The Duran Podcast - Ukraine is Now Trump's War - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: May 3, 2025

Ukraine is Now Trump's War - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome. I am joined today by John Meersheimer and Alexander Mercuris to discuss the recent developments taking place in Ukraine. So we have quite a few developments lately. That is, Selensky decided to sign the minerals deal and shortly thereafter, probably quite related. the United States announced that it would engage in weapon sales to Ukraine. So this has, I guess, been a difficult balancing position for the United States to both be a leading participant in this war with Russia and also at the same time being a mediator. Is this collapsing now, or is this Trump's war, I guess? Well, I think it has collapsed.

I mean, there was an announcement today by the State Department that they've ended their mediation mission. And having been a mediator myself in many negotiations, I mean, that was one of the things I used to do. I mean, the idea that you could be both a mediator and a party is absurd. I mean, it is impossible. I mean, it completely contradicts the whole concept of what mediation is. You cannot be a mediator and at the same time a party to a conflict,

or someone who is deeply involved with one of the parties to the conflict in the way that the United States has been. And I think that is one of the reasons why this attempt of negotiations ultimately failed, because the United States is much too close to this conflict to be able to actually fulfill a successful mediation role. I think presenting this, you know, in an effort to achieve, a peace agreement, presenting it as the United States conducting some kind of mediation exercise was misconceived. And as I said, was one of the things that caused the whole process of negotiation to come to the impasse, which it seems to me it is now in. I would agree with Alexander. I don't think that the United States was a mediator.

I mean, what we have here is a war where Russia is on one side, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States are on the other side. The United States has been an active participant in this war. It's done everything but pull the triggers. You know, it's not a mediator in any meaningful way. I think what was going on here is that Trump thought that he could work out a deal with the Russians. and once that deal was worked out, he thought that he could impose that on the Europeans and the Ukrainians. When you talk about mediation, it's like the United States is in the middle, and the Ukrainians and the Europeans are on one side, and the Russians are on the other side. I don't think, again, that's what was happening here. The United States is a full-fledged participant on one side, and it was trying to work out a deal with the Russians. this is what Steve Whitkoff was trying to do.

Steve Whitkoff wasn't talking to the Ukrainians. He wasn't talking to the Europeans. He was talking to Putin because the two of them were trying to work at a deal. And then they thought they could sell it to the Ukrainians and the Europeans. But the problem here is that not only were the Europeans and the Ukrainians completely uninterested in any meaningful compromises, much less the deal that the Russians demand. But the American National Security Establishment and the Trump administration is honeycombed with all sorts of super hawks who want to continue the war. So, you know, Trump and a handful of his lieutenants were interested in cutting a deal, but there was so much pressure against that inside his own administration that he couldn't even pull off that part of the story.

And let's assume he had done that. Let's assume that Putin and Trump had worked out a deal, which basically would have involved Trump conceding on all the major demands that the Russians make. Let's assume that that happened. He could have never sold it to the Ukrainians and to the Europeans. And the question then is, where would that have left us? The answer is nowhere. A key problem though by selling or perceiving this war as being a war between Ukraine and Russia

is taking the US and the Europeans out of the equation. Now, for me, a strange thing about the whole negotiation, as you said, the idea that they have to impose this on the Ukrainians. Why was it that all of this had to be imposed on the Ukrainians? I mean, the idea that they had to pressure Ukraine to accept they wouldn't be a part of NATO. Why would this be Ukraine's decision? nearly in NATO or the United States, as the leading country in NATO, could have said, could have written a deal with the Russians saying America will not accept any NATO expansion.

It just seems as if we're setting ourselves up for another, you know, not another inch to the east, which could be broke in the future. Why? Same with the security guarantees. Zelensky demanded security guarantees. But the United States could have, you know, move this forward as well. they don't get to veto this. Do they that they get American security guarantees?

It just seems like a lot of this could have been dealt with between the Americans and the Russians, if there was a will. I'm not sure how do the two of you explain this, the fact that there was the Ukrainians who had to renounce NATO. Why couldn't NATO renounce, I guess, Ukraine as a member? Well, I think actually, John has partly answered this for the Americans, for Trump to have negligence, negotiated a deal like that with the Russians would have been incredibly difficult politically to do.

And I do think he was prepared to take the risks. And I don't think he understood that in order to achieve a deal, he would find the Russians as determined in their stance as he expected. I think he thought that he could provide a framework agreement, that the Russians would accept the framework agreement, that the Russians would make significant concessions as well, that they would accept some language on NATO, and that they would accept part of the territories and all of those things. And I think he was disappointed and surprised that the Russians said, no, we have to have something much more concrete than that.

I mean, John has said in the first that, as far as the Russians are concerned, what they would probably want is some absolute guarantee that the United States will not be involved in security issues in Ukraine at all. Now, that's almost certainly, I am sure, something like that, maybe not in exactly those terms would have come up over the course of the various discussions that took place with Wickham. But there is no conceivable way that this could have been sold in Washington or could have been sold certainly to the Europeans or to the Ukrainians,

So I think this was approached in the wrong way. I think that what Trump needed to do, if he was going to move forward, is that he needed to put Ukraine to one side, seek a normalization of some kind with Russia, reopening embassies, getting dialogue going, discussing things with the Russians in that kind of way. And then gradually, maybe out of that, some kind of steps could have been taken that might eventually have led to peace in Ukraine,

especially if the United States have quietly started to stop supplying weapons. But Trump wanted to do it all very fast. He needed it all to happen in 100 days. He wildly overreached. He greatly underestimated the difficulties. And this is where we are. Yeah, and just to build on what Alexander said, you, Glenn, focused on the NATO issue.

And there's no question that's an important issue. And there's no question that we are unlikely to give an ironclad promise that Ukraine will never become a NATO, a NATO member. That's, I think, part of the problem. But there are two other big problems, in my opinion. One is the territorial issue. One could argue the territorial issue is by far. the biggest issue. We live in the age of nationalism. Territory is inevitably sacred.

If you think about how the Chinese think about Taiwan, Taiwan is sacred territory. And for the Ukrainians, understandably, eastern Ukraine is sacred territory to them. Crimea is sacred territory. They don't want to give it up. And how do you square that circle? And then we don't give them security guarantees. Okay, but the third big demand that the Russians have is that Ukraine be demilitarized to the point where it has no offensive military capability. Now, you can understand why the Russians want that, but you can also understand why the Ukrainians, if they don't have security guarantees, at least want to have the capability to build up their defenses to protect themselves. I mean, that makes perfect sense from their point of view. But again, how do you square that circle? So there are three big problems here that I don't think have any solution.

And this is why I don't think you can get a meaningful peace agreement. Yeah, this is, I think the demilitarization of Ukraine was probably a step too far for the Russians. Again, if they get no security guarantees, then it does seem reasonable that they should at least have their own military. maybe not as huge as the one NATO built up since 2014, but if the Russians would negotiate on something, that seems like something they should allow. But again, we have all this complicated issues. You have neutrality, you have the territorial issues,

you have the demilitarization. Why was so much of this negotiation, the pressure on Zelensky focused on Crimea? I don't recall the Russians really asking about this at all, or caring that much about the extent to which the Western countries actually would recognize, or Zelensky would recognize Crimea as Russian. Again, this was 11 years ago. They said primarily the neutrality issue and territorial issues.

And, of course, these other ones. But how did Crimea end up being such an important part of this? Well, just to say about things like demilitarization and all of those things, if there had been a proper process of negotiation, which might have taken a very long time to do. One, two, three years, something of that kind. Over the course of those kind of negotiations, as perhaps some degree of goodwill and trust

is built up over the course of negotiations. Some flexibility on each side might have gradually developed. I've seen that happen over the course of negotiations. but Trump wasn't interested in negotiations of that kind. He didn't pursue actually a conventional negotiating strategy. He wanted to have the deal done quickly, apparently in 100 days, and it is unrealistic to expect that sides that are entrenched in a conflict of the kind that John has described are going to actually compromise on their fundamental

positions in that sort of way. He was in far too much of a hurry, probably actually, what he's done is that in fact he's probably caused each side to dig in more strongly into the positions that they already had, which is the risk you run if you conduct negotiations of this kind of way. Now, as we're bringing up Crimea, again, I wonder whether he thought that this would be a simple thing that, you know, the Russians already controlled Crimea. So you recognize Crimea as Russian and that will please the Russians. And the Ukrainians have lost Crimea for 10 years and they won't care very much. And he thought that he was giving the Russian something that might persuade them to give ground on other things. And of course, that didn't happen.

The Russians didn't give ground on other things, because as you rightly say, they haven't really brought up the issue of Crimea at all. And for the Ukrainians, it was a concession that was completely unacceptable, as they made completely clear. I have to say, I have to say this, there was a huge amount of amateurism in the way this negotiation was conducted. Negotiations of this sort should not be conducted in this kind of way. negotiations need to be conducted through proper negotiating teams, working through all of the issues, taking their time, arguing with each other, reflecting the edds and flows and eddies of opinion

in their various countries, and eventually an agreement is done. But just to think that one man, Trump and one negotiating partner, Wickoff, can somehow get this all sewn up in 100 days, I mean, it just wasn't going to happen. And as I said, it may have made things worse. Gail, let me respond to two of the points that Alexander made just embellish them.

But before I do that, let me just say, I think he's absolutely right about Crimea. They thought that was the low-hanging fruit that they could get an agreement there. And then they could build upon that. But, of course, it might have been the low-hanging fruit, but it was not hanging very low. they got nothing and they had nothing to build on. But my two point told this. First, it's very important to understand that what is going on in Ukraine is from Russia's point of view an existential threat. And it is from Ukraine's point of view, an existential threat. The Russians are an existential threat to Ukraine. And Ukraine and NATO is an existential threat to Russia. And when

And countries feel that they are facing an existential threat, first of all, they're willing to take great risks, and they'll do almost anything to protect themselves. And furthermore, they're going to be highly unlikely to be willing to make any concessions at all. Because, again, they're facing an existential threat. And one of the problems that we have in the West is that we refuse to accept the fact that the Russians see NATO expansion into Ukraine as an existential threat. We just refuse to accept it. And we don't fully appreciate the Ukrainian position as well. We don't understand just how much the Ukrainians fear the Russians. And the end result is you have this mentality where people think there's bargaining space between the two sides.

And all you have to do is reduce that bargaining space, get to some sort of agreement, and we'll live happily ever after. And most people in the West, when they talk about cutting a deal, they missed the fact that this is almost impossible to do because you have two adversaries that think the other side is an existential threat. And I think if we had recognized that from the beginning, we would have understood that this was a Herculean task. bring this war to an end. And it had to be done very carefully, which gets to my second point. To say that the Americans or amateurs, Alexander, is a gross understatement. It's hard to believe how incompetent this administration is. I mean, Steve Whitkoff, who has zero experience as a diplomat, is put in charge not only of the Russian portfolio or the Ukraine portfolio. He's in charge of the Iran portfolio, and he's in charge of the Netanyahu portfolio.

He has three separate portfolios. He has no experience, and furthermore, he has no staff. He goes to these meetings pretty much all alone. He's kind of the lone ranger. There's no question that he's close to Trump, and that is a huge advantage. But at the same time, you would think for tricky negotiations like the ones involving Ukraine. And by the way, the ones involving Iran as well, that you would have a skilled and experienced diplomat in charge. But you don't. And then there's Marco Rubio, who's now the national security advisor as well as the Secretary of State, as well as the head of USAID. And he has a fourth job as well. I can't even remember what it is. But Mark Arrubio has hardly any diplomatic experience.

And furthermore, what he's most known for these days is he's done 180-degree turn on all his views just to appease Donald Trump. And a person who doesn't really have firm positions that he or she is willing to stick to is not likely to prove to be a reliable advisor to Donald Trump, who has to hear some hard, cold truths. But anyway, that's what you have here in the United States. And the final point that I would make to you is that we are dealing with so many different big issues that President Trump can barely keep his eye on any one ball for very long. He's got the Iran issue. He's got the Palestinian issue. He's got the Russia issue.

Now we have the India-Pakistan issue. Then he's got the tariff issue. And if you look at what he's doing domestically, you know, with Elon Musk and so forth and so on. They're just all sorts of issues at play at the domestic level. And this tells me that the chances that we're going to be smart enough to come close, just to come close to working at a deal with the Russians is not in the cards. I think the approach was similar to that of a person negotiating over property or something, that, you know, you can always push it a little bit up the price or down or, you know,

something but but again as i know alexander's also pointed out the this negotiation skills don't always translate into politics and especially as you say when this is seen as an existential threat it's not as if you know they can convince the russians that only a little bit of nato presence in ukraine will be fine it's no it's very it's i guess it was from day one very evident that there was very little room for maneuver on both sides but that's why initially it was kind of optimistic when Hegeseth came along and said, well, there will be no NATO expansion, no security guarantees, no return of territories. It kind of seemed that he recognized that

there was no room for a negotiation on the Russian side. And I thought he would be, they would be leaning heavily on the Ukrainians, because Ukraine can't really survive without America. So it's either this horrible deal or collapse. But yeah, now it looks Trump's been, well, he's been saying again this Biden's war, but it is now a Trump war as well. I'm just wondering to what extent because I think saying that it's Trump's war

now in Ukraine I think is fair, but to say that it's indistinguishable from Biden, I think that would be an exaggeration because Biden's a bit overly enthusiastic, especially in escalation. Even though this becomes Trump's war,

now I don't see him being as enthusiastic about this war or willing to invest or give away money. If anything, I think he sees more the opportunity of selling weaponry. Perhaps I'm not quite sure. I'm wondering if, yeah,

how are you to view this? Like, what will his actual involvement be here? If he's not mediating, but it's still participating in the war, yeah, to what extent? I think I'd say two things. Firstly, I think to say that he's unenthusiastic.

about the war is actually understates it. I think he absolutely wishes this war would go away. I don't think he's interested in it. I don't think he's interested in the issues. He sees it as a problem. He doesn't want to involve the United States in it much more. And as I said, I don't think he's enthusiastic about it at all. But at the same time as he's Donald Trump and as any president of the United States. States probably in his same position would no doubt feel. He doesn't want to see a collapse, a catastrophe, a breakdown, a defeat happen whilst he's president. So if you ask him, I think, at this precise moment in time, what exactly are you going to do from this point on? Are you going to go on supporting Ukraine so as to prevent it collapsing? Or are you gradually going to

reduce support for Ukraine? I don't think he knows himself. I don't get any sense that he knows himself. He's been saying things like, you know, that he's looking to extricate the United States from the war. At the same time, he's licensed a sale. It is a sale. It's not a transfer, you know, the $50 million of weapons to Ukraine. He signed this investment fund deal,

which is, by the way, very different from what we had before. It's much more like a sort of classical investment fund. idea, but he's now published, had published on the White House website to think that this is a sign to everybody that the United States still has skin in the game, that it's still there, that it's still a friend of Ukraine and wants to rebuild Ukraine. So I do think he really, himself, is clear about what to do. I think that what will probably happen is that events on the battlefield are going to shape his future reactions. And as those events unfold, which they will,

then gradually we'll start to see which way he's going to go. I think it's very difficult to predict at the moment exactly what he is thinking, or will do, because I don't get the sense that he has much idea himself. Let me just piggyback on what Alexander said. I think there are three options here that he had from the very beginning. One is to cut a deal, you know, to shut this war down. The second was to try and once he fails to walk away, in effect. Let the Ukrainians, with help from the Europeans, take the Russians on in the future. And the third was to become Joe Biden the second, which is to, you know, put Trump

supported or Trump-sponsored weaponry into the pipeline and keep the war going. Behave just the way Joe Biden was doing. Well, I think we all agree that the first possibility is now off the table. You're not going to get a deal unless they're doing something behind closed doors that we don't know about, which is extremely unlikely. Let's hope it is happening, but it doesn't look that way. That leaves you with two options. Either he walks away or he becomes Joe Biden number two.

And as Alexander said, this war is going to evolve over the next couple months in ways that favor the Russians. And Biden is going to have to make a decision whether we step in, we meaning the Americans, and try to stem the tide or maybe even reverse the balance, which is what you would have expected from a second Biden-slash-Harris administration, or we just say goodbye. We're out of here. And of course, if we do that, what that means is you're going to get Saigon, April 30th, 1975 at some point. It's going to be a collapse of the Ukrainian military. It's going to lose a lot of territory. I don't think the Russians are going to end up conquering all of Ukraine, the way the North Vietnamese conquered all of South Vietnam.

But I think the Russians will end up winning a clear-cut victory. the Ukrainians will lose much more territory, and it will be seen as a devastating defeat for the West. But if Trump doesn't want that to happen, what's the alternative? Be Joe Biden all over again? That's certainly distasteful. So he has no good option here. His only hope was to shut this one down. And it looks to me, and I think you guys both agree with me, like he blew it. yeah no i think that's uh yeah that's a technical term for it he did blow it um but uh yeah it's just i don't seem being it's he invested so much of his political capital

and you know to be the the main theme he has of being this peacemaker because he's not pulling it off in the middle east quite obviously and he's not being able to make some good deal with the chinese i thought this was going to be his one big thing but given that he's been speaking about peace for so long. I know he's good at walking away from walking back previous statements, but it must be very hard. A big part of his base has been openly mocking Zelensky. They said, you know, Ukraine, you know, ripping off America.

They kind of fell in line with this rhetoric. So for Trump to be Biden the second now, wouldn't this be Herculean task? I would have thought so. I mean, obviously, I'm not there in the United States. I don't know my finger on the pulse, certainly not a mage of people, but I would have thought it would be very, very difficult for Trump to simply turn around and say,

well, look, the Russians have not played ball with us, so we must go on supporting this heroic figure of Vladimir Zelensky and Ukraine against the Russians. And we must go on giving them more, more and more and more money after he's already been complaining about how much money and how many weapons have already been sent to Ukraine. I mean, I'm not saying it's an impossible cell, but I would have thought it would be a difficult one.

And it would be politically damaging because people would remember that he said the opposite before, and his political opponents inevitably would use it. So I can't see that becoming Biden the second is actually, attractive choice at all. I would say it was a very, very, very difficult one. But I don't think he wants Saigon too. I mean, I think that is clearly not what he wants. I think that he hasn't made a decision himself. And I think it's a very difficult decision for him to make, given that he's a politician. My guess is that he will go quiet over the next few months and play for time and see what events on the ground dictate. I wonder whether if this goes back, by the way, to something that John was saying

in an earlier programme, if there is a breakthrough, Russian breakthrough over the course of the summer, which, by the way, is starting to look more and more likely. I mean, you know, we're not going to talk about the details of the war, but my sense is it is starting to look more and more likely. then maybe, maybe come the autumn conditions for some kind of peace settlement, much more favourable to the Russians, might be more attractive to the Ukrainians and to the Europeans than they would be today. Because today, as of now, Ukraine is still there. It's still fighting.

It's still in a position to say no. And if that changes, it's say five, six months' time, perhaps he can revisit this whole question and agree the deal then that he tried to achieve today and found that he couldn't achieve. But that's far from sure, and it's far from sure that in six months' time, the Russians will be more amenable either.

I mean, they might have increased their demands. In fact, they quite plausibly will have done. Well, I think, Alexander, they'll then control more territory. And you'll be, the West will be in a position, the Americans will be in a position where they're asking the Russians to give up that additional territory beyond the four oblast. And if I were in the driver's seat in Moscow, I would not give up that territory. If I controlled Odessa and Harkim, I would not under any circumstances give up the territory for strategic reasons. because I would be worried about the Americans changing their mind in four years, two years, or six years. And the Ukrainians, of course, will want to reorder the existing territorial divide forever.

So, if I'm the Russians, I take as much territory as I can conquer and manage to occupy. But I want to make just another point about the whole Russian Ukraine case. I think it's important that we don't look at it in isolation because you want to understand that there are other balls in the air. And there could be big trouble on other fronts that limit what Trump can do in the late summer or in the fall regarding what's, happening in Ukraine. And the best example here is Iran. We could talk a little bit about that, but I don't think you're going to get a deal on Iran. I think the same sort of foolishness on the Americans part regarding Russia is playing out with regard to Iran. And if you don't get a deal, Trump has said that we will use military force against Iran. I find it hard to believe he would do

that, but he may have no choice, given the power of the Israel lobby in the United States, and just given the power of the right in the United States, all the hawks that we have in the administration and outside the administration, all the Lindsay Graham's running around. Well, if he attacks Iran with military force, we all know the Iranians are going to counterattack, and where that all leads will be to a disaster, right? And if he has a disaster over Ukraine, that's going to really complicate what he can do with regard to Ukraine. So the Iran business and the Ukraine go together. And by the way, if we don't work out a deal with the Russians over Ukraine and relations between Russia and the United States deteriorate in the months ahead, that will give

the Russians an even greater incentive to cooperate with the Iranians against us. And that further complicates things. When there are the tariffs, almost everybody believes that there's a tsunami coming at us, that we're going to get hit really hard by these tariffs. And even Trump himself admits we're going to suffer some significant pain. He argues it's in the short term and in the long term will be better off. But that short term is going to include a good year or two. And in that short term, when we're suffering here in the United States from tariffs, that will have an effect on what kind of maneuver room Trump has with regard to Iran and with regard to Russia. So you can tell a plausible story where Trump is in big trouble on a lot of fronts come the late summer,

fall and 26 and this could really complicate matters to the other Ukraine. Well this goes to the idea about trumping Biden too. I'm not sure if it's possible for him to be Biden too because

as you said there's economic trouble at home. The economic war with China isn't going well either that China's appeared to be waiting this out and just watching the chaos play out in the US and of course we have the huge problems in the Middle East, the potential of war with Iran.

So even if he would want him to be Biden too, which I don't think he wants to, the resources aren't really there. There's no hidden weapons depot which Biden left untouched. Which is why I guess it's interesting to, again, look at this whole mineral steel. Is this just transactional? He's selling some weapons now because he got some hands on

the Ukrainian resources and not to widen the question even further but what is actually isn't this minerals deal

is it as extensive control as I mean is you can be coming now an economic colony of America or is it not that extensive well this is a problem

because what has been published appears to be one of only three documents and I've read through that document, it doesn't provide a huge amount of insight as to what exactly has been agreed here. And I was hearing, I don't know whether this is true or not, but that the Ukrainian MPs who are supposed to ratify this agreement are themselves not being shown the whole

agreement in its entirety. But my sense of it is this. The Ukrainians first proposed this back in the summer and early autumn when they were basically looking for some kind of long-term security commitment or even guarantee from the United States. I mean, that was what Zelensky was talking about. He said, look, you give me your unqualified military support going forward. I will give you in return all these mineral rights.

Trump wasn't prepared to give Ukraine that kind of unqualified military. support or guarantee that Zelensky was asking for. The Americans wanted essentially complete control over Ukraine's natural resources. The Ukrainians say, well, you're not even giving us a security guarantee. So why should we give you complete unconstrained control of our natural resources and our mineral rights? So what we've ended up with is a much more conservative, much more conventional agreement, basically an investment rights agreement. So you set up an investment fund to develop various parts of Ukraine's economy. It doesn't come with the security guarantees the Ukrainians wanted,

and it doesn't come with the absolute control of Ukraine's natural resources that the Americans wanted. So it's a very, very conventional agreement, or at least that is what the part of it that I have seen suggests that it is. So neither side in the end got what they were looking for. I suspect that probably they decided to agree this because a failure to agree would have been an indication that relations had completely broken down and might have led everybody to think that,

you know, relations between Ukraine and the United States were now irreparable. And perhaps they didn't want to give them. that impression. But what I've seen at the moment seems frankly, shall I say, rather inconsequential relative to all the other things that we've been talking about today. I mean, I qualify that. There may be all kinds of hidden clauses and secret deals and commitments that I'm not aware of. I like your use of the word inconsequential, because that's the way. I read it as well, not a big deal. But the problem in the West is that the media is hyping this

as evidence that we are tying ourselves to the Ukrainians. This is sort of a de facto security guarantee of some sort or another. But I don't think that's true at all. I think the Americans have made it very clear there's going to be no security guarantee. And if you look at what's happening in terms of just American policy towards Europe in general, we are reducing our footprint there, and we are interested in turning over European security to the Europeans, and we want the Europeans to deal with Ukraine, and we want to sort of get out of the business of dealing with Ukraine. Maybe we'll help on the margins, but we want that to be a European mission. So the idea that we're getting closer to the Ukrainians, this is some sort of meaningful security guarantee.

I think that's a myth that's being created in the West to perpetrate this idea that we shouldn't abandon and we are not abandoning Ukraine. I found it fascinating that JD Vance actually had to tell the Europeans that we don't want vessels, we want partners. So when the Americans are telling us to stop behaving like vessels for the Americans, you know, it's not, we're not in a good place, but, but both of you had some, you know,

interesting or very good points on all of the problems building up, you know, between the Russians, Ukrainians, the United States, but, but you can bring in another element here, though, to this conflict in terms of it not being sustainable, and that's within Ukraine. There's a lot of problems within, I mean, only the last few weeks and days now we see Zelensky put sanctions on Poroshenko, his own former advisor, Privis Arstovich, he also, the guy who is a biographer, put sanctions on him as well. You see now that again, there's some more tensions it seems between Zelensky and the nationalist. At the same time, only the last 48 hours, you see some huge collapses on the

front lines, you know, in many places from Bokrovsk, also the Toretsk region. And it's, no, this can't, it looks like something's going to crack at some point. If, let's say Trump continues to finance this war, or he does it through sales, you know, being very transactional, nonetheless, how can this continue? Because it doesn't seem like, yeah, it's only about American, America supplying weaponry. Well, it cannot indefinitely continue.

At some point, Ukraine will crack. It cannot continue the war indefinitely for exactly the reasons that you are saying. And undoubtedly, the fact that the war is being fought with all the terrible losses that is causing and is being lost is causing extreme stresses within the U.S. Ukrainian political system, exactly with the results that you described. I'm afraid I've come to the same conclusion, well, I've reached the conclusion, which I suspect John always had, which is that these stresses are never going to be sufficient to persuade Ukraine to agree to a peace that the Russians would accept, because the Ukrainians do see this as existential.

For them, if you like, this is a war of liberation. This is their, a war. war that is going to make their nation. And that is a very, very difficult thing for them to give up, or as they would say, betray. So we can be very rational about this from London and wherever we are. But I think that we have to accept that even as the tide goes further and further against them, even as they start being pushed to the wall in all sorts of places, even as their economy breaks down, they're out of,

they've got no gas in their reserves, there's issues about whether they can cover their budget expenses, and they might even be facing a financial crash later this year. That may not be enough to get them to sit down and negotiate, you know, on terms that might be. that might be acceptable to the Russians. If you want to parallel, the American Civil War often offers one,

where the South never surrendered and never negotiated. It just went on right up until the moment of its eventual collapse. Losers never forget. And the Ukrainians are going to lose this war, and they're never going to forget. And they're going to do everything they can. once you get a frozen conflict to change the situation on the ground, to get back that territory.

And the Russians fully understand this. I think if you think about where this war is going, there is just unending trouble ahead. I think the Ukrainians and the Russians are never going to come to any meaningful agreement on the territorial divide. And that issue alone means that these two countries are going to beat each other's throat forever and ever. It's just a terrible situation. Furthermore, it's very important to understand that there are a series of flashpoints in Eastern Europe that are superimposed on this conflict. There's the Arctic, there's the Baltic Sea, there's Kaliningrad, there's Belarus, there's Moldova, and there's the Black Sea. You can imagine trouble, conflict actually breaking out in each one of those

issue areas, sort of independent of what's going on in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. So you just have a number of potential points where this one can blow up moving forward to take this a step further. If you look at what the Russians are doing, I'm sure both of you saw this, big Wall Street Journal's story about how the Russians are developing their military and where they're deploying it. I tend to disagree with the Wall Street Journal, which seems to think that most of these new forces, the Russians are building, are designed to fight NATO. I think the Russians will take care of business on their front lines with the Ukrainians, first and foremost. Then they can worry about war with NATO. But I do think the Russians are worried about.

a war with NATO. I think they view NATO as a long-term threat. They view the Europeans as a long-term threat. Think about what that means, right? The Russians here don't believe that this conflict in Ukraine is going to be settled in any meaningful way. And the frozen conflict you're going to get is one where they have to be prepared that the frozen conflict heats up again. So the Russians, long-term are going to maintain powerful military forces to protect themselves, which is going to cause the Europeans to respond, which is going to cause the Russians to respond. And all of this is going to take place in a poisonous political environment. The Russophobia, as we've talked about before, in the West, is profound.

And of course, the Russians have gotten to the point where they really loathe, in many cases, people in the West. All you have to do is listen to Sergei Karaghanov talk about the West. He hates the West in the way that many of the Russophobes in the West hate Russia. This is going to be the political environment. And on top of that, you have this unending conflict in Ukraine, plus these other conflict scenarios that I describe. This is a catastrophe.

The decision in April 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO is a catastrophically foolish decision. It's hard to believe. I watched a talk you had with Sergei Karagano and I also noticed that the resentment now growing is quite interesting. Again, I used to work with him in Moscow and the tone used to be very different. But of course, this war has also changed things there. There's a lot of anger growing. But while I understand certainly the Ukrainian side that they don't want any negotiations that, you know, again, losing 20% of your territory after all this suffering and a humiliating peace.

I can understand why they want to roll the dice, even though it doesn't seem to be any good alternatives. But what is perplexing to me, though, is the Europeans. This makes very little sense to me. And we can, for example, use Germans as a case study. All this talk now about spending money they don't have to build a huge army, which would even alienate other Europeans potentially.

and you have German generals on TV arguing, well, for example, that the Russians are building up forces near Finland, and they're using this as evidence that the Russians are preparing to invade or to fight NATO. And it's very strange because, you know, when Finland joined NATO, Putin warned, well, now we're going to have to build, you know, restore some military bases there to protect us from this huge NATO front line. And now the Germans seem to be pretending as if this happened in a vacuum that now the Russians are preparing to invaders. It's just, it's hard for me to understand where this is coming from, but also the reluctance to accept any peace negotiations.

I mean, what Trump put forward. Again, I always make the point. I don't think it's a very bad deal for the Ukrainians to get nothing of what they wanted. But again, it's the alternative. There is no good alternatives anymore. And that's why I also agree very much with Arasdowich saying, you know, he said, I would give away this four territories. Because the alternative is we give away eight territories. So this is what's going to happen.

So I understand from the Ukrainian side why, as you said, this is sacred the issue of territory, especially for, you know, within nationalism. But for the Europeans, that they know we're losing to war. We know if we don't strike a deal, the outcome will be much worse for us. And still, no alternative, no support for the Americans. Instead, what we're going for is, now let's continue the war against the world's largest nuclear power. It is very strange. I don't see any rationality here, though.

Well, we've been talking a lot about the Americans or the program, and we've been making very, I think, valid criticisms of a lot of what they have done. I think you can multiply your criticisms of Europe many times fold. I mean, this is our own continent. This is our own region. Russia is absolutely a part of this region. It's part of our history.

I mean, that we have allowed ourselves to get into this situation is incredible. I mean, the decision in April 2008 that John was alluding to, basically about, you know, Ukraine joining NATO one day. It was a catastrophic mistake of American foreign policy, and it was an even more catastrophic mistake of European foreign policy to accept that. And the extraordinary thing is Merkel herself, who was, of course, there and who ultimately went along with the decision, knew it at the time. And she didn't find a way to say no, which does seem extraordinary.

And we see this pattern of failure, inability to think beyond, you know, our own visceral feelings and to look at the long term. I mean, just a few weeks, about two weeks ago, there was one of these endless meetings that the Europeans now like to have. And there was a rout between Sanchez of Spain and Kaya Callas. Sanchez says we need to appoint a high representative to go to Moscow and to speak to the Russians and to conduct diplomacy with them. And Gaia Kala says, why do we need to appoint anybody? I'm the person who's the high representative. Why shouldn't I be doing that? And anyway, the outcome was that they agreed that there would be a high representative.

And then a short time later, Macron apparently comes along and says, well, let's make it me. What has he done? Has he caught Putin? Has he visited Moscow? Has he conducted any negotiations at all? No, none. None at all. So yes, I agree with you, John. And of course, the scenario that John described, which is, to be clear, not just a plausible one, but perhaps even the probable one, is it is bad for the United States and it's very bad for Russia. It's very bad for the United States too because the United States wants to be

in all sorts of different places. But if there's this kind of conflict, permanent conflict in Europe, how can the United States not be involved at least in some way? But anyway, this outcome, bad for the United States, very bad for Russia,

a catastrophe for Europe. We're already seeing the decline of our society. and our economies. We're talking about remilitarising them, as you rightly say, with money we don't have, locked, it seems, into a permanent confrontation with the Russia that we don't want to negotiate with.

Every single political leader in Europe ought to be striving to avoid that outcome. And we see that there's no apparent ability, at least amongst the great powers, the big powers, Germany, France, and Britain, which are the ones that matter to do that. Maybe, possibly, that will change. After all, we had, you know, Vili Brandt and Ospholitic and all of that after the first 20 years of the Cold War.

But I'm afraid, again, there are voices, dissident voices, and they're growing in strength. But I think it will take a certain amount of time, probably a long time, before you. it plays itself out. And even then, repairing the damage is going to be the work of a lifetime. Yeah, you know, it's very interesting, but if you look at how the Europeans acted during the Cold War, let's say for maybe the first 15 years after the Cold War ended, the Europeans acted in a very hard-nosed way when it came to dealing with the United States. I mean, people like Helmut Schmidt, Conrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, these were tough-minded individuals who stood up to the United States when they thought the United States was pursuing full of policies. And you really had a sort of dialectical process taking place inside NATO between Europeans on one side and the Americans on the other side, which I think was quite healthy.

And as you pointed out, Alexander, in 2008, Merkel was opposed to NATO expansion into Ukraine. And by the way, so was Nicholas Sarkozy, the French leader, who was also there in Bucharest. And before that, in 2003, there was significant opposition in Europe to the Iraq War. Both the Germans and the French thought the Iraq War was a really foolish idea. But something happened, you know, after 2008, where the Europeans evolved in a way where you ended up with leaders like Keith Sturmer and Manzoa Macron, who go along with almost everything the Americans want. And then when they decide that they're going to switch gears and oppose the Americans, they pursue remarkably full. foolish policies. You sort of wonder what's going on here. You know, the wisdom is that the Russians are raising anywhere between 30,000 and 40,000 new troops every month. You alluded to this

here, Alexander. Well, in three months' time, three months' time, the Russians raise more troops than are in the German army, the French army, and in the British army. These are tiny armies. The idea that they have the forces that could go fight in Ukraine or do anything meaningful in Ukraine is a joke. Those armies pale in comparison to the Russian army. The Russian army is a juggernaut compared to those three tiny armies. Yet, Starmer and Macron talk as if they had this really powerful, military instrument in their hands that they could use in Ukraine and all sorts of ways to stymie the Russians.

They have no cards to play. The Russians hold all the cards here. The Europeans don't hold the cards. And as we've talked about, the Ukrainians don't either. The Ukrainians are in real trouble. But the idea that the French and the British are going to serve as the cavalry and come to their rescue is a laughable argument. Again, the Russians raise more troops in three months than are in either. the French, the German, or the British Army. And so you sort of wonder what's happened here. Why aren't the Europeans thinking in a cold and calculating way? Why aren't they behaving strategically?

Because it's certainly in their interest to do so. They live in perilous times, right? This is a major conflict that has to be settled here. And we need strategic thinking. And you're getting exactly the opposite from Macron. and from Starmar and from other European leaders as well. It really is puzzling. Well, if Russia was the only issue, which is very troubling,

the fact that we're now at the final stages, it seems, of a collapse in which we're fighting now, more or less almost directly with the Russians, at least that's impressioning got from the recent New York Times articles, which shows how much, how deeply involved the West has been in this, day one, but it's not just Russia. We have, you see, similar collapse in morality or strategic thinking in other parts of the world too. Look at what's happening in Gaza.

In Germany, it's, you know, they openly support Israel's genocide. If you protest it, they will send the police and crack your heads. It's quite absurd. It's Syria. You know, the person Jolani, who previously recognized as a jihadist,

you know, we have bounties on his head. Now, when he was massacring the Aloites, the EU posted out tweets where they condemned the Alowites for provoking the massacre, coming to the defense of their jihadi friends in Syria. And of course, Iran, they see the possibility now of a possible Israeli-American attack on Iran, which would make the world unrecognizable. They could stop, shut down global trade, could set the whole Middle East on fire, and they don't seem to have anything they want to say. They're not leaning in nothing.

And of course, I think a huge problem is the idea that Europeans don't really know what to do. On one hand, they want to remain valuable partners for the Americans. So America do not leave us. On the other hand, they recognize that they also have to diversify if America's going to go other places. So they end up doing both things. And China is the best example. You know, they're threatening the Chinese with economic warfare, but also suggesting that China's a threat,

bringing in NATO into the conversation. And then next, inviting the Chinese to come to Brussels to talk about how we had peaceful relations for all these decades. And then we act surprise when the Chinese don't want to come. I mean, it's just there's no direction here. There's no thought. And the irony, of course, is that our liberal democratic values was supposed to set the foundation for unity in Europe to temper our competing national interest.

And it's a lot of window. It's just very hard to understand what exactly has cracked here. But things are going very wrong economically, politically, and even societies are becoming quite unruly, I guess. So it's hard to see how this is going to end up. Well, it is. I'll just make my last point on this, which is I think we've actually touched on this, both in this program, but also before. One of the things that explains, not the whole of it, one of the things that explains European behavior is this general concern, this fear that the Americans might go away. So you are as pro-American as you can possibly be, as loyal to. to the United States as you can possibly be, as helpful to whatever it is the Americans are doing, as you can possibly be, because of your concern that if you're not, then the Americans will say, look, the time has gone. We've got lots of other things to think about in our own country

and around the world. You're a rich and powerful continent. You can start looking after your own defences. And as we've discussed in many programs, this is a great, fear for Europe, even if it's an unspoken fear, because Europeans have no history of being able to get on together peacefully for any extended period until the Americans came. So this is probably, I think, at some level, part of the problem. I don't say, as I said, that it's the only thing that's there. But I think there's also something else, which is that in Europe, we have been happy to work with the Americans for so long that it is anyway very, very difficult to start thinking independently of what we assume the American mainstream to be. So political leaders

like Adanao, Schmidt, de Gaulle, people of that kind, They remembered a Europe before the Americans when countries like France, Germany, Britain, had a diplomacy, a foreign policy that was independent of that of the United States. People like Stama, Macron and Sanchez and people like that have no such memory. For them, it is axiomatic that the foreign policy that Europe follows will be that. out of what the Russians call the collective West. So I think these are probably some of the reasons why we have all of these things happen. It doesn't excuse the total failure of statesmanship in Europe that we have seen,

which is on a scale that is without parallel, at least since the end of the Second World War. Yeah, I think that's well put, Alexander. Also, Glenn, I think your point about what's happening to bedrock liberal values, especially because of European and especially American support for the Gaza genocide, is right on the money. I don't think most people understand the damage that is being done here to the bedrock liberal foundation that has been so important in the West for so long. It's just absolutely horrible what's happening in Gaza. And the Americans and the Europeans not only don't say anything, they throw people in jail. Or they send them to El Salvador or what have you. If you protest, it's truly remarkable.

The consequences of this for the future of liberalism are not to be underestimated. But I want to ask Alexander one question about Britain. I mean, we've talked a lot about foreign policy and the lack of strategy on the part of the people like Starmor and Macron and so forth and so on. But, you know, when I read about the state of British society today, when I read about the British economy and sort of where things are going inside of Britain, I just say to myself, I think these people are in real trouble. Now, I'm not an expert on that matter. I don't do British domestic politics or the economy in Britain. But it seems to me that Britain has major league problems inside its borders. And that always makes me wonder, why are they talking about increasing all the increasing defense spending, building forces to send to Ukraine and so forth and so on?

I mean, we agree at a purely strategic level, they're chasing windmills. But when you're chasing windmills, when your house is on fire, that's even worse. And that's what it looks like to me. And I was just wondering with you, as someone who lives in Britain and pays careful attention to these issues, where do you think my analysis is right? You are absolutely right. And I get to say something else. I know an awful lot of people who would say the same thing.

Kirstama, apparently as prime minister, this is before Trump came in and the negotiations or talks over Ukraine began, was already spending around half his time on foreign policy, which seems remarkable, given the realities of Britain today. Well, we now are starting to see the electoral consequences. I mean, probably it's not been widely reported, but we've just had local elections here in Britain. Both the Labour and Conservative parties have seen their vote shares collapse to levels that have never been...

reached before. Stama, I believe, is the most unpopular Prime Minister since polling data began. I may be wrong about this, but this is what I've heard. And the Labour Party has just lost what used to be a rock solid seat in a parliamentary by-election to the reform movement led by Nigel Farage,

who was, to be very clear, once upon a time, not so long ago, just a few years ago, a person who spent all his time in town halls and pubs talking about the European Union, with no one taking him seriously. The idea that he might even be poised for power, as some of our newspapers today are saying, to anybody who is familiar with his story seems incredible. So yes, you're absolutely right.

It is extraordinary that the political class, not just in Britain, but in German, in France, right across Europe, is so obsessively focused with these issues, even as the house that they live in collapses all around them. I think that on top of everything else that you were describing, John, the sort of nightmare scenario, which, as I said, I'm afraid, I think isn't just plausible. I think it's actually probable. We also have to look forward to the very real possibility of major social and political discontent developing Europe in the next couple of years. It is not a good picture at all.

And again, it's extraordinary that the political class in Europe can't see it. Yeah, and I would just add to that. You shouldn't be surprised if we have significant domestic. turmoil in the United States. Remember, there's this MAGA base that elected Donald Trump, and he told him that he was going to improve their lot in life. One could argue that when the tariffs begin to hit, that the opposite is going to happen. And cutting all these social services and cutting the welfare state may sound attractive to these people if Trump is able to identify the welfare state with liberalism and they see liberalism is the enemy. But in fact, the welfare state actually serves their

interests in profoundly important ways. You start cutting Social Security and other services in a meaningful way. This is going to have a huge impact on the Magabase. And then when the tariffs kick in, almost everybody agrees that, you know, the price of everything is going to go up. And for people who are now having trouble putting food on the table, buying a car, finding a house, house, they're going to be in worse shape, not better shape. And I wouldn't be surprised if there is at some point significant domestic unrest in the United States. I'm not saying that's likely, but I would not be surprised.

I guess this is a wider problem, though, because after the Cold War, the whole world order was based around the liberal hegemony. That is, of course, the concentration of power in the West, which would organize the world. but it was legitimized this rule by our liberal democratic values that we knew what was best for the world, that the world kind of had to be remade in our image. But the

fact that we're seeing this collapse at home, I think it has two problems. One, of course, it delegitimizes all the Western rule, but it also, of course, fuels social problems within the West. Now, just look what happening around Europe now. Le Pen again, being a rest of the world, and banned from running. Again, the main opposition in France, Romania,

you have the one who won the election, not just reversing or annulling the election outcomes, but also banning him from running again. In Germany today, well, over the past few weeks, it was revealed that the AFD, a party that until that recently, didn't even exist, now polled as number one. This is before Mertz even takes over,

and a few hours today they announced that the AFT has been designated an extremist organization, which seems could be a stepping stone towards banning it. The most popular party in Germany, the main opposition party, they might ban the whole thing. Again, so far they're talking about this in the media and among the politicians, very openly, and justifying it, but at least now they already designated it. as an extremist organization. Meanwhile, Mertz, again, the house is on fire. And what is he talking about?

Not that different from Starmour. How can we ramp up hundreds of billions of euros, money we don't have so we can fight Russia? This isn't going to last very long. This is just a lot of self-harm and destruction. So, no, I'm not very optimistic on Europe either this day. So I think whatever problems you have in the United States, as Alexander said, you can multiply

if you want to see what's happening in Europe now. So it's going to be some rough months ahead, I think. Anyways, any final thoughts before we wrap this up? Well, we've had another pessimistic program just to say. I mean, eventually, eventually, I think I will say this. In Europe, we will eventually come through this. There'll be an awful lot of damage, I'm afraid.

An awful lot of damage has already been done. And unfortunately, we may have to experience an awful lot more. In the United States, I think they're in a much better place, in spite of everything, in spite of all the tariffs and problems there, because, well, they're resource rich, and they have the oceans and they have still a lot of industry, and an enormous amount of science and finance. But in Europe, we really do start needing to think about what we must do to get ourselves out of this hole. And eventually we will. But the longer we leave it, the more damage we will

see to the fabric of our societies. I don't have anything more to say than what Alexander just said. And I thoroughly enjoyed the program. It was depressing for sure. But I think analysis of the situation is basically on the money. And I'm sad to say, land it probably won't be, you know, a few more months of trouble but a few more years, maybe even a few more decades. I think we're sailing into turbulent waters. I should say we're sailing into more turbulent waters than we're in now. Well on that depressing notes, thank you both for your time. It's been a great pleasure. Thank you.