The Duran Podcast - Tensions Between Israel & the US - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: May 12, 2024

Tensions Between Israel & the US - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone, I'm Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander McCurs and the renowned British diplomats, Alistair Crook. Welcome to the both of you. Thank you indeed. So what we've seen is this new ceasefire agreement, which Amas seemed to accept, well, they did accept while the Israelis were seemingly more surprised as they rejected it. But the surprise might come from the American's position towards this ceasefire agreement. So again, this seems very, very complex. And it also begs the question of what actually America's position is in this war, because many people obviously point to the contradiction that the Biden administration

seems to try to distance itself and oppose a lot of what Israel is doing, but at the same time supplying the weapons. But now we see what could be at least interpreted as more divisions emerging between the Biden administration and Netanyahu administration. So I was wondering, Alistair, how do you read this situation regarding the ceasefire agreements? Well, of course, at the moment there's no agreement,

and possibly there won't be. because what happened was that, first of all, this was a document that was mediated by the U.S., Qatar and Egypt, first of all, in Cairo, and the Israelis didn't participate, chose not to participate. They were invited, but chose not to participate. And then on Monday, I mean, this last Monday, it went to Doha, where it was polished and changed a little bit more. And in neither occasion, because the changes were explosive, did the Americans, and we're talking about Bill Burns, the head of CIA, It didn't seem to give, and this is from multiple sources in Israel, he didn't tell the Israelis who were changes taking place.

But just to be clear, what are the changes? Okay. The really incendiary point, from the Israeli perspective, indeed, the point that could bring down the government or keep it going, are to. there are more, of course, many more, but there are two essential ones, was that the Israelis were stuck on this wording, sustainable calm. Sustainable calm because they assert the need to go back into Rafa, and that, as Netanyahu said on Sunday, you know, this is going to be a 10-year war against Hamas in Gaza. So, you know, sustainable calm for the hostage release, but then we have the right to go back into not only Rafa, but all of Gaza, to root out Hamas. And the second part of it was, if you like, also there would be no withdrawal of troops because clearly if they keep going back, they're not withdrawn.

And anyway, so the text that we saw, the detailed text on the 1st of May, we're now the 9th of May, but on the 1st of May, it was more or less sustainable calm. And then suddenly, suddenly at the weekend, it had sustainable calm, bracket, cessation of military operations and a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops. from Gaza, I mean, which was, of course, not surprisingly seen as a complete victory for Hamas in the negotiations. Both of those things were clearly put in the writing for the document. So not surprisingly, this has created an upro in Israel because it basically, contradicts the one thing, and what is so what Israeli is perhaps so surprising and so awkward for the United States is, I think the one point of agreement that they have on Gaza,

and indeed with Israel as a whole, is the point that Biden supports Santali, Israel's right to destroy and root out Hamas completely and annihilate Hamas from the region. And that is the American position as far as I understand it. And this was the Israeli, really is one of the things that they do have in common with the government and with the White House. And then that was blown out of the water by a text which says cessation. Not ceasefire, cessation, because ceasefire implies it's only for a limited period, cessation of military operation and withdrawal of the troops.

So this sort of blew up the whole policy of the government and could have led to the government because the right wing. I've really insisted. And on Sunday we had Netanyahu reasserting it. He said, you know, we're going back into Rafa. probably going back into Rafa for the next 10 years. Because earlier in the day, Ben Gavir and the others on the right wing said, well, if you want a government to stay in office,

well, we have to make the point about Rafa that we're going back in and our commitment to destroying Hamas, eradicating Hamas, annihilating Hamas from it. The agreement that was accepted by Hamas does the opposite. There's nothing there that implies. that Hamas is destroyed or gone, Hamas would be in control of Gaza. I mean, just the opposite of what was probably intended.

So what's going on? Well, I don't know exactly, of course. But I think what we're seeing here was probably that Biden and the White House team Biden were really anxious to get an end to violence in Gaza, mainly because of the electoral disaster that it is reeking on the Democratic Party and the course of all these tensions.

They wanted it down. And I think we know that on a Sunday morning, Biden from Delaware rang Netanyahu, and he said to Netanyahu, listen, You know, don't tell me it's going to be rougher light. It's got to be rougher zero is what I'm wanting from you. I don't want you to go into rougher at all. And so I think he probably called up Bill Burns and said, you know, stop rougher operation.

Stop it. And so the idea was for the negotiators, the Egyptians are a little bit. bit prone this way. I had to do the negotiations for Gilad Shalit initially on behalf of Israel to get the release of this prisoner. It was some time ago in Gaza. And the Egyptians were always saying one thing about what had been agreed to one party and saying the opposite to the other party in an effort to sort of as they saw getting it to a solution, getting it to yes. Sometimes that works and sometimes it blows up the whole whole agreement as well. So it's not always a great success. Anyway, it seems that they got to yes and then of course there was celebration's

complete victory for Hamas. It got exactly what it won and then to the war and the withdrawal of all troops, apparently. And of course, the government have disavowed it. And interestingly, we can see that even if you like, the more opposition elements within the war cabinet have not really come out and sort of complained. There were massive protests in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv after the announcement by Hamas, which took, I mean, the Israelis are very clear about it. It just wasn't passed round. I mean, about two people knew, but the chief of defense staff, Gunn't didn't know about he. He was the

last, and he was scrabbling around to find out what was going on. So they were taken by complete surprise. Then there were huge protests. I mean, really, I would say protests with a lot of tension and a lot of anger as those that favor, those that favor a release of hostages were so pleased because they thought the hostages would now be released. And of course, the government, and I have to say this, because it's important for your listeners and viewers to understand it, the majority of Israelis do not accept. They are still in favor of an incursion into Rafa, rougher particularly, but also they want Hamas completely annihilated from Gaza.

So it set up this sort of opposition. I just want to say a few words more about that because people find it quite difficult. really Israel is divided in two very clearly with different visions of the future and different visions of the history

and on one side and it's a plurality small plurality of people who see this as really the situation as a whole that Israel is facing as akin to what they experienced in German. And they see it as a sort of slow unfolding

holocaust taking place and that they have to defend themselves at all costs. It's he'll be killed and we are in existential danger. Then there is the other segment, including most of the people that want a hostage release, and also even perhaps people like Gans and Eisencott, who are in the war cabinet, but would like something less apocalyptic for the future. And even to go back, if you like, to the status quo ante, in other words, to go back to occupation, a sort of apartheid type occupation, continuing occupation, for the seven to ten years, and that they have the idea that they can turn over Gaza to the Arab forces, who would act as Israel's policemen there, who would complete the job of eliminating the last vestiges of Hamas,

and then eventually turn it over to the Palestinian, a reconstituted Palestinian Authority, who would then in perhaps seven to ten years start negotiations with Israel, possibly about some form of Palestinian state. I actually don't think they believe their own narrative. I mean, on this. I don't really, I don't think,

and that's why I think we have quite noticeable silence, from that sort of dissident element. Yes, they'd like to find a way back to some sort of the normal or where they were. But we all know, look, there are many of particularly the Gulf Arabs, you know, you sit them down late at night

and they have a glass of whiskey in their hand, and they'll tell you how awful Hamas and Hezbollah are and that they're dangers to the world and everything. Okay. But are they actually going to put Jordanian troops or UAE troops into Gaza to kill Palestinians who disagree with this proposition? You know, that's a different issue. They're quite good at saying, well, yes, you know, maybe we can see a way somehow when there's a Palestinian state in ahead.

We could do these things. But I really, you know, I don't think it's. So I think actually there is a sort of. weakness there. And so the question which I will leave you on unanswered is, why was this done? Well, fascinating. Extraordinary. I cannot remember, Alice, you have a much better knowledge of the history here. I cannot remember a situation where the United States has negotiated a peace deal with an Arab adversary of Israel, which Hamas. unequivocally is in this way against, without in fact consulting Israel

and going behind Israel's back. Now that, it seems to me, whatever the politics behind it, that is an extraordinary fact in itself. And would it be going too far to say a kind of victory for Hamas and a very alarming development indeed for Israel?

I think that's very possible. Let me put a sort of best perspective on it. I think there was sort of in the White House mind, I mean the collective mind, sort of an idea that we could get to some sort of calm in Gaza by a little slate of hand, admittedly. but they could sort of, you know, twist the narrative a little bit. And, you know, who knows they could sort of try and keep that going till November.

But I think the key thing was a sort of sense of calm and to stop the rougher process, because as you may recall quite separately in this, the State Department has to issue a certificate, about whether Israel is in compliance with international law in its use of American weapons. And that's been postponed, I think, twice now. And it's obviously not an easy thing to do. And I think some of the language we've heard at the Holocaust Memorial and even now

is sort of trying to prepare the ground for how they're going to ask. answer that question. So I think probably it's more about the American domestic issue, but what you say, I think, is quite right. I mean, sometimes these very clever negotiating tactics, and I know from better experience, actually back far and do the opposite to what you want them to do. judging from what I'm seeing, it's too early now, but judging from what I've seen today and everything, I think it's actually going to harden the line by the Netanyahu.

And I'm always adding, and his allies, because everything in the West is sort of focused that Netanyahu's the problem, that it's only about him. But he actually does represent a substantial plurality of Israeli opinion on all these key issues

about Hamas, about going into the rougher, about the danger, the existential danger that Israel is facing. And indeed, I see that, you know, in some parts of the Israeli press, you know, this fear, the fear that they're in some sort of beginnings of a new Holocaust unfolding, for which I do not agree. I mean, I see no evidence of this at all.

Hamas is not about that. The resistance is not about that. But I accept that that is an authentic view of a large proportion of Israelis. My problem is that the West doesn't seem to take that into account sufficiently. They take it into account as if it's just. the old days when, you know, the secular, Europeanized Ashkenazi were in control, and they don't see that it's become so much an eschatological. I just want to say that some very briefly about,

because I use this word eschatological and people sort of look and say, well, why is it eschatological? It's this. I mean, there was this huge shift. And I think I've mentioned it to you before when we saw the Mishrahim come into office at this last election. And just to be clear, that originally the Mishraim were in a minority, and Ashkenazi were about 80%. And now it's inverted. And the Mishraim are, the underclass, are now a small majority, but they have a clear majority.

and they're in the cabinet, have prominent positions in the cabinet. And the point about it was that from the time of Begit, the Mishrahi were brought in, first of all, to the Ergun, and then into the Likud, to be the backbone of the Likud. And now effectively almost sort of are Likud in many respects. and what is their platform when they came in with their radical platform? Three main things. One is establish Israel on the land of Israel.

That means river to the sea, militarily dominance river to the sea. That's the land of Israel. In fact, it goes up probably to the litany, maybe even a bit of the Sinai. Then those are not so clear. Then the second, build the temple, the third temple. Just to be clear, the first one meant no Palestinian state. The second one was about knocking down Alaksa, and the third one was to institute halakic law,

the Talmudian law, in other words, the biblical law, which includes the need to fight against Amalek from Isaiah, the book of Isaiah. Where in that is sort of secular European liberalism in that gender? It's not there. No wonder it's come to a sort of biblical interpretation as they sort of feel threatened. I mean, it's not, you know,

and we keep on going and thinking, trying to deal with us in our traditional, secular, instrumental way. Oh, no, we need a two-state solution. when it's quite clear that there's no support for that. As we are today in Israel, in the circumstances, it's not possible. I'm just going to quickly say before Glenn takes over that I can say for a fact, a lot of secular Jewish people in the West do not understand this either.

If you read what they say, they too, I think, are very much of the you, you know, that they're talking about an Israel that was. They still believe that it's the Israel that was. So there's this difficult and unpleasant man, Mr. Netanyahu, who's running things. If we can just find some way to get him out, then all will be well. You see that with people like Chuck Schumer talking in that way. And absolutely, what you've described is a completely eschatological point of view. I would say even an apocalyptic one, in fact, but there it is. Glenn? I just want to, I agree, obviously, with what you said.

I just wanted to ask about the American position on this, because, well, whenever you speak to Americans, they always make this point that during election year, everything is treated through the lens of the election. Obviously, the student protests are, as you mentioned, it's not a good look for the Biden administration, as well as the crackdowns. But it's the wider challenges.

Obviously, the absence of a more secular Israel now and the inability to work with people like Netanyahu and the people he represents, but also more of the wider shifts in the international system because the new, well, this behavior of Israel has become a burden for the United States in his partnership with Arab states, especially than Saudi Arabia.

As we see now with China coming into the region, the Americans are very eager to lock down, we'll get more loyalty from the Saudi. And Israel appears to be a spoiler in a lot of the greater objectives by the Americans. So I was just wondering from the domestic problems to less secular Israel, to the regional and global shift,

shifts of power. Is this a huge shift in American, do you see a shift in American position, how if they are in terms of their relationship with Israel, or is this merely, you know, Biden wanting to wash his hands a little bit of, you know, the genocide, which is to large extent supported in Gaza? Oh, I mean, I think first of all, you know, I, the son. sort of strange, but in a way, it is eschatological in another sense. The Americans have had an ideological, a teleological, ideological, ideological predilection for secularism.

I remember complaining to Madeline Albright after the Camp David sessions with Arafat, and I said to her, you know, why on earth did you not allow Arafat to telephone regional leaders, Islamic leaders around the world about your proposals to divide Haram al-Sharif, Temple Malin, horizontally giving sovereignty to the top layer and sovereignty to someone else. And she just turned around me and said, we had a rule at State Department. We were not allowed to consider any religious aspect to policies. It was to be entirely secular. And we had something rather the same about Iraq, you know, when the...

when the American new Weissroy arrived in Iraq. He said, look, I don't know nothing about this country. I know nothing about his culture. I don't want to know anything about it because I'm an expert in neoliberal politics, and this is what I'm here to do, to give you a neoliberal economy and constitution. So I think there's an element. But what I want to say was two things, which is about this. going out, you're talking about the big picture now, moving it out.

You know, at the end of the Second World War, we had the first favor of independence, anti-colonialism, against the colonial powers, Britain and France and others. Germany, too, trying to do that. And then, now we are in a sort of the next phase of, if you like, of an anti-colonialian backlash. This time, not against, you know, literal colonialism as practiced by the British in India, for example, but against the rules order, against hegemonic, if you like, colonialism, financialized colonialism rather than sort of boots on the ground, colonialism of the past. And what changes it so dramatically, of course, is that,

that one of those who suffered a long period of colonial humiliation is now a leading superpower, China, after its year, a century of humiliation at the British and the other colonial past, is now a leading superpower and one of the main participants in the bricks. So there is a very different atmosphere, a very different context. You know, Israel is seen as a very late entry settler colonial project in the region. And it has not been able to come to terms with the indigenous population. Some places settler colonialism did work, like in Brazil, where the people, Portuguese had a policy of marry into the indigenous population,

whereas the Spanish in northern South America went in and killed the population. So there's been two different sort of, there are different approaches. But, I mean, this is what they have. And so the rest of the world sees us through this lens. and I think increasingly a lot of young people in America see it through the same lens of, if you like, colonial settler project, which is engaged in eliminating the indigenous population. And this is, I mean, it's not just awkward for the, I think, the electoral process in America. I mean, this is touching on really deep, you know, issues in the United States, going back to their civil war and going back even further. And all of the placeholders, the institutional leaders of the United States, are, for obvious reasons, either as pro-Zionist or evangelical.

I'm talking about in Congress and in the Senate and in the big institutional for reasons of contributions to campaigns, but also the simple part that that and the CIA and other elements of the structure have. And increasingly, I think it's not just, I mean, I don't want to go too far in America because I don't go there and I leave it to others to give it. But it's getting a wider, if you like, fracturing politics

in unforeseen ways in the United States. I mean, Alexander, you know America much better than I do. But I think it's really actually, you know, something much bigger. I mean, it threatens to undo the United States. in a certain way and undo its relationship with the rest of the world because increasingly Europe and America, and I think I've heard you say this, finds itself sort of coming to war with the rest of the world.

I mean, China, Russia and, you know, pretty well everyone. And we're now isolated in a little, you know, in our sort of steadfast redoubt of people. support for this project as the post-imperial powers and the rest of the world is deeply hostile. And I think it's causing huge and has a potential to cause much greater ructions, both in Europe and America, but perhaps you'd like to. I agree with that. I mean, I think we were talking about the changes in Israel. the changes in the United States are also there

and they're pulling Israel and the United States apart at a kind of social level. The institutions, it seems to be the two, are still very interconnected. But the United States is dealing with the different Israel from the one that it was used to. It's not the Israel of Ben-Gurian and the mayor any longer. And Israel is finding,

that the United States is also changing, as the United States changes internally because the demographic balance is changing, but also as the United States finds that its global position is very different from what it used to be, even, you know, 10, 50, 20 years ago. It is finding it very difficult to adjust to a modern, a changing world.

And it's also, and the political institutions within the United States are also finding it very difficult to adjust to the changes that are taking place inside the United States also. So there are all these tensions that are building up and the political class in the United States doesn't understand how to navigate through them

because they have their own ideology, ideological, conception of the future, which is now becoming increasingly outdated and isn't working anymore. So this is why you see this, these strange push-pull policies in the Middle East. So I think you're absolutely correct. But if we go back to Israel, the new Israel that is emerging out of this, As I said, with all these eschatological visions, with this critical mass of people who apparently are holding them

and who appear to be getting stronger, it's risking isolation as well at a time when it appears to be feeling very frightened about itself. That is a very, very, very, alarming combination of things, given both the eschatological views that you speak of, which are unquestionably there since we first had our discussion. I can see that, absolutely. So both those views and recent Jewish history, it does make one very, very worried indeed about where all this is

going and what Israel might do. And I have been watching some of the commentaries made by people in Israel following the events, the almost agreed deal with Hamas. And I have to say hysteria, I think is, I don't think that is an overstatement of the response. I've never seen anything like this before. You're absolutely right and this is why I say that sometimes, you know, what seems such a clever little move in a negotiation on something that is so so crucial, you know, can turn out to have the opposite effect to what you think. And because, you know, what you say about being isolated, it's not so much about being isolated.

It is that the walls are closing in on Israel from really every direction, from Iran, from Iraq, from Lebanon, from the Houthis, from the economic situation that they're in. and that's why they're getting more and more concerned about it and why there's this furious reaction to the students in America because they see this is undermining them taking away their ability to do diplomatic defense as well as military defense. So what is the way out? there's not a very evident way out because it's clear that you know what was to be the sort of the savior, the Deo Sechrecha who would come out

of this was going to be Saudi Arabia. Well, it's quite clear that isn't going to work. I mean, it's not going to, you know, even the idea of a Saudi-American bilateral deal, you know, and then as preparatory, it's just not going to get through the Senate. You need 67 seats in the Senate for either the nuclear component to it or the defense component of it. And it's not quite clear what the defense component could be anyway.

So, I mean, as that becomes less clear, so it becomes less clear that there's a solution for the internal part. So how are you going to get people to go back to the north and to their homes in the north, as Hezbollah has been rather like Ukraine and in the same parallel, taking more territory, increasing its control over land. It has increased that to now 30 kilometers and alongside Gaza. And ordinary Israelis are frightened to go back. And you see this clearly when Ashley, my wife was looking and what's how. happening to these displaced people. I mean, the first of this month was when they had to inscribe for school.

Well, no one is inscribed for the school year in the north. I mean, they've all inscribed for school in the areas in which they're now living and to which they've been displaced. So it gives you the sense that people are, you know, having to already starting to readjust to something that's not going to change or they don't expect it to change. You know, when you start putting your children in new schools, it's not to sort of pluck them out in the next few months and put them somewhere else. It's not, you know, that's just not normal human being, human behavior. So I don't think so. So all of this means that the only

way out is escalation. I believe that we are going to see a wider war and escalation. It's being carefully controlled by the axis of resistance not to try and allow it to become, you know, a real world war. But it is in some ways, it seems in some ways inevitable unless, unless Israel can come to the final, to the conclusion that the way out of this, the only way out of this, the only way out of this, is to finally do what is unavoidable eventually, it's not certainly possible now, will be to talk to Iran and find a way of living in the land between the river and the sea as ordinary citizens, just as Jews lived in Iran for 300 years, with the same rights, the same citizenship, sometimes even better citizenship conditions than the indigenous population. And to give up that aspect of Israel, which was the special rights, the special privileges,

the sort of striated levels of politics, of the political, the administrative, the territory, the security levels all being sort of kept in separate and with no boundaries. and radical insecurity for Palestinians and radical security only for Israelis and settlers. But it's very hard. I know that people in Europe keep talking about the two-state solution. But one of the things that when I was in Israel at the time, Ariel Sharon got his number,

his former intelligence officer, Rafi Aetan, he's quite well known as a figure, to take me around the settlements. I was a bit puzzled at the offer, but it was made, and Itern, when we went to these settlements, said to the people, you know, this is the guest of the Prime Minister,

and he's instructed you should speak absolutely free, see whatever you like, say it clearly, no problems. And they did. And my God, you know, they are nuts. I'm sorry to say this. They are absolute zealots and they are armed zealots. And there are three quarters of a million of them on that area.

And the IDF that occupies the West Bank is now mostly from settler families anyway. Where do all these people think? How do the people think they're going to deal with that when they talk about a second a two-state solution. I mean, you know, when I came back and it answered to me, did you understand why you were sent? And I said, I got it, yes, I understand it. It would be an absolute bloodbath for anyone, Israel or anyone else to try and take

those people out. They are going to, I mean, they're absolutely fundamentalist in the extreme. They're cultists, really, some of them. Not all, but not all settlers like that. But I mean, you know, it's just ignored in the West. You know, they go on talking about it and they say, oh, well, yes. So where's the second state going to be then, people, you know, gentlemen? Tell us where it's going to lie.

And they say, oh, well, you know, the two-state solution and all of that. But that finished 20 years ago, I'm afraid. And since then, it has been, you know, the whole Oslo process with which I'm very familiar, because I was involved with it for many years. I mean, was a process designed to preclude a Palestinian state from emerging. The pillars in which it rested were all carefully down that at the last resort, everything depended on the decision of Israel. No one else, not America, not the Europeans, just Israel.

had to decide whether it was content with the next stages before it got. That's how it was designed. But, you know, you can't go back to that now. It's not really viable. So I think we're in for a period of some form of turmoil. You know, it is possible, I guess, that, you know, the government might fall. But then, you know, who's going to replace Netanyahu? it's not so clear,

but when Gans went to Washington, and there was a great excitement in Washington that he was there, and everyone thought he was going to say, oh, you know, this terrible Mediahu and USA, and he said to them, look, you know, of course I'd like to be Prime Minister. Why not? It's a nice thing to do, isn't it,

to be Prime Minister? But I have to tell you, you know, I support all the program. of the government. And what is more, I don't think there would be any difference if I were Prime Minister in the broad elements of it from what is happening now. And, you know, jaws sort of fell to the floor. I think in Washington wasn't quite what they were hoping or expecting. But it was the reality. So I don't see. And so, you know, the next phase I imagine is Israel will try and do what it's said is the main task in which it will be very difficult for America to object to, which is to annihilate Hamas. And in that, they will probably fail.

You mentioned that escalation is the most likely reaction by Israel. But this seems to also be an area where it's becoming more difficult as compared to in the past to get Americans along. and obviously going to war with Hezbollah is something they would be cautious about, but as I just pointed out, the much more important player here is obviously Iran. And here we see the United States seemingly made great efforts to avoid a direct war between Iran and Israel, which could have pulled in the Americans. And this, I would assume, is something that Israel is what I'm welcomed. But going back to that strike, after the Israelis bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus,

we saw this Iranian strike on Israel. Now, this whole event has been very polarized in the media. If we watch British TV host like Pierce Morgan, this main pitch is effectively, well, the Israeli pitch, which is Israel is all powerful. They shut down everything. It showed that Iran was weak. Obviously, the counter argument would be that this was not a real attack,

and it wasn't really sustainable the way the U.S. and Israel is shut down these drones. But of course, narratives are to large extent everything, especially for Israel, when all-powerful Israel is important to its deterrents strike. So I understand that the politicians and their supporters in the media have to kind of repeat this, but, well, we're not politicians. We can't speak a bit more freely. So I was therefore wondering how did you read this whole event? And to what extent is it possible to keep Iran at bay and keep this sustainable strategy, if you will, to manage? similar conflicts with Iran in the future.

Okay, well, the first part of your question, I'll just address quickly. I don't believe for a minute that America will cut off the weapons supply. I mean, they may slow walk it a little bit now just for domestic reasons, but, you know, all those people we talked about who occupy the institutional commanding heights of America won't allow it. They're already rebelling, if you look at the morning press, They're already saying this must have been, Johnson said, perhaps this is a senior moment by the president. He forgot what the right lines are when he said, no, you know, we're going to halt the weapon.

I don't think that is. And so it won't affect either Gaza or Lebanon as such. Whatever the plans are, I'm not saying, you know, that I know what state intend, but there will not be, I think. When you're talking about Iran, now I think you, I think we've all sort of forgotten, you know, the context of Iran in that if you just go back to the beginning of the last century, I mean, Iran was the powerhouse of the region, a huge country, very strong under the Shah. The Americans had to deal with it. everyone went to it. What were the Gulf states were sort of Bedouin tribes of very little part. And then in 2006, really, and a little earlier, but 2006 somehow is a sort of anchor point.

When Prince Bandar persuaded Dick Cheney that the weak link for Iran now was Syria, and that if we take out Syria, it was as good as if you like, a coup d'etat taking place in in Tehran. And the point here about this, I don't want to go into it too much, but the point was that previously it was a sort of Persian power in the Middle East. And then they were arguing to invert it to becoming a Sunni Islamic primacy in the region, a monarchical Sunni primacy in the region, and the Americans went along with it. I mean, it has an old history going back to the clean break document, but it was, you know, this.

And what happened on the 13th of April was it turned back again to where it had been, because Iran effectively announced, well, we are ready now. We have done our preparations after what they call the imposed war, the Iran-Iraq War. Iran spent the next decades actually working to prepare a deterrence. They moved everything that was sensitive underground. They built missiles. They developed drones. They developed their technology and engineering capability.

And now on the 13th of April, this is what happened. It wasn't an assault on Israel, but it was a very clear message to Israel and the rest of the region. and the United States, because I can say with quite some confidence, that nine of those ballistic missiles, or at least their detached warheads that were hypersonic, arrived where they were intended to arrive. They were not intended to do huge damage. They were not intended to kill people. They were intended to say, this is possible, and we can send one of these. to within 30 kilometers of Daimona, where the nuclear, Israel's nuclear center is based. And we are ready now. We're in a new phase. And this is the new equation.

If you attack Iran or our personnel, our officials elsewhere in the region, then we will attack from Iran directly into Israel. there has been a huge effort to muddy the waters and say, oh, you know, the drones were all knocked down. The drones were put up principally by Iran to gain, as usual, information about radar capabilities, where the radars were based and, you know, the capabilities of Israel. And it cost, you know, this huge sum to shoot down these, you know, thousands. dollar worth of drones. They have plenty of notice. It takes nearly four hours for a drone to fly at its slow speed from Iran to Israel.

And the Americans used their planes, and they were mostly shot down, not by the Israelis, but by sidewinder, air-to-air missiles from the Americans. and the point is that the people who need to know, no. The media will tell you a different story and say, oh, no, it was nothing like that. The message is we are ready now, and that is quite a serious message, and it means the inversion of the region in terms of a power structure, and not just for Israel, but I think Saudi Arabia and others have, have to notice it.

And in fact, one of the paradoxes when everyone was hyping in the press about, you know, Blinken being in Riyadh for that economic forum, there was also the central bank of Iran sitting in a separate from negotiating with the central bank of Saudi Arabia, new arrangements, and there was a breakthrough in terms of trade. So clearly Saudi is thinking, you know, which is the direction of travel for this world? And where are we going and who's going to be, you know, the big power in the future? And, you know, it's only the first signal has come. But it's an important and a powerful one.

And Iran goes on saying very strong things. It's said the head of IRGC, who was there for the 40th day anniversary of the death of those people in Syria. And he said, well, we may decide to close down the East Mediterranean. And they can do it. And you recall that at the same time that that was going on with the missiles, it just happened by serendipitously that they needed to arrest, a tanker in the Straits of Hormuz, which was another message to the West about its economy and how vulnerable it is with the Houthis sitting on the Red Sea and Iran sitting on

the Hormuz. So, you know, we've got this big shift taking place. And again, you know, there doesn't seem to be any discussion of it. There doesn't seem to be any understanding of it. Of course, you know, there are people who know who do know. But, I mean, you know, it's not assimilated. It's not. So, you know, you get the paradox of, you know, the Americans saying to the Saudis

and the Gulf states, oh, you know, the answer to what's going on and what's happening is you have to buy more of our Patriot missile defenses, the ones that work so well in Ukraine, the ones that protected you so well in 2020. 2019 at Al-Qaik, the Aramco oil facilities. I mean, by all means, by some more of our air defenses, that, you know, I think there's a sort of condescension in that. They assume that the Saudis are not talking to the Iranians. They are talking to the Iranians all the time. And they're obviously talking to Russia. And Russia is one of those states that does know.

Absolutely. Can I say that you actually anticipated the question I was going to ask. Because as a Greek, I am perfectly well aware of Iran. I mean, Greeks know about Iran. I mean, Iran has been an absolutely integral part of our history. Do the Americans, and especially the Israelis, know what they would be taking on if they took on Iran? not just a major historic power and colossal cultural influence across the Middle East, one which has been a power and a presence in the Middle East for longer than there has been a Europe, by the way, just saying. But a major technological industrial power as well.

And a huge country. with a highly educated population and one which is clearly on the upswing. We had a discussion, Glenn Dyson and I, with Saadmahmahmrandi, whom I think you know. And, you know, we had a discussion about the fact that 2023 for Iran was something of a miracle year. Their economy is booming after, you know, many years of sanctions. The sanctions wars are now coming apart. They've joined the bricks. They've had established a relationship with the Saudis.

They're able to talk to the Saudis. They're clearly in the ascendant. And they have diplomatic skills and resources that I don't think any other state in the region has. do the Israelis really, do they understand this? I mean, especially when people spin narratives about Iranian missiles and drones being duds and failures. Because if one thing has become so clear from the Ukrainian crisis, is that narratives, false narratives, propaganda narratives, can become deadly. traps for those who spin them in the sense that you become trapped inside your narrative. And it's very, very difficult that once the narrative is established to start working outside it.

So again, just the question, I mean, maybe in the US, some people understand. But does the United States government understand the kind of adversary that Iran potentially is? And more pertinently, since you talked about Israel embarking on escalation, do the Israelis understand what they would be taking on if they took on Iran? I mean, it's not NASA's Egypt, which in 1967 Israel so comprehensively outmatched. Just ask me. I mean, these are the most profound ones, a question. and once that you and I have been asking, as we watched Ukraine unfold,

with the sort of extraordinary denial that you see amongst the ruling classes of Europe and America. And I think that, you know, they have become so comfortable into their sort of ideological mindset about the future. and so, if you like, condescending to seeing that the rest of us are sort of people that need their guidance and that we really don't understand what's going on in the world. And that therefore, you know, they can't change their position because this would be somehow a betrayal of their leadership. that they are leaders, they have this vision of the future, whether you call it Davos or whatever you like, blue or something or revolutionary.

They have this view, and that they can't go away because that would mean disorder, internal disorder. It would provoke disorder and chaos, because they're the only ones that can take it forward, because they're the only ones that know it and they have it. And the rest of us are prone to such things as populism and sort of misunderstanding and to disorder. And they can't allow disorder.

It would be, in a sense, a sort of betrayal of their role. So they find it so hard to do that. So they don't really want to know that these things are going wrong because it implies that, you know, the disorder is gaining ground. And so it's much easier to say that the student protests are prompted by Putin and by Iran and by China. Z, I mean, is a terrible person. And so, you know, it's all external because they can't cope with the sense of the challenge to their guidance and their such clear conceptualization with the DEI vision of the future. So I think it is very hard.

I think some people, as you say, in America, do get it about Iran. But this, I mean, this, you know, ideological iron framework is so strong that people just can't move on from it. And, I mean, it's been so obvious when we look at Russia and what's, you know, that even now you see the most extraordinary things, you know, being presented. And I think we're not going to get through this until there has been some sort of catharsis in the West. And I think that is coming because, you know, we're going to face defeats. I mean, not just that the whole narrative and the whole notion of Ukraine is going to be

discredited, but also, you know, in the Middle East, it's going to be a nasty mess. But finally, and this is the most important thing, was when Yellen goes to Beijing and says, you know, please curb your overcapacity because it's hurting it. It's saying we've been defeated economically too. I mean, not just in that, in a fundamental way, not about trade and tariffs, but we're just uncompetitive, so uncompetitive now. we couldn't begin to re-industrializing model because we're so far, you know, away from that. Now, we've, you know, after two decades of the sort of financialized model, which has driven out the real economy, deprived it to the full oxygen and offshoreed anything that was, you know, making anything. I mean, you know, that's what the European Union says it now needs to do, which, shows you just how stupid things are, it would take 20 years to start. It would be a cultural upheaval

to, you know, I mean, I live here in Italy and think, do you see Italians going to go back and working in a tank factory? I mean, it's just not going to happen, and it would take trillions which they haven't got. That's why they're trying to seize all the Russian assets at the moment because we in Europe just don't have the money to go on, you know, picking up the pieces from Ukraine when it comes apart. So it's a real problem, this sort of denial, I think, real problem is leading us to potentially to all sorts of disastrous places. I don't want to seem too gloomy, and I'm not really because I think, you know, this is how, you know, renewal takes place. You have to go through

the unpleasant process of tensions and crisis before you can really start. And you can never see the new shoots which makes it so frustrating is you can never see the new shoots until

too late because if you could see the green shoots then a steamroller would have been run over them within minutes so that you wouldn't ever see them again. So, I was going to be a big concern as well, this wishful thinking, because this wishful thinking that something will just disrupt in Moscow or Beijing,

and we will be able to go back to the way things work with the 90s being, obviously, the golden era we want to retreat to. But this wishful thinking, it's so dangerous because it fails. We linked it into patriotism now, that if you just subscribe to this wishful, thinking, then this is how you express your loyalty to the in-group as it was. But there's an inability now, it seems, to adjust to the new realities. I remember I wrote a book back in 2015, which I wrote about this geo-economic partnership

forming between China and Russia. It was very difficult to present and argue for it because it was just dismissed all over as, well, this is a marriage of convenience. Obviously, they're going to clash over Central Asia because they both want hegemony. And so it's not durable. In one to two years, this will be all blown over. And so, again, this wishful thinking. And then now suddenly, nearly 10 years later, we're realizing, oh, the sanctions can't sink Russia anymore because they have diversified their economic connectivity.

And it's just we could have adjusted to this. And the Ukraine war, all this lies, which are easily proven as being lies, they have prevented. course correction, which will be actually in our interest. Now we see the same applied to the idea that the Chinese could be crippled. They could just take away the access to chips. You know, they wouldn't be able to replace them. Iran being this mediocre power, which obviously also can't even launch a proper missile. All of this is just very dangerous self-delusion, though, it would seem to me.

I agree. I mean, having just come back from Russia, I mean, you know, you see, you see the planning and the development is across. I mean, to Siberia and the Euroles, there are 20 year, 40 year plans. It's not just new roads or a train here. It is different power structures. It's really a sort of an awakening giant sort of happening because it's so large and so diverse. And suddenly there's a sort of change. People were very disorientated after the peristroval. perestroika years and that awful period of neoliberalism. And now suddenly, paradoxically, the Ukraine had a lot to do with it. The Ukrainian war has suddenly given this sort of great push towards Russia being itself

in this new way and finding where it is in the world and being comfortable in it, comfortable with a situation economically, but comfortable with itself. It's sorted out its internal problems. I mean, you know, there are, of course, still tensions and things like that. But everyone understands now that there are boundaries. Stay within your boundary and you're fine. But don't sort of cross your boundary because that invites trouble. And so you have, you know, there's still liberals and there are still conservatives, but they don't, I can't say they become bosom buddies, but they keep to their boundaries and the thing is going ahead very strongly. So, yes, no, there's no sort of sense of that.

I'm just going to throw in my very last point, which actually flows very well from your last one, which is that, of course, the Russians have retained some of their organization, and managerial and planning skills. And as somebody who, in a peripheral way, was involved with industry, long ago, long, long, long ago. I can say that this is another massive problem. It wouldn't just take 20 years to rebuild factories. You have to engage in, you have to go back to planning

because industry requires planning. You have to build infrastructure. You have to completely reorganize your entire managerial outlook. You'd have to rewrite all the economic textbooks. It would be an impossible thing conceptually for the Europeans of today and the Americans of today to do. If they try, they will fail. It won't work because they don't know how to do it. Yeah, yeah.

No, I agree. I mean, you know, there was that extraordinary discussion between Zee and Putin some years ago, I remember Z. And it was so interesting because Zee was giving his reasons why he thought the Soviet Union had failed. And he said, you stop believing in your own principles, and you succumb to nihilism. And nihilism has sunk you. and he was saying, in effect, you went down the Western route, and that was your big mistake. That's what really did you in because you went to the Western route. And Putin turned around, and he said to Z, no, you are absolutely right and why we so much admire your model and how you've managed to keep economic creativity, but within the sort of framework of national.

needs. And so, I mean, the real sort of dilemma is, you know, the West complains about China and Russia because it's not following the Israeli model. And there, China and Russia together was saying that, thank God you didn't follow the, you went away from the American and the Anglo model, the Anglo model rather than the European model, because it was particularly in Anglo-Saxon sort of construct. And so they're evolving something, going back to the 19th century and Vitti and others, for a different model. And we all think they've made this huge mistake by abandoning, you know,

the Western liberal economic, the Adam Smith type of model. And they have. and they see that is the failure, the exact opposite. Thank God, says Z, to Putin, that you've given up on that model, because that's the only way to save yourself now. Yeah. My final comment, I guess, I was thinking when you spoke earlier about something kissing the world in 2014 when the crisis began to break up with Russia,

and he wrote that, you know, if we consider Russia to be, a great power, which we should, then the focus should be on how to learn to coexist and harmonize our interests with them and effectively walk away from this idea that security is advanced by defeating Russia, that this is something we have to abandon. And I think this was also more important to have an honest discussion about, obviously China is a great power, but also now if Iran fits within this kind of. category as well, because this former idea is that if we can only have a regime change or we can just defeat them through a proxy, then things will go back to normal.

It seems not a very good approach to security anymore as this new multipolar system emerges. One day, we'll arrive there, but it will take quite some time. We have to go back to address the lacuna that arose at the time of the fall. of the Berlin Wall, where we made no arrangements for security, architecture and understanding between the two spheres that were now emerging. And eventually, the West has to come, and America principally, I suppose, has to come to a negotiation about what is the North Atlantic national interest, and the modus vivendi with the heartland, security, and economic interest, the whole of Central Asia.

And there has to be, you know, Russia touched on this in 21. And of course, it's unacceptable to the United States today and to Europe today. But sooner or later, there's got to be a discussion about how to have some sort of modus vivendi between the Rimland and the heartland in terms of their security needs and their sort of economic interest. But it's a long way off, unfortunately. I agree. I think that's a good place maybe. Yeah, I'd like to finish on that Mekindrian spirit as well.

So, yeah, thank you so much, Alexander and Alastair. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me and hosting it.