The Duran Podcast - Russia's Eurasian Future After the Ukraine War - Fyodor Lukyanov, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: November 17, 2024

Russia's Eurasian Future After the Ukraine War - Fyodor Lukyanov, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi, everyone and welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Dyson, and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercurris. And the guest of the day is Fyodor Lukianov. He's an editor-in-chief at Russia in Global Affairs Journal. He's also chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy in Russia. He's a research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club. And yeah, this is where he also moderates as well as interviews President Putin. every year at this annual Valdai meeting where most of us know you from. So welcome. It's good to see you again, Fyler.

Alexander. Thank you very much. Thank you for this invitation. And thank you very much for joining us, Mr. Lukianov. So I thought we could start maybe just addressing, I know everyone these days are talking about Trump. But it does, what is interesting, I guess, with this election, also in terms of relations with Russia, would be that the...

differentiates himself very much from the rest of the political class in Washington in terms of how he imagines relationship with Russia, but also his desire to obviously end the Ukraine war. However, he's also been in power before. As we know, in 2016, he argued the same. Getting along with Russia would be a good thing. He clearly believed in Kissinger's advice, which he received, that we shouldn't alienate the Russians to push them towards the Chinese. And they also made some efforts to get along with Putin, but it didn't result in that much, indeed.

I would say that his beginning sending the javelins, which even Obama had been reluctant to do, as it would escalate the conflict, contributed to the war. And so I guess my main question would, do you see the Trump presidency being different this time around? And why do you think his position on Ukraine is so different from the rest of the political class? without making the question too wide does this open up the door more to the negotiations I guess to what extent are you optimistic that we can get an end to this thing yeah thank you very much of course everybody is talking now about a possible new beginning between Russia and the US I mean everybody here

everybody's talking but not everybody is how to say it, happy about the perspectives which can come up, for one simple reason, because in the Russian public opinion, and in particular around those who pretends to influence decision-making, I stress pretense, because in fact it's not the case, but at least the intellectual segment of our society, There are many people who believe that negotiations at this point, whatever will be discussed with Americans,

might end up in disadvantages ceasefire, disadvantages compromise, which at the end of the day will be, even this compromise will be later on broken and destroyed by the other side and produce even worse conflict pretty soon. There are nuances in this position,

but I must say that this view is relatively widespread among people in the so-called strategic community in Moscow. It does not mean that President Putin, who is the ultimate decision? decision maker, share this view. We don't know this. But he might be a bit more sophisticated because as long as we consider and follow his political career, we see that he is in fact much more nuanced person than some people here and some people in the West would like him to see.

We can talk about this later. But coming back to Trump, I think that the problem, which might arise in this context, is exactly about this nuanced approach and simplistic approach. Because everything we know about the president-elect, he probably has sound, as a normal human being from the business sphere.

But he really believes, and he said it actually many times, at least in his behavior, we can see, he believes that international affairs is more or less the same as business-like negotiations. And what Glenn mentioned, this multiple states, by Trump in his first presidency that he wants to get along with Putin, were based on a very simplistic perception of how things could be done.

To simplify even more, he probably believes that we should get rid of this nasty Ukrainian problem, because for a reason which I don't understand, but something is there, Putin wants that, okay? And then we should get Russia on board against China, or at least to get Russia neutral to give us space and energy to confront China. Which sounds logical, but only in case you are a real estate business and then try to negotiate based on strength, negotiate with your counterpart. It's not the case here, and I think all of us understand that whatever Putin would think about Trump, Ukraine, China, whatever, we don't know exactly what he thinks, but to undermine relationship with the by far mightiest neighbor, to have a very vague and unclear perspective of some kind of relationship with the far mightiest neighbor, to have a very vague and unclear perspective of some kind of relationship with the fight. way, hostile country, that would be simply idiotic move on the side of Russia. And that's why I don't believe it can happen. And if not, then Trump is in trouble, because then he should invent something else,

and I'm not sure he can do it. I think that we've heard comments from senior Russian officials, including Mr. Putin and Mr. Lavrov, which to some extent, I mean, support all the points that you have just been making. I mean, I was listening very carefully to the discussion that you had at Valdae, the one you moderated, the one at which Glenn asked Mr. Putin questions. And I noticed that he spoke very warmly about China. He made it very clear that Russia is not going to sacrifice or bargain away its position with China in return for ephemeral promises from the West. I think on this, I think we should take Mr. Putin at his word, simply because what you

just said, it would not make sense. And I think whatever we may think of Mr. Putin, one thing I think everybody agrees is that he's a very clever man. So I don't see him doing something idiotic, or completely inconsistent with his own interests and Russia's interests in the way that people think. I just also very quickly wanted to say something else, again in support of what you just said. I actually said it yesterday in a program, Glenn and I did with John Meersheimer, Professor John Meersheimer. I have been very heavily and frequently involved in business negotiations. I just want to confirm exactly what you said.

business negotiations, deals in business world are completely different from international diplomacy. The two are completely unlike. There is no similarity between the two. And anybody who thinks there is is completely misunderstanding things and is going to get this completely wrong. Now, that's just a few things I wanted to say. Can I just move on to a particular point? because there's a very widespread view in the United States, which I think extends beyond Trump,

that the Ukraine conflict has gone as far as it can from an American point of view. Whatever objectives the Americans had, they've not really been fulfilled at this time. And the point has been reached to bring it all to an end. Senator Rubio is saying this, and he's going to be the Secretary of State. Mike Walsh, the new National Security Advisor, is saying this.

Lots of people are saying this. But they all seem to be talking very much around this idea of a freeze of the conflict on the existing lines. And also potentially at some point in the future, putting the question of NATO membership for Ukraine to one side, but perhaps revisiting that in 10, 5, 10, 20 years. or something of that sort. Again, I understand completely. You do not speak the Russian government. Let's get this absolutely clear. But is your sense that in Moscow, the community that you said, the strategic community and potentially the Russian government, would they favor this idea? Is this something that they would consider? Or is this really not a response to Russia's own

strategic concerns with respect to you, Craig? Yeah. You know, I probably I should tell you one thing, which is a little bit broader than what you asked, but might help to understand some logic, some principles which Mr. Putin is guided by. And that might be an answer to a question as well. If we look at military conflicts, at wars in the last couple of decades,

most of them were launched and conducted by the United States. In those wars, be it Afghanistan, be it Iraq, be it Yugoslavia, Libya, some minor conflicts or interventions like, I don't know, Somalia, or what was it, Panama, Haiti, Haiti, yeah, sorry. The endgame has been always formulated as exit strategy. Americans did some job,

rightly wrongly, we don't discuss it, but did some job with certain purposes which could be achieved or not rather not than yes but okay and then in a certain point with some success or without any success

Americans started to talk about exit strategy as the final destination of this conflict how to withdraw without making situation even worse for the United States sometimes it worked sometimes not like in Afghanistan for example but what I would like to stress is the very principle. You intervene with some aims grounded or less grounded,

but you believe those aims are worse intervening. Then you see the result. The result might be different, but then you say, okay, fine. Now we withdraw and turn the page. And in all those conflicts, you never have. heard in the American in the Western narrative the notion of victory. Okay, Bush said that he won in Iraq, but no one can consider that in a classical understanding of victory as before.

And that's exactly the principle, the ultimate difference between conflicts, United States fought and wars, United States fought, and this conflict, this war in Ukraine now. Because neither Putin nor a majority of Russian people actually think in this term of exit strategy. They think about the victory. Again, rightly or wrongly, grounded or not grounded, but this conflict is being understood as something that's strategically important,

existentially important for the country, for the nation, that it should be achieved. Something should be achieved, which would change this strategic landscape. And I think that this is a principle, the very important difference, which brings us back to bring, brings us back to your question,

whether Moscow will accept some ideas about ceasefire, breathing down and so or not. Putin's motivation in this conflict was not initially, was not about to take part of Ukrainian territory to satisfy some post-imperial ambitions and so on, even if they do exist. Let us assume they do exist, but it was not the reason for that. The line, the logical line, which started well before, but which was formulated clearly in the memorandum of Russian foreign ministry in December 21, and then continued throughout the whole process of the so-called Istanbul negotiations was not about territory, was not about how to restore the Soviet Union or Russian Empire or whatever. it was about strategic security in this part of the world, which Russia considered as unsatisfactory for herself. That's why NATO issue is by far more important than any than the size of territories Russia would be able to get to take from Ukraine.

And that's why, coming again back to your question, that's why the idea that, okay, let us postpone the NATO issue again for next 20 years, and then we will see that will not fly. We did it already 2008, not 20, but almost 20, how many, 16 years ago. And that was considered at that time as a big compromise. On the western side that NATO and then time US President Bush was defeated in this internal discussion. And then Merkel and the Sarkozy, they proclaimed big success. We saved peace and so on. But then we saw what happens today is unfortunately the direct consequence of then time, so-called compromise. And that's why I believe, I'm afraid that.

any provisional solutions, schemes like you described or like I'm being discussed in the United States, they will not work especially given the fact that the Western commentators and states persons did everything to finally eliminate any preconditions for trust by saying that, you know, Minsk agreements were just to give Ukraine time to prepare for a war with Russia. And Putin recently again reminded that how should we react on your proposals now? It does not mean that negotiations are impossible or Russia will flatly reject anything which would come from NATO or the US side. But I think Russia will push hard to get not a 10.

temporary solution, but at least some contours of acceptance on the western side that it is not about just Ukrainian territory and borders, it's about strategic situation in Europe. Before I go back to Glenn, before I just quickly step in, just this morning, just about what you said about victory, just literally before we did this program, I was reading this comment from Lavrov, he said that everyone in Russia has the same understanding of victory. It is victory as the ultimate outcome. And that was on the discussion about Ukraine. And it's exactly the point that you made.

The Russians do not think about exit strategies in the kind of way that Americans and Westerners do. They have a different conception of how war is conducted. I just wanted to make that point because, as I said, I saw those words of Lavrov literally just before we did this program. Anyway, that's all I wanted to say. Yeah, I got the impression, too, that Minsk now has become an analogy, if you will, of exactly what has to be avoided in the future, which is less of a temporary settlement. Meanwhile, used this temporary ceasefire to prepare for the next war.

I think it's probably, well, it would be unlikely for Russia to accept such a thing. when it's this close to victory and then essentially say, well, let's just a ceasefire and fight again in another 10 years. It's a, yeah, it doesn't seem like a great... If I may just add one thing to correct a little bit

the picture, because yes, I think we are right. All of us are correct saying that victory and long-term solution is very important. But of course, we live in a real world. And Putin is, by

at the end of the day is a realist politician. He believes at this point that the space of the possible, the space of improvements for Russia, which can be made, is still quite quite significant. So we are not in hurry to stop, so to say. But I don't believe that he is so much. obsessed with fighting that he will try to continue that in case he will see some signs of, I don't know, overstretched or overheated Russian economy or some problems in the country.

Then he, from my point of view, will react pretty quickly in changing tactics, not strategic goals, but tactics. And that's why I would not exclude some kind of of situation when a ceasefire or negotiations will happen before goals will be achieved, which he

would see as the final ones. It's one thing, another thing, much cynical. We know we live in the information society everywhere in Europe, in the US, in Russia. the victory is what you declare to be victory. If you need it. Well, I've seen some efforts, perhaps, a narrative change that is,

it's coming mostly from NATO and Washington, where they're saying, listen, Russia wanted to take all of Ukraine to restore the Soviet Union. They only got 20%. We won. And this could be a positive thing. If both sides can claim victory,

then nobody lose face. You know, this makes it more easy to make a compromise. But I was curious to what you see as being Russia's, well, the likely outcome, if not even the desirable outcome in Ukraine. Because I think everyone at this point recognizes that Russia has won this war. Well, maybe not a journalist. But besides that, I think everyone's recognizing this is moving very quickly by the day for

Russian victory. But one thing I thought, which we also discussed with Mercham, by the way, is I thought was interesting several people spoke about in Waldadis need that Russia's winning the war, but it should also ideally win the peace. And I think in this context, the security kind of dilemma would play in because in a settlement, if Russia's total victory gets to dictate the terms, then this often neglects the security interest of counterparts. Again, this is a common sense, not what one thinks of primarily at the end of a war in victory. But But again, if Ukraine ends up in a position where it doesn't have security or if Russia crosses the Dnieper, for example, that would trigger a lot of apprehensions across Europe.

I was just curious. What would you see as possibly the ideal scenario in which, again, one wouldn't trigger an intensive security dilemma or ideally or likely outcome, given that it's uncertain what kind of negotiation. Moscow will have. I mean, it's been almost three years and no one has sat down to talk with President Putin. So it's one shouldn't assume that the negotiations will go well. You know, a couple of days ago, Chancellor Schultz mentioned in, I think it was an interview or something public, that actually the status which Finland had after the Second World War would be a very good solution. When I heard this, I was absolutely out of mind

because it was exactly what everybody said 10 years ago, including Kissinger. I think even Zhizinski said something like this. That we should be realistic. Ukraine should not be part of NATO, but we can negotiate some more or less permanent restrictions, but which will give Ukraine a great possibility to develop like Finland had after Second World War. And at that time, that was seen as Putin propaganda and totally flatly rejected and dismissed by Ukrainians,

by NATO, by Americans, by everybody. Now, suddenly they discovered that it would be a great idea. Okay, unfortunately, people everywhere, including my country, they get vice after disasters normally. You know, I'm not in the position to even fantasize about the possible outcome. I think that I can just try to say what the public atmosphere is here. I would dare to argue that the initial idea by some turbopatriotic forces that Ukraine should not exist after this war, that Ukraine as a unit, international unit, should disappear. Okay, let us give those bastards in western part of Ukraine to Poles and Hungarians, but the rest will be part of Great Russia and so on.

We still have some people speaking in this manner, but those are very marginal and not reflecting any official or even any widespread position. I would say that the general mood is moving towards understanding that Ukraine will be in place, in limited, in restricted borders. Putin says frequently about Russian historical territories. Of course, I'm personally myself, I'm not in favor of referring to history when it comes to political processes because then we can start it but we never

stop because the history is absolutely without borders and time limits. But more or less understandable what can be seen as territories which Russia historically sees as part of the core of Russian

space. And you mentioned Glenn, you mentioned crossing Nepper yeah, sure, but we understand from military point of view, it's extremely difficult and that might happen only in case of collapse of Ukrainian defense at all.

And in case of collapse of Ukrainian defense at all, that's the next question, what the West and NATO will do because to accept collapse of Ukrainian defense and collapse the fact of Ukrainian state in the current form would mean giving up, which until recently at least, was not

seen as any option for NATO at all. Russia should be defeated on the battlefield and that's it. So of course with Biden or Harris administration, I would be probably more

concerned about the hypothetical response in this case in this scenario. With the Trump administration, I don't know. The difference, again, it's a broader issue, but I think very relevant to this topic we discuss. The difference is, from my point of view, very clear between Trumpian people and pre-Trump and people. Biden framed the whole international world, the whole sphere of international affairs, as a struggle between democracies and octocracies.

And that was continuation of a very long tradition of American policy, which ideologically existed for probably centuries, but in practical terms, came after the end of the Cold War. And all presidents, starting from Bill Clinton, more or less, follow this line. If so, if you see it in this line, then of course Ukraine is absolutely essential and existential because this is the place where battle between autocracies and democracies happen.

Fortunately, Mr. Trump doesn't share this idea at all. He doesn't see world in this way and I guess even most of his entourage, they don't. Which means that in case of possible a possible risk of Ukrainian defeat

they will not tend to see it as defeat of the whole American policy since decades which is good but at the same time we know that Mr. Trump is about

showing strengths not using force necessarily but showing strength. And that's the question, how he will react to show that America is still very mighty, even in case Ukraine is defeated. Can I ask, can I just move a little bit beyond the question of Ukraine, the specific issue of Ukraine? Because one of the great problems is that everything now,

the whole relationship between the West and Russia is now framed by the one issue of Ukraine. And of course, I'm not saying that isn't a major problem. But there are so many other things that we need to start thinking about. At some point, one would like to believe that a dialogue between the West, between the United States and Russia, and between the European powers and Russia, would resume. Is that also a perspective in Russia? I mean, do Russians,

and again, I'm talking about, I appreciate again, you're not talking about the Russian government, but within Russian society, within the Russian expert community that you were talking about, the strategic community, do they perceive at some point

a situation where once again we're at least talking to each other and coming to solutions on specific issues, if not, you know, large-scale ones. Because putting aside these very complicated and unrealistic chess games that Americans especially are addicted to, playing Russia off against China and all of that kind of thing, which isn't going to happen.

Security in Europe, and of course Glenn and I are in Europe, security in Europe is impossible without Russia. and achieving security in peace in Europe is a worthwhile objective in itself. So could you just elaborate a little of what you might think the Russian perspective on this might be? Yeah, that's a very important question. And I think that the perception in the West is, again, slightly distorted. because people who actually want to end all this mess and who are not hawkish,

they used to argue in the way you did, just, that, okay, it's a terrible problem, we understand that it's very difficult to come to terms, but the world is much bigger. And by the way, this conflict demonstrated that the majority of international community, they basically don't care. I think it's another, we can discuss it. I think it's one of the most important outcomes of this conflict.

But that's exactly the point on the Russian side, that, yes, indeed, we are ready to discuss plenty of important issues, global issues, regional issues, with Americans, with Europeans, with Japanese, whatever. The next day when the Ukrainian issue will be settled not because we are so careless about what is happening in the world

but because this is the absolutely key element of the future European-Eurasian stability that we stop no, we solve the controversy, which was never solved after the Cold War. In this regard, the Ukrainian crisis, and I say it all the time here, sometimes I receive not very positive response, but I'm sure that I'm right.

Ukrainian issue is not about the future of international system. This is about the past of the international system. Unfortunately, we dear this legacy from the end of, of the Cold War and how the Cold War has ended. And as long as we have it, we cannot expect that we step up to the next level and start to discuss the future. But that means, from the Russian point of view, rightly or wrongly, you can judge, that the so-called selective engagement, what Americans love to propose us at different periods, especially Obama did it very actively. Okay, we have these agreements.

Let us put them aside. Let us discuss issues which are important for all, but mainly important for us. For you as well. Let us discuss them. Issues which are important for you, but less important for us, not this time, some other day. It never worked, despite the fact that Russia tried to do it, and it will not work in the future. And in this regard, the more comprehensive solution for Russian-Western relationship is needed. But the first step, the precondition, is that we settle this Ukrainian control.

You mentioned the wider world. And I think this is also something that took a lot in the West by surprise, because not only did NATO, as well as EU leadership for that sake, argue that the only acceptable outcome was to defeat Russia on the battlefield. But indeed, the assumption was also that Russia's economy could be collapsed fairly quickly and Russia could be isolated in the world. So this was kind of the three pillars of how Russia would be defeated. But it also has to be pointed out.

One of the key reasons why Russia has fared so well and also has a growing economy is because most of the world didn't follow this. Indeed, I think about 85% of the world's population live in Canada, countries which has not imposed sanctions on Russia. Of course, it's different than supporting the war, but it's still, it says that, you know, they're not joining the proxy war against Russia either. Now, all of this is interesting, and it shows some success, I guess, from Russia that at least since put on steroids in 2014, at least this shift from greater Europe to greater Eurasia that it has been paying off. And a key manifestation of this appears to have been bricks, that is

the construction now of a new alternative international economic system, which is less vulnerable to the pressure from Washington. And I would say a key consequence of the war in Ukraine and the West sanctions on Russia, the theft of its sovereign funds, of course also sabotage of Chinese supply chains. All of this is really motivated to bricks to push forward quite forcefully. And we see this now, I mean, both in terms of the... the economic connectivity, but also in terms of the amount of countries around the world who would like to join this grouping.

So I was just, I know that perhaps it's going a bit faster now due to all the sanctions and also given that Russia is leading the bricks holding the chair. But I was wondering though what do you see as the future direction of bricks, you know, what was achieved in Kazan, what would be the main objectives going forward and possible challenges to overcome? Is this, I guess how much future does Bricks have?

Do you see what is the potential? Yeah, you're absolutely right that this is probably the most important outcome from what started

to happen in 2022, yet at least. The West was surprised that only countries which have binding relations with the United States were engaged in the anti-Russian coalition. Only those who are members of alliances or binding relationships which depend on the United States, they join.

Those who have intense ties, but enjoy certain level or big level of sovereignty, they preferred not to do it. Despite all arguments and despite the fact that objectively, of course, especially at the beginning,

it looked badly. What happened? The big country attacked a smaller country and so on. But despite all this, the world majority, as we call it now, decided not to take sign. And then, That continues. More than that, when they decided not to take sight and nothing happened,

Americans had no leverage to punish them for that properly. In previous decades or eras, they probably would use some instruments to force important countries to join. Not this time, not because Americans suddenly became nice, but because situation is different. And now what we see, and Bricks is a big manifestation of that, is the widening sphere of countries which love to be, to enjoy all possible benefits, to put it in less romantic, but more pragmatic terms. Why should we join Russia against America? No reasons.

Why should we join America against Russia? Even less reasons. Let us be pragmatic. Let us be peace-loving. It is a great position. We are not for you or for you, but we are for peace. It's a bit hypocritical, of course,

as always, but you can, cannot deny, you cannot reject it. And of course, what the United States did since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict to heavily abuse the economic power and economic monopoly, that contributed to the creation of the non-hegemonic world more than anything what Russia, China, Iran, not Korea, whoever could do to undermine this hegemony. And so I think that Bricks is a very strange creature, actually.

In the current form, to put it honestly, the quite unclear system with member states, invited members, partner states, it's very difficult to identify what it is. But to some extent from my point of view, I might be completely wrong, but I think that it corresponds to the nature of the international system today much more than any of previous institutions. Because previous institutions do not work anymore or do not work as they were supposed to work. While this breaks with the unclear and vague, flexible but widening field of relationships,

gives opportunity to participate in the creation of this new space. It's not a world order. I think it's very important. It's not, Briggs is not a new world order. Bricks is an alternative space for interaction, which is not against the West, but trying to bypass the West. Do what you do, we don't, of course, we respect you. America is great, Europe is still.

but let us operate in a way which we believe is better. And of course on the American side it is perceived as anti-American because Americans don't like anything except what they initiate. But in fact, this is really a creation of a new area. Whether it will be successful and how quickly it will be successful, It's a completely different story because when I hear that countries like Libya are ready to join or Bolivia or many very respected, but to put it mindly, a little bit problematic countries, declare that they will join bricks. I don't know exactly how it will look like. What is the indicator and the day when the bricks will invent something to have an alternative payment system without dollar or euro?

That will be the day of the end of the American hegemony in the world. It's very difficult. I'm realistic. I understand that the dollar is a reserve currency, not because. Americans are so mighty, but because it's extremely comfortable. It's very good mean to use. But the trend is very clear. Everybody understands, even those who are not in the conflict with the United States,

they understand that anymore, they cannot rely on dollar as before, as a neutral instrument. It's not anymore. What you say about, I think, the global majority and the development of Bricks, I think that it is clear to any objective and impartial person of the world. In fact, it's not been created by the events of the last three years, but I mean, the events of the last three years

have been a catalyst moving that process forward. But again, could I just ask a question about Russia specifically? Because obviously, Russia is now a core member of the Bricks. is involved in relations, it's developing relations with many, many countries. How does Russia perceive itself? Does it perceive itself still as a European country? Because of course, we used to have, you know, the language of General de Gaulle, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. We had the Gorbachev idea of Europe, the common European home. we had the idea of Europe from the Atlantic all the way to Vladivostok.

Or has Russia outgrown this? Is it now seeing itself perhaps as a player that has, if you like, burst the bonds that, you know, once tied it to Europe in the way that it did? because this is something that I think that some people in Europe are worried about. You do on the fringes, and I have heard this, say that, you know, we've lost Russia, that Russia is no longer part of Europe anymore, that one way or the other, either it's Mr. Putin's fault. I mean, we always talk about Mr. Putin to an exaggerated extent. either it's, you know, the Russia, Mr. Putin's fault or it's the Chinese who've done this or we

ourselves, maybe we've done this, we've pushed them away, but the Russians have basically given up on us and that they no longer think of themselves as Europeans in the way that they used to do. Have you any thoughts about this? I mean, again, I'm not suggesting that you speak for everybody in Russia, obviously, but perhaps you could just, you know, give us your views because this is debate that is taking place, especially I should say in France, but in Britain too, to some extent, even in Germany. You know, to rephrase old meme, old formula, Russia is too big to lose, too big to be lost. You cannot lose it, so even if you want.

There is a discussion in Russia and Glenn who follows our discussion very, very carefully, knows that very well and knows people who speak about this. And there are people who say, like, for example, Dmitri Trellian, whom we know, all of us, that the European chapter of Russian history has been closed. It started with Peter the Great, and now it's over. And now Russia will see itself as a Eurasian power, or as admitted training put many, many years ago, 20 or even more or less years ago, Euro-Pacific country. And that means that the whole landscape, intellectual landscape,

will change. That's one view. Another view is that in a framework of the Eurasian security, we should be distant from everybody. So try to behave like the global majority, to be, so to say, to enjoy benefits from all sides, including the West. And there is some logic in that because whatever how much warmly Putin talks about China but there is objective

situation that China is enormous power close to us and at a certain point one beautiful or not very beautiful day we will discover some frictions with them and some controversies that's inevitable that's how international affairs

works so we need to have counter-backed balances and so on. My personal view on this is less linear. I think that when we speak about Russia as part of Europe, we need to clarify what do we mean by that?

Because if we talk about culture, history, self-perception, relationship with different parts of the world, there is not the slightest doubt that Russia is a European nation. Whatever we say, whatever we try to state, but Russia is a European country populated by Europeans, at least as long as Russia is populated by those who live here now. And I hardly can imagine that it can't be changed anytime soon or maybe even at all.

And that's great that it cannot be changed. Having said that, we should get read of a very bad complex which Russia inherited from its history. and I agree with training and Peter DeGreate increased this complex. The complex to strive to be accepted by Europe as real Europeans, as genuine Europeans, catch up not just economically or technologically, but even in terms of status, in terms of psycho. And that feeling generated for years, decades, and centuries, this pendulum between go to Europe, go out from Europe, to embrace Europe, to fight Europe. Those are sides of the same coin, actually, anti-Europeanism and pro-Europeanism in our context.

is the same. What I promoted with my dear friend and colleague Professor Alexei Miller since many years since 2015 we wrote a small

brochure arguing for, so to say, distance and positive indifference vis-à-vis Europe. We are not against Europe, but we don't need to try all the time to

prove that we are Europeans and to demand that Europe should take us as equals and unfortunately that was unfortunately that was the main substance of the whole era after the Cold War when Europe turned

from an idea turned into the institutional framework And Russia wanted in one or another form to get into this framework. And Europeans never promised anything, but said, okay, okay, keep going. We will see. Probably you will get something. And that created a situation when big enthusiasm to get to Europe, which we had immediately at the end of the Soviet Union and immediately after,

collapse of it turned into something opposite. No, we are no Europeans at all. And the pendulum, which went extremely far away under Gorbachev and early Yeltsin period, that we should do everything just to be accepted as a civilized world. Now it's the opposite position. Go to hell with all your everything. I hope that at the end of the day we will come to more balanced, the pendulum will go to a more balanced situation.

And why I hope that it is possible, contrary to the tradition of Russian history, because the role of the West in the world of 21st century is different. The West is not seen anymore as a beacon of everything good, everything progressive, everything future related, that we need to join otherwise we are backwards. Not anymore. And I hope that at the end of this collision, which is of course very unnecessary,

but it happened, we will have a new self-understanding here that we are European country by nature and by culture, which is situated in Eurasia, in which has to have as intense relationship with the rest of the world as possible because the world is different. That's ideal picture. I don't know whether it's achievable, unfortunately. That's to a large extent.

A lot of this reflects the ideas of the 19th century of Dostoevsky as well because he was effectively saying that Russia's efforts to will remake itself in the image of the West was preventing it from making. the valuable contributions to civilizations which it could. They had to chart its own future. But again, this has been one of the, I guess, curses of Russia since Peter the Great is modernization is linked to Europeanizing Russia while pursuing its distinctiveness would be the other pendulum swing. But that's why the emergence of, well, the rise of the east is so interesting because no longer does modernization means to Europeanized, not just Russia, but China or anyone else, that there are actually. are other paths to have this organic or distinctive path to modernity.

But I like your idea though, Eurasianism or Eurasian integration, that it shouldn't be pro-Western or anti-Western. It should simply be not make the West matter less, but it will be less obsessed about it or have other, not put old eggs in this basket. And when you spoke, it reminds me a bit something that Andrei Kortunov once wrote. who argued that at the International Affairs Council

he was pointing out that yes Russia often has got very rational, pragmatic politics but he also said that there was sometimes a hint of resentment in the policies as well because if they want to join the West the West says no we create a Europe without you

and this would create some resentment so it would actually be better for the West as well if Russia had other partners because if it has too much riding on making things work with the West, it becomes perhaps too intense for all sides. But yeah, but I do take a point on this, on the identity, though, that it should, that, you know, Eurasia might change its identity, even though the origin is European. But I was curious because we all said that the Eurasianism means, of course, diversifying the

economic ties, which is important, more now than before, but also diversifying political ties, but I was curious in the security space because, you know, this is a last vector, like how to what extent would Russia seek Eurasian security solutions? Because we know the Chinese, for example, are renowned for wanting to avoid military alliances for a variety of reasons. But do you see any possibilities of other security cooperation with China that doesn't fall within the category of an alliance or possibly Iran. This is also, you know,

I remember back in the early 2000s, appeared Iran was almost a bargaining chip to score a good deal with the Americans. But now, of course, this has become a strategic partner, something Russia can't really trade away anymore. And, you know, a primary, or a key priority.

So did you see any, because there's already a lot of security cooperation between the countries, but did you see this being possible in the future formalized into something resembling an alliance or does Russia also prefer to keep it a bit loose like bricks with less formal ties as this alliance has a tendency to create counter-alliances, you know, alienating the Israelis or the Arabs, something which would necessarily work in Russia's interests?

First of all, if I may, you mentioned eurygianism. of course it's a different, very long and extremely interesting discussion but just one point. I think that Eurogenism in a classical form is a very interesting and intellectually provocative

and intellectually reach theory concept which is genuinely Russian which is important. We don't have so many concepts created here. we normally took some foreign concepts as well. But I don't believe that Eurasianism, as it was created 100 plus years ago,

is applicable to today's situation and to the future situation. Because Eurasianism, if we remember the history of it, that was actually an intellectual reaction to the collapse of the empire, looming collapse of the empire, and to the absolutely disastrous development in Europe, which followed soon after beginning of this idea. And that was a very much decadent view, an attempt to

imagine, to invent something which can replace the order, the world which is collapsing around us, which is very, again, which is very interesting. but it has, from my point of view, absolutely no grounds for creating something new now. On the other hand, Eurasianism understood in the new light should be based on yes, on economy, and probably even more than economy, it's the connectivity, the creation of Eurasia, which is totally interconnected by roots, by relationships, different kind of relationships,

including alliances probably. But frankly, I don't see countries in this area which would be ready to engage in strictly binding permanent alliances, including Russia. Why China is not in favor of alliances for this of alliance with Russia or alliances at all for the same reason as Russia is against this because neither China nor Russia

have a tradition to be an alliance which means that you share your sovereignty with anybody else Warsaw Pact was not a real alliance it was a Soviet domination with a bunch of satellites NATO is an alliance, but based on readiness of European countries to limit their sovereignty, not the United States, but they do. Neither China nor Russia, nor I would say Iran, nor India, India or India or any Turkey even, despite the fact that Turkey is member of NATO.

But you see that Turkey develops towards Eurasian understanding. Probably they will stop at some point, but maybe not. And that's why I don't believe that we can expect alliances, especially military alliances to emerge here. If you look at Russian behavior during this conflict and emerging relationships in the security field, emerging now. Be it Iran, be it's North Korea,

be it China in a hidden form or some other countries. All of those relationships are built on today's need to achieve something very concrete. Even this very widely discussed

cooperation with North Korea, I don't know details, of course, but my guess is that the very fact of noise around this is more important in Russian strategy as the fact of North Korean soldiers being there, not being there, because it creates a different psychological atmosphere. Frankly, I don't believe that any of Russian military commanders would allow any of North Korean soldiers to go to the battlefields,

field because what to do with them there, actually. So I think it's much more, much more, it's a trick rather than an alliance. It does, it doesn't, it should not deny the fact that Russia is trying to diversify relationships and the fact that we revived relationship with North Korea, it will, at the end of the day, it will, it creates already, a completely different situation in the Korean peninsula. South Korea initially was furious.

Now they start to think what to do. And they might come to some interesting conclusions at the end. In general, if we discussed China just moments ago, if we look at the geography of President Putin's visits in Asia in recent months, North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, meeting with the Indonesian at that time president-elect, meeting with the Malaysian prime minister. That's exactly what I said, that Russia

tries to find way to balance relationship with China. All those countries are not hostile to China, but they have different interests. And at end of the day, coming back to your question about Eurasia, I think that Eurasia as bricks cannot be put in the clear and fixed frame. If somebody would try to do it, it would destroy the whole idea. And I think everybody understands that. And even Chinese project like Belt and Road, they are, of course, about money. but even in this field they are more about to create a framework where everybody can try to find something for itself

my very last question because we've kept you for a while but it just follows from a point that you've just made about the Russians essentially having sovereignty and with sovereignty comes agency do you think that might mean going forward that the Russians might find it easier in terms of East-West relations with the West to deal with the Americans than the with the Europeans in the sense that the Americans, because they're absolutely a sovereign power, that they have more agency than the Europeans appear to do. I mean, you had very hard work over many decades building up a relationship. with Germany, for example. And it flipped around almost immediately, partly because the Americans

were so opposed to it. And the Germans didn't have full agency and they had all kinds of issues, internal issues, which flowed, by the way, to a great extent from that, the enormous influence in Germany of the United States. Did you think that people in Moscow may say, well, if we're going to talk to the West, let's talk to the Americans. because they can actually make decisions. They have that level of freedom of action that no European government today has. Just the question.

I don't know what will happen to Europe in years to come. I think we should disregard the current hysteria around Trump because it's rather what is the word, the moral hazard, the panic. Of course, Trump will not destroy transatlantic ties. Trump will not withdraw from NATO and so on. So the first presidents of Trump was not good for Europeans, but it was no disaster.

More than that, actually, what he demanded, they started to do, I mean, pay more for the membership. and that was not only him who said it to Europeans. But of course, whoever will follow Trump, the profound question about whether Americans will need Europe as much in the future as they did in the past is obvious because world is changing exactly what we discussed moments ago. The problem, actually, it's normal. It's nothing new.

The problem is that the Europeans and the German politicians and people in particular, whom you mentioned, they believed in the end of history most of all. They really believed that history has ended. and things which happened to Europe in the 20th century in the first half of the 20th century will never return. I can understand them because Europe committed a suicide actually in the 20th century and the period of successful European integration, first Western European, then all European, that was like a fairy tale. and it's so difficult to acknowledge that this fairy tale has ended.

But the question is what to do next? And you know, in Russia years ago, maybe 20 years ago, at the point when Putin deeply believed that it was a way to find a place for Russia in the Eurocentric, European-centric world around Iraq war, when Putin supported Schroeder and Shirak in their opposition against George W. Bush.

And actually, people don't remember that, but Putin was not very enthusiastic about this. He didn't want to do it, actually. He never supported, of course, Iraq war, but he believed that at that point, okay, let Americans do stupid things they want to do, but our relationship with Americans are, is more important. And the European leaders, Shirak and Schroeder convinced him that no, no, no, we need to come together and to resist and so on.

And he decided to do it, I think, for practical reason, because he expected Europe to revaluate possible models for relationship with Russia after this. And at that time, we had a lot

of intellectual discussions here that now we see that Americans are going global and militant and so Europeans don't need it. So now it's time for Europe and we will support that to

understand, to realize their strategic interests, and the strategic interest of Europe is, of course, to get together with Russia, Russian resources, European technologies, money, people, and so on. Nothing like this happened, because after Putin supported France and Germany against Bush, and then he, so to say, asked, okay, what next? Let us work together and cooperate. They said, yes, of course, great, thank you very much. Now please go to Brussels and start negotiations about some new treaty. And you know, this is European integration. We cannot do much. This is not our prerogatives and so on.

And of course it didn't work. But why I say it, because at that time, it was a strong belief in Russia among some important people that Europeans will evolve into much less America-centric, centred, dependent to much more strategically autonomous group or nations and so. I think since that, everything which happened since that, not only during Ukrainian conflict, but even before, demonstrated that it was not realistic at all to expect such development. Europe does know what to do in case Americans will decide to abandon them.

Or at least, okay, not to abandon, but at least to decrease involvement, as Trump probably will do. Because during the Cold War, at the height of the Cold War, at the appearance, which were absolutely awful and nasty like beginning of 80s when Ronald Reagan came to power in Washington and introduced immediately sanctions against German, Italian, French, British companies who participated in this gas project to extend the gas deliveries to Western Europe. Chancellor Brandt, President, met Iran, who was

Fetcher, I think was the Prime Minister of Britain at that time, they went to Washington and convinced Reagan to remove sanctions because that was stupid thing to do and don't worry about geopolitical loyalty, but economically it will, and he lifted sanctions. Can we imagine something like this today? Absolutely not.

And that means that the European sense of self-interest has disappeared. I don't see any sources from which it can reemerge. Even in the very unlikely case, because Europe is not America, in America, Trump can win. I'm almost sure that in Europe, even if similar forces will prevail, the masters of democratic manipulations will do something to remove them from real power

but even if they prevail so what? Marine Le Pen becomes French president and so what should she do with this landscape I don't see a lot of options for her.

That's why I don't expect any serious reshuffle of relationship between Russia and Europe, unlike US. With the US, it's unlikely, but it's more possible than with the European Union. Yeah, I thought it was interesting the word fairy tale, because I think it does explain some of the reason why there's an absence of pragmatism, which you find in the United States, because it's worth pointing out that in Europe, you know, the, of the past decades, this ideology that developed of Europe, pursuing this perpetual peace that is the end of history. You know, Europe has transcended its own past.

It's a whole new chapter where the laws of gravity no longer applies. You know, where it would have liberal peace based on the collective hegemony of the political west. We kind of, I think, bought full into this and bet everything on it. And now that, yeah, it's starting to fall apart. That is, the Americans are relative decline. They're going to Asia.

Yeah, a lot of the assumptions are not playing out. There's no alternative. Because if you, the Americans can do course correction. As Trump say, you know, this is not our problem. Give it to the Europeans. For Europe, there's no other, you know, we made a whole ideology out of this policy, so there's nowhere to go, really. But it does beg the question how far this can go, because in a multipolar system, like what we have now,

rational states, in terms of maximizing their own prosperity and security, they have to actually respond to realities. And I feel you mentioned before the countries who have sanctioned Russia. They're the one who are security dependent on the United States. And this is the whole point. You know, the security dependence can be converted into economic and political loyalties. But we also see that this is what makes Europe less and less prosperous and relevant now. That is yesterday I think was Alexander pointing out this. Europe now is buying oil from India, not sorry, buying Russian oil from India at a higher price.

We're de-industrializing for no purpose at all just to hold on to this idea that. So we're not acting rational anymore. We're not pushing national interest and it can only go so far as we see the German economy falling apart. You say political instability from France, Italy, Germany. This can't really go on forever. At some point one gets the impression that

a bit like 1989, but this time in reverse, our political elites will be brushed aside because I think the absence of alternatives is really what is causing a lot of this radical behavior. This

country, for example, is a case study in Norway through the whole Cold War. We try to have a balance between deterring the Soviet Union and not provoking, so having no basis. Now that the Americans are leaving Europe apparently or getting weaker, the rational decision will be to diversify. You know, make peace with your neighbor, connect with India, China, the rest of the world, not to have all your eggs in a basket when this is not a winning horse anymore. But instead, we're opening American bases left and right on our soil because we're hoping to increase our own market value so the Americans won't leave us. I mean, this is really desperate, irrational actions. I'm just wondering how long can this go on before things fall apart?

And that will be my last question, by the way. You know, it's not up to me to predict something, anything about Europe. And Europeans should start to think about this in normal, realistic terms. because what I can tell you about my own experience. I haven't visited Europe in quite a while now, but all the time I have extremely intense in change, starting from 2000s when I started to work as an editor of the journal and started to visit Europe on a regular basis.

And until the end of previous decade, That was a very strange discussion all the time. I remember very well. That's an episode from my personal experience. That was year 2009. I was invited to Berlin to speak for a very important group of people. Pink tankers, business people, some politicians, and so on. 2009, I stress that that was the beginning.

of still very great, but feelings of something. And then Greek crisis came very soon, and then this chain of crisis. And the question which the audience posed to me was, what do you think about Russia 10 years from now? Can you predict? What can you expect? I said that, of course, it's very difficult to expect anything.

We live in the extremely turbulent world, which will change a lot. And those changes, global changes will have direct impact on changes inside any country. That's why Russia. And then I, of course, I numbered some losses and minuses of our situation trying to be more or less objective and balanced. And then I said that of course it's so But unfortunately We can discuss Russia But we should discuss the European Union as well

Because we don't know how European Union would like 10 years from now Absolutely no idea because everything will change The reaction was they were laughing all of them Is it are you crazy What are you talking about Yes Russia is in unpredictable totally. But here, we know

exactly what will happen. Oh, okay, some nuances. But in general, then I asked, okay, what will be here 10 years from now in the European Union? And they said, it will be like now, but better. Seriously. I said,

okay, let's discuss 10 years from now. Unfortunately, 10 years after, I had no chance to meet them again. But I'm afraid that it was not because my audience was stupid. That was because the

dogmatic framework which we here in this country remember very well from the Soviet Union time. Now it is there. And even today, when everything is crumbling and the world as prescribed

in the directives of the European Commission is collapsing, but it's absolutely impossible for people in charge to get rid of that. And to some extent, I say a terrible thing now, to some extent the war, which is happening now, that's the only way to keep it going. As long as the war continues, you can, so to say, subscribe all bad things to Russia and not to think about yourself. But it will be over at some point. And then I think Europeans will ask questions, Americans will ask questions.

And even the bosses in Europe will need to give some answers. And to give answers as they got used to give will be insufficient. And a final song, Alesson. Well, I just, just to say, just what Mr. Lukianov just said, it reminds me of that expression. I think it was actually

was certainly Thatcher, and it was, by the way, Thatcher who went to Reagan and said, you know, you can't section us and she was very, very unspoken about it. But anyway, just on this last point, she used to say, very often, that which is unsustainable

cannot be sustained. And she was right. It's absolutely true. I mean, you can disagree with her with many things. I certainly did. I was, I opposed to those things. But on that she was absolutely, absolutely spot on. She was completely correct about this. And I think in Europe we're going to find that very, very quickly. And I agree, by the way, what Glenn said.

The very fact that the Americans appear to be in relative decline and are thinking about the rest of the world is making us go even further to try to keep them here. And in ways that are incredibly self-destructive and ultimately irrational. But this is the spasm that we're going through in Europe at this particular time. And it has to run its course. And eventually at some point, I suspect it will. That's anyway, that's my last thoughts. Yeah, I heard of saying from the Europeans now.

They're going to start buying expensive LNG from United States because that will make Trump more interested in Europe. It's quite crazy. But just one last count. I think also it's quite understandable where the Europeans come from, though, because if you look at the 1990s, everyone wants to join the EU. The EU simply has to set conditions, you know, just have better democracy, better governance, and we'll allow you to join. I mean, the ability to present themselves as a force of good, and the alternative is some backward, you know, power politics, which we have already transcended. Politics effectively became, let's socialize the rest of the world to become more like us because we already broke the code.

it's a nice way to look at international affairs but obviously probably very delusional as well so yes if I may just I ask I hate to I listen to myself and understood that I

sound a little bit like an American new conservative who knows better how others should leave and do to be fair, I must say that with all criticism we can have about Europe looking from the outside. Of course, Russia is facing enormous challenges and will face even bigger challenges after this conflict will end. Not just direct consequences of this war, which will be in place as well. But I think we arrived as everybody, as America, as Europe,

Europe as China, we arrived to the moment when previous experience should be reconsidered profoundly. We lived for several decades, for 30 plus years, in the after taste of the Soviet Union. It might sound strange. It's so many years since collapse of the Soviet Union. But mentally, it was still there. It's very, very long process of revaluation. And sometimes even today, we see some attempts to restore some elements of the Soviet approaches, which will fail completely.

It will not work. But it shows that the intellectual vacuum is here. We try to understand how to position Russia in this new world, not only in terms of geopolitical issues, or economy, but who we are. And the idea of Russian civilization, from my point to it's very timely, but it's absolutely insufficient. It's good to start the discussion.

We don't know what the Russian civilization is. And I think that at the end, we need to create a completely new perception of ourselves, which is not in place yet. And to say very terrible thing, the generation of rulers of leaders of Russia today, They, as President Putin as well, they are much more about to close the chapter of the end of the Soviet Union and to give floor to the new understanding, new people and new ideas. Hopefully it will happen rather sooner than later because, of course, this war, I agree with President Trump, but this war should stop. but it's not again it's it's not the turning point is the beginning of a turning point and that's as troublesome for Russia as for anybody else

mr luciano thank you very much can i just quickly say as somebody who has to speak to neoconservatives american neoconservatives quite a lot you have never at any point in this program sounded like one just just to make that completely clear thank you very much I wish I would have put time in four questions about how this war has changed national identity and confidence in all of this of Russia. But we seem to be able to time. That's another program. Yeah, we can discuss it again. Yeah, absolutely.

Well, thank you so much again. Thank you very much. Thank you. Bye.