The Duran Podcast - Trump To Force Ukraine Peace on Europe - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: February 15, 2025

Trump To Force Ukraine Peace on Europe - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Good day everyone. Trump has unleashed, well, he has been unleashed on the world and only three plus weeks into it. He's made some very big moves all over the world. I would say some have been positive. While some developments like in the Middle East threatens to unleash a disaster. But I thought we could start by at least focusing on Europe and the proxy war in Ukraine. because after initially stumbling through with some misinformation and even insults, Trump has held his first phone call with Putin, at least the first one we know of. And, well, the Europeans are in shock and, I would say, also despair, has struck the old continent as he's taking big steps to end the war.

You know, Alexander was speaking earlier on and pointing out that the Europeans are very upset, but they don't seem to have any clear alternatives. However, he's not only getting the United States out of Ukraine, but he also wants to get out of Europe. So this is, yeah, huge developments. I feel we meet every four weeks, but the world looks like a very different place every time you speak. So I guess we should get used to this. But, yeah, how are the two of you reading the situation? I'll start Alexander.

But before I do, all I want to say is that, On Tuesday morning, the 12th, I had one view of the Ukraine conflict, and by the afternoon I had a completely different view because the Hexas speech had taken place. In the meantime, President Trump had announced that he had talked to Putin. So almost instantaneously, I did 180-degree turn. I'll turn it over to Alexander. Yeah, this is something I wanted to bring up later, because you've been very thinking. that a peace deal couldn't be made, but it looks like they almost gave a, well, accepted all the terms. But anyways, I was hoping, Alexandra, also if you could maybe bring in some of

the actual situation on the ground, because things are looking at them. Well, they are hopeless. I don't know that we need to spend too much time on it, because in fact, every day we kept more news that the Russians continue to advance, the Ukrainians continue to fall back, and they continue to suffer very heavy losses. But I'm going to actually act as a slight if I can say moderating thing. Because yes, Trump and Putin spoke together, but I think it is important to understand that at the moment all they're doing is speaking. They have not actually come to any agreement at all so far about Ukraine. And they both agree that the war should end through negotiations. But Putin still talks about the root causes, and it's not clear at all

whether Trump is prepared to go along with what Russian thinking is about all of the root causes. I mean, he's saying Ukraine should not be part of NATO. But that's been said before. I mean, it was said in the 1990s and previously Ukraine had provisions in its constitution, that it would be a neutral country and that all changed. And NATO decided that it would make that decision that it did in 2008 and all of that. So there's been nothing said and done so far on the American side, which is not reversible. And the Russians have made no substantive concessions on their demands at all. I don't mean to underestimate the significance of what has happened. We now have the president of Russia and the president of the United States in direct dialogue with each other.

We have talked about negotiating teams being organized. Trump has mentioned who he wants to be a part of those negotiating teams. The Russians have talked about further their own negotiating teams. There's talk about a summit meeting. in Saudi Arabia, but we are still very much at the start of the process. And in the meantime, the war in Ukraine continues and will probably continue for some time yet. And what I will say is this, listening not so much to, you know, not reading so much what Trump has said to Putin, or following too closely what Trump's been saying, which is not.

always consistent. Perhaps even more interesting and important has, and alarming for people in Europe is what Pete Hegsseth has been saying, because he's been talking about the realities, and realities which are indeed realities with which people in Europe and to some extent Ukraine don't want to face, and realities that Ukraine is not going to join NATO, and realities that Ukraine is not going to recover, is lost territories and further realities that the United States is not going to deploy troops in Ukraine and giving every indication that this project, if you like, the proxy war in Ukraine has from an American point of view gone as far as it can and it really can't be taken further and that it should be wound down. But we have those statements and they are important

statements and we have a process of discussion underway, but we've still got a long entangled route before an actual agreement is reached, and it might never be, just saying. Just to follow up on what Alexander said, I think the Hexeth speech in Brussels was really the key. I mean, obviously President Trump is President Trump, and he's. the man in charge. But they sent Hexeth out to deliver a very clear message. His words were carefully crafted. And I think his speech was truly remarkable in terms of what he said. Just to start, it's clear that the Russians have had two central demands since at least June 14th of this year. One is that Ukraine will be a genuinely neutral.

country. It won't be in NATO, either de jure or de facto. And number two, that the West and Ukraine will recognize the annexation of those four oblasts in the east of Ukraine plus Crimea. And Hexon said quite clearly that Ukraine is not going to be in NATO. And he said that Ukraine is not going to get back all of its territory. Now, he didn't stipulate exactly how much territory the United States would be willing to concede to the Russians, but I think it was implicit that those four Oblasts plus Crimea are gone. So in a very important way, Hexith, who is speaking for the administration, was saying that we accept the two principal demands that the Russians make. And that is a major turnaround. I certainly didn't expect it.

And it opens the possibility that you'll get an agreement here. But to take this a step further, and Alexander, of course, was getting at this, there's another big dimension to this, aside from Ukraine per se, and that is the American's relationship or the United States' relationship with Europe. And basically, Hexit said, if the security guarantee is given to Ukraine, it does not include the United States of America. The Europeans give that security guarantee. This is a quite remarkable statement.

Because we all know, and Zelensky said this, that a security guarantee from the Europeans without the United States and without NATO is meaningless, right? The Europeans can't provide for the security of Ukraine. So in a very important way, you see that the United States, is beginning to separate itself from Europe. And Hexeth, today, I believe, or yesterday in Warsaw said that you want to understand that United States troops in Europe is not forever, but we're not forever.

This is another quite remarkable statement. You know, no previous policymaker, certainly in the Biden administration, would have said anything like that. So the glacial plates are moving here in a very important way. And just to add to this, you want to remember that President Trump has been in office for only about three weeks. He has four more years in front of them. And in terms of the U.S.-European relationship, he can fundamentally change that over the course of the next four years. But anyway, my second set of points have to do with whether or not we can actually realize a peace agreement. And Alexander concluded by saying this is not clear that this is a really dicey issue. And I agree with him. And let me tell you

what I think of the two main problems. One is at some point Trump is going to have to bring the Europeans and Ukrainians into the deal. It just can't be a U.S.-Russia deal. And I think that's the Ukrainians and the Europeans are going to be roadblocks. If you listen to Kierce Starmert, he said today to my utter amazement that it's inevitable that Ukraine is going to be brought into NATO. This directly contradicts what the Trump administration is saying. It's a really sort of in-your-face statement. And that makes you wonder how the Europeans and the Americans and the Ukrainians are going to craft some sort of deal with the Russians that's acceptable to all four of those parties. The other problem is it's going to take time to make this work. And in the meantime, the Russians are

winning on the battlefield. And it is possible that all of this discourse over the past few days will so further doubts in the minds of soldiers in the Ukrainian military, take them less willing to fight and facilitate the breakdown of the Ukrainian army, in which case the Russians will conquer more territory. And you want to think about what the implications are of the Russians conquering more territory. It's one thing to talk about signing a deal where the four oblasts plus Crimea are lost. It's another thing to talk about a situation where the Russians control eight or nine or seven, however many oblasts, a really big slice of the country, and getting the Russians to abandon

those additional oblasts that they have conquered so that you can make the deal palatable to the Ukrainians and to the Europeans, it's going to be wickedly difficult. So I think that given the difficulty of putting an agreement together and the danger that the Russians will end up capturing a lot more territory, makes it even harder to see how this is all going to work out. Regarding the security guarantees, though, because Hegsef did say that the Europeans indeed should provide some security guarantees for Ukraine, but as you pointed out correctly, he did not want the US to partake in any way.

He even added that the peacekeepers, if there would be any European and non-European peacekeepers, would not be covered under Article 5, which means if something would go wrong and the Europeans would get hit by the Russians that America has nothing to do with this. And again, it seemed to be contradicting a bit idea that the Europeans should

send peacekeepers, because I can't imagine the Europeans be willing to send any of their own troops, unless the Americans are standing behind them and giving this very clear assurances that we will stand with you if something goes wrong with Russia. But

So, yeah, this is also what I'm curious, how to, as you mentioned, how do you bring the Europeans in? Because the Europeans obviously want a role, they demand a role, but they don't really have that much to influence in order to assert a role. And furthermore, as you pointed out, correctly, I think both the Russians and the Americans view them as spoilers. They very much said that they're against the terms of these negotiations. don't like it already. And they, yeah, they pretty much haven't done

any diplomacy for three years. So it doesn't look like they will play a helpful role. And given that there's no helpful role, why include them when they're not relevant? And even, it's even unclear if the European can even host the negotiations, as Alexander pointed out,

they're going to meet now in Saudi Arabia. Now, back in the good old days, that is three years ago, they would have met perhaps in Finland or in Switzerland, but these days, Europe doesn't have any neutral countries anymore. So now we can't even meet in Europe. So I'm just curious.

How can you actually bring the Europeans into this? And from that perspective, one can wonder or be cynical whether or not Trump has been completely serious because it does seem as if you look towards the Middle East, the way, I hope at least this is bluster when he threatens, you know, to ethnically cleanse the whole region, it seems to be able to get some movement. I'm just wondering, he does the same in the Western Hemisphere. And given the fact that the Ukrainians and the Europeans are so resistant to getting an end, resisting to get an end to the war, is it possible that is overplaying

a bit, the extent to which is willing to accommodate the demands of the Russians in order to I guess shake up the Europeans and Ukrainians, or is this being too cynical? I think it is absolutely impossible for me to try to read the mind of Donald Trump. I mean, he does things that are so completely unconventional and unpredictable that if this is some kind of cynical play, then it's a very complicated one, and I don't understand it, but I can't say that it would surprise me. The fact is he has spoken to Putin. He has had a discussion with him.

It did last for 90 minutes. The two men seemed to find, well, perhaps not so much common ground with points of contact. And they've agreed to meet again. And they've even agreed to visit each other's countries. Whether that actually happens is, of course, another matter. Now, that in itself changes completely the whole situation. Now, what it has also done is that it has exposed the complete sterility of European diplomacy, because we have refused for three years to talk to the Russians.

We have insisted that the war must go on. We've put forward no, and I speak as a European, obviously. We have put forward no practical, productive alternative. to what Trump is at least apparently trying to do. And all we can do is criticize and, you know, resurrect the ghosts of Munich and Yalta and all of that. And, you know, Europe today, by the way, is full of references to those two conferences and agreements. And at the same time, basically harp on. about going on and doing more of the same, even as the war in Ukraine is being lost.

So it's exposed. The fact that Trump is talking to Putin and is engaging in diplomacy is exposing firstly that in Europe we have lost our ability to conduct diplomacy. It is outrageous to us when it happens at all, at least when it happens with the Russians. And I think it's It's also exposing something else. The fact that we have no cards to play. We are not going to send troops to Ukraine unless we have a guarantee from the Americans that they will protect those troops. The Americans are not going to give that guarantee.

We can't therefore send the troops to Ukraine. We may insist that we are part of a negotiation. Well, we are not coming to that negotiation. anything positive to show. We can't deploy troops, we have no ability to take independent action. All we can do is exactly what John said, create as much trouble as possible, stop the negotiations from proceeding, prolong the crisis, and hope that through that we keep the Americans in Europe, which I think ultimately is what this is all about now. It's about clinging onto the Americans, keeping them here,

even though it now increasingly looks as if they want to go. I think that if you want a peace deal here, which Trump does, you simply have no choice but to accept the Russians' two principal demands. There's just no alternative here. As Alexander said, we have no cards to play. But if you want to end it, you send Pete Hexeth out, and he says there will be a neutral Ukraine, and we will recognize the fact that Russia has annexed certain pieces of territory. There'll be a debate over what that territory should be.

But Trump really has no choice here. And if he doesn't accept those demands, the war is just going to go on. Putin has made that manifestly clear. All his lieutenants have made that manifestly clear. It's just pretty straightforward here. And if the Europeans and the Ukrainians, and there are a lot of people in the United States who are very unhappy with this deal or the direction that Trump is moving in as well, so let's assume they all prevail.

Where does that leave us? If Trump fails to put together a deal and end this war, where does that leave us? Where does that leave us? Is the United States just going to walk away from Europe anyway? Are they going to say the Europeans won't cooperate with us? Therefore, let the Europeans deal with this problem. That's a possibility. But I think, as we have said before, you don't get the deal that Putin wants,

and then it's settled on the battlefield. And if it's settled on the battlefield, it's going to be much worse for NATO and much worse for Ukraine. They would be better off reaching some sort of agreement now. But I'm not making the argument that that would be a good agreement from Ukraine's point of view. It's disastrous, but it's the least bad alternative at this point in time. We have pursued this remarkably foolish policy for so long now that we've put ourselves in a situation where the outcome for Ukraine. can't be anything short of disastrous.

But now we're asking the question, how disastrous? I don't want to be clear here. I'm not making the argument that settling this war on Putin's terms is good for Ukraine in the sense that they're getting a good deal. They're not getting a good deal. They're getting the least bad deal. And that's because the Ukrainians themselves, mainly in the form of Zelensky, and the Americans, mainly in the form of Joe Biden, have pursued this remarkably foolish policy

and put us in this terrible situation, which is not easy to get out of. Perfectly said, completely agree. I wonder if we're overestimating the extent to which the Europeans will resist this, though, because I think a lot of its shock, keep in mind, Higseth came to Europe, has said there will be no NATO membership,

the territory won't be recovered, no American security guarantees, and plus we're leaving your continent. This is a lot delivered for an extremely dependent Europe. And keep in mind that the foreign policy chief of the EU, Kayakalas, that is the top diplomat, says she doesn't actually believe in diplomas. She said that Putin is a dictator and a war criminal, and she doesn't talk to war criminals, so she won't have any talks at all. and also she talked about splitting Russia up to smaller countries. This has been kind of the position the Europeans have had.

But I do think once reality begins to set in, when they realize they don't have many options, I think like already the NATO Secretary General, Mark Ruta, he came out and he said, well, we never actually promised Ukraine, NATO membership in any deal. now of course it hasn't really been mapped out exactly what Hexseth meant when he said no NATO doesn't mean no NATO in a peace deal or no NATO ever same with the territories will the Russians get what they're holding now we'll have to withdraw a little bit do they get the territories part of the four oblasts they're not yet conquered they could negotiate over what the security guarantees could be there's still some minor details they can they can discuss and I'm thinking of Europeans would have, they could be won over if they can at least be allowed to sit in the corner and, you know, have something to say, I guess.

So I think just the Europeans, they painted himself in the corner because also with Biden's support, we all had to adhere to the same slogans. That is, you know, Ukraine decides when the war ends. We can't negotiate before, you know, we have a Ukraine in a favorable position, so they need more weapons. And in Europe, they're saying the same thing still, as if, you know, that Ukraine should decide and simply if we send more weapons, everything will be fine. So I do think that, yeah, once we'll let a few days pass by, perhaps the Europeans will come around because I just don't see what the alternatives is. Same with Zelensky for that sake. I mean, he might oppose it, but the Ukrainians, they want peace, the Russians, they want

this moving forward. The Americans want this moving forward. It just seems if he doesn't play along, it could be very easily to have him removed, you know, with new, by mobilizing new forces within Ukraine. Again, maybe I'm reading too much into it, though. I think there's a number of important points here,

which is that ultimately the Europeans are very short of alternatives. everybody knows. Zelensky has said this himself that without the Americans, this cannot continue. The war cannot be won without, well, they can't be one at all,

but it can't be continued without the Americans. Without the American security guarantees are meaningless. The Europeans, who, of course, have always known this, nonetheless, abdicated all responsibility

instead of engaging in diplomacy, instead of trying to prevent the war in Europe from happening at all, instead of discussing, making agreements with the Russians, which would have prevented that, they went along with this proxy war. It's important to say that at no point in time, at no stage, have the Europeans acted in any way that showed any lack of enthusiasm for this process. proxy war. It is as much our choice that we pursued that option of a proxy war as it was the American's choice. We chose to back Ukraine. We chose to say without Ukraine, you know, no negotiations, that kind of thing. So we have put ourselves in this impossible position. Now, I think that

perhaps eventually some reality will fall in because we are without cards to play. We can't continue the war without the Americans. We can't give guarantees without the Americans. We can't negotiate with the Russians without the Americans. Why would the Russians negotiate with us now? They've seen what we are like. They've seen that we do exactly what the Americans tell them. They've heard how we speak.

They've heard how negative we are about them. If the Russians can talk to the Americans who have agency, they will negotiate with the Americans. They won't have any incentive to talk with us. So, yes, I think if one takes a logical, realistic view, then eventually after this tantrum ends, we will start to come around and to accept the reality and move forward with whatever peace is eventually comes out of this process.

The trouble is, there hasn't been much logic on realism and reality from Europe up to now. Certainly there isn't very much sign of it in Britain, where of course I live. And coming back to this problem, this fear that haunts them, if they think that a peace agreement in Ukraine is going to result in the Americans leaving Europe, and that's what the Americans are practically saying, that will again predispose many, many people in Europe to be against a peace agreement, because they hope that without a peace agreement, if there is a continued conflict, and of course a conflict can continue after a war, that that will,

somehow keep the Americans in Europe. I think an equally alarming thing, amongst the many alarming things that Hegg said, on top of the fact that the Americans won't be Europe forever, was when he said that for the United States, the priority is now China and the Asia Pacific. The Europeans are very accustomed. They have lived all their lives in a situation where Europe, is America's priority. The idea that that will end is something both unimaginable to them until recently and very frightening to them now that it is about to come to pass.

Two quick points, building on what you said, Alexander. One is, I think you're absolutely right that the Russians don't trust us and for very good reasons. And just looking, just looking, Donald Trump and how mercurial he is, he's the last person in the world you really want to trust. So I think what this tells you is that the Russians have a powerful incentive to conquer a lot of territory.

And they have a powerful incentive to weaken Ukraine as much as possible. And what this means is that it will be harder to get a deal. The Russians are not going to be generous because it's not near strategic interest to be generous when you're dealing with the United States of America because the United States will take advantage of you. And they're in the driver's seat now on the battlefield. They've got the leverage. And what scares me is that it would be impossible to get a deal, not just because of the Europeans and the Ukrainians resisting, but just because of what the territorial situation is, looks like and what the incentives are for Russia to really make Ukraine a dysfunctional rump state. And that'll, that'll bologs up the works. My second point is, on a previous show,

Alexander, you said, and I found this very insightful, that one of the reasons that the Europeans are so subservient to the United States is because they've found. fear that we'll leave, right? So they're just very good to us and do what we want. But what you're saying now, which of course is quite correct, is that's gotten them into real trouble because they've never acted independently in the past. They're completely subservient to the United States. And now the United States wants to sort of cut their legs out from under them. And they really have nowhere to go. So all of this tells you they would have been much wise in the past to have stood up to the United States. And if we go back to that April 2008 summit, if Angela Merkel and Sarkozy

had really held the line, they had mightily resisted expanding NATO into Ukraine. In all likelihood, we wouldn't be talking about the problem of the United States leaving Europe at this juncture. But they didn't stand up to George W. Bush, and we know what happened after that. Well, exactly. Can I just very quickly on your first point say something, which I noticed, but I wasn't sure when I saw it, but somebody else quite independently confirmed it to me, which is that the Russians, the Russian Defence Ministry has changed its language recently. Now, what they're saying, what they used to say when they captured territory outside the four oblasts in Halkov region, which is not part of the four oblasts, they used to say that so-and-so village

or settlement or whatever has been captured. Now, over the last couple of weeks, they've changed and they say so-and-so village or settlement in this territory in Kharkov region has been liberated it is a significant difference and as I said it tells you that they're now thinking of Stang I just want to make a point

based on what John said as well because I think the Europeans are misunderstanding a bit what the Americans are saying because the whole point of Hegset was that they're not making concessions to Russia They're not giving anything away. This is just, yeah, the reality of the situation.

Because what is the alternative to accepting some of Russia's basic terms? The alternative will be, you know, not to have all the territory back or to join NATO. The alternative will be to even have more Ukrainian deaths, to have even more territory lost. So this whole idea now that, you know, the Americans are selling out the Ukrainians, you know, who really betrayed him? There was this deceit by pretending as if they would be able to join NATO, this deceit that perhaps in the future the West would intervene in the war. I mean, this has been a bit talking point along Ukrainian circles.

If they just fight a little bit longer, if they show their determination to the West, then we would eventually intervene and come to their assistance. So this was never going to happen. and this deceit aimed to keep the war going, it's been a disaster for them. So this whole idea that there's concessions, that they betrayed, it's all strange. But in all fairness, I was a bit surprised

that they were conceding to all of Russia's main demands before even sitting down together, though. This took me a little bit by surprise as well. But this seems to be part of a larger package. And I know many people Well, predicted this in advance That the Americans would want to get a wider deal Because, you know, they argued

Well, Trump said that he would be very happy He would love it if Russia came back into the G8 Because, you know, you don't have to like them But you talk to your opponents, this makes sense. He also argued that there should be more nuclear disarmament. He even suggested that there should be drastic cuts in military spending between U.S., Russia and China. Now, this makes sense.

If you believe that the world is becoming more multipolar, you don't need this much military. This excessive military dominance is a strategy of global primacy if you want to dominate the entire international system. If your security derives from no one being able to compete with you, that's the military budget you have. But if you recognize that the world has become multipolar and security derives from mitigating the security competition and having mutual disarmament.

All of this is starting to make a lot of sense. So I was wondering if you should see this in the context a bit of what Marco Rubio was arguing in this interview he gave recently with Megan Kelly that the unipolarity is over, multipolarities here. We have to make adjustment because in a multipolar system, the great powers should sit down together. They should look at how not to undermine each other's security. And again, I guess this is what the Europeans are taking so great offense to.

But this is the world order that has emerged. Or is it treating too much rationality into, why is it perhaps just some impulses from Trump? Well, one doesn't know, but just a few points. Firstly, was it 10 years ago that John spoke about Ukraine being led up the Primrose bath? what those people who say that this is a huge betrayal of Ukraine, that we must go on fighting, help the Ukrainians to keep on fighting.

What is that, if not leading Ukraine further up that same prune rose bar? Just saying, I mean, that's what Ukraine is being offered. I mean, you talk about the, you know, the duplicity and the rest, but I mean, it's worse than that in some ways. I mean, it's cynical and it's dream. then it's dreadful, and it's the Ukrainians who are paying for it. So that's one thing I wanted to say. The second point about the fact that Hegsa and Trump have in effect conceded the key,

the two most important core demands that the Russians have made, about Ukrainian neutrality and outside NATO and the territorial issue. I think that it was absolutely clear, certainly over the last couple of weeks, that unless the Americans accepted that reality, there were not going to be any negotiations at all. I think at some point that was understood in Washington. And I think also they understood that they had to explain that to the Europeans in order to make this whole process move forward

and to explain why they were doing, what they were doing to the Europeans. So I don't think that they've conceded anything that wasn't, you know, going to happen anywhere. I wouldn't see that as conceding points to the Russians. I'm simply recognising the realities, given that the war is being lost. Now, as for Rubio's really quite astonishing points about the fact that we are in a system of competing great powers, a multipolar system where there are great powers, and that there should be deplorable. diplomacy again and that the purpose of diplomacy is to resolve conflicts.

Well, I hope that that is partly what we're seeing. I mean, what we're seeing with Ukraine is consistent with that. But I wonder whether the entire American government has accepted that view and whether Rubio and Trump ultimately have done as well. because if they have, it's a revolutionary change. But I'm afraid we're going to have to wait and see to what extent that is really the case. If it is the case, I would welcome it, especially the points about returning to diplomacy. But, well, we'll see.

Two quick points. One, Glenn, going back to where you started a few minutes ago about what's happening on the ground, and how that is influencing events. It's very important to understand that Hexeth said, he said explicitly that America's position is a recognition of hard power realities on the ground. Just think about those words. He said this in Brussels.

It's a recognition of hard power realities on the ground. In other words, Hexon understands, the Trump administration understands we have lost. We have lost this war. The tide has turned against Ukraine and the West. The problem is that huge numbers of people in the West don't understand that. They operate under this illusion that Ukraine is doing fine. And all we have to do is give them a bit more weaponry and fine-tune the fighting. machine and they'll stymie the Russians and eventually roll them back. And if you think like that

about the situation on the ground, then obviously you're not going to like this deal at all. But if you face reality, which is what Hexeth and Trump and company are doing, then it's obvious you have no choice here. But to end the war, unfavorable terms, if you can. So again, And I think the Hex's speech, when you look at it, is a really quite remarkable document. The number of things that he says in very clear terms that are quite profound, well, you agree with them, I happen to agree with them. But the things that he says that are quite profound, quite explicit are really amazing. And I think the Trump administration will build on what Hexas said.

I think that's the foundation. I think they sent him out on purpose to make that set of arguments. Second point, just about multi-plarity, I think what's going on here is that the United States wants to pivot to Asia. And it understands that if you pivot to someplace, you have to pivot from someplace. And they want to pivot from Europe and go to Asia. I think that they'd like to pivot from the Middle East as well and put an end to that. But it's much more difficult because of the Israel lobby and the United States to pivot in any meaningful way from the Middle East.

But Europe, you can pivot from. And I think what's happening here is that the Trump administration wants to have good relations with the Russians and, in effect, peel the Russians away from the Chinese. I think that the Trump administration is trying to do what the Nixon administration did when it changed our relationship with China because we didn't like the idea of China and the Soviet Union being the best of friends and us being on the other side of the fence. We brought the Chinese to our side of the fence. I think in this case, what Trump and company are trying to do is bring the Russians over to our side of the fence. and put some daylight. It doesn't mean that the Russians and the Americans are going to be bosom buddies or allies or anything like that.

But I think that the Trump administration wants to put some daylight between China and Russia, wants to get us out of Europe as much as possible and let us concentrate on East Asia. It's a bit strange, the reactions, because it seems very irrational. I mean, it is a huge shift in U.S. policy, especially after three years of war as well. in all fairness the war has been lost there's nothing that can be done to reverse it there is genuine concerns about this escalating further into nuclear war america doesn't want to be stuck in europe as you said john they rather go to china and instead now they're pushing russia into the hands of china and anyways if they don't make a deal it's going to be much much worse deal the longer the wait so

this is really a rational thing and this is why i like what alexander pointed out as well if the Europeans had a better option, then put it on the table, but there is nothing else. It's just the same old thing. They've been saying the past three years, just drag the war out a little bit longer. But I actually wrote an article about Hegsef's comment on my substack, and I wanted to work it around a quote by Machiavelli, because, well, I know you like him, John, so I was thinking about you when I wrote it. But Machiavelli, he wrote that, yeah, men will live.

not look at things the way they really are, but as they wish them to be. And for this, they are destroyed or ruined or something. And this is very much a nice summary of how we've been speaking about Ukraine.

I think ignoring the reality of how this was going to end, it's always been front and center. Of course, someone really wanted just to bleed the Russians and cynically used the Ukrainians. But a lot of people in the West, they were convinced they were on the right side, that this was the moral, righteous things to do, to, yeah, to send weapons to

Ukraine and continue to fight. And again, any listener, I would advise them to go and listen to, yeah, Professor John Meersheimer's comments and speeches, well, a decade ago, again back in, was it 2014 or 15, arguing, yeah, what Alexander mentioned is, you know, we're leading the Ukrainians down the primrose path, simply we're leading them to their own destruction. And if we don't bring a peace, simply because whatever good intentions we may have, I'm not saying that's the case, this will destroy them because you can't threaten the survival of another superpower or great power and not get this response. And again, since that speech by you, John, I've seen them undermining the Minsk agreement

seemed they being able to undermine and effectively cancel the 2019 peace mandate that the Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted for. I've seen them sabotaged the Istanbul Agreement. I mean, what's been done to Ukraine is quite horrible, but it has all been done under this idea of how we wish that the world would be that this was the righteous thing to do. And it's just strange to me, because even Obama back in his day recognized that it would be a very bad idea to start a war in Ukraine. a hot war against the Russians, given that with the proximity, the Russians would have the advantage of logistics. And I would add, more importantly, this is much more important to the Russians. They will fight all the way because this is a threat to their existence, irrespective of the denial we get from Europe. So I just...

I need to read that article of yours, John. It's a long time since I've read Machiavelli, by the way, so... But I would certainly not. And absolutely, we... We have created a whole moral narrative around Ukraine, which has completely distorted our judgment and in disastrous ways. Of course, we've done that on a foundation of what we perceive to be our self-interest, certainly in Europe. And as John absolutely rightly said, it's turned out that it's not been in our self-interest at all.

running away from reality hardly ever is in anyone's self-interest but that's but that is exactly that is precisely what we ended up doing so I would certainly be interested to read your piece there now as I said if we go back to the whole issue

of China and Russia and the United States I think the key thing to say is that the Russians are not going to rupture their relations with China for our benefit. But having good relations, or at least better relations with Russia, maybe not good relations, but better relations, having a calm situation in Europe, having a situation where if the United States transfers troops and materials

and resources from Europe to Asia means that the Americans can do that and the Russians won't rush to take advantage. That obviously, in a competition between the United States and China, works to American advantage. And if you listen to the Trump people, if you listen to things that J.D. Vance has been saying over the last few hours, you can absolutely see that China is what they have on their minds. Pete Higgs said the same.

They're always talking about China now. And just going back to what John said, that is absolutely right. You may not be able to split Russia from China, but a Russia that has good terms with the United States is not going to be a Russia that's going to cause problems if the United States finds itself in some issues with China and the Pacific. So there's a kind of logic to this. It makes a sort of sense, more sense than anything we've seen from the Biden people who seem to think that the right way was to take them off both on at the same time. I want to go back to the Machiavelli quote that you started with, Glenn. I think one of the principal reasons that we're so much trouble today,

we meaning the West, is that we, don't pay attention to what I would call brute facts. We failed to recognize brute facts. And we failed to think rationally and logically about all sorts of issues. And what's happened is we've created this sort of ideological straitjacket. If you don't fit into it, you're pushed completely out of the discourse, the mainstream discourse, which really kind of bizarre. And J.D. Vance was making this point in Munich when he said that, you know, it's a lot like the Soviet Union used to be here in Europe, right? There's this ideological straitjacket. So that people like us who have been arguing against the conventional wisdom for a long, long time,

And I do believe we emphasize brute facts and logic. This is not to say we're always right. We've all been wrong on a number of issues. That just goes with the territory. But we're concentrating on the brute facts. We're trying to be as logical as possible. But because we come to conclusions that are outside the ideological street jacket, you're basically ruled out of court.

You're not part of the discourse. So we have this huge number of people in the West who are, thinking about Ukraine based on faulty logic and a misunderstanding of the facts. And in those sorts of circumstances, it's no surprise that you're in this disastrous situation. If people had paid serious attention to the facts and had thought logically, we would have shut this war down a good year and a half ago. And it would have been to Ukraine's advantage. And this argument that Ukraine is not losing on the battlefield, it can turn the tide, has nothing to do with facts and logic. And pursuing policies based on that set facts is destined to do even more damage to Ukraine.

So I just think it's very important, especially when you're dealing with national security issues, for people to be brutally honest about what's going on, whether they like it or not. You just, you know, if you want to be a good strategist, you want to think about what's best for your country. So basic intellectual integrity is essential. And I think intellectual integrity has suffered enormous damage since the Cold War ended in 1989. And that's in good part why we're in so much trouble today. Yeah, but I think it's also a curse of the unipolar era because during the global primacy, the whole premise is

there's one power that dominates you don't have to take into consideration anyone else so at the end of the day the US and the political West would get the final say it's it can decide not to continue to fight but if it wants it can have the final say but this is really the war that

has broken the unipolar moment and it's definitely finished it because it's I mean people make this comments like for example this is unfair it's It's, this peace which Trump is accepting now, it only takes into account Russian security. It completely ignores Ukraine.

And, you know, it's suffered this much, all these deaths, all this losses. And it's very unfair. And, yeah, I couldn't agree more. It is very unfair. It's horrible for the Ukrainians. They suffered so much. The peace will be humiliating. They will get no security after this either, no proper security guarantees.

But this is also reality. Because what is the alternative? No one has shown the alternative. Instead, this assumption that we can always get a better deal that we will always come out on top, it's always pushing us to double down. But look where this has taken us. Before 2014, no one in Russia was laying even claims to even Crimea. No one, you know, there was nothing. And then after the coup, then you have Crimea.

If we would have accepted, implemented the Minsk agreement from 2015, the Ukrainians could have reintegrated Donbass, even only with some. some autonomy, some minority rights, like religious rights and language rights. Even in 2022, the Russians were willing to pull back their forces in return for neutrality. Now we have NATO Secretary General saying, well, NATO membership never had to be a part of a deal. If they said this in 2021, there wouldn't have been a war. We keep doubling down and we keep losing and things get so much worse. But still, we're pretending that the alternative to a bad deal now is this utopia, which doesn't exist.

But the real alternative to this horrible deal is an even worse deal. And there's nothing we can do anymore. We lost a war. We went to war against Russia, a proxy war, and we lost. And it's the Ukrainians which will bear the main burden. And it's horrible what's happened to them. And this peace is going to be terrible as well. They're not going to have so many millions of people have left the country.

So many young men have died. Their industries are destroyed. Their natural resources are half of some things under Russian control. electric grid is destroyed. I mean, it's terrible. But I've watched Pierce Morgan interview, you know, you John, and it's like he's saying, well, the moral thing has to be to continue the war, to continue the war. Like you said, they have this ideological straitjacket and they can't break out of it, even though he can't explain this position, why this would be in the benefit.

Well, absolutely. If you fight and lose a war, then inevitably, the terms of the peace that follows, are going to be disadvantages to yourself. That is the nature of war. The thing in that kind of situation is to make sure you don't fight a war, which you are likely to lose. And there were ways of avoiding that war, but we didn't do that. We have the war, and there's going to be a peace, which the Ukrainians is going to be bad for the Ukrainians, far worse than what they would have had if the war had never been forward. And in a way, it's going to be very bad for us as well. And I think we have to accept that.

But that is the reality. And as you absolutely rightly say, the utopia of thinking that you can win when you are obviously going to lose. All that guarantees is that when the terms of the peace come, they're going to be even less advantages to yourself than they would be if you agree the piece now. Now, this is obvious. And again, it should not take great statesmanship to understand this. It's frankly, shocking that it has taken Donald Trump in the United States to break through and to bring us to that point of understanding. Well, you know, there were so many other clever people, or apparently clever people

in the United States who could have seen it. And it is even more shocking in Europe where we know all about wars or say we do, We've had our long history and where we invented modern diplomacy. So we don't seem to understand this either. And we insist on clinging to these fantasies that, you know, we can still lose a war and get a good piece. When that is obviously absurd. Now, there is that other region of the world, which is racked by war, which is the Middle East. and I'm going to suggest that it's practically the same there.

It's obviously playing out in a different way over a very, very, very much longer term. But again, the longer the war, the conflicts go on there and they all have one point of origin, which is the Palestinian crisis at the core of it. The longer they play out, the more disadvantages the terms are going to be. because again, in the end, victory there is unachievable and defeat will follow.

Just so. One quick point about the Middle East, and then I want to introduce what I think is a big point about Ukraine. Just on the Middle East, the discourse in the West, especially in the United States on Israel and its various wars, is probably even worse than the discourse of Ukraine in Europe and in the West more generally. It's really remarkable how at a touch with reality, the discourse on Israel and on the Middle East in the United States and in Europe. And the end result is you get remarkably foolish policies. Truly amazing.

But I want to go back to Ukraine. The Russians have made it clear. And we've talked about this before, that the Russians don't simply want to settle the conflict in Ukraine. They want a broader security architecture. And it's very important to understand, as we all know, but for viewers to understand that there are a series of flashpoints outside of Ukraine in Eastern Europe. I like to say it's the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova, and the Black Sea. These are all potential flashpoints, and it would be very good if we could get some sort of broad security architecture in place that covered at least Eastern Europe so that there won't be trouble in these areas once the Ukraine war is. shut down. And the Russians are in effect insisting on this, but if they do that, then it'll take even

longer to get some sort of meaningful agreement. I think that would actually be the best possible option, though, because with European security agreement, something that focuses on positive some gain, everyone could effectively benefit, because as you point out, there's all these other conflicts just waiting to play out unless the underlying foundation, the reason why we had this war and this other conflict emerged. And it's also a bit shocking to me that how the roles have been reversed. Because in the early 90s, when the United States began to, or mid-90s, more correctly, began to suggest that perhaps we should go with a different secured system. So instead of having a security system based on, you know, no dividing lines, having indivisible security,

the Americans began to suggest how about we just expand NATO which means a hegemonic system where again it doesn't matter we don't have to take into account what Russia cares because it's too weak and we'll be too powerful anyways this is how we'll stay secure Europeans were quite worried at that time

at least the French were expressing some concern whether or not this was a good idea and now of course the Europeans can't imagine anything else this is living under US hegemony is the only possible solution.

It's just, I think as this whole hegemonic system begins to be unraveled, it has to be replaced with something else. Because if we continue to have this idea of European security, where we don't consider the security of our adversaries, by, for example, pivoting into the Arctic and dismissing the Russians, now we're talking about, well, some of the East, European countries are talking about seizing Russian ships in the Baltic Sea. I mean, this is so absurd.

This is an act of war if they would ever do this. And the Russians wouldn't have any opportunity, any chance other than retaliate. Because how can they let Latvia take their ships? I mean, it's beyond absurd. So we really have to find something to address, which is, but then there has to be an acceptance that this is not just the war of Ukraine. This is, you know, a war over a collapse of pan-European security. Hegemonic model is finished, but something else has to come in its place, especially if the Americans are leaving.

Absolutely. I completely agree. I think that in the interests of Europe, the United States, and the Russians coming to some kind of understanding about how to deal with these conflicts, so that these conflicts do not result in the kind of catastrophe that we have had over Ukraine is absolutely a, and in everybody's interests. Again, this is not difficult. It's strange that it's so resisted by so many people. And if I could just go back to the fact that the French had all those doubts back in the 1990s and of course they now prefer the hegemonic system with the Americans present. They prefer a hegemonic system with the Americans present to the alternatives that they would be faced today, which is a system where there are no Americans present. In the 1990s, the Americans would still have been there.

Now there's a real chance that they might go. And for the Europeans, this is very unnerving. I mean, what happens if the Americans go? We've discussed this in previous programs. We got the Russians to worry about. You've got all of these issues in Eastern Europe to worry about, too. but we've also got ourselves and our previous rivalries and tensions to think about. What happens if without the Americans and you are in Paris,

the Germans, for example, come to an understanding with the Russians. Where does that leave France? So you can see how this plays out and why the French would much prefer that the American stayed and why they are now much more dogmatic in defending. the hegemonic system in Europe than they were back in the 1990s when they were more flexible about this. But precisely because it is likely, or at least possible, that the Americans may go at some point in the next few years, or perhaps decade, who knows, it becomes even more important to try to set up some kind of structure to ensure that we don't get

kind of crises that we have in Europe now. And again, that ought to be what European diplomacy was focusing on. Instead, we get Kirstama telephoning Zelensky and telling him that Ukraine is on an irreversible course towards NATO. I cannot begin to say how upset and angry I was when I learned yesterday that that call had been made. Just a couple quick points. One is it is important to emphasize that when the Cold War came to an end and the Soviets were pulling out of Eastern Europe, they wanted the United States to remain in Europe. They saw us as a pacifier, and they thought it was especially important for us to stay because Germany was Germany. And they liked the idea that Germany was integrated into an alliance that was run by the Americans. But in the 90s, and I remember very well, this phrase popped up regarding NATO, and it was expand or die. And the idea is that if NATO didn't expand, it would more or less wither on the vine. And what's happened here is NATO looks like it's expanding and dying.

And just to take it one step further, I think the first tranche of expansion, major tranche was 99 when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were brought in. And then the second big tranche was in 2004, with the Baltic states, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak, and Bulgaria were brought in. We got away with those. The Russians could live with those two tranches of expansion. But it was the April 2008 decision that was fatal. If they had stopped after the 2000, decision. And they had actually then gone on to work out some sort of meaningful security relationship with the Russians to cover those areas that weren't covered by NATO. And that was not a lot of territory, by the way. You and I believe have a very peaceful situation in Eastern Europe

today, simply because I don't think the Russians had either the intentions or the capabilities to overrun Ukraine, Belarus, Eastern Europe, whatever, right? The Russians were just interested in getting their own house in order. And Putin, despite the picture that most people have of him in their heads in the West, is not a highly aggressive individual. And in fact, if anything, he gets beat up in social media inside Russia for not being aggressive enough. We're not waging the war aggressively enough in,

Ukraine. So I really think if you would not had that April 2008 decision, we would not be in this catastrophic situation, certainly catastrophic from Ukraine's view that we're in. I completely agree. I just quickly add, my own view is that if it was down to the Russians, they would still want the Americans to stay in Europe for exactly the same reasons that they did in the I think they still don't want a Europe, which is going off, careering in all kinds of directions. They want stability on their western borders, and they understand that the United States is the best country in the end to provide it. We provide the glue, right?

Exactly. I mean, we're not simply the fast fire, because you have massive collective action problems when you have you know 20 plus nations trying to figure out what to do either on the economic front if you're talking about the EU or on the security front if you're talking about NATO and the idea that you can take the Americans away and you're going to have this thing called Europe. I don't think it's going to look like that. I think you're going to have a number of independent nations and sometimes they're going to be at each other's throats. But this was also something that surprised the Americans

back in 1989 when the Cold War was negotiated over in Malta. I think it was Condoleezza Rice, who was pointing out that the Americans had been a bit surprised because they assumed that any agreement with the Soviets meant that the Americans had to get out of the continent, but the Soviets even then had said, no, the Americans can stay. It's just, you know, we have to end some of this confrontation. So this came at a surprise then. And even, I think, yeah, you were correct, John, if the, if NATO had simply said, you know, we're going to expand, you know, even 2004 when we moved into the former Soviet territory by

absorbing the Baltic states, I think the Russians could have adjusted that as well. If we'd said, listen, here's the new security system in Europe. It's a more unfavorable new status quo, but at least this is a new status quo. You're going to, can we live with this? But we never even offered them this. We always said, no, the revisionism will not stop. continuously expand. And, you know, after this, we're going to go into Georgia, Ukraine. Who knows what we do after this? Are we going to build bases all around in Crimea? Are we going to, you know, build

missiles, missile on the border in, you know, in Kharkov? There was nothing. There was no limitations at all. And there was no acceptance of a new status quo. It's just this continuous pivot closer and closer to Russia. Again, it's the limits of how much territory you can take. But in terms of moving the military infrastructure. I think this refusal to accept N new status quo is really something that made the Russian simply draw a red line. And obviously, as everyone recognized, Ukraine was really it, which is why Robert Gates, William Burns, everyone recognized 2008 was a horrible mistake, a huge overreach.

Anyways, as we always tend to go a bit over time, Alexander, John. Do any of you have any final thoughts? I agree with the last point, and I think this has been said by John as well. 2008, that decision is going to be researched and discussed and argued about for years. It was the fatal moment which set Europe on the course to war. A fact that is not acknowledged in Europe, of course, in Europe at all, but which we need to acknowledge, we need to understand the, momentousness and the recklessness of that decision, which wasn't even properly thought through

or discussed at the time. It was certainly not the big media story, as I remember. Yeah, and just one final point, Glenn, thank you for giving me the opportunity to make this, but you want to remember that NATO expansion was packaged together with two other strategies One was EU expansion, and the other were the color revolutions. And the color revolutions are usually thought of in terms of the orange revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. But we were interested in fomenting a color revolution inside of Russia. When Michael McFaul was the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, he was in a very important way pushing for a color revolution inside of Russia.

And as you can understand, this really spooked the Russians. So it was not just NATO expansion. It was also EU expansion and the possibility of a color revolution inside of Moscow that really contributed to this disastrous policy outcome. Absolutely. Yeah, just as a final comment. After the coup in 2014, there's a New York Times article. which came out in 2024, I think,

which argued that on the first day after the coup in 2004, you had the CIA, MI6 and the new security agency, well, the new security chief of the intelligence agency in Ukraine, who had obviously been handpicked or approved by Washington. They agreed to this trilateral agreement between the three security institutions. And one of the things was the Americans were chairing on, the CIA is saying, well, how wonderful it is now to have the Ukrainians. We can really infiltrate the Russians here because when Ukrainians meet the Russians,

it's like their brothers. They don't even think that they're handing over information. And even the former head of the National Endowment for Democracy even suggested, oh, after Ukraine, you know, now Putin should be worried we can come for them. You know, John McCain, he even made this threat as well. You know, he tweeted something after Arab Spring, Moscow next, or, you know, something along those lines. It's just, it couldn't be more obvious that after Ukraine,

We're coming for Russia as well. So it's, yeah. Anyways, this belongs to a different show. So Alexander, John, like always, thank you so much for your time. It's been very interesting. Thank you very much. Thank you and thank you, John. Yeah, thank you, Alexander.

And thank you, Glenn. I thoroughly enjoy it as always.