The Duran Podcast - US Superpower Myth Shattered w/ Trita Parsi

Episode Date: May 6, 2026

US Superpower Myth Shattered w/ Trita Parsi

All right, Alexander, we are here with the amazing Trita Parsi, joining us for the first time on the Duran, and we're very happy and very honored to have Trita with us. I'm sure everyone knows him and is following his work. But just in case there are some people, Trita, who are not following your excellent work, where can people follow you? Well, first of all, I'm delighted to be with you guys.

I'm a huge, huge fan what you guys have done in broadening the public conversation at a moment when unfortunately from all different sides it was being contracted is really amazing. So I'm tremendously grateful for you having me on, but also for all the work that you guys have done. People can find me increasingly on Substack, which is at T-R-C-R-C, as well as on Twitter at T-Parsie

and on the Quincy Institute's website, which is quincy-INST.org. I will have all those links in the description box down below, and they will also be as a pin comment as well. So, Alexander, Trita, Let's begin. Indeed, let's begin. And since we only have Trita for a limited amount of time, I'm going to go straight in, though

I will quickly say that I have been following Treater's work and writing continuously and, well, it has massively informed me about this crisis, the crisis we are in at the moment between the United States and Iran. And yesterday we saw what looked to many people like a resumption off the wall. We had a situation where the United States was talking again about escorting or maybe not escorting, guiding ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Not at all clear what that means. I'm not sure the Americans themselves know what it means actually.

And, well, I think that the key to understanding the events of yesterday, and why perhaps we should not be overly concerned about them is provided by a recent article which Trita wrote for the responsible statecraft, for the Quincy Institute, about how the decision of the sea blockade, in fact, was a major mistake by the United States. It appeared to be predicated on assumptions that Iran would not be able to keep going. if its exports were blockaded, and that turned out to be wrong. And I suspect that the Americans now realize, or at least the president now realizes, why that was wrong and why he felt that he had to do something,

which is why I said we had all of these events yesterday. Peter, can you take us a little bit further and explain that? And then let's use that as a pathway to look at the deeper events that are taking place because it again highlights the extent of American limits, which is what we are now looking at. Absolutely. And it also highlights a pathology that exists in the United States that I write about in the same piece that you mentioned, in which we're constantly searching for some sort of a silver bullet that brings the Iranians to their needs. and causes them to capitulate so that the United States can remain a superpower that does not compromise

with states that challenge it, that are smaller and perhaps not even a middle power in the view of some here in Washington. That pathology has been going on for more than 40 years. It has intensified dramatically on the Trump because of his willingness to take increasingly extreme measures in the effort of getting that type of surrender. And as you mentioned, he's starting to recognize now that the blockade, which was supposed to be this silver bullet that brought the Iranians to their knees, in addition to the war that was supposed to be the silver bullet that brought them to their knees, in addition to the threats of war that was supposed to be the silver bullet that brought them to their knees, in addition to all of the other things that the U.S. has done for the last 47 years that was supposed to bring them to their knees. None of them have worked. The only time we've actually seen a compromise coming from the Iranian side is when the US actually offered compromises of its own, and that was in the JCPOA. What Trump did in this case, however, I think is particularly problematic because he actually got a disproportionate benefit from the ceasefire because of the fact that he was in desperate need of getting old prices down.

and the ceasefire reduced to oil prices, it dropped 20 or so dollars on the barrel, and the Iranians had not managed to get what they wanted, which was to get sanctions relief. So the Iranians were in a greater need of making sure that this continued into diplomacy in order to secure their key objectives. Trump technically could have walked away.

I'm not saying that he should have, but he could have walked away and he would have achieved the key thing that at that point was important, which was let's just get out of this war, and let's make sure oil prices come down. Yes, Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz, but it still is, and it probably will in almost any scenario. But in that scenario, the Iranians would have opened up the straits for traffic.

Those ships would have to pay some sort of a toll. But nevertheless, oil would flow once again. Oil prices would have come down even further. And Trump needed that pressure release, and then he erased that pressure release by actually imposing a blockade. The blockade was supposed to really strangulate the Iranians based on some really flimsy analysis done by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which frankly, I suspect, is the root cause of most of these fake silver bullets that the U.S. has pursued. Their argument was essentially that the Iranians would run out of storage for their oil,

and that would force them to close down their oil wells, which would be very costly, and that would cause a disaster in Iran, and then they would come and cry uncle. And the Wall Street Journal, by the way, today is reporting that Trump is predictably frustrated that Iranians have not capitulated yet as a result of this blockade. And incidentally, the FD folks had predicted that Iran would have collapsed about 11 days ago. But here we are. And as a result now, Trump is trying to see what he can do to again gain some of that type of a pressure release. If he can get some ships to get through the Strait of Hormuz without any fighting, without a resumption of war, that would push down all prices and that would give him some more time, which I'm sure he would then use to try to find another silver bullet.

Because the type of paradigm shift that is needed in actually going towards real diplomacy has not yet happened in the U.S. side. But it is extremely tricky. It probably won't work. As you mentioned, the U.S. is not actually escorting any ships. It's guiding them, essentially pointing to them where on the map they should be able to go, which is very different. Now, why isn't it escorting it for a very simple reason? Throughout the war itself, the U.S. Navy kept itself roughly 3,000 kilometers away from Iran shorelines in order to make sure that none of their missiles could hit any of the ships and sink one of them. If that had happened, we would have had casualty rates on

the American side that goes way beyond what we already have. And as bad as this war has been, strategically for the United States, Trump has still managed to evade some of the worst things that could have happened in this war, such as a large number of Americans getting killed. At this point, I think it's 13 or 14, which is, of course, is very unfortunate. None of them should have died if this war had not been started in the first place. But we're talking about hundreds of Americans dead in those type of scenarios. So he's trying to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to make sure he opens the straight, but without actually putting any of the U.S.

naval forces at risk. And the Iranians responded in a way or actually preempted in a way that appears to have been designed to signal that the slightest type of an effort by the United States to enter the waters militarily will be responded to by the Iranians very forcefully. They will once again escalate horizontally, but perhaps this time with much more of a focus on the UAE. And the drone that struck yesterday at that organizing, installation or a port in UAE is the one that the Emirates were planning to use to circumvent the strait of Hormuz and pump out their oil and export their oil without having to go through the straits. So it was very clear that the Iranians were saying that if you want to escalate,

we're ready, we're ready to escalate. We still have escalation dominance. And now we saw from the press conference of the administration this morning, they were insisting that nothing has happened that actually breaches the ceasefire. Which is extremely interesting. Now, the thing about the ceasefire, and I think this is a point which many people miss, is that Iran initially was opposed to the idea of a ceasefire for exactly the reason that you said. They did not want to get into a ceasefire that was lopsided in American favor, that allowed oil to be shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, taking the pressure off Donald Trump, And at the same time, leaving the Iranians without any of their wider objectives achieved.

They spent the first weeks of the war denying that they would agree to a ceasefire of that kind. And according to the reports I've heard, which I'm sure are true, they only did agree to that kind of ceasefire because their erstwhile allies, their friends, the Chinese and the Pakistanis told them that they had to. So the Iranians were not happy about the ceasefire. And I think it was controversial from what I understand in Iran. But then along comes Donald Trump. And he does what the most hardline people in Iran probably would want him to do, which is he keeps the sea blockade in place, which gives the initiative back. Now, this brings us back to this point that you've just made, because what can the Americans do to force open the Strait of Hormuz, which they have not been able to do in 40 days of fighting?

That is the question. Nobody I've seen. I've read large numbers of articles and commentaries. I haven't seen anybody, even those who advocate military action, they never provide an explanation of what exactly. is that the United States can do now that it wasn't doing before. Any thoughts? The short answer, of course, is whatever he actually could do that potentially could work, it is absolutely not willing to do for very good reasons. It's not worth the price. You would essentially have to occupy the entire Iranian shorelines. It's not just the straits.

The Iranians can attack ships from any point of their 1,500 kilometers shoreline to the Persian Gulf and put at risk any ships that are going through that are not being approved by the Iranians in this new mechanism that they're trying to put in place. So this is not just about mining this trade. It is similar to what the Houthis did in the Gulf of Aden, in which they, because of their ability to shoot drones or missiles at ships, simply ensure that no one even bothered to go through. insurance costs would be too high, and why would anyone want to risk their lives for this anyways?

So as long as the Iranians have, and they have thousands of rockets and missiles in the shorelines, and that shoreline incidentally is very mountainous, so it's not easy for the United States to be able to penetrate it with land forces. So we're talking about an actual invasion of Iran, which would require more than 500,000 American troops. It would take nine to 12 months to actually be able to mobilize all of that. giving Devonians a massive amount of heads up. And Devonians already have planned for this for more than 30 years. I mean, we have footage coming out now of some of these leading IRDC officials, giving lectures back in the 1990s on how to react to exactly this type of scenario.

And those blueprints are essentially the ones that they're using right now, but with better technology that they did not envision that they would be able to have back in the 1990s. So again, we're back into the type of a situation in which the United States have started a war of choice. And one of the things that is endemic to a war of choice is that you're actually not willing to pay a particularly high price for the victory that you want. And the United States could militarily do this. It would probably be the last big war the US would be able to fight because it would be tremendously costly. But ultimately, it would probably win at least that phase of the military campaign. But for what? For opening a straight that

actually was open before you started the war in the first place. So I'm not begrudging the administration at all for not going down that path. There's some element of rationality still there. What I'm begrudging them is that they're not recognized that there is no silver bullet and that they have to get much more serious about diplomacy. And diplomacy is not about dictating terms to the Iranians or vice versa. It is about actual making some compromises. And there are still space for some good compromises in which this whole episode can end up in an acceptable way. But time is running out and the more Trump is looking for these false silver bullets, the less time he will have and the tougher that these negotiations are going to become and the weaker his

own negotiating cards are going to become. I cannot say in simple words, what a revolutionary moment for me. that is. Ever since the defeat of Saddam Hussein back in 1991, the overwhelming, prevailing assumption that existed around the world was that at least in the first few weeks or months of any conflict, the United States was unstoppable. That, yes, maybe once the big break had been made, the United States could be bogged down over time, as happened in Afghanistan or has happened in Iraq, and it has happened previously in other places. But the idea that the United States would land a punch, an initial punch,

and that that would not break through and knock out in some significant way the adversary. That has been unthinkable, certainly since the end of the Cold War. And to my way of thinking, the entire premise of the United States as the hyperpower, the country that dominated the geopolitical landscape, the global geopolitical landscape, was based upon that presumption. what you have just said is that that ability to simply punch through and to achieve a quick, painless, effortless, shock and hour, shock and awe outcome is no longer there. Am I understanding you correctly? You're absolutely correct.

And to make it perhaps a bit worse from the standpoint of American primacists is that much indicates that this is not unique to Iran, this strategy can be replicated by other states, even if they are not sitting on a strategic waterway, such as the Strait of Hormuz. Even absent that, this can be replicated because of the combination of using asymmetric efforts, drones, missiles, as well as the shaping of the terrain. I know you all have been talking a lot about Ukraine and Russia on this war. I think it is fair to say that Ukrainians, although unlike the Iranians, they had massive amount of support from Europe and other places in the United States itself, intelligence, military, funding, etc. But nevertheless, Ukrainians were also capable of shaping the terrain in a way that at a minimum, they deprived the Russians of the type of a quick victory that they Putin thought the special operation was going to be. In this case, I think it goes further.

This is not just depriving the U.S. of a victory. This is actually a strategic defeat for the United States because it simply doesn't have the cards at an acceptable cost to be able to coerce Iran into that submission. In fact, it doesn't have escalation dominance. Whatever the U.S. would do, the Iranians can counter-escalate in a manner that ends up becoming more costly to the U.S. than to the Iranians,

at least more costly to Trump's presidency, which ultimately is what matters here. And this then spells for a very, very different future going forward in which I think global primacy by the United States, which has been under attack here at home by the American public for at least 20 years. And people are really tired of these wars and really tired of the idea that the U.S. has to have global hegemony. And in fact, the administration in its NSS in December of last year was the first document in which it spelled out as clearly as it could be that the global hegemony. was no longer seen as an objective. They shifted the hegemony back to the hemisphere. So it wasn't a rejection of hegemony per se.

It was a rejection of the contours of that hegemony. But nevertheless, it was the first American document that I've seen that actually made that case as clear as it did. But it was always a situation in which the U.S.'s allies who benefited from America's security umbrella were constantly lobbying the United States to make sure that America kept its primacy in place, that it kept its bases in Europe in place, that it provided Europe without security, same thing in Asia, same thing in the Middle East. But now I think we're going to be in a scenario, certainly in the Middle East, in which the GCC states are going to diversify away

from the American security umbrella. They're not going to abandon the U.S. They're going to buy more weapons from the U.S., I suspect. But the basing systems or relying solely on the U.S., I think those days are essentially over for all of them with the potential exception. of the UAE. But it may also raise question marks in Asia and other places because it will raise questions as to not only about the reliability of American primacy, which clearly was under attack by Trump, but also its efficiency.

And this will then have repercussions in how Asian countries deal with China, how European countries are going to have to be forced to recognize the reality of dealing with Russia. And we're going to be in a scenario in which, primacy is no longer just going to be under attack by the American public, but also, if not under attack, at least to a certain extent, abandoned by some of the states that for years we're spending millions of dollars in Washington lobbying for it to be sustained. I think this is absolutely correct. The United States can produce reports that at an intellectual

level concede that things are not as dominant as they once were. to have that fact actually demonstrated is a profoundly different thing. The psychological effect of that is exceptional. And so, I mean, most leaders around the world might have some knowledge of this report that was appearing in the United States. But they will hardly have based their views on American power upon it. Now they have seen an outcome that is very different from any outcome in military terms that they have seen up to now. But what about the United States itself? Because you say that there is criticism of this hegemonic approach within the United States.

There's also a huge amount of support for it. And there as well, the psychological effect of a strategic defeat at the hands of a country like Iran, in fact, specifically Iran, about which the Americans have all kinds of issues. Well, that is going to be, when it really hits home, it is going to be very, very difficult for many people to cope with. And a complicated question, is this one of the reasons? the Americans are finding it particularly difficult to come down and sit down with the Iranians and engage in negotiations. Because admitting defeat of that kind here in this kind of way is, well, the implications of it are so huge. Absolutely. I think you really put your finger on it

when it comes to admitting it vis-a-vis a state such as Iran, a country that in the past also achieved the humiliation of the United States in a manner that almost no other country had. And I'm not saying that in any way should perform a good way. I think it costs the Iranians tremendously through the defeat that they, through the humiliation that they imposed on the U.S. in the hostage crisis. And I think most Iranians who had anything to do with it, frankly do regretted. And if they don't, they should because it's set the stage for an animosity that was far, far deeper than any geopolitical factor warranted to be.

still living on today. And I, earlier on, I have been worried that the Iranians may actually lose patience with Trump and decide that, you know, they actually have to go for his humiliation rather than what they have done so far. They kept the door for diplomacy open. They're putting forward proposals. Some of them obviously are containing a lot of maximalist objectives, but at the end of the day, we're not seeing their language, et cetera, really be looking for the humiliation of Trump yesterday. You know, there's, you know, there's. There's a lot of trash talk about military, between the militaries, et cetera. But beyond that, we haven't seen them going that direction.

And I hope they don't because I think we'll be making things even more difficult for the United States to shift towards a position in which we actually could get an exit out of this. But I also want to say something that I think is very important in terms of Trump's unique ability to actually be able to spin this as a win. He still has that ability. as long as he doesn't go in with ground troops or doesn't escalate further in a matter that just makes it impossible for him to spin it. And it's not his ability. It's whether he can still convince his own base that this was a vin.

Right now, he still seems to have that ability, although the numbers are coming down. The numbers amongst his own base were almost at 80% support in the beginning of the war. It is coming down now. I think the last poll I saw showed it at 68 or something. So he still has some time before he loses his own base. But once he's lost his own base, he has nothing. Because he certainly doesn't have the independence. He certainly doesn't have the Democrats.

And to him, it's not been that important. It's always been more important that he can convince his own base of his narrative of success. And I can see an actually convincing narrative of success, not compared to the milestones or goals that he set up at the beginning because they were completely unachieve. But if he strikes a deal, he gets a nuclear deal that in some aspects are stronger than the JCPOA, which actually was on the table before he started this war. What the Omanis had mediated in many ways was actually an improvement on the JCPOA,

and the Iranians accepted it. If we can go back to that, combined with primary sanctions relief, massive sanctions relief, but particularly primary sanctions relief that allows American companies to go back into the Iranian economy. Again, prior to this war, the Iranians were open to it. They spoke openly about it. The four minutes wore an op-ed in Washington Post, talking about a trillion-dollar business opportunity. This would be the largest economy that had opened up since the fall of the Soviet Union. And this would be a massive boost for the American manufacturing industry.

And for most Americans, they don't care about enrichment. They don't care about these things. They care about jobs. They care about the economy. And this would be a major boost. And Trump would have an easy time. being able to spin this as a major win because he managed to open up the Iranian economy, reestablished those type of relations.

He would still need to get something decent on the JCPO, but he can. Would he have the blob with him? Absolutely not. And he will never have the blob with him. Frankly, I don't know if he should care about that. Will there be a narrative that ultimately he lost that this was a defeat strategically? In many ways, there will be. But if he at the same time can manage to get this win within that, that is still a very valuable frame and ultimately in the long run, very good for the United States itself.

Now, I'm with the Quincy Institute, you know, that we don't favor American hegemony. We think that this is the wrong strategy for the United States and for the world as a whole. We would have obviously had liked to see the shift away from primacy be done in a different way than this, but if the blob here is incapable of adjusting proactively in favor of a smarter strategy, which in our view would be restrained. And it only will do so in a scenario like this. Well, again, not preferable, but we'll take it. Right.

That, of course, however, is predicated on the assumption that the Iranians are going to be interested in such a deal now. And this takes us back to the political system and the political situation within Iran, about which I personally am extremely poorly informed. And I say that openly. I mean, most people who talk about Iran pretend that they know a lot more about it than I think they do. Now, I have been reading Iranian statements and they do come across to me as actually very sophisticated people. And people who have a very realistic understanding of the wider world and ultimately of the United States and of the balance of power between themselves and the United States.

But sometimes, you know, there is the phenomenon of dizzy with success. Is Iran going to be the kind of country that's able to resist that? Will they, if there is a serious return to negotiations, would they be prepared to make compromises on their part, which might make it easier for the Americans to make their compromises to? We don't know for certain. It's a very critical question. It is reasonable to suspect that the manner that this war has turned out may have hardened

the Iranian position on several different aspects. Some of it strategic, some of it perhaps emotional. For instance, the welcoming of American businesses into Iran, which was a huge, huge shift in Iran's position, is that still on the table given the fact that the United States has inflicted $300 billion plus of damages on Iran in addition to killing a large number of people, including the Supreme Leader and other leadership figures. Emotionally, will the Iranians be open to that at this stage? That is a question mark.

It's a question mark as to whether they think at this point, having been attacked by two nuclear weapon states in the middle of negotiations twice within one year, whether they should give up some of their nuclear assets or whether they actually should sprint towards a nuclear weapon. public opinion Iran appears to have shifted quite dramatically in the direction that they should have had a nuclear weapon, that it was a mistake that they didn't build one. Within the elite, there seems to also have been a shift in that direction, whether that is going to be the decision or not remains to be seen. But I think at the same time, there is also a potential for a different scenario because they are

negotiating about the nuclear deal. So now they may not want to give up their 60%. They may be more open to blending it down, but they're still negotiating. and they know that in such a negotiation, they would have to give some restrictions, agree to some restrictions in order to be able to get any type of a deal. So my suspicion is that it is not what they're offering that has been amended in a significant way. It is what they're asking for in return that has been amended in a very significant way. The cost, essentially, the price has gone up.

And I think the price at this point is all sanctions should be lifted. secondary and UN sanctions. They're looking for something that increasingly appears to be a grand bargain, but without calling it that, something that puts an end to the conflict as a whole that encompasses Israel, encompasses Iran's allies as well as the U.S.'s allies, a non-aggression pact that would be codified in the UN Security Council, and then as a result, in their view, guaranteed by Russia and China as well. And in that context, if they have a choice between keeping a nuclear program that will be under tremendous scrutiny anyways and any move towards weaponization can spark another war, compared to getting all of the sanctions lifted and completely rehabilitate Iran politically

and economically, I'm not so sure that they would opt for going with the nuclear program. the massive lifting of sanctions, the complete normalization of their economic relations may be attractive enough, particularly mindful of the fact that they actually did, as we talked about it, strategically defeat two nuclear weapons states without having nuclear weapons because of their other tactics. And as a result, their calculations will be that there will be a bigger win for them to compromise on the nuclear program, but get all sanctions lifted and get fully rehabilitated and fully end the conflict between the United States and Iran. That would achieve a major, major blow against Iran's immediate rival in the region, which is Israel.

This would be the nightmare scenario for the Israelis, who not only are very unhappy that the war has ended, but would be devastated if the United States lift sanctions and normalizes relations, at least economically with Iran. In fact, that was where I was going to lead you to, because the regional implications of what we're talking about are enormous as well. And do they point in your opinion to a potential withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East? I don't mean a complete withdrawal, I mean, but the kind of constant presence in the Middle East that we have basically seen from the United States since 1991.

the bases, the military forces, the deployment of those forces in all sorts of places, the involvement in all of those many wars. A relatively recent phenomenon in American political and strategic terms, but a constant one since 1991. Is that coming to an end now? I think it very likely will, but it also depends very much on how the negotiations with Iran goes. I can see the United States using this as an opportunity to finally get out of the Middle East, something that I think three administrations in a row have now promised but failed to actually act upon.

The Biden administration in its early first year was actually toying with an idea of vacating 17 out of 19 bases in the Middle East. And last minute decided not to do so because they thought that that would create a vacuum that the Chinese would fill, which I think is preposterous. the Chinese are smart enough not to take on responsibilities of that kind. But nevertheless, this is something that for a long time has been considered by the U.S. and it should have been considered and should have been implemented. Remember, Obama talked about a pivot to Asia and very much about pivoting away from the Middle East. The question, though, is if it is coming as a result of a demand from the Iranian side,

it frankly makes it more difficult for the United States to do so. It's one thing to leave on your own volition. It's a completely different thing to be forced out. And this is again where I think the Iranians should be very careful, not to push for things that the U.S. might do on its own anyways. But if you frame it as an Iranian demand, you may actually counter the forces in the U.S. right now that feel that the U.S. needs to get out. I mean, even from the U.S. standpoint, twice the U.S. has now attacked Iran. In both of those instances, it vacated almost all of its bases in the region. So what's the point of having these bases if in the situation of war you actually have to vacate?

them. And from the standpoint of the regional players, these bases were supposed to deter a war started by Iran. It ended up being a war that the U.S. itself initiated. And then within that war, the bases were not a deterrence. In fact, they became the magnets for attacks. American weaponry is a different story. The GCC states are quite happy with their performance. But the basis and that type of reliance on the United States, I think, is going to come to some sort of an end. I mean, just the question of who will pay for the rebuilding of these bases. Some of them will have inflicted damages in the billions of dollars. The United States doesn't pay for these bases.

It's actually been shifted, the burden and the costs have been shifted to the GCC states. Now, the GCC states are going to have a whole lot of other expenses as a result of this war. will they waste money on rebuilding these bases that they know were of no particular strategic use actually were a strategic detriment to them? I find it unlikely. Now, I think a couple of them will be kept, but many of them will probably slowly fade away. I'm going to ask the last question before we have to leave you, which is, or you have to leave us, which is about diplomacy. because one of the other things that this story has been said is the diminution, the tawdry quality of diplomacy by the United States carried out by real estate developers and the president's son-in-law. But this is partly, this is in some ways a continuation of a decline in diplomacy that we have seen for at least 40 years. I mean, you spoke about a situation where the United States makes demands, and it's the

American conception of diplomacy as we make the demands, and the other side accepts them. That's what negotiation and diplomacy is. Is the United States going to have to change that? And are we close to the point, especially there's now a negotiation, a real negotiation with the Iranians? where this could be the learning experience for the Americans that will finally teach them that they have to do that? I think your characterization of American diplomacy, unfortunately, is quite accurate. It tends to be particularly accurate when it comes to Trump's approach to diplomacy. I find it to be somewhat similar to how Biden would want to do things,

how the Clinton administration did it. but I think the Obama administration already back then had realized that it needed to be a compromise and as a result was very different. I do remember, you know, I was very involved in the JCPI and I remember getting briefings at the White House. And when the briefer, I'm not going to name any names, but when the briefer was someone from Obama's own circle, the entire tone of the conversation was that this was some sort of a joint problem solving exercise.

and which the two sides were trying to together get to an acceptable solution that resolved it, that met both of their interests, and then they had to work together in some ways against the many skeptics and opponents of the deal in their own capitals, as well as in Israel and in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. And then sometimes we had a briefing from someone who came from Clinton's inner circle, who was a Clintonista who had come up in the Democratic Party

under the Clintons. And then suddenly it sounded as if we were at war, Then it was all about how we're going to, you know, the Iranians are going to have to accept and, you know, all of this type of a coercive language. And it was really stark. And I think it shows again, and this is not to praise Obama. I know he's made many different mistakes, but I think the JCPA is actually a very worthy achievement for the United States. It shows that Obama in many ways was the exception. And the question is if we can get back to that type of scenario. And again, he was an exception because there wasn't any strategic defeat of the United States before Obama. came to that conclusion. There was a different type of defeat, which is that in January 2013, Obama realized that his sanctions on Iran were not going to cripple the Iranian economy faster than the Iranians could actually present the United States with a nuclear feta complete. And as a result, he had to shift strategy. He had only two choices, either accept Iran as a de facto nuclear state or go to war, unless he was willing to change.

the mode and the red lines of the negotiations. And it's in that moment in which they prepare to go to Oman and secret negotiations in March of 2013 in which the United States for the first time offers the Iranians to accept enrichment on Iranian soil under strict restrictions. That's how this entire JCPOA was open. That's where the deadlock was broken.

It was before Rouhani even was elected. He was not even aware of what was taking place in those negotiations. He was briefed on it once he got into office. But the deadlock was broken in that, and that was because Obama realized that between those two bad options, he could actually do something else. He could change the red lines.

And it was a very smart move. We need to do the same thing right now. Different circumstances without a doubt. But again, there is still a manner to be able to turn this into at least a partial win for Trump. But it requires him first and foremost to just stop talking to, and listening to the Israelis and there are many supporters in Washington, D.C., who have sold them all of these dumb ideas, everything from the war to the maximum pressure, to this blockade and everything he has done when he has listened to them has put him in a worse position.

Very last question. How easy is this going to be with the United States to change? Because, I mean, if you go to all of these journals, these publications that you see all over the place, from the think tanks and all of these bodies, I mean, they remain very, very entrenched and committed to this view that the United States must ultimately always prevail. It's going to be a very difficult thing to take all that, all of those people and their preconceptions and their beliefs. Can it be done? Very quick question. Yeah, it can be done. I don't disagree with you at all in the sense that it is very difficult. And as long as any president plays in the game of that arena and which essentially the media elite and the blob are calling the shots, yes, then it's next to impossible. If he on the other hand, things completely outside of the box, goes for a deal that opens up the Iranian economy, he can point to that as a win and he gets massive support in the American public for it because it will have positive economic repercussions for the average American.

That's when he can overwhelm the foreign policy elite and the blob. And that's what I think he should do. And incidentally, that's kind of the playbook of Trump on many other issues anyway. So it's kind of baffling that on this one, he's so in lockstep with the blob, the very same blob that he hates. And he hates him. Trudely, this has been an absolutely brilliant program and very enlightening. And, well, definitely, we would love to have you again. Thank you very much for joining you.

Thank you so much. Before you go, before you go, where can people follow your work once again? Yes, they can go to substack, which is at Treata Parsi or Twitter at T-Parsi or to the Quincy Institute's website, Quincy, INST.org. All those links and the description box down below. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you so much. Really appreciate you. Take care.