The Duran Podcast - The Transatlantic Split: Theater, or the Beginning of the End?

Episode Date: April 12, 2026

The Transatlantic Split: Theater, or the Beginning of the End?

Let's talk about what is going on between Europe and Trump, between Stommer and Trump, the splits between the United States and Europe, the end of the transatlantic partnership. Is it really the end of the transatlantic partnership versus just all theater? Your thoughts? Well, I think there is a lot of theater here. I mean, I think that we have not yet reached. In fact, we're not close to the point where, you know, they really are going to go in different directions and that there's this split. I mean, in Europe, people, as we've discussed many times,

are still massively invested in keeping the relationship with the United States as strong as possible, as keeping the United States in Europe, as into keeping the United States in NATO and all of these things. Because if nothing else, I mean, it's money. I mean, it's a steady flow of American investment, American money. It works for a lot of the political and economic elites of Europe to keep this relationship going. But you are getting more signs now that some people in the United States are becoming increasingly exasperated with the relationship and are starting to say, say to themselves, well, this is an entirely, a traffic entirely in one direction in the sense

that we give and the Europeans take, and they don't give a very, very much in return. And this conflict between the United States and Iran has acted as a further catalyst for this, because the Europeans fundamentally, deep down, don't care about Iran, at least not in the way that the US does. They don't, for them, Iran is not a threat. It's not a country that's going to invade Europe. It's not a part of Europe. It's not part of their neighbourhood. And they don't want the Americans in the Middle East focusing on the middle.

Middle East and fighting Iran. They want the Americans in Europe keeping the NATO system going, and of course they want the Americans focused on Russia instead. So the Americans, by contrast, have a different outlook to this, for then the Middle East remains immensely important, as we have seen. East Asia also is important as well. Russia is not the tremendous threats and problem that it was seen to be back in the Cold War. And the Americans are saying, look, you want us always to go on giving you money and weapons and to helping you in this conflict in Ukraine. But once it comes to this situation in the Middle East, to the conflict with Iran,

we ask you to come, we ask you to help us. We ask you to help us open the Strait of Hormuz, which you depend on for your energy. We don't. And where are you? And the Europeans won't come because they can't come. Their militaries are in no position to come. And that's another issue for the Americans. And the Americans are very angry.

And they're speaking increasingly angrily about. it and the Europeans for their part, they're starting to talk about the Americans in ruder terms than they have done up to now. And if you go to the European media, at least to the British media and the German media, you can see that for the first time they are talking about a situation where there is a final irrevocable divorce, one which even if Trump loses the what Trump's presidency ends, that the US is going one way, the Europe is going to go another way, that this historic alliance, this historic relationship is now indeed coming to an end. Probably there is a lot of theatre in this.

Probably there's some attempts to scare the Americans about it, to make the Americans think, well, you know, don't take us for granted. we can go by ourselves. But the fact is that the very fact that people in Europe are talking about this at all, however it is that they're doing it, whatever their motives are, makes it more likely to happen. So it's not going to end in a rupture now, but in five, ten, twenty years,

it's starting to look as if it will probably happen. Why would why would the U.S. even demand anything of the Europeans when it comes to Iran? I mean, there's nothing the Europeans can do. There's nothing the U.K. or NATO can do militarily with Iran at all. There's nothing they can really do on a sanctions economic basis. They've sanctioned, whatever they can sanction at this point. So, I mean, it's just Trump's way of passing this off to somebody, right? And that's what the Europeans fear.

They fear that they're going to get stuck with the bill on all of this because Trump's saying, you know, I want to get, I want to walk away from this. He may be saying that Netanyahu is not going to let him walk away. But and the other powers that be are not going to let Trump walk away from this. But he may be trying to, a part of him may be trying to say my chance to walk away from this because this is a debacle is to just pass us off to the Europeans. But the Europeans can't really do anything. They can't contribute anything. They can't block anything. They can't escort anything.

they have no military that's that's even remotely comparable to the United States. So Trump's trying to pass this off on the Europeans, but the Europeans fear that they're going to get stuck with this problem, right? And they're pushing back on it. They don't want to get, they don't want to take the blame. They don't want to get stuck with this problem, at least not with the United States there. They don't want to be left alone with Iran trying to figure out how to escort ships or how to deal with this. That is, though, I mean, to be fair to the United States as well, fair to the Europeans, fair to the United States.

Trump is trying to pass us off to the Europeans. But on the flip side, that's what vassals do, right? I mean, if the United States says go there, they go, because that's their role in the relationship. I mean, it's not a relationship of equals. It's not a relationship of peers or friends. There's a master and there's a servant. And if the master messes stuff up, he may call on, on, on,

I'm a servant to go clean it up. But you see, you're absolutely right. And I think in Trump's case, yes, a lot of this in the end is going to come down to a question of money. I mean, you know, you want this to help you with the Straits of Hormuz. You've got to write some checks, big checks for the United States. We're looking for them. And of course, the Europeans now are not in a very strong position to write checks. but there is another thing, which is you're absolutely correct, the Europeans aren't able to do

anything in military terms in the Gulf. There was a article in the British media by a former Royal Navy captain, and he said if the US can't force open the Strait of Hormuz, thinking that our militaries can is, as he put it, for the birds. In other words, But it is impossible. It is way beyond what we are capable of. But saying that, talking about it in that way, tells the Americans something, which is that these European allies that they have, in military terms, they are not an asset, they are a liability. They want to send troops to Ukraine. That's what they said. That's what Stamas and Macron's coalition of the willing,

which we've been hearing so much about for the last year. That's what they want to do, but they want the Americans to be there to help them because they cannot take on the Russians by themselves. The Americans want the European militaries to be there on side to help them in the Strait of Hormuz. but the Europeans say, we can't. So there isn't just an imbalance of military power.

It's not a case of the Americans being powerful and the Europeans being less powerful. It's the Americans being powerful, but the Europeans being zero. And that is, I think, something which this conflict has very brutally exposed. And we see this. I mean, there's been a lot of talk about rearmament in Europe. The reality is we're not seeing, we've discussed this in many programs, we're not seeing any rearmament in Europe. I mean, talk about, you know, redesigning Volkswagen factories to build armored vehicles, which is all over the place. It's all about money. It's not about weapons. The project to build a joint fighter jet has collapsed.

The project to build warships for Germany in Dutch shipyards is about to collapse. The Europeans are incapable of getting their act together here. And it's going to become an even bigger problem with every passing year as the deindustrialization processes in Europe intensifying. So looked at from an American perspective, yes, these are vassals, but they are vassals that are becoming a burden rather than a strategic asset anymore. Yeah, but for the United States, there are parts of the U.S. deep state, of the U.S. government. and even the Trump administration, that see Europe is playing a key role in trying to bring down Russia.

They have not given up or abandoned parts of the United States government and parts of the Trump administration have not abandoned the dream of trying to regime, change Putin, or trying to bring down Russia and break Russia apart. And they do see that as one path towards destroying China. I mean, there still is that school of thought. There still is that thinking and that strategy, alive and well in Washington. I'm not saying it's the dominant force anymore. Maybe it is. But it's still there.

It hasn't gone away. That has not disappeared. Maybe that was prevalent in Biden, more prevalent in Biden and less in Trump because Trump wanted to go after Iran. Maybe the path for Trump was take down Iran. We're not succeeding in Russia, so let's take down Iran. And that will be our way to eventually take down China. And maybe those guys won over the. the Russia to China path.

But, but I mean, there still is the, the, the, the, the, the, the,

the, we need Europe, we need NATO, we need these vassals, because they, they serve a purpose to, to, to cause trouble for, for Russia.

Absolutely. Can I, can I just say, this is, this is the reason why, going back to the start of the program, I don't think this is going to happen now. I mean,

this is an aware of, that is starting to spread, I think, beyond Donald Trump and some of the other people within MAGA, who have been already critical about Europe for some time. But an awareness that Europe is moving from being a strategic asset to becoming a strategic liability is beginning to gain more traction in the United States. States. But it is not yet the consensus in the United States, not by any means. There is still a very, very strong Atlantis current, a near-DiPont deep state current, which continues to value the alliance with the Europeans, partly for historic reasons, partly because of financial reasons, partly because

of social reasons, because all of these people know each other, and get on incredible. be well with each other, the intelligence agencies, which are, as we know, very powerful. They still work together very closely. And some of the European intelligence agencies, as opposed to the militaries, probably are still seen in the United States as a strategic asset. Europe remains a significant market for some American businesses. And, of course, there's the wider feeling that if you are going to be a global, superpower, the global hegemon, you need allies, and the allies are still there in Europe,

even if they're not quite as strong as they were. So I don't think this is something that is happening anytime soon, this severance between Europe and the US. It's just that I think that the events that have happened in the Middle East this year have catalyzed. They've accelerated that sense on both sides, that this is a relationship which cannot last forever, for very, very much longer. For the first time, on both sides, you're starting to see people who, are saying to themselves, well, eventually we're going to have to each go our own ways. And we've each got to start thinking about that because the Americans are saying the Europeans

are a drain, they're a liability, we have to move forward without them. The Europeans are saying, well, we've got to worry about the Russians, some Americans still focused on the Russians because they still think to themselves that if we can collapse Russia, then we can isolate China. There's still those people. But arguably, that is becoming less dominant in the United States than it used to be. So each side, there are starting to be people who are starting to say, well, let's think about the future. Let's think about the future without the other. and it's not so much in Europe at least, the political mainstream,

but you're starting to see groups like the IFDA. IFDA, by the way, to stress, has never up to now been an anti-American party, not by any means, but they're now starting to say, we ought to pursue a more German-centered foreign policy and we want to see the U.S. military leave Germany. How can Europe go their own way? How can they even contemplate that or even think about that? The U.S. can do it.

The U.S. can tell Europe, see you later. We're done with you. Or certain countries in Europe, they don't have to give up all of Europe. They can pick and choose. They can say we like Hungary. We like Slovakia or Serbia, whatever. But France and I don't know, Italy, whatever. Are they just, you know, hypothetical.

They could say, we like these countries. We'll stick with them. We don't like these countries. See you later. Europe can't do any of that. Europe is locked into the U.S., completely locked in. And even now, more so than the month ago, because now the Middle East, Qatar, Hormuz, the gas situation, the energy situation, the sanctions on Russia.

The U.S. is the only game in town for Europe now. I mean, just being, I'm being practical about it, just energy, gas, oil. There is no one else except the United States now for Europe. And they're not going to lift sanctions against Russia, at least not with this group of leaders, not with Randerleian or Kayakalas, Costa, and all of these guys. They're going to have to go before we even think about Europe approaching Russia for some sort of energy trade. That's not going to happen.

So they're locked into the U.S. On an energy level, completely locked into the U.S. On a military level, you mentioned the bases. They've got all these bases. I mean, forget Germany, Greece. Greece is entire economy now seems to revolve around the U.S. military bases from the north of Greece all the way down south to Crete. It's all military bases now.

They're completely locked in. And Greece is one country. I mean, this is throughout Europe. It's military bases everywhere, U.S. military bases, all over the place. They're locked in there. NATO. The U.S. controls NATO. So they're locked into NATO via the U.S.

and the EU. The U.S. exerts all kinds of influences on the EU. They exert the most influence on the European Union. If the European Union was sovereign of the United States, then it might not have gone down the route that it did with regards. to Russia, the sanctions. So, I mean, my question, the U.S. does have the flexibility to choose

if it wanted to. But Europe has zero flexibility to do anything, at least not in the near term, not in the next five or 10 or 20 years. Maybe Alexander in 100 years? Maybe 200 years they can move away for the United States. The Europeans will never initiate this.

the Americans may and perhaps at some point will. I mean, if this feeling, this sense in the US, that the Europeans are reliability rather than an asset begins to gain strength, which perhaps over time it will, then it might be the US that reconsidered whether it really wants to be in Europe. And then, of course, that's the moment when the Europeans will have to face up to life beyond the U.S.

It's going to be devastating for Europe. Well, it is absolutely. I mean, and I want to talk about my own country, which is Britain. Talk about the UK, but also what would a country like Estonia or Latvia do if the United States says, see you later? Well, well, you imagine that? They have only, they have only one option then. and the only party in any of the big European states that's talking about it seriously is the IFD. You have other European politicians like Orban who are talking about it.

You have some people like Salvini in Italy who are talking about it too. You have every so often Bart de Weber talking about it in Belgium. And you have some intellectuals like Emmanuel Todd in France. talking about it as well. But if we have a situation where the United States makes a decision that in its own interests, it is going to leave because Europe is a liability rather than an asset. So the only choice there is is to make up with the Russians in some way. I mean, it's the only, it's the only way forward. Of course, that presents a whole new set. of problems because obviously, I mean, there's people like the Baltic states who have an almost

irreconcilable, incandescent attitudes to Russia, which I don't think are ever going to change. But then, you know, the Baltic states are small, their ability to, you know, ultimately shift European policy is going to be very difficult. The Scandinavians, the Finns, for example, quite a good relationship with Russia before, which they've now destroyed. They're going to be very vulnerable too. It's going to be very, very difficult for them to shift their entire policy round. The country that's going to be most affected and most deeply and most profoundly affected is, of course, Britain.

and the thing to understand about Britain is that in the case of Britain, our relationship with the United States is at a completely different level from that of any of the other European countries. Obviously, we have the same language, we share a lot of the same history. but our relationship starts in 1940. It goes way beyond. It's older than NATO itself. It begins during the Second World War. And the whole political system in Britain, the whole institutional system in Britain,

is constructed around the conception of the American Alliance. the idea of a Britain working by itself, returning to the world that it, the position it was in, before the Second World War, when it was an entirely independent actor, it is something that is conceptually unimaginable. And the entire structure of Britain's armed forces, such as they are, is predicated on the American Alliance. So for us to just, for us in Britain to even think about these possibilities is going to be enormously difficult. And, well, there are some people now who are finally talking about it. But the last major politician in Britain who did think about a future without the United States.

And this is something that people may find difficult to imagine was Winston. and Churchill in the early 1950s, who became increasingly unhappy about the closeness of Britain to the United States and the fact that we'd lost a lot of our independence and our freedom of maneuver. But you have to go way back or way back to him to think of a British politician who has any experience, any idea of foreign or domestic policy without the American. being intimately involved in it. Can you say that this falling out, theater acrimony, discontent that's now happening

in the Transatlantic Partnership, is really all about being left out of the decision making, being left out of the operations, of the regime change, that was being playing. In the case of Ukraine, Europe was included, right? They were made a part of it. They were let in on the meetings.

They got to sit down with the Bidens and the Sullivans and all of these guys and the Blinkins. And they got to hang out together. And then they got to be part of the whole decision to try and regime change Putin. And they were going to actually benefit from the destruction of Russia and the plundering. of Russia. So it was a joint venture, and they were going to be a part of it, and they were going to benefit from it as well. There were a lot of, a lot of spoils to be had for everybody. So great, they're all in on it. But with Iran, they were left out. They weren't included. They weren't talked to. They weren't advised. There's nothing for them at the end of the whole Iran

scenario. You know, what do we get out of it? We don't have a seat at the table. What's the benefit to us? And so this may be what it all boils down to. Maybe if they were included in Iran, in the Iran regime change plan, and if they were included on the spoils and the benefits, if it was going to be successful as to what they were going to benefit from it, what they were going to gain from it, if they were

included in all of that, maybe they would be more willing to help out Trump. But they were just cut out of it. Where Ukraine, they were, I mean, they were in it together, Munich, 2022, right? We're in it together. We're going to do this and we're going to benefit from this. And as Kaya Kala said, we're going to break up Russia into six, seven different countries and it's going to be great. And, you know, they were excited. They were really excited. Iran, you know, they were just left out of the whole thing. So there's no upside for them. I think there's a lot of, there's a lot in that. But I think I think that needs a certain amount of unpacking. First of all, it's not just Iran that they have been frozen out of. They've also been frozen out of the discussions between

the Americans and the Russians that have been taking place since Trump became president again. You remember there was that grotesque, farcical situation. there was the last meeting in Geneva and the Europeans all turned up. There were all those national security advisors from all the European countries and they were milling around the hotel lobbies trying to get into the room where the Russians and the Americans and the Ukrainians were meeting and the Russians said absolutely not. No way are we letting the Europeans in and the Americans on this sided with the Russians. And that really upset the Europeans an awful lot

because ultimately they, I mean, the whole Ukraine war, the conflict with Russia is something that they care about and are involved in a very, very great deal. So they are already unhappy about being frozen out by the Americans on something that is already very important to them. Now, about Iran, there's a number of things to say here. Firstly, the reason the Europeans were cut out was because, in a sense, they cut themselves out.

We were doing all kinds of programs, going all the way back to the June 2025 war and the aftermath of it. We could see that a war was coming. we could see we were talking about this in the run-up to the war. We said that it was obvious what was going to happen. The Europeans could have come to the same conclusion. They could have gone to Washington.

They could have spoken to Trump. They could have spoken to Rubio. They could have spoken to all of these people. They could have discussed the situation with the Americans about Iran. and if they'd wanted to involve themselves in this enterprise, it was up to them to try and do it. Now, I think one of the reasons why the Americans froze them out is because the Americans sensed, Trump and the key people around him, sensed that the Europeans were not really keen on this enterprise. Ultimately, Iran isn't important to them in the way that Russia is.

And for them, given that the obsession remains Russia, Iran is a diversion away from the focus on Russia, which is where they want to keep the United States. So this, I think, was one of the reasons why they were frozen out. it was because the Americans sense that the Europeans weren't really keen on this.

And the Europeans confirmed that by not coming along to Washington in November, December, January, February, and saying to the Europeans, look, we know that you're preparing something.

We want to be part of the action. So in a sense, it also shows that there is now this drift apart that we spoke about in this program. Just to finish off the video, can you say that the Trump administration and the Israelis, Nairnjahou, they said, why should we share the spoils of victory

with the Europeans? Why should we share Hormuz with Europe? Maybe they also said that. We don't need them. We can do this on our own. And we don't need to include the Europeans where the Europeans are hanging around in Geneva at the hotel because they're worried that they're getting cut out of the deal. I mean, you know, you were included in the deal under Biden and now you're being cut out of the deal. And that's upsetting.

Right. So you're basically telling the Trump administration, no, no, no, don't you dare cut us out of this. We were we started this. We were included in this. We were part of the team that put this together. if there's any resolution and any benefit for for anybody, we've got to be included. Yes. But then that brings us back to, I mean, I'm sure that is exactly what the Israelis and

the Americans are saying, you know, why do we need the Europeans? We don't want to share anything in Iran with the Europeans. But in a way, that again comes back to the point. The Americans are saying to themselves, we don't need the Europeans for this because the Europeans are weak and useless. So we don't need them involved. Now, of course, that it's turned out that it's actually a bit more difficult than the Americans assumed it would be.

They're asking the Europeans for some help and the Europeans can't come along and give any. And that, that again exposes how weak ultimately the Europeans are. You know, I can remember, you know, previous conflicts in the Middle East when Saddam Hussein sent his army into Kuwait, Margaret Thatcher was there. She said to the Americans, we're all behind you. But the point was she had an army, a serious army to offer. I mean, I think it was three divisions of troops, powerful air force, the British fleet. they were an important part of the force that participated in the First Gulf War.

Then when Blair was talking to Bush, well, already by that point, the British were less strong than they had been a decade before. But they were still strong enough to put significant amounts of men and machines on the ground. Now, the British have nothing. Their aircraft carriers don't carry aircraft. They have to hire them from the United States. The British army is reduced to 75,000 men, and they would have difficulty scratching together a force of 20,000 and keeping them in the battle for any length of time. The other European states are weaker still. And the problem is, the problem is, is that these two wars, the one in Ukraine and the one in the Middle East, has exposed that reality. So the Americans, it's not surprising if they're starting to say to themselves, what do we need these allies for? I mean, they want us to come to their rescue when they are in trouble,

but they have nothing themselves to put on the table. And that, I think, ultimately, is the source of the crisis. It must be very frustrating and uncomfortable for both sides. The Europeans are seeing that Trump can push them around, but it can't push around Iran. Yeah. Right. So he can push us around, Germany, Italy, France, he can push us around.

Yeah. But when it comes to Iran, couldn't do it. Yeah. Meanwhile, the Trump administration and someone like Trump with this massive ego is saying, you know, I don't need the Europeans. What am I going to do with the Europeans? We don't need them. And now he's coming along and saying, well, you know, I need them for something so they could help. me with a coalition, or at least I could pass this off to them.

So it must be like very frustrating and uncomfortable for all of them. Because all the images of one another, it was all fake, it was all untrue, it's all been shattered. You know, the U.S. can never be defeated by anybody and they're all powerful and look what they do to us. You have the leaders in Europe that say, even if we wanted to stand up to the United States, even if we wanted to exert some sovereignty, it's impossible. And then they see Iran. That must make them feel so small.

To say that it is humiliating is not an adequate word. I mean, bear in mind, again, I'm talking about Britain. Within the lifetime, within the present lifetimes of people alive in Britain today, Britain was the dominant power in Iran. I mean, right up until the Mossadegh crisis, Britain basically ran Iran. That's in the early 50s. Now we have a situation where Iran is a more powerful country in military terms than Britain is.

Britain cannot do some of the things, not all of the things, but some of the things that Iran does. And that is a shattering thing. Iran, which, to be clear, is not a rich country. It's got sanctioned. It's got levels of poverty, which we don't have in Britain. But it still manufactures more steel than Britain does. I mean, this is a shattering thing for people in, not just in Britain, but right across Europe to face this, to face the reality. that countries that were great powers only a relatively short time ago

are far less powerful today than their former colonies. Can you make the argument that with Hormuz, Iran has shown that they actually exert more power and control over the global economy than the European countries? There's no question about this. Again, I mean, if we're talking about this, no European country has the strength to do or the ability to do what Iran is doing with the control of the straight of all moves. I mean, there's nothing like, I mean,

we have sanctioned, not just the Russians, by the way, we sanctioned Iran. We sanctioned all sorts of other countries. There's even EU sanctions against China. and what have all of these sanctions achieved? Well, in Russia's case, they're stronger than ever. In Iran's case, they are, as we've seen, more powerful. And China is growing in power almost every day.

So undoubtedly, the Iranians, by contrast, if you think of what they're doing with Hormuz as being their type of sanctions, they start imposing these sanctions. and the entire global economy shudders. So again, if you're looking at this as a revelation of power, look at this simply as a question of who has power. Iran has more power than any individual European country. I'm not saying, I want to stress this, that people in Iran have European standards of living.

obviously they don't. But if you're looking at ability to project power, to exercise power, to defend yourself, to say no to the United States, to say no to the Chinese and the Russians, as the Iranians have often done, by the way. Well, clearly, Iran has an ability to do these things which no European country by itself does. And on top of everything else, Exactly as we discussed in another program, we did a short time ago. Trump, very unhappy about the whole European behavior over Iran. He's now bringing up the topic of Greenland all over again. If he comes for Greenland now, which he might very well do, what do the Europeans do?

The ultimate accumulation for Europe and for NATO. And he's tying Greenland. to Iran. You can see it in his messaging. Exactly. You didn't help me with Iran and Greenland. Exactly. You didn't help me because I was going because I was talking about Greenland and that's why you didn't help me. And you know, he brought it up with Ruta when it was in D.C.

Exactly. He's going to go after Greenland again. Yes. Exactly as we said he would. So, I mean, you know, what we could see. And by the way, you know, I, you know, this is something we've been talking about many times. but I think we should just reiterate it. The decline of Europe is really gained momentum to an incredible degree

once the European Union was constructed in the way that it was, and people like Osceola would put in charge of it. Whilst this structure remains in place, the decline is going to continue. And ultimately, one of the points, purposes of the European Union was to bind Europe closer to the United States, that by weakening Europe to the extent that it has, it's starting to look like a liability rather than an asset to more and more Americans, just say. Exactly.

That's exactly right. The whole point of putting people like Ursula and Kayakalas of the positions that they're placed in is to bind them more to the United States. end to distance them more from Russia. That's why you put them in these positions, not because they're good diplomats or capable leaders or anything like that. They're going to push you further under the United States

and they're going to create problems for Russia now. Exactly. Okay. But we'll end it there, the durand.orgas.com. We are on X and Rumble and Telegram. Go to Durand shop, pick up some merch, and also join us on Substack as well. Take care.