The Duran Podcast - What to Expect with the Return of Trump - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: January 19, 2025

What to Expect with the Return of Trump - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Donald Trump has packed his bags and is moving back into the White House. So assessing his foreign policy, what does he want to achieve and what's possible for him to achieve? So to discuss this, I'm very pleased to be joined by Professor John J. Mearsheimer and Alexander Mercurz. And, well, I thought the main two areas of conflict, obviously, that will require Trump's attention is obviously the Middle East and Ukraine. But I thought before we jump into these conflict areas, I thought we can also address America's relationship to its main allies, the Europeans, how this might change,

because we see now with the new polls just coming out, it seems most of the world is actually quite positive about Trump's return to the White House, with one exception, which is the Europeans. He seems to be taking a bit harder position against the Europeans, Obviously, he's more eager than Biden repairs to shift America's focus away from Europe towards Asia. But also, before even taking office, he's already threatened tariffs on Europeans. He demands higher military spending from them.

And at the same time, also suggesting America might seize Greenland, which is Denmark's territory. we see Musk backing the German opposition calling more or less for regime change in Britain. Again, I don't think there's going to be much pushback from the Europeans, to be honest. I think that will take the abuse as they gave up on defending national interest or self-preservation or even dignity a while ago. Perhaps I'm a bit too harsh. But I guess my main question is, what will Trump do with Europe? What does the relationship look like? Is he just want to renegotiate, get a bit more from the Europeans and offer less?

How do you read this more dismissive attitude, I guess, towards Europeans? Well, I'll take a quick cut at it and then turn it over to Alexander. I think that in an ideal world, what Trump would like to do is settle the Ukraine conflict, establish good relations with the Russians, and by and large, pull American troops out of Europe, he would have no problem putting into NATO. And he does want to focus on East Asia mainly. And he also understands that the Middle East is an area he can't get away from, not just Gaza, but there's the whole question of the Iran issue.

So he's not going to get away from the Middle East. He's got to pivot to East Asia in his own mind. And the place he'd like to exit is Europe. And again, he'd like to shut. down the Ukraine conflict. But I believe that it's almost impossible to see how he's going to shut down the Ukraine conflict and, you know, create a genuine peace agreement. And I don't see how he's going to be able to turn this over to the Europeans as he like to do. So my view is he's going to be stuck in Ukraine and he's going to be stuck in Europe and he's going to be stuck dealing with the

European allies for the foreseeable future. Not that much is going to change. Basically, Joe Biden has left him with a bed of nails in Europe as well as in other places. I just don't think Trump, despite all his interest in pursuing a radical strategy in Europe is going to be able to do much. I would agree with that, and I'm going to say something else. The Europeans at this moment in time, my senses, that they're listening to all the things that Trump is saying and they're whispering to each other,

and I'm saying, is this man really serious? Is he really serious about making a rapprochement with the Russians? does he really want to leave Europe? And if he does, what can we do to make it more difficult for him to do all of those things? Because to repeat again, the one thing the Europeans do not want, and we've discussed this in many programmes, is that they do not want the United States to leave Europe, but to downgrade significantly its relationship with Europe.

they're floating all kinds of ideas at the moment about sending European peacekeepers to Ukraine. They're talking about how they can persuade Trump to impose more oil sanctions on the Russians. They're discussing all of these things with each other, because ultimately they have, as they believe, a reason and interest in keeping the Americans as involved, not just in Ukraine, but ultimately in Europe. was possible. So I think Trump is going to have to contend with three things. First, he doesn't want to be seen and framed as the man who lost Ukraine and who suffered a military debacle and a catastrophe in Europe. And that's going to incline him to deal with the problem and to try and find some way to mitigate that and perhaps to prolong the war. That's my sense. The second is he's got to deal with the

Europeans who are going to be spoilers in any attempt he makes to try and leave. And of course he's also got to deal with his own people in Washington. I don't be his immediate team, but the usual people in the State Department, the Defense Department, all of that, who also wants to keep the United States in Europe and to commit further to the conflict in Ukraine and to all of those things. So I think John is absolutely right. I think he wants to wrap up Ukraine, move on to other things. But he's going to face a huge amount of opposition from all sorts of different angles and different parties.

And I think it's going to be very, very difficult for him to do. And I wonder whether it's going to be doable at all. Two quick follow-up points. First, it's quite interesting. you think about it, the Europeans have a vested interest in the Ukraine war not being settled, because if it's not settled, the Americans have to stay in Europe in a big way. If it is settled, then the Americans are basically free to get out. So perpetual war in Ukraine is in Europe's interest in a perverse way. Second point I'd make, and we've talked about this before,

but it's worth going back over. For Trump to get a peace agreement, he has to do at least two very important things. One, agree that Ukraine will not be in NATO, either de jure or de facto, that Ukraine will be a neutral state. And second, he has to accept the fact that the Russians have annexed these four oblasts

plus Crimea. I find it hard to believe that Trump will do that. that, more importantly, I believe that if he did do it, it would be almost impossible to get this past the Ukrainians, the Europeans, and the American foreign policy establishment. So, absent agreement on those two issues, how do you get an agreement with the Russians, a peace agreement, a meaningful peace agreement? And the answer is, you don't. I think the neutrality issues, I agree that this might be more complicated because, again, I think, well, Trump has committed himself to anything, but the Europeans been hammering on for so long that some security guarantees has to be made and also the irreversible, as we say, path to NATO membership.

On the territorial issue, I tend to be a bit optimistic because the Russians don't control all the territories of these oblasts. And I think they might be giving themselves some leeway to do some territorial swaps, perhaps. And also, I think it can be sold into the public as well. Even after three years of war propaganda, we can say, listen, Putin wanted to take all of Ukraine, even though, yeah, this is nonsense. But again, narratives are quite important in the West. And, you know, he only got 20%. So it's victory for us.

So I think we can pull it off. But I think the neutrality issue is very painful because it's, It's, yeah, we created such a powerful narrative. But I also wanted just to ask about, from the Europeans' perspective, how much, will they continue with this, though? I know they want to keep the Americans here, but how much abuse are they prepared to take? I mean, through the years, I think from 2008, they're willing to invite to give future membership to Ukraine, even though they knew it would create war. I remember when the spy scandals were in Germany, the main instinct was to make excuses for it.

They kept quiet during the Nord Stream. They didn't say much when their industries were cannibalized. But now, even with the current issues with Trump, when he says, you know, you only have to buy European-American energy. It seems like the EU is preparing itself to cut off from all Russian LNG. When Trump says he wants to seize Greenland, the response. is, well, we can meet and talk. Maybe we can give us a nice base agreement. So it seems like we're willing to meet any threat with some kind gesture.

Will the Europeans adjust to America's different priorities? Or do you see the Europeans having any alternatives at all? I'll let you take that one, Alexander. You're muted. Right. I think not only do the Europeans not have, have any alternatives. I think that their anxiety to keep the Americans in is at this moment in time greater than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War. And there are two reasons for

this. Firstly, they're perfectly well aware now that they have a very angry Russia on their doorstep and they don't want to be left handling with that all by themselves. But also, and I think this is a thing that perhaps it's not so obvious, but from the standpoint of London, it is. The tensions within Europe itself are increasing. We have increasing strains within Germany, within France, but also between European states. And we've discussed this many times. You've explained it very well, John. The Americans are the best. big stabiliser. The very last thing the Europeans want is a situation where the Americans go. And the Europeans are not only left confronting the Russians, but ultimately confronting each other.

And that is a deep nightmare and one that all European governments, however uneasy they may be, about what the Americans are doing, however unhappy they might be about things Trump, is saying, however resentful they are of each other, it's the one thing that they all share and which unites them all. The interesting thing was a couple of weeks ago, I was in Hungary. I went to Budapest. I met many people there, including, you know, they have deputy foreign minister, the deputy finance minister, people from Orban's office. They're very keen for the Americans to stay. The British of the other end. if you like at the Spend. They're also very keen for the Americans to stay. Everybody wants the

Americans to stay. I think even the Russians deep down want the Americans to stay. So put the Russians aside. Within Europe, whatever the Americans do at the moment, the alternative to not having the Americans here is even worse. Maybe people won't articulate it, but I think it is their fear. And because of that, at the moment, there is no limit to the pain they will absorb in order to at least try to keep this American alliance going. The fact that Trump shows some sign of wanting the United States to actually exit, to leave, that, I think, is in anything going to make the the Europeans, even more keen to make concessions to keep the Americans here. By the way, just quickly to add to what you said, John, I think you're absolutely correct about the point that

from a European point of view, and I don't think this is, in fact, if you go deep down, you can find sort of semi-admissions of this. It's better to keep the war in Ukraine going, to keep the Americans in, or at least the conflict in Ukraine going, in order to keep the Americans in, then to have it settled, to have a peace agreement, to have this problem resolved so that the Americans can go. And that's one reason why we have these eccentric decisions, like the British signing a 100-year treaty with the Ukrainians. It's not, I mean, the treaty itself is a nonsense, but it preserves the commitment. commitments to Ukraine and is therefore a vehicle to trying to keep the conflict going. Just two quick points.

One is that with regard to dealing with Trump, a lot of it is just bombast. Trump, he likes to blowviate. He likes to make these outrageous statements. And he offends everybody because he doesn't talk in diplo, speak. He has his own language. He's like a New York roughneck, and it drives people crazy. But at the end of the day, it doesn't matter very much. If you think about his first term in office from 2017 to 2021, he was constantly offending the Europeans. But in terms of actual policy, did anything really change? No, I don't think so. Nothing of any consequence. Yes, there were a lot of hurt feelings

but you can accommodate to hurt feelings. And I think one could argue that we're going to have to listen to him over the next four years, lamb-based the Europeans at every turn. But in fact, in terms of concrete policy, not much is going to change. Second point I'd make is, and I'm arguing somewhat against that first point, is if you look at what's happening in Europe, Europe is in real trouble. And this is especially true when you look at Germany. The consequences of this war in Ukraine for Germany have been disastrous.

And I don't see the situation getting better anytime soon. And you wonder sometimes, aren't the Germans going to stand up at some point and say, enough is enough? And we're going to break with the Americans in certain important ways and set off on our own course. Isn't that likely to happen? But it seems that the answer to that, building on what you said, Alexander, is that that's not going to happen, that the Germans are going to continue to basically be America's lackey. And when the Americans to tell them to jump, their only question is how much higher. And if that is true that the Europeans are not, and the Germans in particular,

and not going to stand up to the Americans, the question you have to ask yourself, is, where does this all lead for the Europeans? Because what's happening in Europe is not good. And a lot of that has to do with the fact they have been following America's lead. And this, of course, all goes back to what happened in April 2008, when Angela Merkel and Sarkozy should have continued to stand up to George W. Bush about NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia instead of caving. But they caved, and the Europeans tend to cave all.

the time, much to their detriment, I think. But the German obedience, it works within the political class, and one can argue, yes, they will continue to obey and be a whipping boy the correct expression, but it only works to certain extent because the whole point here is that they're not really addressing their own national interest anymore. And I guess the great irony for Germany is that perhaps their most important partner to be an economic, powerhouse in Europe is the Russians. If they have proper relations with the Russians, they could actually be a proper center of power. Instead, they seem to be ignoring at every turn their national interest. Now, if you ignore your national interest over time, a vacuum would be created, which will be filled by new political forces. And you do see on the left, as well as on the right, completely new political forces standing up and starting to

challenge the government. Indeed, that's part of the panic now, I think, that both the left and the right is talking about restoring gas cooperation with the Russians. I think a lot of this is too late, perhaps. And, yeah, perhaps even having an independent foreign policy. I think it might be a bit late for this as well, as a lot of its deindustrialization. I don't think necessarily can be reversed. But if they don't respond to national interest, at some point something's going to start cracking, I think.

Again, I might be wrong. on the second issue was just what Trump's wants in Ukraine, I'm just curious for the both of you to what extent will he actually have some I guess possibility some room for maneuver because he's not taking over a stable situation

as if the front lines are stable in contrast the situation for Ukraine keeps unraveling And even its ability to defend cities is collapsing. So we see every city now falling faster than the previous. So even only today, the key defensive cities, be it Velika Nova Silica or Chaziviar, they seem to be both only days, if not a week, away from falling. And the Russians are about to enter the Nipro Oblast for the first time,

where there's no real defensive lines and there's no industrial towns really to hold back the Russians. So things appear to be going for the wars very faster by the day. So I guess in such a situation where there's no stable front line, can Trump, he will be very forced. Either has to get involved to try to stabilize it by more weapons, so doing the Biden line, or he's going to have to accept a very painful piece, so having less negotiation power. Alternatively, the third option is simply take a step back and say,

this is not my problem, it's the Europeans and Biden, and let Ukraine collapse. But what can he actually do in this situation? What would he achieve, you think, in such a scenario? If Ukraine is collapsing again, they might reduce the conscription age, they might get some new weapons, they might get lucky things, might improve, I don't think so, but if that's the case, what can you do in some? such a situation. Let me say a quick word or two about that and then turn it over to Alexander, who obviously

spends much time on a show talking about this issue. It seems to me that there's not much Trump can do to stem the tide that Biden hasn't done already. Biden has tried mightily to do everything he can to buttress the Ukrainian forces so that they can stand up to the Russian steamroller. It's not like there's this huge inventory of weapons in the back closet that Biden has been unwilling to use that Trump can now use to rescue the situation. There's just nothing in the cupboard. And so Trump, you know, has no real cards to play for purposes of slowing down the Russian offensive. And as we all know, the Russians are on the march, and there is a real danger that the Ukrainian army is just going to collapse. And if they don't collapse, they're just

going to lose more and more territory, because the Russians are going to continue to push real hard to conquer all four of those oblasts, and I believe more territory as well. And the problem that Trump really faces is that he's going to be the one who's in the White House when Ukraine clearly loses. The West can now tell these stories, which are not accurate, that, you know, we're standing up with the Ukrainians against the Russians. Everything will eventually be fine. You know, they can make these kinds of arguments now, but there's going to reach a certain point where it's so obvious that the Ukrainians have lost that they're going to have to admit it. And what is Trump going to do in that situation?

This is going to be a tremendous humiliation for him, a tremendous blow, because the Democrats and many Republicans as well will beat him over the head for losing Ukraine. So he runs a real risk here of getting into serious trouble if Ukraine, loses. And of course, the alternative strategy is for him to recognize this and cut a deal now by satisfying the demands of the Russians. But as we said at the top of the show, that's almost impossible to do. So I think you could make a very important argument that Trump is in a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation. And he's just, to put it simply or put it bluntly, he's just destined to lose in Ukraine.

Well, can I just say two things? Can I just first, first of all, start about Germany because I thought it was important points to make about Germany because Germany is in a particular situation in Europe because putting aside the history, which of course you cannot do, everybody in Europe knows the history. Everybody knows the history.

Germany is potentially the one country in Europe which can dominate. the others. So take America away. You have a situation where you're not just left confronting the Russians if you are other states. You're also left confronting the Germans as well. What has been a major stabilizer in Europe is not just that the Americans are there to control the Russians. It's that the Americans are there above the Germans. So that the Americans are there above the Germans. So that is unsettling, not just for other European states, seeing what's going to happen in Germany. It is unsettling for the Germans themselves, because they've had all kinds of experiences

of what it would mean if they're left dealing with the other European states by themselves. And that is one particular reason, one further reason, why the German political class has been so accommodating of American demands until recently. It's a very different situation from the one in the Cold War. During the Cold War, nobody really believed that there was any possibility at all that the Americans could leave. So at that time, political leaders like De Gaul or Villabrant or whoever could pursue foreign policies, which could strike deals with the Russians with each other, would do all sorts of

things, because they were always confident that the American stabiliser and mediator would always be there. Now that there's this German concern, however real it is, that the Americans might leave all European leaders, perhaps the Germans in some ways most of all worry about the danger of that. They want to keep the Americans in, and that is why they're prepared to go to these extraordinary lengths, these incredibly self-destructive lengths, to try to keep the Americans in Europe as they are.

Now, this is probably not sustainable for the long term, but for the moment, I think it is where we are. Now, about the war and about the war, and about the situation and the war, I'm just going to say a few things, which is that absolutely, John is absolutely right, the Russians are advancing westwards,

and that is probably not going to change. I don't see how it can change. I'm going to suggest, and I'm just going to throw out this thing, that this is in fact one leverage that Trump actually has in the situation, because he could conceivably, if he knew how to do it,

if he was to Iran or someone like that, He could come along and say, look, we do need some kind of settlement with the Russians. Because if we don't get it, they will simply win. And then we will be left all of us. You, we, the Americans, the Europeans, everyone will be left with this terrible almighty mess. So let's try and cobble together some kind of understanding with them, even if it isn't a full-scale agreement to try to contain that disaster.

Whether Trump can do it is another matter. But as to your point, John, that if the disaster comes, they'll try to fasten it on him. Well, Robert Kagan, who we all know, has just written a long piece in the Atlantic, which already is doing that very thing. Yeah. Can I just say a word about your point on the Germans, because I was very tempted to raise that issue.

What struck me in our discussion, and Glenn started this off, was that during the Cold War, and even up until the Iraq War in 2003, the Europeans stood up to the Americans on a number of important issues. Remember, both the French and the Germans refused to go along with the Iraq War in 2003. And I hadn't thought about why things changed after that, but Alexander, I think you put your finger on it. What happened is the Europeans became aware after 2003 with the rise of China and the pivot to Asia. Remember, Hillary Clinton announces the pivot to Asia in 2011, 2011, China's rising, dot, dot, dot. At that point, it became clear that the Europeans might pivot away from Europe so as to be able to pivot to Europe. And then the Europeans became remarkably subservient. I hadn't thought of it until you mentioned that, which is, I think, very important.

because the imperative for us to pivot to Asia is not going to go away. And it's really reflected in someone like Trump. So it'll be very interesting to see how that plays itself out. And this, of course, gets back to the discussion we were having before about how important it is for the Europeans, for the Ukraine war to not be resolved and to continue on because that keeps the Americans in. I just wanted to make that one point.

I think you're correct, though, because, well, if you remember in the early 90s as well, the French, especially were quite vocal that, well, if we don't have some European cooperation in the European Union, it would be an American-dominated world. We can't have this, so we have to really assert our own place in the world. And obviously, this is far gone. I think a key challenge is that the Europeans, they envisioned a unipolar world which was based on two pillars, the United States and the European Union as two equals. Now, this creates some problems in the priorities because on one hand, we'd like to renegotiate the relationship with the Americans.

So what more political sovereignty, while the Americans are insisting, we should pay more for security. But anyways, this was the main idea. But once the Americans suggest, well, actually, the main interest of ours is in Asia, the whole collective hegemony project falls apart. we would like the Americans in Europe and we would like to have

equality, but I think an equal status, of course, this is not going to happen anymore, but I think the priority of course is then nonetheless to have the Americans. I also just just a quick point on what you mentioned, John, with the Russians taking more and more territory. I think

I very much agree, but I don't think this is the only problem. As the Ukrainians can't defend their lines anymore, they're also forced to withdraw. So now that they're losing more territory, it's also devastating for manpower because once you have disorganized withdrawals, there's a huge casualties. This is usually the case in wars, but you see this now as well.

Only the last 24 hours when you see the Ukrainians trying to escape from the Kourajama pockets. They are just being massacred on the way out. It's quite horrific. The video's coming out. And also when they don't have time to withdraw, like in Velika Nova Silica, they're now effectively in a cauldron. They can't escape anymore.

it's quite it's quite gruesome what happens in the final stages of war when you have this more or less increasingly disorganized withdrawals anyways I thought yeah we can perhaps if it's okay switch a little bit gear to

the Middle East as America wants to get out of Europe at least Trump does but it also wants to get out of the Middle East at least Trump has suggested he wanted an end to the forever wars and a common friend of ours, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, you know, Trump recently shared a video with

his, where he's scolding Netanyahu, which I thought was fascinating. We spoke to Jeffrey Sacks about this, but what does this all mean? Is Trump willing to demote Israel, like is demoting the Europeans in order to shift focus to Asia, well, in China? Or what will he do about the Middle East? Again, the ceasefire most seem to attribute it to him. I tend to agree, but what is happening? Will this hold? Probably not. Anyways, many questions at once. But yeah, what do you see Trump doing with the Middle East, both of you? Just very quickly, you remember Jake Sullivan about a week or so before October 7th was gloating about the fact that the Middle East was so peaceful. And this, of course, is for the obvious reason

that the United States has a deep-seated interest in having a peaceful Middle East. We don't need wars in the Middle East. But given everything that's happened since October 7th, it's quite clear that the potential for the United States to get sucked into a major war in the Middle East is very great, mainly in Iran. And furthermore, the Israel-Palestine conflict is a disaster for the United States, both morally and strategically. So I think Trump coming into office wanted to shut down the conflict in Gaza.

And he basically forced the Israelis to accept the ceasefire agreement that had been on the table for a long period of time. This is Trump saying, I just want no more conflict or open conflict in Gaza if we can avoid it. And it appears at this point he has been successful, how this all plays out. as you said, Glenn, remains to be seen. But that leaves the big issue of Iran. And there's no question that the Israelis will put great pressure on us and domestic forces inside the United States, mainly the Israel lobby,

who put great forces on Trump to attack Iran. Absolutely. And in fact, there's been two articles, both in Axios. I don't know how authoritative Axios is, but they say they've been informed about this, that first Trump's people and then Biden's people were contacted from late November, December sometime. And they were both discussions took place

about strikes on Iran. So this is absolutely on the agenda. I mean, the trouble is you may want to close the Middle East down. You might want peace and stability there. But that might not be possible because, of course, events in the Middle East have a way of getting, you know, following their own course. And the great problem that the United States always has in the Middle East is that it cannot control its ally. Now, John, you've written about this.

I was actually reading your book, by the way. That's why I mentioned it before. I was reading your book. But about Israel, the Israelis will ultimately always do. do what they choose to do. It can end out disastrously for them. I think Gaza, the war in Gaza, has been a disaster for them. This is my view, and I absolutely hold it from every perspective. I think they're massively overextended. I think they find themselves in conflict in all sorts of places. But the impulse in Israel seems to be, instead of rethinking and retrenching,

it seems to be to look for more problems, as far as I can sell, more conflicts in the hope that you can solve them. And until the United States is able to get a grip on its own airline, I think that the problems in the Middle East will not go away. It is as simple as this. Yeah. I think the Israelis are in deep trouble. And by the way, I believe the ceasefire agreement that they have signed. is an acknowledgment of defeat in Gaza. You want to understand that they said, the Israelis said that they were going to decisively defeat Hamas, finish Hamas off, at least as an effective

fighting force. They acknowledge across the board now, they meaning the Israelis, that Hamas is alive and well. It is reconstituted itself. Furthermore, in the ceasefire agreement, they have agreed, to my amazement, to pull all Israeli forces out of Gaza and to allow the Palestinians in Gaza to return to their homes, which means that their effort to ethnically cleanse northern Gaza has completely failed. Furthermore, they have agreed to remove Israeli troops from the Philadelphia corridor, which is the line that separates Gaza from Egypt, which they said they were going to stay at for as long as was necessary. Furthermore, food aid, fuel, medicine, and water are going to now begin to flow into Gaza in large amounts.

What's happened in Gaza is, in my opinion, a defeat for Israel, given what it said its goals were. The situation in Gaza today, once the ceasefire is put in place, is not going to be altogether that different than it was on October 7th before Hamas attacked into Israel. It's really quite remarkable. And as you said, Alexander, and it's absolutely true, the Israelis are overextended. Not only have they been fighting in Gaza in a long war, and you want to remember, this is an army that. that's constituted to fight short wars, not long wars. They've been deeply involved in Gaza, but they now are occupying southern Lebanon,

and they are occupying a huge slice of territory in Syria. And furthermore, as we were just talking about, they're talking about attacking Iran. This is a country that is overextended, and it depends heavily on the United States. So Trump does have some leverage over them, and he is not worried about his re-election. So he may put some, not a whole heck of a lot,

but some pressure on the Israelis, and that coupled with the fact that they are in trouble may work to curb their aggressive tendencies. How much, who knows? By the way, did you see that yesterday, the Israelis were attacking Jalani's forces in Syria? They were directly attacking them. didn't take them long to pick a fight with the new Syrian regime.

And of course, as we said, they're very anxious to go to war against Iran. I think it's important not to attribute all the changes to Trump's amazing diplomatic skills. Again, I think what's happened with Israel, besides delivering a lot of death and destruction to Gaza and to Lebanon, I think it's difficult to see how we can measure this as a success, as you pointed out, given the objectives they set forth. So I think they did overextend themselves. They are not able to achieve their objectives.

And I think probably a lot of the willingness to embrace this ceasefire indeed comes from the military, which is exhausted itself in Israel. So it might not just be, again, Trump's... pre-presidential diplomatic skills. And I think it's important to also recognize the limitations of Trump, with all this bombast one often gets the impression he can perform miracles. But I think, as you mentioned, there's very few cards to play in Ukraine, and also in the Middle East, he might have been blessed with Israel's exhaustion.

But an interesting topic was brought up here, though. the Israel now attacked HTS, again, the new government in Syria, and also there seems to be more growing tensions now between Turkey and Israel. How do we see the situation changing? I mean, we spoke back in December, and I think all three of us agreed that the situation in Syria was nothing, if not very unstable. Too many players are in the game. You have the Americans, wants to stay there. You have now the Turks in, you have of course, HTS, who does not want the Kurds, much like the Turks.

I mean, there are a lot of players, and many of them have competing interest. They seem barely unified when they were anti-Assad, now that Assad is gone. You see this holding together? Well, I can be fairly brief and then pass over to John, but I think this clash between Israel, and the US Syrian authorities, HTS, is further evidence that Israel has just replaced one problem in Syria with another potentially even bigger problem. And the problem with Israel is that the more problems it accumulates, the more its predisposition seems to be to look for ever more grandiose and violent solutions to those problems.

So there's already talk about a war with Turkey, which, I mean, it seems to me crazy, but there are people in Israel who are actually talking in this way. And there's even apparently been a report from a committee in Israel, actually saying that Israel should prepare for a war with Turkey. And, of course, there's continued to be this agitation for a war against, Iran, it's not just that Israel is overextended, but that also there's this dynamic within Israeli politics as well, which seems to drive towards ever greater radicalization. This is going to be a very, very difficult problem for any president of the United States

to deal with and contend with, especially given the fact that even if the president himself wants to restrain Israel. As John has discussed, and I think the problem, has got much worse since he wrote about this, I think the problem is that the lobbies in the United States that will support axiomatically

whatever forward line Israel takes have actually got stronger. At one point in my life, I spent a lot of time studying how Israel was created, going back to the early 1900s and marching forward up to 1948, and then even looking at how Israeli leaders behaved once the state was created. I just was very curious how this was done, because it was really a Herculean task to create a Jewish state in a world that was filled with

Arabs. But anyway, one thing that stands out is that from the very beginning, and this, of course, is true up to the present, is that the Israelis have had a deep-seated faith in the utility of military power. They thought that the big stick was the best way to deal with the Palestinians, and it was the best way to deal with the countries around them. They didn't favor diplomacy, they didn't favor detente. What they favored was the big stick. And inside of Israel, when it came to dealing with the Palestinians, there's this famous concept of the Iron Wall that was invented by Zeev Yavatinsky, who was an early Zionist thinker. And the idea of the Iron Wall was that you could literally beat the Palestinians into submission.

You could beat them up and eventually get them to accept the fact that the Israelis were in charge and they were second or third-class citizens. And the Israelis have never lost that faith in big stick diplomacy, both in terms of dealing with internal adversaries and external adversaries. And I'm a person who just believes that military force is important and sometimes military force solves problems. But in the end, most of the problems that we face in the world are political problems. And there has to be a political solution in most cases. I mean, in World War II, when you're fighting Japan and Germany, the solution was ultimately military. You had to go into Berlin and go to Hitler's bunker.

Okay. But in most cases, diplomacy really matters. Politics matters enormously. And the Israelis just don't buy that argument at all. They're not interested in a political solution with the Palestinians. They're not interested in a political deal or diplomatic. diplomatic deal with the Iranians. They just want to use the big stick. And it has not worked with the Palestinians. That we were just, that's what we were just talking about. Look at the cease

fire agreement, despite the horrendous destruction they wrought on Gaza, despite executing a genocide, they have now reached the ceasefire agreement, which is an acknowledgement of defeat. And when you look at Iran, there is no military solution here. The idea that you can take military force and destroy forever Iran's nuclear capability is delusional. So if they suck us into this idea of attacking Iran, it's not going to solve the problem. We're just going to end up in an even worse situation. But the whole idea of Israel being in a partner of the United States, I'm wondering if this is becoming exhausted. Again, this is very famous or, let's say, a renowned video at least of Biden in the 1980s, or I think it's the 80s, where he makes the point that we should not apologize for Israel, because if there wasn't an Israel, they would have to invent one, because this is America's way of projecting foreign.

into the region. And this is fair enough. All great powers would use certain proxies to project force. But over time, it seems it's the Israelis who gain more and more influence over American politics. Again, there's been an issue discussed in the US over the decades. I think they were better at balancing it under, for example, Nixon than now. But anyways, it seems as if over time now the US interest is shifting, not just this pivot to Asia, which also applies to the Europeans, but in general the goodwill towards Israel appears to be, might be not the vanishing, but at least reducing. We see the new generation of Americans at least seem to take a more critical view of Israel. I don't think the genocide has helped Israel in any way. And you see both on the left

and the right more preparedness to speak up, maybe not among the politicians yet, but among media figures, for example. I was surprised to see Tucker Carlson saying, why are we listening to them? This is not America first. And they're pushing very hard back. I'm just wondering, as much like the Germans, as if they're not pursuing their national interest anymore,

something eventually will crack. I'm wondering if the same will happen in the United States. If you go on for too long, as you wrote in your book about Israeli lobby, if this is not in the U.S. interest anymore to support Israel and everything it does, at what point does something crack and America begins to push a little bit back against Israel and chart a different foreign policy which might not simply be a copy paste of what Israelists want?

Glenn, it has hardly ever been in our interest to support Israel. The idea that Israel is a strategic asset to the United States even during the Cold War is not a serious argument. That's why you have some. such a powerful lobby. You wouldn't need a lobby if Israel was a strategic asset. If Israel was doing our bidding and we thought it was wonderful to have this attack dog in the Middle East doing X, Y, and Z, you wouldn't need a lobby. You have a remarkably powerful lobby. So excellent points.

Alan Bershowitz once said, Jews of my generation created what is probably the most powerful lobby in the history of democracy. That's what he said. This is an incredibly powerful lobby. And the reason it's there is because if the United States was left to its own druthers, we would not support Israel. It's a strategic liability. And it's also a moral liability, as this recent genocide makes clear. And the problem that Trump faces is that he can push back against Israel. But you want to understand that there are real limits to which, he can do. If he really tries to get tough with Israel, the lobby will move in and they will cause him huge amounts of trouble. The Middle East is going to be a problem. And I have to say,

given the realities that we've just been talking about, I don't think that Trump is going to be able to simply walk away from the Middle East any more than he can walk away from Israel. from Europe. I just don't think it's an option. By the way, on the point about Israel being an asset, an asset of the United States in the Middle East, I mean, the history of the Middle East just doesn't show that at all.

The United States had many friends in the Middle East before Israel appeared. The alliance with Saudi Arabia was forged before Israel appeared. It was forged during the Second World War. So I don't think that Israel has, added anything to American power. I think all it has done is given the United States endless trouble, but there it is. That's what the Americans have on their hands until they make the decision that in their own interests, this relationship has to change. It doesn't mean abandoning Israel,

but explaining to the Israelis that there is genuine limits to the amount of support that the United States is prepared to give. them and telling them that the time has finally come, that they must make peace with their neighbours and with the Palestinians they live amongst. Until that happens, we're not going to get peace in the Middle East. Yeah, I think that that's definitely true. Sad but true. I guess a last question, though. What can we expect, again, both of you from happening in the Middle East now?

I know it's a bit too open of a question, but of course, I don't know, I'm a bit pessimistic about the ceasefire holding necessarily in Palestine, but with Lebanon, this ceasefire also appears to be violated with increased frequency. We have Syria, obviously, which could, if not fragment, at least, continue to be more or less a war zone. but also Iran more specifically Do you see it as likely as Israel is being able to pull in the Americans into attacking Iran if so to what extent would the Russians and the Chinese come in to

the rescue of Iran I know this would be a lot of speculations but given how interests are shifting and yeah the priorities of the different states what is the likelihood especially on the Iranian issue that this could be a trigger for a more great power war.

Let me say a few words about Iran. I think the Israelis don't only care about the possibility that Iran will go down the nuclear road. In other words, start to weaponize, actually start to weaponize. The Israelis are profoundly upset at the mere fact that, that Iran has retained the capability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium. This is the reason that the Israelis were so adamantly opposed to the JCPOA, because the JCPOA did not eliminate Israel's ability, excuse me, Iran's ability to make fizzle material or produce fizzle material.

So the Israelis are going to continue to push for an attack now, even though Iran is not going down the nuclear weapons road. And my sense is that Trump will be able to resist that. Maybe not, but my sense is he will be able to resist it. But the question is, what happens if Iran actually does decide to weaponize? And it begins to develop fizzle material that's bomb level grade, bomb grade level, and it begins to build weapons and delivery systems. What do we do then? And I think in that case, the United States would probably attack Iran along with Israel.

So I think as long as Iran doesn't weaponize, there is a serious possibility. I'm choosing my words carefully here. There's a serious possibility we can head off an American attack. And an Israeli attack, I mean, despite all the bombast from the Israelis, it's hard to see how the Israelis can take out all of the nuclear facilities in Iran and put an end to any possibility that Iran will get a bomb. Israelis can't do it alone. They really need the American.

And as I say, I don't think the Americans will do it until Iran is actually moving towards weaponization. I agree with that. Now, as it just happens, Iran has just signed an agreement, a treaty with Russia, literally as we're making this program. Now, it is not an alliance. In fact, I've just seen some of the provisions of it. It absolutely clearly says that neither side is making any commitments to come to the defense of the other.

I don't think the Russians are ever going to come to rush to the defense of Iran if it finds itself in conflict with the United States. I mean, that isn't going to happen. But I think that what you will probably see is the Russians and others helping Iran to build, up its own conventional military capabilities. And if that is true, then if those military capabilities develop over time, that might persuade the Iranians in their own interests that they don't need to go nuclear. And that might actually act as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. It might take away the incentive to attack Iran. And Iran itself,

might feel that it doesn't need the leverage of retaining the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons and it can dispense with it. So that's possible. I mean, I don't want to have a crystal ball. It may not quite work out that way. I think Iran is a pretty sophisticated player in terms of the Middle East. And I think that the Israelis perhaps underestimate the extent to which the Iranians are able to keep things moving in the Middle East without getting themselves drawn into a confrontation with Israel that will involve the United States, which would be a disaster for Iran, and by the way, it would also be bad for the Americans and the Israelis also. About the general situation in the Middle East, I think for the moment it's very bad

and probably going to get worse. But going back to what John says, I completely agree. I think the Gaza outcome, even if it doesn't stick, is a confession of failure. So what we are seeing is Israeli military power is now coming up against limits.

And for the long term, and it may be the very long term, that might be, a reason for hope that once we found our way through, we will get to a point where it just comes to be acknowledged that you can't go on fighting and doing things and the United States can't go on supporting Israel fighting and doing things like that

and that some kind of general settlement is the way forward. But I think we've got a very long way to go before we reach that point. And realistically, it's not going to happen in the four years that Trump is president. Just to pick up on your point about Russia and Iranian nuclear weapons, it's very important to emphasize that the Russians are adamantly opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Absolutely. Absolutely. Can I just say that's completely true. They've said that. There's no doubt about it.

And you remember Alexander and Glenn, And the Russians played a key role in putting together the JCPOA. The Russians don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons. To take it a step further, your point about Russia giving Iran conventional weaponry that would allow them to defend themselves and, of course, the nuclear sites, that would go a long way towards deterring an American or even an Israeli attack. So if the Russians put pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, but yet give them the capabilities, the conventional capabilities to defend their nuclear sites, that would go a long way towards heading off trouble, which is

not to say you wouldn't have a war, but it would go a long way toward preventing that. What's very interesting, what you have here is the Americans have no interest in attacking Iran. It's not in our interest. That's why we helped foster the JCPOA. The Russians would like to shut this one down. The Iranians don't want a war, and I believe the Iranians wouldn't develop nuclear weapons if they didn't have these threats from the United States and Israel. It's really the Israelis who are the problem here. And as I said before, the Israelis can't stand to live with the fact, that Iran has a reprocessing and an enrichment capability. But the Iranians won't get rid of those capabilities.

That's what we found out when we negotiated the JCPOA, and they've made it clear since then. They're going to keep that option open to develop a bomb, and that means keeping an enrichment and a reprocessing capability. And you can understand why the Israelis are unhappy about that. but I think they're just going to have to learn to live with that because nothing's going to change. But I think it is not that difficult

to prevent Iran from acquiring a bomb. Well, I think people often neglect that the nuclear weapon is the ultimate equalizer. So I very much agree with what Alexander said as well, that this we perhaps should welcome Russia supplying any conventional weapons to Iran because if it can defend itself with conventional weapons, then it doesn't have to go after the bomb. This is one of the things that worried me when Syria got knocked out and destroyed

was it seemed to foster the belief that in addition to the destruction, or not destruction, but the partial destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, that Iran might feel vulnerable and exposed in which a bomb might be attractive. but I do think that might, it's a bit premature given that they do have proper conventional capabilities. And if they're further assisted, I don't think they have to go through this, down this path. Also, as both be very much correct, added, I think not just the Russians, but the Chinese will be very appalled by their new friend Iran if they would begin to develop nuclear weapons.

So I think they would avoid this. By the way, I would also apply this to Russia. I think the extent to which, which is uncertain China has assisted Russia or definitely Iran has supplied drones to Russia, you know, to what extent should this be welcomed by the West? We keep talking as if defeating Russia on the battlegrounds should be a great idea. But if we accept that Russia sees this an existential threat and our goal is to defeat and destroy Russia, I mean, what of God's green earth are we doing here? They would definitely resort to nuclear weapons.

So perhaps we should be a bit happy that they do have conventional weapons to check the West. Otherwise, I think we could have been in nuclear war already. Anyway, it's just a final comment. I think, you know, one would assume at least that once an actor is unchecked as the West was after the Cold War, one would expand and push for additional power until one is balanced. And it does appear that NATO has been balanced in Ukraine. It also appears now we have been balanced, not just the Israelis, but the American sponsors as well as the Europeans in the Middle East.

Well, one would assume when it's not possible to expand anymore, one is balanced that if there's a mutual acceptance of a new status quo, that a new peace agreement could come in place, I'm not sure if this assumes too much rationality or, yeah, just as a final question before we, yeah, wrap this up. Too much, too much rationality is, I think that the great problem with, I think we do eventually find our way towards rational outcomes, but I think we have to sort of get through all kinds of fears and anxieties and worries and anger.

and we're talking about a West that briefly had a moment of enormous power, I mean, extraordinary power such as we found ourselves after the end of the Cold War. It is ultimately unsurprising that it's very, very difficult to let it go and that we are very, very angry about the fact that it has been taken from us, I mean, you know, we are, you know, human beings and, you know, anger and resentments of that kind are unsurprising. Eventually, no doubt, we will get there, but, you know, we probably got quite a long way to get to go before we do. I would just say in conclusion, Glenn, in response to your question, there is hardly any chance of getting a meaningful peace agreement in Ukraine, getting. getting meaningful peace agreements between Israel and its various adversaries in the Middle East.

I think the best we can hope for is frozen conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East. If we can just shut down the genocide and Gaza, that would be a huge step forward. and if we can prevent a war between Iran and Israel plus maybe the United States, that would be a huge step forward. But I'm sad to say I don't see much chance of getting meaningful peace agreements in either one of these regions. I just hope we can freeze the conflicts and then smart diplomacy will take over and we will be successful in avoiding having those frozen conflicts turn back into hot conflicts. But it's going to be,

I think, a herculean task both in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe more generally to avoid big trouble down the road. Because as I've said on a number of occasions, when you talk about Ukraine, superimposed on the Ukraine conflict is potential trouble over the Arctic, the Baltic, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova, and the Black Sea. So the potential for trouble in Europe is very great. And I don't have to go down the litany or problems in the Middle East. So it's going to be rough sailing. Donald Trump is going to have his hands full.

Sadly, yes, I agree. I just think the world order that exists since the end of the Cold War, The world order is obviously shifting as the distribution of power shifting and new balances are being, balance of powers are being established. It's just once you have a shift in world order, it either has to be done through brilliant statecraft, a great diplomacy, or it's usually through wars and economic collapses. I don't feel we're surrounded by these political giants and inspiring political leaders anymore so I just fear

we're heading down more war and economic problems until a new reality is forced upon us but anyways thank you John Alexander always a great pleasure to speak with the two of you thank you very much thank you

Thank you.