to reopen the whole discussion by getting their defense minister and a very high-powered team with military officers and all of that and aides of Zelensky's there. It shows how complicated this is because the Russians and the Americans, they will have tough discussions and Peskov, who's Putin's spokesman today, said these are going to be long, tough discussions. We're only at the start of this process. There's a long way to go. But the Americans of the Russians probably can reach ultimately an agreement and consensus with each other.

But the wildcard is the Ukrainians who fundamentally are hostile to this entire process. They don't want it to succeed. They don't want a great deal to be set up in which their commercial ships are inspected. They don't want to move to the kind of ceasefire and substantive negotiation that the Americans and the Russians have in mind. So they are very, very nervous about this and the European countries are nervous about it also. Well, I think the wild card, in my opinion, is that the United States, the Trump administration, is not ready to completely cut off Ukraine. Yes. They still have some weapons from what I understand.

from the Biden drawdown from all of the packages that he put in place before he left office, you still have weapons flowing from that drawdown package of which the Trump administration is just not touching. This is my understanding of things. And so they're allowing those weapons to go and they're allowing Ukraine to remain on a type of drip feeding Ukraine on life support to continue to fight the war. Because for the Trump administration, the way I see it is they're negotiating with the Russians, and that's what we're talking about, a proxy war, so it's the United States, negotiating with Russia because those are the two parties that are at war. The United States, of course, is using Ukraine as a proxy.

But the Trump administration, they need to keep the appearance, not only the appearance, the actual weapons flowing to Ukraine, because if they were to give that up, that would be too big of a card to give up to the Russians as you're trying to negotiate. the best deal that you can as the United States. And so they're not ready to give up the weapons flow, the money flow to Ukraine just yet because that would be just giving up the perhaps the only leverage that you have at this point in time. You have this drawdown package from Biden and the threat that maybe you're going to continue to provide weapons after the drawdown is finished. And then you have the sanctions. That is the only leverage that the Trump administration

has, at least with regards to Ukraine. If you brought it out and talk about security architecture in Europe, which we will not do in this video, then of course you get into all kinds of other issues. But what do you think of what I just said? I mean, that seems to be the sticking point for the Trump administration, because if they did cut off Ukraine, it would be the end for the Aleksky regime, the end of the Ukraine military in a couple of months. The Ukraine military would fold. But for the Trump administration, as they're negotiating this, they feel like they have to have to hold this card close to them. Yeah, well, I mean, that is absolutely right. He cannot simply give up the weapons and intelligence supply for the moment, because you're

quite right. It is the only leverage he has. I mean, there's been some talk about expanding the sanctions, but even media outlets in the West are now skeptical about this. They're saying that doing that is going to have more consequences for the Western economies than it would for the Russian negative consequences as well. So he's not really in a position to do that. So he's holding out, he's still allowing weapons to flow to Ukraine. He's still engaging in intelligence sharing to be provided to Ukraine. And it gives him some leverage over the Russians. And it still gives him some leverage over the Ukrainians as well.

Because obviously he's shown to the Ukrainians that he can pull this at any time. He did this about two weeks ago for a time. He pulled that he stopped the supply of weapons. He stopped the supply of intelligence, sharing of intelligence. And that was what brought the Ukrainians around and forced them to agree to any kind of negotiation process at all, which up to that point they'd resist it. Now, there is, however, a problem because, yes, there is this continued flow of weapons left over from the Biden period. But apparently that runs out around the summer. So what at that point does Trump do?

Does he go back to Congress and ask for a further appropriation of aid from Ukraine? Well, I think he could do that, but I think it would be politically extremely embarrassing and very difficult to do this, given all that he said about that and about how sending supplies of weapons and all the money to Ukraine has been more, you know, throwing good things after, you know, after throwing. bringing away good money after bad money and all that kind of thing. So I think that we are very, very difficult thing to do. And I don't think it would go down very well with some of his supporters in Congress as well. You know, the Marjorie Taylor Green camp of people within the Republican Party who are very hostile to this whole Ukraine project altogether. So I don't think this can be spun out much beyond midsummer. and I'm not myself convinced that Trump wants to spin it out much beyond midsummer.

Now, this is where we come to this really very interesting interview that Steve Wickoff, he's, well, point man, his friend, gave to Tucker Carlson, which I thought was one of the most revealing interviews that any American official up to, this point has given. Now, he talked about, you know, Wittkov talked about his meetings with Putin, he talked about the state of the negotiations, he spoke about the ultimate relationship with Russia, but he also spoke about the ultimate end to the conflict, the way the conflict in Ukraine might end. And I have to say, I came away with the overwhelming impression that in which, in which, Wittkov's mind, it's going to end with Istanbul Plus, that eventually the Americans are going to have to give the Russians what Putin is demanding, all of the four regions and all the

other things that Putin basically is seeking. I can't interpret Wittkoff's words in any other way. way, really. And if so, I think that the Americans don't obviously want to do this now, because doing that now would be massively embarrassing. It would look like a capitulation to Putin, to the Russians. So they need a kind of extended negotiation process. They need one ceasefire in the Black Sea, one ceased fire attacks and energy systems. They need a process on a final settlement. They need a meeting with Putin. And I think they ultimately made that process underway in order to arrive at that conclusion. And I think that's probably where we're going

based on what Whitkoff says. And I didn't really see how it can end in other. any other way. Because again, I've seen many people come back and say that the Russians can't seriously expect to have all of the four territories transferred to them. And I've seen all sorts of very, you know, intelligent explanations of why it would be unreasonable to come to that kind of conclusion. I don't think to the Russians, it looks that unreasonable. I think that is the position that Putin outlined. I think it's the position that Putin explained again to Wickoff. I think it's the position that the Russians have set out in many places.

And I think it's the one that the Americans will come around to in the end. And I think in Whitkoff's case and probably Trump's at the back of their minds, they already have done. No, Putin's going to get criticized for not going all the way to Odessa. Well, exactly. He's going to get a huge amount of criticism for that. Absolutely. Yeah, that's going to be a big problem for his administration. I don't know how they're going to explain it or how they're going to spin it.

Well, you know, he did put out the terms, though. I mean, Putin laid out the terms in June. Yes. And those terms, whether people agree or not, those terms did not have anything connected to Odessa in those terms. That's just the fact of what he spelled out as the terms for Russia to conclude. the conflict. I want your thoughts on that, but just to get some perspective on the Whitkoff interview, there's analysts that like the interview, there are analysts that did not like what

Whitkoff said. There's other people in the middle. But the one thing that I took away is that Whitkoff is signaling at Istanbul Plus, June 2020. There's no doubt about that. Yes, the root causes, he identified the root causes as the territory, the Foroblasts and Crimea. We all know that the root causes our NATO expansion. Okay, we know that, but I think Whitkoff wanted to signal to Tucker, to Europe, to Ukraine,

to the Russians, that he is absolutely looking at the territory in its entirety going to Russia. I think he wanted to signal that. And more importantly, you had a high-ranking American official, one of the highest ranking American officials at the moment. He's Trump's ambassador envoy for Project Ukraine, saying, I like Putin. Yeah. You know, that's an incredible statement that I don't think I've ever heard in my entire life. Maybe George Bush's comment in 2000 and, I don't know, four or five, whatever when he said, I stared at the Putin's eyes or something like that. I remember Bush saying something like that, but that was a good 20-plus years ago for someone at this moment at time

in the United States, so close to Trump, so close to the president to say, I like Putin. I mean, that just must have said the shockwaves across the collective West. Anyway, your thoughts on what I said. Absolutely. And that was an astonishing thing for Wickoff to say. And in Europe, obviously, it's gone down very badly indeed. In London, the commentaries about it are very negative. In the United States lesser.

And this is, I think, a major difference. difference in that I get the sense that this decision, which I think has been made by the Trump administration to end the war and to end it quickly, it is actually very widely accepted across the political system in the United States. People could see that the war hasn't worked. people could see that the sanctions weren't successful. People know what the outcome of the war would be if it was continued. So ultimately, I think on this issue, on this topic, Trump has a very great deal of manoeuvre space in the United States.

And Whitkoff's words about, how the United States, how he found Putin a likable man that he liked him and that he found him very straight down the line and very easy to understand and work with, which by the way, I mean, that's also been my impression. I mean, I've never met Putin. I don't know whether he's likable or not in that kind of sense. But all I will say is this. He has always impressed me as a very straightforward person, certainly not manipulative. in the way that, say, Zelensky is. But when Witkoff talks about the fact that he liked Putin, what that means, and this is

where I think the Europeans are going to become even more alarmed, it means that the administration is looking towards a longer term and good relationship with Putin and, of course, with Russia. And that is the most frightening thing for the European. of all. So I think that's, that gives us a clear sense of the direction. Wicco's interview was very, very interesting. And by the way, it comes around the same time that we're getting from the Russian media, from Comer Sands, and it's also spreading right across apparently Russian regional media as well, comments from Putin himself about things that he said to the

industrialists union in a closed meeting. Apparently, he said to them, when we are absolutely going to stick by the June 2024 terms, we want the entire four regions transferred to us. We want that fact internationally recognised as well. And if we don't get it, we're going for Edessa, and not just Adessa, but other places do.

So a very hardline position told to absolutely top business people who are going to be making investment decisions based on what Putin is telling them. I mean, this just after Putin telling them also that he expects the sanctions to stay. So look at all of this together. Put it all together. Putin wants Istanbul plus. I think the Americans are going to give him Istanbul plus.

I think that everything else looks at the moment unlikely. With the international recognition of those oblasts, I mean, that's key. Will the United States recognize those territories? And you said that this is a hardline position. And some people will view it as a hardline position. But address the fact that there's going to be a lot of people in Russia, analysts, in Russia and outside of Russia, that are going to say that this is not a hard-line position because of the Odessa situation.

There's going to be an awful lot of people who are going to say it's a sell-out, that it betrays the people of Odessa, that it leaves Odessa outside the motherland, outside Russia. Now, of course, they may not be, in terms of how they look in opinion polls, you know, a vast majority or the Russian population, but they are influential people. They're influential in the military, for example. And they are part of Putin's own core constituency. I don't think Putin sees these as maximalist or unreasonable terms at all. I think he sees them as the minimum of what he can afford to give.

This is my own view. Now, about Adessa, what I think Putin is going to try to do, and I think what again he will probably succeed doing, and we've discussed this in previous programs, is he's going to want major changes to the Ukrainian constitution. He's still sticking by his position of denuclearization, demilitarization, and denazification. And we've discussed this in previous programs. Lavrov has recently taken to bringing up the topic of federalization. I think he will want autonomy, significant autonomy for Odessa and all of that. And he will try to come back and say to people in Russia, look, I've got Odessa, I've given it autonomy.

I've given it the right for people there to use the Russian language to conduct their own affairs to a great extent. and that probably will win over some people, but it won't win over every one of his critics. They will still say, even if he gets that, that it is still a sellout as far as they're concerned. So I don't think Putin has as much maneuver space here as some people believe. And yes, you can come up with all sorts of explanations and theories about how unreasonable this is and why it would make much more sense for Putin to accept

the current contact lines. But I doubt, I'm not convinced that's politically possible. Just saying. And all of this has to factor in Alenski, Zelensky and his administration. I mean, none of this is going to fly if he's still in power. I agree. So you have to deal with that as well. Absolutely. And that's a huge issue. That's a huge issue. You've got to get him out.

You've got to get him out. And that's because he's, I mean, he's not going to sign a treaty which recognizes the four regions as Russian. I mean, that simply isn't going to happen. The Russians question whether he's even in a position to sign that treaty because they've raised questions about his legitimacy. And the Russians today have, by the way. published a warning, you can find it in Tas, saying that Yulia Timoshenko, who appears to be the person the Americans are thinking about as a potential replacement for Zelensky, that she's not really going to be able to do this either. So, you know, there's lots of problems, lots of issues here going forward. Yeah. Just a final thought. Do you think that if we get to this point, Istanbul, plus, if we get to the point where the United States, there's a lot of ifs here, if we get to the point

that the United States recognizes the new oblasts, if we get to a point where Putin does work out some sort of autonomy or federalization with Odessa, the Odessa region, that you could get scenario where the Bandarites in the West starts some sort of secession movement or something like that? Well, I mean, Gordon Hahn, who is an analyst that I have great respect for and who is very familiar with the situation in Ukraine and knows a lot of the actual detail of what's going on on the ground. He actually thinks that there's a very serious risk if something like that happens, that we could get a coup, that the Bandarites, that the...

people from the military who are radicalized are going to be so angry with what they're going to see as a betrayal, that they will turn on the political class of Kiev and they will overthrow it, and they will try to renew the war in some way. So, you know, there is that possibility. I don't know about this because I don't have that kind of inside knowledge about the situation in Ukraine to be able to say whether that is so. But I suspect that that is a real danger and possibility. And I wonder whether anyone in the West is taking it especially seriously.

I think more likely the kind of scenario that we will see is exactly the one that you've outlined in the sense that if we do get Istanbul Plus and if it does come with federalization and all of that, there is a very good chance, it seems to me, that central Ukraine, Kiev and the small towns and, well, some larger towns, Vinica, Jitumir, all of these places, could start drifting back slowly, back into the Russian orbit. And I think at that point, the Bandarites and people of that kind will say to themselves, we don't want to be part of any of that. A coup really isn't an option. because the international response would be so negative, and perhaps the internal response in Ukraine also.

So let's actually retreat to the regions that support us in Western Ukraine and actually secede. Now, Western Ukraine actually was talking about seceding from Ukraine in the early weeks of 2014. This was during the time of the Maidan protest. when it looked as if the Maidan protests were going to fail if they ultimately succeeded for all sorts of reasons. We're not going to discuss now. But at that point, there was a real movement within Western Ukraine, within Galicia, Lvov region, to actually secede from Ukraine. And I have to say, if Istanbul class is brought into effect, if it sticks, if we see federal happen, then the secession of Western Ukraine is a real possibility.

And my own view is that it would not, at that point, join Poland. I don't think that the Banda rights want to have anything to do with Poland, actually. I think it will try to establish itself as an independent state. The Banderites hate Poland. Absolutely. So, yeah, I think they would try to establish themselves as an independent Trump state. And I don't think, just the final thought, I don't think Russia, if we actually got to that scenario, I don't think that Putin would be too bothered. No.

With a secession. No. I think he said that many times. I think he's basically almost invited the polls of various times and the Romanians and all of those to take what they can. I do think he's interested in going to Lvov. I do think he absolutely wants to go to Lvov. And I think if Western Ukraine breaks away, then I think he will probably say to himself, and he won't be the only person. I mean, a lot of people within the Russian establishment will say, well, what that means is that the rest of Ukraine, central Ukraine, orthodox Ukraine, the Ukraine that was part of the Russian Empire, the Ukraine that joined with Russia back in the 17th century, the Ukraine that was.

Soviet Ukraine before 1939, that will then drift much more quickly back to Russia because that is its natural home. All right. We will end the video there at the durand. Dotlottisie, bitchew, telegram, Rockfin, and X. Go to the Durant Shop, pick-ups, some merch like what we are wearing in this video update. We also have a coupon 15% off all merch spring sale on the Durant Shop.

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