The Duran Podcast - West Sleepingwalking into Major Wars - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: June 15, 2024

West Sleepingwalking into Major Wars - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone, Glenn Dyson here and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris and Alistair Crook. So, yes, Alastair Crook, you have, well, decades background in as a diplomat, a British diplomat, but also from EU politics. So I hope you can bring some insight here because it feels now that the West reputation in the world appears to be, if not in freefall, at least in Steve, decline and at the same time we often hear politicians use this very remarkable language of liberalism and combined with a sense of moral superiority. So the contrast can be quite remarkable at times. And I see this, of course, both with reference to Israel as well as the crisis with Ukraine. And someone might, well, sometimes one might get the impression that no one's really

behind the wheel. And I think we've been seeing that we've been moving towards very predictable crisis, if not wars, in regards to both the Israel-Palestine question, but also with Russia for decades. One can also put China in this camp, of course. And every time we see that there's no real course correction. So, you know, these are crises which we don't really want, but we could have prevented them. Yet we see no real corrective. So it appears we ignore problems, unable to merely address them, and they build up. And I was just wondering, how do you see this phenomenon, if you will, and what is the direction of geopolitics these days?

I think all of these crises, first of all, are escalating together in an integrated whole. Does that mean that they're directly linked? Not yet, but it's quite possible that they may become directly linked. But I think the two that are escalating most obviously at the moment is in Ukraine, where all the signs are that the West has opted for a very dangerous, process of, if you like, what I call walking the precipice, of escalating as far as it can without perhaps going into a major war. But the object is really to keep provoking Russia. And so we're seeing not only the strikes are deeper inside Russia. Some are targeted on real

strategic targets like the over-horizon radar systems that Russia has, which they have attacked. Others are across-border attacks. Of course, this is not new. We've had this for more than a year, and I think you've both been sort of noting that over the period. So it's not new. missiles being fired into Belgarad and that area. And mostly, again, as we saw with Donnyat, often these are targeted on civilian areas. In Belgorod particularly isn't, like the other towns to the south of it, a military base.

It's basically a civilian target. So the Ukrainians seem to liberate. to be pushing the emblem as far as they can, to persuade the West, give more and more either air defenses or aircraft or new weapons, and to be okay with taking the war deeper and deeper into Russia. And the danger here is that it seems to me clear that now mostly Western and leaders have stopped believing that Putin is not bluffing. They think that they can go on incrementally just passing red line and red line and red line, and that he won't, he talks the talk, but it doesn't actually result necessarily in a reaction.

and that therefore there's a sort of complacency, very powerful complacency in Europe and in America that this process can go out just simply escalating the tensions, pushing, provoking Russia to react. Now, I mean, this does cause

great, does cause a real dilemma for for Russian leaders. On the one hand, they understand that they are being provoked. They understand that there's an election taking underway in the United States and that some element of this is also about finding a winning narrative. We're really facing down with Putin and you see it's all bluff and Really, he stalled out, as Kirby said, the spokesperson said the other day.

You know, they're stalled out in Donbass. Of course, that's completely untrue. But, you know, that is part of the course in this time of just, I mean, the lies had come out. You read headlines every day, sort of, you know, Kiev's wonder weapons are decimating Russia and things like this. I mean, this is all part of the winning narrative trying to think. So Russia really understands that, clearly. But the problem is that equally they can't allow their red lines to be crossed without any reaction, not just simply because it's a military necessity,

but because pressure in Russia. on the general staff and on Putin and everyone in the West tends to think of Russia as a one-man show and it's very much not a one-man show and it has a political constituency that it does have to attend to and they're getting very angry

at what is happening indeed and so the pressure is growing so what sort of reaction might be coming. Well, I think one of the reactions might be they, at the moment, of course, all of these missiles that go into Belgarad and to other targets, I mean, are completely facilitated by overhead surveillance, by control rooms, man, by NATO, in the airplanes, in the drones, they not only provide the sort of target,

they provide the slalom path through which the planes or the drones can fly to avoid the major sort of radar configurations of Russian. And everything is there. We've started to see there seems to be suddenly problems with Starlink. But maybe soon we're going to see, because this is the most obvious when, you know, the West says they're not participants in the war. They're very clearly

participants. They put the targeting in. They put the coordinates in. They set the missiles up, and they guide it through their overhead reconnaissance planes to land on the targets. So there's no doubt, you know, in that sense, from the perspective of Moscow, they see this is entirely a NATO exercise and therefore fair gain for them to take out something like one of some of these drones that are flying and guiding these missiles. Or alternatively we could see and I think this is another possibility, especially depending of where the F-16s are going to be put. but I think we're going to

could well see the logistics space in Poland start. So we are going to go to Article 5 situation probably at this rate if the sort of easier routes is not chosen but

they want to give a clearer signal to the west not to go and I think after when they if they do that it will be accompanied by a tough message even now I know nothing I mean I don't ask them

and I don't want to know the answers to those questions because it's not I don't want to talk about that in the sort of public domain but quite clearly one can see where the next step might be again another warning like the ones

President Putin has given during the St. Petersburg conference about you know weapons and tactical weapons and how these could be used and then where do we go? What does the West do then? Does it go? Their own escalation in that field? Do they then put more aircraft into Romania and Poland and attack? Now, I just think that, again, sort of

misreading, misconceiving reality, the West doesn't understand the reality. that actually Putin is trying to help us all get through until November, without someone sort of, you know, holding their hands up and shouting and saying, oh my God, you know, this is 9-11 again starting, you know, we'll have to go in and smash everything. So I think he's trying to do this. And he said it in St. Petersburg or just after, I think, maybe it was in, the meeting in Uzbekistan, when he said from this, you know, we are deliberately going slowly. I mean, because that keeps our casualty rates down, but it doesn't mean that we can't change

course and change the tempo. So would it be a moment for Russia now to change the temper, to ensure the temper, to ensure? increase the tempo to push the tempo out because already the military structure of Ukraine is wobbling, wobbling quite badly in terms of high rates of death and difficulty difficulty with manpower, with weapons, with ammunition. I mean, it really is holding together by a threat, in my view. I don't know if you share that view, but that's my view that it really, and that that thread may break, an unexpectedly break, and then we'll be in a new situation. And then again, you know, this is how, you know, I think I may have said it on your program.

The thing that worries the non-West actors in this is not the nuclear issue. It is the psychology of the United States that you can suddenly have Lindsay Graham going off and sort of saying, bomb, bomb, and you know, it gets a momentum. It's in an election time, so presidents have to be tough and face-down adversaries. So it is, I think, quite a dangerous time in that sense. How does this connect with what's happening in Israel? I think it connects in this way, in that Ukraine and indeed the European elections

have sent a shockwave through the ruling elites, ruling structures in the United States because they can read the tea leaves of what's been happening in Europe and the sort of where the popular opinion lies from the European elections. So they're extremely anxious. And I think they're not as confident as they seem to make out about Ukraine. They're not, they present, oh, you know, we don't have to worry, it's all going fine.

I don't think they feel that because I think they know that might be. the threat may break at any time. And then they face a real problem in the run-up to the elections in the United States. So what does that mean in terms of the Israeli conflict? I think it means that just as Team Biden, and I deliberately say Team Biden, because I think it's the team that are perhaps taking these decisions more than the Biden. But I think that what we are going to see from this, particularly of the failure of their misconceived attempt to sort of bulldoze everyone into a ceasefire in Gaza, without really, you know, without knowing the players and coming at it and trying to use subterfuge to try and get the result they want. a very dangerous thing to do.

I just say for the views who are watching. I mean, I did the negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, hostage release, as I did with Hezbollah. And I know a little bit, therefore, about how they think that went on for about a year old together

with that. And eventually there was a release of about a thousand hostages for Kilad Shalid. And with the other ones, it was different because the hostages were were dead. So, you know, you have to really think through in a much more profound way, how you're going to handle those negotiations. And really, the basic point that doesn't come

across, if you like, the miscontrol of the ground reality is that Hamas hasn't changed its negotiating strategy really at all from the beginning. The basic strategy is the same principles, two principles which have not changed during this period, which there has to be, the process has to lead quickly to a complete end of war. Not cease far, not a truce, a complete end of war and a complete withdrawal of Israel from all of Gaza, including the Nets Tseh and whatever else they'll say. But all their bases, everything, the integrity of the thing. But they haven't changed on that position.

There have been some changes about when and how many people will be released and whatever. But this is completely at odds with what Netanyahu was. I mean, yes, he would like a ceasefire now simply because he's really, army is tired. The commanders and the generals were saying to them, we need, you know, the ceasefire to have a break, rest and recreation. The reservists need to go home. We need to re-equip and get ourselves. And of course, Hamas knows quite well that at the end of this period of six weeks, then they intend, I mean, it's not a secret because Ned Yang says it, then they're going to come in and start the war again. So why does Hamas wants to get involved?

They don't. I mean, this is, you know, a loose situation. So, you know, they give, you know, they give the chance for Israel to recoup, reorganize itself, come back fresh and then to start the war after six weeks again. And so this has been not accepted. Instead of which we've had now three or attempts to fudge this. First of all, we got a change in language, and so I was astonished. This was when Hamas said, oh, we accept. And I couldn't believe it because I got the old agreement, and then I got this new piece of paper, and it said, a complete cessation of military operations. End of conflict, cessation of military operations. Another paragraph said, and a complete cessation of military operations. And another paragraph said, and a complete withdraw of

forces. And I thought, wow. Anyway, I mean, there's a long story in that. I still think that this was Bill Burns made a mess of this. He blamed it on the Egyptians now. He said

it was Egyptians, but had changed the language without them knowing. Come on. They were at the negotiating table. in Cairo, they were in Dohar. I mean, it was guaranteed by the United States and they didn't know what they were guaranteeing. I don't know.

I'm a bit surprised. Anyway, so that was one. Then we had, you know, the second one with Biden's broadcasts in which he said, oh, this has been approved by Netanyahu. This has been approved by Netanyahu. It was not approved by Israel.

There was a discussion in the war cabinet, which is not the same as the main cabinet. It is an informal structure, which security issues are dealt with, subject to the authority of the whole cabinet. They cannot make decisions, strategic decisions that go against. The two things are either the Knesset or the full cabinet in the constitution of the main decision makers. And he kept saying that Netanyahu had agreed it. And I thought this was, again, you know, America being too clever by half because it was left so opaque what happens between first,

phase and two phase, and is it meant to conflict or, you know, Israel reserves the right to come back if there's a problem, you know, if there's any breach of the ceasefire. Let me just say, on record, there will be a breach. I've done five ceasefires between Israel and Palestine when I was there. Every one of them who was a breach in the ceasefire, and every one of them ultimately collapsed because of those breaches. So that's really where we are. And so, you know, Hamas has sought further details, and it stuck there. Well, thank you.

Am I muted? No, I'm not. Thank you very much for this. A couple of things. Firstly, about the situation in Ukraine, the battlefield situation. I've been following it very closely. I do so every day. I'm absolutely on this.

I think that the Ukrainians are holding on by a thread. In fact, that thread is getting thinner every day. I think that you see an exhausted army, very disaffected and a moralized army. It is under extreme pressure, which is growing continuously. It's like a sort of eggshell type situation now. That's how it looks to me. I have to say I'm extremely concerned about the extraordinary escalation of the rhetoric

that's been happening in Europe over the last couple of months, and even more than in the United States. I wonder how the political leaders who have been escalating the rhetoric in the way that they have are going to be able to climb off when the situation does indeed break down in the way that it does do. But I have a basic question, and we can come back to Israel in the middle shortly,

but a basic question firstly about, you know, what the Russians, are they confident about the situation? I've been watching Putin in action in St. Petersburg. He spoke also in other venues as well. He seemed to me very, very confident. Of course, I don't know what's going on behind the scenes, whether he's putting on a strong front, whether, in fact, there's been much agonising and discussion

going on behind the scenes. But that was overall the impression that I got. He looks much more assured and gives the impression to me of being more in control of the general. situation than anybody in Europe does at the moment. And one can argue at length about President Macron's very strange decision to call parliamentary elections at this particular moment in time. But to me, whatever the reasoning behind it, it looked like a very desperate move, indeed,

of a symptomatic. of a political leadership that feels that the situation is, you know, slipping out of their control. So that's about the Ukrainian situation. The second is, about this ceasefire deal. Let me go back to your... Yes, I'll say. Just about that one thing. You're perfectly right.

I mean, Putin is... absolute command of the situation. He's extraordinarily impressive in his, the width of his knowledge and his detailed knowledge. He's very comfortable. He's very composed. He knows where he's going. Russia stands behind him. Overall, I mean, it's quite striking when I was there for two and a half weeks, quite a long time. I mean, people before used to, you know, talk about the Ukraine run. They don't any longer. We're going to win. That's it.

They have not, you know, no one is saying, well, why not this or not or that? They just know that they've won the war. So it's not a sort of contentious thing, but the Western language and belligerence

to Russia as a whole, outside of the Ukraine context, bothers people. They're angry about. that. So it's not so much about Ukraine, I say, which they think it'll fall in whatever time in its own new course, but they're very angry and bitter about, you know, I mean, the extraordinary language and the extraordinary sort of depths of language to which European leaders of no consequence, You know, people who represent a sort of pocket-handkerchief state get up and start abusing Putin,

who is, you know, a statesman running a major power in the world. So that part of it does bother them. So sorry, go on with the second part of your own. Well, maybe because that, I mean, that does answer. Are they afraid of what the West is trying to do? I mean, that is perhaps another question. I mean, are they going to do? Because I am, to be honest, I look at what Western leaders say.

I look at the way they brought us to the edge of the precipice. I never imagined in my worst nightmares that we would ever get to this point. I am sure you remember this. but back in the time of the Vietnam War, for example, there was pushback, strong pushback across the West when it was suggested that American bombers might bomb Soviet ships transporting military goods to North Vietnam in the harbour at Haiphon. Even that was considered too dangerous an escalation then.

And now we're talking about shelling Russian cities, launching missile strikes, doing all of these things. We say to each other, the Russians are just bluffing when they say that they will respond. What happens when it becomes clear that Ukraine is indeed going to lose? Is there any point where Westerners, the West, can back off and pull back, without doing something that really will take us too far? I don't know. You know, the same question would apply to really the other two wars at the same time. The West has certainly lost its way and is in a state. stage of near panic.

And you say what's going on in Europe in this way, you know, I think that what we are seeing in these sort of quite extraordinary sort of expressions of loyalty and to Zelensky and to Ukraine and everything, the European election, particularly sort of, it was made very clear, and the German one, AFD, said that the prime problem that their own people complained about was Ukraine, not immigration, not the price prices, but Ukraine.

And of course, Brussels wants to ignore. You know, to understand, you know, this whole matrix of the Western, if you like, a security state, permanent state is by invitation. There are a whole group of these. It derived from the Trilateral Commission.

It extends to build a bug. It extends all of them orchestrated by David Rockefeller and sort of brought up. And we have chapters of those in Europe too. And Europeans, most of them, nearly many of the European leaders, were all members of the Trilateral Commission, secretive organisation. You only attended by invitation from David Rockefeller and the other. This is the heart of this sort of matrix.

But people are frightened and in existential fear for their future. So they want the club to stand around them and protect them. And, you know, they don't want to be out of line and then, you know, let go on. So, you know, I think Cesar's as an expression of loyalty to the matrix or whatever you want to call it. Because people in your political leaders, they see how shaky their own situation is. And so they want the club to embrace them and hold them tight and hold them safely through the squalls that are about to hit them. and that they fear that if they deviate show disloyalty, they've gone in a second. They're out of the club.

So I think, I mean, this is my guess as to, you know, what's holding, taking Europe down the sort of extraordinary language, extreme language, which is not reflective of what people feel. I mean, certainly isn't what I get here in Italy. But I don't think there is anywhere apart from certain East European states in Europe that feels very different. Even those, I would question. I think Poland is much more divided. You know Poland quite well, I think. But Poland isn't straightforward. I mean, you know, what you hear from Tusk is not actually necessarily a reflection of the situation.

So I think they're very frightened. Could they do something stupid? Yes. And this is what I say when Putin is thinking about these things, is how to manage the psyche, the Western psyche. How can I, you know, go incrementally slowly, not try and sort of fear them too greatly and to move on that way.

He's very good at those calculations, but the pressure is growing on him to teach the West a lesson somewhere, to give it a slap in the face, because, you know, this is a humiliation. I mean, there's no sort of sense of weakness in Russia. I mean, what is so striking when I went to him because I was both in St. Petersburg and Moscow and giving several talks in these things. It's transformed. People are so patriotic. So I love Russia. I mean, I'm not talking about officials. I'm talking about, you know, ordinary people.

You meet the strength of it. You only have to watch one video of Shaman singing to the Russian people, hundreds of thousands, his patriotic songs. And, you know, these people talk about to give up, or about to to stop. I mean, they are confident, they believe in Russia.

I'm proud of Russia. They're happy that Putin is clearing up the corruption. So, no, I don't think it's that. What worries him is, I mean, I don't want to say it because I don't want to engage in the European

thing of denigrating everyone. But the view of the European leaders by the most senior people in Russia is really extremely low. I mean, it couldn't really get a great deal lower. I mean, they don't seem to think that there is any part in talking to any of them at all.

And they say, you know, they've deceived us, they've lied to us, they continue to lie to us all the time, and we just don't, we don't trust them, and we wouldn't trust them. It will take years before we would find new interlocution. terms and a new, perhaps a new generation coming into office. Maybe things will change quicker than they think, but that's how I think they look at it. And even with the United States, they're very weary.

And because, and I've said to them, I've said this more less publicly in the sense, you know, what does Russia do? Because, you know, if there is an election in America, the sort of if it goes ahead you may find there is an incumbent who's in office but not

in power and that what you have and what Russia will be facing with a whole series of principalities and little kingdoms and little groups all whom have their own foreign policy

and you know I've had that often said to me you know very straightforward broadly, you know, the president's science, this was during the Trump days, signs an executive order changing something. You go to the U.S. Treasury, you say, but, you know, there's an executive order. You're not implementing. Well, that may be the president's policy, but it is not the United States treasury policy. And, you know, wherever you look, the CIA has a policy, Pentagon has a different policy,

CENTCOM has its own policy, which it doesn't discuss with the Pentagon. So it's going to be, you know, is there going to be a possibility of having a concerted approach to Russia after the election? Well, no one knows. And certainly, I don't think it's possible for Russia to do more than have a guess at that. So it leaves them in a very, you know, feeling their way. Because, you know, as Putin has said before, I mean, what they'd really like is to have someone consistent who they know what they're good to do and say. And, of course, you know, that looks less and less in prospect for this coming period.

And so I think that's how I sort of look at Putin's reaction, very confident, sure of himself. But at the same time, he's sort of trying to steer against, you know, a Europe that has gone hysterical. And America that may go hysterical as we come up to November or after November, who knows. But, I mean, how do we, you know, how does Russia manage that? I think they're doing it quite well. But, you know, we have to realize that it, you know, something stupid like sort of sticking aircraft, Finland. does not put a road's aircraft into Romania. I mean, Finland is going to start a war against Russia.

I mean, it's these things, you know, we would have thought, you know, I've just gone off my head that twice or say those things a year ago. But now they're realities that, you know, I mean, I know nothing about the new Finnish Prime Minister, but, I mean, what is she sending all these aircraft to Romania for, to be just, as I say, potter? of the club. I'm in with you. I'm part of the team.

I don't want to be kicked off the team, especially as I don't know what it's going to happen here in Europe in the next period. But this idea of this deep state pushing different pulses towards Russia, this well obviously

also preceded Trump, I think, because I remember the Washington Post writing about Obama when he was cautious about arming Ukraine, because he concerned, this would intensify or push the conflict out of control, as we're seeing now. But then Washington Post was reporting that, well, the intelligence agencies, different parts of the military that they were effectively doing, well, pursuing their own policies, finding

a way of circumventing what Obama wanted. So it's been happening quite open. I was just wondering, to what extent you believe that, right? Russia has been maybe too restrained because I recently saw Cameron now, I think it was yesterday, making the argument that, you know, he used the word we. We have to give Ukraine weapons so we can hit the Russian soldiers before they can even enter Ukraine. So and this is so not only providing the weapons and the targeting, but now this the whole pretension. that pretending that we're simply helping Ukraine and they're doing the fighting or the decisions up to them, it seems to be getting weaker by the day.

Again, it's not just Cameron. We see the same from Estonia. The prime minister there argued that Russia should be broken up to pieces. Estonian president wanted to bring Russia to its knees. I'm not sure Estonia would be the right country to do so. But obviously this is, you know, the But this is getting close to a declaration of war, it feels, when we're talking about killing Russians with our weapons and our technologies.

Of course, you mentioned striking Russia's early nuclear warning systems, and we've seen cluster ammunition being used against the civilian targets in Russian cities. It seems as if it's becoming more and more difficult for Russia not to retaliate. So I think that, sorry. I think that, sorry, I think that, I mean, I would differentiate. I mean, all these threats coming out of Europe, I mean, the Russians treat them as jokes. I mean, you know, they, you know, Britain hasn't the capacity, let alone Estonia, but even France.

I mean, they see these as absurd. The question is the United States. And the United States, because it is volatile, it's not certain who's making decisions in the United States on these key issues,

but also the sense that the United States can, you know, I mean, I've seen it before because I was sort of in Afghanistan during that, the war there. I mean, suddenly, you know, Charlie Wilson, you know, the representative comes, you know, momentum, and it's unstoppable. And, you know, you're not allowed to say, you know, hold on, have you thought this through? I mean, it just becomes a sort of a sort of huge process in it. itself. So I think the Russians

don't pay any attention to the absurdities coming from Europe really at all. But they are concerned how far, I mean, and this is a question, and I'll ask you the question, perhaps.

I mean, as the U.S. election becomes more and more tense, and uncertain, how advantageous would it be for the White House to have a war presidency at that time, or near war presidency, walking the precipice presidency, as I say. I mean, you know, some people in Washington have said to me, well, at the moment, it's not in anyone's interest to have that.

But as that, you know, period comes, and if we get through the sort of the conventions in the early summer, then the interesting thing is could become a point, you know, where it's to save an election, it becomes an advantage to go with this language. I mean, this is why I think, you know, the possibility of that we have to look very carefully what's happening in Europe. Why are they going and why the language become so belligerent, I mean, to the point of absurdity and, you know, almost making themselves look ridiculous. Why is it becoming so because there is a rumor going around in Europe? and elsewhere that a decision has been taken to go to a bigger war, partly because of what's happening in Israel, and that a decision, I mean, certainly some people in Britain have been said, you know, that this is why he did a snap election, why he's high-telling it out of the UK because he doesn't want to be involved with it. But, you know, he was told, you know, a bigger conflict may be coming, and of course, all of the members of this matrix of connected structures of power are expected to sort of salute and fall into mind immediately that we're going that way.

I find this rather hard to believe, but I'm never sure whether this is because it's my wishful thinking or because, you know, all of these are false trails and kite flyings that are being put around. But there I put it to you both. I mean, is there a point in this strange campaign, election campaign, where, you know, the economy is going wrong, other parts are going wrong, new skeletons are coming out of the cupboard and things like that, that are major diversion, a major sort of thing that could even provide a pretext of postponing an election? Could this be possible? Well, I'll express my own view about this. Firstly, I mean, in terms of constitutional mechanisms to postpone elections, I don't think that's ever been done in the United States, even in wartime. I think it might be a difficult thing to justify.

How American, the wider American public would respond to an escalation to the point of, you know, the United States, perhaps getting into some kind of war situation in Ukraine. My overwhelming sense is that it would be very negative, that it would not be an election-bidding strategy in the United States to start a major crisis with the Russians over Ukraine. I think that every single survey of opinion that I've seen, to the extent that we're getting any, suggests very strongly that. I understand that in the South, amongst the families that make up, you know, the demographic that provides most of the soldiers, they're very, very hostile to the idea of them being sent to Ukraine to fight the Russians.

This is a very remote place from American consciousness. They're not particularly interested in this conflict. They don't understand why the United States is so deeply involved. we're starting to see in Congress itself the first indicators that there is now a principled opposition to this thing. The problem is that is a rational calculation and you can very easily construct an alternative argument. The economy starts to go wrong. Everything else starts to fall apart. the administration finds itself in a very difficult situation electorally. They've made the election itself into an almost an existential issue

because they're talking about the fact that democracy in the United States is itself in danger if the other side wins. We have articles today in the Financial Times talking about the threat of American Caesarism, for example. Now, when this kind of rhetoric takes hold to the extent that it has now done in the United States, expecting people, I think, to make rational calculations of how things might work out, might be rather complacent. One can say, one can imagine, well, you know, we're going to lose anyway, we don't do nothing. Let's start some big event somewhere in Ukraine, for example.

which we are already massively invested in emotionally and viscerally as well. Let's start something there because otherwise we're going to lose anyway. So let's try something. And I have to say, I think there are some people in Wilkinson who might say, let's do that. And of course, coming back to your other point about the fact that they're very, departments in the American government, all of them have their own policies. Well, of course, some of them probably want to continue the investment in Ukraine anyway, and they're not too bothered about who the president is going to be,

and they don't want to say Ukraine go down because, well, that's a very big... Their jobs are on the line. Exactly. So, you know, this is what makes it so difficult. make a fair calculation. But as I said, as far as public opinion is concerned, at the moment, they are not only against it, I think they're becoming more against it with every month of passes. I agree with you, but I do think, you know, we're talking about, you know, quite different forces that generally don't care about public opinion, about what they are. I mean, if it

suits these forces, then, and we saw it was a very interesting article not so longer that in the last few days, talking about General Millie's sort of conversations with Susan Rice during the lead up to 6th January, when at that stage, according to Susan Rice's calculations were going to be 140 Republicans contesting the election. electoral record, I mean a major one, and how they were talking about how to stop Trump at any cost. You know, the question then, I'll rephrase it. I mean, I don't have an answer to any of these things, by the way, and I'm just sort of interested to hear others views. but, you know, the forces of, shall we call it, Blue America,

have all the commanding heights in America. Law enforcement, the media, the Pentagon, the CIA, the federal, the Justice Department, you name it. They own all of those major commanding heights. I mean, can you envisage the... know, on the 20th of January or something, handing over those commanding heights to say an outsider like Mr. Trump coming in, knowing what his stated policy of retribution is going to be.

Quite possibly they will, but, you know, I find it difficult really, you know, to see people giving up. And for those little princes, the princdom of the CIA, handing it over with all its dirty laundry and baggage and records to what they would see as a complete outsider. Anyway, this is just a rhetorical question, so I leave it at that, but I'm just saying these are some of the imponderables. And, you know, I'm not saying that's thought. but in the rest of the world, people are thinking these questions through and wondering, you know, how to proceed and how, you know, they, I think, and I'm not talking just about Russia, I'm talking about, you know, other countries and Iran and so on, follow these things very, very carefully, and are trying to sort of come to some sort of conclusions about, you know, you really need, I mean, you really need a cycle. psychiatrist for this exercise, not a diplomat. But anyway, this is the best they've got.

So, I mean, these are the sort of uncertainties about Ukraine, apart from, you know, what's happening on the ground. And, you know, Israel is now, I mean, I don't think it's understood just about how much of a mess it's in now. It is in deep trouble, deep trouble. And how does it get out of this? Well, I mean, this is, I mean, again, another question for the sort of, you know, the structures of power in the United States, because many of those, the leadership positions of institutional power are held by people who are very strongly attached to Zionism.

and Israel as a Zionist state, not in another form. And they are not about to, if you like, compromise. They are going to push the United States to continue, as it has done throughout full support. And I think that's going to actually increase because as a position, of Israel becomes more and more tenures. The problem for them is that, although they won't see it, they don't have a solution. There isn't a two-state solution available. I've tried to say that.

I keep hearing people saying, oh, it's so simple, the answer is so easy, two-state solution, people living peacefully side by side. It's just neither population wants or trust. to live either with the people that dominated them before or the people who fear that they are, the other side wants to kill and remove them from the land. It's existential, zero-sum gain. And I try and keep pressing people to,

I mean, not because I'm trying to be pessimistic or anything about it, but I've spent most of my life in these sort of negotiations in some way or other. You know, there isn't the options that were available in South Africa. I mean, again, in South Africa, you had one population group that controlled, you know, the wealth and the economy, and another population, which did it and was dispossessed effectively. So you could say, you know, can we make an arrangement in these sort of terms? Well, first of all, that's not possible because those conditions that existed whereby, if you like, the ANC were prepared to allow the Anglo economic community and the Jewish community to retain control over their economic resources and that the ANC would get a political, if you like, the ANC would get a political, if you like them. mandate, which was negotiated between the two parties. Mostly, not by the Africana group, but mostly by De Beers and Anglo-American and so on. Is that possible for Israel? I don't think

this is, I don't think such an arrangement like that is easily done. The only way you can transform this sort of situation ultimately is by both sides beginning to see the other side in different way, come to terms and say, look, I don't like them, I don't agree with them, but I understand where they come from, I understand their history, I understand, you know, what it is. But for various reasons, partly because half of the Israeli population, there's a, you know, there are many divides in Israel that two separate populations, but one of them is the sort of divide between the people that came to Israel basically because of the Holocaust and for a safe space to get out of Europe and be safe.

Now, for them, safety is everything. I mean, they want to be safe, understanding. And this is the key priority. But then you have the other ones who believe. and who are more sort of biblically inclined, who say, no, you know, we want a war. We've got to sort this. We are going to find, we are going to do the audacious founding of Israel on the land of Israel. And for them, you know, a big war, casualties, loss of life is, you know, part of their testament to a Yewai and to the command.

are to found Israel on the land of Israel. So, I mean, with how you don't have a block, I mean, at least in South Africa, you know, at least you had, you know, two people that could talk. You don't have that in the Israeli connection, the Palestinians, but the Israelis are divided between that and the Mizrahi and the Ashkenazi, deeply divided. and it's becoming more and more, if you like, intense, the sort of guilt feeling to the other side. I mean, I looked after the rescue for hostages held by Amas. I look quite widely.

Hebrew and was impressed. Not one word of sense of how many Palestinians were killed and children maimed. you know, left without limbs or anything. Not even a word of saying, well, thank goodness we got our people back, but it was a heavy price, and it's a pity so many people had to know nothing. The hardening of that sort of failure to find empathy for another side makes it very difficult. So I think this, what does that mean? I think it means long war.

and I think one which is likely to get more intense in Lebanon. The Israeli, by the way, the Israeli sort of military side, in the Hebrew press, you don't see this in the English language press so much, but the military are trying to talk about a limited war. And this is why we've seen what we've seen in this last period. They say, well, we're not going to go on an oil war, because, first of all, they're not very confident about surviving an all-out war. But they're also saying, well, we can manage this.

And simply by assassinating key Hezbollah leaders, that will assassinate a key Hezbollah leaders, and that we'll do it by sort of targeted killing assassination. First of all, I don't think they know who, I mean, they know some of the lower level Hasbolo leaders, but they don't know. I mean, they've always claimed to do that. I know, because I've worked with Hezbollah for, gosh, well over a decade or war. I mean, their security is so, so tight and so strong, much more than Hamas or the Palestinians.

But anyway, I mean, the point I'm trying to make you, what happened? Hezbollah slammed the north. Over two days, we're still going on now. I mean, 60 rockets, it's burning. They destroyed land merrim. I mean, they weren't looking for civilian casualties. But while, I mean, they've destroyed so many military posts

and so many areas, and it's burning. way and then today there's another round of heavy rockets. Hezbollah started using new missiles. They have fired for the first time a surface-to-air missile, effectively against an F-16. The F-16 turned right and left as soon as it got Evo. I mean, that changes the whole equation in Lebanon. If they can't use their efforts,

force of the Lebanon, we don't know how many or what type of surface to have missiles, but it's now pretty clear that they do have them. I see you looking at the clock. Are you all right? Do you want to sort of call? In a moment, in a moment, yes, but for the moment, let's just continue a bit a bit long. I think we can continue a bit long. Okay, well, I don't want to mess up your... No, no, no, you're not. I can't stop it any time you want. So, you know, where is I going to take?

Because, you know, this will be a different war from one that Israel has ever experienced because Hezbollah has the capacity to use missiles into the, if you like, to the rear... safe area of Israel, where the population have not been largely untouched before. I mean, into Herzlir, Tel Aviv, and I mean, they have that capacity. We know that.

How long can Israel sustain a concerted air attack on their home base inside? All of these missiles are buried. They're in deep silos. They're not going to be able to destroy them by an air attack, even with Jadan bombs and things. They're at least 70 meters, if not deeper. They're ready for this. This is what happened in 2006.

So how much, if you like, resolve and steadfastness? Will the Israeli public show in this case? In 2006, it was 33 days. And then Israel started calling for an end to the conflict. I was in Lebanon during the 2006 war, so we saw it quite closely. So, you know, all of these are these things which mean, so what is America going to do? Ultimately, I suspect that the dynamics of America and what I said about the ruling strata means that America will feel obligated to come in, to us. How? It's not clear. By aircraft, by missiles. Well, then who knows what will happen.

We might have people coming across the border from Iraq. We might have Jordan. Already, Egypt is literally on the edge of a volcano because it's any time it could sort of explode. and if you senior, you know, Egyptians have been saying, you know, a war with Israel is inevitable. It's coming. It's just a question of when. So, I mean, the situation is really different.

And so is there a possibility that, you know, all of us will get sort of bundled together? Iraq, even the sort of Taiwan and all of these things. in the run-up to this very contentious period coming in the United States. I don't know. You could add another layer of concern, though, in terms of political culture, because I know people like Jack Matlock here's written about this,

because in the United States political culture, a lot of the narrative they frame, for example, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, by presenting this as not being a diplomatic, path. They had this idea building up that, you know, if they just stare down the enemy, go eye to eye, then, you know, you will have total victory. And Matlock writes about this in terms of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well by not talking about negotiating, negotiate the end in 89, but instead the collapse of 91, the whole argument, you know, Reagan stared down the Soviet Union. They had to surrender. They collapsed. And this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this

kind of, yeah, that the final ending, just if you escalate enough, go toe to toe, then the adversary will be defeated, that this is something that's become built into the system. Obviously, if you have a huge conflict

building up in the Middle East, with Russia, also China, I guess it's not a good combination to have. I mean, this is, you know, being the, this has been the process. This is what they do to Hamas, pressure. pressure, pressure. And it has been work.

Well, what it is doing is it is causing a pushback. I just wanted to make a few quick points in response to some of the things you said. Firstly, I have met people who talk in terms of biblical language. I had no idea that they'd achieved the kind of ascendancy in Israel that they now have, and that's clear. But I have found it absolutely impossible to talk or reason with people like that. The idea that you can ever negotiate with them is absolutely impossible. And anybody who is at all familiar with the history of this region,

going all the way back to, well, the Maccabees, or wherever, you would know that for people like that, apocalyptic outcomes are probably preferable to negotiate it once. I'm sorry to say this straightforwardly. That's right. You're absolutely right. Yeah. Now, the second thing I would say is this guy, I wanted just to talk about briefly, this ceasefire that, you know, Biden came up with, which he said that, you know, it was an Israeli proposal. You could have been an Israeli proposal, a genuine Israeli proposal. I would not have expected it to be announced in the way that it was by the American president.

I mean, it made absolutely no sense to me at the time. If there'd been an agreement on a ceasefire, the parties to the conflict would have been the people you would normally expect to announce it. Now, I'm still not completely clear as to what exactly is going on here. And I don't think we know the answers. But your point about the fact that the Americans are muddling and have. securing things and are making things look as if people have agreed to things which they probably haven't done. I think it has to be correct. I mean, I give an example. During the siege of Aleppo

in, I think it was 27, 2016, it all became resolved. There was a Russian-Turkish agreement, as I remember. And the two countries came together. They presented it to the Security Council. It was all worked out. We had a clear clarity about what was going to happen. There's nothing like this here. And, well, I've not been involved in hostage negotiations, obviously, or any kind of military negotiations at all of that kind. But I've been involved in many negotiations in my life. I've mediated a few. When there's this level of ambiguity and uncertainty, by definition, you're not This is going to fall apart. It is bound to.

Nobody's going to agree as to what was agreed. So what the Americans are doing here is not going to make the situation better. It's going to make it worse. That's the second thing I wanted to say. Now, the third relates to something I was reading in the Financial Times today, which is that the United States is apparently now giving itself carte blanche, the Treasury Department has, that they're going to impose sanctions on any financial entity in the world that gets involved in any kind of financial dealings with Russia.

The argument is that Russia now has a complete war economy. So if you presumably provide a credit line to enable one country to export mattresses to Russia, that somehow helps the Russian. military economy. Now, it's quite obvious to me that this is ultimately about sanctioning the Chinese banks. They've been talking about doing this for several weeks. They don't want to sanction the Chinese banks straightforwardly by sanctioning the Chinese banks. So they're going about this in this very complicated way, making out that these are anti-Russian sanctions when they're really anti-Chinese sanctions. We have American

admirals talking about creating a hellscape for the Chinese Navy in Taiwan. I mean, how many more conflicts do you need? You've got a problem in Ukraine, which is not being

sorted out. You have a conflict in the Middle East where I agree. I don't think there's a problem. And as I said, a ceasefire deal which is going to make the situation, worse. You're now coming after China as well by going after its banks and threatening them with Taiwan. And I have never met a single person from China, by the way, who feels differently

about Taiwan from the way the Chinese government says. Just saying, I mean, maybe there are such people, but I've never met any. So, I mean, what exactly are we doing? We are completely out of of control. That's not question. Is this a statement? But all your three statements are all correct. You know, constructive ambiguity. I mean, I've used it.

It's useful up to a point. But there's no point to it if you're trying to be too clever by half. And lose if you have no integrity. If your negotiator has no integrity in this. I mean, you know, you're not always going to be absolutely clear and you can allow both sides to read things. But, you know, this is a dangerous game to play, because when you'll find out, and if you take this too far,

it has, you know, I saw someone I know quite well, a Hamas leader, I've known him for a long time. He's a very sober, sensible man, and he was saying, he was saying, and he said, listen, Blinkland has become part of the problem, not the solution here. But it's this rhetoric I'm worried about, because we keep committing all those.

not, well, committing ourselves to things which can't follow through. For example, with China in the past, there was no one, everyone was clear that they wouldn't promise to come to Taiwan's defense. This was, again, they didn't deny it either, but they kept it ambiguous. And now we see the same with in the Middle East. So we committed to Taiwan, but then in the Middle East, we see, you know, all this rhetoric, you know, Israel has tried for self-defense, Hamas are terrorists

and we kind of lock ourselves into as well the scope for diplomacy and see the same with Russia we keep saying Russia can't be allowed to win has to be stopped at all costs but we don't want to go to war but still we make these commitments and to a large extent this also reflected

what we did in the period after 2014 to 2022 because we kept saying you know then NATO will expand effectively gave a dilemma to the Russians. So you're going to either you have to take military actions or you're going to have to accept this existential threat of NATO in Ukraine. So either one. And this is when you need diplomacy. But instead we make this blanket statements, Russia can't have any veto or what happens in Ukraine. So again, we keep, through a rhetoric, painting ourselves in a corner and leaving out any possibility. So it seems to be a continuous,

trend, which exacerbates all these conflicts. I'll just give you one little anecdote to sort of underline what happens. I mean, this is real in the sense I was doing the negotiations on behalf of the European Union for the Church of Nativity. It was under siege. There were about 250 Palestinians that were in the church, and the Israelis had put a crane up over the church, and they'd filled it with snipers, and anyone that was went in the garden or was seen through a window, was killed.

And I was doing those negotiations, and it got complicated for reasons because we got some peace activists coming in that announced they weren't going to cooperate with any negotiation. Outcome. But then suddenly, the White House realized that Ariel Sharon was going to come

and meet in the Oval Office. in the White House in the next few days. And suddenly, bang, the whole machine came in. There has to be a solution today. It's got to be a solution today. They kicked off the Israeli negotiating team. We was kicked off at the time CIA was brought in. We'll do the negotiation.

We'll sort it out. It has to be done tomorrow because the meeting is taking place with Sharon and Bush, and it's got to be arranged within 24 hours, and everything has got to move to that end. And it failed. It didn't work. It's not like that. You can't just bulldooms people into this situation.

And that's what we're basically seeing here. They're trying to, I can imagine, you know, Biden said to the head of CIA, for God's sake, we need quiet. the election. We want Quartan Gaza. Do what it takes. Get it. Get it now. And so we have all these clever tricks of constructive ambiguity saying one thing to one side, saying something. But they've been there before. They know the tricks. And it hasn't worked out. And now they are further apart than they were before this process by Biden started.

Any final words? Before we wrap us up. I think we are going to, we are living through very interesting times. This is what I'm going to say. It seems conflict on every, every front. My own sense, and I'm going to say it, I think the only real debate that's going on in Washington at the moment is those who say go after China as opposed to those who say go after Russia. And I think that's really the only actual debate that's going on at the moment. a real hard-headed look at what American interests actually are and a real serious attempt to pull back from this crisis in Europe,

which is unresolvable, in the way that it's being approached at the moment and the crisis in the Middle East, even more so. I don't think that exists, actually. And that is what makes the whole situation so dangerous. Now, which brings back to what Alistair was saying about Putin having to steer us through to all of these things. And I think he's the only one. I think, you know, the Chinese are equally understanding, dangerous the situation is. But in terms of Western policy, I've never known things so bad.

I have to say this. I really haven't. And, you know, listening to what we've been talking about today, not just talking about seeing what's happening, it is exasperating. It's as if there's a sort of drive to try and make things, to try to make all the wrong decisions to put us in an even worse position than for the one we might be in at the moment. Anyway, that's all I could say. I mean, I'm... It doesn't feel like history repeat itself. I remember the mid-2000s. The main debates in the US seem to be, should we prioritize Afghanistan or Iraq? And now, 20 years later,

shall we go after the Russians or the Chinese? So history doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme, does it. Elsa Crook, thank you so much for your time. Thank you. Thank you, both very much indeed. the talk and for your views. Appreciate it.