The Duran Podcast - Weaponizing & Destabilizing Caucasus w/ Lasha Kasradze (Live)

Episode Date: July 22, 2025

Weaponizing & Destabilizing Caucasus w/ Lasha Kasradze (Live)

All right. We are live with Alexander Mercuris in London. And joining us from Tbilisi, we have first time on the Duran, Lasha Kasseradze, who has written incredible articles on geopolitics on neutrality studies and national interest. Lasha, welcome to the Duran. Is there anything else that you would like to tell us about your writings or to promote or upload or plug? before we get started. I cannot add much more to that generous introduction, Alex. Thank you so much. It's an honor to be on your channel on Duran. I think we all know that you guys have done an incredible job. And we're all proud to be every time I get a chance, and this is my first time on Doreen,

really proud to be on your channel. As for my articles, like you said, I have written for the neutrality studies, for national interest and for Accura with my good colleague and friend James Carden. And I analyze, I'm an international relations analyst and a focus on former Soviet space and specifically on the South Caucasus. Fantastic. And we have got a lot to talk about when it comes to the South Caucasus.

A lot of action going on. So let's get started. Before I pass it on to you, Alexander, just a quick hello to everyone that is watching us on Odyssey and Rock Finn and Rumble as well as YouTube. And of course, the durand.otlocals.com. And a big shout out to our moderators. Peter is in the house and Zareel is with us as well. And thank you to our moderators for everything that you do,

Alexander, Lasha. Let's talk about the caucuses. Indeed, let's do so. And there is no better person to discuss the caucuses with than Lasha. I should say you all know on the Duran that I was, in fact, in Georgia last month. Lasha was the person who organized the meeting, who invited me there, who organized my trip, who introduced me to all sorts of people. And it was very clear that he knows Georgia and his politics intimately.

At multiple levels, both, you know, the public level, the attitudes of people in the streets, the people who live, there but also the political class and what's going on in the politics and it's not just georgia that he knows he knows the whole of the south caucuses it became very clear to me whilst i was in georgia that the south caucuses is also a geopolitical region and it is a geopolitical region which is very much in the news at the moment there is political events taking place in georgia a developing situation there there is a political situation developing in Armenia which appears to be going in the diametrically opposite direction and then

there is Azerbaijan which is in a different position entirely and then of course there's the outside powers Russia the United States Turkey Iran no one better as I said to talk about these things with then with Lasha So, Lasha, if we can start, can I start with Georgia? Because when I was there, we were just going through, well, I felt very much a period of economic and political stabilization. Since then, we've had more sanctions bills navigating through the US Congress. And I was astonished to see yesterday a statement from some official in the European Union saying that the European Union does not consider the government in Georgia legitimate. And by the way, I had an argument a few days ago,

a week ago, with somebody who's connected with the European Commission, who insisted to me that the government in Georgia is deeply unpopular and is repudiated by its people. And this is somebody who is distant family, just to say. So all of these things, what is the situation in Georgia? To me, as you know, very stable whilst I was there, but clearly the pressure is on. Alexander, thank you once again for such a generous introduction. I appreciate it. And I also want to mention that you, all my colleagues told me that you knew more about Georgia, certain aspects of it, that we all did collectively. So your knowledge and expertise on the region is superb. you know, so you're putting me on a spot here, if it's your extended family member.

I don't, you know, I've always, you know, argued that in the South Caucasus, Republic of Georgia, under the current administration, has been stable. And the idea that Kyakalysis of the world are saying that this is some dictatorial regime, and that, I don't know if you've heard of the latest, you know, push by Kallis to cancel the visa-free regime, the visa-free travel for Georgians is another sort of, you know, madness, if you will, in the long line of crazy things that Brussels have been trying to impose on Georgia or blame Georgia for. But, you know, the idea that this is a less democratic government, with all these flaws, with all these flaws, I'll be the first one to say, but fundamentally speaking, the idea that this is a less democratic government or that it has en masse faked the elections or that the opposition radical party was supposed to be in power because somehow they are the ones who won the elections. I mean, the list goes on and on. I mean, all of that is basically a false narrative, constructed and created. Unfortunately, within the capitals of Georgia and strategic partners, United States and Brussels.

And here, the irony behind this whole thing is that Georgia continues to be an extremely pro-Western republic, wishing that one day it, you know, it would be accepted in the, you know, economic and security infrastructure of the collective West. They continue to think this, they continue to believe in this. And you got to appreciate that. And so the idea that collective West can come up with narratives that says that, you know, this is, this is the government that is pro-Russian or that, you know, they are turning their backs against the West is simply not true.

Now, this, we're talking about geopolitics and national security interests 101. And that has been translated as or reconstructed in Washington as, okay, these guys are not listening to us anymore. They must be pro-Russian. This is, you know, the air of their golden voice, Al-Gashvili, is over. You know, the free hand sort of that roamed and ruled the country between the 2003 and, 2012, supported by Washington, obviously, that era is over. And I would say 99.9% reason behind this frustration, to put it mildly, that's coming out of Washington and Brussels, has to do with the fact that that era is over in Georgia. And that overall has to do with the change in the

international system, they shipped from unipolarity to multipolarity, and then Trump administration's coming to power. Now, this might not be directly as a causal mechanism for what's happening in Georgia, but when traditional foreign policy elites in Washington look at this change, they think, okay, are we losing Georgia, this tiny republic in the middle of the South Caucasus, who was this loyal, you know, sort of a real, to the point of self-destrooted. construction client state, you know, are we losing it? And so they express, they don't know what to do with themselves, really. And they're coming up with these narratives that are, have nothing to do with reality on the ground. Because if you dissect the situation, if you truly analyze what's

happening, the current Georgian dream government is more democratic with all its flaws. I repeat and I underlying that point. But I don't much look at the, you know, Georgia's sort of the morass of domestic politics. I look at the way they handled themselves in terms of geopolitics and international relations. And I think they do deserve some high marks, even though I would say they're extremely passive and I would encourage them to become more proactive regionally, as well as especially with their partners in Washington, with the United States and Brussels in general. It seems to me that they have so much complexes.

It's got to do with Georgia mentality. It's got to do with this sort of, you know, this victim psychology where, you know, since the country went through those nine years of basically state terror supported by the West, that they're kind of understand how collectively speaking, they're kind of lost in many respects. They don't know how to speak to the Anglo-Saxon world, if you will.

But the idea that they, you know, have conducted incomparably more democratic elections with flaws, that they have conducted a pragmatic, strategically, you know, conducive to the outside environment foreign policy, is it goes without saying. I mean, this is, you cannot deny this. And the fact that they've withstood an enormous pressure to somehow become a, a platform for military support for Ukraine,

which would put them obviously directly against Moscow for the second time around, because we all remember what happened in 2008, the fact that they avoided this from happening. You know, they deserve high marks. They understood the strategic risks involved. The Georgian Dream did, and they acted on it. Now, going back to what, you know, European Commission

and all the globalists are saying, and the new conservatives in Washington are saying, this is basically the same rhetoric. This is a rhetoric full of anger and frustration that is devoid of any realistic assessment of what's happening on the ground. So just to summarize this, what's happening on the ground are several things. Relative economic prosperity, stability,

and on the foreign policy front, pragmatic success in conducting pragmatic foreign policy towards Russia. And those things somehow have worked together in tandem. And this government has managed to keep to juggle all those three areas together without dropping any one of them, at least not yet. considering this was a very, consider the fact that they did this under enormous pressure from none other than Washington and Brussels. Indeed. Can I just make one thing absolutely clear? The person I spoke to, is a very, very heated conversation, by the way, is a member of my extended family who works for the European Commission.

So, I mean, and that person, we had an argument because that person was insisting that the Georgian government is a Russian puppet. I said that Georgia does not even have diplomatic relations with Russia. This person denied the fact, went to the BBC website and Google, and showed me the address of the Russian embassy. And I said, yes, it may be there, but it's close. So it's very difficult to get this across, but as I see, it was a very, very heated conversation indeed. Now, just to quickly sum up about Georgia, and I've already made these points myself, I got the sense of a country that's returned to stability. I saw the size of the permanent demonstration that's outside the Parliament,

and it came across to me as about 150 to 300 people max, in other words, a very small protest indeed. And a very quiet and cheerful one, by the way. I mean, there was no great anger or, you know, things that you would expect in a pre-revolution situation. Definitely a recovering economy, but clearly also a country that's seen some very, very hard times. And that was something that I sensed very much from the people. The guide said as much to me, I don't think people want to sacrifice the situation at all.

So those are just my quick observations about Georgia. What about Georgia's foreign policy? I mean, because is it realigning with the West or is it realigning with Russia? Because we now have another crisis in the further in the Southern Caucasus. There's people saying things are going to happen with Armenia, with Azerbaijan. Supposedly, these two countries are coming together against Russia. and I actually saw a claim that what that means is that there's an attempt to try by Russia to use Georgia against Armenia and Azerbaijan. Is there any truth than that?

No evidence to suggest that at all. In fact, if Georgia continues to conduct this the way it's been conducted and its foreign policy in the region, it extends a very good chance of avoiding entanglements or avoiding that. sort of like the choice between selecting say Russo-Iranian line, strategic line, versus sort of the Turkic world line, which is Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, the West, the Mediterranean. So I think that Georgia has no beef with either of that strategic divide

that is unfolding as we speak. has unfolded as we speak in the South Caucasus. I think what you hear is a whole lot of alarmism. With all the respect to your family member, given the fact that, you know, given who his employer, her employer is, I'm not surprised. I think there is a strong ideology that rules the day, still, unfortunately.

but the wisdom of the Georgian society has sort of beaten that ideology because the Georgian society, the nation that continues to be very pro-Western, also realized at the same time that listening to these narratives will be disastrous for Georgia. So it took a while, but finally, collectively speaking, the society has realized that believing in words, believing in this extreme ideology and idealism and these propaganda narratives that NATO was coming to rescue Georgia or that the European Union is coming to and then putting and then sort of placing Georgia as a hostage. If you don't do this, we will take away your free, you know, travel regime, you know, to Europe or or something else that they might come up with.

This is the kind of blackmail that the Georgian society, not to mention the political party, right, the government, you know, has realized that they've been facing. And so now they're saying maybe we should take a step back and think about this and collectively realize that none of the, you know, NATO is certainly not coming. We're not going to become member of NATO. That's ridiculous. Let's look at Ukraine, our brotherly nation. really, right? Historically, friends of Georgia, Ukrainian people and Ukrainian government. And so let's not turn into this small version of Ukraine, specifically because of the security issues and the promises that were made to Ukraine. Look at them now, right? So they're asked this, they actually are saying this. I mean, everyone I talk to, and unless you are completely insane, you know, even the ones who dislike this government are saying,

okay, fine, stability is better than what was to come. Okay. So, you know, what you see then is this radicalized forces, trained, equipped, supported, legitimized from Western capitals in Georgia, who have sort of, you know, taken on this monopoly of creation of social ideas and social opinion, manufacturing consent, if you will, you know and they've been running with it for the past 15 to 20 years I mean since 2003 up until you know the Georgian dream and Ivanishvili defeated you know like whole united national movement but guess what they still have very strong sort of leftover sort of inertia if you will but even they are now realizing that again the society in general it has realized that they have nothing more to offer They have bankrupted themselves, both on the ideological front, on just simply speaking, ideas front.

They just ran out of ideas. And now they've become, and as a result of it, it's trying to replace it with radicalism. So they don't know what to do with themselves. And that's the problem. If there were a constructive, democratic, you know, a creative opposition in this country, then everyone that I've spoken to would, welcome that process. If there was a, you know, a democratic opposition, not some absolutist radicals who want to overthrow everything and then the hell with what comes next, right, which is

exactly what they're saying outright openly. But a democratic opposition who will offer ideas, who will argue, who will present their case, who will admit, you know, their mistakes as well, as well as admit, you know, a call for compromise in democratic politics, then, you know, the Georgian society would welcome that. But unfortunately and tragically, there is a void where you have only legitimately elected government and those who argue that they're not legitimate,

they have not provided any smoking gun evidence because this is the fourth time that they've been elected, by the way. So what you get instead is this government, that says, look, let's talk, let's argue, let's discuss, let's debate, let's create some sort of a space for social discourse. But anything short of that, we're not going to tolerate your garbage, really, because this is not constructive. All you want to do is overthrow a legitimately, democratically elected government and then throw the country back into the era of this, you know, colorful revolutions and you know the freedom agenda and you know neoliberal sort of you know

expansionism and ideology and you will you will cause another 2008 when russia will russia will russia is already occupying the region but um the country but then this time around there will be there was no doubt there's never been no doubt in my mind that this time around if if it escalated to that point in terms of security that Moscow will take to policy. And guess what? Those who are speaking of pro-Westernism or freedom or that this government is made up a bunch of cowards, they will be the ones who will probably leave the country first.

They will be the ones who will probably run. So, you know, in terms of strategic patience, in terms of wisdom, in terms of realizing that the long term that the current policies are incomparably better, for the Georgian people than the alternative again my assessment is that this

government deserves sort of high marks what happens now again to go back to your original point regionally again what's happening in the region is impossible to talk about this without the collective West's effort to cause another

sort of anti-Russian 2.0 effort collective effort to weaken Russia, right? So to go back to that whole strategic divide, regional divide, so you have the Turkic world, Central Asia, you know, Azerbaijan, you have Turkey, led by Turkey, supported by Turkey. And then this is the sort of the coalition of anti, you know, mostly entire Iran, I would say. Azerbaijan has no beef with Russia. Let's be honest. Even though what happened was sort of, uh, uh, uh, this brouhaha that happened in Nica Zerrinsburg and the arrests,

and as brutal as those arrests were, another response from Baku. This was just a political, it was a scandal. I wouldn't call it anything more than that. I think Aliev is an extremely clever leader. He's a good friend of Georgia and the Georgian people. And he understands that there are red lines. And while I would argue that this incident caused, sort of showed Moscow, no doubt it showed Moscow that Baku cannot be treated as, you know, Moscow sort of, you know, second fiddle or the younger brother, you know, the whole Soviet concept of looking at these former Soviet republics. While Baku and Azerbaijan with Aliyev's leadership sort of showed that to Moscow, he nevertheless realizes.

that in terms of security, there are serious red lines. And so in geo-economic sort of connectivity, if you want to look at it that way, yes, it created sort of its own strategic flexibility, Baku did, correct? It returned and restored its sovereignty fully, correct? Nagorno-Karabakh. And yes, it's within the, among the three republics is the most powerful republics. But let's make no mistake. In terms of understanding national security interests of Russia, regional geopolitics, in my opinion, in my view, very little, if anything, has changed.

Baku realizes that pushing the envelope, for example, we all remember recent comments by Erdogan suggesting that he might place his troops in Baku, in Azerbaijan, which is NATO. And so, you know, we all know sort of the response was not even worth the news, if you know what I mean. I mean, I think Lavrov or, you know, I don't know if it was Zaharovar, whoever it was, they said, guys, come on, let's not be, let's not be, you know, silly here, you know, because that would be the, you know, for Baku, it would be a disaster. And especially now, when Russia has become so much more powerful militarily, it's basically developed a military economy, you know, as a result of its special operation in Ukraine. This republics stand no chance. So I think Baku understand this perfectly well. There is a five, almost $5 billion trade that Baku has with Russia.

So there is a serious intercourse and economic activities between the two countries. You know, so this beef of Russia refusing to apologize for downing of Baku's passenger plane where 38 people died. It was a horrible tragedy. I'll be the first one to admit it. You know, it's all politics. It's all, you know, regional bickering that is caused by something, that is driven by someone. perhaps, I don't mean to be all conspiratorial here, but I think we are seeing now sort of calming down of the situation. It's been, I think, over a month now that this happened. June 27th, I think,

it was, you know, that the, you can't say, in Borga arrest took place. And we're seeing now sort of gradual calming of this situation. And I attribute that to the realization in Baku, in in, well, maybe not in Yerevan, but definitely in Baku that, look, enough is enough. And maybe geostrategically, we stand no chance in terms of going at it against Russia. So we've achieved a lot, right? I'm thinking that's the thinking should be in Baku, correct? We've achieved a lot. Azerbaijan under Aliyev's leadership has returned its historic and internationally recognized

territory of Nagorno-Garabakh and restored its national borders and sovereignty. And so let's just continue with sort of engaging in geo-economic projects. And let's leave on the side sort of security competition with Moscow because we simply stand no chance. In my opinion, that if it's not, that should be the thinking in Baku. because Russia, let's be honest, remains to be the only country in the region with direct national, vital national security interests, both in Ukraine and in the South Caucasus. And I don't see any way where Moscow will give up on those interests, so to speak. So I think that's the divide right now.

Plus with Israel, obviously, we understand how Israel sort of had cultivated. When the Soviet Union broke up, it was Israel. that was starting to cultivate relations, correct, in the South Caucasus with Baku. But Israel's agenda is we all know what. I mean, it cares, you know, against, you know, it has its own interest against Iran in the region. And sort of to sort of to circle back to the point when I said that this is impossible to look at the region without this sort of outside, outside sort of circle, strategic circle. This is what I mean, because we're looking at the Turkic world is basically the Chinese.

chain of, you know, Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan, and yes, it can, you know, there is no other way to look at it other than to say this is to balance against Iran. And then whether or not Russia will allow it to lose Iran, that's another question, which I don't think it will. Yeah, I completely agree. Can I just say something? You change your perspective on this whole region radically when you go there. And I think this is a, once, I've read an awful lot of commentary recently about, you know, all kinds of plans to create alliances with Armenia and Azerbaijan and against Russia and all of that. When you were actually in the region, and I was only there for a short time, but it becomes immediately clear that these plans are absolutely unviable. And I get to say something else.

whilst I was in Georgia I met somebody from the United States you'd probably work out who it was but we won't name him very well connected person and we were talking about the American presence in Armenia and the size of the embassy there

and he made it absolutely clear to me that that's really not about Russia at all it's about Iran the actual issue for the US and Israel is much more about Iran than it is about Russia. And that was made extremely clear to me by this person,

and I'm sure he was telling the complete and precise truth, by the way. So can I just discuss this a little bit further now? Because the other part country that's in this region is, of course, Armenia. And Armenia, at some levels, at least from a distance, seems to me to be going through the same road, following the same road that Georgia did, but perhaps two decades behind. I mean, we've had a change of government that was brought about through street protests, not very different from what happened in Georgia in 2003,

a prime minister who is extremely pro-Western in much the same way that Sarkashvili was. he's provoked or he's been involved in wars which have already lost Armenia territory just as Sir Karasvili's wars lost Georgia territory one of the things that I discovered while I was in Georgia this isn't something we talked about

ourselves but I learned it from people in Belisi in the streets the attack on the church in Georgia effectively really upset people hugely in Georgia and all of the various things that were involved, the importation of ideas from the West

that didn't go down well with Georgians at all. You're seeing something very similar happen in Armenia. Is this a viable, sustainable process in Armenia? Or will Armenia return to the kind of road, follow the kind of further the road that Georgia has gone through, which is experiment with,

all of these changes and then eventually find its way back if you like. I mean, what is your feelings about this? I should say that when you're in Georgia, the connections, the strengths of the connections with Armenia at a deep cultural and historic level, become very obvious. Overwhelmingly, Alexander, just to give you a very short answer, but then I will just give you my opinion, overwhelmingly my conversations, and then generally speaking, how this society sort of looks at Armenia,

They're thinking, what is Armenia doing? What are they hoping they can achieve? That's the reaction. And sort of slightly, because, you know, Paschenean has recently visited, and he saw, you know, he visited Belisi, he saw the prime minister. You know, he was probably thinking, oh, let's go take this pro-Western trip once more, once more, you know, that was probably the conversation or encouragement that he thought he would come and sort of relay and convey to the officials to police.

But overwhelmingly on a popular level, I think, not a thing. I mean, I know that the people that I speak to saying, Armenia really doesn't know what to do with itself. Because geopolitically speaking, number of, deductively look at this. Where is Armenia going to go? Who in his or her right mind can think that Armenia can be plucked out of Moscow's out of his geopolitical core

and plugged into the West, especially and critically when the West is nowhere near to be prepared or willing to guarantee Armenia's security. If the West wants to, which is to me that's the number one thing, right? If you want to sort of egg another country against a superpower,

a regional superpower, a nuclear power, I would say just a great power, Russia, then what are you promising that country in its place? What are you trying to do? In Georgia, we saw they promised a bunch of things, but they delivered nothing, and Georgia almost got finished off, basically, as a small state. There is no doubt, you know, Russia, by the way, let's not get confused with the idea that, with the fact that Russia is looking at Armenia from this sort of acquiescence, acquiescing point of view, that it is willing to give up on

Armenia somehow, or that it is willing to bring in, you know, Western troops, which is NATO into, you know, Russia has in Guimri, in Guimri, Russia has its own military contingent. That, in my view, is more than enough to take care of Armenia, for example, right? Armenia has been so intertwined economically, militarily with Russia over the years, over 30-plus years since its independence, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, that the idea that Armenia can be somehow decoupled from. Russia's interests is yet another attempt, a hoax, this myth creation from the collective West. And what is France going to do? I mean, of all the places, it is France that's been pushing

this, right? Correct me if I'm wrong on this. I think it's Paris, it's Macron that's been pushing this idea. And yet, and look at the dark and deep cynicism of this. Now that Armenia has lost Nagorno-Karabakh, as it saw, right? As it saw it. I'm not judging here. Again, Armenia always thought that Nagorno-Karabakh was, you know, they spent over 30 years since the late 80s, up until 20-23, right? They were fanatically, you know, sort of defending the idea that Nagorno-Karabakh would one day be returned to Armenia, correct? Look where they are now. And look how the West is ignoring this. They're basically everyone acquiesced, right?

So Azerbaijan got its own territory with Nagorno-Karrafakh, restored its territory, internationally recognized. Armenia got nothing. And now you are seeing the collective West forgetting conveniently what happened and just pushing Armenia, whatever is left of it, into the arms of, into this, into this, sort of narratives, you know, propaganda-based sort of policy that it is constructing around Yerevan. A point that I'm trying to make here is that Georgia too is sort of is under that danger. It's is experiencing that risk of if the situation escalates and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, sort of Russia shaves, shaves off South Ossetia and Abkhazia completely, right? even though it's recognized these two regions as independent states, correct?

And if things become even worse and Russia says, you know what, I'm just going to come in, take whatever is going to be left of Georgia without these two regions, obviously, you know, I will further separate it from the West in terms of NATO and European Union. But then the West will start, I guarantee you the West then would start saying, Georgia now deserves its rightful place in the West. So, in other words, the point being that in Washington, neither in Washington nor in Brussels, there is no fundamental interest, in my view, that Georgia's national security must be maintained. Because what happened with Armenia, without Nagorno-Karabakh, it's catastrophic loss that Armenia

experienced, which is a huge change in the past 35 years in the South Caucasus, right, has been ignored. this whole this fundamental this fight of Armenia to restore its sovereignty as it saw fit as it saw has been ignored and now they're sort of playing with it if you will they're saying you know even without Nagorno-Garabakh we can let's see what we can do and it's almost as if the West found more flexibility without the Nagorno-Garabakh issue to support Armenia because when this conflict was happening when Russia was in between and playing you know the whole historic sort of balancing act. I don't remember Collective West sort of talking about this,

pushing Armenia into its economic and sort of security infrastructure, correct? I mean, I never saw that. It was only after we started seeing this push or sort of identifying Armenia as yet another potential hotspot in the South Caucasus as a potential sort of a member of the collective West. only after, you know, they lost Nagorno-Garabakh in this disastrous and catastrophic war. So you see the danger, you see the sort of the cynicism and the fakeness of what's happening here in terms of even if we, you know, we lose Abkhazia completely or Samachabla Salta Sautos Saitia completely. No one in the West will oppose it. No, even though it is the United States that's been backing the idea of sort of non-recognition in. the United Nations, right? So it's always back the idea that South Ossetia and Abkhazia belong to

rightfully, right, to Georgia. If one day we wake up and those regions are gone and Russia sort of incorporates them, right? There is no one that will ever, that will either defend Georgia militarily, right, obviously, let alone militarily. But even in other words, Georgia will become sort of this subject of, you know, subject of, you know, tragic, you know, articles and analytic articles and Abbas saying, well, here we're seeing Russia, this draconian regime just dissected Georgia even further. And whatever is left of mainland Georgia, maybe we can help it become member of the West. So this is such a clownish, you know, theatrical tragedy. This is very tragic. If you if you think of what I'm saying, because it is now, again, that Armenia is being pushed into the West, being legitimized.

But with what? Armenia lost everything, right? And then on top of that, you have Russia who says, okay, guys, are you foolish enough to tell me that I am going to release Armenia to some, you know, to some security infrastructure in the West, just to say NATO. And I'm going to sit back and look at it unfold. So Armenia, again, is being driven by its nose. You know, it's being fooled. And it has to tread extremely carefully not to push, you know, buttons in Moscow, not to provoke Russia in terms of its security. Economically, economically speaking, Moscow, I think, will acquiesce and might, you know,

look the other way. You know, by the way, it is looking the other way. If Zangizura Corridor, if it loses Zangazer Corridor, the control that it wants to maintain over Zangizur Corridor, what is Moscow going to do? Point being, point being that national security interests, geopolitics, and just generally speaking, security guarantees are incomparably more important and vital for Moscow. And this is where both Georgia and Armenia are on the losing end. And their chances of not going there is to conduct.

that pragmatic foreign policy. Thankfully, Georgia learned that lesson. Armenia, what Armenia is doing is let the Armenian people decide and let their government decide. But I don't think that that's a very smart policy. Hopefully they won't escalate it to that level. Can I just discuss something that I was confronted with while I was in Georgia? And this is this concept of the NGO state, which is what I was told by some,

by some people in Georgia, Georgia had become, that it was basically being run by people from all kinds of NGOs that were basically Western financed. And in fact, there was an extraordinary speech which I think you sent to me by Horton, Stuart Horton. Scott Horton, sorry. Scott Horton, sorry, in which he discussed all of this and how the Georgian cabinet of one time was basically people who were basically working for the West or who were in fact ultimately Westerners. My brother who has been to Armenia many times, I've never been there, he told me that this is exactly the same pattern in Armenia as well. Is that your impression that, again,

it is a policy that is very detached from Armenian actual realities, but is more basically a superstructure that the West is funded and created, which dominates the media landscape that has a strong control over the universities and the teaching institutions, and which basically governs Armenia, but which doesn't actually have very much depth in the country, just as it didn't in Georgia as well. Yes, I think that whole neoliberal structure, if it's entering Armenia to the extent and with the intensity that it did, Georgia, for example, then I think there won't be in a good place soon. Just to go back to that whole church scandal and the attack on the church, yes, I completely agree with you. It was the same pattern with Sarkashvili. And this is all, I'm not saying necessarily that they were trying to sort of destroy the Georgian Orthodox Church or decouple it completely from, but there was an attempt to, you know, this was a whole, this was the process of creating the new Georgian citizen, right? So this modernity had to come in, this neoliberal economics, you know, it had to enter the Georgian society, you know, libertarianism. And the country was sort of shut down. you know, they shove down their throats, you know, these, you know, this neoliberal economic

principles, you know, this, you know, only liberal internationalism could modernize Georgia, right? So the entire narrative was we need to take Georgia out of its sort of traditional core, which is the Georgian Orthodox Church. To the extent that this is happening also in Armenia, I see, I see parallels of, you know, the sort of neoliberal internationalism, taming, if you will, what the Christian church in Armenia might be thinking what the national security interests and sort of societal, traditional interests of Armenia must be. Because as conservative as the Orthodox Church is and as omnipresent it is, there is still separation between the church and the state in Georgia. and the Georgian church has historically played, you know, a roll-off, you know, keeping Georgia intact, sort of encouraging the Georgian society to stick with, you know, its core sort of Georgian nests, if you will.

And while some outside of Georgia in the West think that it's create some sort of a, you know, hierarchical, opposition against their programs of neoliberalism and, you know, postmodernism or whatever you want to call it. It is the Georgian Church and sort of the spiritual national consciousness, which it has deep and always throughout centuries and encouraged the Republic to, you know, to sort of stand strong and survive against, you know, against many enemies. So, so if Armenia is trying, if Bashinyan's idea now is the goal is to weaken that element of the socio-political structure of Armenia by hitting and weakening the church, then again, I think, I don't think, this is going to sort of, this is going to be, have a counterreaction,

in my opinion, because in Georgia I did. In Georgia, I did. And so, you know, but then to your earlier point, if you don't mind me, if you don't mind reminding me, yeah. The NGOs. The NGOs, yes. Yes. The NGOs was sort of the instrument. What I just said about this whole neoliberal project, NGOs were used as sort of physical material instruments of implementing those policies. Not to mention, our good colleague, Almutry Chinovsky, has worked on that for many, many years.

And she has a very good, you know, sort of analytic, you know, professional. experience that she has over the years sort of rightfully given rightful analysis when she criticizes the NGO class as sort of a mechanism, if you will, as a way to get into the Georgian middle class, if you will, because these guys were paid lots of money, these NGO CEOs and those who were running these NGO companies. They were all coming from this money. The capital was coming from Washington and from grants and from, you know, European Union and Brussels. So one of the reasons why they're so adamant about this whole law that requires them to declare their income, their foreign income, you know, they're so resistant precisely because

it's a great source of income for them, not to mention the fact that they've also accumulated enormous power, societal power. And of course, they are the modern, version of what a Georgian should be. So how can anybody argue with them, right? They are the ones that will sort of lead Georgia out of darkness into the Western sort of social, political, and economic infrastructure that will finally, you know, sort of enlightened Georgia, if you will,

which is exactly the narratives that had always supported this NGO class. And now with Trump's, you know, assault on USAID, obviously that helped I have to say that it helped because USAID was and I think there are a few with the West right to talk about this former USAID employee I cannot recall his name now but they you know is the directly talking about how there was a determined strategy within this organization to meddle and to strengthen the NGO sector in such republics in in such countries and places as Georgia

especially after the fall of, you know, the former Soviet Union. And then Saakashvili was sort of the NGO child, if you will, the NGO psycho boy, if you will, of these narratives. You know, but if the same thing is happening in Armenia, and I think it is, the NGO sector will cause problems. But then, I mean, there is no mathematical certainty here, but at the society sort of wakes up and sees what these NGOs are, you know, truly represent. Then the Armenian society, they're conservative, they're very tough, you know, they don't, they won't tolerate any sort of, you know, social engineering projects that these NGOs entail and want to, always wanted to improve. implement in Georgia at least. So I don't think they stand the chance. But mostly, both mostly, Alexandra, I think if you want to look at Armenia, I think we'll

have to look at it from the security point of view. Because culturally, fine, you know, we can push Armenia into, say, you know, the hands of, I don't know, France. And they can do business together. And they can do economic intercourse together. And that's fine. But where is Armenia going in terms of being. in terms of it being a land-longed country,

which has always been a problem for Armenia. And then where is it going without any security guarantees? So we are seeing this repeating before our eyes. The only hope now is that Bashinian won't, you know, won't get too excited because he thinks that the West found some long-lost love and respect for Bashan. and now they think that they can he thinks that they can make him

the member of the exclusive club so to speak so just just one very last question basically all these reports rumors theories that you see people writing about them on Armenian-Azerbaijanian Turkish alliance against Russia you don't really think this is going to happen

no No, no, I don't think, the only thing that might happen is, are we going to get squeezed to Georgia, Armenia? I even don't, I don't even think that Georgia will, some say that, you know, what if Georgia sort of becomes, face is a choice? You either come sort of this Western route, which is this Turkic world, you know, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, the West, the Mediterranean. or you are going to be stuck with Iran and Russia. Potentially, you know, sure, it's a small state. If the situation escalates, Georgia might even be asked to be used as a platform, as a logistical, military platform against Iran.

And that would be an extremely difficult situation for Georgia. Does that risk exist? Yes. What is the probability and is it plausible that they will put Georgia into that position? In that position, I don't think right now, looking at the regional politics, I don't think that's the case. I think Georgia will continue to be a conduit, you know, the sort of geo-economic, you know, the state in the South Caucasus, through which this geo-economic projects will run, where Azerbaijan will continue its relations with Georgia, you know, using its geo-economic sort of connectivity. energy connectivity projects.

China is also a huge player in this, correct? Russia, many are saying that, you know, and it's obvious that Russia's one of the major reasons why Russia needs this clean victory, if you will, military solution in Ukraine is because it is very much aware of what China is thinking, what Beijing is thinking. you know, so, you know, we can see we are, and India is also extremely sort of deeply involved in this, maybe not in security terms, but India has serious economic interests.

It is competing with Pakistan. It is building this Jabahar port coming from the south, north-south Jabah port out of Iran, that will allow it access to the north, Central Asia and then through via Russia to Europe. So you see how this Eurasia, irasian geopolitical space is being shaped. So to the extent that, first of all, I don't think that Russia will allow a loss, so to speak, of Iran, right? Russia will, in my opinion,

because strategically, if Iran falls, Russia's situation will be, Russia will be marginalized, in my view. And it will have a much harder time, you know, sort of finishing up its adventurism in Ukraine. You know, I think Iran plays a significant role for Russia. And so I think given that, what is this sort of Turkic world strategy is up to or thinking,

what is it hoping for? It's hard to say at this point. Lasha, this is where we're going to end. Just on that very last point, by the way, the Russian and Iranian defense ministers have just met. And Putin just had a meeting with Larijani. who is Harmonis chief security advisors. I mean, I agree with you, by the way.

Thank you. Now, if you can just wait a few moments, because I'm sure Alex has some questions to put to you from our viewers, but this is where I finish, and I just wanted to say thank you, Lasha, for coming on to our program, and I'm sure we'll be having you again many times in the future. Thank you both very much.

Lasha, you have 10, 50 minutes to answer a couple of questions. Sure. All right. Great. Let's start off with Sajeva, who says Lasha, what do you think about what Aliev said in Ukraine, telling them to continue fighting and condemning Russia? Is he trying to push the red line further? No. I don't think Aliyev is, no. I think, just to go back to my original point, Bako realizes perfectly well that it has no strategic. strategic interest in provoking Russia vis-a-vis the Turkic world that hold, you know, Azerbaijan, you know, Israel, Turkey connection or on an individual basis. You know, we've seen this. I mean, we see Turkey do the same thing, and yet it still backs down because, you know, it doesn't want to truly provoke Russia.

Turkey and Russia have gone through ups and downs in their relationship. and Armenia, Azerbaijan is nowhere near where Turkey stands regionally and has, and given its sort of post-Soviet tradition, the Soviet tradition, you know, Baku understands that simply going into, you know, provoking Kiev against Moscow is a foolish, foolish policy, you know, and I think, I think, you know, if I'm Aliyev, I'm thinking how to calm things down and how to enjoy the first ever found sort of prestige in the region, you know, given its restoration of its sovereignty and return of Nagorno-Karabakh, and engage in money-making, as much money as you can make, basically, from these geo-economic projects and amend relations with Moscow and continue with this economic

intercourse with the West. So I don't, you know, I don't see any, you know, strategic plan in unfolding where they can be encouraging Kiev to go. By the way, Kiev is a losing case. I mean, why would you want to invest your political strategy in Kiev? So I just don't see that happening. From Jungle Jin, your thoughts on the consequences if Azerbaijan cuts off the north-south road and allows Western access to the Caspian and Turkey joins the European Union. Well, Turkey joining the European Union, in my opinion, has, I don't know, fell a little to do perhaps with this geoeconomic projects. I don't think Turkey will join the European Union, first of all.

But what was the second, the first part of this question, north-south. If Azerbaijan cuts off the north-south road or corridor, the consequences of such an action. Western access to the Caspian Sea and allows Western access to the Caspian. Well, that's what they're planning on doing. Well, planning is a strong word, but that's what they're tilting towards. I mean, India, you know, that basically means that Iran will have to be plucked out of this whole equation. Iran has to be, you know, isolated. So if we're talking about isolating Russia and Iran, let's just say out of Zangizur corridor,

then it will weaken Moscow, first and foremost, because Moscow wants control of the entire region. There's a 44-kilometer road that connects Nakhichevan with mainland Azerbaijan, and that's a critical point of it. And so isolating Iran, in other words, bringing in the West, as sort of this monopolistic geo-economic player in my opinion

automatically entails the idea of isolating Iran and even but then again going back to India what is India going to do are they going to give up on the Jabah port because India sees this via Iran as a strategic access point to

the west going up from the south to the north and the Central Asia So I don't think it will be that easy for this whole Turkic world strategy to isolate Iran, because again, you got that, you know, 500-pound gorilla in the region called Russia. I doubt that Russia will allow sort of the Syrianization of Iran. You know, it lost Syria now. So Iran plays strategically a critical role.

And by the way, with Armenia in terms of sort of cold, the geopolitics, I think Armenia is better off with, within that Russia, Iran, you know, tripartite, you know, location, geopolitical space, rather than thinking that it can be plucked out and go against the logic of geopolitics, if you will, and thinking that, you know, it will go into west or the west will take care of it. So, yeah, it's an intertwined. It's a convoluted answer, but I think, you know, cutting off north-south trade means isolated. Iran, in my opinion. And that's just not going to happen. From Nikos, a two-part question. I want to talk about the caucuses now. We see Georgia slowly

moving towards Russia. In Armenia, Pakistan has, sorry, in Armenia, Paschignan, has 11% approval, according to pro-West. Part two. Now he wants to join Azerbaijan and Turkey, also known as the country that invaded him. How do people keep supporting him? And can Armenia elect the guy who wants to cooperate with Russia or has Azerbaijan won? Well, first of all, it's sort of a regional diplomatic revolution, if you will, to witness the fact that Armenia is talking with Ankara, right, with Erdogan, right? I think this person who just asked the question, he mentioned that.

So, yes, it's very odd, which is part of this entire conversation we are having. How, you know, Armenia, the idea that Armenia will be strategically allied with Turkey. Now we're hearing that Paschignan is even willing, willingly telling Erdogan to forget the whole genocide thing that they will no longer sort of push that line, you know, of admitting that. there was a genocide. You know, so you're seeing some radical change, unprecedented change. To me, there are no fundamentals that back that change. I don't see any reason how this can be sustainable. So in terms of the second part of the question was support for Paschignan,

if sort of the traditional strategic culture of Armenia, Armenian society, takes over or starts to resist, then, yeah, support for Paschignan might, you know, might decline. I don't know what the percentages now are, but I simply don't think that I, you know, it's my opinion that if Paschenaean stays on this course, more traditional, you know, elements of the Armenian society will challenge him on this. To what extent, it's hard to say. But unless he starts to use some autocratic, you know, methods to subjugate the opposition, you know, to isolate descending voices and avoid some fundamental questions, then, you know, his popularity will decline. It is already declining because, again, he doesn't have any strategic plan as to what it is that he wants to, how is he going to answer to? his own populace, what it is that the West is offering Yerevan.

And I think he's got a good answer to that question. Right. From DF, Paschignan's grandparents are from Hakkof. Who is Paschignan working for? And will the army let him build a corridor? This is sort of a little bit of a conspiratorial flare there. I'm not sure of who he's, what does he or she mean by who Paschinihan is working for? If Paschinihan thinks that it is the collective west, that...

Right. Right. A collective West, maybe a connection with Ukraine or something along those lines. Correct. I think it's a lost case. By the way, we see the patterns of this. When this political controversy happened with arrests and everything in Kaczynenberg, Zelensky kind of offered, didn't Zelensky offer Azerbaijan sort of a way out or something?

You know, sort of, yeah. But that was foolish to begin with. And that entire process sort of died down almost immediately because it was so fragile. Not fragile, but it was so empty strategically, intellectually and politically, it just stood no chance. If the question, you know, if the listener's question is about that, then implies that somehow the collective West is employing Paschignan, then Pashinian has. stands no chance. You know, if I'm Pachinian, I would say the following, okay, give me money, help me with the economy, modernize my economy, trying to help me that way.

But don't ask me to, you know, go against Moscow's national security interests because that will be the end of it. Because I know that you won't provide me with any security guarantees. given, you know, Russia's, you know, armies and military infrastructure and Gwimri, it's a matter of minutes and hours before Russia takes Yerevan, if it escalates to that extent. So I keep saying this. Moscow might acquiesce to, you know, sort of economic adventurism of Yeravon with the West. But again, in terms of, in terms of, you know, Macron promising, you know, Paschignan, you know,

that it will take care of, you know, guarantee Armenian's, you know, national security. That's absurd. They cannot even agree on helping Ukraine. That's absurd. And I think Bashinian has to tread very, very carefully. It has to keep the balance between Moscow. And I'm not saying that what Bashinian is doing catastrophic. automatically. Again, I think there is a chance for Armenia to use some sort of economic

benefits out of this. But again, when it comes to geopolitics and national security interests, Russia stands no chance because the West won't protected. Yeah, don't listen to Macron. Anyway, one final question. Yeah, right. Yeah, exactly. just for you to comment on, if you would like, on the NGOs. Florina says the NGOs infiltrated the state in Romania as well. Yeah.

So I don't know if you want to comment on NGO infiltration in general and what they did in Romania and what's going on to Georgia, etc. Yeah, in Romania, what's going on in Romania having to pay attention lately. I just know that those who advocate freedom and democracy, they are canceling elections and they're arresting people who are running for that who are winning elections uh what was the presidential candidate's name uh that they uh your gasco who's elections they canceled look with NGOs you know i you know having grown up in the states the the idea of NGOs to me has always been to point out the defects of the government of the state right basically you point out some

violations you point you know you you engage some advocacy work fine in georgia perhaps now even in Armenia, in Romania, by the way, with Breastrovia and Moldova, what's happening is also very much similar because the lady there, Moldova. Yes, yes, DeSander. She's running an autocratic government there. She's running. She won the elections barely because of her outside, you know, Romanians who live outside the country. they had to pull in those votes. And that's how she barely defeated, you know, the opposition member, I think it was.

It was a very narrow win. And now she's turning into, they're turning her into this, you know, sort of a female Saakashvili, if you will, perhaps I'm exaggerating slightly. But there was some autocratic tendencies there. And then, Pritznistrovia, obviously, they can do anything against because, you know, Russia has it strategically, to use it strategically against. the collective West. And then you have Gagauziya region who is basically saying, you know, we don't want to be in this. We are basically they're, you know, their regional actors. There are

pro-Russian. Even if Gagauziah, they cannot touch that region, the collective West. They cannot do anything about. So they're using, pinning, you know, Moldovans and Romanians against each other. You are pro-Western. You are pro-Russian. You are backward. We are the light of, you know, sort of the Romanian civilization. the same patterns that we've seen in Georgia. In terms of going back into to NGOs, in Georgia NGOs were backed so powerfully from Washington that they almost had, they basically had the power to overthrow a legitimate government. And that's what NGOs are not supposed to do, correct? This is not the job of the NGO to overthrow governments.

And our colleagues, you know, I mentioned Almut Rajanowski, one of the, and even our good colleague with, you know, from the Quincy Institute, Anato Levin said, you know, what are NGOs doing trying to overthrow the government of Georgia? So you see how to what extent and how far the West has gone, that quote unquote, the symbol of democracy where you have these sort of checks and balances that NGOs are. supposed to point out. You know, they are really abandoning that very purpose of what an NGO is supposed to be, and they're allowing themselves to become weapons of this neoliberal, neoconservative project against a legitimate, basically against democracy, right? Against democracy. When you were elected democratically, that's it.

Then you have to do everything possible to either win that election through that democratic process or just go out of politics and leave politics. But no, this is not, NGOs have always been the instrument since the early 90s in Georgia to have this unfettered access into the society and against the government. And now it peaked to the point where they actually posed a serious threat that it would overthrow the government of Georgia. So I think the pattern is the same in Armenia, except with Azerbaijan, because we all know this sort of that's a vertical power structure that Azerbaijan has, but in Armenia, in Georgia,

in Romania, I think that pattern is very similar. Yeah. One final question. Unfortunately. From far, why is NATO expanding to the Caucasism? Or why is it trying to expand to the Caucasism? That's an excellent question. Strategically, there is no reason.

Just like in Ukraine, just like Ukraine for the collective West and for Washington presents no vital national security interest, no strategic interest. The same goes for the South Caucasus. This region presents no national security or geopolitical interest for Washington. In my view, and there has been worked done on this, is that the reason this escalated to the point where Washington found, the adesity to say that NATO would go into the remote South Caucasus is because of the unipolar moment that lasted for 30 years. I think it stems mostly from sort of the international relations system and structure, you know, sort of this neoliberal internationalism, liberal hegemony.

There were so many names for these now. I think that has to, has a lot to do with it. And Washington's obsession with Russia and its sort of perpetual sort of expectations at any time now Russia will come back and rechallenge, you know, the United States strategically. I think that paranoia is deeply entrenched in Washington, but mostly sort of on material terms, the change in the, you know, sort of the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the irony here is that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic threat disappeared and yet Washington still can. continued, right? This, you know, this push, you know, Yugoslavia and the Balkan states and the bombing of Kosovo, you know, was part of this, finding the reason why NATO was supposed to exist, to continue to exist. So I attribute, I know it's perhaps sort of umbrella, sort of overall answer, but I think I attribute that mainly to this paranoia that and really hatred of Russia. saying that, you know, Soviet Union disappeared,

but we will never make Russia our peer, even though Putin tried so many times after he came to, you know, when he first came to power in 2001, since he's been trying to find some common ground with Washington, asking for it to become a member of NATO. And then all Washington gave it was the Partnership for Peace and all this secondary and third-rate program, to make it feel as if it still mattered.

And I think, you know, it got to the point where the first and the second tranche of NATO expansion was not enough caused by what I just said, in my opinion, meaning that whole unipolar moment. And they realized that they had to, for all the wrong reasons, wanted to now take on Ukraine and Georgia. And by the way, Georgia was the first one

on the receiving end of this, you know, foolish strategy, right? It was in 2008 in the Bucharest summit, or was 2007. Well, it was a critical moment in 2008 when Putin came out. We all know that speech. And he said, enough is enough, basically. So that's the reason, in my view, why NATO has wanted rhetorically and in terms of propaganda, at least, to expand into the South Caucasus. And the authors of which of this strategy knew perfectly, well that this was going to piss Russia off. I mean, we all, over the years have talked about this. So that will be my answer, my long answer to that question. Lasha Kazaradze, thank you very much for joining us on the Duran. Thank you for answering

the questions from the listeners. One more time, where can people follow your writings, follow your work? I've written a, my most recent article is sort of a long piece, written on Georgian domestic politics as a reaction to the Megobari Act that the Joe Wilson in Congress through Helsinki or the Helsinki, it's part of the U.S. Senate, the Helsinki organization, they're pushing this Megabari Act that is putting sanctions on Georgia. They want to sort of push it now through the Senate and, you know, they hope that President Trump will approve it. But my article was in reaction to that so that article can be found on Accura you know my good friend James Carden published it as well as on neutrality status on Pascal Lottas our colleague and

friend and I've also written for the national interest in the past and New Eastern Europe also has some of my articles that I've written in the past so those are the those are the platforms. And once we have more to come, I'll definitely mention that on your channel as well. And we're also working on sort of turning this forum event into an annual event. But the work continues on that,

and I will keep everyone posted on new developments. Thank you so much, Alasha, for joining us. Alasha, thank you very much for coming on. It's been a privilege. Thank you. Right. Thank you. Thank you. Take care. All right, Alexander, you with us? Absolutely.

Okay. Let's answer the remaining questions. From Nikos, last time I got a lot of hatred from my fellow Duranians for criticizing my side for what I see as inaction and ineffectiveness. Normally, it doesn't affect me, but then you talked about it in a lot of. video. Where's the second part? I don't know why calling out dumb decisions like letting Azerbaijan ruin the caucuses or allowing the West to strike Russia and then doing nothing is considered a bad thing. I'm not propagandized. Part 3 says, I believe that we should recognize our mistakes in order to improve ourselves, even on the side we support. Right now, I believe. I believe,

believe that if a nuclear detonation happened in Russia, they would do nothing. And I am sorry for offending the copium of people, but I am not a blind follower. I can say things like not borrowing money from China when Russia's debt is low in order to help the economy is dumb. Well, I think this is a lot. One more. One more, part five. One part five. Let me be clear. I support Russia.

I love Russia. but when they do dumb stuff, I will call it out because they need to improve and we need to acknowledge it. And I think you understand this, Duran. Well, first of all, I mean, can I just say, Nicos, you are absolutely entitled to have your views and to state them and you should be treated with respect when you do so. So if somebody treated you with disrespect and you were criticized inappropriately in that way, but then I am very sorry. And I apologize on behalf of everybody on the Duran for that.

Having said that, just as you have your views, we are not obliged to agree always with your views. To give an example, if there was a nuclear strike on Russia, can I absolutely tell you there would be an immediate and overwhelming reaction? If you're talking about Azerbaijan, the situation in the South Caucasus is extremely complex, but you heard Lashas views and he comes from the region. He does not believe that this conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia is for real or that it will endure for very long. And nor do I. And can I also say that having been to the region, your perspectives change very radically when you are there and when you spend time there. You begin to understand better how disconnected from the actual events on the ground, a lot of the commentary that you read actually is.

There is an awful lot of posturing. There's an awful lot of adjustments. All kinds of things are going on in the South Caucasus. But I think that a lot of these ideas that there's some kind of alliance being set up against Russia there, for example, is a mirage. And the closer you get to it, the more obvious that becomes. So that's the first thing.

But of course, the Russians make mistakes. And you gave an example. You said maybe they should borrow money from China to develop their domestic economy. Well, maybe they should. I'm not saying that they shouldn't. All I am saying is at the moment they're not doing that. And I don't think they feel the need to. And whether the Chinese would be prepared to lend the money in that way.

I'm not sure about that either. But there it is. But they are seeking investment from other countries. And given the experience Russia had, with borrowing from the West, maybe it's understandable why they don't want to borrow him now. But anyway, a lot of points, but you know, you made a rather complex set of points yourself there. Sangeva says thank you for all that you do, Duran. Thank you so much for that.

Thank you. Thank you. Dan Zugar says a bad word, Israel. Thank you for that. Super chat. Matthew says, tactical nukes in the UK, a meaningless provocation. will the US attack Russia directly? Well, I can't imagine this.

Britain getting tactical nuclear weapons. I mean, again, what really do we think we are doing? I mean, again, becoming Airstrip 1. You know what that refers to. That's what Britain came to be called in George Orwell's novel, 1984. Air Strip 1 against Russia. I mean, it's foolishness. It's not going to change the geostrategic balance.

It's not going to scare or intimidate the Russians. It could simply get us into more trouble in the long term. Haruko, thank you for that super chat. Sanjava says, Alex, there's an echo. Don Zugar says you have an echo. I think that got sorted out as the live stream went along, but thank you for those messages. Let's see. Nikos. Nicos asked about Azerbaijan and Armenia. Elsa says, can you be less democratic than the EU?

Good question. No, I think it is the most anti-democratic structure that exists anywhere in the world at the moment. It is a self-appointed, self-created bureaucracy that functions entirely independently of elections, and which isn't even anchored in a particular state or nation. So, I mean, it is, it is a monstrosity. And it is profoundly non-democratic. Nico says, I saw Ukrainian videos with their usual feel sorry for me stick, and I want to ask, is there time for us to blame the citizens for their actions or inaction towards the people of Dombas? There are consequences, unfortunately.

Unfortunately, there are. I think this is, again, a very complex topic. I think you're talking about the vast majority of people in Ukraine. I'm talking now about Central and Western Ukraine. In Central Ukraine, I don't think they particularly wanted this war. In Western Ukraine, I'm afraid A lot of people did because the population there has become deeply radicalized. And to be clear, I think this is something that has happened over the last 30 years. I don't believe it goes back much further than that. That's my view. But I think that where a lot of the blame lies is with the kind of NGO bourgeoisie in Kiev,

very similar to the similar bourgeoisie in. Tbilisi and Yerevan and Kishinov and Bucharest, who are extremely structurally anti-Russian, tolerated absolute horrors being played out around them, looked the other way whilst Don Vass was, maybe I didn't look the other way, cheered on whilst Don Vass was being shelled, and it brought that nation to disaster.

Nick, thank you for that super sticker. Nico says, can you please explain Obama to me? I remember this guy's a rock star and him and Putin posed as the two men holding the world together. I considered Hillary as the globalist puppet master. Does Obama hate Russia this much? Yes, I find it very difficult to talk about Obama because of all American politicians recently,

he is the one that provokes the strongest feelings on my part. suffice to say he is a deeply manipulative and treasurer individual. That's about the gentlest things I can say about him. But the other thing about him is that he does, he's one of those people who's very, very clever at using others and at hiding behind others to conceal what he does. I figure that out long ago, and I've discussed in many programs,

that reading his speeches used to give me a headache because every sentence says the opposite of what it means. Don Zugger says, do an interview with Spetlana Vladimir, please. Yeah. So that, Nico says,

and I will end it on a funny note. I recently found out that there's a perfume called Zetlinsky made in Israel. You cannot make this stuff up. We found the actual Alenski number five. Absolutely. You're completely correct. There is a name.

Peter S. Thank you for that super sticker. William says, Brian Brilettick says the protagonists behind Project Ukraine don't care. Ukraine can't win. It's to keep Russia busy so they can get up to to Shadans in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

I entirely agree with that. I believe that there is a fanning group in Washington that has exactly this kind of strategy. The big question, however, is, and it's a question I've made many times, is who is actually exhausting who? I mean, it's American inventories that are getting run down. It is America and the West that is piling on debt. It is the United States that's getting distracted and bogged down in conflicts all over the place. So it seems to me that this strategy, which absolutely does exist, is producing the exact opposite outcome to the one intended.

Toiletsaw says he called Aliyev a friend of Georgia that says more about Georgia than Azerbaijan. naive doesn't even begin to describe it well i think that there's been a long-standing relationship between georgia and Azerbaijan which is in mutual interest i think the point that lasher is making is that these are small countries they need to maneuver very carefully they need to maintain good relations with each other which by and large they do by the way and they need to avoid getting drawn into superpower games if they're going to preserve their independence and ensure their own development. When you are in Georgia, and I met quite a lot of people from Armenia, by the way, while I was in Georgia too, that becomes extremely clear.

Yeah. William says Ukraine and Ukrainians are considered disposable. Sticky Mark says, Stoulovvue, I'd rather mount my horse and ride out to meet my destiny, then go remain and be trampled into the dirt by the stampede of fate. Genghis Khan loved and peace from this crazy ladyish in Yorkshire. Don Zuger says, never ask a woman her age, never ask a man a salary, and never ask an Israeli for evidence. Thank you for that. Flying Boar says, I hope there is a color revolution in Turkey because Erdogan is a spoiled brat and has been crossing too many red lines.

I will not shed tears for it. Well, I suspect he's there for a while. That's the truth of it. He is a very extraordinary personality. I mean, he's certainly left his mark on Turkey and on the region. He has achieved quite a lot in Turkey itself. But my own personal view is that with every year that passes, he undermines and spoils his own achievement.

Nico says, I also forgot. Did you see Tucker's interview with that disgusting reporter from Build? I love Tucker. Man, he has become such a badass and can see the deference with this, with this POS. All he said was, I hate Putin. Yeah, and absolutely. I did see it.

I thought it was quite brilliant. And I thought it was time somebody to have gone Bill Taiton. You can see how delusional build is when you listen to the, That editor has interviewed. Absolutely. You understand how they're, how they're so propagandized. They believe it.

Oh, absolutely. The German media, by the way, for those who don't know, is the absolute worse. Not just Bill Zeyter. It is worse than the British, much worse than the American. It is extraordinarily the extent to which in Germany,

people still have independent minds, despite having a media like that. And Germany, unlike Britain, I've said this already, One of the things it does have is that it does have a certain independent media, not to the extent that the United States does, but there are alternative voices in Germany. Sparky says, would it be a good idea for Tulsi Gabbard to be President Trump's golf partner instead of Lindsay Graham?

I would definitely know how to play golf. Very good idea. Zareal says the UK nukes can only be enabled by the US slash NATO. Well, exactly. So why go out of the way to have them? I mean, it's stupidity. Yeah. Arcane Eclectic says, Alex, will you visit St. Petersburg on your trip? Not this trip, no. Sparky says, I'm sure the globalists not only custom curate much of the internet media content. President Trump watches. They also curate what the First Lady watches, as well as others close to Trump. Well, of course they do. Junglgen says European leaders consider Europeans expendable.

Sure enough. Sparky says if you can't trust Erdogan, who can you trust? Very good question. William says, I agree with you that in trying to overextend Russia, the West has overextended itself. Exactly. And Jungle Jin says Australia media is worse than German media. I believe that's true also, but I don't know it so well.

All right, Alexander, final thoughts and we'll wrap up. Well, I want to finish with just two things. So this is these things that I actually took back from Georgia. Firstly, about the importance of Christianity and the church there. Several people in Georgia, I'm talking about people on the street, tell me that they would fight to the death of their church. I don't believe Armenia is different, by the way. So, I mean, there was that.

and, you know, they might not even be particularly religious, but the church is absolutely central to their identity. The other thing which I find even more extraordinary, I just want to pass on, is that in Belisi, at the very centre of it, there is a gigantic building which Sakashvili built as his presidential palace. It is completely empty. Nobody will tell you what it is. The guides refuse to even notice it.

people are so ashamed of it and at the same time so horrified by that period that it's as if they want to just draw a curtain and pretend the thing isn't even there. It was very strange. All right. Thank you to Alasha. Thank you to everyone that watched us on Odyssey and Rockfan Rumble and YouTube as well as the duran. That locals.com.

And thank you to our moderators. Valies in the house, Zareel, Peter. Who else is moderating? I think that's everyone that was moderating. So thank you to our moderators. I hope I didn't miss anybody. Alexander, I think we can wrap up this live stream. Indeed.

And we can get back to work. Get back to work, indeed. All right. All right. Take care, everybody. Have a very good day, everybody. Yeah. Take care.

Bye-bye.