The Duran Podcast - UPDATE: Ukraine ramps up drone attacks into Moscow

Episode Date: March 18, 2026

UPDATE: Ukraine ramps up drone attacks into Moscow

All right, Alexander, let's talk about what is happening in Ukraine. So what is happening in Ukraine, Alexander? The Russian military continues to advance. They've captured some more key villages. On the other side, we have Ukraine launching huge amounts of drones into Moscow or into the Moscow region. My question with this operation, this initiative by Ukraine and the collective West, to launch so many drones into Russia is why? Why now?

What is the purpose of this? What are they trying to accomplish? Why Moscow? Why Moscow? Well, I suspect... I mean, it's the capital and everything, but what's the plan? What's the military strategy behind this? What's the aim here?

This has been true altogether about the whole Ukrainian drone offensive from the first moment, in the sense that if you're looking for military objectives, it's very, very difficult to find any. But there are political objectives and there are psychological objectives. So you conduct drone offensives against Moscow, against other major Russian cities. You conduct missile strikes like the ones we saw in Bryansk about a week ago. which shocked the Russians profoundly, by the way. And you hope maybe that that will stun people in Russia, that this will create a major crisis there,

that it will create conflict within the leadership, criticism of the Russian leadership, that it will also divert Russian resources into defending their cities and their industrial, plants and their logistic hubs in Western Russia, which to some extent it does do. And that is a legitimate military objective. And perhaps, and this is the other thing, you hope that something will get through and reach Moscow and might actually hit someone or something in Moscow that might make a difference.

And I'm sorry to say this, but I mean, we've seen that the Ukrainians, with a Valdai attack, they are absolutely, I say I have no hesitation in saying the Valdi attack, by the way. I know it's denied. But with the Valdai attack, they have clearly an objective to try to reach senior people in Russia. They've assassinated generals. They've done all that kind of thing. And I think that given that some, Some people in Moscow are out of reach in terms of that kind of assassination. It may be that these drone attacks specifically targeting Moscow are intended to reach those people in some other way. To mention Putin, the Valdai attack, as I said already, obviously was aimed at him. And I think it was in 2023 that I remember the U.S. Ukrainian drones reach the Kremlin itself. Yeah.

The Russian advance, capturing of various key villages. Now, this is interesting because we've now had a report from Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, the Russian general staff, I should stress, and the man who's also the overall commander of the special military operation. And he's now given us an update. Since late summer, Gerasimov has given us regular updates about the military situation, something that he didn't do until fairly recently, but he is increasingly doing now. And it was very interesting. And if you believe Gerasimov, and by the way, I do. I've always found that Gerasimov, he's not always 100% accurate because it's difficult to be.

But he is 90% accurate, pretty much all the time. Anyway, if you believe Kerasim of, which I do, then the mapping projects, most of them, are behind. They're behind the actual events on the ground. So the two key places are the northern Dombas, Slaviansk, Kramatosk, but specifically these towns, Liman, Sviatogosk, all of those,

Rai Alexandrovka, we did a program a few days ago with Stanislav, and he pointed out that this is the high ground, these places that we're talking about in the northern part of the Dombas are the high ground. If the Russians capture them, that enables them to establish air and drone control. over the two key cities, Slaviansk and Kermlatorsk. Anyway, Gerassim said that the Russians now control most of Lehman and that the battles there are coming to an end. And he also said that if we look at the other end

of this remaining fortified line of towns, the Russians now control 60% of Constantinivka. Now that is going to come as a surprise for many people because that's not what the mapping projects show. But I long since come to the view that the mapping projects are behind on Konstantinvka, that the Russians control 60% of Konstantinvka. And it looks as if the Ukrainians, the Ukrainian troops there are mostly encircled. So if you accept this account, which I do,

then we are coming close to the end. of the battle for Dombas, which began in earnest in May 2022. It's been the big, long-running battle of the war. This is where the Ukrainian fortifications were. This is where the Ukrainians had their best troops. This is where they needed to stop the Russians. This is the territory the Russians needed to capture. If you go back, four years, five years,

to the programs that we were doing for years, to the programs that we did at the start of the special military operation, we said repeatedly at that time that the key battleground is Dombas, this is the territory that the Russians need to capture. They are coming very, very close to doing it. Probably they will control it, but might even be, my guess is, by midsum. What is Russia doing about the drone strikes in to Moscow? What is Putin doing about Oh, there's nothing. As far as I can tell, I think he's letting them happen. Well, I say that.

I made a point, and I repeat it again, when Putin warned the West back in 2024, that if there are going to be missile strikes against Russia, for the Russians, that would be a crossing of a red line. And there were warnings made at that time that Russia would respond. And the ambassadors of Britain and France were called into the embassy, to the foreign ministry in Moscow and told that if that happened, the Russians in a time and place that they're choosing would take counteraction. And we did programs at the time, and we said that the Russians might conduct drone and missile strikes on bases, British and French bases, using proxies. Well, I did a program on my own channel a couple of days ago, which I said, isn't that

what it appears to be happening in the Gulf? Isn't that what it looks like we're seeing with the Iranians? The Iranians do seem to be using intelligence provided by the Russians. the Iranians do seem to be operating their drones in ways that suggest that they have been educated on how to train, on how to do it by the Russians. Maybe the Russians have provided them with some technology. We're starting to see that with some of the Iranian drones. And sure enough, we've seen attacks on a British base and on a French base in the Gulf. Of course, the Russians are denying that they're.

they had anything to do with it. But if you conduct strikes through proxies, the whole point of, the whole point of that is to provide yourself with deniability. So perhaps we shouldn't be entirely surprised or persuaded by these Russian denials. So it may be that the Russians are doing something of that kind and have done something of that kind. But in terms of the current drone strikes. Well, the Russians, of course, continue with their own much more powerful and effective air offensive against Ukraine, but their response to the drone attacks has been entirely defensive. They are able to bring down most of these drones, by far the greatest number. they can argue validly that these drones do relatively little damage, that so far civilian

losses from these drone strikes have been few, that the attacks on economic targets, on oil refineries, on factories, have done only slight damage overall. We made this point, by the way, during the Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian refinery, is in the summer, we said that people were overstating the damage that these drone attacks had done. And by the way, on that, we would prove to be right, just to say. So the Russians, anyway, from the moment, have decided that they can absorb these attacks, and they're focusing instead on keeping up their military operations. One thing the Russians are doing is that they're also making it very, very clear to the Europeans that they're not welcome to act as mediators.

Ushikov told Macron's envoys who came in February to get lost. Lavrov has just given a press conference in which he said that the Europeans have completely discredited themselves as mediators. He went through the whole story going all the way back to 2014 and the Maidan crisis and the way in which the Europeans have broken every promise, every agreement lied repeatedly, how they're completely committed to supporting the Ukrainian, the Kiev regime. Lavrov always calls it, as the Russians always called it. So, Lavrov said, we're not interested in European mediation. He asked the obvious question, which nobody else has asked. He says, all these worries, all these worries about freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz.

Why is nobody talking about freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean, where tankers have been attacked, or in the Baltic, where there have been attempts to try and restricts? shipping through the Baltic. So why is nobody talking about that? So Lavrov, the Russians, taking a very, very strong line over the Europeans, telling that you're not wanted, no business in negotiations. We have nothing to say to you. And with the Americans, they're saying, well, for the moment, it's far too many important things going on in the Persian Gulf. This isn't a good moment for negotiations anyway. And there was an article in the Financial Times that said that the Russians had been conveying this message and that they were very frustrated by the way the

talks up to now had gone. Well, I mean, the Brijansk missiles. I mean, I understand the drones are not getting through. Yeah. But the risk is that one of them will get through. I mean, there is that risk. And there's most likely something will get through. I mean, if you launch 100 hundreds and hundreds of drones, eventually something's going to get through. That's just the way it is, even if you have the best air defense in the world. The Bryansk missiles, the Storm Shadow missiles or the Scout missiles, did get through. They absolutely got through. And I don't think we've seen a response from Russia, have we?

Well, they called in the British and French ambassadors again into the foreign minister. I think the British and French ambassadors aren't going to care about that, right? I mean, okay, they called them in. They've done that a hundred times. Can you make the argument or let me get your analysis on some of the arguments made that Russia is now seeing how the United States wages a war, which is with complete disregard for international law, but they do it. So they go in very, very hard, very, very fast, shock and awe.

If they have to kidnap someone, they kidnap someone, if they have to decapitate. They'll decapitate. If they have to go after oil depots or water or anything, they'll do it, the United States and Israel. So you have that side of the equation. So they're saying, okay, well, Russia, Putin, look at how the U.S. does it. They're not considering international law and looking to comply with all of all of the the requirements of how you should prosecute a war according to to the UN or Geneva Convention or anything like that.

That's the U.S. And then you have the other side, which is, hey, Russia, look at Iran and look at what they're doing. Look at how they fight an asymmetric. Look at how they go after the GCC countries. The air base is there in order to fight off the United States. Look at how they have instilled fear in the Europeans. You see, the Europeans have no problem attacking Russia. But you could see that they're scared, or you can make the argument, that they're absolutely

scared to get involved in the conflict in Iran. They have no problem getting involved in the conflict with Ukraine. With Ukraine, we'll absolutely get involved. We'll even fire Storm Shadow and Scout missiles into Brijansk for the 20th time. But when it comes to Iran, not our war. We don't want anything to do with this. We're scared to death to send our ships into the Strait of Hormuz because they know that Iran is going to hit them. I mean, can you talk to that a bit?

Yeah, absolutely. Well, can I first of all begin with Briansk? Can I just say the attack on Bryansk has been a massive shock inside Russia. This is something that came out of the blue. The Russian military were clearly caught completely by surprise. The air defense was not working. Civilians were killed. It's clear, if you look at the statements that the governor of Bryansk,

And the mayor of Briandsk have made, I mean, they clearly feel very angry about what has happened. This has been something that has cut through and cut through massively. And I think that what the Russians, well, clearly they let their guard down. I mean, they've never had problems shooting down scalp and storm shadow missiles up to now. clearly what happened is that they weren't expecting this attack. The air defences around Briansk were alerted and ready for it. And one has to ask why. And I'm going to make a guess.

I suspect that the Russians have been looking at the military situation. They looked at the state of Ukraine's Air Force. They said that the Ukrainian Air Force is no longer capable of conducting these strikes, that the number of storm shadows and scalps has run down. And I think that the Russians probably weren't expecting this ambush. And it might have political consequences too. Now, as to your other point, if you go to Russian media, if you go to Russian social media,

the points that you have just made are all over the place. People are saying, look, why are we still fighting this war with the gloves on, where everyone else has taken the gloves off? Why are we still even having discussions with the Americans? All right, we're not meeting them in Geneva. I mean, even Dimitriov isn't meeting with God, at the moment. But, you know, why is Putin taking calls from Trump still? Why are our officials still saying that Russia achieves something from these discussions? And if you look at statements

that Lavrov and Peskov have been making, trying to justify these contacts with the Americans, these negotiations that took place in 2025 and early 2026 under this year, they've become incredibly defensive about it. They've been saying, well, you know, we had these meetings with the Americans. We met the Americans. The Iranians never met the Americans one to one. We met the Americans one to one. We've looked into their eyes.

The Iranians never did. So there's already that difference. I don't think anybody takes that seriously. There's a nonsense argument. But when people come up with nonsense arguments, then you can see that they're being very defensive. And the Russians also say we had disagreement in Anchorage, and we're going to stick with that, and we're not going to move beyond it. And people who criticize Putin and these negotiations don't know what it was that we agreed

in Anchorage. Again, the implications is the implication is that this is somehow, again, to Russia's a advantage that they had this discussion in Anchorage. But again, people will say, well, if you had this agreement in Anchorage, and what has it brought you? So the pressure is there. And these drone strikes, these missile strikes on Briansk, the example of Iran, the site of what the Americans and the Israelis have been doing, undoubtedly, this is affecting the conversation inside Russia. And the biggest, strongest clue that this is the case is, again, that one individual who is very, very active talking about all kinds of things about the economy, about developing the microelectronics

industry, about improving schools, about all sorts of things. The one person who is avoiding every kind of discussion about negotiations, who's not meeting with the generals, who's not talking about the military developments, Vladimir Putin, is keeping well away from all discussions of the conflict up to now. Now, that says to me that he's clearly coming in for criticism, internal criticism. He's still reluctant to change. He stance, though I think it has been hardening quite a lot since the Valdei attack. But when people are under pressure and when they're criticized, sometimes, and Putin is a proud man, that makes them even less willing to change because that would be an admission that the people who are bringing this

criticism were right all along. But you could see that he's avoiding talking about the situation. And to my mind, that shows that the pressure is on. Whether it will ever be enough to cause the Russians to change their approach is another matter. I've been reading and listening to what Gerasimov has been saying. He is the chief of the general staff. He doesn't have to worry about these political pressures, because the political pressures aren't on him. They're on Putin. not on him. And he seems to be entirely satisfied about the progress of the war up to now. Just that. Okay. I don't know how much answered my question as far as Iran in the United States. I mean, I understand your answer.

Yeah. Yeah. It is just basically Putin's just letting Yerazimov do what he wants to do. but I mean, I think there is a type of political risk, can you say? Oh, there is. If you're talking about political risks, yes, there are. Not so much in terms of Putin's own position. There is no desire or intention in Russia to challenge you. Capital, like political capital and reputation. Political capital, absolutely.

And this is going to have an effect. And in all sorts of ways, first of all, talk about any improvement of relations with the US. It's going to run into more opposition. Lavrov's comments and the treatment, the very rough treatment, of Macron's envoys and of the Europeans, suggests that it's well understood in Moscow now that any opening to the Europeans is politically unacceptable

within Russia itself. greater, greater connections, stronger connections with China, that of course. But looking beyond this, Putin is into his penultimate term. If he decides to serve another term, it will be his last one. inevitably, and this time I think it's for real, I don't think there can be any further extensions beyond the term that's coming. I think at that point, there's, in fact, probably already now, you're starting to see people talking about who are we going to have when Putin goes. And I think that there's going to be pressure that the person who takes over from Putin is going to be much more

hardline, there might have otherwise been the case. I say hardline, hardline towards the West to make that clear and having a different perspective on economic issues than some of the more liberal people that Putin was associated with in the first decade of his presidency. That's many years away. Oh, I know. It's many years away. But Russia has its own political rhythms. And in Russia, it's not that far away. To us it is because in the West, we're used to elections every other year. But in Russia, I think probably already people are starting to discuss perhaps more seriously

what will be the future line. And as I said, Putin has always been somebody who historically has wanted good relations with the Europeans, good relations with the Americans, the discussion now may be that really this isn't something that Russia should do, that the person who comes after Putin should be one who's an even more committed Eurasianist than he is, but also a much, much more strong anti-Westner than Putin has ever been. Yeah, just to summarize and wrap up the video, I, I guess the thing that people should not expect from Putin, which is probably never going to happen,

is the expectation that Putin is going to finally go hard in this conflict, right? To really... He's never going to do in Ukraine what Trump and the Israelis are doing in Iran, nor is he going to go on the rampage the way that Iran has done. Like Iran is doing. Yeah, he's never going to- When is Putin going to finally say, okay, the gloves are off? Yes, I think people should forget about that.

It's never going to happen. Again, at the same time, they should also put aside any fear that he's going to make dramatic in session. Exactly. I mean, he's going to stick to the line that he has taken, basically since the summer, autumn of 2022. He's going to leave the military to run the thing. He's going to give them the resources that.

they ask for. He's not going to escalate the war beyond that. He's certainly not going to put pressure on them to accelerate things faster than they want to go, which is, I mean, the big difference. I mean, one of the reasons people always bring up other wars, but let's talk about the Second World War. The thing about the Second World War was that the Soviet leader of that time, Joseph Stalin, was constantly there pushing his generals to move faster and faster. I mean, he was telling, you know, they'd come back and they said, we'll be ready to attack on Friday, and he said, great, we're attacking on Tuesday. They'll tell him, we will take X, Y, Z place, and he said, great, you're going to take that,

And you're going to take ABC place as well. If you follow the history of the Second World War, you find that. That isn't what Putin does. Putin is not as directly involved and as engaged in the war as Stalin was involved in the Second World War. Of course, it's a very different war. I mean, this is not the kind of conflict that, you know, a war of millions in the way that the Second World War was.

But I'm just explaining the difference in approach between the two men. So he's got a general who he trusts, Gerasimov, a professional of his fingertips, an incredibly methodical general staff officer. He is running the war in the way that he chooses. He makes the decisions. He decides how to advance in which place. He's winning the war in the way that Putin likes. Putin's friends, Modi, Xi Jinping, Lula, they're perfectly happy with this.

The Russian economy has been able to cope with every single problem up to now. And on that, Putin is very proactive because that's something he understands. So Putin is saying to himself, I'm not going to change a strategy that is working well. Yeah, it will remain an SMO. It will not be upgraded to anything. else, which is important. Because if it was upgraded to anything else, then we would see the gloves come off, no doubt about it. So it will remain in SMO, most likely a military solution, but Putin will always prefer the diplomatic solution. And if there is a chance, which I imagine

there will be in the future, if there's a chance to reestablish relationships with the Europeans and with the EU, as well as with the United States, which there will be. Putin will absolutely walk through that door. I think these are, this is what people should expect from this war going forward from the Russian president. Yes, but with much, we'll walk through that door, but on much more stringent conditions than he might have done it was left to himself. But he may make some concessions. Well, he probably already has. He probably already has. Again, what exactly he agreed with Trump in Anchorage is very, very difficult to work out.

It doesn't seem as if it was anything substantial, just say. But my sense of Putin and my sense of Gyrassimov, I follow and track Gerasimov very closely, is that they're both perfectly happy with the way things are going. I know a lot of people are very impatient. They want to see big arrow movements. They want to see rapid advances. But I think that they're saying to themselves, things are going pretty much according to the way we want.

I think it's also not only the fact of a big arrow offensive in rapid movements. I think it's also the drone strikes into Moscow. Exactly. The drones into Valdei, the missiles into Brijansk. Exactly. And the appearance, and it's not even the appearance, the Russian inaction. You know, the seizing of tankers, for example, okay, Lavrov says, well, why isn't anyone paying attention to the tankers in the Mediterranean?

And I get your point that these are not Russian flagged and all of these things. But people can then come out and say, well, if it was Iran, they would never accept this. If it was Trump, or if it was Trump, he would never accept this. I mean, that's the natural response that people are going to say. Exactly, exactly. It's okay, so Lavrov could come out with a statement and say, well, What about the ships in the Mediterranean? But then the response to Lavrov would be, well, why are you not doing anything about it if you're, if you're Russia and you're this great power?

Because Trump would never allow this and Iran would never allow this. I think that highlights the conversation that we're having. Indeed. But again, to repeat, it's not an uncontentious position in Russia itself. Putin, as I said, is avoiding public discussion. He's not talking to the media about the conflict in Ukraine anymore. A year ago, he was talking to them regularly. He is not talking to the media about Ukraine.

He's not discussing Ukraine very much in public speeches. He's not having meetings with the generals. All of that is clearly a sign that there are people who are making precisely the kind of criticisms that you've been talking about. Yeah. Okay. We'll end the video there. The durand.com.

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