The Duran Podcast - Window of Opportunity for Peace is Closing - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: October 22, 2025

Window of Opportunity for Peace is Closing - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome back to the program. We are joined here by John Meersheimer and Alexander Mercuris to discuss some of the issues now taking place primarily between the United States, but obviously also involving Ukraine, as the two leaders might meet in Budapest. So it's good to have the both of you back. Very nice to be here, Glenn. We have excellent to be him. It is interesting. it seemed like we were walking back from the brink. That is, Trump at least said he was going to send Tomahawks to Ukraine, which seemed like a crazy escalation given that this would have to be operated by Americans. And also, they could carry nuclear warhead, and the Russians warned they would treat it accordingly,

which, yes, is quite an escalation. Yet, Trump has walked his back instead, meeting now. with Putin in the Budapest, or at least that is the plan, unless it's been cancelled. And the reaction in Europe, as we walk away from the threat of a nuclear Holocaust and instead embrace diplomacy, is utter panic. Poland said they might intercept Putin's plane if it goes through Poland and the UK. They're talking about sending troops now to Ukraine, Sweden's defense minister said do they have to go, Europe has to go into war mode because we should prepare for war with Russia. I mean, every few decades, it looks like the Europeans prepare for some collective suicide.

I was thinking a good place to start would be what to expect from this meeting if it does take place. Will this be another Alaska or should we expect something more from Budapest? Let me just say a word before I ask Alexander to answer that specifically. question. When I look at what's happening, it seems to me that the Russian position remains unchanged, as we all three have said on numerous occasions, the Russian position on negotiations has been the same from the get-go. At the same time, if you look at the Ukrainian position and the European position, those remain unchanged as well. Nothing changed. there. The only person who seems to change his view, sometimes on a daily basis, sometimes

on a narrowly basis, is President Trump. And he moves all over the place. And I think what happened was that the Russians were obviously very nervous about the idea of us giving tomahawks to the Ukrainians. So what they did, and the Americans were willing to go along with this, obviously, is to arrange a telephone conversation between Putin and Trump the day before Trump was supposed to meet with Zelensky. There was no way that was not going to lead to a situation where Trump would tell Zelensky he can't have tomahawks. So that was a big win for Russia.

But again, we'd get back to Donald Trump because he's the moving factor in this story. And in that case, you know, in terms of the meeting with Zelensky and the meeting the day before, the conversation the day before with Putin, what happened is that Trump went back to a position that was more sympathetic to the Russians, which didn't appear to be the situation that existed before his conversation with Putin. And now what's happening is all sorts of pressures being brought to bear on Trump to move back in the other direction. And this has been going on and on for a really long time, but it doesn't really matter very much in terms of the outcome of the war, because the three of us have said many, many times, this one's going to be settled on the battlefield. Exactly. I mean, that's the whole point. I mean, there's a, I have to say, I have a depressing sense of deja vu about this whole latest affair. I mean, we've been here so many times. I mean, if we go back to the previous summit, Alaska Summit. There was all the threats. It seemed as if we were heading towards massive sanctions against Russia, tariffs against China and India, sort of economic war, not just against the Russians, but against much of the world as well. And we had deadlines, and then we had

more deadlines, and then the deadlines shifted backwards and forwards. And then suddenly, out of the blue, we have, Witt Goff turns up in Moscow. And then there's discussion. and there's a summit meeting and we don't hear any more about the sanctions. And then we're told there's been all kinds of progress, all kinds of things have been agreed. And as John absolutely correctly says, it doesn't look as if the Russians.

In reality, shifted or changed their position at all. And then the Europeans and the Ukrainians got talking to Trump and we started to see Trump move over again back to their side. And then we got a new thread. A new idea of the Tomol missiles going to Ukraine. And again, we have, well, not perhaps a deadline exactly, but a moment of truth, which was the meeting between Zelensky and Trump. And then again, we have this time a telephone call.

And suddenly that's all off. And we have another summit meeting. But again, it's clear that nothing has been agreed. Nothing has been decided. There's no real preparation going on. Rubio and Lavrov talked, and the reports say the talks, the discussion didn't go terribly well. And all the signs are that we're going to revert back in a couple of days, back to Trump saying how disappointed he is in Putin and how things aren't turning out to be quite as straightforward as he expected.

And we're going to have another swing back again. I think people on every side are becoming very tired of this. I think the Russians are getting very tired of it. Certainly the Europeans are. You're seeing commentaries in the British media, certainly, about this. And I think the general sense that's beginning to grow is that Trump does move backwards and forwards one way and the other, but in the end, nothing changes. everything remains exactly the same. We always end up in exactly the same point that we were in previously. No real negotiations, no real discussions, the war goes on. Let me ask the two of you a question based on everything

you just said, Alexander. I agree that nothing changes at the diplomatic rhetorical level. It's just, you know, the eternal return of the same, right? But the fact is, as both of you know very well, things are changing on the battlefield. The Russians are winning the war. And the Ukrainians are in real trouble. And I think it's fair to say, and I know both of you agree with this, that it gets worse and worse every day for the Ukrainians. And at some point, the Russians are going to win this war or the Ukrainian forces are going

to collapse. But as we approach that point, as it becomes clearer and clearer, what do you anticipate that the Ukrainians and the Europeans will do at that point in time? Well, Alexander. Well, I was just going to say, it's an excellent question, because that is clearly what is happening on the battle fields. Yeah. But there is no admission of this.

If you go to the way in which European officials talk, Ukrainian officials talk, it's as if that wasn't happening that we're in a stalemate, that the Russians are bogged. down. So when it, that moment arrives, when it becomes undeniable, I am not sure that there is a plan anywhere in Europe about what to do at that point. I don't know whether the Europeans are misleading themselves or deluding themselves about this. I don't know whether maybe at some level deep down inside the, you know, in the bureaucracies, some might, somebody might be talking. We've had the former head of the British Army who is widely considered to be Britain's most best general. He's basically given an interview to the independent, which one of our newspapers,

which he's basically saying, let's actually start to think and talk about these ideas. You saw there's an article today in the Financial Times that maybe the moment has come to start contacts with the Russians. But, you know, all of this happens very, very much on the margins. I don't know anybody in government in London, in Paris, and of course he got political problems in these capitals in Germany, who is actually addressing the situation that John has just done. described. So I don't think they themselves have any idea what to do. And I don't think they're at the moment even admitting the reality to each other. Glenn, I interrupted you. No, I just think the Europeans are a bit of a dilemma because they can't accept a defeat. And also this is the whole idea of why they need to pull the Americans in the assumption that if

America makes a decision to fight or defeat Russia, then, you know, the weapons will somehow pop up. It's all a matter of political will. It just seems to me that the way the Europeans behave, because they want to negotiate an end to this from position of strength, that is, if the military situation gets worse, then they're beating their chest even louder to kind of make up for it. So showing that they're ready to fight Russia, they're going to go into this industrial production, going to war mode, oh, we're going to bring down Putin's flight. I mean, we're going to have to be real tough here to balance out how poorly things are going. But no, this has been my question for the past three years. What happens when the war is lost? Because it's a war of attrition. It ends when

one side runs out of soldiers. When there's no more army, there's no more war. And at this point, you either need one radical escalation or you need to accept defeat. I just feel that we've gone so deep down this hole, especially since the Americans decided to walk it back a bit, the Europeans wanted to overcommit to show to the Americans that they could carry their own weight. And, no, we just double down over and over again.

So I can't really tell anymore. I get the impression it's still undecided, It can go both ways. They might do something crazy or they can accept a defeat. But again, in defeat, it's not going to be a pretty peace either. If Ukraine collapses, it's going to be very humiliating defeat. The Russians will impose their will. Again, it's going to be a messy, if not ugly, peace.

On the other hand, there's no peace that Europeans can accept either. So I don't think anyone really has a plan. And there's just, you know, how to just keep the war going. And if we get through the day, then that's it. That's something. It sounds ridiculous. But I just, you go through the statements. There's no strategic thinking.

There's no objective, no discussing how to achieve those objectives. We're going to defeat the Russians. You know, what exactly does this mean? What do we see coming out of this? We increasingly realize we can't, NATO can't expand. Ukraine can't get its territory back. Russia will likely win, but there's no discussion in terms of, you know, with this in mind, how we can arrive at the most favorable possible spot there is.

So it's, no, it's, I don't think there's anyone behind the wheel, I guess what I'm trying to say. But the thing is, Glenn, what we're talking about here is a situation where the Ukrainians are clearly losing. Nobody can deny it. The army on the front lines is beginning to collapse. That's not to say Russia is they're going to conquer all of Ukraine. But it's on the march. It's conquering more territory. The Ukrainians can hardly put up any defense, and people in the West can no longer continue

to behave in the delusional manner that they have been behaving in in recent years. And so you say they may escalate, they may do something crazy. But my question is, what can they do? What's the option here? They've searched for every possible military option. You know, that's why there's all this attention on the tomahawks now. The tomahawks are the magic weapon. This is a joke.

If tomahawks were such a great weapon, why weren't they talking about tomahawks a year ago or two years ago. It's, you know, sort of the last arrow in the quiver. And as Putin has said, and as we all know, it's not going to make much difference. It's not going to affect the outcome hardly at all. And if the Russians are winning, I mean, escalation on their part doesn't matter much. They're winning. So I just don't see where the Europeans are going to go. And if you stay in the fight, you know, even though you're losing, you just try and bring it out for as long as you can. All that means is more of Ukraine is going to be lost to the Russians. More Ukrainians are going to die. Don't you reach a point here where the Ukrainians

and the Europeans have to negotiate with the Russians? Or if that's not the case, it just seems to me the Russians are going to take more territory and kill more Ukrainians. I think one of the points that bears repeating perhaps an understanding is that when we talk about the Europeans, we are not talking about a single entity like the United States with a single government where things can be talked and argued about and sometimes occasionally people come to a decision.

The Europeans are not going to be united about this. There are cracks in southern Europe, in Italy, in Spain, in Greece, which of course I know, there is one view about the war, and there I think there would be great reluctance to escalate, and there probably they would say, well, look, this has gone as far as it can. Let's see whether we can talk to the Russians and whether we can find some kind of way out. Other people in other parts of Europe might take a completely different view. The Baltic states, which for some unaccountable reason, seem to hold an extraordinary sway on European policy,

which I don't myself understand. They, of course, will want any kind of escalation that they can imagine. They will be joined in that by some other people in Northern Europe, probably. And there will be all sorts of other people in the middle. One of the reasons why it is so difficult, in fact, impossible politically, to discuss alternatives, to look forward to say, well, we're losing the war. And we need to think how to find ways to deal with that problem. And that might mean being realistic about what we can do and the need to negotiate with the Russians.

The problem with doing that is that the moment that happens, the entire appearance of European unity collapses. And that is something that the Europeans collectively are terrified of permitting. If they start discussing possible outreach to the Russians or any kind of diplomatic strategy, the whole structure will basically collapse into argument. And that makes any kind of forward thinking and approach impossible. The risk is that that's going to continue even beyond that moment when we see the collapse in Ukraine. And there will still be a reluctance for people to break out of line and to start saying,

look, we've got to talk, we've got to find a way. So we could end up in a situation where we actually do nothing at all. The Russians continue to advance and there is no attempt to come to any sort of. of understanding with them, at which point everybody's left with the worst possible outcome. The Russians with a destroyed Ukraine on their west border. The Europeans with a defeat that they have no real plan how to handle and a crisis on their eastern border. And of course, the United States left to pick up the pieces and not perhaps knowing how.

and perhaps not even wanting to. So that, that I think, is the risk we run. You know, I hadn't thought of this until you just made those comments, Alexander. But I think what you're saying is that if the Ukrainians do lose on the battlefield, they visibly lose, the army begins to collapse, what you're saying, in effect, is the centrifugal forces that are already at play in Europe will speed up. And if anything, there won't be a unified European position or anything close to it. In fact, you'll be moving in the other direction.

And of course, if you marry that to the fact that the United States, and here we're talking about the Trump administration, would like to divorce itself from Europe and take the responsibility for dealing with Ukraine off America's shoulders and put it on Europe's shoulders. and here's Europe sort of disintegrating politically. This is in a very important way, a catastrophic situation for Europe. You've solved it out perfectly. That's exactly what I'm saying. This isn't really hypothetical anymore. We're not talking necessarily a year from now.

If we look at the front line now, we see Epokrovsky, almost more than half of it, just falling apart. And the rest seems to follow. We have Kopjansk, Siversk, Liman, the Russians entered Constantinavka. The last 24 hours you have this whole Saperosje front restarting. It is the intensification along the front line is quite dramatic. But I agree with the assessment of you, Alexander, that this is that the unity in Europe is a big issue. It's worth remembering that when we had the NATO-Russia Council, this was always

a key element. Actually, why it didn't work? Because the NATO countries first had to get everyone together and then they have to come up with a common position, which is very difficult, even when you have the Americans in the room who tends to, well, heard

the group nonetheless. But then once they meet with the Russian with a common position, they can't move anywhere. And, you know, the former Italian prime minister, Romano Prodi, he once referred to the EU as a giant with clay feet, once it tries to move, it falls apart.

And I think that also applies to this war. I mean, we kind of shocked everyone. Everyone got shocked after the Russians invaded. We overwhelmed our population with this vicious war propaganda. We put the crisis in charge like Kaya Kala. She should represent Europe now, apparently. And we all got on board unity against the evil Russian opponent. But if you will begin to switch now,

I mean, the Baltic states, they're not going to embrace diplomacy. Poland, no. But also if there's an out, if you can start to talk peace, I guess the threat is that if peace risks breaking out, countries from Greece to,

well, to Spain, they might jump on board of the peace train of, you know, of Hungary, Slovakia, in which now the Czech Republic might start to board as well. we risk in peace to fragment Europe. But this is geopolitical Europe.

Our unity is no longer based on prosperity. That's gone out the window. Now it's the Russian enemy. And so we also dipped into the Russian savings, which we took. So if there's a piece, we have to start paying back the money. There's a lot of problems coming our way. I could make one other point, just sort of switching. to the other side, to the Russian side.

I mean, I think the Russians are obviously doing very well on the battlefield. They're paying a price, of course, because that's inevitable in a war of attrition. But they're doing very well, much better than the Ukrainians, as we were saying. But I also think if you move away from what's happening on the battlefield and you sort of go to the, let's call it, the diplomatic, rhetorical level, Putin is actually doing very well there. as well. You want to remember that one of the goals of the West from the start was to isolate Putin. And of course, they failed miserably in that regard, especially with regard to countries like China and India.

And if you look at what's recently happened with India, if anything, Trump's policies on tariffs vis-a-vis India has driven the Indians closer to the Russians. and the Chinese and the Russians, of course, are very close. So Putin looks good there. But you also want to remember that Putin went to Alaska. He set foot in the United States. Now he is presumably going to Budapest. He's going to Hungary.

That's a country that's in the European Union and is in NATO. I just want to think about that. And furthermore, Putin, he plays along with Trump. Putin surely understands that Trump is a loose canon. And he says things that are, at first, Blanche, very offensive to Putin and the Russians. But Putin plays nice for them. Putin understands there's absolutely no point in retaliating. And what Putin wants to do is look diplomatic and look reasonable.

and look reasonable, and look smart, and look informed, and look coherent. And whether you like Putin or not, he is it brilliant at all those things. He just does a great job. So Putin looks like the only adult in the room, at least me. And I think to increasing numbers of people, I know it's true for both of you as well. when you compare him to Trump and the European leaders, there's just no comparison. So Putin is not only in a situation where he's doing very well on the battlefield, he's also doing very well at what I call the diplomatic slash rhetorical level.

I think that's absolutely true. I think the one thing I would say is that Putin, who I think does have a realistic understanding of things, probably would optimally like a US president or indeed some leader in Europe, but one of the big countries who he could work with in order to try to chart the way towards a long-term solution to this problem. Because Putin understands and understands very well, and the Russians, I'm sure, understand very well that even if they win a victory in Ukraine, when they win a victory in Ukraine, they are going to still be faced with a mass of unresolved problems that are going to stretch out into the future. So I think that Putin absolutely,

he's played this whole game of diplomacy with the West with extraordinary skill. He has won a lot of respect, and I think that is the right word, around the world because of it. He's consolidated his status in China, in the Middle East. He's going to India in a few weeks. But he must understand at some level that the weakness and chaos in the West, and it's important to say, by the way, we're talking about the problems, the fractures in Europe, that in France and Britain, in France we have a political crisis. In Britain, we are on the brink of one.

In Germany, the political situation there doesn't look terribly stable either. Putin, I think, probably understands that that, in a sense, is a problem for him. And it is a problem that in the United States, he doesn't have a president like, well, Kennedy or Nixon, too profoundly different people, but somebody who the Russians could talk to. But here, I have a question for you, Alex. and for you as well, Glenn, if you're playing Putin's hand, do you have a vested interest in exacerbating those tensions in Europe, driving the Europeans apart and not allowing them to come together and form a coherent whole? Or do you have the opposite interest, which is to do

everything you can to work with them and foster some sort of coherent Western policy so you can cut a deal. You can make an argument on both sides. Well, I'll just answer that question before, Glenn, because I just want to say my own thing. I think Putin understands that he has to deal with the European leaders and the American leaders that he has. And ideally, he would prefer a de Gaulle or a Brandt in Europe, or as I said, a Kennedy or a Nixon in the United States, with whom he could come to an understanding. In the absence of that, a situation where there is a deepening crisis, political crisis, in Europe and where Europe fragments, is obviously preferable to him and Russia

than a situation where they all coalesce together and become more. threatening to Russia itself. So in that respect, yes, exacerbating the divisions does play to his advantage. But I don't think optimally

that is what he would prefer to see. I agree. I think well, I just first on the Hungarian issue, I was reading it the same way that how how it strengthened the hand of Hungary.

Because keep in mind, Hungary within Europe has become almost a pariah state because Orbán went to Kiev, he went to Moscow, he tried to get the diplomacy going again, long time ago, and the Europeans or EU punished him for it. So the fact that now he's a representative for Europe in the eyes of Washington and as well in Russia, it's not great for the EU,

which has been seeking to isolate him because he didn't fall in law. line. So he has to be isolated. Now, the Russians and Americans are essentially elevating him. So it's, no, it's, it's an interesting move. But in terms of having an objective to split up the Europeans, I think instinctively it would be a good move for Russia, given that, well, our main unity now is against the Russians. But, I mean, geography doesn't change. If you have too a humiliated loss to create humiliation on part of the Europeans, that the peace becomes too ugly.

I don't think it would be necessarily something that would create stability in Europe. And Russia has some poor history with political instability in Europe, how that spills over to Russia. I still think that this is going to end on the battlefield. So whatever happens in Hungary, it's going to end up ending up on the battlefield. However, I don't think it's necessarily written in stone. I think if the Russians could...

I mean, the most difficult things for the Ukrainians to accept a peace now is the territorial issues. And the Donetsk, of course, that they have to pack up and leave big cities like Slaviansk and Krematosk, which they still hold. It's a bit over the top. I don't... Even if the public would accept it, it would be too... difficult for the nationalists and other groupings within.

I think that, however, if you would see Trump suddenly begin to speak about an end-to-nato expansion and deal with the basic security architecture issues which the Russians have been hammering on about for 30 years, they might be willing to make some concessions on other areas. Because keep in mind, at one point, Keith Kellogg was even on TV, was making the point, of all people, Keith Kellogg, making the point. that in an agreement, the issue of NATO expansion might have to extend to Moldova and Georgia. I mean, if something like this was on the table for the Russians, you know, if they control one or two cities less, I don't really think that would be the overarching issue. So I haven't really given up on the peace issue yet.

But if the Europeans are coordinating to, if they find unity in opposing Russia, I think it would make common sense to try to solve divisions. See, one problem I think that the Russians face is if they cut a deal in which they make certain concessions to the West, they're not as ambitious in terms of territorial goals as they could be. In other words, they can conquer more territory, but they don't do it because they want to facilitate a deal. The problem that they face is what happens if they cut a deal? and then in two years, Trump or somebody else changes his or her mind,

and Russia's not necessarily back to square one, but in bad shape. What I think is that the Russians now have very powerful incentives to pursue maximalist goals. I think you want to grab all the territory you can. You want to go to great lengths to make sure that Ukraine is a dysfunctional rump state. You want to do everything you can to make. make sure that the West and that dysfunctional Ukrainian rump state are as far apart as possible. If you're the Russians, you've played this game where you trusted the West, right? You know, you got involved in serious negotiations with regard to the Minsk Accords and look what

the West did to you. You just can't trust these people. And especially if you look at Donald Trump, who in God's name would trust anything that Donald Trump says? He changes his views all the time. Right. And so I think one of the real problems here in settling this war is that I think deep down inside the Russians understand. And you see it with some of the spokes, people like Medvedev, they understand that they have to grab it all. Not all of Ukraine, but all they can get

before they begin to run into trouble. I think that's absolutely right. I mean, the Russians talking about. about this with themselves. I mean, it is, if you go to social, Russian social media places, I mean,

it's a constant topic of discussion there. How can we trust the Americans? How can we trust the Europeans? And even Putin has acknowledged it on several occasions. And this problem of trust is a huge one.

And it's not, easy to see what guarantees the Americans and the Europeans could ever give to the Russians, which could not be withdrawn and which the Russians would be able to take away and accept and say to themselves, absolutely, this is something we can rely upon, and it's going to settle the situation in the future. It is a massive problem. What I will say, however, is that there is still an influential current of opinion, I believe in Russia. And I believe that Putin himself is a part of it, which says, well, yes, all of this is true. But unless we can come to some kind of understanding, maybe not with the Europeans, where it may be hopeless,

but with the Americans who have more agency and have many more reasons. because they're so committed in so many places around the world to stick to what we agree with, unless we come to an agreement with them, then we are guaranteeing to us for ourselves further problems in the future. And let's try instead and see whether we can find a way out. And I think that's one of the reasons, by the way, why Putin and other Russian officials, go to such extraordinary lengths to maintain a dialogue with Trump, because at least he's speaking to them, and they might be able, they think,

to discuss these things with him, and maybe plant seeds, which even if Trump won't take them forward, perhaps a future American president might. I'm interested in what you two think would be the minimum goals of the Russians in terms of territory. Do you think the four oblast plus Crimea would satisfy them, or do you believe that they're a handful of other oblasts, especially Odessa and Harkiv, that they definitely feel they have to have? I mean, what's your sense from following Russian discourse as to what the minimum set of territorial goals are?

Well, I think, well, again, it's a bit, yeah, I'm uncertain because they do, they don't really, they don't open about the negotiation position. So I think, well, at least my impression is that there's no negotiations on Donbass. Again, they hold Lugansk, but Donetsk is key. They have to get all of this. And the two main cities remaining then will be Slaviansk and Krematarsk. but I think I'm more optimistic on the willing to make concessions perhaps than you, Alexander. That is, I do think that they would be willing to forego some of the territories that do not yet hold in Saperosia and Kerson. I don't think they would ever dream about walking away from any of the territory they already have,

but they might accept, for example, sticking with the territory of Keroson, on their bank of the Nipper. But again, I might be mistaken in this, but it would depend on if the source of the war could be resolved. And I get that I get the trust issue. There's no trust and they'd be foolish to trust the European as well, because at the moment, as we speak, Europeans keep saying that, well, maybe a ceasefire would be good because Ukraine has been exhausted. We need to replenish the ranks. We need time to build more weapons and send them, imagine if we can fill up Ukraine with long-range missiles, then this could never happen again, this kind of idea. So this is essentially what Minsk was about.

We make a peace deal and then incrementally we change realities on the ground. We build a huge Ukrainian army and then we can start to redo some of the things, like take back Crimea. and I think this is why they don't trust it. But if they had some agreements from all of NATO, which guarantees that there won't be an incrementalism, because this is the key of NATO. If it's the missile defense, if you remember this, originally, oh, we're just going to have 10 interceptive missiles in Poland.

They'd be crazy to fear it. But then it incrementally grows. It's the same with NATO expansions. It was same with the troop levels in Ukraine. Everything just grows slowly in order to, not to provoke too immediate and harsh pushback from the Russians. So if they could have some deal, no weapons being no Western weapons in Ukraine, no boots in Ukraine, no de facto membership, nothing, you know, I think the Russians would

want to put an end to this, especially if they, over time, can build up their strength in their position, but Ukrainians cannot. Then the worst case, if the conflict is revived again in five years, then the Russians, would stand strong while the Ukrainians will probably be much, much weaker. I have modified my views about this, and I think this has been come increasingly clear, to me at least, over the course of this year, since Trump became president. I think the moment Trump appeared and started to at least float the possibility of a negotiated solution, I think that the Russians themselves have been probably thinking and talking and

discussing this thing with each other. And I get to say, I don't think they've come to a complete view. So I think there are some people like sections of the military who say, we must have the four regions and we must have more. So recently, a few weeks ago, the chief of the Russian general staff, General Gerasiv, he appeared and there was a map behind him on the wall, which showed Adessa and the whole black sea coast of Ukraine as part of Russian territory. And I suspect that there is a view within Russia, perhaps especially within the military, who say, look, this is what we must have. This is Russian land. Those are Russian people.

We should bring them all in and bring them together. There are others who say, well, look, it's the full regions. They're part of Russia. We stick there. That's what we decided and agreed last year. And what Putin set out when he addressed the foreign ministry. and we accept the four regions and then we come to an agreement about everything else.

And then again, I think that there is a third current, which is Putin himself, possibly, and some of his officials. And they're saying exactly the things that Glenn is saying. And they say, look, Donets, Lugansk, this is non-negotiable. They're just too important. They're the core territory that this whole conflict ultimately, was about. The land bridge to Crimea is also core territory. We're never going to give that up. But other parts, other places in Zaporosia and Herzon region, which we don't yet occupy,

let's be flexible about these. If we can get all of these other things, if we are going to be able to get guarantees that NATO's not going to be expanded eastward, that there's not going to be the build-up of the Ukrainian army in the future. If we're not going to see attempts to basically turn Ukraine into a real problem for us, well, we can forego Zaparajia and Herson, you know, two cities. They're not as important to us, as important to us, as achieving those things. So I think that current opinion exists as well. And I'm starting to get the sense that Putin himself shares this. Notice that over the last couple of months, the Russians have not been talking so much about the territorial issue. Lavrov Putin himself, they've been saying

territory is not for us the key issue. It is the rights of Russians in Ukraine. There are a to speak their language, to have all of the rights that people have. Those are the things that really matter. And that does suggest that at least some people in Moscow, and I think Putin himself are prepared to be a bit more flexible on the territorial issue, provided, of course, all of the other things can be addressed. I would just say, Alexander, that I think how the Russian, think now when there's very little movement on the battlefield. I mean, there is movement. I don't want to minimize it, but there's not major movement at this point in time.

And the Ukrainian army has not collapsed. It's a very different situation than one where the Ukrainian army falls apart. I think if the Ukrainian army falls apart, the Russians are likely. I'm not saying for sure. We're speculating, of course. I think the Russians are likely to find that their appetite grows because at that point, it will be easy to take all of Zaporosia, all of Hirsan and maybe even think about going into places like Odessa.

And as you know, they're already moving into other oblasts besides those four, Harkiv being one, Nieuptu being another. So the Russians are, you know, conquering territory. And if the floodgates were to open, I would imagine that they'll grab a lot more territory. And again, the reason is they're now in a good position. They will not be in a good position in two or three years.

You have an opportunity in front of you, and you're dealing with duplicitous people. People you can't trust. And you have a deep-seated interest in making sure that Ukraine is really weak. I mean, I sound like I'm talking in very ruthless ways. But if you're the Russians and you feel like you've been betrayed by the West and you've fought this bloody war where lots of Russians have died, I think you're going to be quite hard-hearted in your thinking about what to do moving forward.

I don't disagree because, well, it's more than 20 years now since the Orrude. Russian revolution. So this is not one little issue which has to be sold. We have had more than 20 years now trying to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit. So I don't think there's any trust. I do think that they believe for very good reasons that the at least Europeans will try to still pull Ukrainians into the NATO orbit. And also I think if, as you say, the war continues and there is a collapse and the Russians can march. forward at great speed. I don't think only Odessa, I think Karkov, Nipro, Nikolaev and Odessa, those four regions, they would definitely go for it because, well, then they could guarantee the way they see the language, cultural and religious rights of them, but also this is where most of the strategic territory. This is the entire coastline. This is where the main resources, and that's not just great for Russia, but it's also great because that's a key appeal, not the main, but it's a key appeal for the Europeans and the Americans.

There's a reason why we want Ukraine into our orbit. So if you strip it off all the nice parts, again, sounds very crude, but then there will be less interest from NATO in terms of returning to Ukraine, trying to have another go at it. So I very much agree with it. I just think if the conflict is still going, the Ukrainian army hasn't collapsed yet. The Russians know there will never be another Trump as a president, unless J.D. Vance, who's willing to actually talk to them and consider their concerns, I think, yeah, for the sake of peace. Because who knows, six months from now, things can change. The drone technologies can change. The economic situation in the world could change.

The position of the Indians could change. I mean, there's, all the other variables won't remain constant. So I think to if there is a possibility now to strike a deal, yes, but as the Russians have kept saying over and over again, if the longer wait, the worst deal will be. And I do think this,

if there's a bit of a collapse now, they're going to take some more territory. Even Arstowich, the former advisor of Zelensky made this point. He said, I would give up four regions because the alternative is eight. And I know exactly which four other regions the Russians would cease. So

No. I don't disagree. I just think if there's a deal today or in Budapest next week, I think the Russians would make some compromises if there would be something to guarantee this. That is not just another temporary pause before we get back into restarting the Ukraine war. Go ahead. Go ahead. I would just say, I mean, it took very quick things. Firstly, there's also Russian opinion to take account. If you can take place like Kharkov or Dessa or Harsson, and you don't, you have to explain why, and that might not be in Russia.

And if you do take these places, realistically, you're not going to give them back. And going back to what Glenn is saying, that shows that we have only a very limited time window now, because the Russians are going to take Donbass very soon. And once they've taken Don Bass, I'm going to say very soon, in a couple of months' time, maybe. But they will take it. Once that is done, then exactly coming back to your earlier point, they might be less willing to make territorial concessions. And with every day that passes, making territorial concessions becomes less and less likely. And in fact, the point will come when it won't be possible at all.

You know, Glenn, you were mentioning Moldova and Georgia before and the possibility of NATO expansion into them. And I think Alexander was also saying maybe it was you, Glenn, that the Orange Revolution was over 20 years ago. I would note that we fought, excuse me, the Russians fought a war over Georgia, NATO-executive. expansion into Georgia in 2008. And here we are saying that's still an open possibility. And if you look at what's happening in Moldova, right, it's very clear that the West is deeply interested in turning Moldova into a Western bastion on Russia's doorstep. And there's Transnistra, and it's right next to Ukraine, and so forth and so on. Again, the incentives to take Odessa just begin to go up when you start thinking about the world that you're facing as a

Russian leader. And you, Glenn, talk about guarantees. You know, maybe they can give some solid guarantees. I would note to you, Glenn, you are a good realist, and you know it's a good realist. Giving guarantees in the international system is not something that works very well, because talk is cheap, and we have nobody to enforce those guarantees. You can give the Russians a guarantee, but if the Americans or the Europeans or both of them welch on the guarantee, who's going to protect the Russians? And the answer is nobody. And again, that just gives the Russians a very powerful incentive to really grab all they

can and to really make sure, not only that they grab more territory, but that Ukraine is a dysfunctional rum state. You wanted to be dysfunctional. This is why it would have made sense, as Aristovic said, to get on an airplane, go to Moscow and cut a deal right away and make it a sweetheart deal for the Russians. This is a repellent idea in the West. Oh, my God, go to Moscow and give the Russians pretty much everything they want. How could anybody possibly think that except morally bankrupt people like us? But of course, that's ridiculous.

If this war isn't settled immediately, the Ukrainians are going to lose a lot more. And cutting a deal now that's generous to the Russians and does everything to solve the commitment problem that you were describing, Glenn, is what makes sense. If there's an opportunity opening for the Russians to take Nikolaev and Odessa, they not only have, then the whole black sea and all in the northern parts that is that NATO can't expel Russia anymore from the Black Sea which is a key concern but also connect them with Moldova which means that the efforts of well canceling the autonomy of of transnistria sorry Prittnerovia was in my head and the swinging Moldova into NATO I mean

all of this could be canceled so it would be a great price in terms of also preventing future conflicts from Moscow's perspective. So this is why I'm saying, which we should get on the first plane to Moscow, because now is, as Alexander suggested, that the window opportunities is closing. If we can give them this sweetheart deal and, you know, Trump wants to completely transform U.S. American, U.S. Russian relations from the past hundred years. And, you know, I know there's a lot of distrust in Russia, but I, I, I, I, but I, I, but. But this is the last chance, I think, as you said, whatever we do that creates more distrust,

then I think they'll go for these territories. But, no, I think times of essence, which I can't understand why the Europeans just want to, you know, fight another day, because every day the Ukrainians grow closer to a collapse, and the Russians get one step closer just ceasing whatever they want. Well, you took the point I was about to bake out of my... before I could say. I mean, if you were trying to create a rational policy for the Europeans, much more for the Europeans than for the Americans,

they will be getting right behind Trump, and they would be contacting Moscow, and they will say, please, please, have this summit meeting in Budapest. And they would be saying to Zelensky, you must now agree to this because time is of the essence and time is short. and do you really want to put Kharkiv and Hearson and Odessa and Nikolaev and all of these places at risk? Do you understand that if you lose them, you're never getting them back and think of what will happen to Ukraine? Instead of doing those things, we are doing the exact opposite.

We are supporting Zelensky and his officials in their intransigence. And it's extraordinary to see. I mean, you know, one can explain it. I mean, I've tried to provide my explanation for it earlier in the program. But that doesn't take away from the complete bankruptcy of statesmanship that it actually shows. One would have thought that someone, somewhere in Europe, apart from Orban, would be able to see this thing clearly and would be arguing in, you know, in private, in the chancellories, Here's the moment. We've got to seize this moment.

The Russians are indeed at the gates of Pachrovsk. They might be pushing through the defence lines before very long. We don't have a huge amount of time. Ukraine can't go on much longer. Maybe it's got six months. Maybe it's got a year. Who knows how long it will be. But unless we cut this deal now, we might not be able to get any outcome

that would be in any way beneficial. or even reasonable for ourselves. Until in Europe, we rediscover the art of statesmanship. We're not going to do that. And here I have to say that over-dependence on the United States for so long has atrophied away our own ability to think these things through. if you compare the level of debate and discourse that takes place in the United States, patchy though that is, at least people in the United States talk about these issues in Europe

because we've relied on the Americans for so long, especially since the end of the Cold War, we don't seem to be able to think these things through. And that's how someone like Kayakales, for example, becomes the representative of European diplomacy. Just a quick point on this to put it in a slightly broader context. What I find puzzling is if you go back to the 1990s, when the decision was made to expand NATO, it's made roughly 1994,

and then the first tranche is 99, second big tranche is 2004. and of course the Ukraine decision is 2008. But anyway, go back to the 1990s. There was huge opposition inside the Clinton administration and outside the Clinton administration to NATO expansion. You saw it at the time in public, and now a lot of the records have been released, and you can see it in the government records from the day.

And by the way, it's clear in those government records that have now been released, that they understood that Ukraine was the one place that was really dangerous. They understood, even the proponents of NATO expansion, that this was going to drive the Russians crazy. But going into Ukraine was going to be especially dangerous. Anyway, you had this big debate, and the expanders won. But what I find remarkable is that the debate then completely disappeared. after 19, I'd say 95, there's hardly any debate at all, and certainly after 1999.

And instead, in the United States, and of course because the Europeans drank American Kool-Aid, they mimic these arguments. But after 1999, the idea that we had an open-door policy on admitting countries to NATO, and it didn't matter, what the Russians thought and the sort of balance of power calculations that the opponents raised just didn't matter. That became almost like a religion, and nobody in the United States protested. Nobody in the United States or in Europe protested. It's really quite remarkable that more people weren't standing on the rooftops, especially after 2008. especially after the Georgia War in August of that year,

especially after the Ukraine conflict breaks out in February 2014, that there aren't more people who are saying, we have to rethink this. Look at what's happening. We just had a war in Georgia, and now we're on the verge of another war in Ukraine. Ukraine has just lost Crimea. You would just expect that debate that took place in the United States in the 1990s

to resurface in Europe and even in the United States. But that hardly happens at all. And it's just a band of characters like us, not a large community by any means. And most of us are marginalized. All of us are marginalized in very important ways from the mainstream media. We're the opposition. We were where George Kennan was, what William Perry was, in Paul Nitzah, Jean-Cartrick-Patrick,

name it in the 1990s. But out there in the mainstream, you know, among people in the foreign policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, it's actually quite stunning that there's hardly anybody who stands up and says the emperor has no clothes. And I don't have a good explanation for it. I believe many articles and books are going to be written on this. But I just find it, quite amazing, especially given the disastrous consequences here. Look at what's happened. You know, we talk about Russia, we talk about the United States. Look at what's happened to Ukraine. This is a catastrophe. That's not an exaggeration. It's a catastrophe. I found it in the 90s how that disappeared to be also interesting.

Yes, you know, I published a book last year on the Ukraine. We're not in the whole chapter just assigned pretty much to the 1990s around this debate because it was such fierce as you said, opposition. And even the anti-Soviet hawks, many of them would also come out and say, well, this is just going to restart the Cold War. This is a very bad idea. And you had the giants from General George Kennan, obviously, being the

main one, but you mentioned William Perry. He even came out later on giving an interview back in 2016 when he said, well, it wasn't just him who was opposed to NATO expansion, who at least recognized that it would cause a disaster. But it was making the point. Everyone in the

administration realized that this was going to be seen as a stab in the back for the Russians and they would come back angry. But as his point was, it's not that they rejected this argument. It's just that the rest of the Clinton administration thought it doesn't matter. The Russians are weak. They're getting weaker. Our relationship should be based on managing their decline, not accommodating their security concerns. And for example, Madeline Albright, she was very pro-expanding NATO, but she also recognized, yeah, the Russians are all feeling encircled. But if things go bad, at least, NATO will be there. So, you know, it's, no, it's quite extraordinary. I think that this amnesia is, again, goes back to my comment before with the NATO

Russia Council. That is, we have this debate. We recognize that is problematic, but we also recognize if we want the hegemonic peace, the NATO expansion is the key. Once the decision has been made, we put the debates behind us, and we organize in solidarity around the narrative. that no one has any reasons to fear NATO. It's an institution intended to promote democracy. And, you know, we all signed under, and we all agree that this is the narrative we will now follow, and we forget all about those big debates in the 1990s.

By the way, if you want to go through the Senate debates, if you look through the discussions they have, and you look and you search up the word insurance guarantee. No, wait, not insurance. Yeah, something along those lines. We need a insurance policy. That's what NATO was. Let's expand NATO.

If we have our future conflict with Russia, we'll have NATO. This was recurring. It was obviously it was against Russia as well. But in case we would have a conflict and to create this hegemonic Europe. But we forgot it completely. I think it's because if we would open up this box again, then the whole foundation of the European security architecture would come into place. We all have to walk around pretend it's not real that debate debates. We had the legitimate concerns of the Russians.

You know, this is all stuff of Kremlin talking points that legitimizes Russia's bad behavior now. So it's, no, it's a fascinating part of Western history that the whole decade kind of went into, yeah. It's true. I mean, I don't have much to say to this, except that, I mean, it's part of the general change that has happened in politics altogether.

I mean, you know, that kind of debate, the one that took place in the early 1990s in the United States, and which, by the way, there was a similar debate in Britain, as I remember at that time. That debate belongs more to the world that existed before the end of the Cold War. It was the sort of arguments that you had between doves and hawks. Of course, some of the people like Boulnitzer had been,

and Jean-Jean Prick-Patri were absolutely anti-Soviet Hawks. But you had these kind of very high intellectual and intelligent and well-informed debates, and they used to play out in public, and they used to have an effect on policy. I can remember them. I'm sure we all can remember them during the Cold War. It was almost in effect the last one. And then something changed altogether, not just about that, but about so many other things. I mean, the disappearance of peace movements in Europe, for example, which I was never

part of, by the way, just to say, but I mean, I remember them. And they were very much part of the political landscape in Europe at that time. And so many other things, too, the way the media functions was completely different before. How it all changed, I don't know. I do think, and without getting into a completely different topic, I think the events that started, you know, the conflicts in the Middle East, the war on town, all of that, did perhaps lead to a closing of minds. The point is we have to start opening our minds again, and we have to stop, we have to rediscover some of that ability to conduct debates in the way that we did previously and not moralize and climb onto, you know, podiums and, you know, soapboxes and lecture people and make what we call moral judgments,

which because ultimately they're not based on any kind of reality, are not really moral at all, and lead to exactly to the catastrophe, which we're looking at today. One additional point about NATO expansion, Glenn mentioned Madeline Albright, which triggered in my mind. The fact that I recently read Steve Kinzer, the journalist Steve Kinzer, who I think does brilliant work on all sorts of subjects, has written a book on Ukraine, the Ukraine War, and he goes back to the roots of the Ukraine war. And one of the central themes in the manuscript, I don't know exactly when the book is coming out, but I believe it's shortly. One of the central themes in Steve's book is that if you look at who most of the hawks are, a NATO expansion, they have East European roots.

People like Madeline Albright, people like Spignau Bresensky, and even people in the military, Democratic and Republican administrations, and so forth and so on. It's really quite impressive, as you read through the book, to see the extent to which expansion, NATO expansion into Ukraine. NATO expansion more generally is fostered, strongly fostered by Americans who have East European roots.

Well, that was a common theme, though, that the whole idea after the Cold War, if we should remove the dividing lines, unify Europe, essentially as outlined in the Charter of Paris for New Europe. This is what we're supposed to. But you sold from the Eastern European countries, then they didn't necessarily want an end to the dividing lines. They just wanted to be on the other side of the dividing lines. And instead of seeking reconciliation, which, for example, the French were

looking for after the Cold War, you had coming out of Eastern Europe more calls for historical justice and all Australia revenge. But again, in Europe now, we're all Latvians, effectively. We're all we're all seeking, you know, revenge on Russia. But I think it's besides the hatred of Russia and seeking justice, there's a different thing that's gripped, at least Europe. Yeah, Alexander, you just mentioned the obsession with what they think is morality. It feels to me that normative statements is confused with morality in Europe these days. We just say things which sounds lovely.

It's if I would say, oh, you know, America's threatening Mexico with the drug cartels. Mexico's every right in the world to host Chinese missiles. And this feels like the most moral thing in the world to say. But in reality, in the realist world, you're condemning Mexico to death. So it's, again, I don't understand anymore. political class on this continent? I think that's, I think that's completely right. I mean, it's, it's, it's unfortunately something that goes so unchallenged in Europe.

I think this is more in Europe than in the United States, that this kind of very moralistic language is very difficult to argue against, especially when it is made by people, like people in Eastern Europe, who do have legitimate. grievances against Russia. We shouldn't forget this. I mean, they do have legitimate grievances against Russia, but constantly satisfying that sense of grievance, constantly appeasing it. Instead of helping to find a way through, what it is doing all the time is making it worse and worse relations between the Russians and the Baltic states, as I remember, used to be much better in the 1990s before they joined NATO than they are today. And the Baltic states have become more

and more aggressive towards Russia all the time precisely because they feel that they, obviously they have that grievance, but that the support that they're getting means that, That grievance is not just justified, but it can be amplified and it can be supported with no consequences for themselves. And that has been disastrous and it's fed us all in. And it has, to a disastrous degree, spread that sense of grievance right across Europe with helping to bring about this crisis that we're in now. I think Finland is even a better example. Finland survived the Cold War nicely, living next door to the Soviet Union, which was far more powerful in military terms than Russia is today. Finland had no problems with Russia after the Cold War ended.

Then it joins NATO. Is this going to work to Finland's advantage over time? No, it's just going to exacerbate relations between Russia and Finland. It's going to make relations worse. And you see both sides talking about defending the border between the two countries, and then both countries are competing in the Arctic, and you say to yourself, how does that work? It was foolish, I think, for Sweden and Finland both to join NATO.

And I agree with you completely, Alexander, with regard to the Baltic states. And then if you go to Poland, you know, you look at the foreign ministers, Sikorski, his basic view on how you deal with the Russians is you take a stick and you poke them in the eye at every opportunity. Does this really make sense? I mean, I understand that Poland's history is a dark history. I understand that it disappeared from the map between 1795 and 1918. Okay. But if you live in a dangerous neighborhood and you live next to a great power like Russia or the Soviet Union before, before that, I think poking it in the eye with a stick is usually going to be counterproductive.

I think there are other ways to deal with the bear. But you can't sell that argument to lots of people in Eastern Europe. They think that poking the bear in the eye is the way to go. And I think when you're small and weak and you live next door to a bear, you have to be much more prudent. Well, when I said we're all Latvians now, I didn't even mean to exaggerate. I mean, the Scandinavians are perfect in this sense. An example, the Swedish defense minister recently came out and made the point that, well, the reason, you know, we live next to Russia. The way what I want to learn is you have to, you know, arm yourself to the teeth to survive and, you know, you have to fight for your freedom.

Well, that's not their experience at all. They became neutral and they had, they lived quite well. They had some instances of submarines, which were instigated a bit by the British and Americans, in order to try to lure them a little bit away to create, because they were concerned. They had too much peace with the Russians or the Soviets at that time. Same as the Finns. Stub was telling Trump that, oh, our experience with the Russians, you know, you have to always deter them because this is the only way you can keep them at bay.

and even referenced, I think, the Winter War before World War II. But this is when the Soviets invaded Finland. But as we know, as all the documents show, the Soviets were afraid that the Germans would use Finland as a launching pad to attack the Soviet Union. A little bit, not a little bit, a lot like Ukraine today. And as a result, they invaded Finland to prevent Finland from being used as a bridgehead into the Soviet Union. And once after World War II an agreement had been made to make Finland neutral, they lived with a huge border to the Soviet Union in peace and they prospered. But now they make it sound like fighting Russia till the end is what this is the new history or what has made them prosperous and safe. It's just a very strange, very strange history.

I hear the same in this country in Norway. They make this argument that, well, if you look at the Soviets, they never really liberated anyone in World War II. They might have pushed out the Nazis, but then they stayed behind themselves, which is fair. If you're a Polish person, you can say this. But in this country, the Russians came in. They liberated the northern parts. They buried their dead, and they went home. I mean, we don't have this.

We're just all in reinventing our history and trying to play the same. role. It's very, very strange. Glenn, people don't believe in getting into the details of history anymore in the way that you do. I mean, we get comments in the media here in Britain that when Putin brings up the history of the Ukraine, of Ukraine, what he sees as history, you don't actually respond to it or argue with it. You just roll your eyes and say there's another history lecture and you can't take this into account. I mean, that is another problem that we don't want to look into the past and understand it and discuss it. But there it is.

I mean, we have to deal with this crisis that we have now. And that means, at least with the time being, putting all this to one side and focusing on the current problem. And you spoke about how Finland they talk about the only way to secure your free. and prosperity is by being armed to the teeth all the time because of the fear of the bear next door. Well, we've just been living through that very same thing. We are trying to arm ourselves to the teeth and not succeeding, and we're not getting very much prosperity. And, well, I'm not going to discuss the issue of freedom. So this is not a way forward.

It is a dead end. And we have to go back and do what we should have done much before and try to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis and find some way to live with the Russians before the window closes, which it will very soon. If the Russians get across the river, if they cross the river in force, If they start moving westwards, then frankly, I mean, all the discussions that are taking place about diplomacy and all of that, they become effectively redundant. And we may be closer to that point that many people understand.

Two very quick points. One is, I think it's important to emphasize that the Soviet Union or the Red Army liberated and saved Poland. because I believe that Poland was number three on the genocidal hit list, the Germans' genocidal hit list. I believe that the Jews were obviously number one. The Roma, or what is sometimes called, the gypsies were number two. And I believe the polls were number three. And there were a variety of statements that were made by German leaders that made it clear that they wanted to eliminate every pole from the face of the earth, if they could. And the Soviets saved them, I believe.

And I would also note that the reason the Soviets stayed in Europe during the Cold War was in large part because of the German problem. You want to remember when 1945 comes and the war ends, the Soviets have just fought one of the most disastrous wars in modern history. Their losses are just almost unimaginable. And the reason they want to stay in Germany and they're not leaving is they don't want Germany to come back from the dead. And you want to remember, we stay on one side and they stay on the other side. Germany remains divided throughout the Cold War because Germany was a serious threat. Certainly a serious threat to come back from the dead in the 40s, late 40s, 50s, and even in the 60. You just don't want to lose sight of that.

It wasn't that the Russians were just sort of mindless aggressors who were trying to conquer all of Europe. They had a German problem to solve. The other point that I would make is I think one of the reasons that the Poles, the Baltic states, even the Finns and the Swedes have turned into real hardliners against the Russians is that they feel secure or have felt secure under the American security. umbrella. As long as you have NATO there, as long as the Americans are there in force to protect you, you can poke the Russians in the eye. Sokorsky can poke the Russians with his stick in the eyes, and the Russians can't do much about it because the Americans are there. But the great danger that the Europeans face is that the Americans will go home. Trump has powerful inclinations in that direction. And if the Americans go home and those Eastern European countries are left on their own

to deal with the Russians, it is not likely to be a pretty situation. So I think the Europeans should think long and hard about how to deal with the Russians in the context of the possibility that the United States might pull almost all, if not all, its combat troops out of Europe in the future. Yeah, well, I think that's the dilemma for the Europeans, because there was an article in Reuters, I think, suggesting that at the end of August, the Americans informed the Europeans that were planning to reduce their presence in the Baltic states. And suddenly, now every day, every drone we see near an airport is evidence of Russian hostility

and reason why I have to go to war. Even after we find out who flew them, one of our citizens, own citizens, the rest, we still talk about the hybrid war. So this attempt now, this threat inflation to go harder against the Russians, all of this is aimed at, of course, pulling the Americans back in. But it's a big gamble because if the Americans are leaving and everything indicates that they want to reduce their presence, then we're left without our backup, essentially. and I think you're very correct. None of the Europeans would do anything like this if the Americans didn't stand behind them. So, no, I think we're walking into a disaster.

But it's hard. I mean, for anyone following the European media, it's like all our leaders are cosplaying World War II. They really do think that this is their great moment when they will go into history books for standing up against our new Hitler. So, no, is any final thoughts before we wrap up? No, I think John is absolutely right if the Americans are leaving.

And of course, it is inevitable that someday they will, but it is more likely than not, probably that they will leave relatively soon. Then we in Europe need to sort out our relations with the Russians, whilst they are still here, that ought to be a priority. But again, the quality of European leadership is so bad that at the moment we don't seem to be able to do this. I have to say, I think we're going to see a Russian military victory in Ukraine. I think there will be a deep crisis in Europe. I think despite that, probably the Americans will eventually leave,

because they've been in Europe for a very long time, far longer than we could have reasonably expected that they would be, when this all began, and they have many, many things of their own to sort out, and they're not directly threatened. And then perhaps finally, confronted with the reality of the crisis we face, we in Europe might do something about it and might make a serious effort to sort it out. But I'm afraid that's probably where we're going, because I don't myself see much sign that we're going to be able to do anything else.

Yeah, I have nothing to say other than I agree with everything Alexander said. Well, from that, thank you both for taking the time, and I hope to see again very soon. So thanks. You're more than welcome, Glenn. I enjoyed it thoroughly.