The Ezra Klein Show - The Origins of Abundance

Episode Date: March 21, 2025

To mark the release of our new book “Abundance,” my co-author Derek Thompson had me on his podcast, “Plain English,” to talk about it. We’re on book tour right now, so we’re doing a lot of talking about this book. But this conversation is different. It’s just Derek and me, and we get into the story of how the book came together, and all the people and ideas that influenced us – a kind of intellectual history of the abundance agenda. And I thought the audience of this show might find this interesting too.  This episode of “Plain English” was recorded on March 11.Mentioned:“Abundance” by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson“Abundance” book tour“The Political Fight of the Century” by Derek Thompson“The Economic Mistake the Left Is Finally Confronting” by Ezra KleinThis episode contains strong language. Unlock full access to New York Times podcasts and explore everything from politics to pop culture. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

From New York Times opinion, this is the Ezra Klein show. So this week on Tuesday, March 18th, my book, Abundance came out. I am excited about it. You've heard parts of it on the show and I've been trying to restrain myself from completely overloading this feed with content about the book or its ideas. But I did do this show with my co-author, Derek Thompson, on his great podcast, Plain English. And Derek took us through something that I really enjoyed and hadn't expected to do, which is an intellectual genealogy of the book. How this came to be, both in terms of he and I working together, he and I coming to these ideas,

and all of the other different writers and forces and movements and researchers who helped inform it. I thought it was worth sharing with all of you too. Ezra Klein, hello and welcome. I am thrilled to be on Plain English. What a wonderful and rare opportunity to talk to you about abundance. This is exciting. We're going to answer somewhere between 10,000 and 11 billion questions about this book in the next few weeks.

So I wanted to hold this conversation to the relatively high bar of, what can we talk about together here that other interviewers probably won't even think to ask us? And the first thing that I thought of is that nobody else knows the story of why this book exists in the first place.

So in my personal chronology, the story of this book starts in the fall of 2021. I am rolling off of book leave for a related but distinct project on the history of technological progress in America. I haven't had a very easy time with book leave because as it turns out, writing a book is, among other things, a total pain in the ass. But one of the themes of this progress book that I was writing was the distinction between invention and implementation. Just because somebody comes up with a good idea does not mean that it's going to change

the world. Ideas are cheap, building is hard. And I'm rolling off of book leave with this idea sort of swimming in my head. And in September, 2021, I see that you have published an essay in the New York Times that's called, quote, the economic mistake the left is finally confronting. And you use this essay to introduce a term that you call

supply side progressivism. What was this essay about? Why did you read it? 2021. You know, even when I go back to that essay, you can, you have moments as a writer, I know you do, and where a bunch of things that have been bothering you for a long time, coherent to one thing.

You realize you've been thinking about one thing and not many. And so there are a couple of things floating in my head over the sort of years before that. One is that I felt progressivism had developed a dysfunctional relationship with technology. And this had happened in my view, after the 2016 election, when a lot of Democrats turned on social media and the billionaires who ran social media platforms as prime reasons that the Donald Trump had won, but also, and I don't actually think this next part is wrong,

prime reasons that the public commons were becoming filled with toxicity. And because the leaders of social media platforms sort of represented tech, they had become synonymous with tech, and they were these mega and quite unaccountable billionaires, I felt that the left had, in its anger at these companies, begun giving up on technology.

But then at the same time, two other more positive things were happening. One was the Yimby movement, which was the sort of emergence of a strain of at least at that time, I would call it progressivism centered in California where I was living, which was not just saying we should build more houses. I think this is actually a quite important distinction. And I would really recommend a Connor Doherty's book, Golden Gates, which is just a fantastic history of the Imbiss.

But it was not just saying we should build more homes. It wasn't just like, here's the supply and demand curve. It was saying that was illiberal, that you were not a social justice focused progressive. If you lived in a big economically important city like, you know, San Francisco or Palo Alto, and you were fighting the building of these homes, it had to be part of the self definition of progressivism that we were making it possible to for the working class to live in the cities that were the engines of American opportunity. And I felt the Yimbys were, and I am a Yimby, the most exciting ideological faction to emerge

in a very long time. And I was very involved in climate change policy reporting. And it had become very clear to me that there was only one pathway, a very narrow, narrow pathway, which I don't actually think with Donald Trump, we're all that likely to be on in the way I'd hoped. But at that point, we were maybe on. By which, if we were going to avoid the worst of climate change, it was going to be because we had technologically accelerated solar, wind, and battery technology to the point that we can mass deploy it at a price point

competitive with fossil fuels. And that might actually work. That a politics of sacrifice was going to fail, but a politics built on clean energy innovation and then rapid deployment might work. But we did not have, if you looked at how we built things in America, in blue states, the policies needed for rapid deployment. So we were going to need something like yimbiness for clean energy. And then the final thing, and then I'll shut up with this long thing, was I had moved back to California. I'm a Californian.

I lived in California from when I was born to when I left college to go to DC. I then lived in DC for 13, 14 years, 2005, roughly, to 2018. And then I went back to California and the state, in my view, just was not doing well. And when I looked around at why it wasn't doing well, why did it become so unaffordable, why it had such a bad homelessness problem? Why people were so upset? Why so many people were leaving, right? California was and is losing people. It was really just

clear we hadn't built enough. The things we had wanted to build like high speed rail had not come to fruition. We did not have enough mass transit. There's no functional, I shouldn't say functional. There is no good subway system in Los Angeles. It would be such an amazing city if it had a good mass transit system. But we weren't building enough homes, we weren't building enough clean energy to meet our clean energy goals. The California's problem was not its commitment to justice, but its commitment to expanding supply.

And that was like the set of things like knocking around in my head that somehow cohered into that essay. So I read your essay and I'm inspired by it. I'm inspired by... I'm happy to hear that Derek. That's a sweet thing of you to say. I absolutely was. I was inspired by the substance of it. This fusion of liberalism and technology, which I found important but didn't quite find an interesting way to articulate in an important way. But I'm also inspired by a semantic move that you make. You take this concept of this ideology of progressivism, which in recent years has been

judged and defined on the demand side. Progressives ask in many cases to be judged on how much they spend to make the world a better place. And you do this really clever maneuver where you flip the yardstick. You say, what if we judge liberalism, not by what it spent, but rather by what it built? That's what yimbyism does.

It says, how much housing have you built? Not how much have you spent on housing? That's what yimbyism for clean energy would be for, not just how much have you authorized to spend on solar, how much solar have you deployed. And I'm thinking about it as it meets my own project about this distinction between invention and implementation. And maybe similar to you, there's a bunch of ideas that are swirling around in my head waiting to be conjoined into one idea.

And it's January 2022, and I'm standing in line in the freezing cold in Washington, DC, waiting for some rationed COVID tests because Omicron is circulating. And it's cold, and I don't do well in the cold, and I'm just angry. It's been two years since the pandemic started. There aren't enough tests. And before that, there weren't enough vaccines. And before that, there weren't enough vaccines. And before that, there wasn't enough PPE. And as I'm getting angrier and angrier,

I'm thinking if you zoom out, there's been a supply chain crisis in the pandemic, in the post pandemic era. And if you zoom out again and look at the entire century, it's been defined by a housing crisis and a clean energy scarcity, and even a shortage of doctors. And I write this sort of controlled screed

that says this is a century that has been pockmarked by scarcity. And what if we could fix that with an abundance agenda? I'd write this piece, the abundance agenda piece. And I have a sense now of where the story goes in my head, but what do you recall is the bridge that takes us from this moment to us getting together and deciding faithfully to work on a book together?

Well, a few things. So one, I also was, I was inspired and slightly dispirited by your piece because I read it and immediately was like, oh shit, he cracked it. Like he cracked the right way to think about this Which was this had to be a positive vision it did it my My nature, but definitely my piece in my approach was critique. We are doing this thing wrong and

What I so admired about your piece and about your work broadly is that there was an optimism in it There was what if we did it right? Right, in the same way that you said, I flipped the yardstick on what to judge progressiveism by, I think you flipped the yardstick on what was this about? Right, it wasn't about what we did wrong, it was about what we could do right, the world we could have.

And I don't know, as we were both writing about this, it was just clear to me we were both gonna write books. But also you and I, I think't know, as we were both writing about this, it was just clear to me we were both going to write books. But also you and I, I think share a, I think it feels more common at this exact moment, maybe I'm wrong, but it felt less common to me then. Like a genuine interest in optimism maybe, but an openness to optimism definitely about technology. I don't know if you remember this, but I have a strong memory of this. I think this was probably before

the supply side progressivism piece. But I remember calling you, being like, hey, I'd like us to chat. And calling you like in like 2020 or 2021, I was on Mission Street or Valencia maybe, NSF, just to talk about like crypto and what you thought of it. Because like, what is the position we, like I should hold on crypto,

which seems like it has some modest use cases, but seems like a huge amount of energy around something that does not have like an obvious way that it is improving anybody's lives and the culture around it seems very grifty and scammy to me. But you were the person I called on it because I thought that you would have a sort of openness to the idea that it would be good paired with a politics that would protect you from the idea that

it either must be good or must be bad. And so that was, I think one of the reasons I thought there was enough affinity here when I sort of reached out to you on the broader book idea, because a lot of people are going to write over this period, there was no getting away from the fact that liberalism was going to have to face problems of supply, constraints of supply. That's what the EMB's already were. That's what in halting ways, a climate movement was already doing. It's doing it in the ways it is more comfortable, right? Putting money to build things as opposed to releasing the things

that make those things hard to build. But you could see that we would need to figure out how to build fast. There are a bunch of things here that I thought were just clearly going to be part of the agenda and or already were. But in terms of building a usable politics around it, you know, I thought that you had a orientation and like a bridge to technology and a sort of more positive corporate thinking than a lot of other people. You know, than a lot of other people I could have imagined covering it. And again, I think it's why your abundance essay hit as hard as it did. Because you could see the better future, not just the worst past or the disappointing present. And so to me, that was the bridge at a certain point,

I was like, I'm like, it doesn't make sense. I didn't think for us to be racing each other this, but also, you know, I felt that we would both bring things to the project that the other one wouldn't. I wasn't exactly sure what they were, like for, you know, you never know how a collaboration is going to work out before you do it. But I just sort of had a sense that we were temperamentally, like similar enough in the important ways and then different enough that it could be additive. I'd also say I found writing my first book super lonely.

Like I did not like it. I like being in collaboration. All the great projects of my life from, you know, blogging in a weird way was like such a tight community in its early days. And I want to say here for a moment, like, like rest in peace to Kevin drum, Cal pundit, who was one of the early wonkish bloggers and huge inspiration and, you know, even a mentor to me and to Iglesias and a lot of us who came up after him reflect the work Kevin was doing. So I'm sort of, I'm really saddened by his passing.

But blogging was a real community effort, you know, and that was at the American prospect and wonk blog, like, you know, and I had this wonderful partnership for many years with Dylan Matthews and Sarah Cliff and Brad Plumer and, you know, at my show with Roche Karma and my editor and Redika. I like doing things with other people, I think best in collaboration and communication. So it seemed like a cool thing to do to try to join forces with it. I'm curious what that was like for you. Like I sort of called you and I'm like,

hey, I got an idea. What was your thinking on it? So long as we're really doing the deep history here. Let me answer your question directly just after I reflect in the crypto conversations. If I recall, you called me and essentially said, there's a piece of this technology that many people I consider smart are so interested in

that I want to be similarly interested in. Are you interested in it? And the feeling that I had about crypto in 2021 is for better or worse, very similar to the feeling that I had about crypto in 2025, which is that I think it is historically remarkable for any technology to become or to mint multi-billion dollar wealth

before it demonstrates a use case outside of creating an asset class to bet coins up to the moon. And I'm still incredibly confused by it. And I was confused about it on the phone in 2021 and four years of thinking about it has unfortunately not revealed much more to use a tealianism, a definite optimism about this technology. But it was I remember that those conversations about crypto

were sort of the beginning of our being in touch in a different kind of way in the run up to this project. What I do remember, maybe the day of or the day after publishing the Abundance Agenda essay is that you texted me and essentially said what you just said here on this call. You said, I think we might be circling the same book And you texted me and essentially said what you just said here on this call. You said, I think we might be circling the same book and we could race each other to the finish line or maybe we should write the book together. And I texted you back and said, yeah, maybe we should write this book together.

And I tell my wife, hey, you know, I think I might write this book about abundance, the abundance agenda with Ezra Klein. And she takes my phone and she does that thing where you pull back the text message, you can see the timestamp. And she sees that you sent your text at like 12 47 PM, and that I responded to the text at 12 47 PM. And she's like, you didn't have the forbearance, the self respect to wait 15 seconds before saying yes, you were so desperate to say yes to this project

and in less than a minute. And I was like, yes, I think that, I think this could be like a really fun thing. I do think that we are coming at this idea, at the same idea from opposite sides. Anything else we should hit about the run-up to the collaboration on this book before we dive into the book itself?

Well, as long as we're just doing intellectual history, I wanna just call out. It's nice to be able to do this because I hope we are very generous with credit in the book. This is not just our idea somehow by any means. So, a couple other people I just think were really, really important in this. There was the whole Progress Studies world, which was sort of started by Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison. Jason Crawford has been a big driver of, I think that was very, very influential in the

book you were writing sort of before it morphed into our collaboration. The Niskanen Institute had an awesome paper that was very influential and was a central part of my sort of first piece on this, that economic mistake piece called, I don't remember what the paper was called, but its idea was cost push socialism, which was this idea that it wasn't just accidental that you often had very, very high prices for things that liberals wanted to subsidize, that it was the obvious outcome of subsidizing a good that you were at the same time choking off the supply of. Just to jump in, yes.

The paper is called Cost Disease Socialism by Stephen Telles, Sam Hammond, and Daniel Tekash. Yeah. And Steve Telles, I think, is a big influence here. He's a really, really thoughtful, smart guy, political scientist who I've known a very, very long time. And then at that same also at Niskanen, they've had a great state capacity project under Brink Lindsay, who wrote a book that was in part about, that was very much about abundance.

Jen Polka, whose book on recoding America that came out after and during the period we were working on this, but she's sort of affiliated with them now. So Niskanen has, I think, really been a very important intellectual hub of this kind of work. You know, and then there are a bunch of writers, it wasn't just the Yimby movement, there are a bunch of writers who were doing just extraordinarily great work on, on housing in particular, but, but in ways that generalized. So I think Matt Iglesias just is a genuinely unsung hero of just like forcing the progressives to take

this seriously for a decade, right? He had a Kindle single back when people used to do that called the rent is too damn high. And I mean, I don't remember what year that came out, but it was some time ago now. And he was just really, really pushed that Jerusalem Dempsey's who is at Vox and is now at the Atlantic. And my partner, Annie Lowry is also at the Atlantic. She has done, I mean, covered housing forever. We are always talking about these things, but she had this idea

that she published in 2020 about the affordability crisis. And she published this right before the pandemic hit. And it's like an idea I've never stopped thinking about. And now everybody uses a term, I think, I'm her partner, unfairly without crediting her. Like everybody talks about the affordability crisis, but it's her term. And the affordability crisis was this idea. And again, people thought the economy is really good in 2020. So they weren't talking about its problems. But she writes this piece and says, look, if you look at the things that people really

need to build a good life and a secure life, if you look at housing, if you look at education, if you look at elder care, if you look at childcare, if you look at medical care, there might be others I'm forgetting here. They're all skyrocketing price and have been for a long time. And so consumer goods are really cheap, inflation looks very low. But if you are looking at these things that are essentials to like actual human beings, you can do without a flat screen television. It's really difficult to do without good medical care or a home. There's a huge problem building here.

And then you have the pandemic hits. And so like that piece had gone very viral, but it sort of cuts the, I remember like, it just like, I think that piece comes out in February of 2020, so it just cuts, or maybe even early March, it cuts the conversation over that. But that had always like bounced around in my mind. Then you have pandemic inflation,

which focuses everybody on prices. And then the pandemic inflation recedes. But now they're really looking at prices and the affordability crisis prices don't, the affordability crisis prices don't recede, right? Because that's been this multi-decade building problem. And I think that's a really big part of this. For me, that was one of things that clicked into place. Oh, that was one of the things that clicked into place. Oh, the next era of politics is going to be different. Like we were focused on demand and insufficient demand for a really long time. I mean, that was a problem post, in some ways pre, but very much post financial crisis. But the affordability

crisis is going to define the economic conversation in the post pandemic period, because it is a completely unself-problem. No one even has a really good way to solve it right now. And we're gonna have to think about it and that's gonna have to be supply oriented. So while we're doing just like this intellectual genealogy, and I'm sure I'm forgetting a million people, but I think it's worth saying like,

all these people and many more, had huge parts of the idea is that, as we were sort of like trying to weave things together and think about them were really important. And on the topic of liberals need to care about productivity in a new kind of way, especially when interest rates are high, I would also want to throw out Eli Dorado and Noah Smith,

who I think did really good work on setting the table for a lot of ideas that make their way into the book. So speaking of- Yeah, Noah's idea just is of, what is it called? Chequism? Chequism, yeah. Where progressives only care about the number on the bill, right? Whatever is a bigger number on the bill, a bigger number on the climate bill, that's

better. But without actually following through to be like, how much did that money actually build us? This is great. I think it's a line sort of like, you know, like numbers on legislation don't build things. Like what actually matters is how much you built with it. I've always thought that's a really, not just like a useful concept, but a very true critique.

Yes. Someone asked me recently how my vision of the book shifted from the original abundance essay to the final book, Abundance. And I loved this question. So I want to the final book abundance. And I loved this question. So I want to turn it toward you. How is the book that exists now different from the one you imagined in say 2022? Oh, that's a good question. Um, I ended up doing a lot more historical work than I thought

I would be doing. So I was, I ended up being very influenced by Paul Saban's book, Public Citizens, which as long as we're, I actually I'm so excited we're doing the show and just like can thank all these people. But Mark Duckelman, who just has a new book out, it's very along the lines of ours called Why Nothing Works and it's great. He had written this piece years ago about why it was so difficult to rebuild Penn Station, which sucks. And I think that if I'm remembering it correctly, I think that piece turned me on to Paul Saban's work in the book Public Citizen or Public Citizens, which was very much about the rise of natorite progressivism, the rise of Rachel Carson, the rise in the back half of the 20th century of a progressivism that was actually about

or liberalism actually about checking what the government could do. So there's New Deal liberalism that's about expanding what government can do. And then you have these people like Nader who emerge and say, no, no, no, no, no, government is devastating us right now. It's not doing enough. What it's doing is bad for the environment. It's building heedlessly. It's captured by corporations. And it's doing is bad for the environment. It's building heedlessly. It's captured by corporations.

And a lot of those points were correct, but they build this architecture of legislation and process and regulations and a huge nonprofit movement that exists to sue government and exists to slow government down and exists to force more veto points into government. And in doing that, in following that line of historical work, I think I began to understand something I had not understood about progressivism, which

is how unbelievably insufficient the idea that the cleavage in this country is liberalist and government is good and conservatives think government is bad really is. Like that's just not how it works. Conservatives often do think government is bad, really is. Like that's just not how it works. Conservatives often do think government is bad, except if it's national security government or the police state, in which case they think it's great and like you can just pick up anybody you want. And now I guess on the day we're talking, throw them, have ICE throw them into a jail in Louisiana because you don't like the things they've said.

Conservatives are very comfortable with a government, I think, of terrifying levels of surveillance and police state power. But liberals are very divided in their soul on government. There's a liberalism that wants big government and a liberalism that is terrified of government running over marginalized communities, doing the bidding of corporations, not being good enough to liberal constituencies like unions. And so trying to unearth what was happening that we had chosen to hobble government in these ways, what had happened that this was so true in California, which was a state where you couldn't blame everything on Republicans.

That was something I don't think I realized I'd be doing, you know, when it began. Like I needed explanations for things that I could see the thing was happening, but I didn't understand why it was happening. I'm curious what your answer to this is though. How is it different than, or what did you learn, I guess, that you were not expecting to learn? Or what did you go down a rabbit hole on that you found revelatory? I think the biggest difference between the essay and the book is the level of political

critique. I think that in part maybe due to my own personality, which is pathologically agreeable and seeking optimism wherever I can find it. I did not initially see this book as requiring the depth of political critique of liberalism in the last 50 years that the book that we wrote has. And I think that that critique is utterly necessary to understand the problems of the last 50 years and how to fix them.

I mean, just to pivot off of your point about the degree to which Ralph Nader and the legalism of the 1960s and 1970s changed the character of liberalism and in many ways defined the character of modern liberalism. There's a great line from, what is this, page 89 of the book. This is in the chapter that we have about energy and the way that liberals have gotten in their own way in terms of building precisely what they want to build, say clean energy like solar and wind. The PBS news anchor, Jim Lehrer, once asked Ralph Nader why he was qualified to be president in 2000.

And Nader could have said, no one can make government work better than me. No one is better at understanding how to make government effective than me. But he didn't say that. What he said is, quote, I don't know anybody who has sued more agencies and departments. There was this idea, this identity of liberalism that said that the way to prove that you're a good progressive is to stop governments and businesses from changing the physical world. And maybe that was in some places a responsible response to the environmental degradation of the middle of the 20th century.

But now that our problems aren't what can we stop building, but rather what have we stopped building? The houses and the solar farms and the wind turbines. We need to have an identity shift from a liberalism that's proud of suing government to a liberalism that's proud of making government actually work. Sabin has a great line in the book Public Citizens that you were calling out where he says in the 1960s, 1970s, quote, it was as if liberals took a bicycle apart to fix it, but never quite figured out how to get it running properly again. And in many ways, I never thought of the book project emerging from the abundance agenda as being a book project about identifying the ways that liberalism took the bicycle apart. But I think it's really important to figure out how liberalism took the bicycle apart,

if in fact we're going to get it properly running again. To dive into the book itself, there's any number of ways that a book about liberalism and the future of politics could begin. You could start with culture. You could start with taxes and redistributive welfare policies. We start with housing. Our first big chapter is about housing, the problem of rising housing prices, and the problem of constraints on housing construction in many of the places where people most want to live,

like San Francisco. Why is housing so foundational to your sense of this project? So, I wonder how much we're just going to bore everybody with us, but we eventually had a theory of the book and how to write it that each chapter should be doing three things simultaneously. It should be really good at walking you through a fundamental problem of supply that has been caused or could be fixed by policy.

So chapter one is housing. Chapter two is really built around high speed rail and decarbonization. Chapter three is state capacity. Chapter four is about invention and chapter five is about implementation. So it should be doing something on that level. And you should really, you know, I hope if you read this book, you'll learn a lot about housing You learn a lot about decarbonization to learn a lot about how we build things in America and its legal system You learn a lot about how China captured solar

Technology and the production of it from us and sort of took that over you learn a lot in a great chapter Derek did about penicillin and then it should be kind of giving you like a piece of the history here and then it should be kind of giving you like a piece of the history here. And then it should be giving you a sense of like one of the fundamental ways we have thought about doing things that doesn't work. And so chapter one is about housing one because I do sort of buy into the housing theory of everything as it gets called that that housing is just fundamental people need a place to live but more than they need a place to live or maybe not more but People need a place to live, but more than they need a place to live,

or maybe not more, but alongside needing a place to live. If we are going to have a strong economy, we need to let people live in the economic engines of the economy. One of the things I was most proud of, I think on a book like The Joys of It, given that most of writing a book is absolutely miserable, one of the joys of it is when you come to a really new economic idea, I'm sorry, a new

idea, a new epiphany. And I was really struggling with this question of, well, why should we, why do we care so much how many units we build in San Francisco? I mean, you can live in other places, Montana's not full of people. And the sort of theory that I eventually I think cracked was that the big mega cities are increasingly the engines of the American economy. And they are the frontiers that the frontier of the, you know, we used to worry about the closing of the frontier because we thought it was like this expansive land America had that was the guarantor

of our prosperity. But it's never the land. It's the ideas that emerge in the land. In a modern economy, what matters is being on the frontier of ideas, being able to turn those ideas into technological or somehow commercial or service-oriented artifacts that you can then sell domestically and globally, right? That's how the economy actually works. And then being, then there are things like, you know, that happen that are not high productivity

sectors but really benefit from being near them. Like you make more money as a barber working near the Googleplex than you make as a barber working in rural West Virginia. And this is just an absolutely ancient path to mobility and prosperity. A huge amount of the inequality we cut in the 20th century just came from people moving from poor, more low productivity areas to high productivity areas. And then we sort of threw that into reverse. And now people leave those areas.

The work, like, I actually find I actually find this research so shocking, but people are leaving, working class people are leaving. The high productivity areas to move to low productivity or lower productivity areas because it's just too expensive to live there. There's Ganong and Shoah whose work I quoted in the book. They have this sort of thing about like the janitor and the lawyer.

And it used to make sense for a janitor to move to New York City, and it made sense for a lawyer to move to New York City. Both of them would make more money there. Now it still makes sense for the lawyer to move to New York City, but not the janitor because the janitor can't afford a house, can't afford a place to live. So in gating the mega cities by constraining the supply of housing such that they became in affordable to live in. What we've done in addition to making them in affordable is shut off a driver of opportunity.

You in that chapter sort of quotes from the Raj Chetty research too, that shows people tend to be more innovative living in innovative places. But interestingly, they innovate in the exact same ways of the place they grew up in, right? You're much more likely to, you know, if you're a kid, you know, you're the son of like a, you know, somebody who works in a factory in Northern California.

You're the son of an auto mechanic. You're more likely to patent in computer science because you grew up there, whereas if you grew up in a place that was like big in the defense industry, you'd be more likely to patent in the defense industry. Like, this is really, really good, interesting research. And so we are shutting off, you know, the ways in which you used to have, you know, kids grow up in a kind of ecosystem of innovation and expertise and connections. And we have the research to know that really matters.

And so the fact that like, while I was working on this book, like I knew people who are firefighters who were driven out of living in San Francisco Francisco because the city they were protecting from burning down was unaffordable for them. Right? That just fucking sucks. Like, that's immoral in my view. And so, you know, housing is at the center of a lot. It actually really matters for innovation because cities are engines of innovation.

Like almost all of the major AI research is happening within what, 50 square miles in America? 50 square miles. There's not one big AI firm, not one frontier level AI lab in New York, not one in Los Angeles, not one in Boston, not one in Miami, not one in Atlanta, nowhere, right? It's right where it is because of these egos, these agglomerations of talent and knowledge and know-how, they are really hard to replicate elsewhere. You cannot just do it by force.

You actually have to build the thing and it's sort of a little bit random. And then once it's built, you have to let people be near it. And so housing to me was very, very central because one, I think the Yimmies were the best example of a supply side liberal movement at that moment. And two, it just kind of affects everything else. But then three, you could see what I think was at the heart of a bunch of liberal pathology here, which was the fundamental skepticism of growth and the fundamental idea that was that had taken hold in California among other places, that having more people move to your

city was bad. It was gross. They were like locusts, right? among other places, that having more people move to your city was bad. It was gross. They were like locusts, right? I have these quotes from the San Francisco Chronicle in this period where they talk about people coming there. It's like the people already live there are treated like stewards of the land, the authentic voice of the Bay Area, of Marin, of San Francisco.

And anybody who might want to come now is like a consumptive horde. I mean, these are not like the people writing the My Land column in the San Francisco Chronicle are not like indigenous to the region. So I don't know, that's a lot of answer, but that for me, it was like so much was bound up in housing and to sort of understand what had happened, you had to begin untangling it not just as a supply and demand problem, but as an ideological problem, like as a way that liberalism begun to think

really incorrectly about the places it governed, about their function. You had Michael Bloomberg talking about like, New York is a luxury good. It should not be a luxury good. It's not a penthouse, it's like an escalator. And, you know, so we just really gotten something so wrong there that trying to untangle that,

not just at the level we need to build more houses, but how had we thought about this, such that we had gotten into this situation in the first place, felt really necessary. Thank you. There are a lot of conceptual tensions in this book that I think are very important. Scarcity versus abundance being one of them. And you've really dilated on this right now within the housing market. This idea that in many places, people who call themselves liberals and progressives, and even sometimes people that have lawn signs in their front yards that say kindness is everything,

nonetheless sit in houses zoned for single families and resist and often sue to block the development of affordable housing units that would cast a shadow over their own house. And so a part of this project is redefining liberalism away from the liberalism of the clenched fist toward a liberalism that recognizes that growth itself can be a good. Another really critical tension here that really echoes throughout the book in almost every chapter is the tension between process versus outcomes in government. I think maybe the best way to make this tension crystal clear to people is to see it through a prism that you call everything bagel liberalism. Why don't you do here for everything bagel liberalism what I asked you to do at the top

of the show for supply side liberalism. What is this idea? Where did it emerge from? And why is it important? So I did over the past couple of years, one of my not as good as abundance language, but the best language I ever came up to describe what I was talking about here was a liberalism that builds, which people really like. But often in my own head, I thought of this as a liberalism of the details. What I had come to believe is sort of related to Noah Smith's Czechism concept was that even pretty policy-oriented liberals tended to turn off once the bill was passed, and they didn't

dive into the details of what was happening after it. They tended to be affectively hostile to say the view that, oh, these regulations are really unwise. Or there's some reason we've ended up trying to build a $1.7 million public restroom in a small park in San Francisco. So one of the things I started trying to do was really, really, really dig in

to what was happening in projects that I cared about. I got a email, I got connected to somebody who had helped in the construction of this affordable housing complex in San Francisco called Tehanan. At another point, I ended up looking into pretty deeply what was going on with something called Measure HHH in Los Angeles, which was a bond measure to build affordable housing. It was not built that like, you know, some number of years later at this point had built like a couple thousand units and they were costing about $700,000 per unit, right?

These publicly subsidized affordable like housing units were costing as much as a full place would cost you in Denver. So something was wrong. And I began going to these places and talking to the people who were building the homes or building the complex or people consulted on the building of that kind of thing or the people in government who were working on it. And what I began to realize when I would say, okay, tell me how this got to $700,000 or in the case of Tohan, which was built much cheaper

and much faster, it was done through modular construction, et cetera, tell me how you avoided getting there. And what I basically began to hear a lot about was the layering on of standards, expectations, processes, and additional goals. So it sounded good to have a big preference in the San Francisco contracting rules, first for minority owned contractors, and then that was made illegal by the people of California.

So then it became for small and micro sized contractors. But that was shooting cost up because like one way you get, if you are a very efficient contractor who's really good at building things You're probably gonna get more revenue and in getting more revenue you you actually became someone disfavored By anything that was getting public money to build affordable housing in San Francisco, right? Like we actually were punishing publicly companies for being good at what they did to say nothing nothing of like, if there was like a national company that was really good at using modular construction on an offsite factory to build affordable housing cheaply,

like we just, you just couldn't do that. So they were able to get around a bunch of, you know, there were more things, right? Like there was a mayor's disability commission, which these projects were already ADA compliant, but the SF mayor also had their own sort of like disability agency that had to come in and do its own inspection and would come in and say like, at the end of a project, we don't think these doors are quite wide

enough, you got to change all of them. And like that would cost however many hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars and take another month and a half because you had to find this contractor who could do it and they were already overbooked. And you just begin to hear story after story, right? I was talking to people who did this work in Los Angeles, again, affordable housing, publicly subsidized. This is the housing that liberals tell me they want, right? They don't want this market rate bullshit. They want affordable housing. So here the people of LA, the taxpayers, they put the money into it. So what have they done? Well, because they wanted to lower the amount of money that the taxpayers was paying, what they were trying to basically do is use the taxpayer money, the bond money,

as a seed funding. And if you could use it to seed funding, then it would be like, okay, cobble together other money from philanthropies, from public tax programs, right, that are there to do things like addressing veterans, homelessness, etc. to finish it. So you know, we're in theory, you're stretching the amount of money that the the the taxpayers were offering. You were leveraging it. But when I talked to the comptroller, he was like, Oh, no, we we've made a terrible mistake, right? The guy who was actually trying to figure out how to save the people money.

And I have this quote in there from him, Ron Galpern, I think it was. But he basically says, look, like what they're doing, and I heard this from everybody, is that they're having to cobble together all of these different funding sources. And each one has its own strictures, its own audit structure, but it also wants different things. Like this one is for veterans housing, for homeless veterans.

So then you need to find these homeless veterans, right? This one is for pregnant women who have been in abusive relationships or people with mental health issues. And all these come on their own timeframes and you gotta wait for the funders to make their decision and the timing costs money and then you've missed something else

and so that costs you money and like the people you're gonna contract with, they've moved on to another job. And it was all very well-meaning, like the green building standards are very high for these affordable housing complexes. Somebody, Jasmine Tong was telling me who works on affordable housing, was telling me about, you know, situations where she, you know, that they, the planning commission made them or someone made them put in like really, really high level air filtration. Cause like the affordable housing was near

a freeway, which is on the one hand fine, but great. I want everybody to have really good air filtration, but it was much better than was normally required. And the alternative was these people were living in a tent under the freeway. We were really letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. And of course there were the NIMBYs coming out to things, but everything bagel liberalism was the idea. And it was coming, I'd watched the movie, Everything Everywhere All At Once, which at the center of that movie,

there is like an everything bagel where you truly pile everything onto the bagel and it becomes a black hole from which nothing can escape. And it began to feel like that to me, that we were piling so much on that these things just weren't getting done or they weren't getting built quickly enough or they weren't getting built at a level we could afford.

And so we weren't solving the problem. And then I'll try to wrap this up, but I saw it happening nationally because we had just passed the Chips and Science Act, which I was a very big supporter of, but that at its core is subsidies for semiconductor fabs in the US. And then I noticed that the notice of funding opportunity,

it had all these things about like preferences for minority subcontractors and, you know, did you have childcare on site and what were you doing to increase the percentage of women in your construction workforce? I'm like, does the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing corporation really know how to change the percentage of women in like construction? Like if we want to do that, fine, but just pass a bill that addresses that directly. And there were all these different things, right? How are you going to make this climate friendly?

A bunch of good ideas. I supported them all individually, but we were making this project harder. And we were doing something that might fail entirely. The history of industrial policy is not a history of whenever you try it, it is successful. And so what I began to see was like liberalism had adopted this approach to implementing things that passed, where it would pass a thing and say, we're addressing affordable housing. And then like in all the meetings to turn that intention or proposition into action,

it was larding them up with all these other goals that then was making the final thing fail or making it really late or making it really expensive. And of course, people were losing faith, but also we just weren't solving the problems. And like that was a culture, like that is what not was is currently, it is still happening. That is a bad culture, right? It is a culture where we are like not saying no to people in process, and then we are disappointed in the outcomes. And we need to be working backwards from the outcomes.

Doing this stuff is hard. You need to be focused. The chapters in this book are housing, energy, government, science, and technology. I do think that one of the strengths of the final product is the rhyming of themes. One wouldn't necessarily think that the problems in construction would be similar to the problems in, say, biomedical breakthroughs. But in fact, we have empirical evidence showing that productivity in construction is flatlining or down, at the same time that we have evidence that productivity in biomedical science is flat or down.

The same way that you just pointed out that an abundance, unfortunately, of paperwork is slowing down the construction of affordable housing in places like California. Well, if you look at American science, by some surveys, scientists say they spend between 30 and 40% of their time filling out paperwork, either filing for grants or checking the boxes after those grants are filed or won. And so in many cases, the problems that governance has and the problems that liberalism has developed

rhyme across housing and energy and building and government and science and technology itself. And so I do think it's one strength of the book is the degree to which without pushing on this rhyming too hard, you can see the same problems raise their head again and again and again in place after place. And I do think... Because they're cultural. Yes. Before you ask a question, I want to get you to expand on something that you

jumped quickly because I know you're driving the... you're the host on this one, but I want to get you to talk about this for a second because you drove a lot on things like the NIH and the slowdown in biomedical research, which one a lot of people don't believe is happening slowdown in biomedical research, which one, a lot of people don't believe is happening, right? Ben Wallacewell's in his mostly very kind New Yorker piece, but was like, look at this. We have these GLP ones, like, you know, like how much more biomedical advances do you need at the moment?

But two, at this moment, you have Elon Musk and Doge and RFK Jr. you know now in charge of the federal government and slicing through the NIH, the HHS, the CDC, right? They're putting critics in charge of these agencies. They're firing huge numbers of scientists. How is, how, what is your critique of the way we are funding science or what is the books critique? I guess because I'm at least somewhat involved And and how is it different than theirs right when you when you're seeing them do this and in fact you like We end up quoting research from the guy. They've eventually put in charge of the NIH

How is what you want how's what want, different from what they are doing? I think that the way that we fund science in this country is A, unbelievably important. The National Institutes of Health is probably the most important biomedical institution in the world. B, it hasn't changed very much in the last 70 years. And if you or anybody listening

knows anything about bureaucracies, if a bureaucracy doesn't experience some kind of institutional renewal generation after generation, it's going to build a series of habits that even its practitioners agree are bad. And in fact, the scientists, the practitioners that I spoke to

about the way the NIH works told me pretty much invariably that it was biased against the most important high-risk research, that it tended to waste scientists' time, and that it advantaged conservative ideas and older scientists while we have a good understanding that much of the best work that's been done in scientific history have been radical ideas

from young scientists. I mean, this is absolutely core to a Kuhnian theory of paradigm shifts, the idea that it was not a group of gray beards who came up with quantum mechanics in the 1900s, 1910s, and 1920s. It was people like Einstein and Planck building on a couple of discrepancies that they were finding

in the record to build an entirely new theory of how the world works that has in fact been core to not only the development of nuclear power power but also the electronics revolution. Great ideas often come from young scientists and it is young scientists who say the system isn't working. There's a great quote from John Densch who serves as the director of research and development in functional genomics at the Broad Institute and he told me people need to understand how broken the system is. So many really intelligent people are wasting

their time doing really, really uninteresting things. Writing progress reports, coming up with modular budgets five years in advance of the science. I mean, again, you take so many of the criticisms that you described about the construction of affordable housing at Tehannon and you just change a few words here and there from funding source to public and public housing to, you know, R01 grants and check boxes for scientific funding. And it's essentially the same story. So we have, I think, an urgent need for institutional renewal

at the National Institutes of Health, given how important their discoveries are to improving and extending human life. I don't think Elon Musk understands the first fucking thing about the NIH. I don't think he did any research. I don't think he spoke to anybody about how exactly the NIH works, how it evolved, where it came from, what its habits are, which habits are good and which habits are bad. What I see instead is, I'm not inside of his head,

but what it looks to me like is a pretty pure play of ideological punishment of universities that they think are woke. So they're going after Columbia, they're going after Harvard because the indirect costs are 55, 65% there. They're attacking science to punish the cultural ideas of scientists and not going into the institution of science and renewing it to solve 21st century problems.

So that would be the pretty clear cut that I would draw between our approach to understanding the NIH and fixing it and the Doge approach to slashing and burning the NIH because they have a cultural bugaboo about the ideas of scientists I can I can pick up there, but it's also a Pretty there's a there's a there's a couple questions about the sort of the book making contact with the world that I want to get To let's do it before we have a heart out. So I I don't think I'm violating someone'spoken covenant with our editor Ben, our wonderful editor Ben, by saying that the original publication date of this book was actually last year.

The original plan is for abundance to come out in the middle of the summer of 2024 to make contact with that presidential election. June 2024 and March 2025 are completely different worlds. From a political standpoint, they're practically different planets. And for the sake of putting together- Yeah, you have a kid now. Right.

The kid was born in 2023. So that's the same world. But I guess 18 months is a different world from nine months, certainly on the sleeping front. But for the sake of putting together a readable and finished product, I think we absolutely needed to take those extra months. But every few days, I think to myself,

just how differently this book would have existed inside the news cycle if it came out during, say, a Biden to Harris handoff period versus today, which is an era of just lurid chaos in the Trump administration, how do you think the timing of this book's new publication date deepens its message or complicates it? Remind me again, what the original one was? When were we doing it? I think it was going to be published in the summer of 2024. I don't remember exactly the date. Summer.

Jesus Christ. I think it was supposed to come out just before... Just around that first debate, maybe. Just before the DNC convention. Oh, God. Because we wanted the book to influence the DNC platform. Take it away. Yeah, like maybe May or June of that was when we were thinking, as

I remember now. I think given what happened, that would have been a pretty tough new cycle to enter into. I think that the upside and the downside, I don't know why I call it upside and downside, just the reality of it hitting now is you have two things that affect the way it's going to be received. And not just the way it will be received, I will say for myself what I am trying to do with it. One is that the Democratic Party, which is a party I am first and foremost trying to

influence because I think that I share more of their goals and so they might be open to more of my And our ideas is at a real liquid moment and it doesn't know what it needs to be next time It has exhausted the fumes of Obamaism because that's really where we've been Barack Obama Represented a different tendency and politics. He created a different coalition. He had a really strong governing philosophy. And then after him, you know, Joe Biden, Joe Biden would not have won in 2020 if he had not been Barack Obama's vice president. And now there were real differences

in how Biden governed. I mean, he had a huge influx of people from the sort of Elizabeth Warren movement. They are much more attentive to, you know, monopoly and concentration power. They did a lot, frankly, that I think is pretty abundance-like and helped inspire us in the book around the Inflation Reduction Act and so on. But in terms of the story Joe Biden could tell, it was ultimately the exhaustion of the Obama story, right? He was the sort of the the final the final part of that and then Kamala Harris did not have time to come up with a new story Right and she was in this strange bind between you know me Was she gonna run as a champion of an unpopular administration or was she going to? Unconvincingly try to separate herself from an administration where she was the

vice president, right? So in the end, the loss has I think destroyed that period of the Democratic Party, right? It's done. It needs to figure something else out. And I think everybody understands that the thing it needs to figure out has got to have a lot to do with cost of living, because Donald Trump is not lowering the cost of living and that was the dominant voting issue in 2024. Now, Democrats want to run against Donald Trump because he's not brought down the price of eggs yet. They see that as his real vulnerability. But ultimately, to be a nationally dominant party, they're going to have to have genuinely,

they need to rebuild credibility and cost of living. And so I think that's one way that our book enters into a live conversation there. Then you have Doge. And, you know, Steve Telles keeps needling us that Elon Musk and Doge are what he calls dark abundance. And the point is that we are saying in many ways government is inefficient. I was listening to a clip on Search Engine, great podcast, from Elon Musk's marathon interview with Lex Friedman where he says, you know, building high speed rail in California is basically illegal.

And he is not wrong. He is not wrong about that. Now Musk is going in and Doge is going in and instead of re-imagining what government can do, expanding government capabilities, making government work, he's just destroying the thing. Now his defenders will tell you, oh, this is what he does. He turns things on and turns them back off or turns them off and turns them back on to see what breaks.

But this is not like running Twitter. And he is, when you fire a bunch of really talented people, which they are doing, you can't just turn that back on. They want ideological control of the government. And they have not, you know, I've heard other people say, oh, they're doing zero-based budgeting. That's not fucking zero-based budgeting. When you do zero-based budgeting,

and you try to start from zero and have things justify themselves, you have measures and metrics and goals upon which they can justify themselves. If anybody has offered that in the Trump administration to the people working at USAID in a real way, I have not heard it. In fact, like as Marco Rubio just canceled, I think it was 88% of the contracts, a bunch of the people who were supposed to justify them were told they had more time to do so. And the cancellation notice came before they were even given their opportunity to make

the case for what they were doing. They are not trying to make government work better. They are trying to break government so it is a thing that they can control. But because they are attacking government inefficiency, at least in a rhetorical way, it sort of intersects with us. And my fear is that the Democratic Party, the liberal movement, which had already become, in my view, way too pro-institutional, you know, as you like to point out, they don't, they like all those yard signs, like in this house, we believe in science, they don't actually

mean science. They believe in scientific institutions. They believe in the institutions, right? And when those institutions are not good for fundamental science, like they don't know, they don't care, they don't try to do anything about it. So I'm worried it will push Democrats into reflexive support of everything in government. I don't think I've ever been particularly naive about Doge. Some people I really like, I think were more optimistic about it than they probably should have been. But there is a need for the thing Doge pretended to be.

Right? We actually do need efficient government. I think I say in the excerpt, I published something like, we're sort of caught between a party that doesn't make government work and a party that wants government to fail. And I would like to create or be part of creating some third poll.

I would like a liberalism that is absolutely rip shit if government is failing, but because it wants it to work and will make it work. And frankly, I would like a conservative movement that, you know, maybe has different goals than I do, but actually wants a functional government, not just to retool it as a zone of corruption and ideological mastery. But you know, this is going to be a very different moment. Like we're talking to a Democratic Party reforming itself. We're in, you know, we're watching people try to destroy much of the government that we are interested in, you know, facially

using critiques that sound similar. It's both much more in a way possible for the ideas to take root and it's much more dangerous for them because yeah, you could just get this rally around anything the government does affect that actually would not in my view be healthy. Like I hear Gavin Newsom out there on his podcast and I like that he's doing a podcast. I think it's good he's bringing out MAGA people, but the big news he's making is about, you know, whether you're going to have trans kids in sports. The problem for California for Gavin Newsom to even run for president is housing.

And California is not like you can look at Fred data. It does not have more private housing struts today, or at least in January than it did in January of 2015. That's what I want to hear him confront. Because he believes in more housing. What's gone wrong? Why has it been so hard? Right?

That's like the thing where I want the like liberalism to ask like, why did it fail in governing like not just, you know, some I think in some ways like these cultural arguments are easier for it to have than to actually ask, why are so many people leaving California because the cost of living is so high after years now of democratic rule and in an era where there's not one statewide elected Republican. Like that's what I want to hear Democrats confront. And I worry that Doge is going to give them a way to not confront it because, you know, if you're, it's like easier to be the alternative to people just trying to thoughtlessly wreck and corrupt government

than the alternative to yourself who has maybe not been, you know, running government in a way that is really what people are looking for. Ezra, our friend, Tyler Cowen has this term that I love called a Straussian read. And a Straussian read of a book is an interpretation of the book that is not explicitly inside of the book itself. It's a vibe of the book that you pick up off the page, even if it's not articulated in the letters themselves. And we were recently on a podcast the other day

that made me wonder about a particular Straussian read of this book. The parties, as you know better than anybody, are polarized by education. I wonder what we think of this idea that they're also polarized by personality. In many ways, the character of liberalism that we are trying to shift is overly deferential to process, to infinite listening, and not sufficiently committed to action and outcome.

That's how you get what Nick Bagley, as quoted in the book, calls the procedural fetish of our side. On the other hand, I think a criticism that you and I both share of Donald Trump is that his style assumes a kind of kingly power in the executive branch in a way that assumes something close to absolute power and is inclined to run roughshod over norms

and bureaucracies and laws that exist to channel voices to reach a consensus. This might be a simplified diagnosis, but one interpretation of the personality differences between the modern left and the modern right is that the left believes in language and process and listening and trusts bureaucracies and rules that respect those, while the modern right believes in a kind of extreme centralization of executive power that actively seeks to destroy bureaucracies. I wonder if you see this personality polarization as a live wire in politics right now.

And if so, is what we're asking for, is for liberalism to have a bit of a personality shift, not a personality flip all the way to the other end of Trumpist extreme authoritarianism, but a personality shift that values process a little bit less and values outcomes and action a little bit more. I do believe this. I mean, absolutely. My line on this is that the personality of the right is too autocratic and the personality of the left is too bureaucratic.

And I think that has a lot of dynamics, including by the way, Madaglis has his line, the crank realignment, right? R.F. K. Jr. used to be a Democrat. Now he and the people like him are Republicans. The Democrats used to have like big parts of it that were very skeptical of corporations, even of the government. I mean, when we're talking about this new left, the new left was skeptical of the government, right?

And it was inside the party. And you know, we're trying to unwind some things that it did, but that balance between different tendencies, I think, was important. And as the Republican Party has become the party for cranks, for skeptics, for people who believe in conspiracies, and has attracted both the left and right wing variants of this, right, the QAnon people and the anti-GMO people. On the one hand, that's made the right way too skeptical of systems, institutions, structures. On the other hand, the left has become too rallied in defense of the professional classes

of the institutions they run. Now I think the culture, the governing culture in which you really try so hard, at least domestically, not to disappoint your coalition is more new. I think that the move from the Obama to Biden eras was significant there. I think that the Obama people are much more willing to make hard choices that made people

in their own coalition angry. Obviously on foreign policy that happened a lot with Joe Biden, but I think he was himself a lot less engaged on domestic policy. And that led to a kind of coalitional approach where you're always trying to keep, you know, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren and AOC feeling happy with things.

And right in the end, they were huge defenders of his when, you know, a lot of the party was trying to push him out. And obviously on the right, you needed to hold, you know, the moderates. And so that sort of ended up in this highly consensus-oriented culture. And the other thing is that there is a level, not just holding the coalition together, but

of just believing in everybody's expertise and trusting it. Jen Paul could tell these stories of the way the lawyers will interpret statute more and more and more rigorously in order to defend against any possible lawsuits. On the other hand, Musk and Trump routinely do things that are facially illegal and like, fuck it sue me. I'll take the lawsuit like we'll fight that out in court I'll see you there I got great lawyers. And I don't love what they're doing but if there's one lesson I would like Democrats to take from them and from Doge, it's that a lot of things, strictures, rules, interagency working groups that they lesson I would like Democrats to take from them and from Doge, it's that a lot of things,

strictures, rules, interagency, working groups that they were treating as solid are just norms. Like, you can break a lot of that. I don't want to see these mass idiotic firings, but I do want to see civil service reform. It is too hard to hire and fire in the civil service. That was true four months ago, and a legal way it is true today. And so yeah, like, but I also want to see, I think you solve the problems, you know what to look for.

And I don't think that the, I don't think this is just like a personality type. I mean, I know lots of very grumpy people in democratic governments. I think it actually came to be a view, a view around inclusiveness, a view around what makes a good meeting, a view in what kinds of approaches to governing had created problems in the past. Adam Smith, who's a House member from Washington State, has been very eloquent on this point. And I think that view that approaching government this way, like really trying to say, well, what are the environmental justice groups saying? Like we really need to listen to them. They represent something we wouldn't necessarily know otherwise. And

like they need to be signed onto this if we're going to believe this is fair. That culture, like it was not just a temperament, it was actually a response. It was a response to periods when frankly you did need more of that. And it overgrew itself. Like anything, the solutions of the past become the problems of the present and now you need to swing the pendulum in the other direction. And you need to swing it harder than I think the left has been comfortable with. And the way I know you need to swing it harder than they're comfortable with is we are not

on pace to meet our decarbonization goals. And even in the big blue states that say they want to're comfortable with is we are not on pace to meet our decarbonization goals. And even in the big blue states that say they want to build more housing, we are not building significantly more housing. So we are not achieving our goals. And that's where in the end, what matters is being outcome focused. There are a lot of ways to do process. And there are ways to do process that are very inclusive and do listen to things.

And at some point somebody has to say, does this actually fit the outcome we have promised people? And if it doesn't, then you have to start making hard choices and disappointing people. And like that's what leadership is. And I think there are a lot of people, a lot of democratic governors who want to lead. You can't tell me, Josh Shapiro has actually been very good on stuff like this. I think Wes Moore has been pretty good. I think Gretchen Whitmer has been pretty good.

But you can't tell me these democratic governors, like they don't want to lead. I think in many ways, you've been convinced that they shouldn't, you know, or they don't have the ability to overwhelm the interest groups in their own legislatures that are stopping them from passing some things. But I think that's changing too. I don't think this is all a personality type that we need psychologists to unwind in the Democratic Party. I think it is also a set of ideas that they've been convinced of about what makes for good leadership. And they got overly convinced. And now we actually need a little bit of a return to strong leadership where somebody,

some executive at the end of the day is there and says, I hear you. And the answer is no, because what we have promised is we're going to build these homes. We are going to lay down these transmission lines. We are going to build these windmills and site these solar panels. And these problems we are solving are so important that we are going to accept these tradeoffs. And like that to me is like the corrective we need not to burn government down, but to make it deliver what it is promised. I agree the pendulum needs swinging and I'm grateful that you helped me try to swing it both in the book and in the show.

Ezra Klein, thank you very much. And I'll talk to you in 35 minutes. And vice versa. This has been so fun, Derek. Thank you for doing this. Thanks for watching. We'll see you next time. Bye. Bye. You