The Duran Podcast - Towards negotiations between Russia & Ukraine/NATO? Nicolai Petro, Alexander Mercouris, Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: February 25, 2024

Towards negotiations between Russia & Ukraine/NATO? Nicolai Petro, Alexander Mercouris, Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris. And the guest today is Professor Nicola Petro. Welcome. Nice to be here. A pleasure to have you again, Nicola. So yeah, we had Nicola here before. He's a professor of political science at University of World Island. But I also find it interesting you have a background as a practitioner from the US State Department. at an interesting point in time, of course, when the Soviet Union collapsed, we worked for the U.S. State Department

as a special assistant for policy on Soviet affairs. I'm not sure if I got that title right, but anyways, I find this to be an interesting background because it gives you a nice understanding and great perspective on, I guess, the paths that were chosen and the different future, perhaps, which were not taken. Obviously, if I may,

seriously, it just struck me how similar the similarity of the prospects that we face then and now it was beginning to be clear in 1990 that the old world was collapsing and people who had not thought ever in their careers

to be facing the prospect of a new world order in which the Soviet Union did not exist and therefore could not be an enemy, had a devil of a time, let me put it this way, had a devil of a time facing that reality. And I think one of the things that brought my candidacy, this was through the Council on Foreign Relations, to the fore, was the fact that I had already been writing, about the prospects of Russian social transformation and that what I believe that communism was rather an overlay onto a deeper Russian historical tradition, which was much more varied than the one that had been portrayed by the government. In some respects, I was right in the resurgence of

national identity and religion, I think. But in some ways I was wrong as well in that the collective nature of society, the idea of us being one unit which existed in Russia, but also to a large extent throughout the entire Soviet Union, had laid deep roots. And I haven't grown up in the Russian immigration abroad really had an ear for the deeper philosophical tradition and the history, not but a teen year, I would say, for the Soviet reality. And that hit me very hard when I moved there in 1996 and then proceeded to live and work there for part of 10 years. in a rural region, the region of Nogred, the city of Nogrid,

the city of Nogrid, the Great. It's interesting, it would say many people couldn't foresee or imagine living in a world without the Soviet Union because I feel that might be perhaps one of the problems we have with negotiating an end here, because we can't go back to the way things were obviously, and I think this is very hard to come up with what a new reality might look like. once this war is over. Anyways, and that's kind of a, what we really want to discuss with you today as well. Particularly because the media

extended the light of the Soviet Union artificially in people's minds, although the people within the Soviet Union were ready to make that break and move on. But they had no roadmap and they had no allies in the West. and that is much to our collective shame. I agree, by the way.

I think that's entirely correct, and I've spoken to others, Jeffrey Sachs in his own very different, a very different perspective, economic perspective, essentially says the same thing, that he went there and he found that he had no allies

in doing what he wanted to do in Washington. because, again, people could not really make the conceptual leap that was needed. They couldn't put behind them some of the older views that had been developing over the Cold War. And the sense of the Soviet Union is somehow still there, even as it wasn't. Well, I point out to my students that to this day, Whenever there have been U.S. presidential candidates, and particularly when there's a slew of them fighting it out to get into the sunshine of the final, being the final choice of their respective parties, every single one of them has made the error at some point along the campaign trail of inadvertently referring to Russia as the Soviet Union, just in casual discourse. And that shows a sad mindset of our political leap, their inability to see the reality as it is. So let's jump into the issue of negotiations.

I think this is something that might become more likely in the months, if not the weeks, to come. in terms of, I guess, who would have to do the negotiations? Would it be Washington or Kiev? What prevents diplomacy? What will be the different parties willing to compromise on? And the reason I think this is an interesting topic is because one of the more absurd aspects of this war, I think, has been the absence of an exit strategy. That is, the leaders keep saying, and the media for that sake, that the only acceptable outcome is victory. But no one has defined what victory against the world's largest nuclear power would actually look like.

And I also hear leaders make the argument that we must treat Putin like the new Hitler. But what does exactly does that mean? No one outlines if we should follow the same path. Are we going to invade Moscow? Are we going to watch him die in a bunker? This is, and then none of this really is very reassuring. So meanwhile, I think for two years, years now we see on NATO side we've rejected diplomacy in negotiations and also security guarantees

and I think the problem with this is that there's no peaceful alternative to a military victory as we haven't defined it and also unlikely that we could ever achieve it so I guess this is the strategic vacuum of this war but let's start with this question of when do you see the negotiator well who would do the negotiations because I think the Biden administration appears to be, well, fiercely opposed to peaceful settlements. Maybe I get this wrong, but does that mean that the initiative has to shift to Kiev to push for a negotiation? Right now, I think all sides in the West are trapped by their own rhetoric.

And that rhetoric insists that Ukraine must achieve victory. and victory is defined specifically as the recapture of the borders of 1991. So that includes Crimea. And the problem here, so let me just step back. So that's the objective. And then there are to be negotiations. So we have essentially reconstituted the importance. the impossible conundrum which we were unable to resolve with the Minsk Accord, which was,

we will deal magnanimously with Donbass after they have surrendered and after they have returned, re-entered Ukraine and Ukraine has re-established control over the border, which of course gives them no leverage whatsoever. And so it was essentially, negotiations were tantamount to surrender. And of course, Zunbass and its supporters in Russia could not agree to that. That's the situation we have right now. The expectation, as I understand it, in Washington was, yes, and even rhetorically to this day, you will hear State Department and Defense Department officials say, yes, of course,

we're four negotiations. But at the right time, and the right time is after Russia has been defeated. But what if Russia cannot be defeated? Putin has suggested he's not going to allow that. And it's hard to imagine practically how that could happen, given the disparity of forces, which previous presidents recognized and saw as a constraint on their activities. I'm referring specifically to Barack Obama, and why he refused to engage specifically in support to the same extent of Ukraine.

his presidency, he said there is, famously, he said, there is an escalation dominance problem. They can always do more locally than we can from a distance. And this is proving to be correct today. Now, I'm not saying, well, we can speculate about will Russia inevitably win or is the opportunity to inflict a strategic defeat on Ukraine, something that it has roughly, by the end of the year and the beginning of next year to accomplish, because at that point, presumably, all the money and things like that, toward rearmament in the West will begin to have effects.

So that's a very complicated and uncertain question. But if before that, we have a practical dilemma and a moral dilemma. The practical dilemma would be to end the war so that the fabric of international diplomacy and the international community can begin to be re-knit. And this has to occur because the only alternative is mutual annihilation. I never thought I would miss the days when we were talking about mutual assured destruction. But it would be a very useful concept to remember today. that we still, if anything, have this capacity in space.

And the second problem is the moral one. I was struck by a phrase that Ambassador Chaz Freeman made at a speech here in Rhode Island not long ago. I would remind our viewers that he was former U.S. ambassador to China in Saudi Arabia, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, former acting director of national intelligence. In other words, he's covered all the bases. And I quote him to say, combating Russia to the last Ukrainians was always an odious strategy.

And now, Ukraine is about, sorry, NATO is about to run out of Ukrainians. Well put. I mean, this is absolutely correct because, of course, one of the things that it seems to me that isn't fully understood in the West is that if you pursue what is in effect an all-or-nothing strategy, victory is your only way forward, then, you know, you always risk ending up with nothing. but it was nothing isn't something that we in the West are going to pay. It is what Ukrainians risk. And the damage that is being done to Ukraine every single day is appalling. And it is now increasingly, I think, understood in Ukraine itself. I try to follow what happens there.

I don't speak the language. But I understand that there's increasing concern. in Dismay in Ukraine about the situation. And I would have thought that that alone should actually push towards at least an attempt at a diplomatic solution. I get the sense sometimes listening to officials in London, in Brussels, in Berlin, in Washington, that they're almost afraid to negotiate. And I wonder why. I ask myself, what is it of?

about negotiations that they so fear. Well, I would, sorry, gathering my thoughts. People fear what they cannot foresee. And I think the New World Order that is probably coming, inevitably, is something that they fear instinctively. And therefore they cling tooth and nail to the old waves. And what they don't appreciate is how much they've alienated Russia, which would have been happy 10, 15 years ago, even more 20, 25 years ago, to have been part of this New World Order.

would have been happy to be part of it. But the West, and we get this from Tucker Carlson's interview, now it's, I think, irrevocably part of our political discourse, the understanding that what's something that diplomatic historians only were really familiar with before this interview, namely that Russia asked four times, specifically about the prospects of joining NATO and were rebuffed by multiple presidents, as well as NATO leaders.

And again, this goes back to a point I made at the beginning, where we simply, as a generation, did not envision, could not envision the better future. I was speaking recently to a group in India, and they said, well, what about realism? I mean, doesn't realism, in fact, predict that sort of limited ability to reach an accord because it anticipates conflict as being a perennial aspect of human affairs? Only to an extent, because the ideal for a real for a real aspect of human affairs, is a period. resolving conflict was also inherent in Hans Morgentau's thinking, namely that if you should gain the upper hand, you do not strive for dominance and hegemony. That is a fiction.

What you should strive for, if you are wise and statesmanlike, is balance. You seek the middle ground and you offer concessions that are interoper. and meaningful to your former opponents, but not vital to yourselves, and thereby begin to form a, you invite your opponents to become part of the New World Order. You give them an investment, the reason to invest in the New World Order. And this was something that, again, I would agree with those who say Russia was consistently denied. I saw it in my own experience and I observed it among my colleagues later. There were, of course, individuals who had great sympathy for Russia and its aspirations in the U.S. State Department and in senior physicians, but they would run into a wall

of elite consensus that nothing was possible and a very dismal view of Russians as a people that really smacks of Russophobia in an ethnic sense. It really was a I hesitate to use the term racist because it's not racial, but it is ethnically driven and culturally driven. This was largely Solzhenitsyn's argument as well towards the end of the Cold War, that the US should define its enemy as being communism, not Russians, because communism is gone if that would entail perpetuating this whole crusade and pretty much not ending the Cold War. I'm wondering, sorry, go ahead.

No, I'm sorry, I interrupted you. I'm sorry, I interrupted you. No, no, I was just going to say this, because you mentioned we don't have any, that we locked ourselves away from negotiation at me. We redefined it. But in the beginning, it feels like it was opportunistic way. It was an opportunistic construction. But now it seems like we trapped ourselves. Because keep in mind on the third day after the Russians invaded, the Ukrainians and Russians agreed.

We're going to have negotiations without any preconditions. And later on, you know, the United States intervene and said, no, we don't accept this. There has to be preconditions. You have to withdraw all your troops and then we'll negotiate. So again, as you suggested, we conflate negotiation with capitulation. And again, the same idea was, you know, we'll supply them weapons to Ukraine so they can get better bargaining power. But two years later, no one's calling for negotiation. So that wasn't really correct either.

And if you listen to a British historian, Ferguson, he wrote a piece for Bloomberg, where he interviewed various leaders in Britain and the US. And they all came back essentially with the same answer. The only acceptable outcome is regime change in Moscow and strategic defeat of Russia. So I think once in the beginning that could have been seen as an opportunity which pursued. But I think now it has become much deeper because now it's, We linked it into morality. That is, you know, Ukraine has to be allowed to join NATO.

And it's seen as, you know, moral because every country should be allowed to do as they please. But of course, what this actually means is, you know, it would be like Mexico joining a Russian-led alliance. It's what we're saying is obviously in the real world, this would never happen. We know that the Russians would never permit this. And the same goes now. Even though we accept, there's no possibility. of Ukraine winning, we still want to keep them fighting, simply because it's the moral thing to do as they can't negotiate.

Let's talk about, I think you've articulated the current cul-de-sac in which there is no way out. How do you break through this? There is a potential. It is voices of dissent in side Ukraine, because if you want to remove the basis for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, you have to remove the equation of the West. You have to remove its contribution and its interest, because its interests are entirely driven by the need to have and foster a conflict between NATO and Russia. A conflict that will allow for the tremendous growth in military expenditure for decades. I mean, this is already clearly been articulated.

So that is now the strategy. of the military industrial complex in the west. We are to some extent going to save our economies by repurposing them for conflict with Russia. It worked before. It worked in the 1950s and the 1960s. Why can't it work today? So the way out is for the these voices in Ukraine that wish to not fight on behalf of NATO to the last Ukraine, but wish to save Ukraine, in order some of them to reach a compromise with Russia that would allow for mutually beneficial relations. others, nevertheless willing to support such a policy, but with the intent of recapturing those

territories 20, 30 years from now, maybe by becoming a much more attractive alternative to neighboring regions of Russia than Russia is itself. And I think, by the way, that this is at Istovych's position. He is not for capitulation. He is for regrouping and reaching a peace settlement and saving what can be saved. But on either way, this sort of, should this tendency, and should these voices grow important in Ukrainian politics, which is, I'll grant you hard to imagine, given the tight lid that is put, on descent in Ukraine.

But nevertheless, should it become important and should negotiations then begin between Ukrainians and Russians themselves, then the West would be left empty-handed, essentially, in its ambitions. And I think that is really the only way to move forward. I do not agree with what I heard in Putin's speech And what I sometimes hear voices emanating from Moscow and elsewhere,

that this has to be a negotiation between Moscow and Washington, or Moscow and, well, Moscow and Washington because Brussels is an advantage of Washington. Because of that denies Ukrainians all agents. And Ukrainians desire such agency, they want to be part of the negotiations. and really asserting their right to negotiate on their own behalf is probably the only way to save the country, not just now, but in the long run. I completely agree. I'm going to say one thing. I think the idea that was current in Moscow, that this is going to all end as a result of some kind of understanding between Moscow and Washington, a new Yalta, was quite widespread in the autumn. I sense that it is gradually ebbed away.

I think that they've been looking at it. I mean, some people like Putin might still be speaking about it. I do get the sense of Putin is speaking about it very much. But I get the sense that they no longer think that a negotiation with the Americans over this is possible. because as you set out earlier, the Americans aren't interested in a negotiation. They want straightforward capitulation. And that is, of course, something that the Russians are not going to ever agree to.

So that only leaves Ukraine as the only party that the Russians can negotiate with. And if you actually followed Putin's interview with Carlson, which he just said, recently if, and it's not inconsistent with other things he's been saying, and which other Russians have been saying as well, are there important Russians. They say, look, we are prepared to sit down. It's the Ukrainians, however, who need to make the first move. They've made themselves this law, which is the edict that we all know that Zelensky has. They've got to put all that aside. And I did get the sense, actually, that they are prepared to talk to the Ukrainians, provided the Ukrainians will talk to them.

There is a deficit of trust. It might be problematic for the Russians now to negotiate with some Ukrainians. But I think that there is still an awareness amongst some people in Moscow that if total victory by the West against them is a dangerous fantasy, total victory by Russia is also potentially dangerous as well. So some kind of negotiated outcome is optimal. That is my own sense of what the, I won't say exactly consensus is in Moscow,

but because I'm not able, I don't talk to these people, but I do get the feeling that that is the way people are thinking there. So, there are constant interactions between senior Ukrainian and Russian officials. They occur regularly in the energy arena, because Russian gas still flows through Ukraine, the existing pipeline network, at least until the end of the year, I think. And the prospect of the question of what to do about this and how to make it resemble, make the Russian gas resemble European gas, reverse flows and how to continue that, all has to be negotiated between senior officials in the

respective energy departments. And there is, of course, the constant interaction between the respective militaries who are exchanging prisoners, most of the time successfully. And so, the contacts are there. They simply need to be expanded. And they might, for all we know, actually be expanding through those connections, but it would never be admitted publicly until something has been achieved and an accomplishment could be declared. For example, how flat-footed were we all, we were all caught by the upcoming meeting in Moscow of Palestinian officials from various factions. You know?

Yesterday there was Moscow was out, and today it's right smack in the middle of everything again. That's because all the negotiations were done in secret. And then when everybody was on board, boom. Now we have something to discuss. In practical terms, may I just add one caveat. So there is a way, to have you taken, needed two in terms of negotiation.

So the first step is to establish the possibility of direct dialogue between relevant and responsible officials in Ukraine and Russia, who have the authority to negotiate something, even though something doesn't have to be specified. The Minsk Accords, by the way, were not signed by any actual Ukrainian official. They were signed by a rep by Lianyat Kuchma, who was temporarily designated as a representative of Petro Parashenko personally. And that was considered such a clever move by the Ukrainians because it, you know, on the one hand, yes, we were signing these accords, on the other hand, maybe we weren't.

And, you know, we can get, that can work for a while. And so that's, that's a first step. Once those are underway, however, there is nevertheless the bigger issue of how to encourage the West to buy into peace, peace between Ukraine and Russia, something that Western governments currently do not want. How do you do that? Well, by offering them a carrot and saying, well, after this is negotiated, you will, in fact, have lost your major bulwark, your major way of trying to undermine stability in our region, like you lost Iraq, like you lost Afghanistan. You know, this is straight three-year-out.

But we're going to offer you a way back in. Let us indeed revisit Dimitramin Vidiv's proposal of 2008 and Vladimir Putin's proposal at the end of 2021 and broaden it to include all relevant parties. Let us have a true peace negotiation in Europe, a pan-European conference, that would touch upon all the things that are upsetting to states in the region and construct fora for discussion of democracy, of security, of the well-being of the continent as a whole. And you'll say, well, this was already done. This was done in 1975 in Helsinki.

And we have an organizational structure for that. Indeed. Let's use that formula and revisit it. Or if that formula seems too constricting now, because we have a new world order on the horizon, which includes states that are interested in Europe, but overshadow Europe in the long run. That includes China, that includes perhaps Africa, perhaps Iraq. Iran, certainly Russia, the bricks generally, they must have a seat at the table. So maybe we should be thinking in larger terms of the new Congress of Vienna, or I go back

even further to the origin of the nation-state system. Let's think about, you know, we haven't revisited this question in 400 years. important our nation states today in an age of transnational communications, artificial intelligence, and God knows what. All these things together, maybe we should be reexamining in a new Treaty of Westphalia. These are all exciting prospects to come after an armist disagreement at the very least is agreed between Ukraine and Russia itself. And that is relatively much simpler

because we are talking about two states negotiating directly with each other and ignoring all the chatter to the side. Remind me a bit now about George Kennan. He was making these arguments in the 90s that now that the world had completely changed, we had all the opportunities in the world to reinvent the international system,

invite the Russians in. And he was quite dismayed. that the only political imagination we had was, oh, let's keep these blocks. And our only decision should be who should be inside the blocks and who should stay outside, that this Cold War mentality could not be shaken. But you mentioned that there might be more willingness

from the Ukrainians once they realize that this is the only way out to negotiate with Russia. But my question would be, who in Ukraine? Because at the moment, one gets the impression that the far right always have this veto, as we saw, again,

both Paraschenko and Zelensky kind of ran on a peace platform, at least Selensky, but they both had to reverse themselves away from Minsk after pressure from the fascist groups, Osov and others. So it begs the question,

what can be done? And also, one gets the impression now that, Zelensky's position is rapidly weakening in Kiev. Maybe I'm wrong about this, but that's definitely something Alexander has discussed and thought a lot about. So I'm just wondering, does that make it easier to negotiate for the Russians to negotiate with Ukraine if Zelensky's hand is weakened or is it only more difficult? Because certainly you need a central power capable of talking to Moscow.

Probably. But maybe not. It depends. It depends, as I have said, from the beginning of Russia's military campaign. What is to be negotiated will depend on the outcome of the battlefield. The West's mistake last year was to assume that the outcome had been determined by the temporary repelling of Russian forces at the end of in 2022 and maybe early 2023. But that proved to be only the first stage of the Russian engagement. Then it became more serious, but we didn't change, we didn't foresee how that would affect the battlefield. We made, I should say, Russian

analysts may be falling into a bit of euphoria here as well today. Because the potential that Russia has has not been fully realized on the battle. The potential that Russia has militarily, in terms of resources, et cetera, you know, So it should be able to overwhelm Ukrainian forces at this point. Why it has not done so is a matter of very interesting speculation. Maybe, as some in the West argued, because they can't, and ultimately this is a sign of weakness to exploit, but maybe because they are at the same time suggesting we are holding back and offering you an opportunity to negotiate. Who wants to talk to us before we strike? Because

a strike is inevitable, a devastating strike. What I find interesting in the Ukrainian discourse, which I do follow, is that you mentioned the far right. And its limitations, how it poses limitations. Yes and no. There are intellectual leaders, former minister, and I would specifically mention to you, the former minister of transportation,

Omindian, and the former Ukrainian ambassador to Germany, André Menik, currently deputy foreign, Minister as well, an ambassador to Brazil, both of whom have gone on record now, saying we should not exclude the possibility of negotiating with Russia. Now obviously they've got their own agenda. This is not let's have peace. It is let us lick our wounds, heal, rebuild ourselves, and re-engage the fight later. That's the traditional far-rider nationalist narrative, and it hasn't gone anywhere.

And then, of course, we have out of Stovi, who has undergone a total metamorphosis. But as someone, as he points out, and it's worth listening to, someone who knows the internal discussions at the very highest level to the Ukrainian government, here are three voices, At one point, we're totally committed to the far-right nationalist agenda and now say, well, he comes up. We have to reassess. And if I look at Ukrainian history in my book, I do tackle this issue. The book came out, you know, a month after the invasion, especially, but now, or let's

say a few months after the invasion, but I was already thinking about what could possibly change give the rhetoric. And so I looked at the rhetoric and the remarkable transformation that the organization of Ukrainian nationalists and their predecessors in Germany during the interwar period underwent in their rhetoric when they needed. They were entirely an anti-Polish organization during the interwar period and all of and pro and I would say allied with the Russians when the Soviets even, when necessary. Then once the polls were gone and it was a matter of dealing and opposing the Soviet regime, everything switched. Similarly, when Nazi Germany was on, was in descendants, they were all gung-ho

for that kind of regime for Ukraine, but then when the writing was on the wall and that regime lost, boom, they rewrote their charter and became Democrats overnight. That sort of thing is practical politics, and I don't see much interest in collective suicide among Ukrainian nationals. Some will escape to the wet, but that won't include everybody in your family. And those people still remain in Ukraine and there will be an inevitable acceptance of the need to negotiate with the power that emerges dominant as a result of the battlefield outcome. That is very interesting. I just want to share with you something that I, an email that I

received about three or four weeks ago. And again, this is always very frustrating. because I can't identify the person who sent it to me. But suffice to say, he is somebody who has contacts both in Moscow and Ukraine. And he's also specifically got contacts with some people in the Duma. And he informed me that there had, in fact, been over the past few weeks, a number of informal contacts between people from Ukraine and people in Russia. and that this is actually known about in the Russian Parliament. And he gave me the names of the people who had been involved, allegedly.

I mean, I can't obviously corroborate all of this, but that's what he said. And by the way, he's somebody who, in the past, I have found that what he says turns out to be correct. Doesn't mean he's correct about this. But he provided me the names of the people who have been reaching out and who have been speaking to the Russians. Now, they're all people that all of us have heard of. They're all business people, famous Ukrainian business people. It's not difficult, I think, to guess who some of them might be. But they have all been reaching out and they have been contacting people they know in Russia. They've actually had meetings, according to this person, in a few places. And there have been discussions. And the Russians have been relaying, the Russians they've been meeting have been relaying back. to Moscow, to the official government, what is going on there. So according to this person, these contacts are taking place. They're not going very far.

There's not yet been any kind of breakthrough, anything of that kind, but they are supposedly taking place and they might lead to something. And obviously, I am not following Ukrainian affairs with the detail that you can. I can, I like because I don't speak the language for one thing. But I also get the sense that there has been a shift

that people are now looking at the situation. They're beginning to say, this isn't working in the way that we were led to think it would two years ago. When we were assured that Western support would work and Russians would fail. And I get the sense that there is a war weariness now, starting to take hold in Ukraine, which might explain these informal context that I'm talking about. Well, let me just add an addendum to that. At one point after the events of 2014,

many Ukrainian officials obviously left the country, including the former Prime Minister Nikolai Azadav. And Azadav who has a blog mentioned in passing that currently in Moscow, there are two complete former Ukrainian governments. All the ministers, everybody is right there. And obviously, they have all the contacts and know all the people throughout the government that they've always known. So this is not the case of one country and its elites not being able to communicate or contact or talk to the other side.

As you suggest, right now, it's like, well, nice to have coffee with you here. Take my card. Let's stay in touch. And we'll see how things go. and, you know, not what the pathos of military victory is made of, but what is actually the substance of negotiation. Let's find a way to get through this and end it, if possible, without worrying about all the moral qualms, et cetera, survival first. And I think to the extent that the reality becomes, can we survive, these voices will grow louder and clearer. You ask who, Glenn? Who? Anybody? Any TV clown? I mean, who? Can anybody take Zelensky seriously when he declared that he was going to stand? Absolutely not.

But he had a television platform. People looked at Zaluzni and somebody, probably, I suspect, would like to groom him. And he can't be groomed, obviously. Some people were surprised that he took his demotion so easily when he was surprised that he took his demotion so easily, when he could have used it to establish himself as an alternative figure. And he was in the safest position to do so at that very point. But we don't know what blandishments he was offered. We don't know his personal situation.

We don't know the body. But if not Zaluzni, who now appears to be the hope of some, or Aristovic will appear to be the hope of others. It could literally be anyone coming out of the woodwork on a moment's notice and declaring themselves

to be the new peace candidate without somehow being also the capitulation candidate. They can pull that off. I'd say they've got an excellent chance. it's interesting mentioned Arasdowich because I also have this feeling that he could potentially be someone to if not a certain leading role

at least a part of the role in a new government because he well he's perfect symbol I think of this shift as both of you mentioned from the Ganghofer War towards more finding a solution because again for those who watched his interview

in 2019 when he kind of spelled out, yes, we need to provoke a war with the Russians by inviting the Americans in, and only in war will be defeat the Russians. And, you know, this was the grand goal. But for those who follow him, either on Telegram or Twitter, he's done a, yeah, reinvented himself to such a huge extent. And now he's talking about, sorry? He's reinvented himself too often to be. Yeah, even for a politician. I get that. And that's why I often get the, whenever I comment on what he's saying,

it's always the same comments by people, which is he, well, is he authentic? He's just saying what people want to hear, which is fair enough. But it's interesting the way he's reflecting on the development of Ukraine, because now he's suggesting that whilst Americans and NATO who got Russia and Ukraine to fight like two monkeys with knives, you know, in his words,

He's also reflected on the far-right influence, the banderas, as I say, which are a small minority, but were able to dictate identity which mainly the Russians. Sorry? He reflects upon the importance of reconciling the religious divisions, all popular theme. He himself could not, I think, be the candidate. He can still reinvent himself as the voice behind the throne, whispering, sweet, sweet ideas. ideas to the potential candidate. And he'll probably wind up doing that in one capacity or another, either as an advisor or let's say consultant for Western governments.

We have a long history of that with Iraqi refugees and others escaping to the West. Or back in Ukraine. but it will have to be somebody different. I remember what I was going to say now. It's interesting that you highlight what he has said and you mentioned that is popular. In other words, that he has an audience and that is what is more important.

Maybe he's not the best messenger for this message. but the message is popular and the message is out there to be heard. And I found it interesting that this theme of, were we betrayed by the West? It's not unique to him. And it was raised at the Munich Peace Conference, sorry, Munich Security Conference recently by none other than Zelensky himself. You said, you know, if perish the thought that the West is not, in fact, our strategic ally. But if it isn't, then, well, we won't be their strategic ally either.

So take back the West, you know, cutting off your nose despite your face. But I imagine that's about the level of thinking that is rather characteristic with the density. I mean, I think it is not impossible. We can see a negotiation, and I think this is between the Ukrainians and the Russians. I actually would go further. I don't think it is impossible that we could see a reconciliation between the Ukrainians and the Russians. That still leaves the larger question, however,

of what happens in the relationship between Russia and the West and the general peace in Europe, because if there is a reconciliation or a peace of any kind between the Russians and the Ukrainians, people in the West, in the United States, but unfortunately and disastrously also in Europe, will see this as a defeat. and they might be very resistant to what you were suggesting of, you know, joining in discussions about a wider, better relationship, or longer-term relationship, because that would, in effect, amount to an admission that, you know, their power has limits and that their defeat is somehow irreversible.

How does one address this problem that at the moment there seems to be such a strong elite consensus in the West about Russia? Is it something that only time can change? Because I do sometimes wonder whether that is really what we have to wait for. Well, I used to think so. But each generation I learn by reading G. Maiton's book on Russophobia and Russian Western eyes, written in 1990, by Berkeley historian, Martin Malia, that this reconstitution of the theme of an eternal Russian threat is a one of the ways in which Western identity is in fact constituted.

May be an elemental aspect of our identity. Even though I would argue that our cultures are not identical, but they interlock and interact on many historical psychological religious levels. But it does appear very important to important sections of the Western elite to consolidate their identity, their id, by creating an opposing image, an image of evil, which is a Western image, which is a Western image, but everything. that we do not want to be. And therefore, by contrasting ourselves, everything we do not want to be, we are.

This is what we are. And this process continues haplessly because we are indeed so close. And the connections as soon as you get below the superficial political rhetoric are so obvious. I mean, every cultural historian many of whom, after the Russian Revolution, wound up teaching from Russia, escaped from Russia on that famous philosopher's boat and wound up teaching at Sobohne in Oxford and other

Berlin, New York, major Western institutions and it was obvious that they shared the same cultural values and had brought these values with them and were building these bridges. I remember a quote by Yvonne Bunyan in his 1930s Nobel acceptance speech. He said, we are not in exile. He said, we are on a mission. It actually rhymes in Russia. We are in a mission to the West. Now, he understood that mission, I think, to be, here's one.

who is who the true Russia, the real Russia is. To some extent, we're still on that mission today. Our mission is to alert, I hope, Westerners to how much they are themselves Russian, and they are part of our common European heritage and common European culture. Let me address, that was a long preamble, to your point of how can we,

get beyond this. Well, in fact, there is the broader cultural discourse, but which is a problem and needs to be tackled, has to be tackled by people like you and I who write books and write essays and point out the obvious. And to some extent this is being done and has always been done and will continue to be done. But politicians have the ability to cause of their bully pulpit to move this process forward in the political thinking of the elite much faster and more dramatically. And that has the possibility of happening if the right people are elected. Right now, we have a political elite that is conditioned or that is convinced, and that has convinced itself that Russia is an inveterate enemy.

And it obviously was not hard to convince them that this is a long-standing historical tradition that they weren't aware of as soon as the current hostilities began. But even as that discourse currently dominates in the West and in Europe, we do have opposing voices. I, in all countries, in Germany, in France, used to be in Italy, but they're not part of the formal coalition, so they're keeping quiet about their personal reservations. England, I think less so, although there are a few interesting and articulate voices like Lord Robert Skidelski in the House of Lords, making this point as well. arguing that, well, we may not like this or that about Russia, but if we are to have peace,

then we need to have negotiations in order to establish a common framework for coexisting. And this simple phrase, mutual coexistence, which was, which entered into our political discourse during the time, it seems to me, could easily be revived. Doesn't mean that we agree. Doesn't we mean we're moral equivalents. It doesn't, you know, we leave all of that aside and simply say, let us learn to coexist with one another. And again, that is what I essentially hear from Putin.

Because actually, I don't like you either, you in the West. And we will certainly have our differences. and we're headed in different directions right now. But that doesn't mean we have to drag the whole world down with us, so let us coexist. So far, the current Western is leading to saying, no, we cannot coexist, you must die, which is an impossible prospect, I think, without killing everyone in the West in that same action. But, should the opposition or these minority voices gain ground in subsequent elections and achieve the prominence that they currently have in countries like Slovakia and Hungary, I see a lot of potential for

for shifting the discourse in positive ways, at least as far as coexistence, if not beyond. But let's say that's fantastical hope, and that's not going to happen. What do we do if the current majority hostile to Russia, eager to see it defeated, persist? Well, we see what is happening already in the surveys that were conducted this year for the Munich Security Congress. Russia, which was at the top of everyone's list as potential disruptor and danger, last year, has fallen out of the top five dangers for all, I think, but three countries. And the United States, and I believe, great thing. And, of course, the media has much to do with that. But for the rest, Russia is essentially, the Russian threat is now essentially an afterthought.

Ask your friends to name the top five things in the world that they are worried about. And they'll come up with all sorts of things if they can come up with even five issues. And of course, there's a whole list of issues that people mention in the long run to actually think and articulate the top five. At the time you get to five, you've got four more important issues that you're worried about and want to spend money on. And you're not going to support spending another $100 billion on the fifth item on the list. And that's especially true for the United States. So, if Russia, in fact, just continues to do what it does and fulfills what it says its objectives are, which is to pacify Ukraine, but provide no further threat to NATO itself. My question is, given this logical tendency of the population, to diminish things that are not, to have things recede that are not having an immediate impact on their well-being, how are you going to argue for a 10-year increase in spending when the threat is obviously not materializing?

This is a very difficult dilemma in a democracy. And I think in the long run, one of the democracies cannot sustain if they're a democracy. That is to say, they have to listen to the people and basically pay lip servants through the Russian threat, but in time shift their resources to what people are truly concerned about. And that is, again, if Russia fulfills what it says its objectives are and not attack NATO or threaten it in any way, then that danger will quickly receive in the minds of the Western public. I'm wondering, though, if it's, again, we can't go back to the way things were, but if the prospect of getting along with Russia is less problematic now, because in the past when Russia's main objective was to create this greater Europe, to connect closer with the Europeans and especially Germany.

This, of course, was always problematic, especially for the United States, because Russia integrated into Europe would, of course, begin to dissolve some of the alliance systems, which gives this leading role to the United States and all the economic loyalties that comes with it. But at the moment, well, since 2014 and especially since. since 2022, we see a very different Russia now. It's the Russia that has committed itself almost completely to the east now in terms of how it expects its economic development to go.

So it doesn't really see any future anymore in the West. And just the relationship between Germany and Russia, which would be the center of any Russian integration with Europe, this is now completely destroyed. I think this is the worst, the relationship has been. in so many decades. So I just think maybe it will make things easier given that they no longer have an interest in Europe. And this is the former head of the Russia International Affairs Council. I forgot his name now, Andre.

Yeah, he wrote this interesting piece once where he pointed out that maybe Russia falling out of love with the West. it can be a positive thing because once it had this interest to be a part of the West, but it was rejected over and over. This fuels a lot of resentment, and his argument was essentially now that it has lost its interest, it might be more easy to have an amicable divorce instead of fighting all these things. Now, I'm not sure if this will play out this way. I was just wondering your perspectives.

You think it will help or undermine a future approach with the West, the fact that Russia has chosen an eastern path now. Russia has reoriented its foreign policy priorities at cause of force major because it had to, not because it wanted to. And at the same time that its strategic interests plausibly lie in the East, its cultural identity still firmly resides in Europe.

Now, I say this, and I understand not everyone agrees with me, the so-called Eurasianist strand, but I am not in favor of Eurasianist thinking. I am a Russian westernist. And as such, however, I do not. glorify or look up to the West. I see the West is needing to learn a lot from Russia to recapture its completeness. To reconstitute itself for the better. Because European culture without Russian culture is damage.

It's lame. And so both sides. needs each other, in my opinion, and would do well to go back to a more Byzantine model of European identity, in which the eastern and western halves of the continent looked to each other. As Alexander Herzl, the great revolutionary writer, Russian revolutionary writer, said, Westernizers and flavophiles looked like the Russian eagle in two different directions, but their heartbeat is one.

That heart is a European heart. It cannot be otherwise. No one thinks of Russia as an Asian nation. That is just inconceivable in terms of intellectual history. Anyone who knows Russian culture at all understands that. So Russia has a role to play. It has much to expand, its resources, 70% or more of them, that its power resides, rests on, are in fact east of the Urals and in Siberia and the Far East.

70% of its population is in European Russia, and it remains the largest European country, both in terms of population and territory. And our economy as well, yeah. And I would say that as I don't hear anyone, well, there are people, but I don't hear Putin saying, we do not want to have dealings with Europe. We are willing, I hear him say, we are willing to have as good relations with Europe as they wish to have with us. The premise being, do we see each other as equal?

And do we respect each other's interests? And in that sense, Russia's relationship to Europe is no different from its relationship to its neighbors in the south or its neighbors in the east. only its neighbors to the south and east are willing to have relations on that basis whereas for its neighbors in the West they see themselves somehow superior I just wanted to say we're coming to Britain

I mean it is certainly true Britain at the moment anti-Russian feeling is off the scale and you will find a few people who speak out against it, but they're very few. But it has not always been so. And a little while ago, for example, I just happened to come across a video of the trip in 1967 of Alexei Kossigin to Britain. And he was a very, very, there's a very relaxed visit.

He meets the Prime Minister. He goes to Downing Street. He meets politicians. He goes to the palace. He meets the Queen. It's tea with the queen. The whole mood, and it's a British newsreel, is a very, very relaxed one, very different from other interactions with Russian leaders since that. The thing about that visit is, of course, it happened at a time when the situation in Europe was extremely stable.

We had a situation where, I mean, obviously Europe was divided into blocks, but a kind of balance had been found. And nobody really felt threatened by the other. So Kusigin is able to come to London. And there isn't this sense of edginess and anger and panic about his visit. And it seems to me that in order to achieve, a sort of long-term relationship, a more friendly relationship between Russia and the West.

What one has to seek, ultimately, is some kind of return to stability, a genuine sense of stability in relations between Russians and West Europeans and Russia and the United States, such as the wars in the 60s and such as the wars during the daytime period. And this takes me back exactly,

to the point that you were saying earlier in the program about the fact that things are changing, the world is reshaping, there is this period of great stress, because things are changing in a way that leaves Westerners, very uncertain. Perhaps once we get through this period of, you know, uncertainty and fear, and we get back to a more stable situation again, we'll be able to have a time, like we did in the 60s. I could just remember that time, by the way. And it wasn't just Kassigit. It was the time, you know,

when there were cultural exchanges and all kinds of things going on about. A situation where there is a finally a more relaxed atmosphere altogether and people are able to communicate and talk and there isn't this great fear about the Russians in the East anymore. The names among the Brue.

British historians who contributed a great deal to, I think, a proper understanding of Russian culture in the context of European culture for English readers. We have, I think it was Cambridge, it was Cambridge, Dimitria Balienzky. Yeah, absolutely. We obviously have B.H. Sumner, great histories I grew up on. And today we have, of course, Richard Sackwa. I also believe, although I haven't, I'm not that familiar with the work, the cultural historian Rachel Polonsky, and Robert Skidelsky, who doesn't write exclusively on Russia, but always does so with a plum.

Oh, and at Emanuel College, Professor Lane. Yes, Lane. So, stability, yes. But stability is earned. It's not granted. It has to be, at some extent, impose. In other words, why are you willing to have stable relations with me.

If you think you're all that different with you. If you could, you would you would oppress me. You would deny me and be influenced. But the reason you accept equality and stability with me is because you fear the consequences of not granting me

That is what I think, that quality of understanding that not granting respect leads to instability in the relationship over a long period of time and to resentments is exactly what was lost after the end, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We read it, I was just reading the memos that have been released, I think, earlier this month, by Strobe Talbot as a deputy secretary of state. And he says, yes, of course, Russia would want to be part of NATO, but we can't have that because we won the war. And we would be granting them a seat at the table. Why should we? Well, and now you have the result.

And unfortunately, that mentality continued after Russia was no longer on its knees, beginning to rebuild, had rebuilt, and is now reconstituting the world order in its own image. Just we're at the incipient levels, but that's clearly the objective, I think, of the Russian leadership today. And it would like to sell that objective to the rest of the bricks. And I think that's what the current Russian presidency this year's Russian presidency of the bricks will, we will see more of that theme emergence. There really is no way back. But by saying there is no way back, Russia means we need to find a different way forward. And we're willing to show you that way. China is reluctant to do so because it has such great investments in the current world order,

but it is receptive. India, like I said, all the rest of the Brick's nations are receptive to this idea, but they're not ready to jump on board. The West is helping, you know, in all it, in all sorts of ways to encourage this abandonment of the West, unfortunately. It's not, it's not, it's not, it's doesn't see that it is sawing off the branch that its own world order is sitting on. That's very, very unfortunate. So mutual stability is going to be forced upon the West. The West is not going to accept it voluntarily. And we can hope that it amounts in the long run not much more than Sabre Rattling, although

that's not what the war in Ukraine is by any means. The war in Ukraine is a disastrous conflict in Europe, but it is especially a disaster for Russia and Ukraine, which is why the two of them need to sit at the table and feel this rip between them. Stability in peace, though, in the realist theory, would require two main things, which would be both a balance of power

and the desire to preserve status quo. I think what makes this situation so difficult to resolve is, well, first of all, there's no balance of power. But beyond this, you have this now a rivalry for world order. We have, for example, NATO pulling towards restoring unipolarity while the Russians are pushing for multipolarity, but also the willingness for status quo, because we always had a bit of propaganda both sides, but what's happening now is something very different. This is really fierce resentment. And, you know, we spoke previously about Arstowicz, and he had another interesting comment.

And he was suggesting, well, not suggesting we're explicitly saying that Ukrainians have been heavily propagandized. And he made this, he proposed an exercise that if you can't explain the position of your adversary, if you can't make yourself articulate it, honestly, then you have been propagandized. And I would say this also applies to the West. I mean, try to explain the position of Russia in any audience in the West and see the things. fierce attacks you will be subjected to. There is no one is permitted to even explain the Russian position anymore. So this makes me quite pessimistic that we can find a solution.

But of course, once a balance of power would restore itself, one would assume that perhaps the rhetoric, the narrative, the moral entrapment, if you will, that all of this would begin to resolve itself. But I'm not sure if that would be too much of an optimistic. So there are different ways to approach the concept of balance of power. In my opinion, being more of a social constructivist, I think we are not talking about something objective, but about the perception of balance.

And we have a problem here in that the West thinks it has the advantage on all these indicators of... Whereas Russia argues today that it is not the equivalent of the West, but it can balance the West in many ways and therefore has an equivalent power of sorts, not a direct equivalence, economy to economy, military to military, but when one considers resources, connections, all these things, the two sides are much more in balance. And that balance is in Russia's perspective, the perspective of Russian leadership, that balance is likely to grow in Russia's favor over time,

even though they are now somewhat slightly below the less. But the failure to recognize that as the reality is very much a construction of our social media. You could, in fact, make a simple argument that, If one made the argument that the sides are in balance and need to respect each other's interests on that premise alone, you would have a completely different political discourse between Russia and the West. Because that was in fact the argument that Kissinger made for detente in the early 1970. It was not that we are any closer morally or politically or conceptually, it's that we

We have no choice because of the balance of power. We have reached parity. So as soon as a Western politician says, you know what, we have parity with Russia and we cannot ignore it, then is by the way, one of the arguments that many of the peace activists made is that, well, remember nuclear weapons? Let's not ignore the danger that nuclear weapons pose. If that became more a part of our actual political discourse, it would transform. rapidly. So stability, the second aspect is stability. And you're right. Right now, both sides

define stability differently. But Russia is aiming not for instability. Russia is aiming for a new stability, which it argues is a multipolar world, and that a multipolar world will be more stable than either a unipolar or bipolar work. So that is the argument. And again, that is a respectable, intellectual, and academic argument to make. So if one turned that equation around, we have very much, I think, a plausibly realist way forward in this relationship, which is, one, recognize that an essential equivalence of power, if not balance of power already exists, within Russia and the West.

Think of the failure of sanctions as a manifestation of that. And secondly, that stability in fact is to be found in a multipolar world, not a unipolar world. I think both of those arguments resonate well. in countries outside the West. I'm glad you brought up the sanctions because I think this is actually a very vital point of this. Because one of the most interesting things

over the last couple of weeks, if you follow the British media, is that it's suddenly been an acceptance that the sanctions have failed and that the Russian economy is turning out to be much more stable and strong than it was assumed to be. So we've had, we first have an article in the Financial Times.

There's a follow-up article at The Guardian. This morning you have an article saying exactly the same thing in perhaps the most stridently anti-Russian newspaper of all, which is the Daily Telegraph, you know, that Russia has absorbed the sanctions below. And interestingly enough, it actually quotes and actually a very well-known analyst here from the Royal United Services Institute, a man called Richard Connolly. And he says that in fact, not only has Russia absorbed the sanctions blow,

but those who think that the sanctions will have a long-term effect are probably wrong. The experience of sanctions is over time. Their effect fades. So that already changes the perception. It says to people in London and, you know, in Britain, I think, as in most countries, political leaders take their ideas of the media. It's straightforward about this. It tells them that this is not going to be a successful sanctions war as they had previously expected, that it would be. And that already changes the whole understanding of where we're going forward.

So if this is an economically stable country with a resilient economy and a strong science and industry and all of that, then of course you have to take it seriously. And it ceases to be, you know, the gas station masquerading as a country with so many politicians talked about. and then if you have to take it seriously, you have to talk to it. And then when you start to talk to it, things begin to become possible. So I'm actually, strange enough, I'm slightly more hopeful about this. I mean, I hadn't expected these articles to trickle out. And of course, they've all come following the shock of the failure last year of the war.

the way the war was being conducted in Ukraine. So perhaps we're at the beginning of something and the beginning of a change. Anyway, I wanted to make that point. I think I'm essentially done, but I just wanted to say this. I have noticed these articles coming out in Britain, one after the other, in all the big newspapers.

That's very interesting, though, because I remember 2014 after Russia took back Crimea, Henry Kissinger, he was making this argument that if we consider Rush to be a great power, then we have to find a way of harmonizing our interests with it. And thus we have to stop this discourse about how to defeat the Russians and instead how to live with them. That is, if we consider them a great power, which he obviously did. And as you Alexander pointed out, we obviously didn't because we keep referring to it as this. metaphorical gas station masquerading as a country.

And this was kind of entrenched in the old ideas and rhetoric, because obviously Russia should have no say in what happens the security arrangements in Ukraine. NATO should no say about NATO's expansion, even though it's the largest country in Europe, and it should have no say at all about European security. And I think that this assumption that it's so weak that it's not a great power. So we don't have to adjust to it. I think this has fallen apart in this war as well because, you know, we thought we could defeat the Russians on the battlefield with sending weapons and Ukrainians at them.

We thought, you know, we could crush their economy in a week with sanctions. We thought we could mobilize the international community politically against them. But all of this failed. So maybe one good thing can come out of this horrible war would be that we would more or less go a little bit back to Kissinger's argument in 2014. Okay, now we come to terms. It is a great power, which by definition is you can throw everything what the kitchens think at it and it will still be able to absorb the punches. Now, if this is the case, perhaps policies would change as well and some more, I guess,

political interest or willingness to harmonize interest and accommodate it to some extent, even though obviously we're not going to have any warm feeling towards each other for the next couple of decades probably. I'll just go. I'm just going to say that again I was thinking in terms of silver lines, silver linings to horrible situations

that war creates. One of them should be for intellectuals to really come to terms with the fact that we do not understand how sanctioned works.

We have nothing but a theory that has proven to not correspond to reality. And this over more than 40 years of applications of sanctions throughout the world. So we had smaller examples of the failure of sanctions over time in various countries, South Africa and other countries that were targeted. Venezuela, Iran, targeted by sanctions. And now we have the real mother load of evidence that sanctions, A, do not work, and B, do not accomplish what politicians promise us they will accomplish. And as a result, however, we never question or revisit the premises of that policy.

That is the definition of insanity. And I think as academics, we have an obligation to bring that point more and more to the public's attention. That when a politician says these are the sanctions that we're going to impose, they should be asked, in order to accomplish what and in what timeframe exactly. Otherwise, what are you signing us up for exactly, except the prelude to what? And we're still far away from that discussion. Absolutely.

I just interested, I think you might be interested to see what Connolly says. Richard Connolly, an expert on Russian economy at the Royal United Services Institute says that optimism about how hard sanctions would bite show a lack of understanding in the West and a failure to learn from what happened in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea, which is exactly the point that you just made, Nicholas, and he goes on to say, I think it was arrogance,

I think it was also ineptitude. Now, bear in mind, this is appearing in the Daily Telegraph, which a year ago was publishing articles by an economist from Yale. I'm not going to name him. Who was saying that it was all smoke and mirrors. So, you know, it's quite a shift. Right, but I'm sorry to see that he leaves the door open to the possibility of more effective sanctions.

I believe as a matter of reality, sanctions are never effective. They do not, they are never tied to policy outcomes. That is the proof that no one expects them, even the people implement, never expect. never expect them to be effective. It is merely a stop to the public. Hey, listen, we're doing something. Leave us alone. I think I'm slight, just just too quickly,

I think I'm slightly giving a wrong impression because I'm saying, as I said, these things out of context. My impression is that he's somebody who has completely lost belief in sanctions, certainly as far as Russia is concerned. As I said, he does go on later in that same article to say that the Russians are adapting to the sanctions and there's every reason to think

that they will continue to do so. So the thing about sanctions with Russia is that the country not only has survived them, but it is growing, growing even as they're happening. Other economies have been affected adversely by sanctions, but it hasn't worked in the same way with Russia. I think is part of the point that he's trying to make too. With sanctions, though, I think, well, as Nicolai corrector points out, it's that the purpose, of course, imposing economic pain is in order to convince them to make political changes or policy changes.

But I think in this war, though, you know, it seems like a key goal in itself, as many American leaders stated, and Ian Stoltenberg, by the way, was to degrade Russia, to merely weaken it. So economic decline in its own was seem to be an objective, not necessarily to foster policy changes. But even at this point, of course, it has now very objectively failed. But I'm still optimistic now, not about sanctions, of course, because as you correct, the point out, this has never really properly worked. But I think especially the last 30 years, it has been, well, more recently it works even less. because at least in the 90s, when there was one center of economic power, sanctions would bring great pain.

But these days, we see sanctions now that there's alternative poles of power, it merely isolates the belligerent who's imposing the sanctions. As we saw with the Europeans, we can't diversify away from Russian energy. We buy it through third parties more expensive to feel like we're doing something. But the Russians are, they've been able to diversify. So sanctions function even less under multipolarity than unipolarity. But the reason I'm optimistic, which is what I was coming to, was, you know, if you were said two years ago, sanctions don't work. It's going to impact the Europeans more than the Russians, which I remember I did two years ago. It was called Russian propaganda.

I would be a Russian propagandist for saying it. But these days, now you see it accepted in the media. So we're kind of slowly accepting reality that we can't defeat the Russians with sanctions either. And back to my former point. And if we accept this, then we can't defeat them. And this was kind of like our last chance to knock out Russia. Then we're going to have to at some point learn to live with them. And I think, again, a silver lining, as Nicolaev would say.

I think for that to become the mainstream view will require the removal of the current dominant political parties, a shift transfer of government. Two parties and personalities that are willing to assert the need. for conviviality for coexistence, not consistent, with Russia as the premise, as the basis of their foreign policy. There are such parties, but they are still very much in the wings. I'm less optimistic than the two of you. Thank you for making this a more optimistic discussion. but this will take a long time and perhaps even a generational shift. One of the things that I see as optimistic is that their elites have to exert a great deal of effort

to recreate and maintain hostility coordination. And that is expensive and difficult and not as successful. It's like making a copy of a copy of a copy. And each time you make a copy of Hitler, the next Hitler, the next Hitler, the next Hitler, the next Hitler, the next Hitler. It becomes a parody by the time, you know, you have the current sixth iteration of Hitler. in someone. People forget even what Hitler actually stood for, which is why you can support Azov Battalion and call them Freedom Fighter, which is completely absurd. So my point is, it becomes hard and the next generation, we do have the opportunity to write for them,

to speak to them. Anything, I may be wrong. But in my sense today, that anything we say here, no matter how insightful or articulate or even promising as a venue for negotiations and reconciliation, is going to fall on deaf ears among the current elite. But I don't sense that among my students. I mean, I talk to them. They have questions. They say, what about this? What about that? And I give them my answers and they go, oh, that's interesting.

I hadn't considered that. And now I have a broader perspective on events than I was reading in the New York Times or the Daily Telegraph or DeMollong or whatever. But unfortunately, people of a certain generation, of a certain age, their worldview is set as it is. And the more power they have to wield, the more they rely on those original instincts and are resistant, I think, to novel interpretation and new ideas, which is why it's very important, in my opinion, to bring new blood into politics early and frequently. I like that finish Shall we leave it on that note Or do you have any final comments?

No, I think there's been a wonderful discussion And I think that's a good note to finish as well, actually Thank you so much Thank you so much