The Duran Podcast - UN Iran snapback sanctions
Episode Date: September 24, 2025UN Iran snapback sanctions ...
Transcript
Discussion (0)
All right, Alexander, let's talk about the JCPOA sanctions, UN, UN sanctions.
It's important to say that.
Snapback, which has been activated by the UK, France, and is it Germany?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yes.
The big three, the big European three.
They have decided to put those sanctions to trigger those sanctions back onto Iran.
China and Russia are not happy about this.
And they have said that they're going to continue to trade with Iran, effectively ignoring these UN sanctions, if that's possible.
Anyway, what are your thoughts on?
Well, the Russians and the Chinese will ignore these EU, these UN sanctions.
They're insisting that they're illegal and illegitimate.
And in order to try, I think, to underline that point, they got, I think they put a lot of pressure on Iran to get Iran to reverse its position on contacts with the IAEA.
Iran after the 12-day war in June severed its connections with the IAEA with Rafael Grossey.
And they said, we're not going to let the IAA back into Iran.
The Russians and the Chinese told the Iranians, you have to reverse that.
And the Iranians, to many people's surprise, then came to a deal with Grosse and the IAA,
which would have allowed the IAA back into Iran to inspect the Iranian nuclear sites.
And the reason that was done was because it shows clearly, it demonstrates clearly, at least the Russians of the Chinese will say, it demonstrates clearly, that this claim by the Germans, the French and the British, that Iran is in basic breach of its obligations under the JCPOA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are wrong.
that Iran is still cooperating with the IAEA.
And that will mean that when the snapback sanctions come into effect in October,
the Russians and the Chinese can still go on saying
that despite the fact that nominally the sanctions are in effect,
actually they are not because the entire process is illegal.
That is what the Russians and the Chinese are going to say.
So they're going to continue to trade with Iran.
they continue to supply weapons to Iran.
They will continue to forge ahead with military partnerships with Iran.
The French, the British and the Germans have made absolutely clear that the fact that the Iranians did this deal with the IAA makes no difference at all.
They will still insist on snapback sanctions.
They still argue that Iran is in violation.
of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the JCPOA.
So we will get snapback sanctions in October.
The Russians and the Chinese will ignore them.
And that then sets the scene for the Europeans, the Americans, the Israelis, the neocons in all of these places,
to come forward and say, look, the Iranians are in violation of their obligations.
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the JCPOA.
The Russians and the Chinese are assisting them.
So the only thing we can do, therefore, is to renew our attack on Iran.
And what this is all doing is it is inegrily leading to that point when the war between Israel and Iran, which started in June, resumes in earnest.
Right. So the UK, France, and Germany, they've basically set up the conditions, finalized the conditions for a round two in the conflict between Israel, the United States against Iran.
Yes.
How does this connect if it does connect? Maybe there's no connection with the UK and France, not Germany, recognizing Palestine.
Is there a connection because this is angered Israel?
So on the one side of things, they're setting up the conditions, finalizing the conditions
for something that Netanyahu has wanted forever now, which is a conflict between Israel,
the United States, and Iran.
But on the other side of things, you have Stammer and Macron recognizing a Palestinian state.
So are the two connected?
Are the two not connected?
I think they are deeply connected.
And I think that the reason this has been done, I think the reason that they have moved forward
with recognizing the Palestinian state, despite Israeli and American objections, is because
it provides them with their alibi.
They're saying that we are not neocons.
We are not hardliners.
We are not looking for conflict in the Middle East.
on the contrary, we're trying to settle it.
It will enable them to tell their own populations in Britain, in France,
that the reason we are supporting this war against Iran
is not because we support Israel also in relation to Gaza
and what the Americans are doing in Gaza.
We oppose these things.
We are people who are against conflict.
in the Middle East, but the Iranians are fermenting the conflict in the Middle East.
So despite the fact that we oppose what Israel and the US are doing in Gaza and elsewhere,
nonetheless, we feel able to support them in this because Iran is violating the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty, is violating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, is violating the
the JCPOA and therefore is the bad actor in the Middle East, is the cause of the problems
in the Middle East, and it's been supported in this by the Chinese and the Russians. So it's an
alibi. And I think that is clearly what this is about. It is the fact that they've now
recognized the Palestinian state is actually another sign that they're preparing
for a war with Iran.
Interesting analysis.
Yeah, you're right.
You're right.
It's a type of plausible deniability, isn't it?
Exactly.
You know, we don't, we don't want the conflict between, we don't want to escalate the conflicts
in the Middle East as is seen, as it, as is shown by our recognition of Palestine
in order to try and get to a diplomatic solution, a two-state solution in accordance with the U.S.
So you see we're trying to lower the temperature.
But on the flip side, you know, Iran, they're just behaving badly.
And so something has to be done.
Exactly.
It's, as I said, intended to give them an alibi.
It's in order to pacify and mislead their own populations.
Certainly in Britain, I believe the same is true in France.
People are very, very upset about many of the things that have been happening in Gaza, but
you tell them, look, we're opposed to what is going on in Gaza.
We support the Palestinians and the Palestinian state.
But of course, we have to go off because Iran is the ultimate threat in the Middle East.
It's WMD all over again.
It's the same game that we heard back in 2002.
It's all being played again, all over again, using the same kind of subterfuges and
manipulations that we saw use at that time.
In coordination with the United States.
Yes.
Yes.
Absolutely.
So this is all coordinated.
The US's anger.
Absolutely.
Maybe there's an anger, but there's also an understanding.
I think there's...
Okay, we give you guys the recognition of Palestine, but you know, you've got to get these sanctions snap back.
And when the time comes and we're ready to launch an attack against Iran, you're not going to protest any of it.
Correct. That's absolutely right. That's exactly what this is about.
So the big takeaway from all of this, from all of these diplomatic maneuvers is that we're very likely going to see a resumption of.
the war between Israel and Iran and ultimately between the United States and Iran before the end of the year.
And I'm afraid, I'm worried that the United States is going to be much more deeply involved this time.
I mean, much more public, I mean, it was involved last time, but it's going to be even more publicly and directly involved this time than it was back in June.
I don't think there's any other way it cannot be more involved.
Exactly. Exactly.
Yeah, it was involved in the first.
It was involved in the first. But what I mean to say is it won't be limited to just one strike.
Right.
It will be a much, much more layered.
It will be much more systematic attack across Iran.
Again, decapitation strike will play a central role.
But they will try to keep this going for much longer in order to try to try to
achieve their objective, which ultimately is regime change against Iran. Because bear in mind,
the snapback sanctions are basically saying that Iran can't be trusted, even when it does deals
with the IA, as it has done. What that ultimately means is, you know, if you can't trust the present
government in Iran, it means, and you're saying that it's going to go ahead and go nuclear,
then you're basically saying, well, the objective must be to change it.
Yeah, just a final question.
Does Iran see all of this?
Do the bricks, the global south, do they see how all of this is unfolding?
I think in Moscow and Beijing, they do understand this and they understand this very well.
And I think they're trying to explain this to the Iranians.
I think some Iranians definitely understand this.
I'm not convinced that all of them do.
This is the problem in that I get the sense that some Iranians still are very wary of their BRICS partners.
They still hanker for some kind of negotiated solution with the West.
They've left it disastrously late to get military assistance, you know, serious military
assistance in terms of, you know, real arms sales and real integration of military supplies to
Iran. And I think Iran looks very vulnerable at the moment. I have to say this because I don't
think the Iranians have played this very complicated game with any particular skill.
I mean, the argument that he's always made, for example, about Iran going up to 60% uranium enrichment
was that it was intended to give Iran leverage in the negotiations, the nuclear enrichment negotiations.
But that makes the assumption that what the Israelis and the NICONs in the US were really interested in was putting limits
on Iran's enrichment program, whereas in fact, what those people were always setting out to do
was to achieve regime change in Iran. So going up to 60% enrichment didn't give you leverage. It
simply provided these people with the excuse to seek regime change in Iran. I think the Iranians have
never really got come to terms with this or understood the true.
objectives of the people that they were up against.
And as I said, they've left it very, very late now to sort things out.
And to be frank, I don't think they can't fully sort things out before the end of the year
when I expect the attack, the next attack to come.
And it would be a more powerful attack than the one that we saw in June.
Against that, Iran did show resiliency during the attack in June.
It did show its ability to strike targets in Israel.
We know that Israel and the US were running short of air defense missiles.
If Iran is able to survive the first week, then again the balance will shift in its favor,
as it did during the war in June.
But it has to get through that first week.
And there's no guarantee that it will.
At least, I mean, I can't guarantee that it will.
I don't know how, again, I don't know how strong the position of the government in Iran is.
And militarily, at least, it looks vulnerable.
All right, we will end the video there.
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