The Ezra Klein Show - Behind Trump and Vance Is This Man’s Movement

Episode Date: August 1, 2025

Vice President JD Vance gave a speech recently that deserved more attention than it got. Accepting an award at a right-wing think tank, he argued that there’s a fundamental brokenness in how we define who is an American. He explained that this is the root of many of our country’s problems: a national identity that has become too broad.That was also a core idea of the 2018 book “The Virtue of Nationalism,” which caused a sensation on the right. Its author, the Israeli political theorist Yoram Hazony, went on to build a movement. For years, he has hosted NatCon — short for National Conservatism — conferences. Those events have featured speakers like Marco Rubio, who is now the secretary of state, and Senator Josh Hawley. And one of the most reliable speakers, year after year, has been Vance.I wanted to talk to Hazony. What exactly is his argument, his worldview? And are the Trump administration’s policies putting it into practice?Mentioned:JD Vance’s speech at The Claremont InstituteBook Recommendations:The Demon in Democracy by Ryszard LegutkoThe Strategy of Denial by Elbridge ColbyIsrael and Civilization by Josh HammerThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [e-mail] can find the transcript and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.htmlThis episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Elias Isquith. Fact-checking by Will Peischel. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Aman Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Marie Cascione, Annie Galvin, Michelle Harris, Rollin Hu, Marina King, Jan Kobal, Kristin Lin and Jack McCordick. Original music by Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Kristina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Unlock full access to New York Times podcasts and explore everything from politics to pop culture. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

You know, Vice President J.D. Vance gave a speech recently that deserved more attention than it got. Vance was accepting an award from the Claremont Institute, a right-wing think tank, and not just any award, an award for statesmanship. And Vance in this speech sets himself a few tasks. One is to understand the nature of the left. And I'm going to be honest, I don't give him high marks for where he ended up. The radicals of the far left, they don't need a unifying ideology. of what they're for, because they know very well what they're against. What unites Islamists, gender studies majors, socially liberal white urbanites, and

Big Pharma lobbyists, it isn't the ideas of Thomas Jefferson or even of Karl Marx. It's hatred. They hate the people in this room. They hate the president of the United States, and most of all, they hate the people who voted for that president of the United States in the last election in November. This is the animating principle of the American far left. Something I've always found interesting about Vance is that if you read Hillbilly Elgy, and I've read it a couple of times, if you take seriously what he is struggling with

in that book, one of the things he's struggling with is a sense of being othered. Vance reads his own audiobook, you can hear him saying this. I realize that in this new world, I was the cultural alien. I began to think seriously about questions that had nagned at me since I was a teenager. Why has no one else from my high school made it to the Ivy League? Why are people like me so poorly represented in America's elite institutions? Why is domestic strife so common in families like mine? Why did I think that places like Yale and Harvard were so unreachable?

Why did successful people feel so different? You could imagine that guy going on to build a politics of tolerance, of politics to make sure other people don't feel that way. And yet he goes on to build a politics all around othering. Maybe it's calculation, what he thought he needed to do to get ahead. But it feels more like projection. We're effectively run in this country via the Democrats, via our corporate oligarchs, by a bunch of childless cat ladies who are miserable at their own lives

and the choices that they've made, and so they want to make the rest of the country. miserable too. I watch that. I listen to him, and I wonder if he imagines that everyone who disagrees with him feels as he does, is motivated by the emotions that pulse within him. And that's why he finds it personally convincing to say that his opponents are driven by hate, because it often seems like there's a lot of hate driving him. But explaining what motivates his political opponents is not the only task Van Sets for himself. He wants to diagnose something deeper, a more fundamental rot beneath Western society.

Every Western society, as I stand here today, has significant demographic and cultural problems. There is something about Western liberalism that seems almost suicidal, or at least socially parasitic, that tends to feed off of a healthy host until there's nothing left. And what is that something? What is the parasite here? Well, a few sentences later, Vance makes it clear. America in 25 is more diverse than it has ever been.

And yet, the institutions that take this incredibly diverse country and form culture are weaker than they have ever been. While our elites tell us that diversity is our greatest strength, they destroy the very institutions that allow us to thrive and build a common sense of purpose and meaning as Americans. That's the problem, Vance thinks. diversity. What we have broken is our definition of belonging, how we define who is an American, and the way we have broken it is we've made it too broad, too capacious, too accepting, too diverse. The problem that Vance thinks is that we have come to believe a story, a fiction that says Americanist is about what you believe rather than who you are and where your parents were born. If you think about it, identifying America just with agreeing with the principles, let's say,

of the Declaration of Independence, that's a definition that is way over-inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time. What do I mean by that? Well, first of all, it would include hundreds of millions, maybe billions of foreign citizens who agree with the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Must we admit all of them tomorrow? I watched that, and I think, I mean, no, no one is suggesting we should. But Vance knows that. He's setting up a straw man, in order to make his real argument work. He's creating a fake position that Americanists should be built on nothing but fealty

to the Declaration of Independence in order to argue his real position that Americanists should have nothing to do with the ideals in the Declaration of Independence. If you follow that logic of America as a purely creedal nation, America purely as an idea, that is where it would lead you.

But at the same time, that answer would also reduce, a lot of people that the ADL would label as domestic extremists. Even though those very Americans had their ancestors fight in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. And I happen to think that it's absurd, and the modern left seems dedicated to doing this, to saying you don't belong in America unless you agree with progressive liberalism in 2025. I think the people whose ancestors fought in the Civil War have a hell of a lot more claim over America, than the people who say they don't belong.

It's so interesting that the war J.D. Vance chose to illustrate that argument with was the Civil War, a war in which one side wanted to dissolve the United States of America in defense of slavery. What he's saying here is that since then, we have increasingly identified Americanness as believing what the victors of the Civil War believed, that we are a country dedicated to realizing what was written into the Declaration of independence. But Vance is saying, no, that was wrong. What matters is not what you believe about America. It is how long your family has been in America. You can see Vance as in conversation

here with Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass trying to rebut their vision of citizenship. But Vance is a man of his time. The person he is rebutting here is Barack Obama. Obama with his funny name, his Kenyan father, his belief that America is an unfinished project, and that the language of patriotism belongs to those who seek to finish it. Obama, who to some seem like the fulfillment of the American experiment, and to others seemed like a betrayal of it. And I just say very simply, why doesn't he show his birth certificate? Why has he spent over $2 million in legal fees to keep this quiet and to keep this silent?

There's a reason so many, including Donald Trump, were so obsessed by the question of where Obama was born. Vance is not inventing the intellectual challenge here. Obama and others have made something like the reverse of the argument Vance is making. Here he is marking the 50th anniversary of the marches from Selma to Montgomery. And yet what could be more American than what happened in this place? What could more profoundly vindicate the idea of America? than plain and humble people, unsung, the downtrodden, the dreamers not of high station,

not born to wealth or privilege, not of one religious tradition, but many, coming together to shape their country's course. What greater expression of faith in the American experiment than this? What greater form of patriotism is there than the belief that America is not yet finished? that we are strong enough to be self-critical, that each successive generation can look upon our imperfections and decide that it is in our power to remake this nation to more closely align with our highest ideas.

The view on the right is that this vision of patriotism, this vision of citizenship, is acid for the bonds that hold the country together. Countries are about people, not ideas. They're about a shared past, not an imagined future. In 2018, Yoramazone, an Israeli political theorist, released a book that became a sensation on the right. It was called The Virtue of Nationalism, and it sought to build a right that could withstand the challenge that liberals like Obama had posed. It sought to make a right

that would reimagine belonging, not around the ideals that won the Civil War, but the people who fought it. Hazzoni became the founder of a movement. Year after year, he would host NACCON conferences, short for national conservatives. And year after year, One of the people would come to those conferences, who would speak at them, was J.D. Vance. That's part of the firm in which he developed the politics we know him for today. So if you want to understand that politics, that speech, this administration, Hazoni and his book are a good place to start. As always, my email, Ezrapline Show at nmytimes.com.

You are Mizoni. Welcome to the show. Thank you for having me. So I want to ask about the central trip-tech in your book, families, tribes, and nations. I think people know what families are. But to begin, how do you define tribes and how do you define nations? Okay, what most of us are raised on is a view of politics that's, first of all, based on the individual, and then individuals agree to create the state. And one of the central points in my books is that for most purposes, this is not a helpful way to think about things.

So what is a helpful way? Part of the argument is that there is such a thing as human nature. And, you know, obviously there's a great deal of variation and people have choice, but there are certain things that constantly recur when you're talking about human societies. and the most basic thing is that human beings are sticky. Put a human being... I have toddlers, I know that. Right. But even when they get older, put human beings in almost any setting,

in almost any kind of social context. You can be at a party or at a conference or something on the street, and within minutes you have this feeling with somebody, like somehow you're part of something together. So that, I think, is absolute bedrock, this feeling, which I call mutual loyalty. So from this perspective, children are born into families. They're not born free and equal because they're born into families where they're not free. Their parents tell them what to do.

And they're not equal. Their parents tell them what to do. And, you know, there's brothers and sisters and aunts and uncles. But that means human beings are, the first nature that they have is not. one of freedom and equality, but of being part of a little tribe, of people who are loyal to them, and they grew up being loyal to their family. So when you pan out, these families can also be loyal to one another. And there are words like clan is kind of an outdated word, so is tribe. But if you look at the way that the tribes are built in the Bible or other ancient texts,

You'll see that families join with other families into clans and clans form with other clans into tribes and tribes with other tribes into nations and then there are families of nations. Mutual loyalty, I think, is the fundamental human building block for everything that happens in societies. So the story, sort of you've just offered, is we are born into families.

That's where our first loyalty lies. Families bent together. You can call that a tribe. tribes band together you can call that a nation I think living in the United States with 300 million plus people

I would not describe the organization in the United States as a bunch of families got together and created tribes and a bunch of tribes got together and created the modern USA were clearly something else or do you think I'm wrong about that?

I think you're right and you're wrong always I'm sorry I'll try to be like more unequivocal and unreasonable as we go along no I think if we're talking about the United States the way it was 50 years ago then I think it was much much more clearly a nation the way that I'm describing it I mean we haven't got 1975 you would say it was a bunch of families that had come together to create tribes and the tribes that come together to create a nation sure well listen this is not necessary consensual process. I mean, I'm looking at societies, human societies, and I'm saying everywhere in human history, there's these kind of concentric circles of loyalty. And I think that in the 1980s, you know, when I was on university campus in the U.S. and first becoming interested in these questions, in the United States, I think there was almost nobody who doubted that it was a nation, that it was certainly divided into streams and parties and different religious denominations, but the idea that it was a unity that was held together by mutual

loyalty, almost everybody was part of it. You know, maybe some people were left out, but most people were part of it. I don't think there was much question. Today, there's a question. But when you say nobody doubted it was a nation, was that your definition of a nation? Mutual loyalty, depending on mutual faction. I think I just garbled that a bit for you. But what is the definition of the nation? Okay. So a nation is a collection or a group of tribes that are bound together by mutual loyalty and that share certain characteristics. Usually it's a language. Often it's a religion. In most cases, it's a common history of joining together against common enemies. That's a nation. And it's known, you know, you can look at the symbols, like, you know, does it have a flag?

Does it have a passport? Does it have borders? But all of those things, I think, are peripheral. There were nations in history before anybody had passports or flags. It's a natural grouping of human beings. You said a minute ago, and I think this gets to the core of the project and the argument that you're actually in here, that in 1975, sort of go anywhere in America. and people say, yes, we're part of this, this nation. We are bound together.

We are this entity. And it sounded like you don't think that is true today. What is the position you're arguing with? Well, I think there's lots of people on both the left and right who read my book and they say, you know, that doesn't sound like American. And there can be different reasons for people saying that. But I think that the main thing that's bothering them, which I am very sympathetic to, is that the divisions of the United States into tribes that don't feel a strong loyalty to one another.

We are deteriorating in that direction. There is more and more talk of civil war. There's more and more talk on both left and right saying that the others are not legitimate, that they need to be driven from the political landscape, driven from the country. I mean, it's an extremely aggressive view of your competitors and rivals who are supposed to be your co-nationals. It's funny. I would not describe that even as the thing that, at least as a liberal reading your book, I would take as the argument you're having. I mean, we can go back in U.S. history and find many times when we're quite divided now, but we've had a civil war in this country. When you look at the 1970s, there's a string of political assassinations. There are riots in the street. There are

urban riots, right? These are not, we are not a nation that has always been at calm or at peace with each other. What I understand you is arguing, and some of the people coming up with you, J.D. Vance and others is arguing, is that this liberal idea that the nation is a commitment to a set of fairly abstract values, that you can't really build a nation on that, that what gets called creedal nationalism, this sort of nationalism of a shared story, that that's not for you a real nation, that it won't hold together. Am I misrepresenting you? A little bit.

Okay. Because I do think that many nations do have inherited religions, philosophies, perspectives on different things. The question I think that maybe you and I are disagreeing about is whether people can be loyal to ideas independent of, the tribe, the nation that they're part of. My argument is not that the Torah isn't crucial in defining the Jews and that the American constitution is not crucial for defining Americans. My argument is that children grow up giving honor to the things that their parents honor. And then they become

teenagers and they rebel. So then, you know, they switch over to honoring what their aunt and uncle honor or maybe the other tribe in the nation. But they almost never invent, you know, out of whole cloth, a completely new set of things to be loyal to. So let me take my old friend Bill Crystal as an example of the other point of view. Somebody who will say, look, if you embrace American ideas, then you're effectively an American. It's just technicality whether we make you a U.S. citizen. And I disagree with that completely. I think. think that it's true that some people in adulthood convert to a different religion from the one they're raised with, or they emigrate and they go to a different country. And there are many

immigrants who adopt their new country and they're completely loyal to it. So there is always a minority of people who switch loyalties by choice at some point in their lives. But the fundamental thing that's going on is always that most people are loyal to the things that they've inherited from their family and their society. In the book, you quote a philosopher who says that these big multicultural nations have become, quote, lifeless monstrosities. So you quote them approvingly as sort of making a good argument about what cannot hold nations together. Right. So what are some examples of the lifeless monstrosities that you're trying to warn your readers against embracing or believing in.

I think the most striking example, I mean, there's lots of examples, but the most striking examples are Syria and Iraq and Lebanon, the ones from the Middle East. Countries founded around the same time that Israel was, around the same time that India was. And still, they, you know, they were given a flag, they were given an anthem, they were given passports, they were given like all of the formal trappings of what many people call a nation, membership in the United Nations, that kind of thing. But by my definition, none of those political entities were ever a nation. So maybe Lebanon, when it still had a Christian majority, had sufficient internal cohesion so that you could say that it was a nation. But Syria and Iraq, I think that they have been warring tribes suppressed by overwhelming might, usually by a minority that seizes power in order to defend itself forever. They were never nations before and they're not nations now.

So when people say to me, Yarm, what do you see happening in the United States? that's so troubling and dangerous, my answer is what really worries me that the United States is moving in the direction of becoming Syria or Iraq, a country in which only brute force will be able to hold it together. Lay that case out for me.

What do you mean when you say we are becoming Syria, which is a country created by mandate by other empires jammed together? We have a somewhat different history. So walk me through your fear. Well, you're right that America has a somewhat different history because, you know, despite the fact that all nations are internally diverse, but the United States, at its founding, was able to come together mostly voluntarily because of the fact that it, you know, although the 13 colonies were very different from one another, but still they were pretty similar. It was, you know, it was whatever was 95% or something Anglo-Protestant. and even though there's many different kinds of Protestants, that was sufficient to be able to make the argument

that it was one nation, as John Jay writes in the Federalist. And still, the differences were sufficiently great that the United States fought this horrific Civil War, whatever was, 70, 80 years after the founding. After that, I agree that there have been many stresses, but I don't think anything has come close to the Civil War except today in which the move to say the other side is not legitimate. Let me unpack that for a second.

The basic assumption in democracy is we come from different tribes and different worldviews and different perspectives. We would be killing each other if we didn't get tired of it and finally say, look, we're actually, you know, we're actually relations. We're brothers, in a sense. And so we shouldn't be killing each other. Let's decide that we're not going to keep killing each other. When we have a disagreement, we'll have elections, and then we'll have peaceful transitions of power. And when you win the election, I'm going to honor you, meaning I'm going to say, yes, you're the legitimate president, you have the right to make decisions. I'm not going to agree with all of your. your decisions, but I'm also not going to, like, pick up weapons and start shooting you. And if you look at, you know, any of the presidential debates from, you know, the televised from the 60s or the 70s or the 80s, you'll see exactly this, that Nixon and Kennedy, I'm sure they must have detested each other.

But you don't see that in the debate. In the debate, it's all about, you know, my honorable opponent. It's all, it's not just politeness. I don't understand what this has to do with the argument, to be honest. You have a book about nationalism here that has been picked up by a lot of people in the Trump administration. The Trump administration and Donald Trump himself are like the apex predator example of a politician, a politicians of a movement that when it loses elections, it does not say, my honorable opponents have won the election. We are excited to work together for the good of our shared national project. If you're positing your nationalism as somehow a balm to the post-election divisions and the delegitimizing of the other side we've been seeing, there's some contradiction that you're going to have to unpack for me.

Yeah, you know, there may be more contradictions, you know, since, I mean, there are questions of political theory, which I think apply everywhere and all the time, pretty much. And then there are questions of current affairs. And current affairs is about, and to a very large degree, it's about personalities. And look, if I have to take a, you know, a position on, am I happy about the Trump administration and the people serving it? The answer is yes. I don't, you know, I don't hide that from anybody. And if you ask, are Donald Trump, or for that matter, if you don't mind my bipartisaning this for a moment, Donald Trump or Barack Obama, are these politicians of the old mold who thought it was important, really, really important to cultivate mutual loyalty between the different parties and tribes?

No, they're not. That's part of the era that we live in is that it's even a question. I bet that if President Trump were sitting here and we were talking to him about it, he would say, you know, of course you're right for those days, but now you can't get anywhere, you know, being a nice guy, because nobody's going to be a nice guy back to you. All right, so look, I consider this. I hope you don't mind my saying it. I consider this to be a tragedy. It's a tragedy that the United States, has reached the point in which, in order to be a successful or even a great political figure of either party, you get there by being incredibly divisive. So two things on this. So one, I do consider the Obama-Trump comparison there to be. I think we get lost in that, but I consider to be fallacious.

For instance, Barack Obama did not say that the elections were wrongly decided. When you're talking about that delegitimizing, I think you're looking at very, very different people. And I would say that Obama's rhetoric was often. Hillary Clinton did say that the election. were stolen, right? I don't believe she ever said the election was stolen.

I believe she said explicitly. Well, okay, you know. There was nothing like the long-running post-2020 effort under Barack Obama, who's the other person you named here. But the thing I'm trying to do is apply this to your book and your theory. Yeah. Here's what I think you are saying to me, that America was an Anglo-Saxon nation, formed together by Anglo-Saxon families that came together to become tribes, that

became in the 13 colonies to become a nation, and that there was a long period when America grew in such a way that that clanned structure was dominant, and that somewhere in the last 50 years-ish, it has begun to lose that structure. And now we are coming apart, and maybe that is creating the level of division you're fearing, that there was, that we were a nation-based, on this structure of tribal affinity. We are now a nation that is too much trying to hold things together through multicultural storytelling. And that is creating irresolvable differences

and the answer is to sort of double down on the tribal affinity. Is that how the nationalism fits into this? No, multiculturalism is also based on tribal affinity. It's also based on tribal loyalty. So America in 2025, is also a society that's based on tribes. The question isn't whether it's internally diverse and based on tribes.

The question is, are those tribes loyal to one another? Or are they saying, look, the other guys are evil? We've got to destroy them. There's a difference between saying, I don't like the other guys. They're leading us in the wrong direction. We really need to win this election, but we'll respect the outcome of the election.

and what's happening now, which is a constant drumbeat, both on the Democratic side and on the Republican side, saying that elections have been stolen. And that's something that didn't exist 20 years ago. All right, let's take that premise. As I said, I don't agree with the symmetry there, but let's take it as a premise. I think the place where you're finding my confusion here,

because I read The Virtual of Nationalism, and it would sound, I think, to a listener. Like, I am interviewing a liberal who is saying to me, listen, America is this grand experiment. And what holds that experiment together is the liberal tolerance of division, disagreement, and difference. And that the people in that experiment need to be committed to one another. They need to be committed to our shared institutions. They need to be committed to elections and the peaceful transfer of power. And that what is going wrong is a dissolving commitment to that.

In a way, this is like Joe Biden could be making that argument to me. National conservatism is making some other argument than that. But it's not making an argument about that we need more decency from our politicians or we need just sort of more commitment to the abstract institutions of democracy and the other political party. I agree with all that. Tell me where you don't agree with me. You're a factional movement trying to change both the Republican and the Democratic parties. Who are you arguing with?

Okay. In every Democratic country with which I'm familiar from the United States to India, there is the consolidation in the last 15, 20, 15 years of political parties that are explicitly committed to one degree or another to trying to break the particular nation. away from and out of the unfolding global system. So from the perspective of all these different nationalist parties and movements that are sometimes quite different from one another, but they share certain things in common. The first thing they share in common

is that they look at supranational institutions like the European Union or the World Trade Organization or the International Criminal Court whose purpose is to try to take all the independent nations in the world and put them under a single rule of a single law. The basic argument is the independence of nations, their freedom to chart their own course, is extremely important to all of these nationalist movements, including the Trump movement and including the Brexit movement and so on.

In order to understand national conservatism, the most important thing you need to understand is that it's the product of a time in which people are saying liberal internationalism has wonderful ideals, it is destroying our nations, our societies. A second part of national conservatism that's important to try to understand what's happening is that most national conservatives think that the old liberalism has collapsed or is collapsing into something that is vicious and intolerant and really should not be called liberalism anymore, even if it uses the term. So let me just recap what you said. You can tell me if I'm getting you wrong. The first here is a defense of national sovereignty against these multilateral organizations, these global organizations,

that as you see it are trying to bring nations under a single rule. Yep. Okay. And second is a feeling that for all the maybe high ideals that liberals express about tolerance, the actual liberalism or left of the political spectrum was evolving in a way that was deeply intolerant. Yes. Of many of the traditions, groups, ideas, the character is the right, which is certainly. of part of the splitting apart. That's fair, so far? It's completely fair. Let me just add that the, I mean, now people are always arguing about what these political terms mean, but most people on the right agree that there is a thing

called woke, and most of them agree that it's a strain of neo-Marxism. I'm always confused about what neo-Marxism is. When people talk about neo-Marxism, they're talking, first of all, Marxism is a view that, you know, since Marx and before him, sees liberalism as kind of like a big sham. It's a big lie. Like, as far as Marx is concerned, liberal society is, it's based on a lie because you convince everybody that it's about, you know, freedom of exchange and freedom of expression, all the rest of that. But the truth is that society is built out of competing groups. He calls them classes. We can call them groups.

Competing groups, and that the stronger always exploits the weaker. And that that's It's like an iron law. That's a bedrock assumption of Marx. So if your assumption is the only way that you're going to get justice is through the destruction of the ruling group, the strongest group, if that's your view, then the liberal democratic idea that we're going to have peaceful competition and peaceful transitions of power to people who are actually serious Marxists, they look at that and they say, that's a joke. that's part of the brainwash is we're all supposed to work according to this liberal system. But the truth is that, you know, there's an elite and they always win and they always exploit everybody else. And today the feeling is that liberal institutions, especially during, you know, after the summer

of 2020, liberal institutions gave way to a neo-Marxist younger generation whose commitment to tolerance and to the old system is simply much weaker than the previous generation. You are talking about this movement, this reembrace of nationalism as being at least partly motivated by the perceived rise, at least, of an illiberal left, a left that is canceling people, that is pushing people with more traditional views to the margins of society, that is getting people fired from different positions at different businesses because of speech crimes. if your view is that you're not even an American, you're not worthy of being in polite society. If you don't believe everything I do about LGBTQ issues

or race issues or something else, if you begin throwing people out of the tent for that, then you begin breaking down the sort of bonds of affinity. So you might imagine on the other side of that, a conservatism that is very, very, very committed to the idea that we don't do that. We are a pluralistic, big tent, the most important thing is that people from all sides and all views in this country feel

themselves welcomed in. That is not what I see at all. I do not see a more, what I would call from this perspective, liberal right. I see a much more illiberal right. Where there was in society, there was such a thing as cancel culture. People did get fired from different jobs. Now I see the institutionalization of that at the federal level. I see much more effort to police speech crimes, right? I mean, particularly of immigrants, you know, who are getting, like, rounded up by ICE because of what they might have said about this or that issue, but also, you know, send in people to go through every grant and see if the word diversity is in it. So I guess I do not really understand how if the problem is, what sounds to me like you're describing an illiberalism

that does not sufficiently take into account that we are a big diverse country, people are going to have arguments. This is not a counter movement. J.D. Vance and Donald Trump and so on that is saying that. This is a kind of movement that is moving much more aggressively to use the power of the state to enforce its vision of what America should be and to make it more dangerous or impossible to be in opposition to that vision.

I think that's true. I think it's true. And again, I mean, I said at the beginning that we're going to find contradictions. And that's the way it is. If you're holding multiple principles, they need to be balanced in some way. I do think that the current American right, I would really prefer not to use the term illiberal, because just for a very simple reason, which is that illiberal takes conservatives like me and puts us in the same bucket, you know, with the kooky Nazi right. And there's no need for that. people like me used to be called conservatives. And the actual thing that's going on is that

we have a government that is less liberal, a Republican Party that is less liberal. I completely agree with you. It is moving away from libertarianism. And it's becoming more conservative and more nationalist. Well, before you make that distinction, though, do you think it's weird then that the kooky Nazi right feels more of a home in this more nationalistic conservatism? You look at the Groypers. You look at Nick Fuentes. You look at people who are by any measure, white supremac white supremacists of people we would have called the kooky Nazi right with their Pepe the frog memes. I mean, they felt very ill at home in Mitt Romney's Republican Party. They feel much more at home in Donald Trump's more nationalistic Republican Party. So you want to create this distinction

with the Kuki Nazi right, but it seems to some degree like this for new nationalism has been a way in for them. It hasn't pushed them out. There may be some truth to it, but not enough. when you're in sort of the opening stages of something, there's a lot of working out that's still going on and it's not exactly clear, you know, what does the candidate stand for and what does people stand for and who's actually supporting him. I think that in the last decade,

there's been a lot of clarification. And I don't think, I mean, if you mentioned Nick Fuentes, who really, I think, I mean, is really a minority, really a small minority figure and not particularly important, but he's well-known, so let's just take him for a moment. Nick Fuentes is not, first of all, I don't think he's comfortable with Trump at all. I mean, you know, I don't... Trump had dinner with him.

Mitt Romney would not have had dinner with him. Trump once in history had dinner with him and then never had dinner with him again, and I think that that tells you everything you need to know, that he never had dinner with him again. Okay. No, it's just... I feel like it's the once having dinner with him that tells me what I need to know, but I take your point. I don't think that's completely fair because, look, I, and I'm speaking just for myself, not for the president.

I'm speaking for myself. There are different styles of how to do politics. My style of how to do public affairs is I basically am willing to meet with anybody and talk to anybody. You know, maybe you have a little bit of that too. So I will never blame, I don't think I ever have, and I don't think I will, blame a political leader because once he sat with somebody, the reality of Nick Fuentes is, okay, I'm sorry that your listeners need to be made familiar with Nick Fuentes, because I don't think there's much bigger fish that we have to fry in this conversation if we want to. Nick Fuentes, a young Holocaust revisionist, kind of Catholic, made himself famous on the web for his incessant attacks on Jews. And is he comfortable with the Trump administration?

No, he's not comfortable with the Trump administration. There's all sorts of weird things on the American political right. They are getting stronger. I don't want to pretend, oh, no, they're totally relevant. You know, we shouldn't be worried about them. That's not true at all. They're getting much stronger. But the idea that they're comfortable with Trump, I mean, just look at what's been going on for the last.

The point I'm making about this, which I do think goes to the real fish refrying to use a metaphor, is that J.D. Vancers gave a speech on the need for statesmen and builds out speech around the definition of Americanness. And what he says is you can't have this story because what is being done here when you divorce Americanists from the chains going back across the country's past back to the tribes, the families, something that's more like the Americaness of familial ties that you're talking about,

that there are a lot of people who don't believe in high forms of political equality or who would say things that the Anti-Defamation League things are bad. But they are American. They are part of this project. And they are more American than these, you know, immigrants coming here who claim to, uh, you believe in the Declaration of Independence. You know, the first time I had heard the vice president give his riff about, you know, proposing to his now wife and telling her he doesn't have much, but he's got, you know, this graveyard plot and, you know, he's got generations of his family buried there was not

at the Republican National Convention. Now, when I proposed to my wife, We were in law school, and I said, honey, I come with $120,000 worth of law school debt and a cemetery plot on a mountainside in eastern Kentucky. It was at the 2024 National Conservatism Conference. When my wife and I got, when I proposed to her, we were in law school, and I said, honey, I come along with $120,000 worth of law school debt and a cemetery plot in eastern Kentucky. And that's what you're getting. place that a lot of these, you know, you can call them Groyper's. Nick Fuentes is one example, but there's a lot of people on the young right who feel this way to varying degrees and with varying levels of Holocaust revisionism. But is that a definition of Americanism that is more about

your history here, your ethno-nationalism, your connection to, you know, an Anglo-Protestant culture, and is not this sort of expansive multiculturalism. of, say, Barack Obama or Kamala Harris, that that is much more congenial to them, not because it is more tolerant of the other people who are here, but because it fits their sense that America should be more about blood ties and history. This new contested definition of Americanism

that is very suspicious of immigrants and outsiders, this is a magnet for them. I don't think so. I mean... I feel like it's a little bit denying what we know the new right is. No, I think that because I run nationalist conferences and have been doing it for most of a decade, I'm sorry that I do think I have a little bit more information.

You can definitely pull rank on me on this, but I... Than some other people do. It doesn't mean that I know about everything. I'm not going to compete with you about knowledge of Barack Obama, but I happen to actually know... Okay. You know, from the inside that the national conservatism conferences, which are, just to make it sort of clear to the listeners, MAGA is a very broad alliance. Yes.

Right. Maga is, I would say, roughly, it's the alliance of different groups that came together to make it possible for Trump fans to win. But that, those are not all national or nationalist conservatives. I mean, you know, there's all sorts of people that. There was Elon Musk and there's RFK Jr. This is why I keep zooming in on Vance because I do think Vance comes from the national conservative point. I do. And I would think that there are many others. I mean, I think that just so as to not only make him the issue, Rubio spoke at several of our conferences. This realignment that's happening in American politics is not ideological.

It is largely the divide between people who work for a living, who live, who live, live in the real world, who have to raise their children, and people who live in a fantasy world. And I think he explicitly sees himself as a national concern. Josh Hawley has spoken at a number of the conferences. Josh Hawley. Some will say now that I am calling America a Christian nation, and so I am. And some will say that I am advocating Christian nationalism, and so I do. Let's talk about other people in the administration, that there's important people like Mike Anton at the State Department or David Goldman, Bridge Colby at the Defense Department, Stephen Miller. I mean, all of these people are to one degree or another Nat cons. They come to our conferences and they contribute and they're a part of it.

Now, notice who's not a part of it. If you look at the poster, the flyer that we circulated from the very beginning, we distinguished ourselves. in two directions, from the libertarians, which is, you know, basically the liberal Republican wing at the center who are basically to our left, and from racialist and anti-democratic movements that are to our right. And this has been, I mean, both sides, there's been friction constantly. And by the way, I don't mean that every single person who came to our conferences exactly fits that. We have a statement of principles. You can read it. People know what we stand for. But the key to what we're discussing now is, is there a border between national conservatives and what's to the right of national conservatives? I think that the border is clear. I'm not saying that we never make a mistake. There's never confusion about something. What is the border?

Okay. So the border is, from the beginning, we said, we do not admit, we do not invite people whose platforms are racialist. So there was a big, you know, in our circles, anyway, a big fight with a publication called V-Dair, which is... Which is a kind of, I would call it a racist publication. It's certainly at a minimum... It is a racialist publication. Let's definitely call it that. At a minimum, V-Dair is happy to publish people who are racialists, right? So that's a minimum.

I think maybe you could say more. But for us, that was too much. We did not want to have people who are trying to base politics. You use the word blood. We should probably come back to it. Blood and soil is literally a Nazi term, meaning the Nazi flag is red and black because it's blood and soil. And that's the same true of other quasi-Nazi parties in Europe

that they use those same colors. We are not interested in a nationalism of blood. But your debate with people to write, which I take is real, right? and I understand that national conservatism is not racialist. I think the thing I'm trying to tease out is more your debate with people to your left. So the reason I keep mentioning these J.D. Vance speeches, and I bring him up because to me he is the country's most prominent ideological national conservative. Trump is sort of an intuitive national conservative, but Vance is more of an ideologist.

When he gave that speech, the one at NatCon, where he talks about the generations of his people buried in that Kentucky Cemetery, and the way in which they would fight and die and bleed for their country. And the way there is something different about that. And he says, right, there are ideas and the values of America are important. But to the extent there is a balance of how much what it means to be an American is a loyalty to the country and its ideas and how much Americanism is about a presence here on this soil, that it is something more about being part of the tribe. He is shifting towards the tribe. I understand national conservatism as in general

trying to shift us towards the idea of the tribe away from something like the more Barack Obama or multicultural view that it is about a commitment to all people being created equal. And the thing I think I am trying to pin you down on here is that if what you all were really worried about was too much what I would call illiberalism,

right, too much pushing people away for holding views you're not allowed to have, I think then the movement would be more interested in not doing that. But I understand the argument of NatCon over and over and over again, and I've watched the speeches and I've come to see you before. I take it seriously. I understand it as an argument that the Democrats and multiculturalists, someone, the woke left, the neo-Marxists, have given up on the bonds that hold countries together

and that the direction they are taking the country in will not leave it with enough cohesion. Cohesion is a word that comes up a lot in your book. Cohesion to be a country. They cannot absorb this many new people. It cannot be this broad in its ideas. It cannot be this dismissive of its traditions. The core of this country,

the people who have other people buried in the graveyards. And that's an argument made explicitly. If you think I am mischaracterizing, you tell me, but I think this is the thing I'm trying to get at because this to me is a very live argument in America right now. I think not only are you exactly right, but I think you said that very eloquently. And if you feel like, you know, like coming and speaking in that time

and delivering such a speech, you might get a lot of applause. I'm just not sure I understand what's so terrible about it. Because, look, you keep bringing up JD. J.D. is a man who, true, his family's been here for a long time, but he's a convert to Catholicism. He's married to a woman who's a child of Indian immigrants. And, you know, I just think it's a little bit strange to be trying to make him into some kind of like big threat to pluralism. I mean, I think that in general, Natcons think that 15% of the American population is born-born, that it is the maximum that it's possible for the country to take before, like it literally starts falling apart. They really do believe in the possibility of factional and tribal violence. And the impulse to restrict, to deport, or to have a moratorium on immigration, for most, it's not an in-principle argument that there should always be a permanent

moratorium on immigration. It's literally a reaction to what is seen as at this point, 60 years of abusive immigration, which has spun out of control and is threatening the cohesion. Just I don't, I don't want people to be like, think it's like a mysterious word. First of all, it's a John Stewart Mill word, you know, like lots of liberals have used in history. I wasn't suggesting cohesion is a bad word. No, I've just, I've heard people say that, you know, cohesion is like a fascist term. Never mind, you didn't say that. But when we're talking about cohesion, what we're talking about is just the mutual loyalty we were talking about when there's an external pressure on the polity,

on the society, external pressure, like an attack from the outside, a revolution from the inside, hatred and contempt internally, financial crisis, when there are pressures on the society, do people pull together to rise up to face the challenge because they feel like they're one and they need to circle the wagon and come together, or do they fly apart blaming one another. That's what the word cohesion is referring. Let me get it. Because I haven't yet said it's bad. I do think it can go in bad directions. But look, like take you're Israeli. There was a huge, huge, huge amount of social division in Israel prior to October 7th. There were constant multi-hundred thousand person protests against where Netanyahu and his coalition were taking the country.

October 7th happened and it brought a immediate shift in that. I mean, this is You know, you're nodding, I don't think you would contest this narrative. New York City is a city of immigrants. New York City is a city with more than 15% foreign-born. New York City, after 9-11, had an extraordinary cohesion of identity. National identity, which you are tracking is about tribe and family and J.D. Vance's tracking is about, you know, how many of your generations are buried in the cemetery, national identity coeres, identity in general,

coeres under threat. I think this would look very different if America was actually being invaded, not invaded in the way the Trump administration talks about it, but an actual invasion. And that shows you that solidarity, cohesion, they wax and wane, they're situational. They loosen in times of peacetime.

They harden in times of wartime. I think that's true. But let me add a caveat that I don't think it's true that all identities, all loyalty groups or identity groups become stronger under external pressure. There's a difference between a strong identity and a weak identity.

I mean, it's a spectrum, obviously. The reason that I write in terms of family, tribe, and nation, is because very often they are the kinds of things that under duress they strengthen. But not always. I mean, divorce is precisely, I'm talking about now family divorces. The divorce is within families. Divorce within families, it's an indication of the weakness of the underlying cohesion.

So let's bring this down a level of political organization in a way that I think helps make it more legible. New Hampshire and Massachusetts are part of the original colonies in terms of having a continuous physical legacy of Anglo-Saxon, Protestant Americans there. And just having a continuous connection to the American story, you can't do much better than Massachusetts and New Hampshire. New York actually, too. I'm Californian. My state was formed more recently. My state is far above 15% foreign-born, right? My state is a very, very, very diverse state compared to others.

Is my state, is California less cohesive? Does it have less political identity? Is it lesser? Is it not working? Is becoming California, which in a lot of the trends we're talking about, is far more advanced in the nation as a whole? Is California something to fear?

National conservatives definitely, but my impression is that the identity of the states at this point in American history is in general very, very weak. So the question here is right now in America, is there such a thing as a Californian identity of the kind that would, for example, I mean, this is something people are talking about all the time. Like the federal government sends in troops to Los Angeles.

And people ask the question, is the California National Guard, is it going to obey the orders coming from Washington? Now, my impression, and I'm sure, sure you know better than I do, but my impression is that they will, that we're not likely to see, you know, in the foreseeable future, any kind of like anti-American violence from the... You moved off of the comparison I actually offered, though, which is to say that, yeah, which is that I think if you compare, I'm familiar with New York, I'm familiar with Massachusetts, I'm familiar with states that have this longer lineage, and I am saying that I do

do not believe that that is what creates or separate solidarity. I think my identity as a Californian is as strong as anybody from New Hampshire that I've met. In New Hampshire is tiny, so it's much easier to be solidaristic there. But Texans also have this dynamic. Texans also are a younger state. Texans also are a very multicultural state. And I think Texans would tell you that they, and frankly, I think J.D. Vance would tell you that they fit that vision of nationalism and cohesion better than Vermontus. The thing I am poking at is whether or not this argument that this more soil-based, lineage-based vision of identity, whether or not it actually is stronger, right? The political claim being made by your movement, by your book, is that this is a

stronger, safer way to construct a nation, and that nations like America have gone badly off course, and are getting into more and more dangerous territory. And the Trump administration is built on the idea. Stephen Miller is executing on the idea that what they're trying to do is sort of save our national identity by doing some very, very violent and aggressive things to definitely make America less like California. Stephen Miller from Santa Monica did not like what Santa Monica was growing up, right? He was famous for that. And I just don't think it's true. I don't think America would be more successful if it built itself like that.

I think that we have dramatically out-competed other nations that are far less open than we were than we are, even, dramatically out-competed nations that are much less creedal than we are. This vision of, like, the nation will better hang together and be stronger by being less of this sort of universalistic nationalism and more of this particularistic nationalism, you know, I want to hear the argument for it.

Well, I think I should ask a clarifying question because you graciously allowed me to assert what I think is true that the blood and soil is not a relevant slogan for us. You let me off the blood part. Are you focusing on J.D.'s, I thought, very moving discussion about where his ancestors are buried in Kentucky in order to, to make an argument that nationalism is about the soil? I am saying, I am trying to say quite explicitly, that I think national conservatism, that I think J.D. Vance, that I think this movement that you have been a leader in, is trying to make a move that is much more focused

on the people who have been here. Right? Donald Trump often talks in terms of, like, you know, real Americans. that you are all ideological superstructure for a thing that is happening. I'm taking the ideological arguments here very seriously, but I am saying that I don't buy them, right? And I don't buy them because I come

from a part of this country that is different. And I think my parents, my father's a Brazilian immigrant, my mother, you know, a couple generations back from Eastern European Jews on both sides, I don't think I am less American than people who can trace themselves back to the Mayflower. And I think the implication of a lot of these arguments

is that I or people like me are or should be viewed with more suspicion. And I think people don't always like to defend that. But if they're not going to defend that, I actually don't know what they're saying. Okay. You've mentioned multiculturalism a few times. So let me just address that directly.

Multiculturalism, I don't, you know, I don't, I don't know how far it got in the general public, but as an academic theory, it was very, very popular in, you know, in the 80s and 90s and 2000s. It's a very optimistic theory because what it assumes is that there's going to be lots of internal diversity, which noticed that nationalists and conservatives also think there's going to be lots of internal diversity. that the arguments between them is whether there has to be a center in order to hold the thing together in order for a society to be able to endure over time

much more important than the question of how many generations of the people have been here, much more important than that is the question of is there a dominant culture that consists of group or groups

that have a strong loyalty to one another if there is such a thing, then there can be lots of minority groups that have very different approaches. They can be closer or further. They can feel more a part of it or less. But it was possible to have a successful relationship with all sorts of small minority groups when you could count on there being a center. That center... recognized that America was founded by Anglo-Protestants, recognized that America was also a nation that brought in Catholics and Jews in large numbers

and succeeded, I think, very, very well in bringing Catholics and Jews into this Anglo-Protestant country and not without problems, but it worked. and the claim that, you know, the fact that it was a Christian country, you know, that up until the 1930s the Supreme Court still referred to Americans as a Christian people, that it was legally a Christian country, that it was culturally run by Protestants, that didn't make it, you know, didn't prevent it from being, despite its many flaws, from being, you know, something that was really beautiful and superior to many other countries in the world. So the question then is, and this is, I think this is really the argument maybe between you and J.D. or you and me, is whether the success of that enterprise, whether you can learn from that that the center, the central place of Anglo-Protestantism in America with a strong Old Testament taste, the English language, the common law. You know, I don't expect everybody to be common lawyers, but I do expect people to say, yes, the jury trial is not a universal dictate of reason.

It's an Anglo tradition, and it does what it does, because the people here believe in this Anglo tradition, not all of them, but a core. And so if you have that, then I think you can bring in, lots of immigrants, and you can get them to adopt those ways. If you don't have the center, and then it becomes possible for groups, for immigrant groups, but also other groups, not just immigrants. It becomes possible for secessionist groups of different kinds,

religious, sectoral, whatever, to say, you know, well, actually, we live here and we have rights here, but, you know, we detest the inheritance of this country and we're going to, you know, do whatever we can when it comes possible to overthrow it and end it. That's what J.D. is reacting to. He's not reacting to, like, there shouldn't have been Catholic immigrants. That's absurd. But isn't the history here a sort of inversion of this?

Because this is really helpful, right? I think we're really getting to the core of this. But I look back on American history and you're saying, well, this is what creates a risk of Civil War. Okay, the risk of civil war was a lot of states that would sign on to everything you're saying. Like, there was a profound disagreement or whether or not there should be slavery and whether or not the people in this country should have any form of equality. And they tried to secede. It feels like a lot of places that are highly nationalistic are not actually that

stable. They become imperialistic, right? That's a lot of Europe in the 20th century. Or the sort of modern, more nationalistic right does not feel to me more tolerant and more interested in making sure the bonds between us are strengthened. And so it just feels to me like when you output it to the real world, I sort of understand the argument here, but it doesn't hold together the idea that we would have a stronger nation on the other side of this vision. This is why I brought up places like California, because I agree that our national identity is at this point stronger than our state identities, but our states are still meaningful to us. I can tell you it's meaningful to me.

And California has less of that American center that you are describing, that Vice President Vance is describing than New Hampshire does, has less of that center than a bunch of older states. It's more diverse. It's more creedal in that way. It's a very successful polity. The people on the right can say what they want, but the reason we debate California is that it matters. It invents the future. It's a remarkable place. It seems like a lot of our history in this country speaks to the value of openness. The success of places like Texas and California speaks to the value of openness, the ability to hold people together at incredible scale. And when we've had secessionary problems, and we've had people saying elections are actually trying to storm the capital, it's come from people who say that they're part of that Anglo-Saxon background. that, you know, all trying to do is hold the country together.

There just, to me, is a contradiction in this. If at all, if there wasn't, I wouldn't be arguing it with you. Yeah, I understand. I mean, look, I mean, it seems like we're looking at overwhelmingly the same set of facts. And we have different frameworks that are, that interpret. And that's completely legitimate. And a lot of the issues that if you ask, you know, like these Nat cons, people, you know, for whatever reason, people have a, this is not you in particular, J.D. Vance has captured

America's imagination in good and bad ways in a lot of ways. But Marco Rubio's been around for a long time. He's also like a superb person, and I'm very, very impressed with the work that he's doing and his presence on the American stage. But even though he's somebody who, you know, he was part of the much more liberal Republican Party for a long time. And now people are accusing him of, you know, of being the executioner for doing things like, like restricting the free speech of immigrants or people on student visas and punishing them if they say the wrong thing. Now, you know, I think from a liberal perspective that that's a completely legitimate description of what's going on. But I don't think that a secretary,

of State, Rubio, from his perspective, that that's what he thinks. What he thinks is that the general over-openedness, not the fact that there is openness, but the fact that the openness has gotten to such a point that political movements, in particular, they're focusing on political movements from the Middle East, you know, which you can agree with or disagree with, But the principle of his saying, we don't want the violence and the values of radical Middle Eastern political movements. And so we're going to use the powers that the law allows us in order to reduce that. He's not saying if you're a Muslim, you can't be a loyal American. This is the NatCon project in America.

It's to rebuild a dominant center that people may not like it, but the view is that that is what keeps a country strong. And that in the end, and I understand you'll say, come on, Yoram, when is the end? But the argument is that in the end, the discipline of strengthening the center will be able to make the country confident and tolerant. That is a characteristic only of countries that have a strong center. And how about those of us who look at this and say, we weren't having a problem being confident and tolerant under Barack Obama? They have two percentage points of the vote had gone the other way in swing. states, Paris would be in charge. And my view is not that the country would have dissolved, nor that we did not have the confidence to figure out an immigration compromise, right? People

were working on that in 2023 and 2024. That it's you all who don't have the confidence and tolerance. This is why I keep bringing up places like California, for that matter, New York City, where we are, that we're not having a problem. I mean, they have places with problems, but I would take our problems or the problems of a lot of other places. You keep saying that this is necessary, but to a lot of us, we come from places that are beautiful and strong and successful and do not seem to be hurting so badly without this much more defined Anglo-Saxon Center and this vision that we need a much higher level of compatibility than we currently have of the people coming here

that just put us in charge. We're fine with it. Right, I understand. I think that the question, which is completely reasonable, the question of NACONs are being pretty aggressive in government, is it possible that they can actually be tolerant? Like, let's say that they win. Like, say, they keep winning.

Will they actually be tolerant? Now, obviously, listen, that kind of crystal ball prediction, I don't want to promise anything about what's going to be in 50 years. Like, I don't know the answer, and I don't think anybody does. But let me just say, as a eyeballing it, that if Trump and Vance and Rubio and Pete Hagseth and, and their 30 closest allies and advisors, if they were in charge of America for the next 12 years,

then I think that they would, in the end, succeed in convincing a lot of people. I don't know if you, but maybe you, succeed in convincing a lot of people, not that all their values are correct, but that there are people who are, they look for tolerance, they're capable of it,

they want to build an America that's tolerant and that not everybody has to accept it. The way they're acting out of you is evidence of tolerance. No, the way they're acting, now to me is the evidence of the opposite. It's the evidence of an extreme resentment and horror at a Republican Party that had become politically inactive and inert over an entire generation. They have to use the power of the state in what I would call an intolerant way to rebuild the center in order to rebuild the national strength such that we can be

tolerant again. That's what they think they're doing, yes. They are thinking that if you take aggressive actions to halt immigration and decrease the size of the illegal immigrant population as an example, you take aggressive actions to halt the hemorrhaging of American industry to other countries and reverse it through aggressive trade negotiations. That's another example. You take aggressive action to withdraw primary American responsibility for security arrangements in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and put other people who are allies of ours in charge. If you just take those three things, and I hope one day you'll get to interview President Trump yourself, but my guess is that he would tell you, if we can do these three things,

okay, then we'll be so much stronger and then we'll be able to get to other things. and he would say, then a beautiful America would be in, you know, in range. We'll leave it there. Always our final question. What are three books you'd recommend to the audience? Okay. Now, I'm assuming that, you know, you don't want me to start talking about books of the Bible or whatever it is. It's your books.

You get to decide. Well, okay. I did decide, but I, I, I'm a liberal pluralist. Thank you. I'm going to name three books that are important for understanding the National Conservative Movement since that's been our topic. So first of all, there's a book that was really pivotal that most people haven't heard of called The Demon and Democracy by Richard LaGutcoe. Has anybody ever recommended it before? Not recommended on the show,

but I know of it. Okay. So it's a, Richard is a philosophy professor who became a politician, lovely, lovely man. Like a serious intellectual who wrote this in it. It was really cornerstone for national conservatism in different countries, including the U.S. And his question was his country, Poland, why is it that when communism was dismantled, many of the communists became liberal internationalists? And he's got all these stories about what actually happened in Poland. It's fascinating. Highly recommend it.

The second book I thought to recommend is Bridge Colby's Strategy of Denial. I think that, you know, again, you know, Colby doesn't speak for President Trump, but he's, on foreign policy, he's one of the leading thinkers in the administrationman. But Colby's book, The Strategy of Denial, it answers the question, the key question that the media keep asking, is Trump an isolationist or is he an interventionist or is he a liberal internationalist? What is he? Is it just like random compromises? It's very readable, and it's very much not what most people think. Like when they open this book, what you find is something very different than what you get from the media. People talking about isolationism all the time. And the third book, there's a new book by Josh Hammer, who's a young Jewish natcon called Israel and civilization. And I think a lot of people want to know, especially now that Jews and Israel, have become, you know, lately quite controversial on the right in many ways. A lot of people want to know, how can you be a Jewish NatCon? And he wrote this book, which I think is really beautifully done. It's a really, really good, thorough, well-assembled explanation of what he thinks

Jews should be doing as part of the polity here in the United States. Yer Amazone. Thank you very much. It's really been a pleasure. Thank you so much for having me. This episode of the Esau-Clanche is produced by Elias Iskwith. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris. Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Gelb, with additional mixing by Amman Soota.

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Roland Hu, Marina King, Jack McCortick, Kristen Lynn, and Jan Coble. Original music by Isaac Jones, Carol Sabarow, and Pat McCusker. Audience Strategy by Christina Samaluski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times-pending audio is Annie Rose Strasser.