The Duran Podcast - US-Russia Grand Bargain Without Europe - Andrey Kortunov, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: March 23, 2025

US-Russia Grand Bargain Without Europe - Andrey Kortunov, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome. I'm Glenn Dyson and today I'm joined by Alexander Mercurz and Dr. Andrei Kortunov, the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. And, well, for the past 30 years we've seen the Western Russia appear to have been slow walking towards confrontation. We see this escalation, especially since 2014, then intensifying from 2022. and again at the end of 2024, it looked as if with this direct attacks, that catastrophe might be close. Indeed, with the absence of diplomacy, it really looked very dark times ahead. And now suddenly it's all been changed. The US change course.

They're openly talking about Russian security concerns, something I haven't heard about in 30 years. And, yeah, Dr. Coyotone, you have written that a grand bargain is underway. How are you reading this, I guess, historical situation, I think is appropriate to describe what's happening now between the Americans and the Russians. Well, thank you, Glenn. First of all, let me say that it is definitely my pleasure and my honor to be a part of this discussion. In the spirit of full disclosure, I have to say that I recently retired from all my administrative positions at Riyadh, so I'm just an independent

scholar right now. But speaking of the grand bargain, I remain rather skeptical about whether a ground bargain is attainable under the circumstances. And there are a couple of reasons why I think we cannot repeat what we did 80 years ago after the end of the Second World War. First of all, we do not have a war, a real world war behind us, which means that there is a war that there is no way to fix the exact balance of powers in the contemporary world. We don't have the victorious side that could impose its decisions and it's preferred the move of the game on the defeated side. Moreover, I think that right now the world is much more complex than it was.

80 years ago, we have many more subjects of international relations that claim independence or at least a significant degree of autonomy in their decisions. And I think that no deal, no grand bargain, which might be reached among just a couple of major players, is likely to be recognized as legitimate by others. Plus, you know, we should keep in mind that the international thinking is not limited to nation-states only. It also includes a very significant number of non-state players, which have their own interests, their own views on how the world should develop. So I think that any attempt to have a kind of top-down approach to building a new world order

are not likely to succeed. It doesn't mean that we should not try. It doesn't mean that we should not try to cut deals when we can. But we should be modest in our expectations. And we should definitely manage our expectations. My take is that the new world order is likely to emerge, not from top down, but from bottom up. from relatively small, relatively modest, incremental agreements may be reached in what they call

right now, mini-ilateral format. And gradually, such agreements can extend that to more politically loaded, more controversial issues. But it will take time. So I think that it would be probably too much in fact that one decision or one peace conference, one deal between major leaders will make the trick. I think that it will not. I mean, there is one point that I would make, which I think in terms of relations between Russia and the United States, is, I think, a hopeful one.

And it is this. what the current administration is doing, one would assume would be extremely controversial in the United States. After all, it goes completely against the grain of American policy towards Russia for the last 30 years. One of the most remarkable things, however, at least for me, and I follow what goes on in the United States very closely, is that there is nowhere near as much. opposition to what the current administration is doing, as one might have supposed, in terms of its attempts to stabilize the relationship with Russia. And obviously there is criticism and there is opposition, but it is much more muted and unconvincing than one might have expected.

Certainly it doesn't have the passion that one sees from the kind of opposition. that's coming out of Europe at the moment. And that makes me think that there is at least within the United States and within the elites in the United States and understanding that the last 30 years, the attempt to confront Russia in the way that was done over the last 30 years has exhausted its potential that Russia isn't going to go away,

that all expectations that it would, or that it would support it. itself to the United States in some way. It's now realized that that isn't going to happen. And that does finally put us in a better position to move forward towards some kind of longer term understanding or stabilisation of relations between the United States and Russia. So that is my own view.

I mean, I don't know whether you want to comment about this, but perhaps he was writing about a grand bargain, perhaps you can give us some idea of what you think, a future relationship between the United States and Russia, different from the one that we've had over the last 30 years, a relationship not marked by confrontation, what its essential contours might look like. Well, let me say that I fully share your,

point. And I think that I'm, well, I used to be a student of American politics. And I think that I am also quite surprised with the lack of opposition in the United States to what Trump is doing. I am tempted to take your approach. And I think it is definitely a very grounded position. But I would add to that. that in my opinion, it is not just about Russia, about the crisis within the Democratic Party and moreover, within the U.S. political establishment. Because what Trump is doing is literally destroying the deep state. Just the most recent decision he decided to eliminate the Department of Education. I know, it's not a trivial idea, and definitely it will have a lot of repercussions for how the United States operates.

My take is that there are many people, including those in the Republican Party, for instance on the hill, who are very critical of the Trump's approach to Russia. But they don't want to go against the tide. They don't want to challenge Trump on anything that Trump is doing right now. And if Trump believes that he can cut a deal with Putin, probably quite reluctantly, they accept this as an opportunity. Trump knows better, so let's support our president in his attempt to change the pattern of the relationship. But getting back to your question. Let me share with you my concern.

And again, we academics tend to be pessimistic more often than we are optimistic. And definitely this is a very positive development from the Russian viewpoint. But my concern is that right now I do not see a solid foundation for stable and mutually beneficial bilateral relations. between Moscow and Washington. For many years, and for many decades, we used to have the foundation for this relationship in arms control. And arms control used to be the skeleton of the relationship. Everything else was more or less subordinated

to strategic arms control deals between Moscow and Washington since early 1970s. As far as I understand Donald Trump, Trump, he is not a great champion of arms control, any arms control, because he apparently believes that the United States can outspend and outperform any adversary. You need Russia or China or whoever might be held the United States in the military appeal. That's why if he looked back into his first term, he decided to withdraw on the INF Treaty, start with and he was reluctant to enter into any serious discussions on the new start extension,

not to mention some multilateral agreements that the administration abandoned when Trump was president. So I'm not sure that Trump will try to preserve arms control as the foundation for the relationship. We get down to the economic side, again, I can imagine, that the United States might need titanium or maybe nuclear fuel for the US nuclear power plants, or you know, some other commodities from Russia. Even Russian oil is something that the United States might need because it's heavy oil. It's the oil which use US refiner is better than light oil from the Gulf or from the United States. However, if we look at the numbers at its peak, the US-Russian trade was at about $45 billion a year.

Well, it's not a great accomplishment, and of course it has never been balanced because Russia bought something like $10 billion worth of US product. You know, you look at regional issues and in theory the two sides could cooperate on Middle East or on the Korean peninsula. They can probably even work with each other on some Latin American problems. But I see significant limitations on what they can do. So just to cut it short, I think that one of the challenges that we have right now is to use this favorable environment that the 14th president of the United States has created in order to gradually build a new foundation for the relationship, which will be multidimensional,

which will involve the private sect and civil society and educational institutions. And it will take time. I think it will be not easy because, of course, we should not underestimate the resilience of the anti-Russia consensus in Washington, and these consensus might turn out to be more resilient than the administration. So definitely we should be fully aware of this unfortunate situation, and this situation is not likely to change overnight. On the topic of pessimism, I can understand why there would be some skepticism, at least,

in Moscow because I guess in Trump of 2017 he offered many promises of getting along and we saw unraveling of arms control and escalation in conflict also the tensions in Ukraine at that time but the Trump of 2025 though he enters a very different world one in which they do seem to recognize some of the more limited potential of the United States so again it's very hard to read Trump because what he says and what he does often not the same. But he did mention that he would like to see a reduction in nuclear weapons with Russia, but that might have been a way of trying to pull China into some form of disarmament as well. And he said the same with reducing military budgets.

But again, Russia was linked to China, so I'm not sure what exact game he might be playing. However, there also seem to be more concerns in Washington around the Trump camp that the US might be risking bankruptcy, at least some real economic problems. So do you see this being more just talk, or do you see any significant change, I guess, from the past? Well, my take is that, of course, Trump is different from what he was eight years ago.

I think that first and foremost, he has a much more, committed and arguably a much stronger team behind him. Because back in 2016, there were only very few people who believed that he could win. And therefore, nobody really supported him, at least at the very initial stage of his presidency. Right now it is different. There is a very powerful coalition behind him, not just experts, not just politicians, but but also major business interests, including high tech.

I think it's a very interesting phenomenon how the Silicon Valley changed its positions during this campaign. It is also important to mention that, of course, Trump understands that it is his last term, so he shouldn't care about re-election. He can do essentially what he wants doing. doing. He might be more radical. He is already more radical in some of the decisions that he makes compared to 2017. I would also add that, you know, many people say, and I tend to take it seriously is that if you go through an assassination attempt like Trump went through, it is a formative experience. Maybe now he believes in his mission. more than he did eight years ago, and we should not underestimate such psychological factors. So I wouldn't make any early conclusions on the basis of his full film. I think

this time he's different, and you are right, the world is different. It's not just Trump. The world is not what it was eight years ago, and this is something that the They should keep in the White House. So I think that we can stay modestly or cautiously optimistic about the intention to change the country in the first place and his intention to change the world. My take on Trump is that a lot will depend on the ability to manage economic problems of the United States because the most dangerous scenario is that the United States will slide into a recession. And then I think it would be very difficult for President

to convince U.S. voters that they should support him in 2028. But if the U.S. economy performs relatively well, if Trump manages to avoid a big crisis, the odds are that Republicans might keep the White House in four years from now. But of course, it also depends on whether Democrats, the big crisis that the party is in right now is yet to be seen. So far, frankly, maybe for me, from the outside, it's difficult to keep an eye on the US politics right now, but I don't see any promise in developments within the Democratic Party that would suggest that Democrats are back and they're ready to strike Republicans and

to win in the midterm. I'm going to be a little bit more optimistic, and I get to say this, and it's a point that many have made. You will have all heard it many times. But, One of the great changes of the last three years in terms of U.S.-Russia relations is that the United States found itself in what you might call a kinetic confrontation with Russia. For the first time since the Second World War, in the sense that it was arming a country, Ukraine, that was fighting Russia. it was imposing massive sanctions against Russia. And what the United States discovered is that that didn't work, that Russia proved more capable of absorbing the economic pressure

than I think I can confidently say anybody in the West expected, including myself, by the way. And I thought that the sanctions would not be as effective as most people I knew it. But even I was surprised by how successfully Russia managed to absorb the sanctions blow. And the military blow as well. And if you listen to American officials, they say, well, you know, we've already given a huge amount of weaponry and equipment to Ukraine.

We helped them with offensives. We did all kinds of things. And it hasn't worked. So given that there has been. this major strategic failure, it is perhaps not so surprising that there is now a decision in the United States, a wider decision at the United States to rethink its relationship with Russia. Because clearly, Russia is not going to be crushed or absorbed or defeated. It is more than to use Senator McCain's horrible expression, a gas station masquerading as a country.

on the contrary, it is now shown itself that it is in fact a great power. And you have to deal with that fact. And the Americans who are in great power themselves, I think they can relate to this better than countries in Europe can, because countries in Europe don't have that quality of strategic analysis that the Americans are obliged to. Now, that, however, brings us to where it may be, there is a potential for the Americans and the Russians to talk and think about things looking forward.

And that is the situation in Europe, which remains extremely difficult and very unstable. And I would have thought dangerous to both, because the United States has been drawn into a conflict in Europe with Russia, which has not worked well for the United States at all. And Russia, for its part, has had the problem, again, of facing insecurity on its western borders, which has again led it into a conflict. So there is a commonality of interest there. Maybe it's greater on the Russian side than the American. But the Americans do have to look forward to this.

So, I mean, what are your thoughts about this? And maybe do you have any feelings about what Russian perspectives about Europe are? Europe still important despite its diminished status in the world today. Well, this is a very good question. And first, let me say that I agree with you that there is a war fatigue in the United States and there is a sense that probably, no, we cannot get what we were supposed to. But I would make just one foot note to that. Just imagine that today we would see not Donald Trump, but Kamala Harris sitting in the White House.

And of course, my bet is that the US policy would be very different on what it is today. So it is not only about these objective trends, which are of course important, but it is also about personal decisions which are made by particular leaders. And Trump, in this sense, was very instrumental in managing this change in the US policy. On Europe, I think it is a very interesting question, because to some extent, what is going on right now in the West challenges and even destroys the Russian narrative. about the West and about the road. Because if you look back into the Russian narrative after the beginning of the special military operation,

it was that, first of all, that there is a collective West. The collective West is united by Washington DC. It is very hierarchical. Essentially, Washington, or rather the Anglo-Saxon world makes all the most important strategic decisions. And Europe, meaning by European continental Europe, has to follow these decisions, maybe even reluctantly, because of course these decisions are very expensive and harmful for Europe in the first place. Europe suffers much more than the United States does, or than the United Kingdom does. Kingdom does. It suffers economically, it suffers in terms of security challenges, it suffers

in terms of Ukrainian refugees. So Europe has to behave because it is integrated into this collective world. Right now the picture appears to be very different. We see that the United States does not really integrate the collective West. The United States has its own position. very different from that of the continental Europe. Moreover, one would question the whole notion of the Anglo-Saxon community, given very clear differences in views between Donald Trump and Prime Minister Charmer in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, what we see is that continental European powers, like France and Germany, and many others, which were regarded as satellites of the United States,

tried to act on their own, and tried to disobey the positions that are taken in Washington, D.C. So it's an entirely different picture of the world, which has to be captured, which has been reflected into a new narrative. My personal understanding of the situation is that it might be easier for the United States to change its position on the conflict, because indeed the United States is not that close to the conflict. So it can take a slightly more detached position on what is going on in Europe, and of course on top of that, you all know that the United States has many other things to be concerned about. Now, if you go to Estonia, it starts with Russia, it ends with Russia. But if you go to Washington, it's not only about Russia, it's about China, it's about Middle East,

it's about Latin America. The United States has a global agenda, and Ukraine is just a piece, not the largest piece, in this maze. So in this terms, it is understandable why it was the United States rather than the United States, rather than the European Union to start shifting its positions on Ukraine. Though, you know, if we look who really suffers, it is definitely more Europe than the United States. But right now, I think the assumption in Moscow, and it is a hypothesis which still has to be proved, The assumption is that if the United States is on board, it would be difficult for Europeans to stay outside of this process.

And that sooner or later, maybe unwillingly, maybe reluctantly, but European nations will have to accept at least some of the major elements of any deal which, might be reached by Washington. Of course, since you are in Europe, you are in a better position to tell me whether this is the right assumption or a wrong one. Well, what do you see happening then with the political West, if you will, because, well, it was Friedrich Nietzsche once.

He wrote that for the new to be born, the old has to die first, but it all dies without anything new to replace it, then it's just anarchy. And, well, if you look at the political West today, it is seemingly dying. That is, well, what do we call it, political West or collective West. I think under the after World War II in the bipolar system,

it was either us or them. It was a good foundation for common interest and unity. Also under unipolar system, I think the premise of the collective hegemony resting on the pillars of the EU and the US, also interests could be closely aligned. But in this new multipolar system, less Western-centric as well, with the US few resources that has to be prioritized in different ways. We see the national interest becoming more divergent.

It doesn't seem as if, yeah, the political West has much more to unite it, especially with the US under Trump rejecting a lot of the ideological dogmas. But if the West is fragmenting, and again, people are now speaking about the future of NATO not being so certain as it was a few months ago, what will replace it? Because this is no longer, you know, just a crazy speculation. This is something we're seeing the fragmentation within the West. So, because I think this is why the Europeans are in full panic.

Just, you know, spend money we don't have to buy weapons to, which we're not certain how we're going to use. Where do you see all of this going? Well, my take, and again, Alexander might be with me, But my take is that we're entering a period when probably we will have to rely more on tactical and situational coalition rather than on established and rather rigid alliances. Because the international agenda is getting so diverse. And the number of potential actors is growing so fast that it is almost impossible to manage efficiently such dinosaurs like the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance is very powerful, but it is very bureaucratized.

It is very expensive. It's not quite flexible. And I think that even if we are talking about U.S. alliances, I would venture to say that maybe alliances like Ocus or a trilateral U.S., Japanese, South Korean partnership might have more future than NATO. Likewise, if you look at Briggs, it is also a kind of situational alliance

in the sense that various BRICS members have their own views. Sometimes they cannot agree with each other and they can agree on certain issues but disagree on others. So I am afraid that this traditional system of international relations with strong alliances with hierarchies, with the rules which are clear and unambiguous this world is gone, at least for some time. Maybe, you know, I don't know, in 10 years and 20 years from now,

we'll get back to more order. But for the time being, we will have to operate in the situation of uncertainty. And I think that makes this situation is risky for everybody. On the other hand, this uncertainty might create opportunities for certain players. Look at Turkey, for example. You see that Erdogan can selectively use NATO when he feels that he needs NATO. When he believes that, you know, he can do without NATO, he, you know, goes to Moscow or he goes to Beijing. So Turkey is not limited in any significant way by its membership to the NATO alliance. Likewise, you know, you take some of the, you know, you'll take some

of the post-Soviet states and you'll see that they might take very opportunistic approaches. Look at India. India has very good relations with the United States. At the same time, it has no intention of dropping its traditional partnership with Russia. And they hope to have their cake and to eat it. So this is my take on alliances. I don't think that NATO will disintegrate tomorrow, but I think that NATO has probably outgrown its natural size, and it has become increasingly difficult to manage it and to come to any common denominator on the really important issues which should unite members of its alliance. far from disagreeing with that view, I completely endorse it, by the way. Can I just say, I am, I am, I have, I live in Britain, I'm British citizen, I've lived in Britain all my adult life, but my roots are Greek. I was born in Athens in the 60s. And one of the things that I think I would say is that the overwhelming reality of Western Europe and the Mediterranean world, since the Second World War is the presence of the United States.

The fact that the United States was there, the fact of American power, that is what created this unity and this very structured and hierarchical unity that you mentioned, Dr. Kotonov. Take that away. And I'm not saying it is going to go away, but there is a possibility that it might. It's something that people are talking about for the first time. And nobody quite knows in Europe what replaces it.

Because the divisions are very real. If you're talking about attitudes towards Russia, for example, in the Mediterranean world, which I know well, attitudes towards Russia are profoundly different from what you will find in northwest Europe. I mean, Greece, in Italy, in Spain, in France even. It's quite different. So putting all these together, keeping everybody united as a team in NATO has required the United States to do that. But we not only have different perspectives on this, which if the Americans go, will inevitably rise to the surface.

You already see this with prime. Minister Stama's attempt to create this coalition of the willing. The Italians are not sure. The Spanish are uncertain. All of this. Not only will all of these differences rise to the surface, but we're going to start seeing perhaps greater differences between European states as well.

And that might not just affect NATO. It might affect the European Union as it has come into existence. Also, now that could create. create in turn a very unstable and uncertain situation in Europe. It's difficult to say how this might work out. And instability in Europe is going to affect Russia, because whether Russians are happy about that or not, you share Western Eurasia or Europe, you're a European power, as well as a Eurasian power also. So is there not a case we're saying? if we were talking about great grand bargains,

that having a partner in the United States who might help in managing European affairs, provided that partner is a responsible one and a realistic one, might actually in long term, serve Russian interests. Because I have to say, a fragmented Europe, when it's existed before, has been a Europe of conflict of powers, maneuvering and getting into conflict with each other,

and by the way, looking ultimately to involve Russia itself in their affairs. So just throwing out these points. Well, you know, I think that there is a difference between Russia, strategic interests and Russia's tactical interests, strategically, at least in my view, Russia might benefit from a stronger and more consolidated Europe, because it fits into the Russian concept of multi-polar world. Europe as an independent center of power, independent from the United States, is something that most people to look for. On top of that, Europe has always been a real major partner of the Russian Federation for many centuries, not even decades. So in theory, Russia should be interested in seeing Europe a strong, independent country.

However, if we look at the situation today, of course, it had a profound impact on the Oculus in Moscow. And I think that they look at what Trump is doing. And Trump essentially cherry pigs. He is trying to select some European leaders who share his views or who might get closer to his positions and he prefers to work with them rather than with the bureaucracies in Brussels. And I think the same might be applied to Putin because he has even fewer reasons to rely on decisions made in Brussels today.

But the big issue, I think not only for Russia, but for Russia as well, is what is likely to happen to the European project? Because for a long time, many people in my country believed that if you are looking for any few people any future world order, it should look like an extended version of the European Union, not that of the United States, not the melting port, but something that would allow nations to preserve their identity to stick to their cultural heritage,

but at the same time to find ways to work with its other on joint projects and to come to some consensus of the most important global issues. So the European model was perceived as something that we should look at and just be mindful that when Russia tried its own integration project in Eurasia, together with a number of other states, they use the European Union as a model. And the perception was that this is what worked for them. So the same model should work for us. However, these days, of course, this vision is shattered. And it's not clear whether the European project is going to survive in its current form, or it will be different from what we see right now.

It's not clear where the unity of Europe in terms of its values, in terms of its principles, terms of its institutions is likely to stay as it is, or it will be replaced by something else. So personally, you know, I feel very sorry for what is going on in Europe, but maybe it is a result of the European arrogance, of this firm believe that we are the best, that everyone else should follow our example and should stick to our standards, to our norms, to our rules of the game. At some point, I think these arrogance backfired. And, of course, Trump was an accelerator of this policy.

So we'll see what will happen. I still believe in the resilience of this. the European project. After all, if you look back into history of Europe, it has always moved from one crisis to another crisis. So to be in crisis, it's not something exceptional or unnatural for Europeans, but if you have a perfect storm, if you have a couple of crises linked to each other, that might have a very destructive impact on the future of the European project in my view. Well, earlier is that the United States has very different, well, more global objectives compared to the Europeans. But this also seemed to be more the Russian case, because, of course, you see the United States now we're openly saying that Europe will not be the same priority as it was in the past.

But this is also the case for Russia, especially the last 10 years in which after 2014, when Russia began to move a bit away from this greater Europe and looking more towards the east for this great. greater Eurasia. So again, not the Eurasian Economic Union, but the wider format that is China, India and the great powers. So how will this impact Russia's future after this war? Because if there's a great bargaining between the Americans and the Russians, if we can get an end to the war in Ukraine, what kind of future do you see for? the Russians and Europeans. Will it, is it too much animosity? Will Russia continue to reorganize its economy more to the east? Or is it beneficial for Russia to also, out of pragmatic reasons,

to diversify its economic connectivity, also seek to restore relations with Europeans? I know all the bolts are still in the air, and of course, relations now, especially with the Europeans, are quite terrible. But without looking too deeply into the crystal ball, Do you see what the priorities of Moscow might be at least? Well, I agree that the situation is pretty desperate for the being,

and I don't think that it will change immediately, even if the war is behind us. My take is that Europe will continue to be divided for a rather long period of time, if there is no dramatic change on either side of the side of the situation. continent, continue to be divided, but at the same time, I think that there are still some common interests that might help to restore a degree of communication and maybe even some trust between the two sides. First of all, nobody wants any inadvertent escalation in Europe.

Nobody wants to have a war which might result from a technical miscalculation or an inaccurate interpretation of the other side moves or some human error. And second, I think nobody can be interested in an uncontrolled arms race in Europe, which unfortunately might be the case given the length of the line of contact between NATO and Russia today. So I think that in a divided Europe they can still work certain rules of engagement

including maybe very basic very small confidence building measures gradually building something more ambitious like what we had back in 1970s or 1980s

it will take time I think that the restoration of the relationship will start with relatively non-toxic areas, like, I don't know, for example, restoring air traffic between Moscow and the European capitals, restoring embassies, because right now these embassies are like besieged fortresses, both in Moscow and in European capitals. Gradually, they can move to something more substantive, especially if a certain amount of sanctions removed or east. Geography is important.

Geography will not go away. I think for Russia, it would be only natural to work with Europeans. And for Europeans, it would be, I think, natural to build at least some level of economic cooperation with Russia. are also issues which simply cannot be resolved without an active Russia-Europe cooperation. Look at the Arctic region. We share the Arctic region with Europeans and no significant problem in this region can be resolved without this cooperation. Look at the climate change.

Again, I think that this is something that Russia and Europe have shared interest in and should look together. A lot will depend on the political dynamics within you. For instance, you know, who will be in charge in France in two years from now? Will it be Marine Le Pen? Will it be someone who will claim the heritage of President Macron or maybe the left will have the upper hand, someone like Melancho, that, you know, that creates a very of opportunities and also limitations for what can be done between Europe and Russia. How long the current coalition in Germany might last for? Will the next coalition, which we come to power, will three years from now and three years from

now, will have to accommodate the alternative for Germany or the German left? We don't know. But Europe is a moving target. It will continue to evolve and I think I will look very attentively to what is happening in Europe and it will not hesitate to make use of opportunities if these opportunities are inside. But I think right now a lot will depend on the political dynamics in major European countries. Just to say, and I agree. I mean, I think confidence building measures, getting the embassies working again and working properly, reestablishing air links. And I think the decision, by the way, to cut off air links was profoundly inhumane and completely wrong.

I think that was, of all the things, the thing that shot me most when it was done right at the start of the conflict. But can I just say something else? And again, I'd be interesting. to know what your thoughts about this are, Dr. Kortanov, because it seems to me that in Europe, and again, I'm sorry to come back to Europe, but in Europe, we have a very great difficulty understanding or relating to Russia, because Russia has been very much a part of our history

since, well, certainly since the 18th century. I mean, we've had, you know, Catherine the great, Peter the Great, Alexander I, they were European leaders, or we thought of them then as European leaders. Russian culture, Chikovsky, Dostoevsky, they're European cultural figures. At the same time, we find it very difficult to understand that Russia isn't just a European country in terms of its geography. It actually has a border with China. It has a border with Korea. It borders on the Central Asian states and on Turkey in a way that no other European country does.

It's on a completely different scale. And we always imagine, we always think of the Russians as being both part of Europe and Europeans, but at the same time, we don't want to accept them as part of Europe. because they are somehow, you know, outside Europe and different. So we so do ourselves sometimes, you know, that the Russians are turning their backs on Europe, even though that is what we would like them to do. I mean, we have no real ability to see and understand

exactly what we want the Russians and Russia to be. And this has been always, I think, a fundamental and enormous problem. Now, I don't know how one gets over this, but one of the things that my wife, for example, who is an academic in culture, she's not a political scientist or anything of that guy, she's always been very concerned about the fact that we've had very few contacts at an academic level with Russian universities. This is not, by the way, because Russian universities don't want it. It's because European universities, you know, they don't really want it because they huddle around with each other. We don't have the scientific exchanges. People don't travel to Russia from Europe to Moscow and St. Petersburg in other places in the way that they travel between other European countries.

Is this ever going to change? Is that ultimately the way that we have to get past this, you know, this idea that, you know, understand. And to understand also that Russia is more than just Moscow, because when Westerners go to Russia, it's basically Moscow and St. Petersburg that they only see. Will we ever arrive at that point? And could that be the point when things start to change, and our perception of Russia changes, And our understanding also changes that this isn't just a country that is part of Europe. It's also got this, you know, major footprint, this border with China, this relationship with China as well, which makes it more interesting.

And I would say myself, much more attractive. But anyway, your thoughts on this? Well, you know, it really opens a whole new discussion. of Europe. There's a former historian I can tell you that the concept of Europe has never given us any specific answers. If you read French literature of late 19th century after the French Catholic War, many French scholars argued that Europe ends of the West Banking War, many French scholars argued that Europe ends of the West Bank bank of the Rhine River. And everything to the east of Rhine is not Europe.

These are, you know, Teutonic tribes which have no cultural heritage which not belong to Europe, which will never a part of the Roman Empire. That's why Germany is not a part of Europe by definition. Now, since you come from Greece, you probably remember when Greece had these tragic financial meltdown, many in Brussels start saying that that's because Greece is not real Europe, because they are Orthodox rather than Catholic, and they got their legacy, the heritage from the Byzantine Empire, not from Rome. And of course, it is very strange to say that given the roots of the European democracy. But it is definitely something which is moving. The border

of Europe are not carved in stone. And we can say that Europe is not about the geography. It is rather about ideas. And to some extent, all the world is Europe. We are all Europeans in this way or another. But speaking of Russia, I think that on top of this moving target, what we should put in mind, that Russia appears to be too big to decommate it in Europe. That's why there has been no serious discussion about Russia joining the European Union, for example, because the perception was that the European Union would never swallow and digest Russia. On the other hand, I do remember our discussions with officials from Brussels long before the Ukrainian crisis, And basically their point was that everything but institutions.

You should abide by all the rules, all the provisions of the European Union, because this world is going to be Eurocentric, but institutions are not free. So the perception was that the only way to negotiate was to negotiate about the speed and the sequence of you getting adjusted to our norms and our values. And this is not the way you can talk to a country which claims an independent role in the international system. So I think that this European arrogance, this rather dictatorial approach, its partners, was a serious mistake by Europeans in dealing not only with Russia, but in dealing with other countries, be China or India or Turkey or others, this belief that sooner or later they will have to stick to our rules of the game is unfortunate,

and I think it is definitely counterproductive if you want to accomplish something. You have to demonstrate flexibility, you have to demonstrate your willingness to, to reach a compromise. So if you compare Europe and Asia for Russia, you can say, and you'll be right. You can say, well, Europe is much better for Russia than Asia because, you know, you know Europeans, you have large diaspora in major European countries.

Many of you guys got your education in Europe. You know languages, we have a history, you know, we are united by Christianity. So you should stick to Europe because in any case, Europe will be kinder to you in the long round than Asia might possibly be. And that would be right. But on the other hand, I think that Asia has at least two major advantages for Europe, if you look at this situation from Moscow. First of all, in Asia, you will not find a single nation which will perceive Russia. as an existential threat. Nobody will try to build its key or her identity on the basis that we are not Russians.

And clearly this is not the case for countries in Central and East Europe. They have to distance themselves from Russia to prove that they are different, that they have their own identity separate from Russian. And second, in many ways, Asia is more flexible because it is not so loaded institutionally. You know, to enter Europe, you have to pay a lot for your entrance ticket. In Asia, they will give you this ticket for free. You can even lead some integration projects in Asia if you want. So Asia does have an advantage over you.

But let me just also mention that, at least in my view, we should distinguish between your priorities and your identity. Russia's priorities for the time being might be in the East. But in my view, the Russian identity remains European. You cannot change it in a couple of years, even in one or two generations. Russia is a very special European nation, with strong interest in Asia. with a kind of mixed identity, but in the end of the day, it is a part of the European family of nations.

That cannot be denied, because it's a millennium of history, it's about our culture, it's about working out. I don't have any final question, but no, just a comment, I agree, and I think this is why, on the topic of reshuffling relations and these great bargains, I... I was very optimistic about the proposal, I remember, by Medvedev back in 2008, about this pan-European security architecture for this reason, because the EU tended to, well, treat neighbors more that they would have this gravitational pool. So if you're Moldova, Georgia, any other country, even if they wouldn't be a part of the EU,

they would gravitate towards it. And they would have to, they could set conditions in order to have economic cooperation. So the EU even referred to as external governance. So the Moldovans had to accept the energy package from the EU. And this is, of course, they're problematic. Not just Russia, as you mentioned, too big to digest, but even Turkey can't really be digested. So the idea that you all have this huge giants, which will just gravitate around the European Union, which do us at their toll, but they don't actually have a seat at the table.

It was always a very source of a fragile foundation. It wasn't going to work. but I'm wondering if now that Russia looks more towards the east and I think you're correct it's easy for Russia to be in the east where there's other giants and there's not the same historical baggage and there's no need to always balance the Russians because well when you're in the neighborhood with the Chinese and the Indians and the Indonesians well all of them almost

there's yeah there it's I guess it's less intimidating but wouldn't this also help to improve the relations? Sorry, I do, I guess I have a last question. Wouldn't this? If Russia isn't too focused on Europe, if it looks to the east as well, this, again, not being pro-European or anti-European, but just if Europe matters less to Russia, wouldn't it be a bit easier perhaps to work out the other aspects of the relations?

If it's, yeah, if we, I guess instead of being married, if we divorced or neighbors, instead of living in the same house, in this sense, would it be easier to find some kind of a reshuffle to reorganize the relationship? Well, again, my take is that indeed this relationship has always been very emotional, like in a marriage. It was not a happy marriage, but it was a very close relationship. Look, you know, we had two markets, EU-Russia summits a year. EU had more conflicts with Russia than with any other external partner, including the United States, by the league. So it was a very close relationship and that's why when this marriage failed,

it was so emotional on both sides. And I think that we should accept that this type of relationship is not likely to work in any foreseeable future, but we will remain neighbors. And it's better to have decent relations with your neighbors if you want to be profitable, your apartment because your neighbor can make your life miserable if he or she really wants to do that. So I think that if we display fewer emotions, if they act in a more rational way, and there is, of course, a thing line between rationality and cynicism, but if we're pragmatic, I think that will serve our mutual interests and will help us to go through the very difficult period in rebuilding the relationship.

Maybe at some point we will get back to the idea of her marriage, but not in my lifetime. For the time being, I think a kind of neighborly relationship is the best model we can look for. I think that... Sorry, and I was just going to say, Alexander, borrowed that analogy, the marriage and the neighborhood from Brexit, actually, because that was what you British were suggesting, We will be better when we are just good neighbors instead of married.

Anyways, I'm sorry for interrupting. No, no, I just want to say that I hope that happens to. I think that one day maybe we will come together again, though not in a marriage. And I don't think that a marriage between the Europeans and the Russians in that kind of way would work. But one thing, I'm not sure what kind of Europe we're going to see in the future. And I think this is very, very much in flux. And I'm going to just finish one very quick observation

for my very last one, which is that I think in Moscow, and I think to some extent in Washington, it's very difficult to understand how regionally minded European leaders have now become, the extent to which our horizons have shrunk. Now that we are middle-ranking powers, we basically think of our own neighbourhood and that probably explains partly our arrogance as well,

rather than have a sort of conception of the global picture, which you do have in Moscow, and of course they still have in Washington too. But anyway, that's all I wanted to say. That is where my very last commentable. And I just wanted to say thanks. I don't know whether Glenn has anything more to say, but if he does, obviously.

And Dr. Kortinov, yeah. I think that's a good place to finish it off, unless, yeah, Dr. Kortono, if you have any final remarks or comments? Well, I think that it is impossible to cover everything. But thank you for inviting me. I appreciated the discussion, and it was

nice to find out that we have many ideas in common and that we share many perceptions of the contemporary rule, because it's not an often case right now, even here in Moscow.

Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Kotenoff. Thanks again. Thank you. Bye-bye.