The Duran Podcast - The Peace Agreement to End the Ukraine War - w/ George Beebe, former CIA Director of Russia Analysis

Episode Date: January 18, 2025

The Peace Agreement to End the Ukraine War - w/ George Beebe, former CIA Director of Russia Analysis

Hi everyone and welcome. My name is Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris and George Beebe, a former CIA director of Russia Analysis and now the director at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, which by the way has excellent publications and at least my go-to-source for great analysis. Bebe is also the author of the Russia trap from 2019, how I'm our shadow war with Russia could spiral into nuclear catastrophe. So, again, something we all ought to be reading. Welcome. It's good to see you both again.

Thank you very much. So our topic today is an article written by you, George Beebe, for the irresponsible statecraft, and it's about how we can end the war in nuclear. Ukraine, what would be the conditions around the peace negotiations, how could the U.S. have some negotiate from strength? So a lot of these issues. And I thought perhaps we could start off by you outlining your key argument, perhaps. Well, sure.

What I was trying to do in the article was to point out that the approach that the Biden administration has taken to this war, Even prior to the actual invasion in February of 2022, has been counterproductive. First, it increased the likelihood of the invasion happening. But once it occurred, it actually made it less likely that we could resolve this conflict at the negotiating table. And I tried to point out, you know, what were the flawed assumptions behind the Biden administration's approach and what Trump needs to do in order to maximize the likelihood that we can find a compromise settlement, one that the Russians buy into, the Ukrainians buy into, and Europe supports. Now, the other key player in this, which I did not get into in the article, but which is

probably the most difficult part of all of this, is Washington. has got to convince Washington's foreign policy establishment to get on board. And that may be even more difficult than convincing the Russians, Ukrainians, and our allies in Europe to buy into some sort of compromise. And there's a lot of challenge that I think awaits Trump as he undertakes this effort, which I think is absolutely necessary. I think there has got to be a settlement of this war, the alternatives to that are much worse than the compromises that are going to be necessary to end this war at the negotiating table. So Trump is absolutely right in trying to seek an end to this war. But that does not mean it's going to happen just because we want it to happen. There are

going to be some big challenges ahead. Now, what kind of leverage do we have in all of this? that's, you know, a big question. I started to get into it in the article. But I think the biggest thing that we've got to do is reframe our understanding of the dynamics of this conflict. I think the Biden administration from the very beginning framed this conceptually as a conflict between Ukraine and Russia. And they felt that this war could end in several ways. could sort of coerce the Russians into ending the invasion. We tried to do that through sanctions by trying to isolate Russia diplomatically in the world.

That was an abysmal failure. We could not twist Putin's arm into essentially saying, gee, sorry, I'm going to capitulate to your demands and end this invasion. Or we thought we could put the Ukrainians in such a strong position on the battlefield that they can either win this war outright, drive the Russians off of Ukraine's land, or have the upper hand in what would essentially be a bilateral negotiation between Ukraine and Russia. And I think that was a conceptual failure on our part. This war, from the very beginning, has not been primarily about bilateral.

issues between Ukraine and Russia. Sure, those are an aspect of this conflict. Yes. Those are things that do need to be addressed. But that is not the key to finding a settlement to this war. The big issue at stake here is Europe's security architecture, Russia's place in that architecture, and Ukraine's place in that architecture. And the Russians have been, I think, quite candid about their views on all of this. And unless we're willing to address that broader issue, we're not going to find a solution to this conflict at the negotiating table. It's as simple as that.

So if Trump is going to find a way out here, we're going to have to deal with that broader issue. Now, interestingly, from my point of view, we have a lot more leverage when we approach this. as a broader geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West, than we do, if we're looking at this as a narrow battlefield contest between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine is overmatched, has been from the very beginning.

We seem to think that we could provide some sort of magic technological solution that would allow Ukraine to win this war over Russia. And I don't think that was ever a realistic possibility. But when it comes to this broader question of Europe's security architecture, the broader balance of national power between Russia and the West, we've got a lot more leverage over this. The Russians can't solve the problems that they're facing from NATO and from the United States just by winning over the Ukrainian army, which they're going to do in one way or another. I think that's abundantly clear at this point. The question is sort of the nature of that victory over the Ukrainians. But, you know, even if they were to conquer all of Ukrainian territory, which I don't think they can do, number one, I don't think they want to do.

Number two, I think they're too smart to try to achieve that. But even if they were, hypothetically, they would still have an enormous security problem with NATO that they can't solve militarily. they have to talk to us. There's got to be some understandings reached diplomatically about the balance of power, the various diplomatic safeguards that govern European security. The only way they can get that is by talking to us,

and they want to talk to us. I think that's one of the things that Washington has misunderstood over the past decade plus. The Russians want a big, strategic negotiation with the United States over all of this. So if we approach things in that broader context, we have a lot more cards to play, and I think better prospects for success. Now, the bad news and all of this for Trump is you don't negotiate those bigger issues, which are very complex, very difficult issues. You don't fix that in a

day or 100 days were six months. This is a much bigger challenge. One that I think is ultimately soluble. We can manage these issues, but it's going to take a while, and it's going to take a lot of diplomatic skill, and it's going to require the United States reawakening some of its diplomatic traditions that have been dormant, I think, for 25 years or longer, where in the aftermath of the Cold War, we thought that our challenge in the world was to democratize other countries, reform them, transform them, and also find bad guys, find terrorists, and kill them or arrest them. That's a much different approach to foreign policy than dealing with great power peers or near peers or rivals, you're not going to defeat them. You're not going to defeat a

country with the world's largest nuclear arsenal. You're going to have to find a way to balance power to find a way of balancing interests. And I do think that's possible with the Russians. If we approach this with the right skill, understand conceptually the problems we're dealing with, and bring to bear some statecraft that the United States, you know, hasn't had a lot of practice in applying for some time. Well, can I just say a few things, firstly, which is that, firstly, I think people should absolutely read responsible statecraft. You get incredibly good articles.

And I think that your article is an example of the quality of articles that people will find there. And it's most interesting reading that article a few days ago and then comparing it with a press conference that Lavrov gave just two days ago because so much of the things that you have been saying they're not identical because he's coming to things with a different perspective, but they do chime in some ways

with the points that you've been making. The first is, you're absolutely correct about the issue of the Western borders, Russia's Western borders. Lavrov said this is for us the single biggest security issue. It is the security of our Western borders. It's not the first time the Russians have said that. Putin made that very same point in a very big speech he gave to the Russian Foreign Ministry in, I think it was October 2021. before the crisis exploded.

He said the thing we most need to do is to come to a resolution of the problems, the security issues of our Western borders, because until we do, we cannot fully settle issues of our own internal development. It's an important speech which people always overlook, but it is all there. So Larov repeated that. He also, and this is the most hopeful part of all he, comments, he also spoke very warmly about the fact that the president-elect, Donald Trump, has understood what for the Russians has been the core issue. Or at least, he said the way

Lavrov put it was that Trump is looking at the sources of the problem. And those of his words, and he said the eastward extension of NATO, its expansion to our borders, Donald Trump is the first political leader in the West to have recognized this. And he says, we're looking forward, therefore, to listening to what he has to say. We understand that he has to be inaugurated first. But we are welcome, we welcome this recognition of these two issues. And we are prepared to meet with him. And we are prepared to talk with him constructively.

So that was the other thing, he said. Another third thing, which comes back to a point that is in your article, which is that you talked also about China. Because Lavrov, here, there is the difference in perspective, becomes even more stark. But he did talk a lot about the need for security guarantees, for a restructuring of the security architecture in Europe. But he said, we need to all understand the Eurasian context, which I felt reading his words means, you know, we've got to bring China in.

And in effect, that's not so different from what you say in your article. So the Russians have an interest in China coming in because China is their main ally at this moment in time. So they want China's support. But as you absolutely rightly say in your article, the Chinese. also have their own points of view, which are not identical to the Russians and which the United States could find common ground over. Now, I had a discussion recently with a friend of mine in China, and I said, look, the Americans have now appointed an envoy to look into this problem, who's General Kellogg. China also has an envoy who's also looking into this problem, who is

Lee Kwey, might it not be a good idea for the two to meet? And this person said, well, absolutely, it was like, you know, the light came on. Absolutely, let's do that. I think that would be very controversial. You said about the difficulties with Washington. I think it would be very, very controversial with many people in Washington admitting China into this discussion. It would be very controversial with people in Europe. But the point is that the points you made in that article of yours, irresponsible statecraft, they do seem to me, judging from Lavrov's words, to be things which the Russians would indeed be prepared to work with and which indeed could bring us towards some kind of peace, not just peace in Ukraine, but peace in Europe, which we

as Europeans, Glenn and I are Europeans, we as Europeans, ought to see as our priority. So those are my words, not perhaps a question, but perhaps you might want to say a few things in response to all of those.

Well, yeah, I agree with all of that. Certainly the Russians do have a different perspective on these things. They have a different set of interests from those of the United States. There are however significant areas where I believe American, European, and Russian interests overlap. We have an opportunity to work

with one another. There are areas where our interests are intentional with one another. There are areas where they're in conflict with one another. But I do think there's a significant portion of our interests that overlap with those of Russia. What examples could I cite? Well, number one, the United States wants to change the nature of the relationship that we have with our European allies. Trump has, I think, for many years said the utility of NATO for the United States has changed. As the world has changed, as the balance of power within the world has changed. We're not dealing with the Cold War, a Soviet threat anymore. That's what NATO was designed to do.

And, you know, it has a different purpose now. And we need to approach the alliance differently. And I think one of the things practically that that means is that the Europeans are going to have to bear more responsibility within the alliance for not just paying money into it, but actually having much more. of a leading role. No European has ever been supreme allied commander. That has always been an American military figure. Europeans have always been Secretary General,

the political leader of the alliance. I think we need to be moving toward a situation where we have a European as supreme allied commander and where the Europeans have much greater capability for counterbalancing Russia in all the dimensions of power that is required, not just military, but economic, diplomatic, etc., there needs to be a balance within Europe that the Europeans can provide much more independently than the United States. I think personally the United States ought to remain in NATO.

The alliance should not dissolve. I do think for Europe to take on greater responsibility within the alliance, the United States is going to have to do an awful lot to nurture Europe, to help them develop capabilities that they don't have right now. We can't just say, you know, over to you, you know, take over, good luck, keep in touch. I think that would be a formula for disaster, honestly, for the Europeans. But I do think strategically the United States needs to play less of a role in Europe so that it can focus more on other priorities.

And the two biggest ones are renewal at home, which is a big challenge for the United States, but also dealing with a geopolitical. challenge in China, which again is a very complex challenge. It's not just military. There are all kinds of dimensions of this. It's a challenge unlike what we faced from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We're going to have to deal with it somewhat differently, but it is going to require a lot more attention, a lot more resources. And the United States can't continue to play the kind of role it has in Europe, and it certainly can't be picking fights with the Russians to the degree that we have and still be able to deal with that broader challenge that China represents right now.

And I think the Russians basically agree with that, right? I think the Russians would prefer to see NATO much less U.S.-centric than it is. I think that is something that the Russians see is in their interest, too. So there's some overlap there between, I think, what the United States wants geostrategically in Europe and what the Russians would feel more comfortable with there. And that's something that I think we can work with. Now, China, you know, the United States, I think, largely through its own ineptitude and missteps, has encouraged a much closer and much more anti-American relationship. between Russia and China, then what would have developed otherwise had we approached this, I think, in a smarter way. Now, can the United States drive a wedge between Russia and China right now?

No, I don't think that's possible, and I think the degree to which we attempt to drive that wedge will actually be counterproductive. That said, a policy of dual hostility toward Russia and China, which we've pursued with increasing enthusiasm, I would have to say, has, I think, been detrimental to America's own self-interest. And I think we could realistically aspire to a situation where the United States has better relations with Russia and China. And they are not working together as closely against the United States as they have been recently and as they are on track to continue doing under present trends. So part of what I think makes sense for the United States is to talk to the Chinese about the situation in Ukraine.

I do think the Chinese want to talk to us about this for reasons that have everything to do with self-interest. From China's point of view, they don't want a situation where Russia and the United States are on the brink of nuclear conflict. The fallout, both figuratively and literally, from a conflict like that would inevitably hurt the Chinese. And the degree to which the conflict between Russia and the United States geopolitically

becomes increasingly a nuclear arms race, also greatly undermines China's own security, which I don't think they want to see at all either. Now, on top of that, I think the Chinese are concerned about their image in Europe. I think the perceptions in Europe, and you all can tell me whether my perceptions of this are accurate or not, but as I understand it, the Europeans have been increasingly inclined to view China as part of the problem in Ukraine, as supportive of Russia's war, being an enabler of Russia's military industry production. And that in turn has created or at least exacerbated an atmosphere in which broader relations between Europeans and China are increasingly strained.

And I don't think the Chinese are happy about that. My impression has been that as frictions with the United States have increased and as trade, between the United States and China has come under increasing pressure. The European market has been growing in importance to the Chinese. So part of the motivation I think they have in trying to play a role to end the conflict in Ukraine is because they want a better relationship with Europe for entirely understandable reasons of pragmatic self-interest, which is just fine. It's not a criticism from my point of view to say that the Chinese have a self-interest in finding a settlement in Ukraine.

But that's something I think the United States can work with. Now, my impression also is that the Chinese are not particularly happy with the Russians right now for a few reasons. And I don't want to exaggerate the degree of tension between Moscow and Beijing. But the effort that the Russians have made over the past several months to reach out to North Korea, sign the new treaty, increasingly cooperate with the North Koreans militarily, including getting direct support from the North Koreans. Now, the degree to which the North Koreans are actually fighting

against Ukrainians, I think is still something of a murky question. Nonetheless, from China's point of view, the degree to which the Russians are allied with North Korea is a matter of concern. I think their concern is that this might emboldened the North Koreans to undertake reckless activities on the peninsula that make the prospect of conflict their, greater rather than lesser. And that, of course, affects China's own security. It's not something

that they're particularly happy about, as I understand it. And I don't think the Russians have coordinated their outreach to North Korea with Beijing very closely. That's my impression. Second thing is the degree to which the North Koreans are involved in European security matters increases the likelihood that NATO will pursue an increasingly Indo-Pacific vocation, something that the United States has been urging NATO to do, to be increasingly active in Asia as a counterbalance against China. The Chinese obviously don't want to see NATO increasingly involved in Asia, and the degree to which the North Koreans are involving themselves in European affairs

only increases the likelihood that NATO will see a self-interest in getting more involved in Asian affairs. I don't think the Chinese are happy about that either. So what's the solution to all of these things? Well, one of them is let's settle this war in Ukraine. I think that's something the United States can work with. Now, do I think the Chinese ought to play a role as mediator in all this? No, I don't. Why?

Well, for one thing, I don't think, you know, the... This war is primarily a matter between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine and Russia obviously need to be talking to each other. There are aspects of this war that are bilateral, that only they can work out between themselves. But there's no shortage of potential mediators between Ukraine and Russia. I don't think the Chinese need to be involved there. And the bigger issue in the war, as I point out in the article, is not between Russia and Ukraine directly. it's a broader geopolitical conflict between the United States and Russia in the European

theater between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO. There's no way that the Chinese ought to be involved in mediating there, nor do I think they would want to. The United States and Russia need to be talking. There's no substitute for those direct talks, and the Chinese have no place getting in between the two of us and all of that. That said, I do think we ought to be talking to the Chinese about a settlement. I think the degree to which we're talking to the Chinese only increases the likelihood that everyone will have incentives to try to find a way forward.

And I do think that Chinese can play a very helpful role in post-settlement reconstruction of Ukraine. And this is an area where I think there's not been enough creative thinking. A lot of people have talked about the need for, quote, unquote security guarantees for Ukraine, some military assurance that should the Russians reinvade that the West, the United States, NATO will come riding into the rescue and get involved in some direct defense of Ukrainian territory. And I think there is very little likelihood that we will do that, and I certainly think we should not do that. That's a formula for disaster. That doesn't mean that we can't build a web measures that will reduce the likelihood

that the Russians will want to reinvade or see it as potentially beneficial to them to reinvade. And one of those measures, I think, would be extensive Chinese involvement in reconstruction of Ukraine. The Russians are more and more dependent on China. economically economically than they were prior to the invasion. And crossing swords with Beijing, metaphorically speaking, by reinvading territory that the Chinese have helped to reconstruct would certainly not be in Russia's interest under the circumstances. They would think two, three or four signs before doing that sort of thing. So that's the kind of thing that I think we ought to be exploring.

I think that's again this is something that stood out from your article this idea that we shouldn't limit this to focus on Ukraine and Russia I think this has been a huge mistake and again it comes out immediately in your article this

that the primary goal of Russia has been to block Ukraine's membership in NATO and so I think from the beginning this really strong effort to present this merely as a struggle for territory between Russia and Ukraine I think it was convenient.

Again, last time we talked about narrative control to create the image of the good guys versus the bad guys. So I'm very happy that it came in the Oracle, but also noticed this come up in Financial Times, Bloomberg. And, yeah, because in the past, one couldn't even say this because it was smeared and canceled, censored. If you dare to say this wasn't a part of the territorial ambitions. But again, I think this idea that it wasn't only between these two countries

it was also very important to keep up the narrative of an unprovoked invasion. But I think it opens up so many opportunities once we take that step back and accept that this is a wider problem. As you mentioned, if it's only a serious sum game between the Russians and the Ukrainians, one side will ultimately lose. But if we look at it as European security, we have the possibility of solving this conflict, possibly with some positive some game solution. that is, as you mentioned, the Americans don't want to be too bug down in Europe. They would like to shift priorities. Again, this is a key problem for any hegemon. This was Hirschmann's argument back in the 40s, which was if you have interest everywhere,

then it's very hard to prioritize. So, the United States would like to go east. The Russians obviously want an end to this war and have stable borders. I think the Europeans as well, much like the Russians, don't want to see the continent divided militarily in this way. So everyone could gain from it, of course, also Ukraine, by not being middle of the dividing line where we're competing for influence in Europe.

It's being torn apart. But important of all, I think it reflects reality because if we go back to the 90s, this was the main things we were discussing. The Russians were pushing for, for the new European security architecture. We abandoned some of these agreements when we expanded NATO. This is why they wanted OSCE, is why they had a 2008 proposal for a pan-European security architecture,

the 2010 proposal for this EU-Russian Union, and we kind of pushed them back on all of this. And even if we remember after 2014, after the coup, then even Gorbachev, he was pointing the same thing out that we, because we never agreed on this post-cold war settlement. Putin said the same thing, I think, in 2015 or 16, that if we had been able to solve this after the Cold War, then all of the crises thereafter wouldn't have been there anymore. And I remember also George Ken in, was it, 97, he had this interview where pointed out,

why are we discussing who should be in NATO, who should be left outside, how to mitigate the new bloc politics, when we have the opportunity to do something very different. And I think, I don't know if we revisit some of those questions we kind of ignored because we kind of drew a line under it and said, no, that's okay, NATO's a force for good. Russia doesn't really have anything to be concerned about and we just plowed forward. But yeah, that's why it seems to be able to resolve a lot of issues once we can at least begin to discuss the wider issue of European security.

And as you also mentioned, I think the security guarantees are quite problematic in this respect, because we can't. We keep talking about European peacekeepers and NATO security guarantees. This is, if you recognize that this is a conflict between NATO and Russia as well, then suddenly the idea of putting in NATO countries to be peacekeepers. I mean, we are the one fighting the Russians here in a proxy war, and we're going to be the peace. It's quite terrible, terrible ideas. Yeah, last, just what you said about the Chinese,

balance as well. I think it's correct. I think obviously it's not in America's interest to get the Chinese and Russia's this close together. It's not going to be possible to drive a wedge. But there is a natural balance of power which naturally forms if America doesn't put itself that in the middle of everything. This is why America had an offshore balancer strategy where, you know, don't stay too close into Eurasia because then the adversaries will come together against the United States. once the US will pull back, there will be a natural balance.

And we even see that now, as you mentioned, the Russians don't want to be excessively dependent on the Chinese. That's why they're also tilting towards India, tilting towards Iran. They would like to have better relations with Europeans. Not to be in an alliance against the Chinese, I think, for the foreseeable future, China will be their main ally or partner. But to have a balance at least, diversify their ties. I mean, all of this is in America's interest, too.

it seems as well as Europe. It just seems where we keep going against our own interests time and time again. But perhaps if Trump can embrace this wider approach of being a resolving the European security architecture, I think everyone could potentially win. And I'm really hoping Mr. Trump reads your article. I think one of the things that Trump has done is he has made it legitimate now to talk about these broader issues that are a part of the conflict in Ukraine. And I think as you accurately observed, we went through a period of several years after the Russian invasion when it was a requirement to insert that adjective unprovoked in front of. of invasion whenever one spoke or wrote about the war in Ukraine.

And Trump has now come out and said, you know, the Russians are concerned about NATO, about NATO's military presence in Ukraine. And guess what? Any country would be concerned about that. That's not an unreasonable concern on their part. Well, I think, A, he's right. But B, what he's done is he said, it's okay. To think about this war, understand the various aspects of it in a broader way.

And unless you get your diagnosis of the problem correct, your prescription for solving it is going to fail. So at least we're on a good track, conceptually. I think we're getting more accurate in our diagnosis of the problem. And that means the chances of success go up. Now, that doesn't mean that the chances of success diplomatically are high. Now, this is an enormously complicated issue. It's going to require a lot of very deft, you know, delicate diplomacy with the Ukrainians, with our European allies, with the Russians here in Washington as well.

it's going to require really a master of statecraft to do this well. So I wouldn't put the odds of success as being enormously high, but I'm a lot more hopeful with Trump in office than I was during the Biden administration in this regard. I would agree. There's just two points I wanted to just push forward a little bit. The first, which is, again, in your article, in which you discuss all of these very complicated plans and proposals that we're putting together. And you make the point that may be doing that, working out a very complicated negotiating position, isn't perhaps the best idea. Certainly not before you've spoken to the other side.

Could you perhaps elaborate on that a little? because I know that there are others who take exactly the opposite view. Oh, yeah. What you need to do is work out what you want and what you think in the most minute detail, and then you can present it, and that's the way that you will crash through and get an agreement. I agree with your perspective completely, by the way, but as I said, I do know that there are others who take the other view. So I would just be interested to know what you have to say about that.

The other point, and it's an entirely different one, is that we have a lot of shrillness and worry in Europe at the moment. And I can't help but think that ultimately a lot of what drives it is a fear that Europeans ultimately have deep down. They don't want to talk about it, but they deep down worry that the Americans are going away, that the Americans are going to leave Europe completely, that they're going to be left by themselves to deal with Russia

entirely on their own. Firstly, I don't think that's going to happen. That's the first thing to say. The second point, and it's just one which, again, I'd be interested to know what you think about this. As somebody who's been observing Russia, I don't think that's what the Russians want. I think the Russians want to stable situation in Europe, first and foremost.

And I think they understand that they need the Americans in Europe to achieve it. They don't want to be back in a situation where they have the Europeans, you know, getting into all kinds of problems with each other and possibly getting into conflicts and dragging the Russians in as has happened repeatedly before the world wars. So that's my own view. But again, I'd be interested to know what you have to say about all of that. Well, in regard to your first question about an approach in negotiations, I think Washington's typical approach, and this is not just true under Biden, I think it's been true for many decades, has been you work out an interagency position within the U.S. government, where all of the different players involved and have interests at stake in a particular foreign issue. ensure that they get their interests respected in a negotiating position that we work out. And then we talk to our allies, and that also is a very complicated process.

It is only grown in complexity with the doubling in size of the NATO alliance since the end of the Cold War. We have a lot more players. There's a lot greater diversity of interests and perspectives in Europe, finding something that we all can agree on is not easy. And so our approach has typically been, let's come up with a proposal that we all can agree on, then we put it in place, here you go, Russia, this is, you know, here's our solution.

And oftentimes the Russians will look at that and say, well, hey, wait a minute, you know, we don't like this, we don't like that, you know, we would do this differently. but the United States has had such a difficult time finding a consensus within its own government and within the alliance that we've got very little flexibility left at that point. And the danger that we face with the Russians right now is that we'll come up with some sort of brilliant plan that we think everybody should be able to agree to. We put it in front of the Russians and they say, well, no,

that's not what we had in mind and we throw up her hands and say, oh, you just can't, you know, there's no solution. Can't deal with the Russians. They're not willing to reach a deal, right? And I think we have to approach this in a different way. We've got to say, okay,

not what is our plan, but what are our interests? What matters most to us in all of this? What do we absolutely have to happen? right and then you prioritize you know what do we have to have what's what's you know vital to the United States vital to the alliance in Europe and then where can we have some flexibility what would we like to have ideally but can live with some sort of modification of you know and you know where can we afford to make some real concessions that kind of approach then

prepares you for discussions, discussions within the alliance, discussions with the Russians, and you can start to gauge, you know, where might we find common ground? What are the most difficult issues that we're going to be facing? Then you're in a position to put something down on paper and say, based on what we've been talking about, here's what we think might be a way forward, And then you start negotiating on the basis of that paper, right? And you start to narrow your differences. And this raises an interesting question about the role of presidential summits in all of this.

Typically, what I have found works best is when you work out as many of the issues involved at the lowest level of government possible, and then you escalate things to higher levels as they become more difficult to resolve. And ultimately, you know, when the president sit down, you want a relatively short list of issues that are particularly hard that can only be resolved at heads of state level. And you use the summit to focus on those core issues. Rather than having an early summit where you got basically nothing to grow. agreed, right? And you, you know, tackle this by saying, hey, let's put in place some sort of broad framework. Devils in the details will let the experts work out those details, you know, afterwards. And then you find yourself stuck because so many of these details matter so much.

And it's very difficult to work them out at the working level. And you can find yourself in a negotiation that's far more difficult with less prospects of success than you might otherwise. Now, I don't think that's the way Donald Trump is inclined to go. I think he's inclined to do as much of this himself as he can. It's got a lot of experience of negotiations in the commercial world, and I think he wants to apply that here, and I think he's a big believer in personal diplomacy with other heads of state. So my guess is he's in fact going to seek an early meeting with Putin and try to work out some some kind of framework early on.

So he can point to success and then let the experts try to work things out over time. I'm a little skeptical that that's going to work, but, you know, time will tell. I also think that the prospect of a presidential summit is a card that we play. form of leverage. The Biden administration refused to engage with Russia. We tried to turn Putin into a diplomatic pariah. It failed. But if we're going to bring him back in to the world of Western diplomacy, if we're going to offer him a presidential summit, I think the Russians need to be making some concessions in return. That's a card that we should not play without getting something from the Russians. That's my personal belief.

But we'll see how things work out. You sound a bit like Kissinger at one point there, because I remember back in a good sense, but back in 2014, he was writing and making this point as well, that

he was a bit worried that we suddenly only began to speak in the language of how we could defeat the Russians. And again, he said, if it is a great power and seemingly is so, we should start with what you said, identify what our core interests, where can we negotiate, where can we compromise, where can we not. And I agree with you also what you write in the article because I think

diplomacy itself has become a bit of a challenge for us because, well, especially for the United States, but also the political West, because after the Cold War, I think we stopped doing diplomacy to a large extent. And I think this has also been a curse of the hegemonic era. is you can just put together a list. This is what you want. You put maximum pressure. And instead of compromise, we have unilateral concessions. Again, this is something that the Russians, at least from the end of the 90s and ever since, have argued against.

They just said, diplomacies become this common dance of just giving ultimatums and threats. And they said, we are done with this. We're not giving in anymore. And this is still what we're saying when we see all the our politicians saying we have to approach the Russians from position of strength, which is always good in negotiations, of course, but this also seems to refer back to this idea that we have to impose everything. So here is the deal, sign it. But I just don't see it happening in this instance. And I think one of the reasons we also bought into this idea that we can pressure the Russians into anything is going back to the idea that we convinced us. ourselves this was simply about Russians taking territory. If we don't accept that the Russian

sees this an existential threat, then we're going to make a lot of wrong calculations. But I was very interested what you said earlier on with this challenge of Trump, that his main challenge not be the Russians or the Ukrainians, but convincing Washington, because, well, of course, all would be a problem. And I think that this is something that the Russians are also worried about, because they're not just looking at Ukrainians, they're also looking at the Americans. And they, more than anything, now, they fear a long war because they see this war has now been going on for 10 years. And yeah, if we go back to, I think was 2019, you know, Rand, Rand Corporation had this document where they argue that, well, it's beneficial

to threaten NATO expansion and sense of weapons because then we can bleed the Russians. And this was effectively also what Zelensky said in March of 2022, that when the negotiations were ongoing, he said, well, there's some countries in the West who would like to see a long war so they can bleed the Russians. And so this is kind of what the Russians are worried about. And we still hear this more in Europe now than in America, but nonetheless, this idea that, well, let's do a temporary ceasefire, we'll rearm the Ukrainians, we'll deal with the territories later. So in other fight another day. I noticed

Trump also had this proposal where let's schedule that the Ukraine can join NATO in 20 years, which is just putting setting up another war for two decades from now. So if

they would like just a complete end to this war, either this or yeah, they will seek to dictate terms through military victory. But I agree with you. I think a total Russian military victory, even if it's on the battlefield, it would disrupt

the balance of power too much. It would be destabilizing would make the Europeans too worried. It could create radical elements in Ukraine, prospect of guerrilla warfare. There's a lot of reasons why everyone would benefit from just getting an end to this war. But, you know, you have a know what's happening in intelligence community and in Washington How do you read the mood? Are people ready to put a total end to this war on the right conditions? Or is there a sentiment that, well, here's a place we can bleed the Russians a bit in the future?

Well, I think there's a large portion of the Washington foreign policy establishment that want to see Trump fail. For all kinds of reasons that go beyond just their perspective. on U.S. foreign policy and the role that they think we ought to be playing in the world. And so he's going to be attacked, I think, for being too accommodating of Russian interests, if the Russians were to buy into something, of selling out the Ukrainians cynically, you know, cutting some sort of deal over their heads, of abandoning our allies in Europe. In other words, he's got a formidable problem here in Washington, building a necessary level of support that will be required to pull off the kind of settlement in Europe that will be required. We're not going to be able to do that if most of Washington is fighting against that sort of thing.

Now, part of what affects his ability to pull this off was determined in November, right? The nature of the victory, the extent to which this was decisive, the Republican Party's ability to capture both House and Senate, that increases the likelihood that he can build enough support here in Washington to pull this. saw. I think the Russians are watching very carefully. I think they had a very painful experience as they saw it with Trump during his first term. I think he's spoken in terms of objectives that the Russians found appealing, but in practice, I think his policies toward Russia were heavily affected by Russiagate, by the kind of domestic pressures that he was under at the time

to show that he was not in fact an agent of the Kremlin and by elements within his own administration that fought against his agenda, particularly on Russia and on Ukraine. These were issues central to the impeachments that occurred against Trump at that time. So he really had quite a difficult time having enough room for maneuver

domestically in Washington to pursue an improved relationship with Russia. I think the Russians are very sensitive to the possibility that they will see some variation of that in his second term. Now, the other thing they're going to be paying close attention to

is going on in the Senate right now. And that's the confirmation of Trump's nominees to senior positions in his administration. Looking at this from Moscow's perspective, they're going to be increasingly doubtful if he can't even get his own nominees through the Senate. What are the prospects that he can deliver some sort of settlement deal on Ukraine? So this matters in a lot of ways. It's going to affect Russia's perceptions, I think, of whether Trump has enough political juice here in Washington to pull off the kinds of moves that are going to be necessary. to end the war in ways that all the parties can find acceptable.

What about Ukraine itself? I mean, what should they be doing in this situation? Because they must be nervous about the fact that the Americans and the Russians are talking with each other. After all, it's something that they haven't seen for four years, or almost four years, three years. And now suddenly we see Trump talking about NATO, that he understands that the Russians have genuine concerns about NATO. There's reports in the American media that he's not really interested in Ukraine. What should the Ukrainians be thinking and what should they do? Well, I think they're naturally concerned that there might be a deal cut over their heads between Washington and Moscow that affects their interests, and they don't want to see that.

and that's quite understandable from their perspective. What I think they ought to be reconciling themselves to is not that we will cut some sort of deal over their heads. I think that to be successful, the Ukrainians have to be on board. So the United States has got to take into account Ukraine's perspectives on all of this. We need to craft a deal that is acceptable

to the Ukrainians, but they also have to be adjusting their expectations. And that's something where I don't think the United States has done enough work to bring greater realism to Ukrainian thinking on this matter. And the Ukrainians have clung, I think, to the notion that the West will come riding in and tip the scales between you, Ukraine and Russia in Ukraine's favor in some way, either through NATO Article 5 guarantees or some equivalent of bilateral or EU security guarantees that will commit key Western states to go to war on Ukraine's behalf.

And I think the United States needs to be very frank with the Ukrainians, that that is not going to happen. That said, we are willing to work with the Ukrainians and will work with them to the degree that they're willing to put together this web of assurances that I talked about earlier that can make the prospects of a new invasion much less likely than they would otherwise be. Now, that kind of realism, I think, can be helpful in two ways. One, it can help the discussion inside Ukraine be a lot more realistic about what their true options are, number one. Number two, I think it could help Zelensky deal with hardliners in Ukraine. And I think we're at a point right now where the bulk of Ukrainian citizens want to see an end to this war. I think it's taken an enormous toll on Ukraine in all kinds of ways.

And that suffering is only going to increase the longer the fighting continues. But there are extremists, you know, hardliners that don't want to see any kind of compromise under any circumstances, don't want negotiations with Russia, don't want the United States to be talking to Russia, and are quite prepared to be spoilers in all of this. And the degree in which Zelensky can point to Donald Trump and say, you know, hey, if we're up to me, I wouldn't be doing this. But, you know, I'm dealing with somebody that's putting a lot of pressure on me and we're completely dependent on Washington.

I have to pay attention to what they're saying. That actually can help him deal with the extremists in Ukraine. Doesn't mean that problem goes away. But it's easier, I think, relatively speaking, to deal with inside Ukraine. than under other circumstances. So some of the pressures that I think the United States can put on Ukraine can be salutary if we handle it deftly. There's going to have to be an aspect of public rhetoric here,

which helps frame the debate inside of Ukraine, but there's also going to have to be some frank private channel discussions with them as well. I think that's probably a good idea, because I follow a lot of these Ukrainian telegram channels where they put out a lot of the debates from Ukrainian TV and you have a lot of the political leaders making statements. And there seems to be a lot of consensus around the idea that if we only hold out a bit longer shows strength

that we won't give up, then that will give the Americans confidence that this is a project worth pursuing and they will send in the cavalry effectively. So help us out. it just it seems almost crazy because this would

have direct war would very easily well would be very difficult to control most likely will escalate if not into nuclear war then well something close to it

it just seems crazy that this would be something to aim for but so yeah some more realistic expectations probably have healthy. I think the Europeans are also fueling some of the delusions for Zelensky when the French and the British now are talking about sending their troops into Ukraine. It's not going

to happen. I think it's meant to delude Selensky to keep the fighting going. But I just had one last question about what do you see, given that a lot of this is about the wider European security challenge, security infrastructure. So what do you see? Given that a lot of this is about the wider European security infrastructure. So what happens after this if there is a deal? Because some, as Alexander also pointed out, would be worried that the Americans are leaving, that it might

even be preferential to keep a conflict going if that would keep the Americans on the continent. But we also spoke to people like Colonel Wilkerson, who argued that he believes NATO might collapse after this war as a result.

And again, you mentioned the United States, shifting its resources, his focus, his priorities more towards the east. Again, Europe is less relevant these days. The Europeans, at least according to Wilkerson, he also expected would become more critical of NATO, given that a lot of countries joined it as a defensive alliance. But as Kissinger argued in 1999,

when NATO began to expand and attack Yugoslavia, we could no longer call this a defensive alliance anymore. So, of course, at the moment, we have a lot of European governments who are very much, would never think about it. But we also see that Europe has a massive legitimacy crisis now, just governments and media where seemingly governments are very, very shaky. So while it might have seemed crazy five, six years ago, I think it could be possible now, couldn't it, that there would be a massive crisis in NATO. Is this something you see coming? And if so, is this something that will impact negotiations? Well, I wouldn't rule that out. I wouldn't say it's necessarily the most likely scenario, but I think the war in Ukraine has produced a number of losers.

Ukraine has suffered the most in all of this for obvious reasons. Russians have suffered too. The situation is not been without a significant cost in Russia. But I think Europe is probably the second greatest loser in all of this. European situation where its relatively meager military resources have been largely exhausted in attempting to support Ukraine. Germany, which has been the engine of European economic prosperity, is in a very precarious position economically. Their economy was based on industrial manufacturing and exports. That manufacturing in turn was premised on access to inexpensive energy, which was coming from Russia. They lost access to that energy and have had to pay a lot more as a result, which in turn has made their manufacturing and their exports a lot more expensive. And while all this is happening, the United States is saying, oh, and by the way, as your economy sputters, you have to spend a lot more on your defense sector.

And I think those pressures are putting Germany in a scissors, which is in turn playing out in a lot more political uncertainty than Germany has had for many, many decades. France is in also a precarious situation for different reasons. But when you have the foundational members of the European Union in as precarious a position as they're in, one can't be very confident about stability in Europe going forward. So what's my reaction to this? My reaction to this is that it is not in America's interest. for Europe to be rid ridven by crises, either military and security crises or political crises that cause real instability. That's not a good thing for Europe. Obviously, I don't think it's a good thing for American interests either.

And we're not going to be able to deal with those bigger forces that are at work if the war in Ukraine is still going on. or if it evolves into some sort of unsteadled state where hot fighting is not as active as it is right now, but the key issues at stake have not really been addressed. I think Ukraine then moves toward becoming a dysfunctional failed state, and all sorts of instability will flow out of that. you know, Moldova, Romania, Kaliningrad, Belarus, et cetera, all of which hurts the prospects for European security going forward. So, you know, do the Russians want that? Do they want to see

instability in a region so close to them so important to Russia's own interests? My answer is no, probably not. But if they don't have a better alternative, if they don't think they can reach the kinds of diplomatic understandings that address their interests in Europe, then I think that's the path that we're going to be on. So earlier Alexander had asked me whether, you know, he thought it was in Russia's interest for there to be broader stability in Europe and whether the Russians thought there needed to be an American role in Europe to help ensure that there is stability. I think in general, yes, provided the United States as playing that kind of stabilizing role

that I think the Russians would like to see. The Russians face this kind of question at the end of the Cold War when the question of German reunification arose and whether a reunified German state would be a part of NATO. And the Russians

had to make a very concrete decision. Would we like to see NATO basically ensuring that German military power was contained within an American-led alliance, or would we rather have Germany reunited but untethered in ways that might have negative consequences for Russian security? At the time, they said, well, given the choices, we'd rather see Germany reunited in NATO. That gives us some assurances on all of this.

And I think that general outlook continues today. But again, provided the United States is playing the kind of stabilizing role that will be necessary in Europe, rather than playing a role that increases the likelihood of instability inside Europe. George B.B.B.B. Thank you very, very much for joining us on these programs. there's so much we can talk about here and I think we're going to be talking an awful lot because I think things are actually moving like yourself.

I'm mildly optimistic about the way things are going. I mean, I think that Trump actually did say some important things. I think Mike Walser said some important things. I think the Russians are noticing and they're responding. Where this will go, I absolutely agree. I don't think there's any guarantee that we're going to get any kind of good outcome. but that's not a reason to give up hope.

That's my own view, and I certainly think the right thing is for Trump to read your articles. Perhaps he does. I just want to point that I think some of the sentiments towards Europe has changed quite significantly in Russia, though. I know in the 90s they saw the EU as being the good Europeans as opposed to NATO, but I think over time now they see the Europeans as being almost captured and also after the war now in Ukraine they see the Europeans as being more aggressive than the Americans as well.

I mean recently former president Medvedev made a point that after the war will forgive non-Western countries who joined in on sanctions will learn to ignore the Americans but at least we have to work with them in important areas. but the Europeans will have to be punished because they're vile and they're not that relevant, so we don't have to deal with them. Of course, he's not the president anymore, but I think the view of Europe has changed significantly in Russia. But again, I hope I'm wrong, and I also tend to be optimistic despite all the horrible news coming in. So anyways, George Beebe, thank you so much. for your time. It's always a great pleasure to speak with you. I hope we can join us again sometime.

Absolutely. With my pleasure. Thank you.