The Duran Podcast - Who Controls Hormuz?

Episode Date: October 4, 2026

Who Controls Hormuz?

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the situation with Iran. We had some diplomacy taking place after the UN General Assembly meeting, but that broke down to the point where Secretary of State Rubio allegedly kicked out the Iranian diplomats that were in New York, including the fire minister, Adachi. He kicked them out, told them to leave the United States. It doesn't look like we're any closer to any kind of a deal, of a ceasefire, of a return to the memorandum that was signed by the U.S. President in Versailles. And much of the talk is now about whether there's going to be some sort of a resumption in the military operations of the United States, either before the November midterms or after. the November midterms. We have another U.S. aircraft carrier group heading to the region. We have

some very, very bellicose escalatory statements from the U.S. President, once again talking about possibly blowing them up in reference to Iran. And we have this issue with the Strait of Hormuz. What is happening with Hormuz? The United States. states abescent, they believe that oil is getting through, that tankers are getting through. They're using the southern route, the Oman route. And they feel like that they feel as if they are gaining with each passing week leverage and control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is saying this is not the case and they're actually hitting tankers. They claim they're hitting many tankers that are trying to move out of Hormuz through the southern route.

On top of all of this, you have military escalation, or at least talk about a military escalation from Medinajahou, the Israeli side. You have the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and Yemen. You have the Saudis claiming that they have repaired to the east-west pipeline, and they're wrapping up the export of oil from that route. A very complicated situation. Alexander, how do you see things playing out? Where do you even want to begin in the summary that I've kind of given?

As you rightly say, there's a lot of stuff going on. Many, many pieces moving, and it's not always easy to keep track of all of them. Right. Now, I go to start with what I think is happening in the Strait of Hormnows. Now, the official word, the word that the media in the West has taken up, is that the Americans have managed somehow to gain military control of the Strait of Hormuz, that they've deployed enormous forces to the Strait of Hormuz, that they're able to protect and guide tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, and that traffic, oil traffic, through the Strait of

Hormuz, has returned to the same level that it was before the start of the conflict on the 28th of February. Now, this is very extraordinary and very strange because it goes completely against all that we were hearing and were being told during the earlier period of the conflict. Now, people say that there's more US forces in the Middle East now. I've looked at this. It seems to me that the US has indeed deployed substantial forces to the Middle East, but not more than we were seeing in February. March, in fact, probably less actually. So how is it that they are able to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz now when they were not able to do this in March? Now there may be

explanations, but I've not really heard any coherent ones. I don't know how the US, for example, is able to stop Iranian missiles, or how it's able to stop the Iranians laying mines, or doing those kind of things. Here is what I think has been happening. I think there has been an uptick in exports of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. I think that this follows deals that were done by the Iranians with some of the Persian Gulf states. And I think that those deals were brokered by the Chinese and the Russians. Now I say that because when Xi Jinping went to Washington, he and Trump agreed a joint statement in which Xi Jinping said that China opposes the imposition of tolls

or restrictions on international waterways. And that was clearly a reference to the Strait of Hormuz. And you remember when we did a program a short while ago about MBS, we predicted in that program that MBS would call Putin. And he did indeed call Putin. And there was a long conversation between the two. And Putin again said that Russia does not want to see restrictions on international waterways like the Strait of Hormuz and indeed the Red Sea.

So I think that the BRIC states have gently leaned on Iran and they said, look, we are prepared to give you help. We're prepared to give you economic and military help. But we do want to see some oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz. We do not want to see a collapse in the Persian Gulf. Gulf, in the economies in the Persian Gulf, and we want to see some kind of de-escalation in the conflict that is taking place there. If you keep the straight of Hormuz closed, that makes an escalation all but inevitable. So relax it, reopen it, at least to some extent.

And I think that is probably what has happened. In other words, tankers, some tankers, have been able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, because the Iranians are letting them do so. And I'm going to make a guess that money is being paid to the Iranians to make that possible. That is my guess. Obviously, I don't know all of this for a fact, but the Chinese and Russian statements are there for everyone to see. And at the Brick Summit meeting in Delhi, the Indians, the Russians and the Chinese, arranged for Pesishan to meet with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, in other words, the de facto ruler of the UAE. The UAE is a brick state.

And I think that, as I said, all of these various deals and agreements were quietly done. Now, the problem is that none of this, however, resolves any of the unlawful. underlined problems. And what I think the risk is that because more oil is flowing through the Strait of Hulmos, some people in Washington are treating this as a sign that the crisis is passing and that the pressure is on Iran in effect. Absolutely. And I think that this is emboldening them and is making it more likely that we're going to see an attack in a few weeks And this has been a recurring pattern in this war. Some parties, Pakistan before, if you remember, China and China, definitely, India, Russia, too.

They try to sort out this problem via diplomacy. But whenever we do see diplomacy happen, the hardliners in Washington and in Israel become encouraged and they revert back to a policy of escalation. The diplomacy is seen as weakness. Exactly. And they see it as an opportunity to defeat the opponent in this case Iran. Same pattern in Ukraine as well. Absolutely.

The diplomacy doesn't work with these guys. No. With these hardliners, these new cons. No. But didn't the Chinese, the Russians, the Saudis, the UAE, the U.A. They must have realized that if Iran is convinced for a certain time period to allow oil to get through Hormuz, that what this would do is ultimately emboldened via the hardliners in D.C. to start another attack against Iran.

Because for them, control of Hormuz or the belief that oil is returning to the levels that it was before the conflict, meaning that they now control Hormuz. They have some sort of control of Hormuz for them. That is the one leverage that Iran had over them, and all that is needed is just another military campaign, and the House of Cards that is called the Iranian government will tip over and collapse. They must have known that this is how they'll see this.

Yes. Now, I think that there's differences of perspective. If we're talking about the Saudis and the Emirates, I don't think you particularly like Iran at all. In fact, I think some of them actively hate Iran. They would like to see that outcome that you describe. And, of course, putting all that aside. But they'll be in the crosshairs of Reservoir.

Absolutely. But MBS and the Emirates, the imperative need for them is to get oil moving. I mean, they do have deep reserves, as we know. But those reserves won't last forever, financial reserves, I mean. So they need to get oil moving. They need to start selling oil. They need to get money flows moving back into the Gulf. If the Russians and the Chinese can arrange, well, there are the Chinese mostly,

can arrange for oil to start passing through the straight of all moves. obviously they're going to be pleased and they're going to say yes. And in MBS's case, obviously it takes a lot of the pressure off him that he was under a few weeks ago when we saw the collapse in Yemen who's gaining control of the entire Red Sea coast of Yemen. So from a Saudi point of view, from an Emirati point of view, this is good. if this is a good outcome, if only in the short term. So I can't imagine that they would object to this. The Russians by now, I think of long since come to understand the nature of the people

they're dealing with in the United States. The fact that these people are implacable, that if you give, if you give, they will only come back and demand that they be given. more. So, you know, I don't think the Russians deep down have many expectations of a diplomatic solution. But the other two big, brick states, China and India, are different. I think the Chinese have longstanding issues about closing of straits. They oppose that in principle, because potentially it affects their ability to export through, you know, the Strait of Taiwan, the Taiwan Straits, the Strait of Malacca, all of those sort of things.

So China already has issues, problems with what the Iranians are doing. There is some bad feeling between China and Iran already, as it turns out. We have discussed in many programs the fact that the Iranians have not worked the Chinese, as they should have done, that Arakshi doesn't go to Beijing as often as he should do. That Pezishkan basically doesn't seem to be interested to go to Beijing. And what a serious mistake that is. So China has some reservations about Iran anyway. And China is now gaining a certain amount of experience about how difficult the United States is to deal with diplomatically. But I would say that they're roughly at the place where the Russians were, say, in 2013.

they haven't yet fully understood that long-term relations and the building up of long-term relationship, even any kind of relationship with the United States is extraordinarily difficult and all but impossible. So my take again from the trip, Xi Jinping's trip to the United States, is that the Chinese still think or still hope that something can be done with. the Americans over Taiwan, over trade issues, over technology issues, over all of those things. And for that reason, they're probably not as key to fully back Iran as they might be. Where does this leave the situation in Iran with the conflict? Well, I mean, does the US make a move, a military operation before the midterms, after the

midterms? I think there's a fairly good chance it will happen before the midterms, actually. I don't know why people all think that the US is going to wait until after the midterms. I mean, the only reason to do that, presumably, would be worry that if there is a military operation before the midterms, then it will become an issue in the midterms. Yeah. That's why people think that. Yeah. Probably why people are expecting it to happen afterwards. But having said that, all of all of the signs are there that something big is coming. I mean, the way in which the United States has publicized, for example, the fact that its troops, all of its troops have withdrawn from Iraq. I take that as an ominous sign. I mean, a lot of

people are saying this as a positive sign. It means that the United States is starting to withdraw from the Middle East. To me, it looks like the United States broadcasting the fact that its troops in Iraq are no longer there and therefore that they're not any longer in the crosshairs. So that's how I see. Just like in Afghanistan. I have to cut you off there. Just like what we saw in Afghanistan with blinking, right? Yeah. Yes. Exactly. And you didn't cut me off. I mean, it's an excellent point. So I think that all of the signs are, whether it's before the midterms or after the midterms, I think, as I said, that the Americans have been emboldened by this return of traffic through the straight of almost, through the easing off of the crisis

for the fact that the Houthis have obviously been leaned on and have said that they're not going to interfere with American shipping or other kinds of, or Euro. shipping and so the result is that ships are able to pass through the Strait of Hulmos, that the Saudis have been able to conduct repairs to the pipeline and the militias, the Houthis and the Iraqi militias have not attacked the pipeline again. And so the word is out there, the Iranians are weakening, this is the moment to go after Iran and to hit Iran hard. Now, I have been trying to get some information about what the real situation is.

in Iran is. And I want to stress all the information I'm getting is from public sources. I'm not in contact with people there. But my understanding is this. Yes, there are economic stresses. Inflation is high. But Iran is a country that has lived with high inflation. Before, it's managed, it's found ways to function despite inflationary pressures, that the political situation is stable and that the economy is continuing to function at a level which is more than sufficient to enable Iran to ride out the storm. So I think, you know, in other words, there's no hunger, There's no complete lack of fuel in the filling stations, any of that kind of thing. So that this assumption that Iran is really weakening is wrong.

And of course, if we do see a renewal of the war in a big way, then everything will reverse very quickly. The straight of war moves will again become shot because the Iranians will act decisively at that point. shut it down. The Houthis will become active again and we are going to see the Red Sea closed. There will be more attacks on the pipelines and perhaps the most unexpected and alarming thing of all talk that Hezbollah and Zalani's movement in Syria are engaging in discussions with each other. Jalani under pressure from some of his followers because of the scale of Israeli incursions into Syria. There is no way that Jalani himself is going to engage the Israelis and Erdogan won't let him. But possibly a deal done whereby the Syrians, rather the Syrians again allow Iraq-Syrian territory to be used to

provide supplies to Hezbollah so that the Hezbollah movement can challenge the Israelis more effectively in Lebanon. So, you know, even though, as I said, talk about things being easing off a bit in the Strait of Hormoos, the underlying realities is that, as the pieces are moving, but they're moving in a way that points towards a renewable. I have to ask you this final question. Russia and China would without a doubt know that this would embolden the neocons, the hardliners, the Trump administration, if they started to ease off on blocking the Strait of Formoose, if they started to allow traffic to move through the Strait of Formos, they would know without a doubt that the United States would look at this as

as a sign of weakness and that they would be emboldened to attack Iran in the belief that now they have leverage over Hormuz and now they have some space to finally try and remove the regime. Do you think that maybe China and Russia and Iran knowing this have set a trap for the Trump administration? It would not be... For the United States? I mean, building up Iran's defenses, building up Iran's security architecture,

their missile stoppaws. I don't know. They're drones. I'm just throwing something out there because, you know, we're analyzing this. And I think you've put out a very correct analysis as to what's going on with Hormuz. Yeah.

Without a doubt, I think you're spot on there. everything lines up, MBS calling Putin, China, Xi Jinping meeting with Trump, the statements coming out of China. Iran has allowed some ships to pass through over the past week or two. The Trump administration has seized on this, and they've made it out as if they're the ones that are now in control of Hormuz. Now they're getting emboldened for a military strike in the belief that this will be the that will defeat Iran. Trump has said as much. He's pretty much said in the statements that he's made over the past couple of days, that's something big is going to happen and everything's going to get wrapped up. Wouldn't Russia and China know that this is what the neocons, given their own experience, especially Russia's experience with these guys, but this is what the takeaway that they're

going to get from all of this and perhaps something really bad is waiting for the Trump administration if they move forward with an attack? Entirely possible. Of course, this is something we can only speculate about. It's just a bit ball. I'm throwing this out there. We don't know. Everything that's, you know, we've been talking about up to now, we can support from actual open sources. What is being discussed privately between the Russians and the Chinese and the Iranians and what they're all saying to each other is something obviously we don't know. And in this crisis, we're, perhaps more than in any other. I mean, what we see is just the tip. There is beneath the water a vast, vast iceberg, if you like, of discussions, of conversations, of weapons transfers,

of technology transfers, of intelligence transfers, a huge amount of things going on. So what you've described, I ought to say, is absolutely not beyond the ability of the Chinese and the Russians to come up with. I mean, it's absolutely the sort of thing that I can imagine them thinking and saying and planning with each other, definitely. But if I was to say that that is indeed what is happening, then I will be saying more than I know. So it's possible. It is very possible. Is it actually the case?

Well, we'll just have to wait and see. In a way, it doesn't matter because that's going to be the result. Right. I mean, would Iran at a minimum take some safeguards, knowing that the United States would eventually attack? Well, I would have thought so. I absolutely would have thought so. And I think that is exactly, I can't imagine whatever pressures they came under from the Chinese and the Russians. And I don't expect these pressures were very strong, by the way.

I would have expected that the Iranians would insist on some more assistance, both economic and financial and military. And the fact that from what I understand, the internal situation, economic situation in Iran is relatively stable despite the inflation numbers, that does suggest that they're getting help. I mean, that they're getting help with fuel, with food, with fertilizer, with, with components for their industries, building materials. Who knows what they're getting? But clearly, there is considerable movement of traffic taking place.

And by the way, in Valdai, Putin spoke about how the north-south corridor between Russia and Iran, the work on that continues. That is the Iranians again, who are being slow because they're not buying up all the land that they need to buy up to create the various railway lines and all of those things. Probably true, by the way. But clearly, he seemed to be talking about the fact that this is actually an ongoing project, which suggests that there is considerable economic and other types of support being provided to Iran. I mean, you've got to imagine just a final point that China is not going to allow Iran to collapse.

Absolutely. Just like that either, just because we, opened up the strait of her moose. No. Because we want you to open up the straight of her moose for a little bit of time. China's not just going to allow Iran to hang out to dry. Correct. Yeah.

I agree with that completely. Yeah. All right. Okay. We'll end the video there. The durand.locals.com. We are also on substack and go to the Durant shop pick up some merch. Those links in the description box down below.

Take care.