The Ezra Klein Show - Ben Shapiro and I Talk Political De-escalation

Episode Date: September 16, 2025

This is an episode in two parts. First, my thoughts on Charlie Kirk’s murder, now that I’ve had a few days to process it, and to see the unfolding reactions and responses on both sides. Then a conversation with Ben Shapiro — one that was recorded shortly before Kirk’s assassination, but that has a different significance after it.This episode contains strong language.Mentioned:“Charlie Kirk Was Practicing Politics the Right Way” by Ezra KleinDominion by Tom Holland“What J.D. Vance Believes” by Ross DouthatBook Recommendations:Superabundance by Marian Tupy and Gale PooleyDemocracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville The Constitution of Liberty by F.A. HayekThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [e-mail] can find the transcript and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.htmlThis episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Annie Galvin and Elias Isquith. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Aman Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Marie Cascione, Rollin Hu, Kristin Lin, Jack McCordick, Marina King and Jan Kobal. Original music by Carole Sabouraud, Sonia Herrero and Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Kristina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Unlock full access to New York Times podcasts and explore everything from politics to pop culture. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

You know, Last week, Charlie Kirk was murdered while speaking at Utah Valley University. His murder has shaken me pretty deeply. In the days after his assassination, when I would close my eyes, I just kept imagining a bullet going through a neck. But it disturbed me in a different way when I would open my eyes and look on mine to see some of Kirk's allies declaring war, insisting that normal politics had failed. that the time to cleanse this country of the radical left, whatever that means, had come. When I'd see some of Kirk's critics mocking or reveling in his murder,

sharing clips of his worst moments, suggesting in one way or another that he deserved this, that we were better off. This was not everybody, it was not most of us, it never is. But the nature of online algorithms means that it makes for a lot of what the most politically engaged see of each other. I could just feel the temperature rising. I don't think we have ever felt in my lifetime

as close to some kind of violent national rupture. Because it's not just Kirk. In the last few years, a bullet nearly ended Donald Trump's life. A man tried to burn Josh Shapiro and his family alive in their home. A man broke into Nancy Pelosi's home to kidnap her. And when he didn't find her, he fractured her 82-year-old husband's skull with a hammer. The former speaker of the Minnesota House and her husband were assassinated. The CEO of United Healthcare was gunned down in Midtown Manhattan, and many lionized his killer.

Violence is viral. It infects. It spreads. Violence is combustible. It blazes into civil wars, into world wars, into totalitarian, turns. Who knows what spark will light the wildfire? In the hours after Kirk's murder, trying to process my own shock, my own fear. I wrote a piece about him. In that piece, I said, you can disagree with virtually everything Kirk believed about politics. You can detest some of what he believed about politics and still believe that he was there on that stage practicing politics of the right way, showing up to college campuses and trying to persuade people who disagreed with him. I said that I had often wished my own side exhibited more of that spirit, that we went more

often to the places where we knew people would disagree with us, and talked to them, treated that disagreement as the beginning of a conversation rather than the end of one. I've published a lot of pieces over the years. I'm not sure I've published any with this polarizing reaction. is to that one. A lot of people appreciated it, particularly on the right. They felt it saw their friend and their ally more the way they saw him. And there were many, many people closer to my own politics who were truly infuriated by it. Privately and publicly, they offered the worst things Kirk has said and done, starting a watch list of leftist professors, busing people to the protest that led to the January 6th insurrection.

telling his political foes that they should be deported, saying the Democratic Party hates this country, saying the Civil Rights Act was a mistake. I'd friends say to me, look, we can oppose political violence without whitewashing this guy. I spent some time thinking about that over the weekend, also to spend some time thinking, trying to work through how I'm feeling.

And my reaction, honestly, is it, it is too little to just say we oppose political violence in ways that surprised me given what I thought of Kirk's project. I was and am grieving for Kirk himself. Not because I knew him. I didn't. Not because he was a saint. He wasn't. Not because I agreed with him. No, most of what he poured himself into trying to achieve. I pour myself into trying to prevent. But I find myself grieving for him because I recognize some commonality with him. He was murdered for participating in our politics. Somewhere beyond how much divided us, there was something that bonded us to, some effort to change this country in ways that we think are good. I believe this so strongly that we have to be

able to see that the bullet that torn to him was an act of violence against us all. I actually believe that. I don't know how to express this thought exactly. The nature of our politics right now is it it is ferocious, that our visions of what is good, our visions just of what is decent, have diverged. The stakes of our politics right now are frightening to me. The consequences for people are very real. We see each other as threats, and to some degree we are right. And it is somehow also true, it is true at the same time, that we will be immeasurably worse off if that is all we are to each other, if we cannot still see what binds us, if we cannot still feel ourselves as one body politic.

We are going to have to live here with each other. There will be no fever that breaks. There will be no permanent victory that routes or quiets those who disagree with us. I've watched many on both sides entertain this illusion that there would be, either through the power of social shame and cultural pressure or the force the state can bring to bear on those it seeks to silence. It won't work. It can't work. It would not be better if it did. That would not be a free country. Much of what I would describe as Kirk's worst moments were now just standard fair Maga Republicanism.

And the leader of Maga republicanism is the president of the United States. He is in the White House, having won about half the country's votes in the last election. We are going to have to live here with each other, believing what we believe, disagreeing in the ways we disagree. To recognize that does not mean we downpedal those disagreements. It does not mean we are not appalled or afraid of what our neighbors say and want. But I think it means that we do more than that too. I think we also have to be looking for what we can recognize in each other. And, yeah, in some moments, I think, that might mean overlooking what we can't recognize in each other.

I worry about how hard social media makes that now. It's not just that it flattens us down to single moments, but that it parcels out different flattened moments to different audiences. We are shattered inside the algorithm and the shards of us sent flying out into the world. Instead of being complex to each other, we become incomprehensible, almost unimaginable, to each other. But it is our choice to see each other through these algorithms darkly. We can choose otherwise. I've thought Spencer Cox, the Republican Governor of Utah, has been a remarkable leader over the last week. And what he said here has resonated with me.

We can return violence with violence. We can return hate with hate. And that's the problem with political violence, is it metastasizes because we can always point the finger at the other side. And at some point, we have to find an off-ramp, or it's going to get much, much worse. But see, these are choices that we can make.

History will dictate if this is a turning point for our country. But every single one of us gets to choose right now if this is a turning point for us. We get to make decisions. We have our agency. That does not just go for those of us on the left. I've seen, heard from.

Many on the right, struggling with the idea that Kirk's assassination somehow reveals the impossibility, the futility of normal politics. He tried to do it by dialogue. They say, and look what happened to him. What marks those who choose political violence is not their politics. It's their decision to choose violence. That they make that decision, for whatever reason,

does not justify you making that decision or me making that decision for any reason. We cannot give the lost or the mad a veto over the agreements and conduct. that safeguard our society that gives lone gunmen all the power and it leaves us with nothing I don't know what happened inside the mind of Kirk's shooter

I've tried to imagine being his parents being so excited for the path he was on just a few years ago I don't think the question is what politically radicalized the man who shot Kirk I know many political radicals they are some of the best people I know

I think the question is what broke in him. This was not the act of someone thinking clearly. But we, we still have to think clearly. When Nancy Pelosi's husband was assaulted, when Minnesota had to grieve the assassination of some of its leaders, that did not render normal politics obsolete, it made normal politics all the more essential and beautiful. It was a reminder of the horror that lies on the other shore.

All I can say for me, in the work I do, is that I want to create a space that takes our disagreement seriously, that takes the stakes of them seriously, the consequences for people seriously, but does it without deepening our divisions irreparably. We are going to have to live here with each other. We are going to have to be friends and foes at the same time. A few days before Kirk's murder, I taped an episode with Ben, than Shapiro. Shapiro is well to my right, a person with whom I have many disagreements, and also a person with whom I've had good conversations over the years. And this one was no different.

It's about his new book, Lines and Scavengers, and talking to him about it surprised me. You learn things talking to people that you don't expect. So I've left this conversation as it was. It's about his book, about the political moment before Kirk's murder. I wanted it to live as it was because talking to each other about our disagreements isn't only something we should do in grief or in horror. It's just something we should be doing. Ben Shapiro, welcome to the show. Hey, thanks for having me. I appreciate it.

So let's go into the book. you have a theory of two groups here, lions and scavengers. What's a lion? What's a scavenger? So the basic idea is that there are parts of us, or you can say cultures, groups, depending on how you're characterizing it, who are more apt to build, who believe that there is an active duty in the world to make the world better, to build social fabric, to defend a civilization that is worthwhile, to innovate, to protect things that are good. And then there are people who are basically rooted in envy and are seeking to tear down all of those things.

It's not necessarily that they have a good replacement for those things. It's that they have identified a grievance. And then that grievance is directed externally at structures that need to be torn down. It is based on groups, sort of. But I do make the argument that it's actually quite personal. There's an instinct within all of us that is the instinct of a line and the instinct of a scavenger as well. And the reason that I say that it's sort of internal is one of the things I actually, really try hard to do in the book is not use the terms right and left. I really try to avoid that binary because I really do think that this is something that every single individual has to deal with. The idea that you get up in the morning and you decide whether the problems in your life

are chiefly solvable by you or require action by you or whether you're going to direct your ire and anger and feelings of unfairness at the society around you and the structures of the society around you. And this isn't to make the claim that all structures are fair or that all institutions are worthy of upholding. But the question of whether you're building or whether you're tearing down is really, I think, the basic question. So I didn't take the book so much as about the fight inside the individual. Maybe it's there. I didn't read it as much. What I did take it, though, is as trying to create a new cleavage. Because as you say, you don't really use the terms left and right. And actually, throughout the book, you're not that clear on who it is

you're talking about. So tell me about creating the new cleavage, right? This isn't just left and right. talking about rich and poor, you're not talking about successful, unsuccessful. What's the framework doing for you? What the framework is doing for me is trying to suss out why it seems that there is a coalition of people who are so angry at the institutions of Western civilization that they are agglomerating and putting together sort of a coalition that has a bunch of mutually exclusive goals and yet will march together with the same banners. What really led off the book is what happens in the introduction. Right after October 7th, I was slated to debate at the University of Oxford, and I went into London. My security team told me it was actually too dangerous for me to be

in London proper. I had to stay about an hour and a half outside of London, a beautiful sort of a state that is now turned into a hotel for safety reasons. And it was that weekend that there was a gigantic protest. What I would characterize, controversial, is a pro-hamas protest in the middle of London. And the groups that were protesting were people who ran from very far left on social issues, who would certainly not agree on social issues with people who were standing for Hamas, people who were fans of Hamas,

people who were just opponents of capitalism, and it occurred to me, why are all these people marching together? What do they have in common? They're writers who have termed this the Omni-cause, but I kind of wanted to get to the root of why all of these people who, if you got them in a room and had them argue

about gay marriage, would not agree, or if you got them in a room and had them argue about markets, would have a wide variety of opinions, but what is getting them all together? What is the thing they're all opposing? And you see that sort of conglomeration forming on college campuses,

and I think there are deep roots to it. And the sort of rage that was so clearly effervescent in the streets, I think that that does have deep roots. So you described that as very personal. One of the things I thought was interesting about the book is that it seems to me to be tracking a change in right-wing thought over the past decade.

I don't think the argument we're having anymore is the argument we were having when it was Barack Obama and Paul Ryan, which is more an argument about health care and taxes and, you know, I remember how many years I spent debating the governor norcist anti-tax pledge. It seems very quaint. Now we seem to be having an argument about a more base layer of civilization. So how do you think the argument, at least on the right, has changed? The sense of threat has changed. Well, I mean, I do think that there is a very open debate now inside the right that didn't exist 10, 15 years ago. Historically, conservatism was kind of rooted in the G.K. Chesterton fence principle, right? The idea that the difference between a conservative and a non-conservative is that a non-conservative walks across a field, sees a fence, doesn't know why the fence is there, immediately uproats the fence, and says, I don't know why that fence is there. I'm going to go figure out why the fence was put there in the first place before I uproot the fence. In other words, before you tear down an institution, before you rip away something that has a historic basis, try to figure out why it's there because it might be there for a pretty good reason. And I think that on the right, there is such a rage that has risen, at least on part of the right, that the tendency is to just rip things out by their roots rather than trying to correct or even determining whether the thing can be corrected. The right isn't conservative anymore.

It's counter-revolutionary. It's anti-left. I think the left is anti-right and the right is anti-left. And I think that that is, broadly speaking, a problem. I grew up as a sort of traditional. That seems wrong about the left to me. That they're anti-right? I don't think that what motivates Bernie Sanders is it is anti-right.

You don't like Bernie Sanders. We'll talk about that at some point here, the way you talk about it in the book. I despise Bernie Sanders, yes. Fair enough. Your politics are your politics. But Bernie Sanders is profoundly motivated by a desire to pass Medicare for all. I think that's right. He is not motivated in the way that, say, Tucker Carlson, or some figures I see on the right

or motivated by a sort of reaction. He's had the same politics for decades and decades and decades. But you're speaking of one particular figure I could name figures on the right who I think are motivated much more ideologically. If you're asking who represents the left in America, that would probably be the person to come up with.

I mean, I think there's a case that Zorn Mamdani represents the left in America increasingly. I would also say Zoran Mamdani is motivated by desire to create free buses and rent freezes. I don't think that's right. Okay, but let's stay on the right for a second, the counter-revolutionary side of it. what's a difference between being a conservative and a counter-revolutionary?

Well, I mean, I think that being a conservative is rooted in basic principles, private property, rule of law, traditional virtue, localism, subsidiarity, balance of power among the branches of the government. These were all the things that I grew up with as a conservative. And I think that, you know, obviously President Trump is post-ideological, that is for sure. And what that means is that the right has become sort of a repository for anti-left feeling and it's now a big tent. And what I would say is the problem with the big tent

is you let in a lot of clowns. And so, yeah, obviously there are tendencies on the right. I don't think it's the overwhelming majority of the right, but I think it is a growing tendency on the right to sort of react to the world with a mentality of grievance that can then translate into a desire to rip things out by their roots.

Compared to a decade ago, are you more or less comfortable on the right? I mean, in what way? I mean, I'm... You choose? Well, I mean, ideologically, I don't think I've moved very much, probably over the course of my career. I started writing a syndicated column when I was 17. And so the dumbest things I said were probably between the ages of 17 and 20, others may argue,

between the ages of 17 and probably 25. But my kind of root ideology has not changed very much in terms of being very free market oriented, being very hawkish on foreign policy, being in favor of traditional social policy. That really hasn't changed very much. I'm very comfortable with my own viewpoint. As far as do I see more opposition from people who identify as, part of the right? Yeah, obviously, there's a lot more opposition. It's a less unified movement ideologically, for sure. Let me try to characterize what I see the argument becoming here.

But you can tell me the ways in which you think this is wrong. But this is sort of what I took from the book, that the claim of the right, you have one version of it, different right-wing fingers have other versions of it, is that the left has turned against the foundations of Western civilization, that they've come to hate, that they now, and universal, you know, universities teach their young to hate, like, everything that made us great, and the virtues that made us great, strength, ambition, risk-taking, Judeo-Christian beliefs, and, like, this fundamental, civilizational inheritance. And so what's changed, like, it used to be a fight about policy. And now it's a fight about, are we, is all this, good or not? And, like, that's a much

more fundamental kind of conflict. I mean, I think that's a relatively fair characterization, sure. And when do you think the topic changed? Like, how would you describe the move from, let's call it the Reaganite right? Or for that matter, the left of that era, or the Democratic Party of that era, to whatever you think we're in now? Sure. So I sort of have a grand unifying field theory of modern American politics, which is that the election

that people don't care about is actually the most important election. And that's 2012. So in 2008, Barack Obama runs his unifying candidate, like him or hate him. I didn't vote for him. I was not a fan. Barack Obama ran as somebody who was in his very personage, unifying America. There was no red America. There was no blue America.

There was just the United States. There was no black or white America. There were just Americans. And the idea was that he was sort of the apotheosis of the coming together. He was going to be the culmination of a lot of these strands of American history coming together to put to bed so many of the problems that had sort of plagued America over the course of our tumultuous history. And then he pushed a fairly rote left-wing agenda with regard to, for example, Obamacare. The reaction was the Tea Party.

Right, that was not a hidden part of his O8 campaign. No, no, for sure. But that's not why people voted for him predominantly. His overwhelming victory, I do not think, was due to his support for a much more government-involved health care system. Democrats have been running on that my entire life, I mean, you can go all the way back to Hillary Care, and they were trying to run on that back in the 90s. So something changed, and it wasn't Obamacare, per se. So he wins, Obamacare happens, there's a big blowback in the form of the Tea Party, and he reacts to that by essentially polarizing the electorate.

He decides that instead of kind of broadcasting to the general electorate, a sort of optimistic message about America, that he is going to narrowcast his election in 2012. He's going to base it on much more identity groups rooted politics. He's going to appeal to black Americans as black Americans and gay Americans as gay Americans and Latino Americans. and there are a lot of articles coming out at this time about essentially demographics is destiny and there's going to be a new minority-majority coalition in the United States. And Mitt Romney, who is the most milk-toast

and probably, I'd say, personally clean candidate in my lifetime. He is characterized as a person who forcibly cuts the hair of gay kids and straps dogs to the top of his car and you might put y'all back in chains as Joe Biden said during the campaign. And Mitt Romney loses. And I think that the parties take away from that

precisely the wrong messages. They take away the same message, they manifest it differently. The message taken away by the Democratic Party is we have an unbeatable coalition, this new coalition that Barack Obama has forged in 2012, in which he lost votes from 2008, but he still maintained a very solid majority.

This is the way forward. We will never lose again because we will be able to cobble together majority minority coalition, some college-educated white people, particularly female, and we're never going to lose again. And Republicans took away exactly the same message,

which was no matter how milk toast we run, no matter how clean the candidate, we're going to get ripped up and now, and we're going to lose. We're just demographically losing the argument. And so what Republicans came away with was we're just going to throw whatever against the wall. The big problem here is that Mitt Romney was simply too nice a guy. We need to run the biggest pulsating middle finger that we can. That pulsating middle finger is Donald Trump. And so we're going to run him in 2016. And Democrats took away from this that it basically didn't kind of matter who's at the

top of the ticket. You could put in Hillary Clinton and she could just inherit the Barack Obama coalition because that was the new Democratic coalition. And then she was going to me without going too deep into it. This feels to me like a more narrow argument of political strategy. I don't even totally disagree with it. I do think that the Democrats' embrace of a demographic triumphalism was pretty disastrous. And I would

obviously, predictably, put more weight on what the right is doing. But I think I'm pushing you a little bit into something more fundamental here. No, but I think that they're connected. This is where it becomes the fight over Western civilization, because I would say during this period you have, when you're talking about Barack Obama with his sort of, you know, micro-targeted

polling or whatever it is, It's like you have the birther smear emergent on the right in a very potent way. Obama creates reaction as well just by nature of who he is. Well, I don't know what is as easy as that. I mean, for people who don't, you know, kind of live on the right and imbibe from the media of the right during this time, the understanding on the right was that Barack Obama was a much more divisive figure than the left and the traditional media like to say that he was. And they saw him as a fundamental transformative change agent who did not see the American experiment

in a positive light. And they felt the right, and I sort of agree with this, that he was dissimulating, that he was dissembling, that when he was saying that all the sort of positive, sunny, optimistic vision of America,

that what he actually meant was the Cairo speech where America was sort of a sinner in the Middle East, and that his view of American history was much more along the lines of what he said about Henry Lewis Gates or Trayvon Martin than it was along the lines of, there's no white America and black America, there's just Americans.

And so the reaction, of the right was, okay, this is an interest group-based politics that does not particularly like the founding. And we are going to react to that with Trumpism. So if you understand Obama and Biden more from the left, what are the moments in those presidencies that to people on the right are radicalizing, right, that sort of differ from how differently you see them from maybe how I do? Well, I think that for President Obama, I think the left perceives the Obamacare moment is the moment that the right sort of radicalize. And I don't think that that's actually right.

I think the Bitter-Clinger's comments were a big one. Each successive administration has said that somehow these communities are going to regenerate, and they had not. That's not surprising them that they get better than they, or claims or gods or religion or antipatans or people who want white members, or anti-imverance them or anti-trade some or, you know, anti-trade some of them. and that was in the 2008 election. I think the Henry Lewis Gates statements.

Recently, Professor Henry Lewis Gates Jr. was arrested at his home in Cambridge. What does that incident say to you and what does it say about race relations in America? Well, in which he suggested that the officer had acted stupidly and then sort of linked that with racial discrimination in the past. I think it's fair to say, number one, any of us would be pretty angry. Number two, that the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already proof that they were in their own home. And number three, what I think we know separate and apart from this incident, is that there is a long history in this country of African Americans and Latinos being stopped by law enforcement disproportionately. That's just a fact. The Trayvon Martin situation was quite polarizing for sure.

My main message is to the parents of Trayvon Martin. You know, if I had a son, he'd look like Trayvon. And, you know, I think they are right to expect that all of us, as Americans, are going to take this with the seriousness it deserves and that we're going to get to the bottom of exactly what happened. The Ferguson riots. The situation in Ferguson speaks to broader challenges that we still face as a nation. The fact is in too many parts of this country, a deep distrust exists between law enforcement and communities of color.

Some of this is the result of the legacy of racial discrimination in this country. Those, I think, would be sort of the biggest examples of Barack Obama kind of setting off the right, so to speak. It's interesting you choose those. I mean, those are mostly first rhetorical examples. It's like, take the bitter clingers comment. Because I actually think about this one a lot, where he gets caught on this, he's on tape. It's like, to me, if you compare that to things that get said, even say to Hillary Clinton's

deplorable's comment, right, he basically says, look, you have people in towns that these towns have lost everything. They've lost their jobs. They've lost the plants that employed everybody that their fundamental dignity and livelihoods have been taken away from them. And yeah, in that condition, people get bitter. And then he does say, like, they cling to guns and religion, which I think he wishes he didn't. And xenophobia, right? And xenophobia. It's actually very different than the poor. You're such an empath. You're such an empathizer. I mean, the way that the right reads that is him sneering at those people, meaning if they, if they only weren't xenophobic and religious and hollowed out by life, then they would totally buy into what I'm selling them.

And I think that this also meshes very well with what the right tends to think of. Well, he's saying that we have failed them, right? That they wouldn't just buy into what he's selling them. He's saying that like the left has like abandoned these people. Right, but I will not fail these people. And if I were given the power, then I would, I would fix all of their problems. And really, if they, if they only understood how much, how much I could fix their problems, and what's keeping them from doing that, the reason they won't embrace me, what I would say this is the mirror image of how the left viewed what Mitt Romney was saying

about the 47% of people who would never vote for. So people on the right read that, like, okay, there's a bunch of people who aren't paying taxes. They're unlikely to vote for a person who's going to lower taxes. And people on the left read that as

he's sneering at people who are not paying taxes. And so I think that there is that element here. It's also the other couple of examples you give are interesting for just being about race, right? And again, you're thinking here. Yes, racial relations in this country

got markedly worse in 2013, 2014, 2014, 2015. But is that because Barack Obama should have been more positive on what happened to Trayvon Martin or what happened in a very different way to Henry Lewis Gates? Or because it was hard for people to hear like, yeah, if you're a black man and you see these, your interpretation is, yeah, like we get hassled by the cops often for no reason in a way that white people don't really understand or my son could have been Trayvon. I understand that is also an expression of pain, right, an effort to try to build a bridge. It's very hard for you to imagine and Donald Trump doing the Henry Lewis Gates, the Beer Summit, as it got called,

where you had the cop and Gates to the White House at the same time. It's hard for me when I look back on that and the Beer Summit in particular to hear like, that's what radicalized you all? Yes, and the reason is because the implicit promise of Barack Obama was the worst conflict in the history of America,

which is the racial history of the United States, which is truly horrifying, that in his person, he was basically going to be the capstone of the great movement toward Martin Luther King's dream. And when instead, things seemed to move in the opposite direction, which was, well, you know, it turns out that black people in America, they're inherently victimized by a system, by a white supremacist system that puts black people underfoot. And my son could have been Trayvon. And people on the right saw that as like, well, but that's not true. You are an upper class black man who is living in the White House. And unless your son was mistaken for a prowler going around at night in a neighborhood, then

no, that that actually wouldn't happen to your son. In fact, you have two black daughters and that stuff has never happened to them. So this sort of, Michael Brown and Ferguson, the idea that when the president went out and he said that people wouldn't just make this up, right? And it turns out actually that a lot of it was made up. It kind of sounds like that the interpretation of Obama, at least to you was that if he is elected, we'll agree we've gotten past all this. Like, it's supposed to make us feel better. And then when it didn't, like, that was understood as the betrayal of a promise. Well, I mean, again, that is how I think most Americans saw it, including black Americans. That was a widespread sentiment, not just among white Americans,

among black Americans, is that something had gone radically wrong in 2013, 2014. So something happened. And this was an argument that was made by legacy media a lot, which was that the real reason people were so exercised about Obamacare wasn't because they really cared about Obamacare. It was really because there were a lot of bitter clingers out there who, you know, were cling to their god and their guns, there's xenophobia, and they didn't really like the black president. And if a white president pushed ObamaCare, then probably they would have had some problems with it, but they wouldn't have gone crazy like this. I mean, these people. I mean, I could tell you're saying there's evidence on this. Like I, there was

a lot of polling on this on how attitudes on race correlated with attitudes about Obamacare. I mean, that may be the case. But the point is that the perception, by people who were not actually picking on Barack Obama because of his race, but we're picking on him because of his politics, was that suddenly everything was being refracted through a racial lens. And how do you understand the birth or thing?

You mean the public resonance of the birth thing on the right? I mean that you have a black president and there is like a wildfire-like theory that he's actually born in Kenya. Dinesh D'Souza does a whole movie about this or documentary, whatever was. To be fair to Dinesh,

she doesn't actually claim that Obama was born in Kenya in the documentary. Donald Trump is a prime pusher of this, right? That felt, I... That's a combination of two things, I think. Really, if you're going to try to intellectualize it, and again, you're intellectualizing... Well, I'm not trying to intellectualize it.

What I am saying is that, like, people were not saying that Bill Clinton was not born here. They need to show his birth certificate. They need to prove his Americanness. Well, so I will say that I think that part of it was the same instinct that led people to say that Donald Trump was a Russian agent, meaning I don't understand where this person is coming from.

I don't understand what their philosophy is. I don't understand why he's thinking the way he's thinking. It must be that he's not from here. So I think that there was some of that. In the same way that the left did a, I don't understand who this Trump guy is. I don't understand why he's saying what he's saying. It must be that he's a paid Russian agent,

which similarly spread like wildfire was not race-based, right? And then I do think that there was an element of, he has a very, you know, eclectic background. When he was growing up, you grew up in Hawaii. He spent time in Pakistan. He writes in dreams for my father about his feelings of kinship in Kenya. And then his first big sort of address is presidents of the United States. He goes to Cairo for the so-called apology tour.

Assalam al-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-com. Where he's talking about the evils of American policy in the Middle East. The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars. More recently, tension has been fed by colonialism, the denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a cold war in which Muslim majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. And people go, well, this doesn't seem like super, you know, kind of homegrown.

Now, I'm saying this as somebody who never bought into the burglow crap and thought that it was horseshit from the beginning. But if you're asking me, like, where the sentiment comes from, I think it came much more from the ideology as opposed to the race. Now, again, is there a combo between background there? Sure, can you make the argument that there was a racial component? Yeah, absolutely. Do I think that that was the sort of predominant thing that drove it? I actually don't.

I think that there was a desperate hope, frankly, by a lot of Republicans, that if you could find out that he didn't have a birth certificate, then you wouldn't have to run against him in 2012. And that would be real convenient, wouldn't it? If it turns out he's not an American citizen, then you don't have to worry about it. And, you know, there was even some of this by John McAaney, in 2008. He's born on a foreign

military base. That means that he's not an American citizen. There's discussion about this about Marco Rubio. And I don't mean to downplay it. It didn't take off with him in the way it did with Obama. Well, Obama was also the most singular political figure of any of our lifetimes by this point. So a lot of the book is a defense of Western civilization from its enemies. You talk a lot about Western civilization. How do you describe it? How do you define it?

So the way that I describe it in this book, and I give a sort of more fulsome definition, an earlier book that I did called The Rights Out of History, is the tension between Jerusalem and Athens. Again, not my original construct. That's a division that goes very early on to Tritulian, but the sort of idea of a biblical heritage combined with Greek reason and the tension between them. They don't easily fit together. And so what you see over the course of Western history

is this tension. Sometimes it moves in the direction of sort of biblical theocracy, which you can see in European history. Sometimes it moves more in the direction of reason. But if either comes on more from the other, you end up with a pretty bad thing. If you end up with like a full biblical theocracy bad, if you end up with a fully amoral rationality-based system,

also bad, which is the history of the mid-19th to mid-20th century. And so the history of Western civilization is the symbiosis between those two factors. But the basic principles of Western civilization that I think are the most important, at the very least, that I discuss in the book are things like equal rights before the law, private property, freedom of mind,

freedom of thought, freedom of religion. So a bunch of the book is a devil of this, when I tried to think through, who's the enemy in this book? A lot of it to me was the academic left, let's call it. And I mean, you talk about Edward Said, you talk about and a sort of intellectual culture that understands Western civilization more in terms of its sins than its successes, that is focused on the Nazis focused on

slavery in America, Jim Crow, that this sort of goes back to us saying earlier that I think a lot of the debate Trump is very much part of this. This is one, which is not post-ideological,

is about are we fundamentally good or are we fundamentally bad? Right, no, that's right. Good but flawed or evil, but sometimes you do the right thing. I think that's right. I mean, in your schema of Western civilization, I think I just sort of understood it from what you said.

But these are big things, right? The Nazis, a lot of 19th century and 20th century wars in Europe, slavery in America, Jim Crow. Where do they fit? Well, I mean, first of all, there's sort of two contexts. There's the global context of all of these events happening. There's the global context of fascism in the 1930s, if you're going to talk about Nazi Germany, in which you would also have to include Eastern fascism because Japan was a fascist state that killed somewhere between 20 and 30 million people. Oh, lots of fascism in the 20.

1936. Yes, exactly, and not unique to Western civilization. And slavery, also not unique to Western civilization. But in that way, reason is not unique to Western civilization. I mean, there's a lot of, once you start doing that. I didn't say that reason is unique. I said that the tension between sort of biblical values and reason is unique to Western civilization and manifest in different historical ways. Now, you can argue that those are not contingent, that they could have arisen anywhere, but I think that's kind of a difficult argument. And you can make the argument Magna Carta could have happened anywhere, but it didn't happen just anywhere. It happened in a particular time at a particular place for a particular reason or set of reasons, and then it evolved

in a particular direction. So like it or not, that's how history happened. And so acknowledging that's how history happened. And so maybe that has something to do with, you know, all the wonderful things that we see in our civilization today, I think would be a good move. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't acknowledge sins of the past by any stretch of imagination. We absolutely should. And then we should work to fight the obliteration of attempts not to remember that sort of stuff. It's why you see, I think a lot of not to get into sort of contemporary politics, but you see a bizarre amount of arguing past one another on some of these issues.

President Trump, when he's talking about how slavery ought to be taught at the Smithsonian, for example. We want the museums to talk about the history of our country in a fair manner, not in a woke manner or in a racist manner, which is what many of them, not all of them, but many of them are doing. Our museums have an obligation to represent what happened in our country over the years,

good and bad, but what happened over the years in an accurate way. I think that the way the left interpreted him talking about that was saying slavery shouldn't be taught at all at the Smithsonian. The way the right interpreted that was we should talk for sure about

slavery at the Smithsonian and then we should talk about how slavery ended. We should talk about the civil war and we should talk about what was the rest of the globe doing about slavery at that time. A little bit of comparison would be good

because to be grateful for the things you have you also have to look at, you know, how things are going for everybody else at the time. You touched on this at the beginning. But what is a scavenger to you? Who are the scavengers? So the scavengers are groups, ideologies, people who are fundamentally driven by envy

and therefore externalize all the problems in their life toward a system that they blame as oppressive and then seek to tear down that system wholesale without even necessarily a plan for replacing it. The thing that really matters that the system be torn down. And in the book, I talk about sort of what personality types are most common, relying on the work of people like Derek Hoffer. I talk about sort of why it seems to arise from upper middle class people, particularly in the West. The sort of groups that I break it down into are what I call barbarians, meaning sort of using the traditional barbarians the gate euphemism. The idea that there are people from outside the civilization who believe that the United States or Western

civilization or Europe is predominantly responsible for all the things wrong with their civilization and that therefore the only way to regain your innate manhood, your innate nature, your innate nature, is to destroy and to tear everything down. And here, obviously, you mentioned Fanon. I cite Fanon pretty richly here, but I also cite Sarat, who I think is significantly worse than Fanon. At least Fanon is justified in his opposition to colonialism in Algeria. Sartz is a true nihilist and says that essentially the West should import its own destruction

as a sort of way of doing recompense for all of its sins. Then you have what I call the looters, people who believe that the systems of free markets, capitalism, private property, that these things are. are innately impoverishing and thus need to be abolished. And whatever it takes to abolish it, you should do. I mean, one of the characteristics of scavengers is the willingness to wink, nod, or participate in violence. The idea is that the systems are so oppressive

that violence itself is justified. This is truly a scary thing that's happening in American politics is the widespread justification for actual acts of violence that had been happening. In the book, I use the case of Luigi Mangione as a sort of example, par excellence of this. And then you have what I call the lectures, people who believe that,

not that people ought to be able to order their lives in a wide variety of ways in terms of their sexual behavior, but believe that traditional institutions like family and church are somehow a threat to them doing this, that there's a sort of indoctrinated element to traditional family, to church, and that those need to be abolished or fought

or their influence minimized in order to re-center the marginalized. And so the center basically has to be exploded. And so that explains the sort of bizarre example that we've seen of Queers for Palestine, which why Queers for Palestine, the answer is because, not because, you know, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender identifying people are going to be treated particularly well in a future, you know, Hamas-ridden Gaza Strip. I think the idea is that the same civilization that is marginalizing you, is marginalizing these people,

and therefore you have to get together in a coalitional fashion in order to take down that civilization. You've been talking about the omnis cause on the left, but there are parts of your Chavanger chapters, where the people you're naming are on the right, Tucker Carlson, Andrew Tate, and there are streams of the right that are grievance-oriented, streams of the right, that I think offer a vision, at least of masculinity, specifically, that differs quite a bit from yours. That is destructive and terrorist things down, yes. Talk me through that. Well, I mean, I think that the idea, again, is that this crosses party lines.

I would say that the ideology of sort of resentment-driven politics, particularly economic sphere, tends to be more left-leaning than right-leaning. You know, when you're talking about the right, I do not mean this to be a pure right-left division. And when I criticize the sort of great conspiracy theory, as Carl Popper talked about, yes, there are people on the right who obviously are doing that. This policy is called the Great Replacement, the replacement of legacy Americans with more obedient people from far away countries. I mean, Tucker is name-checked in the book for this reason. They brag about it all the time. If you dare to say it's happening, they will scream at you with maximum hysteria.

I think that Tucker engages in an extraordinary amount of conspiracy theorizing these days because he has a belief that the United States has been fundamentally corrupted in some way and that the only way to explain that fundamental corruption is because there are shadowy forces outside of his control who are not only manipulating you, but they are engaging in a sort tacit brainwashing, a sort of mental manipulation. I mean, the book is largely written against Gravesant's politics, this idea that you see a system, you don't like the system, it must be that the system is to fall. I think that is a rather cowardly way of addressing issues. So name some scavengers with power for me. Well, I mean, I think that by political power,

I mean, I would say that Joe Biden's willingness to open the border is an element of scavengerism, the idea that America somehow bears some sort of bizarre blood guilt that requires us to keep our southern border open to just allow in millions and millions of people. I think that that's driven by a person. You think it for Joe Biden was driven by blood guilt? I think that for a lot of the left that was, I don't know who was president during the Biden presidency. A lot of the left. Name your person. Yeah, exactly. They will. No, I don't mean it like that. I mean, I know the Biden administration pretty well. And what do you think it was? I'll ask you, what do you think was the ideological drive for leaving the border open for that long?

think that they believe that we have an asylum process, that people were fleeing genuine poverty persecution. I think that they were in coalition and were appalled by the first term Trump administration on immigration. And I think that they did not act fast enough when it became a crisis. But I don't think, having talked to many of them about it, that they understood this as a kind of reparations. So I do think that there is a part of the left that articulates this as a kind of reparations. I think it's fair to say that that wasn't Joe Biden

specifically, but I think there is a part of the left that sees it as a kind of reparation. In terms of economics, Bernie Sanders definitely falls on this category. He believes that America is guilty globally. He believes that the great suffering of the earth can be laid at the feet of American style of capitalism, that America is somehow a terrible

and horrifying sight of untold human suffering, because of capitalism. He has never created a damn thing in his entire life that is worthwhile. He did a pretty big political movement. I said that is worthwhile. I guess this is a place. You know, when we're doing the Lions part of the book,

a lot feels to me like a pretty straightforward case for like a traditional and positive masculinity. Be bold, be risk-taking, take care of your family, innovate, see purpose in life. You know, there's a lot there that, you know, as a, if I imagine this is like a male self-help book, well, a lot would have fit, right? And I'd want my kids to read it, right?

I would not argue with it. When you get to the scavengers, the way you write about them, the scavengers are looter, greedy, jealous, and violent. You say, the scavengers are leecher, rebellious, perverse, and leering. The scavengers are barbarian, jealous, enraged, and violent.

Scavengers who do not wish for a better world, or at least a better world for everyone, they'd rather be equal in misery than unequal in prosperity. I mean, I guess let's talk about Bernie for a second. You call him a putrescent Marxist pimple on the posterior of the body politic. This is a person who, as I see him,

has really devoted his life to trying to make the situation of people in the working class are in poverty better, right? He believes that the billionaires and the millionaires have too much. And... Well, now only the billionaires, right?

Once he became a millionaire, that disappeared. Well, sure. And that people should have health care. That should be right. That kids shouldn't be in poverty. That we can redistribute more. I can understand why you disagree with him. You're a more free market guy than Bernie is.

But the cut you're making here is very, very deep, right? Just people who are extractive and want to destroy, want us all to live in hell. And it's like this longtime Democratic senator and former mayor who's pretty good at running. I guess defend that for me. Okay, so, I mean, Bernie Sanders has met very few dictators who are socialist in Ben that he has not offered a defense of. Bernie Sanders has never produced anything outside of a grievance-based political movement that suggests that... Stay where I am on what Bernie wants, right? Because what you're describing in terms of he's never produced anything outside of politics, well, okay, politicians produce politics.

That's their job. Right? Many politicians on the right have not started large businesses. So that doesn't cut enough people out. job growth. He has not produced more productive base of citizenry. He has not produced public policy that has resulted in anything

of measure. He has not been a co-sponsor on a major bill his entire career. He has sat outside the political system and bitched about it for... I mean, I've watched him add huge amounts of things to various bills. I mean, I covered the Affordable Care Act very closely. Are we now going to pretend that Bernie

Sanders is a wildly powerful legislator? He was, he was always for someone on the left. He was always somebody He was always somebody who is very good at work and to get his amendments into bills. I don't want to try to convince you

to like Bernie Sanders. What I'm trying to do is match up like the guy who got a bunch of funds for community health centers. Hold on a second. To this division you are creating in the people who just want to suck dry. Like you don't see anything of value

in the way he understands, you know, people I think you would see sympathetically. as suffering, as deserving a higher minimum wage, is deserving health care when they can't afford it. To you, he is just an enemy of Western civilization. Yes, and the reason I say that is because, again, I think that the easy part of all politics and all of human life

is to find the places where you think that life has been unfair to people because life is sometimes unfair to people. The question is how you direct that. Has he directed that toward actually building better systems, or has he spent his entire career yelling at people, who have become wealthy? Has he maligned them as morally inferior for having developed wealth? Has he decided that there is a class of people who are the great exploiters in his moral narrative and who must be torn to the ground? Billionaires shouldn't exist. I have a question. When you cross

that $99,99,99,000, $999 mark? Is that when you become evil? Like when exactly is that barrier across? I think you could not become evil. You could just have a high marginal tax rate. Well, but that's not the case he makes. That's not the case he makes the case that you are a moral inferior if you're a billionaire. Let me read you something J.D. Vance said to my colleague, rushed out that in 2024, he said, the people on the left, I would say, whose politics I'm open to, I'm here is J.D. Vance. It's the Bernie Bros. But generally, center-left liberals are doing very well.

Center-right conservatives who are doing very well. I think that's actually you and me. Have an incredible blind spot about how much their success is built on a system that is not serving people who they should be serving. Is J.D. Vance, at least this part of J.D. Vance, a scavenger. That ideology is a scavenger ideology. Yes. That is a grievance-based politics that is not rooted in reality. And it is directly at odds with the lion version of J.D. Vance who wrote Hillbilleyology. Oh, he's not been that guy for a long time. I'm aware of that. So J.D. Vance is a scavenger to you? Well, I think that's valuable for me to understand,

like, how you're making a distinction. Well, again, I think that his economic philosophy as articulated there. And again, he's given a lot of different messages to a lot of different people about economics, right? Sometimes he's a Peter Thiel innovator and a crypto bro innovator, and sometimes J.D. Vance is a, we need to ensure that Elizabeth Warren's economic plans are implemented, but from the right. And so, again, I'm not going to be inconsistent about this. If I'm condemning Bernie Sanders' economics, if it comes out of the mouth of J.D. Vance, then it's the same economics. So can an economic system be unfair structurally? Of course, but I don't know why that would be the case with a private property system

in which people own the fruits of their labors. Oh, there's all kinds of ways a private system can be unfair. Well, I mean, sure. And also, markets are shaped. I mean, come on, we're not in crude econ 101 here. We create patent systems and create government enforcement monopolies. I mean, we have a structured economy. Of course, but there is a difference between more and less fair.

And it seems to me the least fair system is a central line. governmental system in which you pick winners and losers and or nationalize the labor of others in order to achieve your specific goals. Sure. You can be more or less unfair. But so your view is sort of basically any politician left or right who says to people, listen, you're suffering. You don't make enough. You're working two or three jobs to get by or not finding jobs. And the reason is that you got screwed. We shipped your job to China. The trade deal. were unfair or the billionaires took too much and now you've got just in time scheduling and a, you know, a community that doesn't have a paper mill anymore, that whenever you sort of

activate that sense, that it's not your fault, it's their fault. That's scavenger mentality to you. I think generally speaking, that is true unless you can provide very, very good evidence that there is a cause and effect relationship between the thing that you are blaming and the thing that is happening to the person. I think most of the time it's misdirection. So I think that when people suggest, for example, that manufacturing is going to come back to the Midwest if you just tear China hard enough and that that's not going to victimize consumers on the other end who are going to be paying more, then, yes, that is a grievance-based politics. That is an envy-based politics. And listen, envy can go really far in politics. Envy is a great way of doing politics.

It really is. The hardest thing in politics is to say the thing that no one will say, which is my job is to basically get the obstacles out of your way so that you can succeed or fail in your own merits. And if you fail, you know, that ain't always everybody else's problem. How do you understand the pitch Donald Trump, or the course of his political career, made to his voters, right? Because I would say a real way that he differed from Mitt Romney was it, he came and said, you got screwed. Yes. And so. I think he is wrong, but yes. And so he pulled the right into a scavenger mentality? I think with regard to sort of a populist economics. Yes. Sure. You seem pretty positive on him a lot to feel that way.

Well, I mean. Like you voted from in 2020 and 2024. Yes. You campaigned for him in 2024. Right. So I'm happy to explain my evolution on President Trump. I didn't vote for either candidate in 2016. I voted for him in 2020. I campaigned from in 24, yes. But that doesn't mean I agree with him on everything. It's so is I am not, I actually want to be super clear. I understand your evolution is interesting, right? I like if we're, I don't want to do a, a gotcha interview with you. I'm actually tracking. it because I think you're an important, it is important to understand you to understand the right. The reason I'm actually surprised to hear you say some of this isn't that I couldn't

map it onto the theory of the book, but that the way you write about scavengers in the book, it's so vicious, it's so subhuman, that to realize that actually politicians he somewhat like fit in that for you is genuinely surprising. So again, I think that to suggest that adopting certain aspects of a scavenger mentality, that doesn't necessarily turn you totally. And this is why I started with the point that every day you wake up and decide whether you wish to be a scavenger or a lion.

So there are people who have aspects of scavengerdom. There are people who have aspects of liondom. I mean, I think that President Trump's economic agenda has aspects that are more lion-like. I think it has aspects that are more scavenger-like. But when I read this book, I read something that, yeah, it maps very, very uneasily onto Trump. You do have a whole section about Trump as a lot

lion and him taking the, you know, I forget if it's the oath of office or which speech exactly it was. But when he won, it's like the lions are reawakening. Well, but what I do say in that section is I don't know whether that moment is going to be justified by subsequent action. I do say that. I wrote that like the day of the inauguration, and it felt like there was kind of a sense in America that we'd move beyond some of the grievance politics that were so characterized inside the DEI basis of the Biden administration or the wealth is bad side of the Democratic Party. But I do say in that section,

I don't know whether that's going to be justified by further policy. I feel like there is an upsurge in the American feeling in favor of things like personal responsibility and non-greavens-based politics. But whether politicians are going to channel that in a positive direction

or whether they're going to re-channel away from that is a whole different question. I want to do one more beat on the scavengers here. Then we'll move on to sort of Trump and the president. Let me read a piece of the book for you. Aside from their base envy, How can we describe the scavengers? As we've discussed,

lions are creative, determined, and audacious. They are steadfast, prudent, merciful, and strong. Scavengers are something else entirely. In his book, The True Believer, explains that those who tear down the societies in which they live are typically what he terms inferiors. The failures, misfits, outcast criminals, and all those who have lost their footing or never had one

in the ranks of respectable humanity. They see their lives and the present is spoiled beyond remedy, and they're ready to waste and wreck both, hence their recklessness and their will to chaos and anarchy. It's pretty sweeping, right? Well, if you wanted to ask me who is sort of like the apotheosis. Yes, who's the apotheosis? The campus protesters over the course of the last couple of years.

Although they're not inferior. I thought about this. I have a little note on that section. I'm like, no, they are. Because they are kids at Ivy League colleges. They're doing just fine. They're not social inferiors by any measure. Well, I mean, as you talk in that exact section,

about the scavengers, about why scavengers tend to be drawn from the ranks of sort of the upper middle class and the overly educated who then produce less than they should. The sort of prototypical scavenger, and again, one of the points I make in the book, I'll say it over and over again, is that people are a mix of these things, and that you can sometimes be a scavenger,

sometimes be a lion, there are ideologies that are a mix of both. When I'm talking about, like, the pure, thoroughgoing scavengers, here you would be talking about Hamas, people who stand for Hamas, people who are out there protesting on behalf of the idea that the real problem in America is police to the extent that they actually want to defund the police. Those are the people who want to tear down entire institutions. Now, politics is a game where you can channel that. You can use it as jet fuel for your political movement. And the problem is that when you do feed

that sort of envious mentality, what you end up doing is throwing more jet fuel on a raging fire that already exists in the human heart, and eventually that's going to take over your entire politics. And that's what I'm concerned about. And the reason that I'm sort of objecting to mapping that onto sort of prototypical politics is because I don't, again,

I don't use Democrat and Republican as the model of this. There is very little, I would say, effort to cross the empathic chasm sometimes to the people you are describing as scavenors, how they would see the world that way. How, in fact, in seeing the world that way,

there would be a boldness. There would be an effort to change things for the better to protect their family, to protect their community, right? how protesters, even the ones you don't like, often understand themselves as standing up for someone who actually need someone to stand up for them, AOC and Bernie Sanders really thinking,

like getting up in the mornings, Zoran Mamdani, how I see them, getting up in the morning and really feeling, like, there are people out here working their asses off, not able to make ends meet, and like they need people in power to stand up for them. And, like, I actually thought the weirdest part of the book to me, the part that was the most striking when I got to it,

was when you quote Nietzsche on Judaism. And you say this is an incorrect interpretation of Judaism, but you quote Nietzsche writing, it was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value equation, good equals noble, equals powerful, equals beautiful, equals happy, equals beloved of God, and hang on to the inversion with her teeth,

saying the wretched alone or the good, the poor, impotent, lonely alone, or the good, the suffering deprived, sick, ugly, alone, or pious, alone, or blessed by God. And now, you disagree with Nietzsche that that's the right interpretation of Judaism and then ultimately of Christianity. And I also think that it's an immoral view of the world. Right. This is what I want to get at.

I do not think that poverty somehow creates value in humans more than riches, create value in humans. What you do in the world is what makes you a good or a bad person. I agree with that, actually, right? I both understand that and agree with that. And that's why I say that Nietzsche is wrong, by the way, the Bible explicitly says you're not supposed to favor the rich or the poor. But there is a, there's quite a lot in the Bible also about understanding the difficulty

of poverty, what you should give unto the poor, that there is, that is very easy for the rich and the powerful to tumble into immorality. So, yeah, I think that, Ezra, you focus a lot, and I've obviously listened to the show a lot and heard conversations that you've had with a number of figures and, you know, your discussions about Zarmam Dhani, for example. And empathy and grievance are not mutually exclusive. In fact, empathy and grievance can go very easily hand in hand. And I do not actually think that once you translate empathy into grievance, I think that

you've actually fundamentally undermined what is good about the empathy. Say what you mean? What is the moment when empathy becomes grievance? Okay, so I feel so bad for you that I'm going to get in your shoes and I can see why you would believe that the systems are screwing you, therefore the systems are screwing you, therefore we should tear down the systems. The transition from, I can see why you believe the systems are screwing you, to the systems are screwing you, that exact transition is where empathy becomes grievance. And there's good social science to suggest that actually empathy

makes for some ugly politics if, in fact, you spend all of your days on empathy because you end up empathizing with one group at the expense of another group. There's a difference between sympathy and empathy. I would hope that everybody in politics has empathy, but I think is perfectly empathic to say, yes, you feel that something bad has happened to you, your life is not what you want it to be. And now you need to realize that the only person who can get you out of the situation is you. And you need to start making really good, solid decisions with your life. And in fact, that message is much more likely to lead to success than the message that I alone can save, which is something President Trump said, or any other

politician who says, I'm going to come in, I'm going to clean up the entire system for you. And now the system will be oriented toward you personally. And magically, your job is going to come back. Or magically, you're going to be more prosperous. magically, somebody's going to take care of your health care in a way that they didn't before. Like, that is a cheap political tactic that is rarely fulfilled in real life. It's interesting. I understand you much more as a man without a party than I did coming into this. Because I think if you look across politics right now, there is not a political party.

There is not a forceful political movement that at its core isn't saying the system is screwing you. Trump is saying the system is screwing you. the left is saying the system is screwing you that the liberals are saying the system is screwing you the right is I mean we're not in the era of Mitt Romney anymore and like you are really allergic to that view yes I mean and again one of the things that

that I believe is that the biblical worldview right this does go to sort of religious belief to me the biblical worldview is rooted in a fundamental distinction that the Bible makes and as an Orthodox Jew obviously this is something I try to live by the kind of ethical basis of ethical monotheism is the idea that you have things to do in the world and that free choice is up to you, right?

When I define sort of what a philosophy line would be, the basic idea that is revelatory about the Bible is this idea that your life is not a series of random coincidences and pagan gods fighting in the heavens and lightnings randomly striking you. I quote Lear where Gloucester talks about, you know, as flies to the gods or we, right they kill us for their support like that that's not the mentality of the bible the mentality of the bible

is something that is radically different which is basically choose life right like the choices in front of you do the right thing and good things will happen now again that raises all sorts of the odyssey questions is that really true do bad things happen to good people of course these are not new problems in religion but the basic concept which is if you act responsibly in the world you are significantly more likely to have a better life and to make the world around you better that's the thing that I try to live by and to teach my kids and when you teach my kids the opposite when you teach them that no matter what they do, they are screwed by the system, and actually the systems that have brought them unnamed prosperity,

the greatest prosperity in the history of the world, the most freedom of any human beings who have ever walked this earth, that system is to blame, not them. I am allergic to that. I think that it makes people worse. I think it makes society worse. I think it makes cultures worse. And I think it empties out your civilization

of meaning, purpose, and prosperity. I've noticed that there is a real collision of interpretation of the Bible that I feel has become more central in the past decade or two decades. then at least I perceived it as being before. So on the one hand, I see the author of Dominion, Tom Holland, on a lot of writing podcasts, I read Dominion. I think it's a really fascinating and beautiful book, right?

And putting forward the argument that a lot of what we revere in modernity, this belief of like the dignity of the individual, that they have rights, that they have a soul, that they're not just pawns on a chessboard, right? That they should not just be subject to the whims of power, that that is an inheritance of Christianity specifically and that there is no liberalism without Christianity there is no

that all these things that the left is sort of rejected as retrograde it's actually where they come from and in rejecting it they have lost something very, very fundamental to what made their entire worldview possible and then there's this sort of other interpretation emerging out of the Bible

which is much more this sort of I wouldn't call it a person responsibility in the way you're talking about it but something that is much more about the world is ordered and it depends on your actions you have been given a guide to how to act within it

and if you want to succeed in this world you must follow this guide and it's not that these two things cannot cohere one's kind of an outside view and one's an inside view but I just think it's interesting right this sort of what I would call like the Bible of the Meek and the Oppressed

and the Bible that is often used by or thought through by those in more power who believe the system has certainly been fair to them and if others would follow in their footsteps, they would find it as fair. Well, I mean, to be fair, I mean, I think that actually the better distinction there would be between the people

who are religiously observant, meaning who actually try to bring the Bible into many, many aspects of their life and who tend to line up, again, more along the lines of what I'm talking about. And the people who read the Bible as sort of an informative document, a book of wisdom,

or people who try to trace the outlines of Western history from the outside, which is what Tom Holland is trying to do. Again, I think that it's more of an internal view of the Bible versus an external view of the Bible. I don't think I buy that. I think that when I look at the politics of the modern Christian right of evangelical Christianity, I do not question people's faith. I don't question how much you try to bring the Bible into their life, but I don't think their politics reflect what you are describing. I think it has become a very grievance-based politics. Well, so actually, if you look at sort of the more grievance-based politics on the right, it tends to be among the more irreligious members of the right. I mean, again, not to get back into my own personal evolution on President Trump, but that's certainly a thing that happened, right? And vote for him in 2016. And a lot of evangelicals did not vote from in 2016 because they were uncomfortable with how this sat with certain values. And then people sort of came around and said, okay, well, I guess this is the choice that I have now. Let's talk a bit about Trump. This is something that you've sort of gestured out. But why don't we do it as a way to set up this part of the conversation? You were, very, very post-Trump in 2016,

wrote a piece about how you would never support him over time shifted. You've talked about this publicly. I said, like, here's what he could do to earn my support at the same time, but yes, and he did many of those things, to be fair. Yeah, so talk me through it. Talk me through your evolution on Trump. Sure. So when he came along, I made several critiques of Trump. Some were character-based,

some were sort of personality-based, some were critiques of people he was letting into the movement. I thought the expansion of the Overton window for the right. Well, you know, I think... somewhat necessary. I think that it was over-expanded, and I think there, as I said at the beginning, some clowns in the tent. But when it comes to his actual policy, I assumed that he would be as heterodox in his politics as he had been in his campaign, which is to say he was on every side of every issue, and you kind of saw in him what you wanted to see. Was he going to be conservative

on social policy, or was he going to carry around a gay pride flag? Was he going to be staunchly pro-life, or was he going to be a sort of New York pro-choicer? Was he going to be somebody who was in favor of strong Second Amendment rights, or was he going to be, you know, maybe do some gun control? Was he industrial policy guy or was he free markets guy? Like, he could legitimately take any or all of those sundry positions. Were the judges that he appointed going to be along the lines of Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia or was it going to be his relatives?

And so my assumption was that he was going to essentially govern almost from the center left and that many of his policies were not going to align with the things that I wanted. So I wouldn't get what I wanted policy-wise. I thought that he was going to, you know, have a dire effect on the kind of political nature of the country. And I had objections to his character. Well, I mean, the extent of the rhetoric that he used in 2015, 2016, I think what was quite unpleasant and wrong and bad, and I still have objections to. And so, as I said, when I endorsed him in 2020, my character critiques of President Trump didn't change. And many of the things that I thought that were bad that he might bring about, you know, more polarization in politics.

for example, that did happen, but I got much better governance that I thought I would, and meanwhile, the left one insane. And so that was sort of why I moved in 2020 was the bad things are pretty much baked into the cake. We know what we've got. He gave me more than I thought he would when he gave me, you know, several justices on the Supreme Court, who I actually quite liked, when he decided that he was going to push sort of a traditional Republican economic policy with regard to deregulation and tax cuts. He pushed a foreign policy that I thought actually was quite excellent. I thought that was the best part of his administration in term one.

And so I got more than I thought I was going to get. So I changed my opinion because the facts had changed. And then in 2024, again, it came down to a binary choice. In the primaries, I supported Ronda Santos. When it came down to a binary choice when it was basically over after Iowa, and now it's a choice between Trump and Biden slash Kamala Harris, then that was a clear enough choice where it's like, okay, I'm going to go campaign for the guy

because I do not want to see a second Biden presidency or a Kamala Harris presidency. but I think that many of my underlying objections didn't particularly change. Where are you now? We're seven months in. What have you liked? What have you not liked? So I think that his attempts to move more toward meritocracy and away from DEI in sort of federal policy and procedure is good.

I think that what he has been doing on foreign policy is shockingly better than I thought that it was going to be. I was one of the few people on the right who consistently took the position that we ought to continue supporting Ukraine, for example, and he came around to that position that maintaining support for Ukraine is a good thing. Obviously, I'm very pro-Israel. I like his Israel policy quite a lot. When it comes to his tariff policy, I've been openly and vocally anti.

When it comes to things like industrial policy in which we're taking stakes in Intel, not a fan, when it comes to his social policy, that hasn't been a lot to say on social policy, frankly, because after Roe v. Wade was rejected, it basically kind of got kicked down to the local level. So you're not seeing a lot there. But, you know, I would say that overall more good than bad, but it's a mixed bag.

And one of the arguments that the right is constantly having with itself is, do you grade him versus what you would have gotten with Kamala Harris? Or do you grade him versus what you want from him as the president? And I always tend to do the latter. I tend to say, here's what I want. Here's where I wish you would do better as opposed to because all day long you can say, okay, well, it's been worse with Kamala. I agree. That's why I voted for him. That's why I campaign for him.

It's interesting. There's an almost parallel argument on the left, which is do you talk about Trump as a normal republic? right? These guy who's, you know, cut Medicaid to fund tax cuts, or do you talk about Trump as something abnormal, something authoritarian, somebody sort of taking new powers? This is something that at other times you've been very, very alert on. You read about Barack Obama, that he's a man who embodies all the personal characteristics of a fascist leader. You said about Biden, that he is an aspiring tyrant held back only by the strength of our constitutional structure. I would say on both those counts, who has the, personal characteristics of a fascist leader, but also who is sort of pushing at the boundaries of constitutional structure, using the power of the government to harass enemies to create incentives to punish those who have wronged him, to force institutions to fold. Trump has been sort of whatever you think of him, much more creative and aggressive than any president of my lifetime.

I'm not sure he's been much more creative and aggressive than any president of my lifetime. It depends on the sector. I mean, I'm old enough for a member in 2009 when Barack Obama called bankers on the carpet and said, I'm standing between you and the pitchforks. I mean, on the left, that was widely understood as him saying, listen, like, you guys should support reasonable financial regulation

because, like, I am trying to keep these people from coming for you, and that was actually true. Well, I mean, okay, the other way to read that is as a tacit threat, which is how you would read if it came from Donald Trump's mouth, if Donald Trump said to a corporation, I'm standing between you and the pitchforks, sign on the dotted line, you would read that in the way that I'm reading Barack Obama. I think rather than I'm more interested in the things he's actually doing, right?

There's an old thing about Trump, and this the thing people said about, I've said before. This is the thing people said about him in the first. The guardrails will hold, right? And they have. The analogy that I've used about President Trump before and his sort of tendency toward executive power, which has been, to be fair, a growing tendency across administrations of both parties over the course of the last 20 years minimum, the radical devolution of the authority of Congress and turning it into a vestigial organ of government with which I greatly disagree

and think it's a massive, humongous problem. When you look at what President Trump has done, the argument that I will make is that much, he's been more sophisticated in the second term. This is true about trying to avoid some of those constitutional guidelines. However, he is, in fact, abiding by court orders. When a court orders him to do something,

then he actually is doing that thing. He is not doing the Andrew Jackson, let them enforce their, let them enforce their... I agree. He is mostly. there sometimes we sort of know that Emil Bove and others have been a little bit on the edge of that

but I think in general they're abiding by court orders and the Supreme Court is you know we just did a show on this I think giving Trump a lot of the power he has sought which in the way the system works he's got the power

I am a little bit surprised though to hear you say that this is all you know equivalent to the way say Obama used the executive branch I mean

it's not just a pen in the phone it's like you look at way he has gone after individuals who offended him from his first term. John Bolton, Adam Kinsinger, like Liz Cheney. Removing the security team from Mike Pompeii. Yeah, removing the security team from Mike Pompeii, or for that matter from Anthony Fauci, who using deportation as a tool around speech, not just as a tool around immigration. Well, I think all these are different policies and lump things all together. They are different policies, but what I understand them all as being is a singular approach to power. Well, I will wildly disagree on the second part, and I will agree on the first part. Let's

start with the first part. Then we can do the second part. Sounds good. So when you're talking about, you know, going after political opponents and the like, yes, I agree that that is a misuse of executive of authority. Absolutely. 100%. And I think that, you know, I've seen it done, unfortunately, you know, I don't mean to do a both sidesism because I'm condemning both sides for the thing. So both sidesism is typically where you say, it's not that bad because my side is doing it, because the other side also did it. I'm saying it's bad when both sides do it. And so I try to hold steady to the idea that when the IRS cracks down a conservative non-profits under Barack Obama, and I know that happened to people. I know people to whom it happened. That is a major problem. And it is a major problem when the presidents of the United States unleashes law enforcement on his political opponents. Again, I think that you can make the case from the right. And the right has very assiduously made this case that law enforcement has been used on both state and the federal levels in ways with President Trump that were at the best creative. But yes, it is a problem when Donald Trump does it as well. When it comes to the deportation policies there, I will strenuously disagree, and I wish that we had these deportation policies all along.

I do not think that we have a duty to import people to the United States who do not like our civilization, support terrorist groups, do not have any real kinship with our values and have come here to lead protests at Columbia University. You think we should deport people of speech? I do not think that you have the same free speech right as a person who is seeking to immigrate to the country that you do if you are born in this country. And to the best of my knowledge, I don't think that the president of the United States believes that he can deport Ilhan Omar, who's a citizen of the United States and saying the exact same things

as Mahmoud Khalil, who is not a citizen of the United States. Well, how did a green card? You're not supposed to deport people for speech with the green card. Yes, but there's a difference even between green card holding and actual citizenship. That can be fought out in the courts,

but the basic idea that we should... I guess the real thing is that we like Mahmoud Khalil in the country in the first place. The reason I argue with this that we're seeing a unified use of power, right, a unified theory of power, is that from 2020 to 24, there's a big argument that emerges

around free speech. And I don't think that argument, by the way, is crazy. I think that there's a lot that liberals and liberalism has to rethink that it did in that period. We just, the thing where Grand Linnehem, the comedian, who sent a bunch of shitty tweets but then got met at Heathrow by police, that's a problem, right? That's not how that should work.

And I think that, you know, know, it is something that sort of we on the left have to answer for, for having, in some cases, have been enthusiastic about things like that, but in other cases, just decided to avert our eyes, right? If a bad thing was happening to a person we thought was bad, we just didn't talk about it, right? But there was a very principled defense of free speech, including speech you hated on the right. And what I see happening with Trump is anything people, institutions, that he perceives as threatening him. And in many cases, just speaking out against him

or having investigated him or, you know, participated in his impeachment proceedings, you know, with Adam Schiff or something else, he is using what powers he has to go after them, you know, alleging mortgage fraud or cracking down in a million different ways on universities. The thing with the law firms, I think, was an example of that. I mean, when I see...

The law firms is a better example than the universities. We will probably sort of differ on what is motivating different examples, but what I see is a unified effort, right, again, which goes back to counter-revolutionary tactics, right? This is, I think, in some ways, a difference between being conservative being counter-revolutionary to say, this has gotten out of hand, this whole society, this whole place. And what we need to do is use the power of the state to change it, right? When Trump is up there saying that ABC and CBS should maybe have their broadcast licenses revoked, he sees Chris Christie on TV criticizing him, he says he's going to open investigation into the bridge, it's different powers in different cases. They're being very, I think, creative. But it is, to me, extremely unified approach to how do you use the federal government to chill what people are willing to do. And by the way, as a reporter, right, we now have the experience, and many, many people in the profession have talked about this of sources who are doing nothing wrong, who are just, you know, they're just experts on a thing. I don't want to get quoted anymore.

I don't want them to come after me, right? The chilling effect is there, is happening. So I think that the, again, it turns into both sides of them really quickly here because it really does. But I'm, I lived through the Obama administration. And there was significant concern about, you know, the possibility they're getting an IRS audit. The right would make the argument, I think fairly coherently, that the, the mechanisms of law enforcement, particularly in New York, were used against Donald Trump directly. I think in New York. That was actually true.

I said this at the time. I didn't think that was a good case. I thought the case in Georgia was a good case. I thought the New York case. The D.C. case was not a good case. Brought by Jack Smith, that indictment was deeply flawed. I could go either way on the D.C. one, but I agree on the New York one. So, you know, again, I think that when we talk about, and I've said it multiple times now,

when we talk about the grand centralization of power in the executive branch, I think that the idea from some parts of the right is turnabout as fair play. And I tend not to agree with that. But I also think that if there is a gun in the room and you're, then you forcewear the use of the gun and you know the other guy's going to use it, then you look like a fool. And so what we really need to do is have an agreement to go weapons down. And instead what's happened is that it's basically politics is blood sport. And I think that you're now getting this on pretty much all sides. And there's sort of a pendulum movement to politics that is incredibly dangerous. I mean, I think that, oddly enough, we could be living in an era where we see Donald Trump is holding back the thing that comes next. Meaning, I think things could get a lot worse. I think there are a lot of people on the left where things can't get worse. Well, you know, they say it always goes darkest just before it goes pitch black.

My grandfather had a joke, and I've checked it in my family, that I remember it, right? It's the only joke I remember. It's a very Jewish joke where he said, a guy goes to the doctor, and this is doctor,

I don't know what to do. I'm sick. My wife left me, I lost my job. Like, help. Doctor says, eh, smile. At least things can't get worse. So the guy smiled. and then they got worse.

Yeah, exactly. So it's a scary thing for me to hear you say that you think Donald Trump could be holding back the thing that comes before. I will probably disagree with you, right? I don't think we're going to bridge this chasm on some of the individual things.

Like I looked into at that time, the question of the IRS and the Tea Party nonprofits and my read of reading Inspector General's reports and other things was that there wasn't much there. But I think there is something different happening here. There is something to structure as it operate. through a system can be challenged.

There's an inspector general port on what's actually happening at the IRS from somebody independent versus getting rid of the inspectors generals, getting rid of the Jags, getting rid of pushing the career prosecutors who are taking down Eric Adams to resign because you want Eric Adams in your pocket

as opposed to facing court challenges. I think we're crossing lines we're going to really wish we hadn't crossed, like masked men in the streets. You need ICE. ICE has a role in the system. But it shouldn't be masked men. who refuse to identify themselves or authority, et cetera,

that I guess the question I have for you, because I reckon, like, I'm not trying to get you to hold my position. But what's a red line here? When would you say to me, you know what? We entered something different. Well, I mean, I think we already entered something different. The analogy that I've used for President Trump

is that I think that the right has a very different view from the left because the left sees Donald Trump standing over the body politic, prone in the street with a knife in its back, and I say, well, Donald Trump is the murderer. He killed politics. Everything was basically working fine. Donald Trump came along, and he's the guy. You can see, he's standing right over the body. There's the knife, right in the back. And the right says, no, no, no, he's the coroner. He came over here. He noticed the body was dead, and there was a knife in it. And he noted that the body

was dead. Now, I think that he doesn't get credit for fixing it. I don't think the president has, you know, relegated power back to its proper channels of authority. But I think that again... Nor wants to. Yes, I don't think that he desperately wants to. go back to Congress for things. But again, I think that we have been in a different era of politics for a while here. And I think that the pretending that the thing that's happening is only happening right now and it's brand new. I get that. I mean, look, I think that's not true. I wrote a book about polarization. I was on your show for a book about polarization that I published in early 2020. Easy to remember because the tour got bisected by COVID. But look,

like you got Lisa Murkowski, public and senator, saying we're in a time and place where I've not been here before. I'll tell you, I'm oftentimes very anxious myself about using my voice because retaliation is real. I guess, again, the question I'm asking is at some point, I'm not telling you that there was not escalation over time. There has been, right? And there was, you know, liberals saw this George W. Bush this way. You know, I understand. And I'm not trying to get everybody to tell the same story about politics. It's actually sort of core to my politics that they're just going to be different stories. But you can escalate to a point for something tips. So, well, And that's sort of what I see happening here.

And I guess I'm asking you, if you don't see it as having happened yet, when would be the thing where, like, instead of the book being, well, there are lions and scavengers and my hope is Donald Trump is like getting the lions out, you're like, oh shit. What is your oh shit moment? I mean, again, I think the book is largely a recognition that we're in the ocean moment. We've been in the ocean moment for quite a time. I mean, I think that the aggregation of power to a centralized authority is an outgrowth of a grievance-based politics that is a, been growing inside the United States and the West for decades. I do not think that these two things are disconnected. I mean, all centralized politics of the 30s, if we're going to do that analogy, is rooted in grievance-based politics. That's what it was. Nazism was grievance-based politics.

Mussolini fascism was grievance-based politics. Japanese fascism was grievance-based politics. And, you know, that politics goes awry very, very easily. And it typically results in people who believe that if you give enough power to one mode of the government, it will do your bidding for you. And that's a very, very scary thing. And I think the only way to fix that, is to do a few things on the personal level to actually stop treating it as empathetic or virtuous to tell people that their grievances are because of the system that must be completely wrecked.

I think that's a huge mistake. And then on a political level, I think that we ought to discuss how exactly the sides go weapons down. So a proposal that was made by my friend Jeremy Boring that I think is actually quite smart. I happen to be a fan of the filibuster. Now, I know Democrats right now are a fan of the filibuster

because it's useful to them. And presumably, if they win the Senate back, they will no longer be fans of the filibuster. I'm a long time not fan of the filibuster. Right. So I'm a fan of the filibuster because if you actually wish for there to be any form of slowing in the system or gridlock in the system, which I'm a fan of gridlock in the system. I think gridlock is actually quite a good thing. I think that the American people should be told, no, an awful lot. And that's why the Constitution is very complex and designed specifically in order to create federal gridlock. So if you're a fan

of the filibuster, I understand you're not. I am. What the Senate should do is they should say, let's do a constitutional amendment to enshrine the filibuster. I think that the attempt to do a convention of states in order to enshrine the principle that Congress is responsible for significantly more of our policy than the president. That would be a very good thing. I think the thing that the founders didn't game for, they figured ambition would check ambition. They didn't figure that electoral ambition would check actual power ambition. So let's talk about the founders didn't.

Because I think this is actually an interesting place to explore. I'm not a fan of the filibuster. But one of the reasons, I think, is sort of not dissimilar from why you are a fan of it, which is, I wrote this piece in Newsweek, many owners of Newsweek ago. And the argument I made was that gridlock is actually a better metaphor for what happens in Congress than people think. Because in gridlock, things don't just stop moving. Everybody starts to take side streets. And what the filibuster does is it often takes Congress out of the game. But the pressure in the party pushes towards the executive branch, right?

So to do this on the Democratic side, you get 59 votes, but not 60 for dreamers. Well, maybe we'll just have Barack Obama do it by executive order. Or on the Republican side, there is a delight, I mean, a genuine delight in the amount of executive authority Donald Trump has taken on. I think I have the number here. But in the first, Obama issued 276 executive orders in his two terms. Trump did 220 in his first term and his second term is already at 198. So as Congress gets more gridlocked, what we see is an expansion of executive power, which I actually think is dangerous.

One of the reasons I would like it to be easier to pass things in Congress is I think it would push things away from the executive. So I'm not a fan of a filibuster thing because I don't think the filibuster works the way people think it does. Well, the reason I like the filibuster is because I think it ought to require large-scale consensus to make large-scale change in the country. And I don't know that 51 votes in the Senate and 218 votes in the Congress and the presidency is enough of a consensus in America

to do large-scale change. And you will end up with policy swinging wildly side-to-side. I understand, but I guess the counter argument I make on this is it when the country feels the problems are not getting solved, it creates pressure for somebody who will solve them one way or the other. And so you got to make sure when you said the country should get told no all the time,

I'm not sure the politics you get after a long period of that is actually a healthy one. But let me give a different one of this, right, that I think about a lot. I think the stakes on the Supreme Court have gotten way too high. And I think it's weird that you have lifetime appointments. So you don't have a predictable pace of retirements. Then you have people staying, you know, trying to hold on when they're on death's door for years so they can get a congenial replacement from a president of their own party.

There have been proposals that you want to create a balanced court. And this goes to, I think, a pretty deep idea. about what it would mean to not disarm but try to fix one of the deformities of the system, which is the framers didn't expect highly nationalized political parties. They didn't expect political parties

at all. So our system doesn't do anything to deal with political parties operating cooperatively across branches breaking the interbranch competition that was supposed to have ambition check ambition. So you could do something, like say the Supreme Court was going to have five Democrats and five Republicans on it

at all times. We have commissions. that. And as such, then you don't have this problem that it becomes like the most valuable thing in the world worthy of all political warfare to stack it. Although the legal realist argument will be that you'll end up with preference-based politics anyway. And so even if you have five Democrats, five Republicans, Republicans tend to be worse at nominating justices than Democrats do. And so, you know, one-third of the justices that they've appointed over the course of the last few decades have ended up voting with the liberal camp in the court. And so that doesn't solve your problem if you're a Republican, for example. I mean, the real thing that the founders did not

game for. I mean, put aside everything else. The biggest thing they did not game for it was the insane growth of the centralized government. If the founders looked at the size and scope of the federal government today, they would be absolutely shocked and appalled. I mean, appalled. The federal government was, was it going to be tiny or even tinier when it was created? You could literally walk to the White House and just get an appointment with the presidents of the United States. And so the thing they didn't game for was that all this power would accrete to the federal government. And then from there, it accreted in the executive branch. And so, you know, that obviously, obviously has been a mistake. And the proposal that I've made to my Democrat friends is you don't

like when Donald Trump is president because you believe that he's exerting authority in ways that you don't like and it's affecting your life. I don't like when Joe Biden's president because I believe the exact same thing about Joe Biden. You know it'd be awesome. If I lived in Florida and you lived in New York and we got to elect these things called governors and you could even live in like a local area that better reflected your politics and we could do fewer things at the national level. You know like the Constitution originally intended and then you could do your politics at the local level. It would be amazing, right? This whole subsidiarity thing, genius idea. It turns out that Montesquieu totally had it right. And that when you tried to take a country of 340 million people

and create a unified, the people demand policy, what you end up with is essentially a blood sport politics in which whoever controls the government gets to point the gun at everybody else and then people get mad. And then the next guy comes in and does the exact same thing. And that's a very, very dangerous politics. I guess there's an interesting way that that's very, very pessimistic because I'd say two things. One is that... I mean, that's what the founders, that's literally,

the founders were pretty pessimistic. I mean, they were. They were at times, right? But there's a lot of the founders didn't see, and people say, well, if you plot the founders here now, they would have absolutely this opinion. I'm always very skeptical.

Who knows what, Alexander Hamilton would think that anything. Alexander Hamilton would certainly not be in favor of the executive branch of the federal government issuing thousands of pages of regulation every single year. That would be shocking if you were. We would have to see Alex Ernest Hamilton raised in this time.

But going away from sort of ventriloquizing the founders, I think there's a good argument for more localism and more federalism. At the same time, I don't notice that people are much, much happier, right? Right now, the Trump administration is saying they might declare a national housing emergency in the fall, which I think is a very funny line, right? It's a huge emergency in the fall. I'm not a fan of emergency declarations. But it's because people believe that the housing markets, which are heavily locally controlled, have become very, very very. broken right so you so in a country of 300 socialists here well listen i i wrote a whole book about fixing it i know you but but the socialists and national are different yeah um i am actually

on one level here where you are which is we are going to have to find some pathway forward to de-escalation right i think if the lesson the left takes from these years is we'll see how hard they went we have to go 30 percent harder it's going to be a miscalation take. Like, I think we are seeing, my view is, we are seeing the way this whole thing can break. The whole experiment can break. We're getting too close to genuine violence in the streets for my liking. But I think it's going to be very, very, very hard without trying to figure out some way to say, okay, we have these political parties competing. We have to create spaces where people feel represented, even when they are out of power. And I think the problem is saying, well,

it'll just be that Florida is its complete own polity, and California is its complete own polity. So there are a lot of Republicans in California, man. You were one of them. And then I left. And then I left. I don't think that's where we want to live in community with each other. Just get the hell out. I mean, I'm not so sure that's true. I mean, truthfully, I'm not sure that's true. I mean, again, I think that people. Not a national divorce, but a, but national separation. I mean, localism is what we used to call it. I mean, again, like, treating it as though the, the idea of localism was that you move away from everybody you disagree with. I mean, it kind of was.

That's how the United States began. I mean, that's literally the foundation of the United States. I mean, I've read the founders too, man. It's not what we wanted for ourselves. We thought we were going to live in a community that had a deep set of virtues exhibited by the citizens in order to live together in something that would be diverse and complex. Yes, but the point is that it was state and locality-based identity before a national identity. I mean, that was very clear. Yes, that is true.

And so, you know, I guess the case that I mean, that is ideological. But I, right. I'm not sure that that's an ideological thing, or that it has to be an ideological thing. I mean, I think that one of the big problems is that when you critique political parties, political parties are like John Dillinger. They rob the banks because that's where the money is. Okay? And so if you're a political party and you want to control the federal government, you need to

unify your own party. And so what we've seen over the course of the last five decades, particularly, is the radical homogeneity of the political parties emerge. And so my proposal is what if we throw the ring into the fire? Instead of trying to figure out better ways to control the handling of the ring, what if we just take it and we toss it into the fire and then we actually just go back home to the shire. Like, how about that?

Yeah, I think probably the place where I go off of that is that unfortunately I don't believe there's a fire, right? That my sense is people want action and they often want national action. And so there isn't a way to bind that as effectively as you want. Well, that's incredibly dangerous. and I think that that's exactly what the founders were attempting to avoid. So, you know, I can stop stating the founders. That's what I would attempt to avoid.

There you go. Okay, I think, I mean, I like the founders. I'm happy with citing the founders, but, you know, again, I think that the growth of the federal government, every time Donald Trump becomes president, and he's done it twice now, every time becomes president, I hear from my liberal friends that they are terrified by the prospect of unified national power in the executive branch. And every time a Democrat becomes president, I hear that they are very excited that the president of the United States is going to unilaterally relieve student loans

and use OSHA depressive acts mandate that I have to soothe the federal government to stop. Right? So, like, if that's the game, then it only gets worse from here. on immigration. And I think there are two streams of the Trump administration sort of immigration policy, right? One, you can sort of imagine of almost any Republican administration right now,

which is there was a huge amount of migration during Biden. There was a quite uncontrolled border. And you're cracking down on that. You're trying to reverse some of that. You're going after criminals. And then there's been, I would call it an exulting and crucial. cruelty. There's been sending people to El Salvadoran prisons and Christie Nome posing in front of a bunch of human beings in a cage. There's been the tweets and memes of, you know, a studio giblified immigrant woman weeping as she's deported by presumably border agents. To me, like the masked ice agents thing and like the sort of the ruthlessness of it has been very telling. Like, I understand that you want tighter immigration enforcement, but how do you take the rest of this? So I think that a lot of our politics is reactionary triumphalism, and I think that is exacerbated by the online's. And so, you know, the way that you gain credibility with a very online base is to do some of those sorts. I mean, some of these things you're talking about are memes, right, and are basically designed for online memory.

As far as the actual immigration policy, which, again, I think is a different thing, I think that a lot of its immigration policy. policies are quite popular with the American people. But if the idea is that you're trying to detect in sort of the policy, the animus, as opposed to saying that there are particular political figures who may be trying to make political hay by sort of posing in sort of k-fabe fashion, I think that's an overread. It's funny. I take these things as much more connected. I mean, I understand this is part of the policy, right? If I were to try to defend the Trump administration on this, and I am not a fan of the Trump administration on this, I would say that, you know, to take the line from Adam Serra, the cruelty is the point, that it's a signal being sent

and that the signals leave. The signal is don't come. The signal is we can do terrible things to you, but that the militarization of it, the cruelty of it, I mean, I do think there is a tremendous amount of, this word gets overused, but dehumanization and all this. And I think that, and I think public leaders. I mean, you say it's like playing to the base, but public leaders are responsible for what they play into or don't play. I agree with that. And by playing into very, very, very, even if you believe it's fake on their point, in a way, I would think it's much worse if it was fake on their part. I don't think it'd be worse if it was a naturalistic outgrowth of policy, then I think that that's actually worse. But I will say that if you were

going to try to steal men some of this, and again, I'm not actually a fan of studio shibling, people crying. I just don't think it's good policy. But if the goal is to send out the signal to the rest of the world, don't come because you're not welcome here, then that's succeeding. I mean, the levels of immigration generally have dropped to the country. Now, again, when it comes to legal immigration, I'm actually quite a fan of certain types of legal immigration, not all legal immigration. But there are open debates on the right about, you know, immigration policy in the legal sphere. And you do see some of this k-fabe playing into that as well in weird in ugly ways on acts. One of the things I'm getting at here, I think, is that I actually find the

cruelty as a policy in the Trump administration to be part of what the whole policy is, part of how it is reshaping the right, part of how it is changing the incentives for the people who will come after him. And it's one of the parts of what is happening in politics that I genuinely do find frightening. Like, I understand that people on the right see the left differently than I do, right? I understand they understand Obama differently than I do. They understand Biden differently than I do. But I think that one of the ways in which Trump broke something fairly fundamental in politics was there were some expectations of a certain decorum that all sides, you know, not in every moment, but broadly tried to hold to. Part of Trump's entire appeal is transgression. And then it's like the people running the social media counts, the people coming up behind him, the people trying to appeal to the base, they just keep escalating the transgression. I think it's a mistake. I mean, I think it's a political mistake. I also don't think that it's a good thing to do. But I think it becomes, like, I don't think it stays in this cordoned off place of I'm just running some politics here.

I think it becomes you, right? I think in the same way that, you know, kids become edge lord neo-Nazis online and then one day they actually don't like Jews. I think participating in this kind of politics is genuinely dangerous. Well, I mean, I use the word ugly and immoral rather than dangerous just because I try to reserve dangerous for like actual dangerous. But if you're saying that it could lead to something worse sort of in the way that you're talking about, sure, I am not a fan. I do not like that. I think that it is a problem. And I think that it is infectious, meaning that because it's transgressive and because it's fun, it has made its way over to all sides of the aisle. I don't think it's unique to the right. I mean, I think

that you see it on the left as well. And failure to recognize that it's a problem across the board means that there's not really a way to stop it. So yes, I would prefer that that stop. I do not think that it is good for the soul. And I think it's good for the body politic. And I think that a politics that says that when we have to do hard things, that we should, at the very least, treat them as hard things. Yes, we're determined to do them. Yes, it's important that we get this done. Yes, it's important to take criminally legal aliens and deport them.

Does that mean it's important to have a picture in Studio Ghibli of the person crying? Probably not. Unless you can show me that there's a calibrated reason for doing it, I tend to agree. When you said there's a world that you worry about, where actually Donald Trump is the guy holding back the next thing. Sure. Right, that one day, Bill Clinton, Republicans are not a fan of Bill Clinton when he was around. Now you look back at him.

Now you look back at him with quite a lot of fondness. Yeah, well, at least the second term, right? Well, for reform, good. What is the world you're imagining there? What is the world, like, paint the nightmare here for the liberals, where Trump is actually the thing holding back, the thing they're really going to come to here. Well, I mean, I can pay for the liberals and then for the conservatives. So I'll do the conservatives first because I have a home rooting interest. So the nightmare for conservatives is the economy goes.

South, an AOC Mamdani-style candidate runs on the basis of oligarchy, says that the Trump administration has enriched itself, says that billionaire. Correct. A lot of crypto money flowing into that administration right now. I've made that case on my program, actually, that the systems are totally broken. We need to elect somebody who is going to break the systems even further and then going to reunify them in a very, very centralized way. And so what you end up with is an extraordinarily far-left president with all the executive power that President Trump has exhibited, but expanding it even further than that, with solidified control of Congress behind them.

And so that's the nightmare scenario for conservatives. Is President AOC with a unified Democratic Congress? And what do you imagine that president doing? Well, I think what do you fear that president doing? Radical revision of free market economics through regulation. Yeah, I could see a world on the foreign policy front where a far left president decides to basically surrender not only to a multipolar world, but to an America last world in which the United States takes not only a non-muscular role in the world, but a sort of repentant role in the world, which I think would be wildly dangerous, not only in terms of security, but in terms of global commerce, an unwillingness, I think increasingly to listen to the Supreme Court, I do think that the one breaking point that

everybody has stopped short of, including the Trump administration, as we've discussed, is just saying to the Supreme Court, screw up, we're doing what we want, right? I do think that we are on the verge of somebody trying to challenge that, right? And I think that when that happens, that's like all hell breaks loose. If Supreme Court orders do not hold, then you could see the kinds of crackdowns on free speech that you see in Great Britain or that you've seen in Canada. You could see a restoration of particularistic regulations designed to benefit certain groups explicitly at the expense of other groups.

All of this, I think, would be really quite terrible. Right now, people on the left are worried that Trump doesn't care what Chicago wants. But this is one of the reasons why I'm not actually in favor of the president violating the Posse Comitatis Act is one thing to, you know, back up ICE in pursuing some legitimate federal interest. It's another thing to police crime in Chicago, even if you don't like crime in Chicago, which nobody likes crime in Chicago. So that's sort of the nightmare scenario from the right. The nightmare scenario from the left, it depends on, you know, where you are on the left, because, again, there's a horseshoe theory where some of the left agrees with some of the right. So I'm kind of giving you the nightmare scenario from my perspective on both right and left. For a mainstream Democrat, right?

For a mainstream Democrat. Where Donald Trump turns out to not be the worst thing behind the door. Right. I think that, you know, you could probably describe this better than I would. Think of a Donald Trump unbound by the Supreme Court. Think of a Donald Trump-like character. Because, again, I agree with much of his agenda. But imagine the agenda that you hate most, but being effectuated by the executive branch

completely without any sort of checks and balances. What would that look like to you? I can tell you that as a traditional conservative, who is, you know, Hawkeshawn foreign policy, many of the worries that I have about the left apply also to the right, right? I think that there's a world where the next thing that arises on the right is a sort of conspiratorial grievance-based policy. I was going to say that if I were going to do it, I would say that Donald Trump, whatever his views, whatever moment he thinks America was great in, the thing that has emerged behind him, you would know what it's like to be young on the right right now better than I would.

But when I talked to a lot of people I've known on the right for a long time, they seem pretty concerned, even the populists, about what it's like being a 23-year-old rightist in the YouTube comments, right? But there's a real sort of rise of the Groyper's, of Nick Fuentes, of, you know, that we've moved from a, you know, decade ago we might have talked about Yuval Levin. It's like a central intellectual right figure. And, you know, we've moved to Bronze Age Pervert. and that Trump is not, he does not come out of an ideological hot house. No, he does not actually. He has his own intuitions.

This is right. The people coming behind him do. So I totally agree. This I actually very much agree with. So I think that the president, what's unique about Trump, and this is why whenever people are talking about him is sort of like the crisis level figure, oh my God, he's going to be, Donald Trump is non-ideological.

He is effectively a pragmatist. The way that I have described him before is that he is heterodox, but reactive to circumstance. So, for example, you know, as I said earlier, I have been a supporter of continuing to fund Ukraine. That was not a traditional kind of Trumpist position during the election cycle. And President Trump put his hand in the Putin fire.

It got burned, and he continued to support Ukraine. Right. And so that is him trying anything and not working and him backing off the thing, right? The way that the left characterizes Trump with regard to tariffs, right, the sort of taco thing where Trump always chickens out. Another way to describe that is he tries a thing. If it doesn't work out,

then he stops trying the thing, right? And so this sort of idea that Donald Trump is this ideological monster dedicated to wrecking all of the things. Like, that's not right. Donald Trump tries things, and if it doesn't work, he kind of untries things, and then he sticks his hand in the fire, and then he takes his hand out of the fire.

You can create algorithms to trade based on this sort of stuff, right? And so I think that the thing that both you and I are saying, which is the centralization of power in the executive branch, if in the hands of a true ideologue could be a dangerous thing. I think that's right. I mean, one of the things to remember about the 1930s, and again, people keep citing the 1930s, is that the mechanisms of power pre-existed

the people who then misused the power. I mean, that's like a real thing. The forcible use of the centralized government in Germany happened under Bruning in 1930. It was Franz von Pappen, who was getting rid of the powers of the various principalities in Germany before the actual centralization under Hitler

in the final enabling act in 33. the sort of, you know, bizarre misunderstanding of history in which, like, there's one bad guy and nothing led up to the bad guy is not right. And I fear that we're coming to a point where the dominance of a grievance-based politics, and this is why, as you say, I'm assiduously avoiding right and left in this book,

because of this, a grievance-based politics that says that America at a fundamental level, the things that have made America awesome and prosperous and a good force in the world, that those things are actually bad and that those things need to be torn away, that American history has to be seen as a series of actual bizarre conspiracies

complete with brainwashing of the American population. We didn't actually win World War II. We didn't actually land on the moon. You know, was America actually founded on slavery and not on the basis of the Declaration of Independence? That's all of a piece. And when that becomes the dominant ideology of the American people,

that our problem is the system, then the next thing that happens is not something that anybody of traditional bent is going to like. And the Internet makes all of this so much worse. It's so much worse. Because it used to be that we used to interact with human beings, right?

As I've said many times on the show, like we all need to go out and touch grass, like go and talk to another human being. And it turns out that most human beings are actually not in the mold of the comment section on YouTube, either left or right. But the problem is that politicians particularly

now use the comments on YouTube as a proxy for what public opinion says. They use retweets as a proxy for a public opinion says. And the way that they use... Twitter is not real life, but they sure confuse it with such. In some ways, I feel like the thing

you are saying behind a bunch of this is that the thing you fear behind the door, that's Tucker Carlson's right. The thing about Trump and the reason why he could be the end of something and, you know, what could come next could be completely different, is any attempt, and the left has been trying to do this, some parts of the right, too, to philosophize Trump. It's a fool's Aaron.

You cannot philosophize Trump. There is no Trumpism. There is just Trump. There is no Dana-only Zool. And so what you've seen is an attempt to turn Trumpism into a theory of economic disempowerment, which I think is actually quite wrong. Because Donald Trump quite likes hanging out with, as it turns out, people in Silicon Valley and crypto bros and people who he thinks of his innovators. But at the same time, he'll yell at China about how our manufacturing base is being emptied out. As you say, he contains multitudes. But I think that whatever comes next is not going to. It's a good place, Dan. Always our final question. What are three books you recommend to the audience? So, Marian Tupi has a great book called Super Abundance. It's not meant to, like, overcome your abundance book. It was preexisted, your book on abundance.

in which he discusses sort of the progress of economics over time. And I think it's a really important book because I think it's important that we'd be grateful for our civilization. And I think that we'd be accurate about the great positive movement in economics that has actually happened

over the course of the last 40 years. And one of the great kind of grievance-based culture points and economics points is the idea that you're worse off than your parents were, your grandparents were, and it's just nonsense. It's not true. So super abundance by Marianne Tupy

is, I think, a really informative and useful read. Again, I'll go classical here. I think that democracy in America by Detokeville is still the best description of what America is and in many ways ought to be. The Mansfield translation is the best version of it. It's really terrific.

And maybe I'll go with the Constitution of Liberty by F.A. Hayek, which is not a complete statement of kind of where I am politically, but I think that it is a good statement of the evolutionary basis of liberty and why checks and balances are necessary in order to preserve that liberty. Ben Shapiro. Thank you very much.

Thanks so much. This episode of Theosokane show is produced by Annie Galvin and Elias Isquith. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris. Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Gelb, with additional mixing by Amman Soota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Marie Cassione, Marina King, Roland Hu, Kristen Lynn, Jack McCortick, and Jan Kobel. Original music by Carol Sabarro, Sonia Herrero, and Pat McCusker.

Audience Strategy by Christina Samaluski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times opinion audio is Annie Rose Strasser. Thank you.