The Duran Podcast - The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order - Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: March 3, 2024

The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order - Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Well, hello, this is unusual in that I am making the introductions today, Alexander McHuris. I have my co-host and friend and colleague on many programs, Professor Glenn Dyson of Oslo University, a person with much experience of international relations, a person with great scholarship and experience and skill in scholarship. and this is going to be a different program in some ways from some of the programs that we've been doing recently, in that it is actually a discussion between the two of us. And the reason we are having this discussion is because Professor Deeson has written and it's just been published and it can be found on Amazon. And in other places, a book, a new book. and it is about the Ukraine War and the new Eurasian world order.

And I have been reading the book with tremendous interest over the last couple of days. I should say that I found it a page Turner. I found it difficult to put it down. It is absolutely griffy. And it is different from every other book I have read about the Conferman. in Ukraine. Most books that I know about the conflict in Ukraine focus specifically on Ukraine. They talk about Ukraine itself, about its divisions, about the factions there, about the internal conflicts, about the history, the relationship with Russia, the involvement of the West,

the diplomacy, all of those things. You'll find all of that also, by the way, in Professor Deeson's book. But what makes it unique, what makes it absolutely fascinating, is that Glenn has explain all of that, put that all in the context of the development of international relations today, the change in the shape of international relations. And the way that this conflict has arisen cannot be understood, and that's absolutely clear from this book, without an understanding in the development of international relations. And the key, the clue to that, is in the title, which refers to the emerging, to the new Eurasian world order. Now, the first part of the book, which I found very interesting, is about different concepts of world orders, the hegemonic system,

which we've had in the West. Lots explained there, a hegemonic system that predates the specific hegemony of the United States and which basically goes back in the 16th century. The conflicts that this has

given rise to, the way this system has worked within Europe itself and it's a hegemonic system of Europe and the West over the rest of the world, but internally within Europe. And this is, I think, extremely insightful and very new.

We had a system that was different, a system of sovereign states balancing each other for most of this time, a system which is defined as the Vestphalian system based on concepts of state sovereignty. developed at the time of the Treaty of Vestphalia in 1648. But specifically, this is a European system, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, it's a system of European hegemony. And then in the 19th century, that system evolves into a system of hegemony, first by Britain,

and then in the 20th century, of course, Britain as the hegemon, is replaced ultimately by the United States. but with all sorts of other complicated things working out as well with a period of the conflict, the Cold War, the balance between the two superpowers of that area, the Soviet Union and the United States. And the key thing to understand is that Western policy towards Russia, Western policy connected to Ukraine, is deeply informed by this long history of European,

then British, well specifically British, and specifically American hegemony, and the kind of attitudes and concepts that this gave rise to, and also the fear that exists now that this period of hegemony, Western hegemony, and American hegemony, which, of course, interconnected, but they're not exactly the same. thing is now ending. And Professor Deeson also discusses the role of liberalism in this system, the way that liberalism itself has evolved as part of that system, and how liberalism has to some extent acted as

the justification for this period of hegemony. and the fear that is also occasioning in the West that as Western hegemony recedes, and American hegemony recedes, liberalism which informs much of the conception the West today has of itself, might start to recede also. And then, of course, we have the rise of the new powers, the development of the multipolar system, which is a system, a kind of Vestphalian, balance of power system in which the West is only a part, and then we have the crucial role of Russia within it, the fact that it's never been a fully easy part of the European Westphalian

system. And of course, it's never been a part of the collective West for many reasons, which will be discussing more deeply in this programme. And the key conflict, the one that defines the change, explains the change, is the one in Ukraine. And of course, as I said, the book does actually go into a great deal of detail about the conflict in Ukraine itself. So it's a book which, in my opinion, doesn't just explain the conflict. It explains why we are, where we are. And the whole nature of the modern world. So first, Glenn, Is this a reasonably accurate summary of your book? I don't pretend that it covers all the points.

No, I thought that was like... But is this, does this generally get the overall gist of it? Yeah, that is the essence of the book, because, well, I wouldn't say, well, sometimes it said that this war in Ukraine isn't necessarily all about Ukraine. And some say it's not about Ukraine at all, which probably wouldn't be correct. But obviously it's a symptom of something much larger if we see how much each side is willing to invest into this. And the amount of risks both sides are willing to take. So this is – and also you get it from some of the citations I use in the book where both sides tend to lean in and refer to this as like an inflection point in world order, which direction are we going. And I think that's what makes this so dangerous.

We are in a vacuum at a moment. There is no longer unipolarity, but multipolarity has not yet cemented itself. So you see now the different great powers pulling the world in opposite directions. And the problem, of course, is world order is about how states engage with each other. And in the absence of common rules, there's more or less im. vicious anarchy and i think that's also something that's uh uh describing what we're going through now but uh but i like what you said about justification as well because this is uh yeah i wanted to boil down what what does world order depend upon and it's um you tend to see it's an

international distribution of power uh and the legitimacy of the rules and this is these two variables is really what dictates how states should engage with it with each other. So obviously in the past, under the Holy Roman Empire, if you had one center of power, and also the universalism of Christianity or Catholicism, then you have also the universal ideals to support hegemony. But of course, as you mentioned, Westphalia, this is really, in 1648, this is really considered to be the birth of the modern world order. in which we all the major powers in Europe began to fight each other. They all realized they can't be a hegemon winning at the end of this.

So, and to large extent it was started by reformation and the absence of the same universal ideal. So you want a balance of power. So all the states, you can't have one state attempting to dominate. So they all check each other. And at the same time, you want to come. the religious or cultural or civilizational distinctiveness of each one. And this has been the foundation, which is why hegemony represents a challenge. And we see some of the same patterns in the US hegemon or the collective West,

in which there's an effort to centralize power again, to have one central power. But we also see that it also revives universal ideals. So when talk about liberal democracy, human rights, it's not that these ideals are bad. On the contrary, I would be a big supporter. But the problem is the claim for universalism suggests that it diminishes the principle of sovereign equality, which is so foundational in the modern world order. And you can see the UN Charter as a reflection of the Vestvalian order reflects this. But now we have a system of sovereignty.

inequality. So no one, well, thinks twice if the West shouldn't interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries to promote democracy or protect human rights. This is the most natural thing. And of course, power interests unavoidably comes into this. And this legitimizes and substantiates hegemony. And I think that's why you see now this has been a breakdown over the past few years. The hegemon is gone in terms of military power, economic, institutional and information across the board. And at the same time, you then see their rules of international law beginning to change as well. So the countries who are for the Westphalian system, they call for international law, in accordance with the UN system. The hegemon advocates for hegemony are talking about the rules-based international order, which is based on sovereign inequality.

So this is really the framework which I put this whole conflict within. Yes, and what is so interesting is, again, it's very historically grounded, which is, I think, absolutely essential. If you don't understand the history, then you don't understand anything. This is always my take to international relations. So this constant temptation that exists in the West, towards universalism. And now, I should just disclose here that, you know, way back long, long ago, when I was

a student of history, one of my big topics, but a big essays about this was on the origins of the 30 years more. And in fact, it's exactly what you said. It was the Habsbergs, who were the dominant power in Europe at that time, and who were, of course, also the representatives of the Catholic Church had very, very much a drive towards universalism. And in fact, they had this, it was a sort of mysterious sort of slogan,

but it was a series of letters, A-E-I-O-U, which is Austria Erit in Orbe Ultima. This was their sort of, you know, their motto, if you like, Austria will be supreme in the world. It was very much a universal idea, so there would be one emperor, one faith, one line of control. Habsburgs controls Spain.

They controlled much of Germany. And in the 1620s, they made this massive push to consolidate it all and to bring it all together. And they did it at precisely that moment when they sensed that they were starting to decline because Spanish power was fading and that had been the core region.

So this was their last big throw. And of course the result was a disaster. And the 30 years war was a catastrophe and it went on for 30 years and there was huge amount of death and destruction. And out of it, ultimately, a multipolar system in Europe emerged. And that was the,

birth of diplomacy, much of the concept of diplomacy that we have today develop then. And this is where I found the most interesting part of your, the first part of your book, is that you were talking about how multipolar systems, which in a kind of a sense of Estfalia in terms of Europe actually was, are systems where there are rules. there is actual law, there's concepts of law, there's diplomacy, there's a desire on the part of the powers, the various states, that they want to maintain a balance so that nobody will be overwhelmed and absorbed by the others, that they will each have their security. And that security, by the way, also extends to protection of their internal sovereignty, their ability to run their own affairs without. the interference of the other, which is of course exactly what the universal empire hadn't wanted. And there you have it.

Right at the beginning of our modern world, the early modern period, we see the same tensions that we see today. And of course the world changed a lot since 16-48. So as you mentioned, there has been disruptions in which the world order had to adjust. So liberalism, for example, especially then political liberalism with the French and the American Revolution at the end of the 18th century. This introduced universalist concepts, which was a disruption as well, which had to be accommodated. So again, there was some needs to make alterations. He also had the industrial revolution emerging, in which power politics was more, became less about only military.

military force, but then also looking at the economic aspects. So initially we have a very focus on liberal economics. We assume that if two countries trade together, then there's an absolute gain. Now there will be peace. But in reality, you see, it's about relative gain. You know, if you can skew the symmetry of dependence, make the other one more dependent on you than the other way around, then this becomes a way of the sourcing power, both economic and political. So you see, this becomes also an instrument in restoring an equilibrium. into the system and i think this is why you also see the fierce competition of between the united states and china for example is not really military at the core it's a competition over who dominates

the key industries who has the most competitive technologies who has the main transportation corridors under their control who has the main banks which currencies are using these are the main issues which they're competing over. Now, I think one, when the United States is at a disadvantage as a military power, it has interest in benefiting from this position. So you see the militarization of the rivalry taking place as the Americans are chipping away at the sovereignty of China by pushing forward the secession of Taiwan, for example. But, no, overall, it's...

It's an interesting framework to look at world order because, as you said, I think one of the things really missing in international relations is history. In the past, all the political scientists have at least a degree in history. This is more or less gone now. We're living kind of in a vacuum where everything is about the present, and that creates a big problem. Because as I also wrote about a lot of the challenges we have today about the hegemon and the decline of hedge money, We already did all of this in the 19th century with Britain. They have their liberal empire. They linked the ideals of liberalism to empire,

and we, to a large extent, have the same today. So in the West, we really consider hedge money to be a necessity, because this allows liberalism to be elevated. But for the rest of the world, obviously, they do not see it in this way. And one of the most interesting things about 19th century period, where, as you correctly say, the British exercised a hegemonism, which had a lot of similarities to that of the United States in the 20th century and 21st century,

is that it provoked responses, it provoked resistance from those countries which were in a position to resist. And that resistance was economic. It took the form of particular, ideas about how to organise economies. So the British wanted to integrate everybody into their own system, which worked to consolidate their hegemonic position. That is what free trade ultimately was all about.

And yet countries that didn't want to be controlled by the British in that kind of way, like the United States and Germany, developed their economies in ways that, rejected free trade. And you have the American system that is developed in the 19th century by Alexander Hamilton. You have the lists, the ideas of Friedrich Lists, which gained traction in Germany, especially in Bismarck's time. And of course, List's ideas also take hold, to take root in Russia, which one suspects the British saw as the biggest adversary of the more. And the response from the British, is very similar to the one that we see from the United States today,

which is to try to create conflicts, to try to block the Russians, for example, with conflicts in the Far East, with Japan, to try to block the Russians in the Black Sea with the Ottomans, the Crimean War, and essentially, again, divide and rule. Well, it's a lot of similarities, because also at that point, you also had this, Eurasian dimension of world order because this was a new thing being introduced. Because prior to this, whoever dominated the seas, they would have the benefit of allowing themselves to become reliant on more free trade. They would control the transportation corridors.

That are great benefits. And then suddenly, as McHinder and others worried greatly about, the Russians were suddenly connecting Eurasia by land. And this was especially the case after it's humiliating defeat at the Crimean War, which ended in 56 when they began to push through. And first, of course, pushing down towards Afghanistan. And then you had this conflict between the British and the Russians. And they also push towards Asia, you know, where they reach all the way down to part Arthur. And again, also being pushed back, having this push back from the British. So to a large extent, this was the rivalry. What is also interesting is on the periphery of this, of course, you have the rise

of new powers. So while the British and Russians were locking horns on the side, you had the emergence of the Americans, the Germans, and other key powers. So, no, there's a lot of similarities. And as you mentioned also how one would attempt to block the Russians then by access to the sea. This is also something that has gone through the centuries. The Swedes did it back in the 17th century. And the British always done it and then followed by the Americans. And if you look at the strategy, again, why we had the Crimean War in the mid-19th century, keep the Russians out of the Black Sea, push them back, also preventing them from accessing them Mediterranean.

Look where we are today. the former NATO Secretary General of Asmussen very openly saying, now we can make the Baltic Sea our NATO lake. The Americans are pushing their military bases up in Scandinavia, so they will have greater influence over the Arctic. And, of course, the Ukraine War, which is to a large extent also about the Black Sea. So these are the main three seas which Russia access Europe. So the Arctic, the Baltic and the Black Sea.

And all of these are now, have been increasingly put under the collective West or American controls instead of the Cold War. But one thing that's very different, because everyone who focused on the Eurasianism of the 19th century, or the 20th for that sake, the Russians were aspiring for hegemony. But no one in Russia today has either capability or intention to do so. Now they see Eurasia not as a hegemonic project, but as a multipolar project, very much a Westphalan project in which they need the cooperation of China, India, Iran, all of these former giants. And this creates a very different form of network across Eurasia. Because in the past, when the Russians had deep interests only in integrating with the West, after the Cold War, all the relationships with the Chinese, Iranians, all of this could be merely elevator market value to the Europeans, something that

could negotiate their entry into Europe to create a greater Europe. Those days are gone, so there's something very different coming, again, which is why I call it the Eurasian world order as well. Absolutely. Can I just say very interestingly, Putin in his state of the nation address, the one that he's just delivered to the Duma, to the Federal Assembly in Moscow, he actually he talked about a Eurasian security architecture. So he's no longer talking about, you know, Europe, a European security architecture, which has to be, if there's going to be a negotiation, that has to be a negotiated matter. It's got to be a Eurasian security architecture. So the Russians are talking about security architectures that encompass India, China, Iran, Turkey, places which

are completely outside the framework of international relations that the Western powers are used to, which essentially was themselves. And that is one of the most interesting things, actually, because the Russians are having, you know, sort of tip, put their toe into this, dip their toe into this idea of Eurasianism in the 19th century, have suddenly embraced it now that they've managed to make the conceptual leap and say, look, it's not the West. So it's not just a small group of European states

and the United States that really matter. The world is completely different. All sorts of other countries have emerged. Civilisations have emerged, resurfaced. And it's a multidis. international system that is much greater than the West. I think the West finds that a shocking idea. And again, one of the most interesting things, parts of the book, for me, was the way in which you discuss the hierarchies, the sense that the West has, that liberalism, in fact, liberalism makes them

superior, that there's something superior about them, that they have the knowledge of how things should be that, you know, they own democracy, they own liberalism, they know what the correct way forward is, and their job is to sort of civilize everybody and teach everybody what that thing is. And suddenly they find that, in fact, the people who they thought are their pupils have grown up and don't want to listen to these lessons anymore. The Russians have understood that. The West can't get his mind around it, or so it seems to me. Yeah, no, I think very much so. And I, in this Putin speech, was also, I noticed the same argument as well, where he really highlighted that the bricks has become, the expanded bricks have become much larger now than the G7.

I think was in terms of GDP, well, according to purchasing power parity, I think it's 38% are now in bricks versus the 27th of the G7. So this is, this is, well, you know, it's not just showing off, but it's pointing out. that the world is not different. The main countries who claim the right for collective hegemon in the world is saying, you know, you're a minority now. This is, we're not going to be ruled by you anymore. And I think this is, this is a symbol also world order, because these are the key institutions which will govern the world, and these are the one who will set the actual rules. And within these institutions, of course, when he refers to the economic power, this is a reference to the international distribution of power.

So you have that one variable. And then next to it, you will also have the legitimacy of how to rule. And I think on this legitimacy, there's something very different because when you have hegemony, you will have demand sovereignty, inequality. When they talk about multipolarity, what they're saying is that this is expressed in the language of sovereign equality. So this is why the Chinese have this global civilizational initiative where they say, listen, we have all this different paths to development.

One civilization shouldn't dictate to another how to develop. So this is essentially a call for sovereign equality. This is rejecting universalism. So of course a challenge for this, if at the West we want to engage with this, except the multiple artists here. We would have to find this balance between accepting that, you know, we want to preserve some of the ideals of liberal democracy. But we also have to recognize.

how this influence world order, that the rest of the world is not going to put up with any sovereign inequality anymore. So it's on this basis that they're pushing back against this universalism. But in terms of this, sorry, you also mentioned how we want to,

how the diplomacy is shaped by this, that we want to, you know, we want to teach the world. And now our little students are all grown up and they don't want to be ruled by us anymore. This is also very much a continuation, if you will. of the 19th century.

Because we did the exact same thing then as well. We said, well, we are very civilized people. Now we talk about liberal democracies versus authoritarianism. But then it was the civilized versus the barbarians. This is when you have people like a Kipling coming with

this analogy of the jungle versus the garden. So once you're in the garden, which is the west where we have civilization, you can have rules. You have the rule of law. You respect sovereign equality, all of these wonderful things. However, when we're outside the garden among the barbarians,

then the rules have to be tossed away. Now it's the law of the jungle. And we have to act what is necessary to do in order to prevent the jungle from invading our beautiful garden. And this was the foundation of the civilizing mission or white man's burden. And we see the same rhetoric coming forward again. Indeed, the advisor I cited as well of Tony Blair, who was openly rejected Westphalen idea. He called for a New World Order. And this was, you know, his advisor even wrote a book about this, where he called for liberal empire.

So very much taking the same ideas from the 19th century. But again, this is not the peripheral. I think everyone was familiar with Josef Borrell, the foreign policy chief of the EU. He used the same, exact same language. They said, you know, we built a beautiful garden here. Outside the garden is a jungle. If we don't go out in the jungle and tame it, the jungle will invade our garden. So it's not just our right to go outside and civilized the world.

It's our responsibility. And this mentality and this idea of sovereign inequality, which really dominates a lot of the foreign policy thinking. And it's not just in Africa and Asia and South America. this is to a large extent how they think of civilizing Ukraine for that sake. Because whenever they talk about Ukraine as democratizing it, they never actually talk about the popular will of Ukrainians. And that was some of the statistics. We show from 91 to 2014, only like 20% of them actually want to join NATO.

Most of them preferred relations with Russia. So how can we justify them joining NATO through a coup, which they didn't even support? And this is the main idea. They don't necessarily know what they want, but we will democratize them and we will, you know, make them civilized. And it's not what democracy is. It's important that we are the teacher. And this is also been a very difficult relationship we always had with Russia because we say, listen, you're the Asians, we are the Europeans, you know, we are the civilization, you're barbarians. Now we're liberal democracies, you're authoritarian.

The only relation we can have is a teacher and a student. So you can either accept this subordinated role, which we divide between the subject and object, and accept implied sovereign inequality, or if you don't want this subordinated role where you don't have a seat at the table, but you do as you're told, well, then you hate democracy. You're an enemy of civilization, and then we have to balance you,

then we have to check you. And this has been NATO's rhetoric towards Russia's in the 90s. We're going to roll upon your borders, But don't worry, we're peaceful, a bunch of democracies. We just want the rule of law. However, if you resist us, this expansion will be used to contain you. So we're talking on both sides of our mouth. Your chapter on Ukraine is astonishing.

And what it shows to me is how in adopting the cause of building up democracy and liberalism in Ukraine, the West has in effect destroyed democracy and what used to be considered liberalism in the West I mean what liberalism there was in Ukraine has been destroyed there also I mean we now have an incredible dominance within Ukraine of extreme right fascist groups and you know whatever they are

they are absolutely not liberals but we support them, we support them, because somehow or other, that helps us to achieve our greater purpose, which is to establish democracy and liberalism in Ukraine. It is astonishing, actually, to see how, you know, this kind of rhetoric. And I think this, I mean, obviously there's a great deal of cynicism here as well, but beneath the cynicism, there is an actual bedrock of belief. I think one of the points you again make is that at some level,

these people really do believe that they're doing good. They really believe that they are defending and promoting liberalism, even as they act to destroy it. So if an election throws up the wrong candidate, well, that's not really a good election. You try and defeat it. you're fully in favour of free expression, provided, of course, that free expression isn't abused,

as you would say, by the wrong people. It is very strange and very twisted, but it is absolutely part of this idea of subordination, that they have to be the pupil, we have to be the teacher. and there's never any point, I suspect, where that relationship will change because from a Western point of view, what they're doing in Ukraine will mean that it will never become the kind of democracy

and liberal place that they say they won. No, I think I very much agree that we did dismantle democracy in Ukraine. And I think it's, it's because it didn't fit the right model. I mean, when you had countries like Poland, you know, they were always quite resentful towards the Russians. When the Kolar was over,

instead of removing the dividing lines, they preferred just moving them towards the east. So they were on the right side of a new dividing line. This was very much preferential, which is why they lobbied hard for NATO expansion to be part of the Western bloc instead of dismantling the block instead of dismantling the block system. But with Ukraine, it's been very different.

Because with the polls, you can set conditions. You know, you won't join the EU and NATO. Here's the conditions you have to fulfill. And it becomes political conditionality. With Ukrainians, it's very different. I worked with a, I worked a bit with a Ukrainian PhD student. And, you know, she looked into this, how NATO was socializing Ukraine, essentially re-educating them about why.

Why NATO is not a threat. It's actually you need us because if you don't have the Russian threat, then you don't want to join NATO. And if you don't want to join NATO, then we don't have the incentive to socialize you. So they have to de-russify and essentially had all these programs to cause divisions. And I think this was the main problem because Ukraine is like everyone agreed, which we're not allowed to say anymore. This was a fact that Ukraine was very much divided. So, you know, you don't oversimplify, but in the western part, So Ukraine as being, you know, you had one ethnicity, one language, one culture,

but over hundreds of years, the Russians had, their imperialism had deeply rooted themselves in Ukraine. So nation building really meant you had to shed and derrussify, get rid of this Russian imperial relic. But in the eastern parts of Ukraine, they look at this close history with Russia quite differently. They see, yeah, over hundreds of years, we lived in the same. state, on the same government, we have the same history. So they say, you know, we're a country with two ethnicities, two cultures, two languages. So for them, nation building would mean, you know, finding some form of sovereignty, but avoiding this ethno-nationalism from the West. And this has been the key problem. They have to east and western Ukraine. They have to find some kind of a

balance, you know, the commonality would be both sides would support sovereign borders. So this is our country. We try to organize our differences within it. But the problem was this was always very fragile. And not only Ukraine divided, but they're also in a divided Europe, because now the Europeans are literally telling them, you have to choose, us or them. And again, this is not empty talk. This was actually in 2013 at the end when the Western countries were inciting riots in Ukraine because they wanted them to choose between us or them, and then they made the wrong choice. The Ukrainians and Russians actually proposed, can we have a trilateral agreement? So they don't, they can be a, Ukraine can be a bridge. They don't have to choose between

us or them. The Europeans said clearly no. Ukraine has to choose. And of course, when it didn't choose correctly, they instigated a coup. So it's quite dramatic. And as you pointed out, I don't think the democratic argument doesn't come out clearly here because it wasn't supported by the Ukrainians, what we did to Ukraine, dismantling it. It's democracy. Meanwhile, the Russians could claim some moral superiority because what they wanted, they essentially supported the eastern Ukrainians. What they said, listen, we can join all the Western institutions as long as the Russians join as well. And this was great for us. Russia because they were favorable to having a greater Europe.

So they didn't demand the exclusive influence of Ukraine. They just mentioned we can't put new dividing lines between Ukraine and Russia. That will create civil war and a conflict with Russia. So this can't be done. Again, this is what the CIA director of the United States said as well. So it shouldn't be controversial. And this brings us to the other key thing, because, I mean, the obvious question is why the wide west just couldn't leave Ukraine alone.

I mean, if it had been left alone, it probably would at some point have found its internal balance. But they couldn't leave it alone. And it seems to me that this is where, again, your conceptual, your intellectual framework helps us to understand why in the end they couldn't leave it alone. Because on the one hand, leaving it alone violates, the sort of hegemonic philosophical mindset.

You have to have people who are going to be like us. You have to go in and teach these people and model them and shape them to be like yourself. But at the same time, as well as that, there is the great, there is the power, great power, hegemonic aspect. You can't have the Russians in because they're too strong and they might disrupt the system. the hegemonic system at its core. So you can't have them in NATO. You can't have them in the EU. You've got to exclude them.

And you've got to weaken them. And how do you weaken them? You do that by detaching Ukraine from them. And by establishing this anti-Russian Ukraine on their western border and you extend NATO eastwards. And you say, so it's in effect, looking at this, well, obviously, were choices which could have been made and the wrong choices were consistently made in terms of Ukraine and preserving peace. But you can understand a lot better why those wrong choices were made,

because on the one hand, you need to preserve your dominant position, and that means weakening Russia. At the same time, you have to reaffirm the liberal ascendancy, and that means that you have to reshape Ukraine. Yeah, I guess there's another parallel from the 19th century, because if you look at the diplomatic cables from the French and the British during the Crimean War in the mid-19th century, the main logic behind it was, you know, we're going to defeat the Russians in Crimea, and that will push them, not just out of the Black Sea, but that will push them out of Europe, they will push them into Asia, you know, kind of where they belong, out of European affairs.

And this is, if you read some of the main strategists who write about the post-Cold War order, the hegemony, for example, Spigny Brzezinski, the famous American advisor, he very clearly outlined the role of Ukraine in this. If you can detach Ukraine from Russia, Russia will no longer be a European power. It will be a nation power. So this is a way of detaching Russia from the continent. So not that much has changed. It's the same discussion. It's the same logic. The only difference this time, of course, is once you push Russia into Asia in the past, it was an economically backward area. It would ensure that Russia could never be a challenge. It would be economically backward. It would end up in no man's land. Now, of course, we do the same. We push Russia into the largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. So it's a very different outcome this time. Absolutely.

I was thinking about this because in some ways it shows how obsolete and backward-looking, Western thinking has become. Because they always say that the Russians are using 19th century methods and concepts in Ukraine. In fact, it is the West that is. They're looking at things. assuming that Russia can only prosper if it is somehow connected to Europe. So if you can push the Russians away from Europe, well, they'll stagnate and decline, which is really what you want because they're too big and they're too strong otherwise to absorb into the system and they might always challenge it.

But of course, what you're actually doing now is you're pushing them or trying to push them away from Europe. The risk is that they will become stronger, but of course, your real rivals around the world who are outside the European and Western system will become stronger as well because they will have Russia joining them. And nobody seems to have worked this or thought this through properly in the West, especially the United States. They cling to these, you know, Jeffrey Sachs talks about this. You know, they're refighting the Crimean War of the 1850s. And it is all about the Black Sea, by the way, what you said,

because I read a piece recently by the Institute for the Study of War talking about the importance of controlling the Black Sea and depriving the Russians today of control of the Black Sea. So they're saying that now. They were saying that then. And obviously, the Black Sea is very, important, existentially important for Russia. But it still doesn't really grasp the nature of the modern world, the extent to which it has changed and already slipped away. And that is where

this point about the new Eurasian world order comes in, and which you discussed so well in your book. Yeah, this is it. The world doesn't end anymore at the Blacks. see, this is where civilization ends. And it's funny because the Russians also, the rhetoric about power shifting, you also see the discourse changing. That's, you know, this whole idea that the civilized there on the West and it's not in the east. This is a whole mentality that is quite backwards.

And they said, you know, we have to shed this. Well, they argue that they have shed it. But no, I think this is why Ukraine is so important in this point in time. because it's not only was the war sparked to a large extent about the competition for world order, because as countless American leaders explicitly keeps saying, but it doesn't end up in their media, is, you know, if you can break Russia, then we would severely weaken the Chinese as well. They would lose their most important partner, and also that would be a clear signal.

And this would revive unipolarity. And as the Polish president said, in contrast, if the Russian president said, In contrast, if the Russians would win this, it would be the end of the golden era of American hegemony and a whole new world would be born. So they all recognized that this was one of the key motivations for going after Ukraine to knock the Russians down. But also the outcome of this. Look what has happened. I think we lived in our own world, you know, that Russia is just this gas station masquerading as a country. Oh, they have the GDP of Spain, you know, all this nonsense.

But look what happened. We sent all our weapons, counterfeeder on the battlefield, all these sanctions. The economy is growing. Russia's now the largest economy in Europe. And we want to isolate them in the world. Also didn't work. The rest of the world said they didn't want to have anything to do with this. And in the book, I cite the Singaporean diplomat.

He was a former president of the United Nations Security Council. Kishore, I'm slaughtering his name now. Mobubani. Yeah. So much for my... Anyways, and his main point was, you know, the rest of the world, they refused to join in on the sanctions and also NATO's anti-American,

sorry, the West anti-Russian crusade. Not because they supported the invasion of Ukraine, because, you know, more or less, None have. But he used a very interesting word. He said, can anyone imagine how obnoxious the Americans in the West will become if they could defeat the Russians? Imagine that. Attempting to restore unipolarity, reliving the 90s.

Nobody wants this. Even the Allies of America doesn't want this. The Indians, the Turks, the Saudis, they want to be able to diversify their economic connectivity. Because as long as this one center of power, they will dominate. too heavily over them. So this is all these countries. Now, look at them, they can trade with the Russians, Chinese, Americans,

and they don't want to choose one camp or the other. They just want to be able to trade with everyone. Now, no one can tell them what to do anymore. If anyone pressures them too much, then they just shift their economy to someone else. So, you know, they don't want to live in this unipolar world. And I think

because in the West, we only see the Ukraine war as being a Russian-Ukrainian war, which is absurd, especially now that we learn how deeply involved the West has been from day one, we can't understand why the rest of the world wants nothing to do with this. Why is it that they don't support the invasion, but under no circumstance will the support any sanctions against Russia? We can't explain it unless we address the wider issue.

Absolutely, because what we're basically saying is that we want to send all of these people who have grown up and become strong. We want to send them back to school. and the school, well, we are the teacher. And of course, you know, you can't expect people to want that. They're tired of our lessons. In fact, they have also come to realize that the teacher is extremely self-serving and doesn't apply to himself the same rules and lessons that he's teaching to the students.

So, of course, they don't want to go back. And it is completely unsurprising. Anybody who understands human psychology and, you know, the pride countries have in themselves and people have in themselves would not find it difficult to understand. Can I just mention that one of the most interesting things for people who read the book

are the very, very many citations. You provide it is full of the quotes, especially of Western officials. And they are eye-opening. I mean, the hubris and arrogance and cynicism, and I have to use that word cynicism, because it's quite all the idealism that is spoken there, there is always this cynicism as well.

It is just astonishing and very, very disturbing. And I have to say, you know, it would be, it will be food for the historians. And if ever anybody were ever said, you know, held to account for this, I mean, their words condemn them. It's astonishing how often and how repeatedly the mask drops in some of the things they say. And, you know, their own words condemn them. And you can find all those words in your book.

Yeah, that's why I know it was very heavy on the citations and references, But I think because this was the topic, it's unnecessary. Before you mentioned, for example, the Black Sea being largely, that the war is largely about control over the Black Sea. I mentioned that on a Norwegian news channel, and I was condemned for conspiracy theories. And then two weeks later, the deputy secretary general NATO, he goes out and he says the same thing. And then it's okay. So it's just that I think the problem is that this war has become so heavily propagandized. from day one. So it's very important to be able to document everything very clearly, you know,

because we say, oh, well, this war didn't have anything to do with NATO expansion, but then you can go all the way, look, you know, Russia's not worried about NATO expansion, but you can go all the way from Bill Clinton to foreign ministers, defense ministers, CIA directors, all these American leaders, top ones, if pro were, you know, cautious about NATO expansion, those who were very favorable of it, like Madeline Albright, very favorable, but she still recognized, well, of course the Russian sees this as an encirclement and betrayal. You know, this was common sense. But still, we were not allowed to discuss this now because it's interpreted as legitimizing Russia,

which is apparently the worst crime you can do. But it's also, yeah, across the board. And also the idea I also mentioned once that Americans have established a lot of control over Russia, sorry, over Ukraine after the coup. But, you know, there's an abundance of evidence. They even put in all their own people. I don't think people will notice, but after 2014, you know, the finance minister was an American working for the U.S. State Department.

Even in the embassy, American embassy in Kiev, she just took over that post as becoming finance minister. So it's colonial. And you had all these other positions of Americans, state prosecutors in New York, going and doing the same for Ukraine. And that's why I think everyone's familiar with this, Viktor Schurkin, the general prosecutor of Ukraine. Him as well is giving interviews later on,

saying that they came in, they ran us like a colony. They would determine every new employment of a key government official had to be proved by the Americans if the Americans didn't put forward their own people. And, you know, they said this saw us as a colony. again, nothing to do with democracy. And then he was fired himself by Joe Biden bragging about it

after he opened a criminal investigation after his son over the Buddhism. So it's just, you know, if you just make a claim, I think people, it's very important in this case to substantiate it. So I guess that's why there's so much, so many citations. And always I try to focus on the Western ones because so far, you know, everyone can be dismissed as a Putinist these days if you say the wrong thing. like to lean into Washington Post, New York Times, you know, the Russophobic ones, if you will. And again, if you come back to NATO expansion, and this is where the citations are so interesting,

the quotations from these, it's so interesting is that, as you correctly said, they understand, I mean, this mythology that the Russians were never promised that NATO would not expand eastwards. Well, it turns out that everybody knew. every other youth that that promise had been made. And there was a deliberate intention, essentially, as far as I can see, not to keep it. And there were all these warnings, it would result in a conflict with the Russians. And as you correctly said, people like Madeleine Orbright, all of these people, they accept that it will lead to a conflict with the Russians.

And then at the same time, they say we need to expand NATO in order to provide insurance. in case there is a conflict with the Russians. And whilst recognising that it was the expansion of NATO that was creating the conflict with the Russians in the first place, it is most strange behaviour, very strange behaviour. But of course, again, one which makes complete sense if you understand the hegemonic framework in which everything takes place. that the need to preserve and prolong the hegemonic position first of the United States and then of the West.

Yeah, that's why, well, again, that's why I find it so difficult to have any discussions as this is, because you say, well, once you start to expand NATO, you revived the Cold War logic of a moving device. lines, us or them, this zero-sum game of the Cold War. But these days, ah, that's just a Russian mentality. But Bill Clinton, he made his argument in January of 1994 when he said, listen, if we expand NATO, we're going to risk redividing the logic of the Cold War. We're going to go back to block politics, us versus them. European integration effect will become this zero-sum game. Everyone said this, George Kennan. And also, I think the best quote is probably from William Perry, he was the US Defense Secretary under Clinton, under Clintonia, from 94 to 97.

And it's not just was he strongly against it and considered quitting, but he also explained the position of all his colleagues who were for expanding NATO. You know, he didn't even reject, they didn't reject the idea that this would be threat Russia. But their main position was, well, you know, who cares? They're Russia's weak. No one cares about Russia. They're, you know, they're going to go into dustbin of history.

They're going to follow the path of the Soviet Union. Who cares? We're going to manage their decline. Let's expand NATO. That would ensure the decline as well. Everything is fine. And anyways, if they one day becomes resentful, at least we have a huge NATO surrounded them.

So it's just the fact that we decide to forget this, for me, it's quite obscene. And I also quote Joe Biden in there just to show what was coming. because in 97 he gave this speech at the Atlantic Council where he makes fun of Russia. Oh, they told me that this is going to be a huge threat for them. And if we do this, they're not going to be able to integrate with the West anymore. They're going to have to look to east to China.

And he mocks them, saying, yeah, sure, go to China. That country doesn't have an economy. This is no point. And how about it? If you're going to go east, why don't you go to Iran? You know, all this mocking. And now, of course, we see it 25 years or, well, more than that later.

And we see, yeah, these are the main strategic partners now, Russia. Their main, most important partners, China, and you see them linking themselves closer to Iran, which is very much overlooked by most countries, how important this relationship actually is. Absolutely. And in fact, let's come to that, because it's very interesting that you talk about Cold War politics,

and block politics, because, in fact, again, it's very clear reading your book. that it is the West's obsessed with block politics. It's the West that's always creating divisions and instigating conflicts and saying, you know, this is your friend, this is your enemy. You've got to make alliances with, you know, someone else, because, you know, we've got to make alliances with us to protect you from so-and-so. So, Pakistan, you must be hostile to India. India, you must be hostile to China, that kind of thing. and create so conflicts everywhere

and try to extend alliances everywhere. And then you have the opposite model, which is the new model that the Eurasians are creating, which is radically different. It says, no, we don't have blocks. We don't have alliances. We don't have alliances even with each other

because we understand that an alliance is defined ultimately by its opponents, by its enemies. And we're not looking for enemies. We're all looking to work together. And I find that, again, an absolutely fascinating part of your book, because you see how the Chinese are very careful that, you know, they're setting up all these systems, but they're actually willing to accept constraints upon themselves to reassure people that they're not going to dominate whatever structures are created and abuse them in their own interests. So Russia, India are able to forge connections with each other.

The Indians won't want to be subservient to the Americans. They have problems with the Chinese, so they look to the Russians instead. It's a fascinating thing, and all of it tying together. Yeah, well, this is why I also had that introductory chapter on the theories and ideas behind the world order, because this was a foundational idea of the Westphalian system, It was not just a balance of power, but also the agreement to maintaining the status quo. So, for example, when Napoleon had been defeated, we didn't create an alliance to perpetuate their weakness, to dominate them.

No, they were invited in at the concert of Europe, in which they had the seat at the table, because the point was to keep them weak. It was to restore and maintain the system. And we used to, it's not that long ago we rejected the idea. Keep in mind that a lot of the lessons the EU supposedly had after World War II, was, you know, we have to have security with each other, not, you know, security with other members, not against non-members, which is why, you know, the Germans, French, we're all supposed to be in the same club. But after the Cold War, that changed. Now, it's not security with each other, with other

members, it's security against non-members. All the rhetoric shifted. And this is the alliance systems you see. This is why, you know, in Europe, we split, America, split us into, you know, the European versus the Russians or in the Middle East, you have the Arabs versus the Iranians, in Asia. They always try to put the Chinese neighbors against them. Of course, the big trophy would be if they're able to win over the Indians, which is why they get so excited every time there's tensions between the Indians and the Chinese, because now you can also divide them into a dependent ally versus a weakened adversary.

But no, you're right. And I think, you know, one shouldn't glorify everything that China does. But, but one shouldn't be blinded either that something might be deceptive. But look at the Bricks expansion, for example. They took Ethiopia and Egypt. They're having rivalry over the water canals. They took in the Saudis, United Arab Emirates, and Iran. These are also adversaries.

So it becomes an institutional format for resolving differences between members, not an alliance against others. No one thinks Saudi Arabia and Iran are going to ally up and attack Britain. It's just, this is not in the cards. It wouldn't work. And I think the Shanghai Corporation organization is the same. They took on more and more economic

competencies. This is concerning for the Russians because he used to military focus and then, of course, Russia would be the kingpin. Once it became an economic institution, they thought, okay, now the Chinese might lead and the Russians made them peace with it. They can be the leader, but they don't want Chinese

dominance. They don't want the new hegemon. So they expanded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but if they took in India and Pakistan, if you have that little trio of China, India, Pakistan, this is a very difficult partnership. But again, if the purpose is to resolve differences between each other, then you can have mutual gain. Everyone improves their economic connectivity, reduce everything of military conflict. And I think this is why it creates incentives for peace as well, which is why I wrote about. the peace agreement they made between the Saudis and Iranians. It's in their interest.

The Americans will never do this. They paying the price now. They can't get the Saudis to join in on bombing to Yemen. The Arab Emirates are putting restrictions on them to attack Iranian proxies or proxies or allies. So it's a very different system that Chinese are advancing. It is beyond America's conceptual understanding. The idea of bringing together in a group,

countries that are rivals in that kind of way, to the American mind, it weakens the group because, of course, they think of it as an alliance and the creation of a bloc. So you're creating divisions within your block. So that's right. You have to exclude, you have to pick one side and exclude the other. But, of course, the Eurasians don't think in that way because they're not creating a block. And that I think is the fundamental difference. and something which the Americans don't understand what the Eurasians,

this is, I'm taking it from your book, are creating is a global Vestalian community in which people balance each other and maintain peace with each other and at the same time prosper and feel secure alongside each other. It's a very different conception of statecraft and one which hegemonic thinking just cannot possibly get his mind round. Oh, I think, well, that's what I always think back at this quote of George Kennan, because he was seen as the architect of the containment policies against the Soviet Union. And after the Cold War, he's so disillusioned because, you know, how did it come down to this? The Cold War was over. the Russians walked away from an empire.

Their main priority is to have peace with us and to work with us. And it called it political midgets, I think, because the only political imagination we had was to, let's revive the blocks. Who should be in NATO? Who should be left outside? That this was the scope. This was the intellectual imagination that we had. That this was the only way to organize security.

Who should be with us? who's against, and how should you organize this power structures? And again, for the Russian Eurasianists of the 1920s, they saw this as being symptomatic of maritime powers, because if you're going to rule from the periphery, then usually you have to keep the big players split. You know, you don't want the Turks and the Russians getting too close, or the Iranians and the Turks, or the Russians and the Germans,

the Chinese and the Russia, so forth. You want to keep them divided. But what you see on the Eurasian landmass, it doesn't work because if you're going to have economic connectivity there not only maritime corridors then you have to be able to work together

and I think this is what you see as well it's not necessarily that the Chinese are more moral than anyone else but they see that if they're going to try to do a hegemonic approach to or perhaps they're more moral with maybe it's confusion ideals I don't know but anyways if they will try to become a hegemon in Eurasia

the Russians would then start to lean more towards India. They would lean more towards Iran, maybe Europe. They would start to shift. So they realized that if they want to have this Eurasian project of integrating with common technologies, institutions, industries, transportation corridors, currencies, banks, all of this, then they have to compromise and harmonize. How else can we explain why our analysis always go wrong? Like we assume that the Russians and Chinese were going to have a huge conflict in Central Asia. It didn't happen.

because they found a way of accommodating each other. And I think this is why there's a lot of potential. But again, whenever I say this Eurasian integration has potential, in the West people say, well, wait, are you supporting this block against our block? But in their Eurasian conception, Europe is a part of this. Even the Americans, Eurasia doesn't have to be against America. It's a multipolar construct. It's anti-hegemonic, not anti-American.

so it's not choosing one side over the other. And I think it's a healthier approach to how Jordanians the world. Both Xi Jinping and Putin have both gone out of their way to say repeatedly that the Eurasian project is not an anti-Western project. It perhaps to some extent protects people from the West, but it is not hostile to the West. And there was this phrase that you gave that, you know, it's not against. It's not an against someone.

It's a positive between the countries that are forging it together. And it's a Vespalian system coming back again to what you said. Because there's rules and there's the rich people observe. it's not a situation where the rules are just made in a completely arbitrary way by somebody, a centre, which is not itself subject to them, which is what the rules-based international order is. Now, there's a lot of other things in your book, and I think that it's perhaps best of people read it. But, I mean, there were some very interesting points you made about how universal empires have declined, basically coded in their DNA, that universalism after a brief period, relatively brief period of prosperity, leads ultimately to atrophy in stagnation. And how that also happened to liberalism in a kind of way that the liberalist, liberal ideology, in the West, the focus on individualism, which was a vital and humanising thing at one point,

has now taken all sorts of very strange courses. And again, I have to say, I found that all very interesting, living in Britain, of course, where one still sees, in fact, one sees very strongly the symptoms, the consequences of stagnation. and atrophy that developed, and which we've not broken from, broken away from, during our sort of late imperial phase. And it explains to Americans, that part of your book, I think explains a very great deal to Americans about problems within their own country,

the economic problems that we're hearing so much about, but also the intense partisan divisions that are there. And it's fascinating that this one book is able to bring all of these things together and show that all of these things are connected to each other. Well, on the topic of the universal state or the challenges of liberalism facing, this was about some of these ideas from John Hertz, he was the scholar who coined the term the term security dilemma.

He wrote in the 1940s that when you have this ideals of, he called it idealist universalism. So he put the French revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks, but I added, well, this was in the 40s, so I added the liberal democracies of our present time into this concept of idealist internationalism. Because he made the point that once these ideals win, in victory they die, he wrote. And I thought that was also a good description of how what happens to, to the idea. to liberalism because liberalism is often, it often thrives in opposition because it's an ideology of freedom of the individual. But once it becomes dominant ideology and there's no alternative to balance it, everything

has to be liberated. So you have to liberate the individual from the common culture, from the faith, from the nation itself. So you have now liberalism divorcing itself from the nation state. It's quite a dramatic way. So this is why I think many people now see liberalism becoming entering a revolutionary stage where we even attempt to free ourselves of our own past. You know, it's burdened with all the sins of our past.

Now we're all going to start living in the area zero again. And it's very destructive at its core. But again, we don't have these discussions because if you comment on the challenges of liberalism, then well, either you're for or against. Everything is black or white. in the discourse. So it's very difficult to approach it. And here again, you discuss very, very well, brilliantly, I think, the need to control discourse. You have to control discourse to protect all of these things, the foreign policy, the many contradictions,

the various statements that you catalogues so well in your book. You can't talk about them. You can't talk about what happened. So you have to control what he's said and, and the, and, you can't talk about what is said and, the information that is circulated. So in order to protect all of these things, you have to sort of suppress and control and censor in a way that is the opposite of what Western societies and democracies and liberal democracies used to be all about.

But I think that's why you also see now unipolarity coming to an end. Everyone recognizes not just the distribution of power in terms of military and economics, but look at how we exercise our ideals. We spread democracy by toppling democracies. I mean, in terms of economic liberalism, you see, the liberalism today is becoming more and more illiberal, I would argue. And even economic liberalism. Now that economic concentration is no longer in the West, if you have complete free competition and, you know, the Chinese are leading in key technologies, be it 5G or anything else, then, of course, this is not favorable to us anymore.

So now we're reverting to the idea of fair trade instead of free trade. from the American system. So you have all this, yeah, you see ideal as the liberal hegemony, not just the hegemonies disappearing, but the liberal core of it's going away as well. And as we said, controlling the narrative,

only 10 years ago, it would be unthinkable to have this amount of censorship and cancellations, as they're called, or content moderation. You know, we're inventing new language to justify why we can't have, you know, liberal economics or free speech or it's quite a difficult, a strange time we'll live in.

Even in this country, we have a liberal, yeah, we have a human rights organizations financed by the states who are now looking to censor people who criticize the glory of NATO. It's just a very absurd time to be alive, to be honest. And I think this is why I see the decline of liberal, let's manage, on it. Absolutely. And of course, and as we now come to the end of this program, can I just say, we are at the end. I mean, what we are talking about is unsustainable. And that is absolutely clear to me from reading your book. And you say, and this is the most, it's always the most important, but perhaps the most disturbing chapter as well. So that whatever happens now in the war in Ukraine, it's already gone horribly wrong, but the unipolar system cannot be recreated.

And you talk about how we have a choice, either we escalate in a disastrous attempt to try and hold things together and pursue it, or we just recognise this fact, and Europe in particular, makes some important decisions which has been avoiding making recently. Either we do that or we risk a great tragedy. No, I couldn't agree more. And I think this is why it's so dangerous if we had more political imagination to imagine what other alternatives we could have. Because so far it appears our only goal is to revive the 1990s, which is already lost. I mean, best case was severely able to weaken Russia. But much like in the 19th century between the British and the Russians,

it's at the periphery you will see new powers coming, be it in India or China, who are the new Germany and America, who are not going to live under this unipolar system anymore anyways. So the world is coming, changing very fast. And there should be some discussions, which is why you and I, we talked to Jeffrey Sachs before, and we discussed this ideas of what's the, of Adam Smith, where he also points this out, that in his days, you know, discovery of America

and in the East Indies, that this was the greatest, he called it the greatest discovery in human history because it connected the whole world. But he also recognized there was a huge tragedy for all the people's Europeans encountered, simply because the disparity of power was too great. Too much power was contrary in the West. All the relationships, be the economic, military, political, all of it would be very exploited. So, you know, he saw it as beneficial if in the future there would be more symmetry in relations. So that's why I keep making a point. This Eurasian multipolarity emerging, it doesn't have to be a utopia.

It's going to have its own set of problems. But it doesn't have to be seen as being the end of the world. It's just the end of unipolarity. But unipolarity was always unsustainable. So I wish there was a broader discourse instead of, just who's supporting us and whose enemies. And that's part of the objective of the book, of course. Well, exactly.

I was going to say, Professor Deeson, you've made a major step in opening up that discourse. I would strongly recommend everybody to read that book. If you want to understand the world we're in today, I think it is an essential book, actually. You get also part of the, I mean, there's an awful lot there that we haven't discussed in this program. You get a very strong sense of,

some of the personalities also, by the way, who've been involved and have made these kind of decisions. And it's just it, it, it weaves it all in the great pattern of history. And of course, if you know anything about history, you know that it doesn't end. It continues. So there's end of history ideas, which you also discussed, but, you know, we'll leave that for people to read in your book. End of history ideas are flawed. and wrong from the outset. I think we can both agree on that.

So go to read the book. Please do read the book. You'll understand the modern world and why we are in this conflict now. And you'll understand the place of this tragedy, of this terrible war in Ukraine, better once you've read it. And as I said, you can find it on Amazon,

Hard copies are now on sale and I think it's an essential and extremely good read by the way as I said I found once I started it I could stop So thank you Professor Deeson If there's anything last that you want to say No not really Yeah thank you

And yeah hopefully people will take an interesting book And as you mentioned I think it was Mark Twain you know he said history doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes and I think this is kind of why I wanted the historical perspective world order because you see the same issues replaying themselves but slightly different as you know new ideas economic systems come into place so thank you very much thank you